The History of China - 05/35: Tiananmen Revisited

Episode Date: June 3, 2023

What does the aftermath of a massacre entail, on the world stage? CIA Memo 6/10/89 - Begins: 2:25 US Beijing Embassy Cable 7/11/89 - Begins: 6:05 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. TD Direct Investing offers live support. So whether you're a newbie or a seasoned pro, you can make your investing steps count. And if you're like me and think a TFSA stands for Total Fund Savings Adventure, maybe reach out to TD Direct Investing. hello and welcome to the history of china six four tiananmen revisited It is here in China, May 35th, 2021.

A false date that I say because in this country, no such date as June 4th exists anymore. This year marks the darkest remembrance of the Tiananmen Square incident yet. For more than 30 years, vigils were held in the free city of Hong Kong to mark the anniversary of this senseless, tragic, monstrous crime against the people of China, and of the ideal of democracy. But not this year. As a result of the brutal, violent, deadly crackdown that stripped even the veneer of rule of law from Hong Kong, rendering it from a jewel of liberty and democracy on the mainland to just another cowed and defeated, strictly controlled police state of China. Those lights of vigil have gone out, probably forever. And so it is with more urgency than ever that I urge those of us who can to not forget the crimes committed by the

government of the People's Republic of China on June 4th, 1989, nor its many crimes and affronts to the rule of law, civility, and even basic humanity since then. Now more than ever, it is critical that the Politburo of Beijing not be allowed to enact its campaign of collective amnesia about Tiananmen, about Tibet, about the millions of Uyghurs even now suffering in Xinjiang, and even strangled in the cradle, Hong Kong City. Today, I will be replaying not only the British intelligence memo, as I have in years past, but two additional primary source documents from immediately after and in the months to follow the incident itself. The first new document is a declassified CIA situation report from just six days after the military crackdown on June 4th, while the second is a U.S.-Beijing embassy secret cable.

Thus, without further ado, I present them in their entirety, and I will be sure to mark where redactions have been kept. CIA, China Situation Report, June 10, 1989. Top Secret, Rough Umbra. Declassified, August 2000. The first two pages remain completely redacted. New Leadership Lineup Deng Xiaoping has publicly met with military officers to express deep condolences over the loss of military quote-unquote martyrs and to congratulate them for successfully suppressing a quote-unquote counter-revolutionary rebellion. Other top leaders present at yesterday's televised session were President Yang Shankun, Premier Li Peng, Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, Politburo member Qiao Shi, National People's Congress Chairman Wan Li, and several of China's octogenarian hardliners. Zhao Ziyang and Politburo member Hu Qili were absent. Redacted. Comment. The appearance of Deng and the new leadership indicates they are now confident of their

ability to remain in power. Although Deng chaired the meeting, the status of his health is uncertain. He may now be sharing power with Yang, party elders, and other military leaders who supported the crackdown. As a result of the upheavals, the military has become an influential player in Chinese politics, and the military's share of the state budget may increase markedly as a price of its support. Redacted. The propaganda line taken indicates the regime hopes to convince the populace that the army acted in self-defense. With Beijing firmly under

control, the military may have decided to return the 1st Tank Division to its garrison to give the capital an air of normalcy. Redacted. Detaining Suspects. Redacted. The Public Security Bureau announced yesterday that students on Beijing campuses have 48 hours to turn themselves in and confess membership in the Independent Student Union. Redacted. Beijing University has hurriedly declared the start of summer vacation a month early. Redacted. In Shanghai, an estimated 150,000 demonstrators have held a peaceful memorial march. Student leaders there escalated their demands yesterday,

calling on the municipal government to lower flags to honor those who were killed in Beijing. Police in Shanghai are out in force today. Redacted. Comment. Redacted. The authorities probably hope to coerce frightened protesters into identifying each other in exchange for promises of leniency, and thereby make it difficult to build an underground organization. Although a hard core of students may try to resist efforts to pacify the campuses, the departure of most students means continued resistance would be short-lived. Redacted. Diplomatic Activity China's foreign ministry today issued a note advising diplomats in Beijing not to travel at night,

apparently in an attempt to hide some of the extent of the crackdown. The note also warned that vehicles should only be used for diplomatic purposes because safety cannot be guaranteed otherwise. It added that armed squads will patrol in and around the embassy areas. Meanwhile, many Chinese diplomats overseas appear outraged at recent events. Redacted. A Chinese representative yesterday told a UNESCO meeting in Paris that he shares the concern of foreigners over the killings in Tiananmen Square. Redacted. End of message. U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable. China and the U.S. A protracted engagement, July 11, 1989.

