The Ezra Klein Show - Why You Can’t Capitulate to Trump

Episode Date: October 20, 2026

If you want to understand the ruins of President Trump’s foreign policy, look no further than Canada. Trump tried to strong-arm America’s trading partner and closest ally with punishing tariffs and threats of becoming the “51st state” in order to extract more concessions.The result? A recent poll found that 41 percent of Canadians now consider the United States an enemy country. Prime Minister Mark Carney is pursuing closer trade ties with China and Europe in order to diversify away from the U.S. And in August, he walked away from trade talks with the Trump administration, barreling our two countries toward a Jan. 1 deadline when huge new tariffs will go into effect.Trump’s theory of power appears to have failed here because Canada — even though it’s the weaker party — simply refused to capitulate. There’s a broader lesson in that.Chrystia Freeland served in a number of senior roles in the Canadian government, including deputy prime minister, minister of finance, and minister of foreign affairs, where she was a lead negotiator for Canada in trade talks with the first Trump administration. She’s the author of a new book, “Unreliable Boyfriend: An Insider’s View of Dealing With a Chaotic Superpower, Plutocrats, and Other Complicated People.”Mentioned:“US business leaders are waking up to the perils of plutopopulism” by Chrystia Freeland“How Democrats Drove Silicon Valley Into Trump’s Arms" by Interesting Times“Jamie Dimon: A Plan for the Western World’s Revival” by Jamie DimonBook Recommendations:“The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia” by Ursula K. Le Guin“The Player of Games” by Iain M. Banks“Book of Lives: A Memoir of Sorts” by Margaret AtwoodThoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [e-mail] can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast, and you can find Ezra on Twitter @ezraklein. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.This episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Jack McCordick. Fact-checking by Kelsey Lannin and Kate Sinclair. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Aman Sahota and Isaac Jones. Our recording engineer is Aman Sahota. Cinematography by Bets Wilkins. Video editing by Kristen Williamson, Julian Hackney and Dani Dillon. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show’s production team also includes Marie Cascione, Annie Galvin, Kristin Lin, Emma Kehlbeck, Rollin Hu, Marina King and Jan Kobal. Original music by Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times Opinion Shows is Annie-Rose Strasser. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and Amazon Music. You can also subscribe via your favorite podcast app here https://www.nytimes.com/activate-access/audio?source=podcatcher. For more podcasts and narrated articles, download The New York Times app at nytimes.com/app. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

No country right now better reveals the transformation of the way the world sees America, the way we've turned from ally and partner to bully and predator than Canada. In late August, Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney walked away, walked away from trade talks with the Trump administration. Canada is becoming stronger and less dependent on America. We are already giving ourselves more than they can take away. And we are just getting started. He did so knowing that the retaliation could be ruinous for the Canadian economy. But it's also ruinous and revealing about the shambles of Donald Trump's foreign policy.

The way that what Trump is doing is not getting America what Trump wanted. I mean, Trump wanted Canada to be the 51st state. They'll end up being the 51st state because it's the only way it works. You know, we don't need them, but they need us. Instead, they might become an associate member of the European Union. Trump wanted to weaken China in the global sphere. You know, we're beating China. You know it. China knows it. In fact, President Xi congratulated me. Now Carney and Canada are negotiating deals in agreements with all manner of other countries, but including China, including China, in an effort to diversify away from America.

And so now American Canada are hurtling towards this January deadline in which massive new tariffs will go into effect. So who is this helping? And what does it mean not just for Canada, but for America, for our relationship with our neighbors, and for our relationship with the rest of the world? From 2013 until earlier this year, Christopher Freeland was a member of the Canadian Parliament. She served in a number of senior roles in the Canadian government, including Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs, where she was a lead negotiator for Canada in trade talks with the first Trump administration. And now she's the author of a new book, Unreliable Boyfriend, An Insider's View of Dealing with a Chaotic Superpower, Plutocrats, and Other Complicated People. She joins me now. Krisha Freeland, welcome to the show. It is wonderful to be with you, Ezra.

So a recent Canadian poll found that 41% of Canadians consider the United States an enemy country, enemy country. A Pew poll found more Canadians have a favorable impression of China. than of the U.S. So I guess my question is, how did we get here? That is a brilliant place to start. Thank you. No, it is. And, no, like, it really is because I don't think Americans fully realize what has happened. And I'm familiar with both of those polls. What is really interesting, if you compare where we are today and where we were in 2023.

And in 2023, obviously Canadians considered the United States to be an ally and considered China to be an adversary. And that position has actually flipped. And what's happened is Donald Trump and challenges to Canadian sovereignty and tariffs. That's what's happened. There was a Trump administration before this one. I'm reliably informed of dim memories. How is that different? So I actually don't think President Trump is different.

And I think it's important for people to remember he tried all this stuff in the first administration. And he did a lot of it, right? He did impose tariffs on Canada and allies, the 232 steel and aluminum tariffs. He didn't threaten our sovereignty. But he said lots of mean things about us and about lots of Europeans. Remember he famously threw those candies at Angela Merkel at the G7 meeting? Yes, I was there. He threw candies at Angela Merkel?

Yes, I don't remember this at all. Yeah, yeah, no, no, he did. He did. It was at G7 meeting that Canada was hosting, and the G7 leaders were trying to convince the United States to sign on to what was like a totally historically milk toast. Everyone agreed with it clause about, you know, we together agree on the rules-based international order.

They could not get Trump to agree. He really didn't like the fact that he was the only one disagreeing with the group. Anglo-American, who I think was actually quite magnificent in how she handled Trump, was the one sort of sitting in the middle. And as he left, he took some candies out of his pocket and actually threw them at Angela Merkel. When you say she was magnificent, and how she handled Trump? How did she handle Trump? So I think she got it right.

I'm going to Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, for people who are less up on German politics. Her view, and I think this was shaped by the many years she spent dealing with Ligimer Putin, who could be insulting and demeaning and really try to knock her off her game. He knew she was frightened of dogs, and so he would bring in a dog sometimes in the meeting. So she was kind of used to... Yeah, Putin does a lot of psychological warfare kind of things.

