The History of China - #291 - Qing 26: The Cosplayer of Heaven

Episode Date: May 7, 2025

The Yongzheng Emperor's stylings: https://bsky.app/profile/thoc.bsky.social/post/3lnvmogqntk2g Please sign up to support the show at: Patreon.com/thehistoryofchina With the passing of his titan of a father, the Kangxi Emperor's 4th curviving son Prince Yinzheng, will assume the Dragon Throne amidst a tumultuous succession. Amid betrayals and backstabbings, this unlikely monarch will ultimately find himself sandwiched between his father and his son - two uncontestable pillars of Chinese history. And yet, he'll still find ways to shine through, all his own... Time Period Covered: 1722~1728 CE Major Historical Figures: Manchu: The Yongzheng Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yinzhen) [r. 1723-35], Kangxi's 11th (4th surviving) Son Empress Dowager Xiaogongren [1660-1723] Longkodo, Commandant of the Capital Gendarmerie [d. 1728] Prince Yunzhi, Kangxi's 10th (3rd) Son [1677-1732] Prince Yinsi, Kangxi's 16th (8th) Son [1681-1726] Prince Yintang, Kangxi's 17th (9th) Son [1683-1726] Prince Yinxiang, Kangxi's 22nd (13th) Son [1686-1730] Prince Yunti, Kangxi's 23rd (14th) Son [1688-1755] O'er'tai [1680-1745] Hanjun: Chen Menglei [1650-1741] Nian Genglao, Sichuan-Shaanxi Governor-General [1679-1726] Zeng Qing [1679-1736] Yue Zhongqi [1686-1784] Lü Liuliang [1629-1683] Jiang Tingxi [1669-1732] Zhang Tingyu [1672-1755] Li Wei [1687-1738] Tian Wenjing [1662-1732] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. Why do fintechs like Float choose Visa? As a more trusted, more secure payments network, Visa provides scale, expertise, and innovative payment solutions. Learn more at visa.ca slash fintech. Hello, and welcome to the History of China. Episode 291 The Cosplayer of Heaven The seditious rebel claims that we are the rulers of Manchuria, and only later penetrated central China to become its rulers.

Their prejudices concerning the division of their and our country have caused many vitriolic falsehoods. What these rebels have not understood is the fact that Manchuria is, for the Manchus, the same as the birthplace is for the people of the central plain. Xun belonged to the Eastern Yi, and King Wen of Zhou to the Western Yi. Does this fact diminish their virtues? Aisen Gyoro Inzhen, the Yongzheng Emperor The Yongzheng reign, lasting from 1723 to 1735, nevertheless marked a critical juncture

in Qing dynasty statecraft. Under this emperor, whose temple name was known as Shizong, although we will continue to call him Yongzheng for his era name, the Qing state implemented extensive bureaucratic and fiscal reforms to address structural barriers to the problems of what was then modern governance. These initiatives prioritized agricultural expansion and enhanced local administration to better serve rural populations. Frontier policies extended Qing authority into Central Asia, Tibet, and previously neglected regions of China, thereby consolidating imperial control.

The remarkable success of this mere 13-year span stemmed largely from the emperor's dedication to efficient centralized administration. However, Yongzheng's reforms did face opposition, particularly from the entrenched scholar elites who found that their precious privileges were often curtailed. His policies unfolded amidst the lingering succession crisis of his father from the 1710s and 1720s. Yongzheng, born Prince Yinzhen, was accused of usurping the throne and even of committing patricide.

After his death, rumors of assassination emerged, briefly undermining the Manchu-Chinese reconciliation effort that had been so painstakingly achieved under Kangxi. Yet despite these controversies, the Yangzheng Emperor's legacy endured through a statecraft that would go on to strengthen the late imperial state's capacity and objectives. Born in 1678 as Kangxi's fourth surviving son, young Prince Inzhen was largely shaped by his mother, the Empress Xiaogong, a favored consort, a fortunate position which likely afforded him greater paternal attention from his very busy father. Official records highlight his classical education, evidenced by his writing and calligraphy. As emperor, Injun skillfully employed Confucian principles,

