The History of China - #15 - E. Zhou 4: The Art of War

Episode Date: March 18, 2014

The magnum opus of the legendary general and tactician of the Spring and Autumn Period, Sun Tzu. In this episode, we go over the life of the military genius, as well as an overview of his manual to success on the battlefield, and how it remains relevant and insightful even today. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. History isn't black and white, yet too often it's presented as such. Grey History, The French Revolution is a long-form history podcast dedicated to exploring the ambiguities and nuances of the past. From a revolution of hope and liberty to the infamous Reign of terror. You can't understand the modern world without understanding the French Revolution. So search for the History of China. Episode 14, The Art of War Last time, we took a look into the life and philosophies of Confucius, as well as his

lasting impact on Chinese and Asian societies. Today, we move our focus over to another individual of the era, with arguably as much long-term impact on China as Master Kong, and on the world, possibly even more so. Though he was also a philosopher, he made his name and legacy as a general and tactician. He is most often called in the West Sun Tzu, though a more accurate Mandarin pronunciation would be Sun Tzu. And like the rendering of Kong Fu Tzu, it is more of a title than a name, meaning Master Sun. Traditional accounts list Master Sun's given name as Sun Wu, and his courtesy name as Changqing, meaning Venerable Minister. Yet in spite of his impact on China, many of the details of his life, and even portions

of the history attributed to him, remain mysterious, disagreed over, or in doubt entirely. Even his place of origin is disagreed on by even the earliest of records on the man. The spring and autumn annals declare that Sun Tzu came from the northeastern state of Qi, whereas Sima Qian's records of the Grand Historian identify him as a native of the southeastern state of Wu. You might think of it as historians being unable to agree whether Samuel Adams was a son of Massachusetts or Florida. Origins aside, he is known, or at least told, to have been a chief advisor and general for the king of Wu, He Lu, in the late spring and autumn period. As mentioned in episode 12, he is said to have been an instrumental part of He Lu's devastating campaign

against the neighboring Chu in 512 BCE, even though that is not entirely agreed on. Sima Qian is the chief proponent of Sun as Wu general theory, and it is through the Grand Historian that we get a tale that brings to light Master Sun's unique personality and disposition. In the period before he was taken on as military adviser to king ha lu the monarch of wu sought to test this supposed military genius's skills to that end he ordered sun tzu to train a regiment of very peculiar soldiers concubines. Unperturbed, Sun Tzu divided the women into two companies, with a favored concubine of the king as the commanding officer of each. His army duly assembled. He ordered it to face right, to which the 180 women giggled and demurred. They were no soldiers, after all. Sun Tzu turned to the king calmly and explained, In any army, it was the duty of the general, in this case himself, to ensure that his soldiers understood the orders he had given,

and it was the duty of his officers to ensure the soldiers carried those orders out. In this instance, perhaps, he had simply not been clear enough in his orders. And so, he once again ordered his concubine army to face right, this time making sure that he laid out his instructions in a simple and clear manner that all could understand. When the women once again guffawed at this command. His reaction was quite different. Immediately, he ordered the execution of the two officers, the favored concubines of King He Lu. The king, of course, raised quite an objection at this turn of events, and demanded that Sun Tzu explain himself. Sun Tzu once again stated that, assuming the general's orders had been understood, it was the duty of his officers to carry those orders out to completion.

If the officers failed in that duty, they were less than useless to the army, and needed to be made an example of. Moreover, Master Sun continued to the likely fuming king, Once the monarch had entrusted his general with a mission, it was the general's duty to see that mission to completion in whatever way he saw best, even if elements of it contradicted the wishes of the king. In wartime, he explained, the military machine must exist beyond the whims of civil authority. The axes fell, and the 180 concubines became 178. Two new officers were appointed by Sun Tzu, and once more his order sounded out,

face right. Both companies, now horrifyingly aware of the consequences of further frivolity and womanly idleness, executed that and every other maneuver flawlessly. Sun Tzu, it's clear, was a man who took the military very seriously indeed. Needless to say, in spite of the loss of his two concubines king ha lu gave sun tzu the job as traditionally remembered it was on the subsequent battlefields of chu under the wu banner that sun tzu would find his inspiration to write his master-work the sun tzu bing fa which translates literally as Master Sun's Military Rules, but which has become more artfully known in English as the Art of War. Traditional tellings aside, though, the actual circumstances, and indeed authorship, of the work remain as historically unclear as the purported author's own history. Though historians Sima Qian recount Sun Tzu commanding at the decisive Battle of

