The History of China - #250 - Ming 35: Nurhachi, Part 2

Episode Date: February 28, 2023

With Manchuria all but tapped out, Nurhachi and his Manchus seek to expand in the only direction that makes any sense - south into Ming territory. It's time for the Airing of Grievances! He's got a lot of problems with you people, and now you're gonna hear about it!! Time Period Covered: ~1618-1626 CE Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. Four hundred years ago, a trio of tiny kingdoms were perched on some damp islands off the coast of Europe. Within three short centuries, these islands would become the centre of an empire which ruled a quarter of the globe and on which the sun never set. I'm Samuel Hume, a historian of the British Empire, and my podcast Pax Britannica follows the people and events that built that empire into a global superpower. Learn the History of China. Episode 250, Nihachi Part 2. Welcome newcomers! The tradition of Festivus begins with the airing of grievances.

I had a lot of problems with you people, and now you're gonna hear about it. You! Kruger! My son tells me your company stinks. Oh god. Quiet, you'll get yours in a minute. Kruger, you couldn't smooth a silk sheet if you had a hot date with a babe. I lost my train of thought. From Seinfeld, Festivus. Last time, we looked at the rough and tumble early life of Nurhachi of the Tertön, and the beginnings of his rise to power and glory in the grand vision of reuniting his people and turning it into a force that could contend with the overwhelming might of the great Ming dynasty itself. We finished up right about the year of 1619, as he'd begun making motions towards assuming the mandate of heaven through seeking out and or

inventing auspicious heavenly signs and signals of his own impending rise. And so today, we pick up from there, as Nurhachi, now styling himself as the heavenly mandated Khan of Jin, turns his attentions and armies southward toward the Ming-controlled region of Liaodong. Before starting in on that, though, it behooves me to note that this is episode number 250 of the History of China podcast. And yeah, there's actually something more like 275-ish floating around, but the number on the title says 250, and that's really what's important, isn't it? At about 9 years and 4 months, that that's really what's important, isn't it? At about nine years and four months, that's approximately 26 shows per year, and as many of you have heard me say here before,

I certainly never thought I'd still be doing this in 2023, way back in 2013. Much less going strong and feeling more confident and thankful for this community of listeners that you are all a part of. Thank you all for helping me keep up the energy with this relentless, now-approaching podcasting ancientness show almost a decade on, and a quarter of the way to episode 1,000. Extra special thanks to all of you guardians on the wall who, through your subscriptions and donations, keep the lights on and the mics humming. And just to find to my family just why this eats up so many of my nights and weekends. You really do make it all possible, and so thanks again. And here's to the next 250. Yeah, I'll have to put together a Q&A soon to formally mark this glorious occasion, so please do send in your China history-related questions. Alright, enough backpatting. Let's get on with the show.

Probably one of the most famous creations of the Manchu dynasty in the making, that was Nurhachi's brainchild, was his creation of the banner system to subdivide his forces. Prior to the implementation of the banners, though, those people who were captured or surrendered to Liderjin authority became members of Nurhachi's own Mukun, or clan. This was fine for a relatively small tribe, but of course trended toward ponderous unfeasibility as the ranks continued to swell. As such, he initially solved the issue by splitting his clan into three, and sharing them more or less equally with his brother, Sir Hachi, and his son, Chuyen, who became respective clan

heads in their own right. This triumvirate, however, would not outlast Nurhachi's executions of first Sir Hachi in 1611 and then Chu Yun in 1615, after which he refused to appoint new leaders to their respective clans. Rothley posits, quote, This fact suggests the possibility that one of his reasons for eliminating his two co-rulers was to rid himself of their clans, which could have slipped from his control if further divisions had occurred, end quote. Instead, he replaced the informal and loose clan structure with a new and far more militarily organized system, the banners, or qi, which we discussed in more detail last time. So complete was this social change among the Manchus at this time,

that the term for clan itself, mukun, seemed to have been temporarily removed from the recorded lexicon entirely. As we've previously noted, throughout this entire period, the Jurchen-slash-Manchu people under Nurhaci at no point held themselves apart from or scorned their neighboring peoples. Indeed, one of the very rationales used by Nurhaci himself in assuming the title of Heavenly Mandated Khan was that his rule was capable of attracting outsiders and foreign populations to his rule, a state of affairs typically only held by the Chinese dynasties