Yeah, yeah. So she was kind of used to dealing with bullies. And her approach, I think, shaped by that to President Trump, was to be what you would say in French is correct. Like to be just cool, calm, not to try to be sycophantic, not to try to curry favor, not also to fight him, but just to be very clear, rational in her approach. And, you know, I think there are leaders who have thought, I can win this guy over. You know, I can give him the shiniest prize. I can give him a gold, you know, a gold watch that's encrusted with diamonds. I can give him the most, you know, I can give him the most, you know, I can give him the most, you know, you know, I can give him the most, you know, I, you know, I can give him. I can give him, you know, I can can flatter him in the most outrageous way. We've had that strategy.

I think most people have tried it, actually. And I think that strategy is in part based oddly on underestimating Trump, right? I think there are a lot of leaders who think Trump is dumber than they are. And so they think, well, I'll just sort of butter him up. I will outrageously flatter him. And maybe I'll agree to some things he wants, but it'll just be on paper. It won't be real. And it'll all be fine.

I don't think that's the right approach. I think a sort of cool, calm, during the first NAFTA negotiations, our approach and, you know, a line I must have said a million times, maybe not a million, but many, many in public was we do not escalate and we do not escalate. and we do not back down. And I think that kind of steady, I'm not going to suck up to you, I'm not going to be bullied by you, but also I'm not going to kind of raise the emotional register with you.

I think that's the way to deal with the president. What does the world in which this goes to full on trade war or continues in full on trade war look like? What can Canada's economy withstand what America is doing? And what is Canada's response? to America, given the size differential? The first thing I would say is I think Canadians are very realistic about the fact that this is an asymmetric standoff, shall we say? This is an asymmetric confrontation, and it means it will be more painful for Canada.

Canadians recognize that. But Canadians also really recognize the stakes. It matters more for us. and I am really confident that Canadians will hold the line. So we have been in a version of here before, and the last time the United States imposed tariffs on Canada, we retaliated dollar for dollar. I was the minister responsible for that,

and ultimately America dropped its tariffs. and the reason America dropped its tariffs was twofold. One, imposing tariffs on our exports to you actually hurt you. That's what is perverse about all of this, is, you know, the notion that somehow America is better off when it imposes tariffs on Canadian aluminum is just perverse. We're actually doing you a favor by getting you to drop those tariffs because tariffs on Canadian aluminum are a tax on electricity. You yourselves are choosing to make electricity more expensive. And you're also- Explain the mechanism there.

Well, aluminum is basically electricity in solid form. That's all it is. That's why Quebec produces a lot of aluminum because it has cheap hydroelectricity. And when you put a 50% tariff on aluminum, you're putting a 50% tariff on aluminum, you're putting a 50% tariff on electricity. The aluminum that Canada normally exports to the United States contains the amount of electricity equivalent to more than 450 data centers, equivalent to the output of half a dozen Hoover dams. It's a lot of power. And you are choosing voluntarily to say, we're going to make that 50% more expensive. Like, that's the whole absurdity of these tariff wars. When Trump says

things we buy from Canada become more expensive. He's taxing things Americans buy. Right. That's the literal. That's like like that exactly. Like that's like the absurdity here is the initial thing that you want to do and you are seeking to do unopposed is actually bad for you. But it's also bad for you. Right. For sure. For sure it is. But you are getting that pain. And one reason, and this is, of a technical reason, Ezra, but I know that you're a wonky person. One reason, one advantage Canada has in a trade fight with the United States, and one reason imposing tariffs on Canada is just so dumb, is we mostly export intermediate goods to you. So the stuff that we sell you is mostly stuff you use to make stuff yourselves. And so by imposing tariffs on the stuff we sell you. Give some examples of intermediate goods. So aluminum is an intermediate good. Very few people go to the store and say, I'd like to buy a ton of aluminum. Aluminum is used by, you know, companies to build stuff.

Another really good example is the softwood lumber that we export to you. Very few people just like buy the wood, but people maybe buy a house or buy a table. Podash, another great example. Farmers buy potash. I grew up on a farm. But actually, farmers don't even buy raw potash, but farmers by potash turned into fertilizer. But everyone uses potash because we like to eat. So, you know, tariffs on Canadian goods make stuff in the United States more expensive. And then Canada's retaliation actually has an impact. It's true that the Canadian economy is small. than the American one, obviously. It's true that Canada is more exposed to trade in general than the United States, obviously. But we actually were your biggest market,

larger than China, Japan, and the UK combined. You guys aren't major exporters, but insofar as you have an export market, your first one is us. So our tariffs can have an impact. So can you describe, because I think it's more for Americans thinking about what it might mean for our economy, much like China targeted essential parts of the American manufacturing process with rare earth magnets and things of that nature, there seems

to be a view on Canada's part that it can cause outsized pain by focusing on things like auto manufacturing. Yeah, look, this is trade policy. 101. It's not something that Canada invented. It's what we did in 2018. And by the way, in 2018, we were joined by the EU, which was really important. And I would love if the EU came on board this time. In 2018, we were joined by the EU and by Mexico. The way to retaliate is you try to do two things. inflict maximum pain on your adversary. And I hate like even using those terms when it comes to the United States because Canadians like really do not wish Americans ill. They just want not to be the

target of unjustified and illegal tariffs. But once you're in that situation, you want to inflict, let's say, maximum pressure on the other side and minimum pain on. yourself. So the minimum pain on yourself is you try to avoid imposing tariffs on the intermediate goods. You don't want your own economy to suffer. You don't want your own manufacturers to suffer. You try to impose the counter tariffs on things that are easily substitutable. And then you try to target your retaliation so that it hits politically sensitive constituencies. So you look at who are the influential senators. Who are the influential members of Congress?

Which are the swing states that the White House depends on? And you try to be sure that your retaliation is hitting there so that people recognize the tariffs are hurting them. So Smucker's Jam, this was in 2018, turned out to be a really great thing that we targeted, made in Ohio. And I had a conversation with Sherrod Brown, who, like, you wouldn't have expected to be a defender of Trumpian trade policy. And I want to be clear, he was not. He is a great guy, was a great partner, and ultimately supported our renegotiated deal. But at one point he said to me, could you guys ease off on Smucker's Jam, please? It's like really hurting my constituents.

