The Good Tech Companies - Why Balancer Lost $120M While Better Incentive Design Could Have Changed Everything

Episode Date: November 16, 2025

This story was originally published on HackerNoon at: https://hackernoon.com/why-balancer-lost-$120m-while-better-incentive-design-could-have-changed-everything. Balancer lost $120M while protocols with better incentive design could prevent such failures through game theory and dynamic rewards Check more stories related to web3 at: https://hackernoon.com/c/web3. You can also check exclusive content about #balancer, #smardex, #defi, #web3, #good-company, #hack, #cybersecurity, #cryptocurrency, and more. This story was written by: @ishanpandey. Learn more about this writer by checking @ishanpandey's about page, and for more stories, please visit hackernoon.com. On November 3, 2025, Balancer lost over $120 million in one of the largest DeFi breaches of the year. Attackers exploited a rounding direction error that had existed in the code for years. Users could only watch as their funds drained or race each other to the exit.

This audio is presented by Hacker Noon, where anyone can learn anything about any technology. Why Balancer lost $120 million while better incentive design could have changed everything, by Ashan Pondi. Greater than what happens when a billion dollar protocol breaks and nobody has a reason T.O. greater than fix it, on November 3, 2025, Balancer lost over $120 million in one of the largest defib reaches of the year. Attackers exploited a rounding error vulnerability across nine blockchain network. draining liquidity pools through thousands of microtransactions.

Yet the technical flaw, while devastating, reveals a more fundamental crisis in Defi architecture. When protocols break, users have no incentive to stay and stabilize the system. They run. This article examines how incentive-driven protocol design, exemplified by SMAR-D-E-X's USDAN mechanism, could transform Panicinto participation during crises. The balancer breach exposes Defi's core weakness. The November attack on balancer wasn't sophisticated in the traditional sense. Attackers didn't break encryption or social engineer credentials.

They exploited a rounding direction error that had existed in the code for years, compounding tiny discrepancies across thousands of transactions using the batch swap function. Each individual transaction created a minuscule imbalance, but executed in rapid succession across multiple pools. These fractions accumulated into millions in losses. Trail of bits analysis revealed that similar rounding, vulnerabilities had plagued the Defy ecosystem for years. Hundred Finance was completely drained in 2023 due to a rounding issue. Zana Finance fell victim to the same vulnerability in 2024, one of that year's biggest hacks.

The pattern is clear. As simple attack vectors become scarce, attackers hunt for arithmetic edge cases that auditors miss. Balancer had undergone extensive auditing by multiple top firms and maintained bug bounty programs, yet the vulnerability persisted. The technical breach matters less than what happened next. Balancer's total value lock plummeted from $442 million to $214 million in less than 24 Hourses users rushed to exit. One whale who had been dormant for three years suddenly withdrew $6.5 million. The protocol couldn't pause all affected pools because many were outside the pause window, having been deployed years earlier. User scold only watch as their funds drained or race each other to the exit.

The balancer incident mirrors a broader problem in Defy Architecture. When protocols to peg or face security breaches, rational users have exactly one optimal strategy. Exit immediately to minimize losses. No mechanism rewards staying. No system incentivizes restoring equilibrium. The protocol survival depends entirely on faith, and faith evaporates the moment doubt enters. Consider the Terra Luna collapse in May 2022, which erased $45 billion in value. When Ust depegged below $1, users who understood the mint and burn mechanism faced a clear choice, burn Ust for Luna at face value and sell on the market, Orhold and hope others would arbitrage the peg back. The rational move was to burn and sell. As more users chose this path,

Luna's supply hyperinflated from 300 million to over 6 trillion tokens in days, destroying all value. The problem wasn't just that Ust lacked collateral backing. Terra's redemption mechanism was capped at $300 million daily to prevent a bank run from destroying Luna's value, but Luna collapsed anyway while barely any Ust supply was reduced. By the time developers raised the cap to $1.2 billion, Luna's market cap had already fallen to $2 billion. Users who stayed lost everything, users who exited early preserved capital, research published in Ledger Journal found that Ust Redemption consistently undercompensated

users, with the tokens price on exchanges following the redeemed value users could obtain by swapping us for Luna and selling on the market. The incentive structure was fundamentally misaligned. The protocol needed users to maintain their positions to survive, but offered them no compensation for the risk of doing so. Game theory shows why traditional defy breaks. Game theory provides the framework for understanding these failures. In Nish equilibrium, no participant can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing strategy. Traditional defy protocols during crises operate in the opposite state. Every participant improves their outcome by exiting, creating a coordination failure.