Bozhu, for instance, the far more detailed account of the battle, provided in the Zuozhuang, makes no mention of the general at all. An alternative and modern interpretation of the text suggests that, given the 2,000 years of cumulative warfare experience the chinese already had under their collective belts and especially given the book's lack of a definitive and singular voice it is far more likely that the work was initially compiled by Master Sun Wu as a reiteration of other, earlier military works alongside his own expertise. Then, over the following century or so, was reworked and edited with updated tactics and strategies that simply had not existed in the time of Sun Wu. As such, it was a collection and continuation of the military stratagems that had proved themselves successful rather than the work of a single man.

While it is widely accepted that Sun Wu authored the core of the work, the anachronisms present virtually guarantee that there were significant contributions and alterations made in the century after his death. These anachronisms include forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, which simply did not exist until the Warring States period, references to protracted city sieges, given that cities during the spring and autumn were both weakly fortified and strategically unimportant, advanced and detailed use of spies and unorthodox tactics,

and the book's emphasis on the speed and maneuverability of infantry, whereas combat in the spring and autumn had uniformly revolved around chariot warfare over infantry. Regardless, the book would become one of the most widely studied and cited works in the Warring States period, the Imperial Era, and even into the modern age. Mao Zedong is known to have studied and based components of his strategy against the Kuomintang off of Sun Tzu, and the U.S. Marine Corps, the CIA, and formerly the KGB all keep the work on their required reading lists for officers. So, if this book is so important, let's get to it already. I must note, before launching into it, that I've tried to keep each chapter short and

sweet, and that means ignoring sections that are overly repetitive, or so specific or trivial, or wandering off-topic as the back halves of later chapters tend to do, that they don't really bear inclusion. I've tried to stick to the main thrust of each chapter, and I'm sure to run afoul of someone, somewhere, who thinks I've missed a terribly important detail. I'm sure they're right, and apologize in advance. The book is very interesting, and short, and I encourage you all to read it in its entirety.

That being said, here we go. There are two overarching themes in The Art of War. The first is that warfare is inherently evil, but a necessary evil, and therefore should be undertaken and concluded as swiftly as possible, and with unnecessary bloodshed avoided. This is in part for humanitarian reasons, but mostly out of economic necessity. As stated in the very first chapter, No long war has ever profited any country. Anyone who excels in defeating his enemies triumphs before his enemies' threats become real.

One need only look at the major conflicts of the 21st century to see the truth of that statement. Atrocities and massacres should likewise be avoided, because they can protract resistance and delay peace. The best policy is to capture the state intact. It should only be destroyed if no other options are available. The second theme is the ultimate importance of positioning and deployment in military strategy, the details of which make up the bulk of the work it is divided into thirteen chapters or pian with the book as a whole referred to as a juan or chronicle without further ado, Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Chapter 1. Detail Assessment and Planning. This first chapter discusses general preparations a general must make before any deployment or

battle can take place. These preparations take place in the general's, quote, temporary temple, meaning his tent, which would be set apart from his troops. It focuses on the five key aspects that govern warfare and determine victory or defeat. They are, one, moral law, which might be better understood as a combination of morale, discipline, training, and the personal charisma of the commander. A general in possession of moral law will cause, quote, the soldiery to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by danger, end quote.

Number two is heaven, which is understood as all things relating to the sky that can affect battle weather seasons night and day etc 4. The commander himself, who embodies the military virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness to those under him. 5. Methods and discipline, which ranges from determination of ranks, to supply lines, to military budgets, and basically everything in between. Using these five elements, the effective commander can then pose to himself seven questions, the answers to which will foretell the outcome of the war to come. They are, which king is in harmony with his subjects? Which of the opposing generals has greater ability who holds the advantages of each side's respective fighting spirit. Which side has better trained officers and enlisted men? And finally, which army is more predictable in its meeting out of punishments and rewards? The answers to these questions can be used to weigh the odds of the upcoming campaign.