of the South and a marker of divine favor. As such, in the pre-Liao Dong campaign period, there seems to have been relatively little friction between the respective population of the Northeast, primarily the Manchus, Han Chinese, and Mongols. This seemingly halcyon state of affairs, however, must of course be tempered with the cold splash of reality. Again, from Rothley, To be sure, the majority of Chinese under the Manchus at this time were captives brought back from campaigns and distributed among the officials and soldiers as private slaves to work the fields. The individual master had complete power over his slaves. He could sell them, or, if he so chose, kill them at will, end quote. So So yeah, not exactly all holding hands and singing

around campfires, but even so, it wasn't as though the whole of the Chinese population living under Manchu rule were doing so involuntarily. There was a sizable number of Chinese who had joined up early on, and of their own volition. Especially those who'd gotten in on the enterprise prior to 1600 were held in more or less co-equal status with their Manchu and Mongol counterparts, and even formed their own companies within the banner system. As of 1614, of 400 total companies, 308 were mixed Manchu-Mongol, 76 exclusively Mongol,

and 16 fully Chinese. And later on, once Manchu-Chinese relations grew tense during and after the Liaodong campaign, those Chinese early adopters were specifically excluded from any such burgeoning ethnic animosity. There are only three rules when it comes to real estate, and they are location, location, and location. The same tends to hold true when it comes to the rise and fall of empires and power structures, namely who controls the regions that have the things that people want or need. As such, to at least some extent, Erhachi's ascent and conquest over the other Jurchen tribes can be credited to the dumb luck of geographical placement and resource distribution.

Not only did his Jianzhou Zhechuan control a region with far greater access to natural resources, with them having exclusive production of pearls, ginseng, and sable pelts, for instance, but their central positioning between China and Korea also gave the Jianzhou people's leverage to demand further concessions from their stronger neighbors for such coveted products. Their direct access to border markets to the south, four in all, allowed them to better exploit their natural resources and stimulate both economic and technological development. In fact, by Nurhaci's time, the Jianzhou Zhechuan had acquired enough southern technology and skills that they were

capable of smelting iron, engaging in gold and silver mining, and practiced advanced agriculture of both cereal grains and cotton, all of which had a dramatically positive effect on their quality of life and their ability to dominate their cousin tribes to the north and west. Yet, in spite of these advantages and advancements, the geography of Manchuria was still harsh and unforgiving, and allowed the people who lived atop it to eke out a living only begrudgingly. Though agriculture allowed for the Manchus to support a markedly increased population, by 1615 they'd once again hit an upper ceiling on the number of people that their land could support. The seriousness of the situation was spelled out by Nurhaci himself when approached

by his Bela princes, who wanted to attack a rival group of Mongols. The Khan warned them, quote, we do not even have enough food to feed ourselves. If we conquer them, how will we feed them? End quote. He went on, pointing out that even without the additional strain of new captives, they were stretched dangerously thin as it was. Quote, Now we've captured so many Chinese and animals. How shall we feed them? Even our own people shall die. Now, during this breathing spell, let us first take care of our people and secure all places, erect gates, till the fields, and fill the granaries. End quote. The already strained situation turned even more dire when, in 1618, the Ming authorities closed down the border markets in Liaodong in response to previous

Manchu hostilities. This created a situation where, quote, ten people share the ration of one person, and ten horses are fed with the fodder adequate for one horse, end quote. Though he makes a show of trying to negotiate with the Ming for the reopening of the Liaodong markets, Roth Lee notes that In the short term, Nurhaci sought to save off starvation for his people by setting his armies out to annihilate the Yehe, the last of the independent Hulun tribes. Through this, he was able to acquire enough food to make it through that winter. But what about the winter after that? Or the one after that? Within their borders,