And I said, share it with all due respect. That's the point. We want your constituents to be complaining to you. And we want you to go out and say, you guys might lose your job. because of Trump's stupid trade war with Canada. And I'll give you one example of how this is starting to work. So, as you may have heard, there's a pretty important Senate race in Michigan. I have heard that.

Yeah, yeah. The Republican candidate has done an ad where he is drinking Labat's Canadian beer, and he says how bad the tariffs are. drinking a labat and watching the red wings, man, it just doesn't get any more Michigan than that. And here in Michigan, we know that Canada is not our enemy. We need to end this tariff war now. So the Republican guy who, you know, is part of a party that is imposing these tariffs, is doing everything he can, including visual cues to say, I'm on Team Canada's side. So you are central in the trade negotiations between Canada and America in the first Trump term.

How did that resolve? Why did that not escalate into what we're seeing now? Well, it did escalate. But not to where we are now. Not far off, actually. The night before that trade retaliation went into force, President Trump called then Prime Minister Trudeau and threatened him with the destruction of the Canadian economy, if Canada went ahead. He told him he should fire me and called me a nasty woman. And, you know, I really give Justin Trudeau a lot of credit for holding his nerve. And you saw then what you're

seeing now, which is that Canadians understood the stakes and Canadians supported that action. We did have, you know, an intense trade conflict and we got to a deal. And we got to a deal that Donald Trump said, was the best trade deal ever that Nancy Pelosi supported too that Sherrod Brown voted for. So we had the fight and we had a positive conclusion. One thing that really helped was we had Republican allies. You know, people like John McCain, people like Chuck Grassley. Even at the end of the day, Bob Lighthizer, who was the USTR, and with someone with whom I had many tense moments. But at the end of the day, he is a very, very smart, very sophisticated

trade negotiator. And he understood, actually, it is in the interests of the United States to have a trade agreement with Canada. And so I think for those reasons and with those voices on our side, we were able to get a deal. So is this what you mean when you say, say that Trump was not that different between the two terms, but in the first term, he had from your description of this, less control over the Republican Party. There were more independent voices, you know, who had their own power bases, much more so than they are today. Think of John McCain. You think of Paul Ryan for part of that. And then Trump's staff did not treat him in the way they do now as this great man of history who can't.

cannot be questioned and in fact should have his impulses accelerated, that there are people there who are also trying to guide and restrain Trump, even if they agreed with him on some dimensions of what he wanted to do. Yeah, I think that's right. And, you know, I think it's when you are the leader of a country or even a minister, the job of the people around you is yes, to help you accomplish the things you want to accomplish, but also to stop you from doing dumb stuff. And sometimes the way to help you accomplish what you want to accomplish is to say no to you. You know, I would say the war in Iran is a great example. President Trump would be much more effective had America not started that war of choice.

And so people in his entourage had they managed to convince him. him not to wage that war, they would have been doing him a favor. And I think, you know, for sure there's less of that. But the other thing I would say, Ezra, that is a big difference. And you're American, I'm not. So maybe you can explain this difference to me. I think this, a big, big difference is the capitulation to the president seems across all of America, seems much. more widespread than it was in the first Trump administration. And, you know, inevitably, that does seem to emboldened the president. And for America's friends and allies, it makes people ask, is this just about the president or is this about the whole country? I think that was truer

in the first eight months, 10 months, broadly than it is now. I do think it happened. But you think the tide is starting to turn? I don't think that civil society, I don't think the Democratic Party, I don't think the country writ large has been, you know, laying down before Trump in the way that much of it was what you saw with law firms and universities in the first months. I do think the biggest problem is the Republican Party is. And when President Trump has a Republican majority in Congress and you have a political situation, system where the check on the president is first and foremost a Congress jealous of its own prerogatives and committed to the national interest. If Congress is captured, if it is

intimidated, there's no real check. And so it's not like American society, as you know perfectly well. I think an amazing poll is that Prime Minister Mark Carney's terror for Prizals against Donald Trump are more popular with Americans than Donald Trump's tariffs on Canada are. I mean, literally, in a trade war, in polls, Americans are taking the Canadian side. The other thing, though, this is where I think you're a little bit underselling how different Trump 2 is from Trump 1. Because even in the story you tell in the book, the trade negotiations in Trump 1 feel like they are about trade. And they're ultimately resolved through questions of trade. And that may maybe be. true here. But the trade negotiations in Trump, too, seem like they are about dominance, tribute, how affronted Trump is that Canada does not want to become the 51st state in a way that has not been easily solvable through, say, higher labor standards on auto manufacturing. Where that came from in Trump, I think is an interesting question. But that has been a very much more present in Trump 2 than I think it was in Trump 1.

You're totally right. And I think that it was always there. I think that there was always that, I'm not even going to call it latent, but it was more than that. There was always that drive to domination. But you're absolutely right that in this iteration, it has become absolutely. explicit. And I do think that Trump's Washington, you know, their offer to the rest of the world is you choose either to be a vassal or fight your way to being an equal. And for a country, you kind of have to decide which lane are you going to pick. If you pick the vassal lane, then I think be Delsey Rodriguez and, you know, negotiate. And, you know, negotiate. And, you know, the best possible terms of submission. Obviously, that is never the lane that Canada would choose. And so, you know, you said, Ezra, it's harder to know what to do. In some ways, it's easier because although

the situation Canada finds itself in is dreadful, there is a very deep national consensus that given that our sovereignty is actually being questioned, the only thing for us to do is to stand up for ourselves. And, you know, that's the view of the current liberal government. But Stephen Harper, who was a very long-serving, conservative prime minister, said in early 2025, when the issue of sovereignty was first really being raised, he said, Canada should be prepared. And, he said, Canada should be prepared to pay whatever the economic price is if it is about defending our sovereignty. So, and I think, I hope Americans would agree that if they were in that position, that's the view they would take too. And maybe that poll you cited about the tariffs speaks to that.