In the words of Sun Tzu, quote, the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his tent ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but a few calculations beforehand, end quote. Thus we move to chapter 2, Waging War. This second chapter deals with, in spite of its rather overbroad title, the economic costs of warfare. Sun Tzu spells out his case that the only good war is a short war, noting that large-scale mobilization could cost the state as much as, quote, 1,000 ounces of silver per day, which I am assured was an awful lot of money. If allowed to drag on needlessly, a full-scale war could easily end up bankrupting the entire state. But mere bankruptcy was not the only danger lurking in the mire of protracted warfare.

Quote, was not the only danger lurking in the mire of protracted warfare. When your weapons are dulled, your ardor dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. If a ruler should allow his strength to be exhausted in the war effort, he would put himself at risk of attack by those elements who might seek to supplant or conquer him in turn. One might hear the echo of Sun Tzu's philosophy in the words of Union General William Tecumseh Sherman in 1864 when responding to the city of Atlanta, quote,

War is cruelty. I want peace and believe it can only be reached through union and war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early success. End quote. Chapter 3. Strategic Attack. This chapter makes a special note of the fact that strength is the product of unity within an army, not necessarily of size. Indeed, outright battle should only become an option if necessary, as the mark of supreme excellence consists of breaking an enemy's resistance without fighting whatsoever. The highest form of warfare is to merely foil an enemy's plans outright. If that fails, the next highest form is to keep the enemy divided by preventing its elements from joining together in strength.

Lower still than that is actually engaging an enemy force in the field, and the absolute last resort ought to be laying siege to an enemy city, because of the extensive time and cost both in terms of material and men. Thus, a truly skillful leader defeats his enemy without fighting, keeping his weapons perfectly keen through not being blunted by use. That said, Sun Tzu then went on to detail the three ways a commander could bring about disaster on his army. The first was to be so ignorant of the conditions on the field that he issues orders that simply cannot be carried out,

such as ordering an advance or retreat when it was not a viable option. Sun Tzu called this hobbling the army, and it's easy to understand why. The second is perhaps not quite as obvious as the first, attempting to govern an army as though it were a state. Virtues that should be encouraged and allowed to thrive in civil society, such as humaneness and justice, are toxic in a military unit, whereas traits that in a civil society would be understood as morally repugnant – opportunism and moral, well, let's call it flexibility – become essential when at war.

It should be noted that this is in reference to behavior towards the enemy military, not among one's own soldiers. Obviously, justice within one's own army is essential, but one cannot mete out justice or humanity to enemy soldiers in combat. The third and final folly of a commander would be to remain ignorant of his officers' strengths and to employ them counter to those strengths. later philosopher and commentator of the art of war touilloux explained the skilful employer of men will employ the wise man the brave man the covetous man and the stupid man for the wise man delights in establishing his merit the brave man likes to show courage in action the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages and the stupid man has no fear of death This chapter then goes on to list several conditions that are essential to victory, but they will be brought up repeatedly throughout. It can be effectively summed up, though, with, quote, If you know the enemy and you know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. End quote. Napoleon Bonaparte rose from obscurity to become the most powerful and significant figure in modern history. Over 200 years after his death, people are still debating his legacy. He was a man of contradictions, a tyrant and a reformer, a liberator and an oppressor, a revolutionary and a reactionary. His biography reads like a novel, and his influence is almost beyond measure. I'm Everett Rummage, host of the Age of Napoleon podcast, and every month I delve into the turbulent life and times of one of the greatest characters in history, and explore the world that shaped him

in all its glory and tragedy. It's a story of great battles and campaigns, political intrigue, and massive social and economic change, but it's also a story of great battles and campaigns, political intrigue, and massive social and economic change, but it's also a story about people, populated with remarkable characters. I hope you'll join me as I examine this fascinating era of history. Find The Age of Napoleon wherever you get your podcasts. Chapter 4. Disposition of the Army Victory can only be achieved when the possibility of defeat has been rendered impossible such security is possible only through maintaining total secrecy, then the enemy cannot know where to strike at you, or where you may strike from, rendering them on a permanent defensive.

