The History of China - #263 - Qing 8: Lord of the Imperial Surname

Episode Date: January 21, 2024

As the Manchu armies of Great Qing press ever-southward, they put increasing pressure on Ming loyalists seeking either escape or additional lands to feed their war efforts. The warlord of Fujian, Zheng Chenggong, the Lord of the Imperial Surname, will begin eying the holdings of the Dutch East India Co. on Formosa as just such a target. Time Period Covered: ca. 1639-1659 CE Major Historical Figures: Ming: Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), Lord of the Imperial Surname [1624-1662] VOC: Christiaan Beyer, Ft. Zeelandia Surgeon-in-chief Taiwanese: Guo Huaiyi, rebel leader [d. 1652] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. TD Direct Investing offers live support. So whether you're a newbie or a seasoned pro, you can make your investing steps count. And if you're like me and think a TFSA stands for Total Fund Savings Adventure, maybe reach out to the History of China. Episode 263, Lord of the Imperial Surname.

On the great river, dressed in morning white, I swear to vanquish the Tartars. The anger of my hundred thousand brave men shakes the land of Wu. Wait and look, when resolutely we cross the formidable moat, who will still believe that China does not belong to the Ming. Zheng Chenggong, 1659 We last left off with the three-point colonization of the beautiful island of Formosa, though by episode's end, it must be admitted, we were left with just two, and those two now working in concert.

They were the Dutch, providing the funding and legal and also protective backing, and the Chinese colonists from Fujian providing the very necessary labor. Yet, as we'll see today, as symbiotic as that relationship began, given the changing situations and desired outcomes of both the Dutch East India Company, the Chinese settlers themselves, and of course that mainland great power that up until now we have left in the story East India Company, the Chinese settlers themselves, and of course that mainland great power that up until now we have left in the story's periphery. Such a virtuous cycle was not to last. In the late 1630s, as the cost of administering Formosa mounted, officials in Batavia began urging the governor and the council of Formosa to increase their revenue. In response, officials on

Taiwan began to consider new ways to draw income from the colony. But voluntary contributions were unpredictable, and so officials in Taiwan considered imposing new taxes. They had already imposed several early levies, such as the tian de, or the one-tenth tax, which was a collection on venison, Chinese beer, salt, mullet, a rock, bricks and mortar, and the selling of houses and buildings, as well as on licenses for deer and fishing. Yet these revenues were not nearly enough to offset increasing costs. Officials therefore proposed a new tax on Chinese immigrants, the Huftbrief, or the Residency Permit Tax.

Now, the idea of the Huftbrief was not new. It was standard practice, in fact, in other colonies in East and Southeast Asia, most notably Batavia, Manila, and Macau. The early version of this residence permit was designed not to actually tax colonists, but simply to keep tabs on them. And yet, in the decade and a half after it was established, several motions were made to start charging for the permit. Yet, they were always rejected in the interest of attracting more Chinese colonists. Indeed, officials believe that they could lure skilled Chinese from Macau to Taiwan precisely because their colony offered free residence, whereas Macau did not. In 1639, however, company officials decided to reconsider charging a residency fee.

This would not, they argued at least, dissuade Chinese from settling in Taiwan, for Chinese agriculture there was flourishing, and Taiwan offered plenty of opportunities. These officials reckoned that if each Chinese resident paid just one-eighth of a rial per month, the company's income would increase by 12,000 rials per year. If the Huibri were cheap enough, they thought, it would have little effect on immigration to the island. The Council of the Indies to Batavia, eager for new sources of income in Taiwan, decided to allow the hoofs gelt. The first collection took place in August and September of 1640. At a quarter of a rial per month, the fee was considerable, but, quote,

after a bit of arguing and complaining, end quote, some 3,500 Chinese paid the tax. In any case, by the 15th day of each month, all Chinese colonists were required to acquire a license, or høftbrief, indicating that its bearer had paid the høftgeld. Because the Chinese used the lunar calendar, the Dutch raised a flag above the tax office at the beginning of each month so that Chinese subjects could not feign ignorance. As for why the Hooft Brief was only valid for one month, when the company might have saved itself time and energy and even cost by selling Hooft Brief for six months or years at a time, in fact, the Hooft Brief were intended not only to raise money for the company, but also, again, to keep track of the Chinese colonists.

Hoofsbrief soldiers who wished to move to a different village were supposed to notify a Dutch official. Failure to do so carried the same penalty as being found without a hoofsbrief, and that was a fine of four reals for those who could pay it, and if they could not, imprisonment followed by a public beating. These rules were enforced by soldiers who carried out inspections. Those caught without documentation were fined on the spot or sent back to Fort Zelandia for punishment. Chinese settlers soon began to complain about this hoof-brief system.