Well, this feels to me like a place where Donald Trump has, in profound ways, underestimated or misapprehended the psychology of other people and other places, which is the core of the Trump administration's case is transactional. America is bigger. We should get more. Bob Lightheiser, the former trade representative, said to you in a trade negotiation at some point, you say this in the book,

that America has 10 times a Canadian economy, he should get his way 10 times as often as you do. And the thing is that people aren't governed in their souls, as transactionally as Trump is. So you might, it would, I think, be easy to imagine a world in which Prime Minister Carney, walking away from the trade table with Trump, threatening pretty ruinous levels of tariffs on the Canadian economy would be an unpopular move. By simple, he's now the most popular prime minister in Canadian history. Trump very arguably elected Carney in the first place with a sort of

threat to Canadian sovereignty because the more conservative party in Canada had been surging before Trump sort of nationalized and united Canada against him. And I think this is really important because it gets to this question of whether or not Trumpian foreign policy will work, right, whether or not it does what it says on the tin and gets America more power and more wealth. If you misunderstand the way people will react to you, if you think you're going to get them to accept a better deal and actually what you're going to do is turn them against you in a non-transactional way, like you are going to unite them spiritually against you, well, then your foreign policy is going to fail.

Yeah, look, I think you are 100% right. And I would even go further. Like, I think there is this huge miscalculation when it comes to what will the impact on other countries be. I would say the world's capitulation contributed to this Trump. administration thinking it would work because, you know, at the beginning, it wasn't only Americans who were trying out appeasement. So did most of the rest of the world. So it's, I'm not going to say understandable, but it is easier to understand why, you know, when Liberation Day, quote unquote, liberation day was met with appeasement that, you know, the Trump team said,

hey, this is working. Describe what you mean by appeasement. Well, countries accepting the imposition of unilateral tariffs. Shocking, really. And, you know, the Trump administration officials themselves said, as these tariffs were being proposed, that they expected that other countries would retaliate. And most of the world didn't.

The exceptions were China and Canada. That was a mistake. So I agree with your point that beating up on your friends is actually not going to make them give in and do what you want. But I would add another twist to this, Ezra, which is even if this approach to trade were to, quote unquote, work and you were to have your partners really give in and accept the approach that is being. pushed on them by the United States, it would actually be a bad outcome for the United States. So go back to that Leidheiser quote to you, which I find very telling. America is 10 times your economy. We should get our way 10 times as often. The corollary, the obvious international relations realist way of thinking about that relationship,

is a world in which America acts that way. if we are 10 times your economy, and we are much more than 10 times your military, we are a tremendous threat to you at all times. And a world in which the Western superpower is a threat to everybody in its reach, which is everybody, is a world in which all the other countries maybe cut deals with us in the short term, but in the background are banding together to contain our threat, in the long term. So in the last couple of years, I mean two years, Canada has signed a trade deal with China.

Not quite. How would you describe it? It's a... Like, a trade deal is like a big thing, but Canada did a deal with China. How's that? China has begun forging closer trade ties with China and being very public about that. Yeah, yeah. Canada, instead of becoming the 51st state has begun talking about becoming an association. member of the European Union, which I didn't quite expect that to happen. Really? Yes. Oh, I, Canadians very much expected that to happen. Wait, so then tell me more about that.

Why have Canadians wanted to be an associate member of the EU rather than our proud 51st? Oh, my God, Ezra, don't say that. We can't. Canada will not be the 51st state. Let me just be really clear. And we don't, I know you didn't mean it this way, but we do not treat it as a joke. On the EU, this is something that in a joking, not joking way, we started to talk about in the first Trump administration. Because just a couple of weeks before President Trump was elected for the first time, Canada concluded our free trade agreement with the EU. I was the lead negotiator. And what is not widely appreciated is that deal is actually on paper a much deeper trade agreement than the USMCA because it includes government procurement. So Canada and the EU open up government procurement to each other. So we had that foundation. And then when Trump was elected for the first time,

and for the first time started beating us up with tariffs, we had become friends with the negotiation of CEDA, our trade deal with Europe. And we talked in a kind of joking, not joking way, pretty regularly with the EU, about how if NAFTA fell apart, if our trade deal with the United States didn't work, would the Europeans let us be members? And it even got to a point where Cecilia Malmese, She is a wonderful Swedish liberal, was the EU Trade Commissioner. She was dealing with the U.S. I was too.

We would text each other and talk to each other. And we developed this shorthand where if you said, I am in Mordor, that meant I'm in Washington. Cecilia once sent me a text saying Gandalf is going to Mordor next week. obvious to me what that meant, Anglo-Mirical going to Washington. In the shorthand, the elves were the Europeans. Hobbits were Canadian. I didn't mind that. I'm very small.

I don't have huge feet, but in other respects, I'm not dissimilar to a hobbit, grow up on a farm and stuff. And of course, I think you know who Sauron was. So were you constantly going back and forth from the Shire then? Yes. Oh, definitely. I would say like safely back in the shire for sure. And by the way, I felt that way. I felt like that relief. That's the other side of that dealmaking strategy that you force people to begin treating you as a threat, which means figuring out how to create defenses against you. And in the long run, this is classic IR theory figuring out how to weaken and undermine you.