In this chapter, Sun Tzu also discusses the importance of troop morale. An army secure in the defense and emboldened on its offense holds an enormous advantage over a force with morale broken. Chapter 5. Forces. This chapter covers the principles of governing an army of any size, as well as using momentum to one's advantage in combat. In principle, commanding a large army is no different than commanding a small group of men, assuming it is effectively divided into manageable units under the direction of capable officers. Rather than trying to directly manage thousands of troops and indirect measures to keep an enemy off balance. Deception is a key feature of the successful tactician, and a properly disciplined army can feign disorder, fear, or weakness to draw an enemy in and crush them. Chapter 6. Weaknesses and Strengths, or Illusions and Reality

An army's opportunities come from both the environment itself and from the nature of the opposing force. He who chooses the place of battle and arrives first to await the enemy will have the opportunity to rest and be fresh for the fight whereas the army that has its battle-ground chosen for it by the enemy must rush to combat and will be exhausted is that he either fights on his own terms or not at all. In baiting the enemy to come to you or harassing them, you can cause them to come to your chosen site. Quote, If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him.

If well supplied with food, he can starve him out. If quietly encamped, he can force him to move. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend. March swiftly to places where you are not expected. End quote. End quote. Sun Tzu was a huge believer that frontal attacks were to be avoided at all times, except as a last resort. Instead, if being invaded, one can force the enemy to turn around by cutting his lines of supplies and communication. If invading, strike for the sovereign himself and force the enemy to respond in defense. If combat is not wanted at all, throwing the odd or unexpected at the enemy can befuddle him. In other words, bluff. This principle is illustrated by the tale of Zhuge Liang of the Three Kingdoms period in the 2nd century CE.

While occupying a city and anticipating the imminent assault of his enemy, General Sima Yi, who vastly outnumbered Zhuge's occupying force, he struck his banners, stopped his war drums beating, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men sweeping the ground. Sima Yi was so thrown off by this that, anticipating a trap, he actually called off his assault on the city and retreated entirely. By forcing the enemy onto the defensive, and by not betraying one's own intent or location, the general on the attack forces his enemy to guard against all possible threats in every direction, thus spreading out his forces and dividing his attention.

Meanwhile, the general on the attack can move his forces as a unified whole, striking with crushing strength wherever he chooses. Above all, remain unpredictable. Tactics should be changed constantly and never repeated, no matter how successful. Chapter 7. Military Maneuvers This next section goes over direct combat and its inherent dangers, and how a general can emerge victorious should it be forced upon him.

Tactical maneuvering, that is, the maneuvers ordered both directly before and then during the engagement with the enemy, are the most dangerous and difficult aspect of warfare. With an experienced commander and disciplined officers and troops, maneuvering is advantageous, but with an undisciplined horde, such attempts would likely lead to ruin. Danzu seemed to be of divided mind regarding speed of movement. Again and again, he speaks of the importance of speed in warfare. Yet in this chapter, he cautions that moving too quickly to try to seize an advantage will result in annihilation the eager troops will pull ahead while the jaded and cautious ones fall behind and will thus meet the enemy with only a fraction of one's strength immediately after though he once again urges the army to be as rapid as the wind. When meeting the enemy, he offers advice, some of it painfully obvious, such as an army whose standards are in order are probably ready for an attack. Other pieces are more insightful, such as if an army is returning home, they should not be attacked or blocked, because men with their hearts set on home will fight to the death to reach it.

A surrounded foe should be left not fight to the death, but instead throw down their weapons and make a break for it, at which point they can either be captured or crushed. Sun cautions that there is no more dangerous foe than a desperate one, and that an army that has burned its boats and destroyed its cooking pots is ready to stake everything on battle and must be approached with caution and not pushed to extremity. Chapter 8. Variations and Adaptability The main focus of this chapter is that there is no always in warfare. To illustrate, it asserts, even if it is the shortest path, there are roads which must not be followed,

such as ones leading through narrow gorges inviting ambush. Even if an army is isolated and vulnerable, some of them must not be attacked, or rather, there are situations in which attacking an army cannot produce victory. Even if it hangs in a perilous position, some cities should not be besieged, especially if it cannot be held. Even if it can be stormed, some positions must not be contested. And though he is the ruler, some commands of the king must not be obeyed. In times of war, as demonstrated by Sun Tzu

to the King of Wu with his concubines, the demands of the civil authority must be subservient to the military necessity. Though it is difficult to know the intentions of the enemy, the successful commander must leave as little to chance as possible. Instead of relying on the enemy not coming, he must always be ready to receive him. Instead of chancing him not attacking, one must make his own position invulnerable.