the Manchus had already maximized the use of all of their arable lands, via intensive agricultural methods. With trade with the Ming cut off, food shortages and starvation was no longer a temporary issue, but one that they would face again and again, year after year. The only possible long-term solution, therefore, was to expand. And the only way to expand was via conquest, and the only logical direction to expand was south, directly into Ming-controlled Liaodong. So it was that in 1618, Nurhaci publicly announced his seven grievances, known as the Nadan Koro in Manchu or the Qi Dahan in Chinese. This list of complaints against the Ming, which included his father and

grandfather's murders, disrespect shown to Manchu envoys, and various border violations, was solely a list of old offenses, often decades old, and nothing new added. Rather, this served as a casus belli, a declaration of war. He followed this up with a surprise assault on the major market city of Fushun, in which he dispatched some 3,000 merchants to the city gates, with his men hiding amongst them, and then, once the Chinese traders within emerged to conduct business with their eager customers, those Manchu warriors forced their way inside the city itself and seized control, quickly obtaining the surrender of the city's

commander. In the days and weeks to follow, Fushun would face total destruction at the hands of its Manchu conquerors, with all of its valuable prisoners and loot packed up and carted off back to Nurhaci's home base at Hetuala. Soon thereafter, Nurhaci's force first besieged and then captured the Qinghe Pass, which served as one of the few points of ingress and egress between Manchuria and Liaodong. Once again, having secured the town and gathered up its useful supplies, the Manchu force proceeded to set it to the torch. The Ming response, if not exactly immediate, was certainly as swift as one could reasonably expect in the 17th century.

The following year, the Chinese army mounted a punitive expedition of approximately 100,000 men, incorporating Koreans and Yehe auxiliaries, as well as its central Han force. Before approaching their Hachi's encampment, the main commander ordered his force to divide into four groups and approach the Manchus from different directions, clearly hoping to encircle them and cut off any escape attempt. The outcome of this gambit, however, could scarcely have been worse. The strategy of dividing the forces turned out to be disastrous, because it allowed the Manchus to attack each separate force individually. After scoring successive victories, the most famous one near the town of Sarhu, the Manchus exploited their advantage and went on to seize the Kaiyuan and

Tieling garrisons. They then conquered the Yehe, who were by that point totally without protection. After these victories, Nurhaci and his army did not return to Hetuala. There was no room there for the thousands of prisoners and surrendered people, and he was ready for more conquest. In 1621, the Manchus took the major towns of Liaodong, including Shenyang, Liaoyang, Haizhou, Kaizhou, and Fuzhou. This left all of Liaodong except for the very tip of its peninsula in Manchu hands. Moreover, the two Ming commanders in charge of the Liaodong defense, Xiong Tingbi and Wang Huazhen, disagreed on strategy and failed to cooperate. Aware of this discord in the Ming command, the Manchus crossed the Liao River into Liao Xi in early 1622, took Guangning, and routed the Ming army there. However, due to mounting difficulties at home, the Manchus were at this point unable to hold Liao Xi.

In 1623, Nihachi relocated the inhabitants of Guangning to Liao Dong, and, that's right, once again ordered the city destroyed. By 1623, Ming presence in Liao Shi was reduced to the Shanghai Pass, Ningyuan, which is modern Xingcheng, and Jinzhou. Though the Ming military managed to strengthen Ningyuan and Jinzhou forces, their command structure remained unstable, a situation that the Manchus could have taken advantage of had their own internal conditions not been so shaky. The Chinese population in southern Liaodong was in rebellion. The relationship between Manchus and Chinese were tense, famine widespread, and banditry endemic. On the borders, Korea supported a Ming resistance force under Mao Wanlong on Pidao, a small island

near the mouth of the Yalu River, and the Mongols raided Manchu territory in the east. All of that detail to say that Narhachi was in no position to undertake any major offensive at this time. He was busy shoring up his own regional defenses. Anxious to avoid a two-front war, Narhachi exerted pressure on Korea to enter into an alliance with the Manchus, but Korea remained fearful of its Jurchen neighbors, and with reason. Throughout the Ming period, Korea had repeatedly tried to wipe out centers of Jurchen power along its borders, and when Nurhaci offered to help the Ming repel the Japanese invaders from Korea in 1592, the Korean court had actually asked the Ming to not accept their offer. Thus, viewing Nurhaci's