100% correct. I mean, I think that the truth. Trump administration is unintentionally revealing the genius of the post-war American establishment. And, you know, it's actually remarkable what they did. They created an alliance based on the idea that they would be better off if their allies were stronger and more prosperous. They actually invested in the post-war reconstruction of Germany and Japan. They actually, America was in this position of unmatched dominance after the Second World War, and it decided to build an alliance. And, you know, from the position of a country that was not America,

very easy to bitch about that alliance. And by the way, when you guys are not in the room, we always have. right? And these were never truly equal partnerships. America was always first among equals. But America did actually listen to its allies. America was governed by this general idea that this is a win-win partnership, that we will get rich together, that the prosperity of one country, far from, within the group of allies, far from being a threat, is actually going to help us, and that we have an interest in each other's security. And like, wow, such a great idea. And a great idea for America. Like, that is what made America different from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union certainly did not

have partners. It only had vassals. Same with China. That's how America was a distinctive superpower. And when Tim Snyder talks about superpower suicide, what he means is America voluntarily wrecking that. And I think you're totally right. Like part of why this incredibly ill-conceived approach seems to have been pursued is no one thought about the next step. No one thought about, okay, if we do that, what are our counterparties going to do? And the counterparties are doing two things. One is try to become as not dependent on America as possible, disentangle those ties as much as they can, particularly in the military space, but also economically. And that's bad for America materially. You know, countries are going to think really hard

before they buy another F-35 controlled by the Pentagon. Why would you want a jet that Americans control? Europe and Canada are obsessed with having an alternative to Starlink. And so is Ukraine. And so rightly so, you know. So become less dependent. So American companies get less money. They have fewer clients. But then also America has less leverage. And the part about all of this that I find so, it's not just depressing, but horrifying, is the biggest winner is China. Because as with that poll that you cited at the beginning of our conversation, Ezra, we are now in a world where citizens of democracies, of countries that have been U.S. allies,

for generations now believe the United States is a greater threat than China. And this is she's China. This is a China which is more authoritarian than it has been in decades. So I find sort of a world where every country that is not the United States or China is engaged in a balancing act between these two predatory hegemons to be a really. really bad world. And just to add some data to that, the democracy perception index put out a survey of 98 countries. The U.S. was the fifth worst perceived country. We were just ahead of Iran, two spots behind Russia. China among these countries was net favorable. One of the, again, going back to the question of even instrumentally, even from the Trump administration's promises and perspective,

is this working? To the extent the Trump administration had a coherent theory of the case, it has always been about American competition with China, American competition for power, American competition for manufacturing capacity, American competition for geopolitical influence, American competition at some level for hearts and minds. Even now for technology and AI? For technology and AI. Trump has acted like a Manchurian agent. I mean, he has put China in incredibly strong position compared to where it was even a couple of years ago.

And one way in which he has done that is what countries want above all from counterparties is predictability and reliability. China has a lot of problems. Unreliable boyfriend. Unreliable boyfriend. What they are is fairly predictable and reliable. You wouldn't say that's true in deals people make with them? So, look, I think that I totally agree with your observation. that there has not been a president who has been more beneficial for China than Donald Trump.

Astonishing. Astonishing how this has helped China. The economist had a great cover. It said, you know, don't interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake. And I think that's like the Chinese. Yeah. Wasn't it she looking at Trump? Yeah, yeah.

And, you know, kind of shh. And I think that is 100% correct. The only thing that I would take issue with a little bit is I would say, let's not fall for the Chinese propaganda, right? The Chinese line is, okay, you might not like us. You might think it's bad that we oppress Uighurs and Tibetans and that we crushed liberties in Hong Kong. But don't pay attention to that. Like don't be like a Nambi, Pambi liberal. You can trust us as an international player because we're not. We play by the rules. We are not a power that seeks to expand. We're not a power that seeks to dominate. We actually believe in the rules-based international order. So kind of, you know, I might be beating up my wife and kids at home, but, you know, when I'm outside in the world, I'm a trustworthy partner.

And a partner who, and this is critical in what China is saying right now, a partner who is supportive of the rules-based international order and multilateralism. And I don't think that's quite true. And where I think it's not true is, first of all, in trade, China broke the global trading system through intentional overcapacity and through intentional and pretty vicious building of supply chain dominance. And, And that's one of the things that got Trump elected, not the only thing, but one of the things. And that's an area where I think he has a point. And then the second thing is I think we should be careful about believing the Chinese assertions that, you know, they don't want to change us, that they want, you know, the world just to kind of have be, have rules-based multilateralism. China definitely wants to change Taiwan. And China passed a law that gives it extraterritorial authority, as deemed by itself, over political forces outside China, that China deems to be acting against China's ethnic unity. And, you know, final thing I would say is China has been pretty Stephen Miller-esque, the strong-do.

they will and the weak suffer what they must in its foreign policy. The iron law of power. Right, exactly. The only difference is China has done it effectively. So when Norway granted a Nobel Prize to a Chinese writer, okay, and like, that's not something the Norwegian government is the boss of, but China punish Norway. And China punished Norway by banning salmon exports. And Norway had to grovel and cowtimore.

to get them reinstated. When Lithuania wanted to have a relationship with Taiwan, China imposed economic punishment on Lithuania. When Canada honored our extradition treaty with the United States and arrested, but like under pretty nice house arrest in a $5 million dollar Vancouver mansion, the CFO of Huawei, two Canadians were illegally arrested and detained in conditions that experts said amounted to torture.

So China is very good at imposing dominance and vassalage on countries that it thinks ought to obey. It's funny. I don't think I agree with you. I don't think we're saying something different, but I realize where the difference is when you were saying that. I don't think the rules-based international order is a concept that still has meaning. And so when... Maybe it has means. meaning, but it doesn't exist.

Yes. Yes, I understand. You know what I mean? I understand linguistically what you are gesturing towards. Yeah, no, no, like it could exist. You know what I mean? It's not. But the point I'm making about this is that I think that a lot of the conversation is like caught on this nostalgia for a thing that arguably is not existed for a while and definitely does not exist now.

And that what China is pointing the way towards, when I say China is reliable, I don't mean they're reliable as a multilateral partner who upholds a fair and neutral rules-based order. They're obviously not reliable at that. But that's how they pitch themselves. I agree that's how they pitch themselves. I think that they are broadly speaking a predictable counterparty in quite often very unequal relationships, whereas Trump is an erratic counterparty. A predictable predatory hedging on. Yes.

So if you're Taiwan, you know what China wants from you. And to some of you're in Norway, you know what China wants, but you know what are their red lines are going to be, right? This is a bad system to move towards, right? This system is a regression towards older forms of geopolitics that we move past through a lot of blood. But this is the tragedy. Yeah, fully great.

And I think another way of putting it might be China is what, an effective Trump administration would seek to become. That's interesting. Right? Like a predatory hegemon, but that's good at it. And I would include that's good at mercantilism and that is good at running a rent-seeking kleptocratic state. So, yeah, China, I agree with you.