using classical allusions to justify his policies, while his interest in Chan Buddhism influenced both his personal beliefs and his style of governance. The details of Prince Injun's early life are limited, with official accounts depicting him as uninvolved in the factional disputes of Kangxi's later years. Elevated to Prince of the Third Class in 1689 and Prince of the First Class, or Prince Qinwang, in 1709, Injun earned Kangxi's trust, undertaking some 15 special assignments and frequently leading the imperial sacrifices at the palace, including representing the Emperor Kangxi himself at the Temple of Heaven

during the winter solstice sacrifices amid the Emperor's final illness. Yinzhen demonstrated filial devotion, caring for his ailing father and hosting him at his princely villas. Whilst avoiding overt factional building, he cultivated alliances with both Manchus and Chinese elites throughout Beijing, which proved crucial in securing the throne and stabilizing his early rule. Kangxi's refusal to name a new heir after deposing his second son in 1712 ensured a prolonged successional struggle, with the victor, whoever it might be's legitimacy,

sure to be contested. By the time of Kangxi's death, the contenders had likely narrowed down to Yinzhi, Inti, and Yinzhi, Yin Ti, and Yin Zhen. Kangxi's third son, Prince Yinzhi, was elevated to Prince First Class alongside Prince Yin Zhen and hosted Kangxi at his villa. His significant role came when their father entrusted him with editing the Imperial Encyclopedia, the Gujintushu Jicheng, alongside the eminent scholar Chen Menglei. Prince Yin Ti, Kangxi's 14th son and Yinzhan's half-brother by the same mother, emerged as a contender in 1718. Appointed Fu Yuan Dajangjun, or the

border pacification general-in-chief, to lead Qing forces against the Khosho-te Mongols for control of Tibet. Recalled back to Beijing in 1721, he was thereafter redeployed to the front in May 1722, just in time for his father's death later that year on December 20. With In-Ti off in the northwest, official accounts state that Prince Ian Jun, representing Kangxi at the Temple of Heaven, was summoned at midnight to Kangxi's villa outside of Beijing. Before the dawn, Kangxi assembled seven sons and Long Kedou, the general commandant of the Beijing gendarmerie, and issued a verbal edict praising Yinzhen as a moral figure, quote, much like the emperor himself, end quote, and designating him successor.

Before his father died, Yinzhen would visit the Kangxi emperor three more times. Kangxi's formal will reaffirmed this verbal edict, formally naming Injun the heir. That night, Injun, his brothers, and countless hosts of soldiers with drawn swords escorted Kangxi's body back into Beijing proper. That December 22, that morning, Injun informed the Empress Dowager of Kangxi's death and his own succession, then announced it to the nobility. The following day, he notified the Board of Rights and decreed a state of national mourning. The day after Kangxi's death, Injun sent a secret memorial to the Grand Secretaries,

ordering an edict post-dated two days before to December 21st, proclaiming Kangxi's death and Injun's selection as successor, and urging the support from all the princes and ministers of the government. That same day, the Empress Dowager issued her own edict, affixed with her seal, confirming Yinzhen's accession. These twin edicts were then proclaimed empire-wide. This highly secretive and very expedited succession was sure to spark rumors. And it did. Manchu and Chinese officials alike alleged that Yin Zhen had altered Kangxi's will, secretly adding a stroke to change his brother Yin Ti's name to his own.

As palace documents used Manchu transcriptions rather than Han Chinese, this claim was likely false, but the lack of evidence for Kangxi's verbal edict and the rushed announcement helped to fuel any dissent and rumor-mongering. The prince now finding himself on the outs, Yin Ti and his supporters faced swift repercussions for not acting sooner. Recalled to Beijing, Yin Ti was stripped of his princely title, placed under house arrest, and later banished back to Manchuria itself, where he would die later in obscurity. Long Kato, one of Yin Ti's key allies, was executed shortly after the Yongzheng Emperor's enthronement. Other Kangxi sons supporting Inti were either demoted or exiled.

This is clearly a man who was not going to take any questions about whether or not he was going to be the legitimate successor. Despite this instability, Yongzheng's administrative prowess emerged relatively quickly. After a three-year mourning period, he initiated a series of reforms aimed at strengthening the central authority of the government, combating corruption, enhancing revenues, and improving public welfare. His secret memorial system enabled direct communications with provincial officials, thus bypassing the time-wasting court factions.