They were required to show their licenses to any Dutch person who asked, which was a policy, to put it mildly, susceptible to abuse. Chinese colonists complained that Dutchmen accosted them in fields or on roads, and under the pretext of a hoof-freeze inspection, demanded money from them, quote, which the poor people frequently paid in order to be released and not be brought to the fortress, end quote. In response, the Council of Formosa decided to change the policy. In 1646, council members resolved to put up placards informing Chinese colonists that they now had the right to not show their hoof briefings to any except company officials

and hoof brief inspectors, who could be recognized by a special medal worn around the neck. Even so, abuses and complaints continued. Towards the late 1640s, Chinese colonists' complaints mounted even more about the actions of Dutch soldiers who searched for hoofscripts. At the same time, they also suffered as a result of an increased population and high rice prices. Some years, many went hungry. Certain Chinese leaders tried to persuade the Formosan colonists to turn their allegiance away from the Dutch. In 1643, for instance, Dutch officials heard that the pirate named Kinuang had begun attacking aboriginal villages and was handing out his own rattan staves, claiming that he ruled the north and that the Dutch ruled the south of Formosa.

Over the following months, he and his adherents sailed around the seas of Taiwan, occasionally striking inland to sack aboriginal villages. In early 1644, when his junk was stranded in the bay of Longjiao, inhabitants of the village captured him and turned him over to Dutch authorities. This so-called Captain Kinwang was unsurprisingly executed on April 2nd, 1644,

after which the company discovered a document among the possessions of his second-in-command. It told how his band had tried to gain as many Chinese adherents as possible in Formosa, sending word in all directions and promising to pay the people well and asking, quote, What do we want with the Hollanders, who give us no freedom, who collect taxes on everything, who make us pay hoofdkelt, and do not let us hunt or do anything else without their license? Come here, and I will protect you and put to death any Aborigines who seek to do you harm. End quote.

The Dutch soon neutralized this pirate band. But they did not remove the frustration that Kinwong sought to capitalize on. Years later, that frustration would explode into open rebellion. On the evening of September 7th, 1652, seven Chinese headsmen asked for an emergency audience with the governor. They told him that a Chinese farmer, Guo Huaiyi, had gathered an army of peasants to attack the Dutch settlements at Sackham. The governor and his officers were surprised. Quote, They thanked the Chinese headsmen and gave orders to put Fort Zelandia into a state of defense.

The governor sent a constable across the Bay of Daljuan to reconnoiter the lands around Sackham. Riding through the warm night air, the constable, approaching Sackham, came to a rice field then known as the Amsterdamse Polder, where he saw, quote, as many Chinese as grass in the field, end quote. Some raised an alarm and attacked him, but he turned his horse and galloped back to Zelandia. He went straight to the governor and made his report. The Chinese, he said, were preparing for war, armed with bamboo spears and harvest knives. It was, to put it mildly, a tense time. That night, there was a great fear in the town, such that everyone gathered together their best possessions and their wives and children and sought refuge within the fortress.

When they awoke the next morning, they learned that the rebels had attacked the company's house in Sackham, crying, Kill! Kill the Dutch dogs! Most of the Dutch who lived in Sackham had found refuge in the company's horse stables, the most defensible structure in the area. Others had been captured by the rebels, who, quote, cut out the nose and ears as well as the eyes and manliness of some, and so, having put the head on bamboo poles, carried them around in triumph, end quote. The governor sent a company of Dutch musketeers by boat across the Bay of Dayuan. On their approach, the rebels, who had encircled the horse stables,

turned and approached the shore, some 4,000 strong, trying to prevent the company's soldiers from landing. 120 soldiers had to march ashore through waist-high water, and as such they were a vulnerable target. Yet they maintained their discipline, and, waiting towards shore in tight formation, shot salvo after salvo at the Chinese rebels. When they reached dry land, they were still shooting and in formation, and the rebels scattered. Dutch officials sent messengers north and south to summon aboriginal warriors, who were told that they would be rewarded with colorful Indian cloths if they helped fight against the Chinese. The aborigines

responded en masse. Over the next two days, the the Chinese. The Aborigines responded en masse. Over the next two days, the Dutch soldiers and the Aborigines together killed around 500 Chinese, many of whom had hidden themselves in the sugarcane fields. On the 11th of September, company officials learned that the rebels had gathered their forces, four or five thousand strong, near a small bay some five miles north of Sakam. Company soldiers, accompanied by 600 aboriginal warriors, approached this bay. The rebels fought bravely, waving countless banners, but they could not withstand the company's musketeers. After a brief but spirited resistance, they fled, pursued by the aborigines and company soldiers. Reportedly, some 2,000 were killed.