Chapter 9. Movement and Development of Troops. This is an uncharacteristically short chapter in the Art of War, detailing the wheres and whys of places armies should encamp and where they should not. In essence, it should be near water, overlooking the area in question, with grass, and not in areas that would invite disease like marshes or damp, dark places. Honestly, this chapter very well could have been rolled into Chapter 10, Terrain. Sun Tzu overviews what he deems the six types of terrain, though his specific divisions are certainly open to criticism of being overbroad and not particularly helpful. Still, here they are.

1. Accessible ground, which can be freely traversed by both sides, although it's not necessarily level on such terrain it is most important to be the first to occupy the high points in order to hold the advantage if necessary, but which would be difficult or impossible to retake once fortified by the enemy, such as forests, hills, or other areas with significant cover. As such, preparedness and being the first force to occupy and fortify such territory is even more important than on accessible ground. Number three, temporizing ground, also known as delaying ground, might also be thought of as entangling ground where both armies have fortified within it. Here it is disadvantageous for either side to attack, and so remaining on the defensive is a necessity. Enemy lures to attack must be ignored, and baiting the enemy into themselves attacking prioritized.

4. Narrow passes. They are easily defended and difficult to impossible to attack. If held, they should be amply fortified. If the enemy controls it, direct assault should be ruled out unless it's only weakly held. If subterfuge can be employed, it may be attempted, but otherwise these areas should be avoided entirely. 5. Precipitous Heights They can serve as a natural stronghold to rain down damage on the enemy below. If the enemy holds such a position, retreat to draw him down. 6. Both armies are a long distance from one another. In this instance, a march to meet the distant enemy will tire your army

and put them at a disadvantage when the forces do battle. from one another. In this instance, a march to meet the distant enemy will tire your army and put them at a disadvantage when the forces do battle. This leads us to chapter 11, the nine battlegrounds. In addition to the six terrains, there are nine battlegrounds or situations in which an army may engage the enemy. As with the previous chapter, it is presented in list form with additional explanation afterwards. To summarize, 1. Dispersive ground, meaning fighting inside one's own territory. This can be advantageous, as the army knows the land, its people, and usually those people will be friendly to the defending army. The same familiarity, though, can be a danger, and where the name of the ground is derived, as the rigors of battle can entice them to flee and disperse into their homes or among

those who will shelter them. Sun Tzu advises not to do battle here, if it can be helped. Of course, if the state is being invaded, there's not much to be done for that. That said, the best defense is a robust offense, so let's assume we're on the attack. That brings us to number two, facile ground, which is the time and place immediately after one has crossed into enemy territory. Enemy resistance is likely to be especially fierce and concentrated, trying to repulse the incursion, and retreat is still a relatively easy option. Sun Tzu therefore advises that a commander occupying facile ground burn his boats and or bridges leading back to the safety of home, so that the soldiers know that the only path is forward and the only way home is through victory

rather than desertion. It is important not to stop on such ground for long, and to maintain forward momentum. 3. Contentious ground, where Such ground confers a tremendous advantage onto whoever holds it. A particularly famous example of contentious ground would be the Battle of Thermopylae, in which the massed armies of Persia were staved off by the 300 Spartan soldiers for days before finally being overrun. Attacking here is to be avoided if at all possible. 4. Open ground. Territory with many interconnected roads and ease of movement and communication for both sides. Number five, ground of intersecting highways, meaning in effect the borders between at least three states. Controlling these roads means controlling access to neighbors and potential allies, and as such is extremely important. Next is number six, serious ground, in which the army

has penetrated to the heart of the enemy state and controls several cities or fortifications to its rear. Here, it is time to recoup and restock through plunder and forage, before pressing onward. Number seven, difficult ground, is pretty much anywhere you wouldn't want your army to stop or encamp. Mountain forests, rugged cliffs, marshes, and the like. These should be marched through as quickly as possible. Finally, we come to the two types of ground on which no army wishes to find itself. First, hemmed in ground, is where retreat, if necessary, is extremely difficult. Torturous paths through narrow gorges are the only way out of a tight spot,

and even those could easily be sealed off by a small number of appropriately placed troops, spelling doom for the army. Should that occur, Hamden Ground quickly becomes our final ground, Desperate Ground, on which the only course of action is to attack immediately and to the death. Retreat has been cut off, and the enemy can outlast any supplies your men may still have. Slaughter the cattle for food, destroy the cooking pots, and explain that the only chance of avoiding death is through furious attack and punching a hole into the enemy lines, or go down in a blaze of glory in the attempt.