China is good at being a 19th century stodern. totally immoral, self-dealing interested elite at the top superpower. And if, you know, a totally dystopian. Just power interested. I don't even think you have to say totally immoral. They are some things they do are immoral, some things are amoral, something. But they are extremely transactional in pursuit of their own power. It's why I think you're right when you say in some ways they are what Trump only promises to be.

But I think there is some actual immorality there too. Like, it's the difference between abusing your workers just to make money and wiping out the Uyghurs and the Tibetans because you believe there should be one Han people. Do you see what I mean? Yeah. Like, like the objective. Yeah, I don't want to be here defending Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs. Yeah, yeah. That's not my point.

I'm saying is, yeah, I know it's not, but like the abuse, I guess what I'm trying to say here, which I think is an important distinction, is it's not just like a ruthless pursuit of economic efficiency. Oh, that's why I say it's a pursuit of power. And I think this is not a new thing. Longstanding view of particularly large regimes is power comes from enforced social solidarity, which can often mean the extent. distinguishing of difference. Yes, correct. That is a scary thing, right? I do not want to live in a world ruled by China. I don't want to live under Chinese rule. This world where you're caught between China and America is a tough world for everybody who's not China and America and possibly a tough world for America too.

I 100% agree. And the only sort of stipulation I would add is this world where you're caught between China and a predatory. America, right? An America, a Trump America. It's a terrible world. I think that in that world, America is less rich. It does less well economically. And I think America is less free.

You know, the danger for America that it shifts from being, well, broadly, I don't want to, you know, romanticize pre-Trump America. but broadly a rules-based market economy to a kleptocracy where rent-seeking is the way that businesses prosper. And, you know, history is replete with examples of how when you flip to rent-seeking, it can be good for the individual rent-seekers, but it is always terrible for the country as a whole. So I think it's a bad option for America, and it's a really bad option for the country. world's democracies. I'll give you an example of the benefits of a benign America that I came across just this week. I was talking with a Brazilian about the Brazilian elections. And this is a progressive. This is someone who is very much anti-Bulsanaro. And this person said, you know, the problem is even if a miracle happens and Bolsonaro doesn't win. And by the way, this person is

predicting Bolsonaro will win fair and square. But the person said, even if a miracle happens and Bolsonaro doesn't win, there's a real risk that the vote will not be fairly counted. And then what this person said is it would be different with a different U.S. administration. Because in the past, something that helped guarantee fair election counting was a U.S. administration. And we don't have that now. And I think that kind of impact at the margins is something that the world's democracies will really lose. And again, this is one of the reasons I wrote my book and kind of one of my big conclusions is the battleground for liberal democracy in the world is America. And if liberal democracy loses here, it's going to be in tough shape in the rest of the world.

In the first term, if you looked at people like Jeff Bezos, a Mark Zuckerberg, a lot of people at the top of the economy, you know, they were very opposed to what Trump seemed to mean for how to do business in America, right? They didn't like what he meant for democracy. They didn't like what he meant for our openness to immigrants. They didn't like what he meant for our values. But they also didn't like this idea that you would have this transactional pay-to-play system. And to, you know, they were not in his sense. coalition. In the second term, to varying degrees, many of them have been, you know, going all the way up to Elon Musk, who just dumped $250 million or something to try to save Republicans in the midterms. And it has a kind of antecedent in your book from your time in Moscow, post-Soviet Union's crackup, watching the sort of oligarchs takeover.

And so I'd be curious how this has looked to you, played out to you, because in some other world, it's American business executives who are very, very strong in talking Trump down from the tariffs, but I don't think they've been as strong as it would have been in the first term. Yeah, I totally agree with you, Ezra. And it's really frightening to me, actually, because of what I saw in Russia. I don't want to stretch it too far, right? Like, you know, Russia tried to become a democracy in the 90s, but never fully got there. America is arguably the world's strongest democracy. Arguably.

Arguably. Arguably. And, you know, Russia never fully built a really freely functioning market economy. So many, many differences. But parallels too. And, you know, what I saw in Russia in the 90s was the men who became oligarchs were broadly, like, really smart guys. innovative, entrepreneurial, PhDs in math and physics.

In a different environment, they might have become like a Silicon Valley founder. But they were smart enough to figure out the best way to get super rich is to get the government to give you an oil company. It is a way to get very rich, very fast. But then, as they sort of realized this, they decided that they could control the state.

And it started with Yeltsin. But then, as Yeltsin was fading, they needed to put someone else in his place. And it was actually the oligarchs, or at least one of the oligarchs, who put Putin in place. And the thinking was, he will be our guy, and ultimately we will manipulate him. We're so much smarter than this guy. He's like a primitive KGB agent. were like brilliant business entrepreneur guys. But of course, he got the last laugh.

And once he was firmly installed in power, he showed them who was boss. And that was him. That should be a cautionary tale for America's plutocrats. And I think they should be very careful about thinking that they can control President Trump. Do you think they think they can control him? I don't actually think that's what they believe.

Elon Musk? I don't think he thinks he can control. Really? Yeah. Do you think he ever did? I don't know. Trump didn't come from where Putin did, right? Trump was already president when they began, had already been president once, when they began moving towards him.

Trump had developed practically around the assassination attempt, which is when Musk endorses him, this somewhat force of history, great men of history, the, the, these same people were very angry at the Biden administration. It had snubbed them. It had taxed them. It had regulated them. It had investigated them. It had spoken unkindly of them. It had them. It had them. It had them. So in some cases, actually, for a lot of them, it hadn't actually. But we can put that to the side. Their level of fury often seemed to me quite outsized to whatever regulatory tax they're willing to pay. It's not like Biden actually did break up Facebook or something. Anyway. What I think they saw in Trump, though, wasn't somebody they could control so much as somebody they could do business with. I think they know they're not in control of him. But particularly now that he won, they take this system as it is. And this is the real danger of a system mutating into what our political system is mutating into. And the tariffs are part of this. tariffs are, among other things, a tool of corruption, is that this is actually the way to prosper

and attain power in the system. Then in a world where the Trump administration would go after its enemies and give favorable decisions on mergers and other things to its friends, that I think many of them convince themselves that this is just how you do business. You're not doing anything wrong. It is what it is. that it becomes a, some of them are true believers. Musk has a very extreme form of politics.