Classification level, secret. Codename, Exodus. Unclassified, November 1999. 1. Secret. Entire text. Introduction. 2. On 19 May this year, three American naval ships sailed into Shanghai. This was, for us, to be a masterpiece of timing, one day after Gorbachev's trip to Shanghai. The Chinese, in an exquisite balancing act, were working with us to give a clear signal to all, inside and outside of China, that the U.S.-China military relationship was vital and real. The ship visit did no such thing. What queered the Gorbachev visit were masses of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, not our ships. The Chinese declared martial law against their own people in Beijing the day we were cozying up to their military in Shanghai. We had miscalculated on the timing and on the symbolism of the visit.

Our attitude was a throwback to the early days of our relationship, when common Soviet bashing was in vogue. We were not coping with or anticipating current realities. 3. When we did deal with internal dissent in China, it was, for instance, to render a social-political invitation to China's leading dissident to come to a dinner party, which the Chinese authorities angrily blocked. Now that dissident is, quote-unquote, the man who came to dinner. He is with us as a constant reminder of our connection to, quote-unquote, bourgeois liberalism, and puts us at odds with the regime here. He is a living symbol of our conflict with China over human rights. 4. Today, the Chinese are engaged in a massive campaign to discredit U.S. influence to the Chinese people. At the same time, China wants our trade, our technology, and enough of a security connection so that it does not end up facing the

Soviet Union alone. China now confronts a severe erosion of popular trust and confidence in the leadership, the probability of economic stagflation and possibly recession, and a shattered image to the outside world. The overall prospects are grim and backward and conservative, but still occasionally cunning. Hardliners dominate temporarily, but there are constant signs of a leadership struggle between forces representing an outward orientation and those that prefer to turn inward. 5. This telegram tries to describe what China has done in our bilateral relationship to alter

its nature, why it has done those things, and what we should do about them. What China Has Done 6. The main focus has been a numbing propaganda campaign, which has returned to some of the themes of the Cultural Revolution and of the early 1970s. It directly links the U.S. with the hateful bourgeois liberalization. The U.S. is behind the counter-revolutionaries. By communist definition, counter-revolution must have external instigation. The U.S. superpower seeks to interfere in Chinese affairs and to push China around. It is a blatant appeal to anti-foreignism and Chinese chauvinism,

and as such, it has had some effect. But by doing so, the regime pushes the United States in the direction of the majority of Chinese who detest the regime, and who would like to continue to have a good shot of consumerism and more fun in life. 7. On the more concrete side, Chinese reactions have often been parallel to our own measures and relatively modest. We suddenly and without warning publicly cut arms sales and military and high-level contacts. The Chinese angrily discontinued exchange trips in motion, General Vuono and Gray, and cut contacts with our DAO officers, steps which took them three weeks after the President

announced American first steps to decide upon and to communicate to us. The abrupt military cutoff was particularly galling to the Chinese, after all the hype which went into glorifying their relationship. Each high-level military visit was a glowing moment to our friendly cooperation. There were some nasty blips, such as silkworm and constant Chinese complaints about our export controls, but we had not factored into the relationship the PLA. Redacted. We have nevertheless the basis for a military relationship in place. Next time, we should do better. 8. The Chinese have used their press to underscore the climate of tension they have created and which is perfectly calculated to intimidate. This has given the signal to lower