The rest fled south, only to be met and slaughtered by a large force of aborigines from southern Taiwan. In total, some 4,000 Chinese residents of Taiwan were killed by company soldiers and their aboriginal allies. It was an inhabitant of the village of Sinkan, the company's oldest ally on Formosa, who shot dead the rebel leader, Guo Huaiyi. He delivered his head to the Dutch, who had it, quote, displayed on a stake to frighten the Chinese and as a sign of victory over those dastardly traitors, end quote. This rebellion, with at least 5,000 adherents, was large and well-organized, comprising perhaps as much as a quarter of the Chinese who lived on the island.

Moreover, it was a peasant rebellion, whose leaders were the rich farmers in the lands around Sakam and whose followers were agricultural laborers who worked the land. Of the various occupations available to Chinese settlers in Dutch Taiwan, those associated with agriculture were the least invested in Dutch rule. By the 1640s, the company had abrogated agricultural subsidies and benefits. The livelihood of farmers going into the future was uncertain, being dependent on the vagaries of the weather and economic conditions in China proper. At the same time, they were preyed upon by Dutch soldiers, who, under the pretext of checking their IDs, detained them and stole their belongings. The governor-general of Batavia and

the highest officials in Formosa tried repeatedly to put an end to such ravages, but the soldiers were not to be stopped. Suitably enough, their most prominent weapons were the very knives that they would use to harvest rice in the daytime. Yet the leaders of this rebellion may have had different motivations than those who followed them. The rebellion's principal organizers appear to have been holders of village leases who owed money to the company. Suffice it to say that even with the crushing of this latest rebellion, relations between the Dutch on Taiwan

and the Chinese colonists they oversaw were tense and rapidly declining. Enter stage left, Zhen Chenggong, he who would be known as the lord of the imperial surname, Koxinga. Zhen Chenggong was born on a beach during a rainstorm, heralded by a mystical fire in

the heavens. During his life, he turned a monstrous sea turtle into an island, vanquished demons, made wells by striking his sword into the ground. After his death, he became a member of China's eclectic pantheon of saints and deities. He is, in short, a legendary figure. Even scholars and academics are apt to write about him hagiographically, calling him a national folk hero. For in both Taiwan and mainland China,

he is revered for his defeat of the Dutch and his loyalty to the Ming against the Manchu Qing. The real Chang Gong is a significantly more ambiguous figure, but no less fascinating for it. We know that he was born in Japan in 1624, the year the Dutch established Fort Zelandia in Taiwan. His connection with Taiwan began with his father, the pirate-turned-Ming official Zheng Zilong. As we've seen, Zheng the Elder was a member of the Taiwan-based pirate gang of Yan Siqi and his associate Li Dan. After Yan and Li died, the year after his son's birth, Zheng rose to rule over a merchant pirate organization that controlled Fujianese maritime trade throughout the China Seas. We've seen how

in 1628 Zheng Zilong accepted investiture by the Ming court, at least nominally giving up his pirate ways for an official rank. Afterwards, he became the Dutch East India Company's main contact for trade with China. He was comfortable dealing with the Dutch, having learned about them when he worked as a company translator, and he allowed trade to flow to Taiwan, knowing that the Dutch were formidable naval opponents. The Dutch grumbled, but they had no real alternative. Ming officials, for their part, were pleased with Zilong, or at least they were happy enough to appease him because they faced bigger troubles elsewhere. Regardless, by 1640, Zheng Zilong had been named the military commander, or zongbing, of Fujian,

one of the highest posts in the Ming bureaucracy. Unsurprisingly, from his very birth, Zheng Chenggong benefited massively from his father's fame and fortune. After spending the first seven years of his life with his mother in Japan, he traveled to Fujian to attend school. Whereas his father had sailed the seas to avoid the scholar's life, young Chenggong was an avid student, attending the county-level licenseate at just 15 years old. He then went to Nanjing, the great city of the South,

to study with renowned teachers at the Imperial Academy of Learning. He was a promising scholar and might have gone on to an illustrious official career. Yet that could-have-been path of academic and official civil service was to be disrupted and forever changed by the stormy course of the Ming-Manchu War. After Beijing fell in 1644, Zhang Chenggong's father and other relatives declared themselves loyal to the Ming, which was reorganizing itself in Nanjing around the Ming imperial palace. This first Ming loyalist court collapsed, and the Zheng family recognized a second Ming prince, whom we know as the Longwu Emperor. Longwu was grateful for Zheng the Elder's support and gave him a promotion.