I don't think they're all true believers. But the thing that is very frightening about capitulation at the level we've seen and the kind of kleptocratic structure I think Trump is trying to build both explicitly and intuitively is that there becomes a competitive logic to further capitulation. right? If you... It's the opposite of the virtuous cycle of collective action. You're anthropic in Dario Amadeh, you try to put limits on what, you know, your system will do through the Pentagon, and all of a sudden you're being potentially declared a supply chain risk and frozen out of all government contracts, right? Conversely, you're one of the other companies and you say, we'll do what you want, Mr. President, and you get all the contracts.

It changes the entire incentive structure in a way that creates this like feedback loop between power and capitulation. But what I also believe has happened, and this maybe came first, you know, the reason that you saw some big business interests get behind Trump before he was reelected, is a sense, or maybe sense is too weak a word, an observation that populist rage was rising in America, that there were a lot of people who felt left out. And an anxiety that that rage could be pretty bad for the 0.1%. And from that comes the view, okay, here's a guy who can harness that rage.

Here's a guy who can be the hero of people who are really unhappy with how things are going right now. now. And the good news is he is not going to be a trust buster. He's not going to break up our companies. He is not going to raise our taxes. He's going to find a different direction in which to channel that anger. Here's the only amendment I would make to this. I don't think that what the business titans were describing here feared. was populism in the country. I don't think they were worried about laid off steel workers in Ohio. I don't think that's the kind of rage or power that they feared.

I've talked to many of these people. I've heard many of them talk to each other. One of the wonderful things about the podcasting economy is you can listen to billioners talk to each other and see them talk to each other on Twitter and elsewhere. X. And what they hated, like say in Silicon Valley, was the way New York Times covered tech.

what they hated was their employees organizing on Slack demanding they put out Black Lives Matter statements, say nothing of unionizing or other more threatening things to the business. And when I think of what they were trying to bring to heal, and many of them have talked about this very explicitly. You know, Mark Andreessen has talked about this when he did an interview with my former colleague Russ Douthat, is what they were trying to bring to heal, what they were trying to stop, was this effort by like another part of society with actual power centers to not just regulate them, not just tax them, but to diminish their social status, to say that what they did was bad and it should change and they should not have the pull or the power

that they currently have. But I don't think they were worried about populism as like normally understood. I think they were worried about progressivism that was coming from other kinds of power centers in society. Sort of agree, but with a plus, plus, plus. So I think that there are kind of two parts to kind of the hurt feelings of the super rich. I think one part is exactly what you talk about.

It's that it's not quite status anxiety as it is... What is your social position? Are you, do you have the main character energy in the society? Should you be lauded in praise? Right. Should the garlands of flowers be thrown at your feet for what you've done? Like are you the heroes?

Because like, you know, there was certainly in kind of Reagan, then Clinton, then, you know, dot com, techno optimism. there was this moment of like, yay, entrepreneurs, inventors, the heroes. And I think there is kind of understandably, like everyone wants to be considered good by their society, a resentment at not being considered good. But I would not overlook Ezra the power of material self-interest. And the anxiety being, sure, like a New York Times column, might write something mean about me. But where that becomes really offensive,

sufficient to politically organize, is all of those mean columns end up electing a Bernie Sanders or an Elizabeth Warren who is going to tax us, regulate us, and break up our companies. Or they potentially into a Biden administration that has Lena Khan

that is actually trying to tax them. Yeah. Like, it's not just hurt feelings. It's partly, hurt feelings, but it is also my economic interest is going to be here. And I'm going to put to you a thesis or a possibility, which is the tide may be turning. I've actually just written a piece for the FT making this argument that I think we're reaching a tipping point and that you're going to see a lot less capitulation because I think there are a lot of people who decided

appeasement was the right thing to do. And I think a lot of them are deciding, first of all, it actually has just encouraged the president to be even more unhinged. But second of all, I think they think maybe he's going to lose. And if the tide does end up turning, I'm going to say the moment that it started to turn was the Wall Street Journal piece that Jamie Diamond published on the 28th of September. So just a few weeks ago, I don't know if you saw this, where he called for a massive U.S. EU trade and economic deal. And he even described it as a big, beautiful agreement and said, this is what America should be doing. I see that is really significant because the piece that Jamie wrote says it contains no direct criticism of the Trump administration, but its actual content is 180 degrees different from the policies the Trump administration is pursuing. And there is also, I think, a really big group of CEOs who actually think global trade, particularly with values sharing partners is a good idea, who believe in the transatlantic alliance, who think Ukraine should win the war with Russia, who think it is nuts to be having a trade war with Canada.

I think there are a lot of business leaders like that. Certainly, I talk to a lot of them. Now, I'm Canadian and also support Ukraine, so maybe I know more people like that. But, you know, I talk to a lot of people like that, many of whom actually donated to the Trump election campaign who are profoundly disappointed right now. And even kind of scared by what they see happening. They're scared by the war in Iran. They are scared by Trump actually siding with Putin rather than Ukraine. They're scared by trade wars that seem about a sort of fight for dominance that Americans don't want. Like, Americans don't actually want Canada to be the 51st state. They do not want to crush Canada or your enemy. Or your enemy. So I think that we may. I think it will depend on the midterms because I think what we've seen from American business is they're going to be on the side of power.

But I think that if they see that President Trump and MAGA no longer deliver at the ballot box, you may start seeing some very different behavior. I think that might be right. I mean, so there's this idea of preference cascades, which are situations where a lot of people hold a preference of the preference. that they don't yet feel comfortable voicing. And so something changes. And then like everything spills out because there's been pressure building up behind a wall. So many people will make the argument

that there was a preference cascade towards Trump in 2024, that many in the American business community and in the American sort of cultural elite and so on had actually become very, at the very least, against the Democrats, right? They hated wholeness. They hated Joe Biden. They hated Lena Kahn.