level security minions to act, with the consequence that American businessmen in Shanghai and Guangzhou have been harassed with accusations of corruption. 9. A gross form of this tension and intimidation is the posting of guards with automatic weapons around the embassy's buildings and armed sentries near the main gate of Jianguomanwai residential compound, portrayal of the U.S. as corrupting, we have seen a reluctance, whether it is individual caution or structural, isn't clear, on the part of the last of this year's international visitor grantees to accept our invitations. 11. The Peace Corps program for Sichuan has been postponed. Chinese opposition to their program, always strong, rose up and struck down the moderates who were pushing it. Redacted. Our friends really did not have a chance once the mood at the top swung against us. 12. The Chinese have embarked on a program of intimidating the foreign media,

especially the American media and VOA. The point is to quote-unquote close the door to beat the dog. They realistically understand that continuing public violence against their own people risks foreign support. This was the lesson for them of the media coverage of Tiananmen. 13. The Chinese have singled us out from the EC and Japan for more of their vitriol, although the EC, and especially France, have been at least as aggressive in their reactions to Chinese suppression as we have. The Chinese need a single boogeyman. We were, in fact, the main foreign influence, not only at Tiananmen, but throughout China. They also want to drive a wedge between us and our friends and allies. Redacted, for instance, have worked over the Latin Americas here with harsh criticism of the

US as imperialistic and predatory, themes which probably get some resonance in these circles. 14. The Chinese have also turned on the high-level charm for visiting American business and community leaders. AT&T got access to Ding Guanggen, the UTC to Li Ruihuan, Daniel Wang to Li Peng. The Chinese theme to these people is, let us cooperate and move forward. The only obstacle is the U.S. government. What has frustrated the Chinese in all of this

is their moves to outflank us so far have not worked well. Most American businessmen will not accept the Chinese big lie and will not lend themselves to propaganda manipulation. The usual apologists for China, who have traditionally end-run the US government, have not been vocal in response to Chinese blandishments. Thus, the Chinese are on the defensive and have turned their efforts inward, trying to persuade their own population. They have not yet succeeded in carrying out the propaganda offensive to us in our own country.

15. The Chinese have, with McDonnell Douglas, postponed an expansion of 20 aircraft for their joint venture because they claim they lack foreign exchange. For some time, even well before 3 June, the Chinese have tried to cut back on imports and foreign exchange expenditures, but this has hurt our business here. They were certainly worried we would hold up sale of Boeings and inertial guidance systems, and that we would alter our agreement on satellite launching. Reneging on commercial business agreements for political reasons is something the Chinese have done in the past with the Japanese, and certainly the Russians did this to the Chinese in 1960. But the Chinese employ a dual standard, and it remains a highly explosive issue, as the Russians found out in 1960. We should therefore honor the sanctity of contracts,

even if the Chinese occasionally have not. We live by the rule of law, and we are trying to get them to do the same. We were right and wise in issuing export licenses for Boeing and Honeywell, and we should deliver on the satellite launch. Not only do we help the good guys, and there are a lot of them in China, but we also help ourselves financially. Despite congressional feelings, which we realize are strong and must be considered, we are not rewarding the murderers of Tiananmen by selling Boeing aircraft for hard cash. Let a thousand points of business decisions work in China, based on their own business's realistic assessments of economic and political prospects for China. Postponing the decisions of the IFI loans is a sufficient governmental input into

this process. It is both multinational and is aimed at China's government for its economic and political failures. 16. Chinese attitudes on certain foreign policy issues have shifted somewhat. We have to watch them on Cambodia. We need to restrain any Chinese support for protracted warfare and stronger links to the Cameroon, and encourage their participation in a quadripartite solution and UN peacekeeping supervision. In Korea, despite clear commercial advantage, Chinese may give more vocal support to North Korea. Redacted was leading the charge on the fast-moving opening to South Korea. We need to encourage favorable long-term trends for improving ROK-Chinese relations. On Afghanistan, the Chinese may be shifting to a more even-handed position

between Najibullah and the Mujahideen. We need to encourage continued Chinese support to the resistance. And of course, they will flog a better Soviet relationship to us and to the world, hoping in part that they can scare some Americans into more accommodation. But in each of these cases, Chinese national interests are not served by going too far. So there may be more smoke than fire. What are the Chinese after? 17. First of all, this regime wants to stay in power. Some of the leadership believes we threaten their power through our links to Chinese who have openly despised them and

worked against them. They must discredit these links. Second, the Chinese must have economic prosperity. The opening to the West, including to the U.S., is perceived as essential to this. Third, the Chinese people must be whipped into line. Profligate tendencies must be controlled, discipline reasserted. Recentralization of authority and control is crucial to this. Fourth, Chinese nationalism, or patriotism, has to be reignited. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and the overseas Chinese are their objectives. Internally, the Chinese relentlessly push, trust the party, love the PLA, and respect the leadership, despite a huge credibility gap.