He also symbolically adopted Chenggong, bestowing upon him the Ming dynastic surname, Zhu. As we've seen across time in imperial China, this sort of adoption and bestowing of the imperial surname was one of the highest honors that could be given by the imperial court. For the rest of his life, Chenggong carried the title Guo Xingye, or Lord of the Imperial Surname. This appellation was pronounced Kok Sang Ya in southern Fujianese, and so to the Dutch and other Westerners, he became known as Ko Xinga. His father devoted more attention to commerce than to fighting the Manchus. In 1646, the Ming prince undertook a land-based military expedition without Zhe Long's help,

forgoing a more cautious and more promising maritime strategy. Outmaneuvered by the swift-moving Manchu forces on land, he was captured and thereafter executed. In the meantime, Zilong had been negotiating with the Manchus. They promised that if he forswore his loyalty to the Ming, they would name him the viceroy of Fujian and Guangdong. Zilong accepted this offer in spite of his son's protests. In November 1646, Zheng Zilong went to Fuzhou to declare his allegiance to the Manchu Qing dynasty. But the Manchus had deceived him.

They took him to Beijing, where he would live the rest of his life under house arrest. Unlike Zilong, Cheng Gong maintained allegiance to the Ming dynasty. Scholars continue to argue about the nature and true extent of his loyalty. Ralph Crozier believes that his loyalty was a later construction of nationalistic Chinese historians who distorted historical evidence to portray him as an anti-imperialist hero. Other scholars, conversely, portray Zheng as a sincere loyalist. An excellent study by Wang Yongzhi, for example, portrays Chenggong's opposition to the Manchus as ideological, even fanatical, arguing that

Chenggong was a, quote, revolutionary traditionalist who transformed sheer violence into a political movement in an unprecedented way. He politicized the entire region, end quote. An important book by a Taiwanese scholar, on the other hand, lends support to Crozier, arguing that The debate, undoubtedly, will continue. Indeed, in a letter to the Dutch, Chenggong himself once wrote, How can one know my hidden thoughts and tell what are my actual intentions, Indeed, in a letter to the Dutch, Chenggong himself once wrote, quote, How can one know my hidden thoughts and tell what are my actual intentions,

which have been revealed to nobody? End quote. Still, it is clear that Chenggong was willing to sacrifice more than his father did for the sake of Ming restoration. He engaged in a constant and shifting war against the Manchus, using the Zheng family's maritime trade networks as his own financial base. History isn't black and white, yet too often it's presented as such. Grey History, The French Revolution is a long-form history podcast dedicated to exploring the ambiguities and nuances of the past. By contrasting both the experiences of contemporaries and the conclusions of historians, Grey History dives into the detail and unpacks one of the most important and

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or simply search for The French Revolution. He was nothing if not an incredibly slippery adversary. Although they could counter him on land, the Manchus lacked an understanding of naval warfare. At the same time, they were also occupied with Ming loyalists in other areas of China. Chenggong's main base was in and around Xiamen City, which in 1654, he began to call the Memorial Prefecture for the Ming, or Si Ming Zhou. He established a government based on Ming administrative policies, with six boards staffed by Ming scholar officials. By ensuring, however, that military and merchant interests held sway over scholar officials, he avoided the bureaucratic infighting that had riddled other late Ming loyalist governments. This made his an especially effective regime,

but it may also have limited his appeal to the traditional scholar elite. Still, his court did draw loyalists from throughout China and became a center of anti-Manchu opposition. It also enjoyed a measure of popular support. Chenggong's soldiers usually had strict orders to refrain from pillaging and killing in the areas that they captured. Like his father, he appears to have strictly enforced these orders, executing any soldier who disobeyed them. Although he controlled the seas and coastlines of southeastern China and had popular support, Zheng Chenggong nevertheless had trouble striking against the Manchus. Fujianese describe their home province as many mountains, few fields, or shan duo, tian shao. Only about 10% of Fujian's land area is less than 200 meters above sea level.