The prisoner's dilemma captures this dynamic. Two prisoners interrogated separately can either cooperate with each other by staying silent or defect by testifying. If both stay silent, both get light sentences. If one defects while the other stays silent, the defector goes free while the other gets maximum punishment. If both defect, both get heavy sentences. The rational individual choice is always to defect, even though mutual cooperation produces the best collective outcome. Defy Bank runs follow this pattern exactly.

If all users maintain positions, the protocol stabilizes and everyone preserves value. If some users exit while others stay, those who exit preserve capital while those who stay absorb losses. If everyone exits, the protocol dies and everyone loses, but waiting means losing more. The individually rational choice is always to exit first. Research on defy mechanisms shows that successful protocols must align individual incentives with collective outcomes. Proof of work mining achieves this by making honest behavior more profitable than cheating. Liquidity mining creates incentives for capital provision by offering rewards, but during crises, most protocols offer nothing.

The mechanism that maintains stability during normal operations fails precisely when it matters most. How dynamic incentives create self-healing systems, the solution lies in mechanism design that creates immediate, powerful financial rewards for stabilizing behavior during crises. This approach doesn't rely altruism or community spirit. It relies on users acting in their own financial self-interest, where the most profitable action happens to be the one that restores protocol health. S-M-A-R-D-E-X-U-S-D-N protocol demonstrates this principle through its dual-sided architecture. The protocol operates as a delta-neutral system where one side holds USDN tokens backed by assets in a vault,

while the other side opens leveraged long positions. When the system becomes imbalanced in either direction, funding rates adjust dynamically to incentivize corrective action. If long positions exceed vault balance, longs pay positive funding rates to the vault side. This generates yield for USDN holders, making it profitable to mint new USDN tokens and add assets to the vault. As more assets enter the vault, the imbalance corrects itself. The greater the imbalance, the higher the funding rate, creating increasingly strong incentives for users to restore equilibrium. If vault balance exceeds trading exposure, the vault pays negative funding rate desto longs. Traders get paid to open leverage positions and borrow assets.

Simultaneously, USDN holders face losses as the vault pays out funding, incentivizing them to redeem USDN tokens and reduce the vault balance. Both mechanisms push the protocol back toward balance through individual profit-seeking. The funding rate itself is proportional to the square of the imbalance between trading exposure and vault balance. Small imbalances create small incentives. Large imbalances create massive incentives. The protocol uses an adaptive skew factor calculated as an exponential moving average

of daily funding rates. Tonshire longs pay appropriate interest for borrowing assets even when the system is balanced. What this means for protocol survival, the difference between failure and recovery during crises comes down to whether users can profit from stabilization. When Balancer faced its breach, users who stayed risked losing more. When Terra-depegged, users who maintained positions absorbed maximum losses. The rational strategy was always to exit. With incentive-driven architecture, the calculation reverses. When USDN faces downward pressure, users who provide collateral to restore the peg earn the highest returns. They're not saving the

protocol out of loyalty. They recapturing profit opportunities that increase proportionally with the severity of the imbalance. The protocol doesn't need users to be heroes. It needs them to be greedy. This approach addresses the fundamental vulnerability that allowed the balancer hacked to cause such devastation. The rounding error enabled the technical exploit, but the mass exodus afterward turned a large loss into a catastrophe cone. If balancer had embedded incentive mechanisms that rewarded users for maintaining positions or adding liquidity during the crisis, market dynamics could have worked to contain the damage rather than amplify it. Consider how this might have played out differently. As the hack began draining pools, users monitoring the system would see

increasing yield opportunities for providing liquidity to affected pools. Arbitrageurs would profit from price discrepancies. The protocol would automatically reward stabilizing behavior without requiring governance votes or emergency interventions. User self-interest would work with the protocol instead of against it. Beyond stable coins. Incentives as infrastructure. The principles extend beyond stable coins. Any defy protocol facing stress- condemned mechanisms that turn vulnerability into opportunity. Lending protocols could increase interest rates for depositors during bank runs, making IT profitable to maintain deposits. DeXs could adjust fee structures to reward liquidity providers,