rise with alarm, the Korean government rejected his requests for an alliance, fearing that it was some kind of a trick. It diplomatically pointed out that its vassal relationship with China did not allow it to deal privately with Nurhaci or his Jurchens. After the Battle of Sarhu, in which Korea fought on the Ming side, Nurhaci intensified his pressure on Korea to abandon its relationship with the Ming. Though Korea did not respond, Nurhaci was successful in that Korea refrained from sending further support to the Ming in its defense of the Liaodong cities. By 1626, the worst of the internal crises appeared to be over. Though the Manchus were still economically weak, the departure of yet another Ming general, Sun Chunzong, from Liaodong in 1626, seemed like an opportunity that was just too good to pass up.

Nurhaci headed once more into Liaoshi and besieged the city of Ningyuan. But, facing the Ming force's newly acquired Portuguese cannons, or Hongyi Dapao, the Manchus suffered tremendous losses and Nurhaci was forced to withdraw in defeat and ignominy. Prior to the use of the Portuguese cannons, the Manchu tradition of combining infantry with cavalry tactics was superior to that of the Chinese as long as battles were fought in the open field. But the Chinese troops of Ningyuan, commanded by Yuan Chonghuan, made effective use of their cannons, and Yuan did not expose his troops to an open battle. History isn't black and white, yet too often it's presented as such. Grey History, The French Revolution is a long-form history podcast dedicated to exploring the ambiguities and nuances of the past. By contrasting both the experiences of contemporaries and the conclusions

of historians, Grey History dives into the detail and unpacks one of the most important and disputed events in human history. From a revolution based on hope and liberty to its descent into the infamous reign of terror, there's plenty to discuss and plenty of Grey to explore. One can't understand the modern world without understanding the French Revolution. So if you're looking for your next long-form, binge-worthy history podcast, one recommended by universities and loved by enthusiasts, then check out Grey History, The French Revolution today, or simply search for The French Revolution. Nohagi's defeat at Ningyuan had major ramifications.

Whereas the Manchus lost some of their confidence to attack Ming fortifications, the Ming gained a boost in morale. Mao Wanlong, emboldened by the Manchu defeat and stronger Korean support, then penetrated deeply into Manchu territory. The five Khalkhas leaned firmly towards the Ming, and Ligdan Khan of the Chahars pursued his goal of unifying the Mongols ever more vigorously. Under the banner system, the eight-banner Bela princes held strong positions. They participated with the Khan

in all major decision-making and held full charge over their individual banners affairs, and through it gained economic independence. They gained separate offices and gave commands to the Chinese officials attached to their banners without going through the Khan himself. Before long, the four senior beilas started positioning themselves for the eventual succession struggle. After the death of his first designated heir, Quyen, Nurhaci had favored his younger son, Daisan, as a potential successor. But in 1620, he changed his mind when he learned of an inappropriate liaison between his wife and Daesan. Now, as we repeatedly went over during our Mongol episodes, special relationships between the ruler's wife and the designated heir

was not unusual amongst steppe peoples. But it was always a very delicate situation, to put it mildly. And in this case, Daisan's opponents used the incident to tarnish his image and that of Nurhaci's wife and her son, Mangultai. It's possible that Hong Taiji was behind this maneuver as he sought to improve his own chances to become the leader after Nurhaci's death. Cases of improper association between grand ministers and beilas also bore evidence that the struggle over succession was in full swing. Giving up on designating another heir at this time, Nurhaci started a system of rotating shifts for bela supervising administrative affairs. In 1622, he suggested collective leadership after his death.