The mountains cut Fujian off from inland China, which is one reason that the Fujianese people have long tended to be so oceanically inclined. Fujian's mountains sheltered Chenggang from Manchu land attacks, but they also made it hard for him to extend his control outward from this base of operation in Xiamen. His early attempts to do so were, to be sure, promising. In 1647, he invaded Quanzhou Prefecture and captured the city of Tong'an. However, powerful Manchu armies soon drove him back once again. In 1649, he once again gained control over large areas of Quanzhou, only to be driven back yet again. When he tried launching attacks further from his base, he had even less success. In 1650, for example, he planned

a major offensive northward from Guangdong, in concert with Ming loyalist forces in Guangxi province. The Manchus swiftly deployed a large army in the area, and he decided instead to seek his advantage by ferrying his army southward along the coast. But a severe storm hindered these movements. Meanwhile, the Manchus had launched a surprise attack against Xiamen, forcing him to return with his armies to protect his home base. Thus, although he had a decisive advantage at sea, being able to move his troops quickly along China's vast coast, this was never quite enough to counter the swift and efficient

Manchu forces on the ground, and he had consistent difficulties in extending his control inland. The only progress he made with land warfare was in limited areas or near his coastal bases. The Manchus did, however, very much view him as a threat. In the early 1650s, after he'd managed to recapture many cities in the Zhengzhou and Quanzhou regions, widening his strategic perimeter around Xiamen and increasing his tax revenues, the Manchus decided that it would prove difficult to reduce him by force of arms. They therefore made an overture. If he would swear loyalty to the Manchu Qing dynasty, they would make him the Duke of Haicheng and give him authority over several coastal prefectures. He entertained the Manchu's emissaries and engaged in lengthy negotiations. Perhaps he did so merely to gain

time to strengthen his military and increase his administrative hold on the lands and people of Fujian. Or maybe he was genuinely considering accepting the offer. In any case, these negotiations never resulted in a formal agreement. He knew that ending the stalemate with the Manchus would require a bold victory. He therefore began plotting his most ambitious undertaking, the capture of Nanjing. This city, which had served as China's capital off and on again for thousands of years, would make a more viable base than Fujian, in addition to the fact that its capture would attract Ming loyalists from all throughout China. For two years, between 1656 and 1658, he plotted and planned his operation and made preparations, gathering grain and armaments, building ships, and drilling his soldiers. He also set up a series of

forts and grain repositories along the coast leading to the Yangtze River. His plan was to sail up the Yangtze with his fleet and land his troops before Nanjing. In the summer of 1658, with preparations complete, he set out with his great fleet from Xiamen. Unfortunately for him, a severe storm forced him to turn back and repair his ships, and it would be nearly a year later that the expedition was ready to re-embark. Thus it was, on July 7th, 1659, Zhen Chenggong's armada sailed through the mouth of the Yangtze River. The ships won their first battles, prompting Chenggong to celebrate by writing the poem that we quoted at the top of this episode. The armada quickly followed up on this victory by proceeding upriver. By August 24th, 1659, managing to encircle the mighty Nanjing. Yet they did not immediately begin a siege.

Chenggong, who felt that Qing power was already crumbling, may have underestimated his enemy's resolve. Believing them already ready to surrender, he engaged in negotiations with the officials in Nanjing. Such a delay may have proved to be the pivotal factor that would cost him victory. Qing reinforcements arrived and launched a furious assault. Despite their preparation, Chenggong's forces broke formation and ran. A month later, the remnants of Zheng's army arrived back in Xiamen. Upon making a count, it was found that the outcome was beyond devastating for Zheng's

forces. Many of his experienced officers had either been captured or killed, as had thousands of his soldiers. Chenggong had made, let's face it, some pretty poor choices. Some of his officials had advised him to secure the area around the Grand Canal instead of sailing directly to Nanjing. If he'd done this, he might have been able to establish a beachhead in Manchu territory and cut off Qing's supply lines. Indeed, he probably could have counted on popular support in the region, since the Manchus had made enemies during their ruthless sacking of Yangzhou. In having failed to do so, however, that opportunity had passed him by, and by this point, it was too late. His defeat at Nanjing left his prestige and organizational structure shattered. He began having more trouble collecting tolls and taxes. What was worse, his trade revenues were beginning to suffer from Manchu policies. In 1656, the Manchus had issued an edict forbidding Chinese subjects, on pain of death,

to trade with Cheng Gong's people. At first, the edict had had little effect, but the same year, one of Cheng Gong's senior merchants, a man who knew the intricacies of the Zheng family trade network, defected to the Manchus and revealed Chenggong's senior merchants, a man who knew the intricacies of the Zheng family trade network, defected to the Manchus and revealed Chenggong's web of secret contacts. With this knowledge, the Manchus were able to begin prosecuting Chenggong's trading partners. Most importantly of all, in 1660, the Manchus embarked on a draconian policy of destroying Chenggong's source of livelihood. They began fortifying the coasts of China and implementing a coastal evacuation policy, whereby all coastal inhabitants had to move 10 miles inland. Equally important, the other centers of Ming loyalism were collapsing, and the Manchus were able to concentrate a larger and larger percentage of their full force on Fujian. Chong Gong proved