He standardized the land tax rates, reduced arbitrary levies, and streamlined collection, curbing corruption, and fortified Qing finances. The Yongzheng emperor demanded an incorruptible bureaucracy, promoting capable officials, and severely punishing corruption or incompetence, thus revitalizing imperial administration. As a Confucian, Yongzheng upheld traditional moral and political order, but showed tolerance for certain Buddhist and even Taoist sects. He opposed Christianity, not for its doctrines, but for its potential foreign influence, a holdover from his father's souring on the French Catholics.

Though his reign lasted only from 1722 to 1735, the Yongzheng Emperor's governance fortified imperial authority and laid the foundation for the Qianlong Emperor's Golden Age. Yet, controversies surrounding his succession would persist. Rumors claiming that Yongzheng forced Kangxi's will, though the veritable records of Kangxi's reign refute this. Prince Inti's case was bolstered by claims that Injun had tasked Sichuan and Shanxi Governor-General Nian Geng Yao, a Hanjun banner man, with detaining Inti during Kangxi's illness. Some alleged that Injun had poisoned Kangxi with ginseng soup to secure the throne before

Inti could return to the capital. Long Kaido's armed escort of Yongzheng was cited as evidence of his questionable legitimacy. However, these accusations probably reflect the defeated faction's retribution in a fierce succession battle. Yongzheng's treatment of rivals varied. Yin Shi, a prominent opponent, was appointed a first-degree prince and served in the Ministry of Works and the Li Fan Yuan, joining Yongzheng's all-Manshu plenipotentiary council. Yet he would soon fall from favor, and was arrested in 1726 for treason and disrespect

thereafter dying in prison. Yin Ti, hero of the Tibetan campaigns, was recalled for Kangxi's funeral but quickly clashed with the Yongzheng emperor. Sent to perform sacrificial duties near Kangxi's mausoleum, he was briefly made a first-rank prince after their mother's death, possibly as a reconciliation, but was soon returned to his guardianship of the tombs. Yin Tang, exiled to the northwest, enjoyed initial freedom until 1724, when his family joined him, save for one son. Reports on his overreach and harassment led to a demotion in 1725.

The following year, Beijing police seized his coded letter, written in Latin letters and devised by an exiled Jesuit father, Murao. Convicted of throne-seeking and of disobedience, Yintong would die in prison in 1727 alongside Yinshi. So much for brotherly love. Two official's deaths tied to the succession, Yan Gengyao, a 1700s Jian Shi and Hanjun bannerman, was Sichuan Shanxi governor general when Yongzheng ascended. He supported Yin Ti against the Kou Shotes, reinstating the Sixth Dalai Lama in Lhasa. His sister,

a concubine of Prince Yinzhen, did not clearly align him with Yinzhen's faction. Nian's relationship with the emperor deepened post-enthronement, marked by gifts and warm rescripts. In 1723, Yongzheng tasked Nian with quelling a koshotake uprising, earning him a dukedom of the first rank. However, Nian's arrogance, sitting in Yongzheng's presence and abusing his power, prompted warnings. In 1725, his correspondences with Prince Intang emerged, leading to his demotion to Hangzhou General. Accused of some 92 crimes, Nian faced decapitation, but was permitted the grace of suicide in 1726. Long Kedou, a Manchu banner man and Kangxi's nephew, was the Beijing

gendarmerie commandant at Yongzheng's rise. Present at Kangxi's deathbed edict, he ensured a smooth transition with an armed escort. Reloaded with a dukedom and a plenipotentiary council seat, Long Kedou was urged to adopt Nian's son in 1724. Yet, by the very next year, Long Kedou's bribery, overreach, and his defense of Nian had irked Yongzheng to the end. He was thereafter exiled to modern Ningxia, where he negotiated a treaty of Kyakhta with Russia. Recalled in 1727 after an imperial genealogy chart was found in his home, Longkato then faced 47 charges, including bribery. He was sentenced to death by slow slicing, but was issued a pardon and died in prison