during high volatility. Collateralized debt positions could offer enhanced yields for adding collateral during market crashes. The key is that these incentives must activate automatically, scale with the severity of the crisis, and provide immediate financial benefits. Delayed rewards don't work because users can't wait through crashes. Fixed rewards don't work because they may not compensate for risk during extreme events. Manual interventions don't work because they're too slow and may never materialize. Research on improving default. mechanisms using dynamic games and optimal control shows that protocols must adapt redemption prices aggressively in low arbitrage scenarios to incentivize speculators to maintain the peg.

In high arbitrage markets, constant redemption prices work because market forces eliminate discrepancies. But during crises, arbitrage breaks down and protocols need explicit incentive mechanisms to fill the gap. Lessons from the balancer battlefield, the balancer exploit demonstrates that even extensively audited protocols can harbor critical vulnerabilities. Multiple security firms reviewed the code. Bug-bound T programs were active, yet the rounding error persisted for years until attackers discovered how to weaponize it through batch operations. Static security measures failed.

What protocols need are dynamic defense mechanisms that activate during attacks, not just preventive measures that attempt to eliminate all vulnerabilities. The former accepts that breaches will occur and builds resilience into the system. The latter pursues an impossible goal and creates brittle architectures that catastrophically fail when assumptions break. Analysis from Crypto Valley Journal noted that battle-tested protocols with multiple audits and billions in assets can still conceal severe vulnerabilities, marking a serious setback for trust in defy. The response cannot be more audits. Audits are necessary but insufficient. The response must be resilient architecture that continues functioning even when components fail. This parallels concepts from traditional financial engineering, where redundancy and fail safes protect systems.

Banks maintain capital buffers, liquidity reserves, and access to central bank facilities precisely because they know crises will occur. Defy protocols need equivalent protective mechanisms implemented through code rather than institutions. Why this matters now, the timing of this conversation is critical. Defy has matured past its experimental phase but hasn't yet solved fundamental architectural problems. Total value locked in defy exceeds hundreds of billions across protocols, but security incidents continue to plague the ecosystem. Hackers stole over $2 billion in 2024 alone, with 61% attributed to North Korean aligned actors according to chain aliasis. We're at an inflection point where the industry can either continue building protocols that are secure in theory

but fail catastrophically in practice, or shift toward architectures that accept vulnerabilities will exist and build resilience into system design. The latter approach doesn't abandon security. ITADs a second layer of defense that activates precisely when the first layer fails. SMARDEX's USDN isn't the only possible implementation of incentive-driven stability. Other protocols could embed similar mechanisms using different technical approaches. The core insight transcends specific implementations. Defy protocols must reward users for stabilizing behavior during crises, making IT profitable to help rather than profitable to flee. This isn't about trusting human nature or building community. It's about aligning incentives so that the most

selfish action is also the most beneficial action for the protocol. It's about turning game theory from an analytical tool into an engineering principle. Greater than the industry needs several shifts in how it approaches protocol design. First, security audits should evaluate not just whether code is vulnerable, but whether protocols are resilient to both known and unknown vulnerabilities. This may ends analyzing what happens when things break, not just trying to prevent them from breaking. Second, stress testing should include not just market scenarios but incentive scenarios. What happens to user behavior during various crisis conditions? Do incentives create stabilizing or destabilizing feedback loops? Can the protocol survive if key assumptions fail? Third, mechanism

design should prioritize self-healing properties over perfect security. Protocols that automatically correct imbalances through incentive mechanisms are more robust than protocols that rely on perfect code and user altruism. The balancer hack won't be the last major defy breach. Arithmetic edge cases and sophisticated exploits will continue to emerge as attackers become more skilled. But the difference between a major loss and a catastrophic collapse lies in how protocols respond during crises. Incentive mechanisms that activate automatically, scale with severity, and reward stabilizing behavior can transform potential death spirals into recovery opportunities. Don't forget to like and share the story. This author is an independent contributor publishing via our business blogging program.

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