that he could still counter Manchu armies, for he was victorious in the first battle of the Manchus renewed offensive, but he knew that he had to find a new strategy, and thus began considering his alternatives. Might it be possible to expand at the expense of the red-haired barbarians? Relations with them had, after all, deteriorated as of late. In the early 1650s, as in most of the 1640s, relations between Chenggong and the Dutch East India Company had appeared cordial. Letters between them indicate a willingness to cooperate and a commitment to dialogue, but beneath those appearances lay a deep distrust. Some company officials believed that the Chinese revolt of 1652 had been incited by Zheng Chenggong, for a few of the rebels said that they had expected

Chenggong to come to their aid with 3,000 junks and 30,000 men, and that he would help them capture all of Formosa from the Dutch. Most Dutch officials did not believe Chenggong would really have helped, and that the revolt was rather the work of the rich Chinese farmers on Taiwan itself. We suspect that the principal Chinese farmers, having achieved a measure of prosperity, undertook this work of their own accord in order to satisfy their own ambitions. Still, suspicion of Chenggong remained, especially since, around the time of the revolt, a Jesuit priest named Martinus Martini, captured aboard a Portuguese junk, told Dutch officials that Chenggong was looking for a new base of operations, in case the Manchus should drive him from China.

According to Martini, Chonggong had his eyes on Formosa. To be sure, they tried to appear friendly, going out of their way to accede to requests that did not harm their interests. In 1654, Chonggong sent a letter to Taiwan and asked to have a Dutch surgeon sent to Xiaomun to help with some personal medical problems. The company agreed and decided to send Christian Beyer, Zealandia's surgeon-in-chief. When Beyer arrived in Xiamen, he was shown Cheng Gong's wound, quote,

a few lumps on his left arm, which according to the Mandarin, Cheng Gong, had been caused by cold and wind, but about which Beyer himself had a different opinion, end quote. Perhaps the Dutch writer's reticence about the true cause indicates that Bayer suspected it was syphilis, which can cause rashes and legions on skin. If so, this would go a long way to explain the psychotic episodes later in Chung-Gong's life, and perhaps his early death. In any case, Bayer prescribed medicine, which Chung-Gong required

him to prepare in front of his own doctor, who inspected the ingredients carefully before allowing Beyer to add them, quote, even though he had no understanding of them, end quote. Frustrated, Beyer wrote to Zelandia. Chung-gong, he said, refused to cooperate with his medical advice. More important, his patient, quote, for the smallest of reasons, has many people killed in various awful ways, such that few days pass without three, four, or five people being executed, end quote. Bayer asked to be allowed to return home. The Council of Formosa refused, ordering him to stay and finish the cure. Bayer was frightened, however, and resolved to take his leave.

When he finally got up the nerve to ask Chonggong for permission to depart, the latter assented. Bayer thereafter returned aboard a Chinese junk. He'd not managed to cure Chenggong's arm, but the prestige of Dutch surgery had not been diminished. It was in 1655 that he established the Ming Memorial Capital in Xiamen. And so his struggle against the Manchus was beginning in earnest, and in the fighting that ensued, far fewer junks came to Taiwan. As the governor of Taiwan wrote in a letter to Batavia, trade would be slow until the end of the war.

Quote, We and the Chinese merchants will have to wait until Chenggong and the Tartar reach a peace or until one is defeated. End quote. Although they realized that they could do little about it, Dutch officials looked on Chenggong's growing power with a rising concern. According to reports of Europeans and Chinese traders alike, he had around 300,000 men and some 3,000 junks. It was clear that he was preparing for a large siege. Although direct evidence of hostile

intentions against Taiwan was lacking, Dutch officials in Taiyuan wrote to Batavia to ask for more soldiers from Batavia, for permission to build more forts on Taiwan to help ward off an invasion by sea, and of course, for more ships. Company officials also began noting that Chenggong did not accept the company's sovereignty over Taiwan and its Chinese residents. In August 1655, the governor of Taiwan received a letter from Changgong. The Spanish, wrote Changgong, had been mistreating his sailors, and he had therefore issued an edict that forbade Chinese to sail to Manila on pain of death. He enclosed a copy of the edict and requested that the governor propagate it in Formosa and enforce it by