Chapter 12 is called Attacking with Fire, and it's, well, pretty self-explanatory. This brief chapter sums up the ways fire can be employed in warfare, namely burning enemy camps to drive them to flee, burning their stores, baggage, and arsenals, and using incendiary arrows and cross bolts to incite panic. The end. Chapter 13. Intelligence and Espionage

This final chapter of the Art of War is one of its most intriguing. As mentioned before, it is unlikely that the historical Sun Wu of the Spring and Autumn period actually wrote this section, because espionage had not developed to such an elaborate extent during his lifetime, and would only come about in the final phase of the Eastern Zhou Empire. Regardless of who wrote it, however, its view into the complex networks of subterfuge, intelligence, and counterintelligence more than 2,500 years ago is fascinating. The chapter predicates the necessity of spy ops on the necessity of quick and decisive warfare. Without knowledge of the

enemy's intentions, movements, and strengths, warfare may drag on for years and impose great suffering on one's own kingdom, as outlined in the first chapter. As quipped by Sun Tzu, or whoever, an army without spies is like a man without eyes or ears. Therefore, it behooves the general to gather as much intelligence as possible to be able to strike at the opportune moment and bring hostilities to a quick close. Sun Tzu, or his ghost writer in any case, stresses that such critical foreknowledge cannot come from divination, deductive reasoning, nor prior experience,

but only through active intelligence gathered by trustworthy agents. These agents must share the most intimate of relationships with their general, more so than any other officer in the army, even so far as to have access to his private sleeping quarters in order to relay information and receive their secret orders. Above all, they must be liberally rewarded, and any promises made followed through on without delay. The Art of War divides its intelligence agents into five categories, local, inward, converted, doomed, and surviving. Local intelligence is pretty much just what it sounds like,

the inhabitants of an enemy district convinced to inform against them. This can be accomplished, according to Sun Tzu, chiefly through treating the civilian populations of occupied regions with kindness. Though, as we are all now well aware, there are quite a few different leverage points that can work in kindness' stead. Inward spies are officials or insiders within the court of the enemy. Some examples are disgraced or passed over ministers, convicted prisoners of high rank, or greedy concubines. These insiders could, do I really need to say it,

provide valuable insight into the workings of the enemy king and his intentions. Obviously. Converted spies is just another term for what we know today as double agents. Captured enemy spies, who are not only pardoned and released, but lavishly paid to go back to the enemy, deliver true but innocuous information, and report back with further insights into the enemy. It is worth noting that, in many respects, the converted spies were the most important kind of agent. Because they came pre-equipped with intimate knowledge of the enemy, their intelligence could lead to contacts with local spies and inward spies. Further, their

detailed intelligence could alert the general to weaknesses and intel that could be fed via misinformation to doomed spies. Doomed spies are almost the opposite of converted spies. One's own subjects, who are known to be dealing with the enemy, are, rather than being jailed, merely fed false information for them to take to the enemy king. The king, hopefully, believes the unwitting spy and acts on their faulty intelligence. The doomed moniker comes from the fact that, typically, any spy reporting false information would be summarily executed when that intel is proved false. At the very least, it saved one the expense of executing such traitors oneself. Finally, surviving spies, which are easiest to think of as the most normal kind of spy, meaning agents who infiltrate the enemy, gather useful intelligence, and then report back. And so, we conclude this episode of the history of China. If it feels abrupt,

well, that is mostly because the book itself ends abruptly, with nothing in the way of denouement or conclusion, such as the terseness of ancient Chinese prose, I'm afraid. Regardless, next week, we forge ahead out of our duo of biopics and into the sound and fury of the warring states period. Thank you for listening. of Queen Nefertiti. If you have, you'll probably like the History of Egypt podcast. Every week, we explore tales of this ancient culture. The History of Egypt is available wherever you get your podcasting fix. Come, let me introduce you to the world of Ancient Egypt.