in 1728. So I guess take any win you can get. As with any emperor, one of the first key questions facing the Yongzheng emperor was the one that had so perplexed his own father before him, that of succession itself, who will come after me. The Kangxi Emperor's failure to designate his eldest son as heir had led to Yongzheng adopting a modified Manchu practice. He showed no favor to any son, concealing his chosen successor's name in a locked box behind a tablet in the Qianqing Palace. It would only be upon the Yongzheng Emperor's death that Hongli, his fourth son, would be

revealed as Qianlong. Challenges to the Yongzheng Emperor's legitimacy persisted. In the 1720s, literary cases targeted scholars questioning both the Qing Empire and the Yongzheng Emperor's authority. The most significant involve Zeng Qing, a failed Hunan scholar. Influenced by a 17th century critic who has a real tongue twister of a name, let me give it a try, Lu Liuliang, Zeng's anti-Manshu sentiments intensified in 1727 amid rumors of Yongzheng's misconduct.

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to you, please contact Connects Ontario 1866-531-2600 to speak to an advisor free of charge. When disaster struck in Hunan in 1728, Deng interpreted it as a divine retribution and plotted rebellion, targeting the governor general of Sichuan and Shanxi, then Yue Zhongqi, a descendant of the great southern Song hero general and mascot of the show Yue Fei. In October 1728, Zeng's disciple Zhang Xi urged Yue to lead a revolt, posing as wandering bandits who rejected Qing rule. Yue's strategic deception revealed Z's identity and Liu's influence. Zheng accused Yong Zheng of murdering Kang Xi, killing his mother and brothers, and executing loyalists like Nian and Long Kedou, labeling him a greedy, drunken tyrant. The emperor, in a November 1728 rescript to the UAE, stated, quote,

I have read the traitorous document and never dreamed that there were people saying such things about me. End quote. He summoned Zheng and Zhang to Beijing, investigating Liu's writings and rumor sources. Punishment would follow. Liu Lioliang's works were thereafter banned, and in 1733, he and his son's remains were dug up, desecrated, and their bones scattered. His family and disciples faced exile or punishment.

Rumors were traced to both Prince Yin Shi and Prince Intang's retainers. Zeng and Zhang, deemed mere pawns, were spared the harsher penalties. Yongzheng sent Zeng to Hunan as a minor official. The charges against Zeng and Lu's writings challenged Qing authority at a very fundamental level. Yongzheng responded with the 1729 Da-Ij Jianmu-lu, or the record of righteous principles to awake the deluded, a four-volume work containing ten edicts, 47 sections on Zeng and Zhang's interrogations, Zeng's retraction on returning to benevolence.

Distributed to schools empire-wide, it refuted accusations against the Yongzheng emperor and Liu's race-based objections to Manchu rule. Liu argued that the Manchus were not only alien conquerors of China, but were unassimilated and unassimilatable into the polity at large, and therefore unfit to rule it. Yongzheng's counter-edicts in the Daiyi Jue Mu Lu asserted that the Qing upheld Ming honor against rebels, and ruled by virtue, countering Lu's quote-unquote, impenetrable distinction between Chinese and barbarians, or hua yi zhe fun. The text opens, quote, Heaven bestows the mandate to rule on those who have virtue.

In the minds of the traitors, our dynasty are the rulers of Manzhou and came in and took over China. In so viewing the situation, they selfishly perpetrate the mistaken notion that there is a distinction between our two peoples and the lands from which they come. They only talk like this to defame us. Do they not know that Manzhou is our native place, like people in China have native places? Xun was a man of the Eastern barbarians, and King Wan of Zhou was a man of the Western barbarians. Did this mean that they did not have sagely

virtue?" Liu Liliang's racial ideology, which deemed Manchus unfit to rule due to their immutable ethnic distinctions, disregarded the Mencian principle that all humans are capable of moral transformation. Yongzheng countered this notion, noting that if barbarians could not achieve sagehood, Confucius would not have served in the state of Chu. This argument underscored Yongzheng's rejection of Liu's exclusionary framework, emphasizing a more universal moral potential over native place or ethnic distinctions. Yongzheng's dispute with thinkers like Liu extended beyond race and to the nature of