confiscating the junks and property of any who disobeyed. But the specific language of the edict raised their hackles. First, it said that the Dutch, quote, behave more like animals than Christians, end quote. Second, it referred to Chinese who lived in the Dutch colony as Cheonggong subjects. Third, and most important, it threatened punishment not only for Chinese, but also for, quote, anyone outside of our nation who extends money for trade with Manila, end quote. If company officials did as Cheung Kong asked and published the edict, they would be admitting that Cheung Kong had sovereignty over the Chinese colonists in Formosa. The governor and the council decided that they must refuse Cheung Kong's request to

preserve the sovereignty of the Netherlands. They replied with a compliment letter, which politely declined his request. Cheung Kong responded not to the Dutch governor, but instead to the Chinese headsman, to whom he sent a direct letter. Therein, he complained that Dutch ships had captured his junks and confiscated his property. He added that he had heard rumors that Dutch officials in Batavia were going to prevent his junks from trading in Southeast Asia. He therefore threatened to prohibit his subjects from engaging in commerce with the Dutch unless the governor of Taiwan would personally guarantee that Chenggong's junks would thenceforth be safe from Dutch depredations and that Batavia would make no decision to forbid his junks from trading in Southeast Asia. If, however, his junks should continue to suffer at Dutch hands, he would, quote,

issue an edict according to which none of my junks from anywhere, even the smallest places, should be allowed to go to Dayuan, end quote. Dutch officials reassured the headsman. Chong Gong was, they said, ill-informed. His junks had not been mistreated in Batavia, and his poor opinion of the Dutch was based on hearsay and rumor. They asked the Chinese headsman to write back to Cheong-gong, telling him politely that they would not propagate his edict. Cheong-gong's ill opinions of the company were well-founded. The company had indeed captured some of his junks.

To raise money for his troops, Zheng had increased his foreign trade, sending junks directly to Japan, Tonkin, Cambodia, Palembang, and Malacca, all ports in which the company had trading interests. Officials in Batavia were wary of his competition. We see that Kosinga is beginning to devote himself more fully to trade, and this may in places undermine our profits. They sent a letter to him to request that in the future he refrain from impinging on their trade privileges. It was polite and was accompanied by gifts, but it made clear that Batavia would not tolerate any increase in Cheng Gong's trade at the company's expense. Batavia also sent a small fleet to Southeast Asian ports to intercept

Cheng Gong's junks. The fleet captured one of Cheng Gong's junks in Palembang and confiscated its rich cargo of pepper. The captors planned to take the junk back to Batavia, but in the middle of the night, it escaped. The fleets also captured another Zheng junk, which it managed to bring back to Batavia. Its cargo of pepper, which the Zheng captain said belonged to Chenggong, was thereafter impounded. Company officials mused about Chenggong's growing influence. They would have received no valuable wares until Chenggong had helped himself to all he wished, quote, since it was in his power to do so, end quote. Moreover, if he resorted to arms, quote,

not only the commerce, but all of Formosa would hang in the balance, for the company's power in the Indies is too weak, end quote. The governor wrote in a letter to Batavia that when one of his predecessors, Hans Putmans, had fought against Cheonggong's father in 1632 and 1633, he'd had 27 ships to Zhilong's thousand and still lost. Now the company had fewer ships and Chenggong far more. On July 9th, 1656, a junk-flying Chenggong's flag arrived at Fort Zelandia. A messenger disembarked carrying an edict. He said he'd been instructed to hand it directly to the Chinese headsman, who should put it up for all to see.

When Dutch officials saw a translated copy, they were alarmed. Chung Gong wrote that the Dutch on Daiyuan, quote, consider our people to be nothing but meat and fish that one can eat. This makes my blood hot, and I am very angry, end quote. He was also angry that the Dutch had refused to propagate his previous edict in which he forbade trade to Manila. Moreover, a junks captain had recently told him that it was common for junks to sail from Dayuan to Manila. Quote, When that came to my ears, I thought it best to immediately close trade with Dayuan and not allow even the smallest vessel or piece of wood to go there. But since my people live there, I did not want to cause them any harm, since they might have junks that are elsewhere and could not get the

news quickly enough to obey. End quote. Therefore, he continued, his subjects would be given 100 days during which junks could freely ply between Formosa and the coast of China, so long as their lading consisted of Formosan products such as venison, salted fish, and sugar. He had, he wrote, placed officers everywhere to inspect all junks that landed on the Chinese coast. Any junk that was found to be in defiance of the order would have its crew executed and its cargo confiscated, with the inspectors getting half the cargo. The intended recipients of the cargo, too, would be executed. Quote, This, my word and mandate, is as strong as gold engraved in stone, and therefore unbreakable.