They hated, you know, the whole kind of situation. But supporting Trump had been culturally looked down upon. Maybe you wouldn't get invited back to your gala. Well, you might get invited, but people would think, like. Think you're a jerk. Yeah, yeah. So people were sort of holding back. And it was once Musk did his endorsement and Andreessen kind of kid.

And then things began all these people who had actually been quietly pro-Trump, at least somewhat. there was this like rush towards it. And then in the Trump era, because there is a real punishment for getting on Trump's bad side, lots of people at different levels of society, but particularly in the business community here, who actually can't stand this. They have the opinions they had in the first term. They think this is grotesque. But they're mostly quiet because it's a risk. even something like the Jamie Diamond op I do describing yes, if you know how to read trade debates

Diamond is disagreeing with Donald Trump but as you say it doesn't come out with a critique of Donald Trump But it's a disagreement at a profound level Sure, but the thing that will tell me the dam has burst is when people say the thing that is true and say this guy is insanely corrupt

and he is harming America's interests and this is a grotesque way of using the Oval Office, and it is against what we stand for both as a country and as citizens, right? That, I agree, I'm glad Jamie Diamond is standing up for decent trade policy, but I see that as a fairly low bar to clear. So, look, yeah, like, agreed.

And I would also just kind of go back to these preference, Cascades, I think part of what was kind of pent up was very well expressed in a great piece that the FT ran right after Trump's re-election, where they quoted an anonymous top banker saying, we can now say pussy and retard again. It's great. Yeah, congratulations, Guy. I mean, also that they quoted him anonymously is so some of these people. And it's so revealing that, like, wow, we were so oppressed. We weren't allowed to call people pussies or retards. Terrible. The oppression that we suffered under Democrats.

But I think there clearly was that. And I guess I do think that there is now pent up among very privileged people, a pent-up appreciation that. the policies of this administration are bad for America. They are bad for the country as a whole. They are bad for the country economically. They are bad for the country in terms of security. And business leaders are starting to see that. Even people who describe themselves as very conservative, who are quite sympathetic with some of the stated objectives. But I don't think they ever were supportive of America. turning into a kleptocracy that was Putin's best friend, that was seeking for Ukraine to lose the war, and that was breaking up the NATO alliance. And that's what's happening. So I want to bring this end back to the U.S. and Canada. If before January 1st, there is a deal, what do you think that deal will look like? What do you think are the core issues that actually could be resolved such that both sides of the. would say, that's good enough. We can step back from this. So the first thing I would say is there doesn't have to be a deal before January 1st.

There just has to be getting into a negotiation and sort of saying we're going to have a ceasefire on further tariffs while the negotiation happens. And I think that would be a good place to be in. In terms of where negotiation goes, what I think would definitely be the outlines of a plausible deal. And this is not just a deal with Canada, actually. I think this could be a deal with the allies writ large, so including the EU and the UK, is America to say, actually, we want to be your friends. We want to be your trading partners. we actually recognize that trade between us is mutually beneficial. It makes us richer. It makes us safer.

But we're concerned about China. And so what we would like to do is to have a common policy on China. I think, and by common, I don't mean, you know, exactly matched tariff policy, but a common approach that has real teeth. Like I think it's important not to frame it as anything punitive towards China. But to create a space where our economies can flourish as well and where we do not have a dangerous dependence on China. That, to me, would be the basic logic of the kind of deal that you could have. What I would love to see happen, I'd love to see two things happen.

The first is the rest of the democratic world should join Canada in retaliating against. U.S. tariffs. You know, it's great to have declarations of solidarity and say we're all friends, but what should really happen right now is a kind of more in sorrow than in anger, united response from the allies who say, this is not acceptable to us. And we're happy to have negotiations. If there are elements of the trade relationship that you want us to work on, we're happy to do it. but we are not going to accept unilateral tariffs, and actually we're going to match them dollar for dollar. And if you had Canada, Mexico, the EU, I'll throw in Japan, South Korea, Australia, just for fun. Basically, America's democratic partners all respond together.

I think you would see real meaningful pressure on the United States in the right direction. So I would love to see Canada not standing alone. The second thing I would love, and this did happen in the first Trump administration, is Americans said to the White House, this is nuts. You have to stop doing this. You need to see American business speaking up a lot more. I would say starting with the auto industry, that's where we build things together. I think the midterm results will be really, really important. You know, I would say Senator Grassley was someone who really had guts last time around

and said to the president, you have to stop this. This is not a good idea. There need to be more Republicans who say that. And, you know, that poll that you cited showing that American, support Canada's counter tariffs, but don't support American tariffs against Canada. What that says to me is that would be a popular position. I think that is a good place to end. Always a final question.

What are three books you'd recommend to the audience? Okay. So my books are, they're two golden oldies, which I reread often, but they're almost like characters in my life. One is The Dispossessed by Ursula K. Le Guin. Do you know it? So I love this book. And it speaks so much to our time, actually. When you think about both the dystopian universe that it describes,

but also the hope for a small, hearty band of people standing for their values. So I love that book. The second one is The Player of Games by Ian M. Banks. Thanks. A... A sci-fi head. Oh, I totally am. I always have been.

I've read sci-fi like since I started to read. And, you know, I think that is darker, but also has light and hope. And I recommend both of those books because I do think, you know, we haven't talked that much about AI. but the combination of AI and a geopolitical order, which is all smashed up, and people having questions partly because of the economy, partly because the geopolitical order, partly because of AI, about like what it means to be human, I think that reading sci-fi is a really good way to sort of explore those issues. So anyway, those are two great books I highly recommend. And then my third pick is Book of Lives, a memoir of sorts by Margaret Outwood. And it's really wonderful. She's obviously a brilliant writer.

The book kind of reveals her to be just amazing person who doesn't take herself too seriously, who is able to laugh. at her own weaknesses and failings, who is not self-indulgent. And since Ezra, we've been talking about how, like, suddenly people are kind of interested in Canada. Her life is a really Canadian story. And reading her account of parts of her life tells you a lot about Canada.

Christopher Freeland, thank you very much. It has been wonderful. Thank you.