Amin did not participate in the succession struggle, probably realizing that as Sirhachi's son he stood little chance of actually succeeding his grandfather. Instead, he asserted his traditional rights of tribal autonomy and, on his own authority, moved his people away from the area assigned to his banner. His action reflected his opposition to the new policy of conquest and foreshadowed his later attempt to seek independence. But Amin was not the only bela to question this policy. Nurhaci's decision to move his capital progressively further into the heart of Liaodong was made over the opposition of the belas who favored raids for treasure over permanent conquest. As administrative matters multiplied after the Manchu conquest of Liaodong, Nurhaci created new positions to cover different areas of responsibilities. Since these appointees

remained outside of the eight-banner system, they strengthened the centralized control and had the effect of adding bureaucratic supervision over the Beiluz and limiting their restiveness over succession and booty. Nurhaci appointed one executive censor, two judges, one Mongol and one Chinese, and four ambans per banner. The four ambans were specifically told to, quote, be constantly around the Beiluz and remind them of the imperial laws, end quote. If they failed to speak up, they, instead of the Beiluz, were to be put to death. Nurhaci also curtailed the Beiluz economic powers.

He removed a percentage of the Chinese on the Beiluz privately owned estates, retaining some himself and enrolling others as registered households under Hanjun banner officials. He also changed the rules governing the distribution of booty in order to equalize the economic strength of the banner bailas. Originally, the bailas had participated in campaigns with equal numbers of men, but such a practice did not guarantee an equal amount of treasure. Because the former practice might lead to disorder, the four ambans attached to each baila in 1623 were to make sure that all high-value items would be divided into eight equal parts. Restrictions also limited the freedom of the belas in the social sphere. New regulations determined what items and how many of each kind they could offer as sacrifices. The regulations distinguished between the khan and the belas, but only minimally between the

belas and the various official ranks. The policy change from raid to conquest also impacted the Manchu rank and file. After becoming members of the new banner system, Manchus continued to participate in battle and gain access to material rewards and slaves. However, as the bottom layer in a banner system that included many ranks, they'd lost some of the freedom that they had had as members earlier. After they moved into Liaodong, Nurhaci required strict discipline and restrained their looting activities. One out of two or three Manchus continued to do military duty and go on campaigns. Those who remained behind had to guard borders, towns, and the Beilas' homes. They had to pasture horses, participate with the Chinese in construction projects,

and engage in farming. There were even Manchu slaves. Traditionally, Jurchens did not enslave each other, but by the time the Manchus occupied Liaodong, most beilas and high officials had at least some Jurchen slaves. Nurhaci's greatest challenge after the conquest of Liaodong was to establish an appropriate relationship between his Manchu and Chinese subjects. Prior to the conquest of Liaodong, Nurhachi appealed to the Chinese by letting

it be known that he intended to redistribute land and appoint incorruptible officials. When he invited the people of Liao Shi to move to Liao Dong, he told them, quote, If you go inside China, your emperor, being bad, will not take care of you. If you go to Guangning, the Mongols will take care of you. Do they have grain and clothing? But if you come to Liao Dong in the east, I shall give you land and treat you well. In theory, Chinese who submitted voluntarily were not to be maltreated, nor was their property to be taken or their family separated. The only indignity that these surrendering Chinese were to undergo was the requirement that they must shave their heads in front and wear the Manchu Q in back. This token of submission

was also a convenient way to make it difficult for them to desert back to the Ming. Nurhaci did follow through with the reallocation of land in Liaodong, but before he could do so, he needed to ensure the immediate food supply for his own people. Upon their conquest of Liaodong, the Manchus confiscated grain and appropriated land for their garrisons. In their conquest of Liaodong, the Manchus confiscated grain and appropriated land for their garrisons. In the case of Liaoyang, three days after its occupation, all Chinese except artisans, merchants, and certain other professions were forced to leave the city. If they owned land, they were instructed to live on their property. If not, they were expected to seek land that had been abandoned by Chinese who had fled.

Administratively, Chinese fell into several categories. Those who had resisted the Manchus were enslaved, as were indigent Chinese households unable to support themselves. Most of the other Chinese households served as free men, in Manchu, haha, or in Chinese, zhuangding, on estates given to aristocrats or to officials in lieu of a salary. For example, after his surrender at Fushun, Li Yongfang was given charge over a certain number of Chinese. Through their masters or officials, all Chinese belonged to a banner. In order to prevent Chinese from escaping, the Manchus stationed troops throughout Liaodong and guarded the borders. Chinese living in coastal and border areas were relocated to avoid possible collaboration with the enemy.