End quote. The governor and the council members confiscated the edict and told the man who brought it that he would be severely punished if he posted any copies of it anywhere on Formosa. The man promised to comply, but the damage had already been done. Chinese merchants began leaving, taking their wives and children with them, for their livelihood depended on the company's foreign wares, and they believed Chung Gong could and would do as he threatened. Company officials had to do something to respond to such a panic. Equally important, they felt that they had to respond to Chung Gong's insult over their sovereignty. Not only had he tried to propagate his edict in lands belonging to the

United Provinces of the Netherlands, but he had called its inhabitants his subjects. The governor and council sat down and composed an edict of their own. Henceforth, they resolved, no one could bring to Formosa and make public any edicts of foreign rulers. Those who did, or even those who brought letters whose contents might hurt the common good of the Formosan colony, must hand them over immediately or face corporal punishment. In order, however, to not appear overly concerned with Cheng Gong's edict, the governor and council decided to wait a month before issuing their own. In the meantime, they put their forts into a state of defense, and sent reconnaissance junks to the pescadores to investigate Cheng Gong's activities.

They found the inhabitants there reluctant to sell provisions or allow them to take on water, an attitude that they attributed to Chenggong's influence. Indeed, Chenggong made it clear that he would vigorously enforce his edict. Just after the company published its resolution forbidding foreign edicts, news arrived in Zealandia that a Chinese junk from Dayuan had been confiscated in Xiamen. A rigorous inspection had revealed a hidden cargo of pepper. arrived in Zealandia that a Chinese junk from Dayuan had been confiscated in Xiamen. A rigorous inspection had revealed a hidden cargo of pepper. Although the 100 days had not yet expired, pepper was not a Formosan product and was technically forbidden by Chenggong's edict, and so Chenggong had ordered the execution of the captains of the junk. Other crew members

had their right hands cut off. The news caused even more anxiety among the Chinese merchants. It was clear that Chenggang was enforcing his measures. Some of the most important Chinese merchants aborted their trade voyages and ordered that their junks, three of which stood full of pepper and ready to depart, be unloaded and their pepper placed again in warehouses in Zealandia. Around this same time, a minor Mandarin official arrived in Dayuan carrying a document with Chenggong's seal. Dutch soldiers ushered him to an audience with the Council of Formosa before he could talk to anyone else. He said he'd been sent by Chenggong to inspect all the junks in Dayuan and record their cargoes. The governor demanded the document and

had it translated. It stated that the official was to tell Chenggong the names of all Chinese merchants who sought to bring pepper and other foreign trade goods to China. He would receive half the trade goods he found in his inspection, and Chenggong would kill the captains and crews. It was clearly intended to be read by the Chinese merchants of Dayuan, for Chenggong wrote, I recommend that you who reside in Dayuan come back in all haste to China, where you will live in peace and prosperity, end quote.

Company officials were incensed. They told the Mandarin that Chenggong had no right to take our subjects to China. They were especially disturbed by the language of the document, which referred to the Chinese on Formosa as Chenggong's subjects. Chenggong, they said, quote, would not stand for us or anyone else to publish such edicts or make such commands in areas of his control. We can clearly see from his actions that he seeks to break the old friendship and commerce that have for so many years existed between our subjects and his, end quote.

As soon as tide and weather permitted, they said, Chong Gong's inspector must return to China and tell his master that henceforth no one should come to Dayuan on such missions. The Mandarin had, however, already posted the edict in the pescadores, so the Chinese in Dayuan soon learned of his errand. They realized that the lord of the imperial surname was taking concrete measures to examine their junks, and they had no doubt he would punish those who contravened his embargo. They immediately began to load their junks full of venison, fish, and other Formosan products so that they could return to China before Changgong's 100 days had elapsed.

They refused to buy the company's foreign wares, not even one peppercorn. Instead, they desperately sold their own foreign wares, not even one peppercorn. Instead, they desperately sold their own foreign wares, causing prices to fall precipitously. Soon, Dayawan was bereft of Chinese settlers and junks. And that is where we will leave off today, looking ahead toward a final knockdown, dragout, winner-take-all showdown between Zhenchenggong and the Dutch East India Company's forces of Fort Zelandia over the fate of that beautiful island, Taiwan.

It will be a tale of bloody conquest, descent into megalomaniacal insanity, and ultimately, the formation of a brand new kingdom upon the shattered remnants of European colonial power. Thanks for listening. Queen Nefertiti. If you have, you'll probably like the History of Egypt podcast. Every week, we explore tales of this ancient culture. The History of Egypt is available wherever

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