The contradiction in this is clear. How can China attract the ocean mentality of its own Chinese overseas, while fostering a continental mentality of its people on the mainland? This was the central theme of the documentary River Elegy, Hexiang, now banned in China. 18. Similarly, how can China attract the West economically and condemn it politically? Can China have it both ways? Deng says yes, it can. And this is the compromise he forges between the hardliners in his leadership and the moderate reformers. Jiang Zemin, the new party secretary-general,

is a symbol of this compromise. Redacted. What do we do about it? 19. Here are some suggestions. Stay in step with Western allies and Japan. This is what made the postponement of the IFI loans so effective. Recommend against Washington micromanaging the situation here. There is too much work on policy at home to be deflected this way. The Kunming missionary episode, for example, was an unnecessary burden. Furthermore, it was wrong to see this incident as part of a heavy-handed response to the current situation. China, and Taiwan, has a long anti-missionary history, and fairly consistently expels such proselytizers. The group actually got off comparatively lightly. No fines, just expeditious departure. We did not need another hot bilateral issue on this one.

Consider formats to quiet, high-level dialogue. We note that former President Nixon is planning a trip to China. In this regard, we want to carefully vet our interlocutors, so as not to become dependent on one group, such as overseas Chinese. When reviewing the travel advisory and the return of dependents, we should give credence to the differences in Beijing and the other regions of China. Treat the other areas better than Beijing, where possible. A major speech from a senior administration official summing up U.S. concerns and hopes could be scheduled for late August, after Congress goes into recess. We need to put more of our emphasis on a coastal strategy for China.

Redacted. We should continue the Fulbright Scholarship exchanges and other cultural, economic, and science and technology exchanges. We should renew the Fulbright Scholarship exchanges and other cultural, economic, and science and technology exchanges. We should renew the ST Agreement and pursue getting IPR guarantees from the Chinese, because these are long-term basic arrangements which help the Chinese look outward, not inward. This also means keeping our working relations going below the AS level to include civil air consultations, narcotics matters, and active embassy-slash-departmental and embassy-slash-MFA talks, both professional and social, at all levels. We have to deal with the variable of the uncontrolled American reaction to China. Our media, our academics, disappointed businessmen, congressmen, will all attack China and will go well beyond USG

policy. Some Chinese will see an anti-Chinese conspiracy and they will attack us in kind. Demonstrators in the US will march on the Chinese embassy, and we will take a hit in retaliation here. This requires us to keep articulating our policies to influential Americans. A promising start has been made with the business community here. Do not let the Chinese establish a dichotomy between good, substantive, high-level talks and bashing us on the ground in Beijing. We are vulnerable here, and this is where we have traditionally taken the harassment. We did not work our eight doing business issues effectively into the President's February visit to China.

We did not adequately protest in Washington the firing on 7 June at our diplomatic residencies in China. We should continue to pursue tough reciprocity on property, access, and travel. We need to coordinate carefully with Washington to devise strategies that work to curb effectively Chinese excesses, and to keep the finger pointed at the real perpetrators. Section Redacted Finally, we have a fine line to walk between doing business with the current declining leadership and its erratic and sometimes hostile policies, and maintaining support for and contact with future forces in China, of which are more compatible with our beliefs and

interests. For the Chinese, our message should be, if you want American business, you also get VOA. We can calibrate this, but our basic principles won't change. Lily, admin, end it's presented as such. Grey History, The French Revolution is a long-form history podcast dedicated to exploring the ambiguities and nuances of the past. From a revolution of hope and liberty to the infamous reign of terror, you can't understand the modern world without understanding the French Revolution. So search for the French Revolution today.