Some Chinese, unwilling to move, requested that they be allowed to stay and share their houses, land, and food with the Manchus. Quote, We are all subjects of the same Khan, they pleaded. Let us live together and eat together. Why should we move? End quote. Quote, Anticipating that this proposal would minimize economic disruption, Nohachi agreed. Less than a month later, co-occupant living began in several areas. This Manchu Chinese co-occupant living experiment didn't last. The Manchus, in spite of various edicts condemning Manchu's chauvinistic behavior, were prone to regard their co-occupant Chinese households as servants instead of working together on an equal basis.

They freely used the oxen of their Chinese families, had the Chinese transport grain and grass on their carts for them, sent them on errands as they pleased, or have their women do the household chores for them. Instances of Manchu's oppressing and robbing Chinese abounded. Only a month after its initiation, co-occupant households were ordered to divide their land and work it separately, each household using its own labor, oxen, and land. After the harvest was in, and a count of all male adults taken, a redistribution of land took place, in theory allotting each male about five samari. But the disruption caused by the moves was severe,

and further exacerbated when tens of thousands of Chinese households from the area around Guangning and Liaoshi relocated to Liaodong, creating more co-occupant households, this time Chinese living with other Chinese. Whether due to social dislocation or Manchu oppression, by the summer of 1622, severe shortages of grain and salt were widely reported. In 1623, famines triggered revolts. Chinese set fires, poisoned wells, stole grain from government collectors, killed border guards, and even tried to escape. The Manchus easily suppressed these uprisings, but as a result of the revolts, Nurhaci shifted to a policy of segregation. He discontinued co-occupancy in the countryside and segregated Manchus from Chinese in towns by moving them to separate quarters.

Manchus were required to carry weapons, and Chinese forbidden to do so. In 1623, revolts were a turning point in the Manchu-Chinese relationship. Earlier, the official policy had stressed integration and had reprimanded Manchus for mistreating their Chinese co-occupant households or their Chinese slaves. Narhachi now adopted a policy not just of segregation, but of explicit unequal treatment. He issued a secret edict to the Manchu Belas, in which he chided them for treating the Chinese as equals. If our Manchus commit crimes, inquire into their merits. Ask what services they have rendered. But if there are Chinese who want to die, or have been disloyal, or have committed robberies, end quote.

Separating Chinese from Manchus and keeping them in separate quarters of the towns may have eliminated some Manchu Chinese friction among the common people, but continued economic hardships compounded by the new discriminatory policies incited further opposition. In 1625, the most serious Chinese uprising of the pre-1644 period broke out. During this upheaval, Chinese killed Manchus, sent envoys to the Ming military offering to collaborate with them, but most of all sought ways to escape. In dealing with the 1625 uprising, the Manchus blamed primarily the lower officials, relatives of officials, and officials who had first gained their status under the Ming. They purged Chinese from positions of authority, killed everyone they deemed unreliable, and turned the entire civilian Chinese population into bound

inhabitants of standardized estates under the Khan and the Beiluz. The establishment of the estates and the separate quarters in the cities were an official recognition of the failure of the policy of co-occupant living. There is no indication that Mongols participated in the Chinese revolts of 1623 and 1625. Some Mongols who submitted to the Manchus were resettled inside the Manchu borders, but most were sent back to their home territory to serve as outposts and maintain a political buffer zone between the Manchus and the lands beyond. Those who settled within the Manchu state received provisions and land, but after a certain welcome period, they were expected to be self-sufficient.

Agricultural production was considered the major pursuit under the Manchus, and none but the most recent arrivals, the officials, and the nobility were excused from taking part in it. Even though there seems to have been little direct conflict between Mongols and Manchus, the Manchus did not deem them particularly reliable, expecting them to rob the Chinese whenever they had a chance and to be lacking discipline. Like the Chinese, the Mongols were forbidden to wear weapons. However, the ban cannot have been effective since, quote, one kept repeating not to sell weapons to Mongols, but they were often sold secretly nevertheless, end quote. In addition to trying to bind most people to the land and to curb banditry, Naochi called on the subjects to follow the Chinese moral code. Official support for Confucian values promoted a form of internal control since, quote, those who are filial to

their parents and listen to their elder brothers will not have bad and rebellious hearts. When the Manchus launched their first attack on Liaodong, they sought grain and other food. They confiscated all available provisions, destroyed houses, and returned with their booty and captives to Hatuala. When the numbers of new subjects made it impossible to remove them to Hatuala, Narhachi realized that this approach had outlived its usefulness, and that he could gain more by destroying less. He announced, quote, If we kill you Chinese or redistribute you, how much longer could we do this? The grain is only temporary. If we keep you, then you can produce for us and we can sell the products and benefit forever, end quote. Nohachi even anticipated to benefit from those Chinese who had rebelled or were caught trying to escape.

He said, quote, If the Liaodong people rebel and escape, they are committing a crime. But why kill them? Take them as soldiers and let Chinese fight Chinese. It will be to the benefit of the Zhecheng, end quote. As his armies made further conquests in Liaodong, Nohachi maintained high discipline among his soldiers. Trying to minimize the disruption to agricultural production,

people were ordered to simply shave their heads, live where they were, and till the fields. All corvy labor, used primarily for building towns and halls and for transporting grain, was to be assigned with care so as to not disrupt agricultural production. Once Manchus and Chinese were installed on the land, raising livestock ranked only second to crops in economic importance. The government itself owned large numbers of draft animals, which were used for transporting grain and construction materials whenever necessary, primarily during the winter months. The rest of the year, the animals remain distributed amongst the people, usually in return for a fee. Demonstrating a degree of government control,

the color and weight of each animal was supposed to be registered in order to make sure that young animals would not be replaced covertly with old ones or weak ones. If someone wanted to raise pigs, he could lodge a request with one of the banner officials to buy an animal, but he was punished if he then slaughtered it for food instead of breeding it. Similarly, animal sacrifices to the dead were disallowed as a luxury that the country could not afford. Trade with other countries was carried on under the banner system. The government

also maintained a monopoly over domestic trade in livestock, furs, pearls, gold, silver, and, of course, ginseng. Private merchants had to be registered and could do business only in stipulated locations. Partially for reasons of government supervision and tax collection, but also because social unrest in the 1620s had made traveling merchants targets for bandits and fugitives. Domestic trade was concentrated in the towns, often at town gates and on the bridges over moats. Later, a law put an end to all street merchants by requiring that, quote, all Manchu and Chinese shopkeepers write their name in stone or wood and put it up near the door, end quote. Particular care was taken to select trustworthy merchants for the newly

acquired southern towns where political reliability was of utmost importance. Nurhaci valued the economic contribution of people with special skills and talents, such as silkweavers and silversmiths. Captured Korean or Chinese craftsmen were regularly spared, whether they had resisted or not. Even when captured during an attempt to escape, a crime usually punishable by death, artisans were often pardoned. They also received privileges, such as exemptions from taxes and labor, and special allotments of food, clothing, and servants. In 1626, prospects for a quick realization of Nurhaci's vision were not good, even though Manchu difficulties, including economic Shenyang, humiliated, wounded, feeling weak, and still without a designated heir. Once more, he called his sons together and admonished them to be of one mind and rule collectively after his death.

Later on, still feeling ill, Nurhaci went to seek a cure in Hot Springs near Chengho. He died on a boat returning from the springs in September of 1626 at the age of about 67. Even though his final years gave him little cause for optimism, Narhachi had created a firm basis for a Manchu state, enabling it to weather the social and economic crises of the 1620s and also to survive its first transition of power. That is where we will leave off today and conclude our story on Nurhaci, the progenitor of the Qing dynasty. Next time, we will continue this story

onward by going over what's happening in the Ming and also with the establishment of Nurhaci's eventual successor, that of his younger son, Hong Taiji. Thanks for listening. The Civil War and Reconstruction was a pivotal era in American history. When a war was fought to save the Union and to free the slaves. And when the work to rebuild the nation after that war was over turned into a struggle to guarantee liberty and justice for all Americans. I'm Tracy. And I'm Rich.

And we want to invite you to join us as we take an in-depth look at this pivotal era in American history. Look for The Civil War and Reconstruction wherever you find your podcasts.