the state itself. Late Ming theorists favored a decentralized fengjian, or feudal structure, with self-governing communities led by local elites, requiring minimal central intervention. In contrast, the Qing embraced a statist model, emphasizing the centralized oversight of provincial and local governance. This model sought to eliminate mediating influences between the ruler and minister or subject, asserting the state's responsibility to ensure the public welfare overall and necessitating

robust fiscal resources. The Yongzheng Emperor justified Qing rule through its achievements, nearly a century of peace, suppression of banditry, territorial expansion, population growth, and increased cultivated land. I mean, what are you all complaining about? Central to Yongzheng's vision was the emperor's role as moral exemplar and transformer of the people at large, a duty that he felt he shared with his father Kangxi. His communications with officials were filled with moral guidance, reflecting his belief in

education as a tool for pacification, particularly in the northwest and southeast under their native chieftains. In 1724, Yongzheng authored the Pengtang Lun, or On Factions, and amplified instructions on the sacred edict. Both distributed to schools empire-wide for dissemination at bimonthly village compact meetings. These works encapsulated his views on proper conduct for both subjects and ministers. Equally critical was Yangzhe's commitment to administrative efficiency and integrity. Viewing himself as uniquely positioned above private interests, he demanded absolute loyalty from ministers, stating,

"...the essential duty of a minister is simply to be aware that he has a prince, or then his dispositions will be firmly disciplined and he will be able to share his prince's likes and dislikes, hence the saying, one in virtue, one in heart, high and low are bound together." End quote. Factionism, he argued, was the greatest threat to governance, fostering corruption and obstructing the bond that was supposed to exist between the ruler and his ministers. In On Factions, Yongzheng criticized the Song dynasty essayist Ouyang Xiu's defense of

cliques as associations of like-minded men, asserting that in fact only the emperor's perspective truly mattered. Yongzheng's disdain for degree-holding officials was pretty evident. He viewed many of them as careless, corrupt, and overly reliant bureaucrats, reliant on examination-based networks that prioritize their personal ties and guanxi over the public interest. He lamented, quote, "...the practice of teacher-student and classmate relationships associated with favoritism and appeals to feelings is seen everywhere and is unbreakable.

If the official career should be left completely to those who rise through examinations, they would just firmly join together and work for their private interest against the public interest. This is of great harm to the public welfare and to the livelihood of the people. The purchase system should be appropriately expanded." To counter this, Yongzheng meticulously selected officials, relying on field recommendations rather than Ming-era lottery, and devoted extensive time to the evaluations, stating, After I have appointed them and in due course observed them, then if I find them unworthy, I have no choice but to change them. Therefore, every time there is an opening, from governor-general down to

local magistrate, if I do not find the right men, I pour through the monthly records of the Board of War and the Board of Civil Office repeatedly. I often go without sleep all night. I must get the right man before I can relax." Yongzheng's personal ruling style prioritized a loyal inner court to oversee the outer court and provincial bureaucracies, countering perceived self-interest among the Mandarins. Inheriting an entrenched outer court and an inner court dominated by princess and conquest elites from Kangxi's 60-year reign, Yongzheng had to assert his own control, bureaucratizing the administration of the Five Lower Banners.

He allowed Kangxi's inner court bodies, such as the Deliverative Council of Princes and the Southern Study, to wane, replacing them with advisors loyal to him directly. The Plenipotentiary Council, compromising both Manch's like Long Kato, Matsu, and brothers Yin Xiang and Yin Shi, managed the imperial transition, but was disbanded after 1725. Until 1729, Yongzheng relied on informal groups of trusted officials, who held high central bureaucratic posts while serving as inner court deputies, thus enabling oversight of the outer court with flexibility. The Grand Secretariat was relegated to routine tasks, with policymaking shifting to the inner court itself.

The core makeup of Yongzheng's inner court until the late 1720s' Zhenggar Campaign included Yi Prince Yinxiang, a loyal brother uninvolved in Kangxi's factional struggles. Promoted to Prince of the First Rank, Yinxiang handled critical tasks, including fiscal reforms in the early 1720s, as well as the Zhenggar War planning. His death in 1730 devastated Yongzheng, who confessed in an edict that the loss of such an incorruptible confidant left him unable to eat or sleep. Yongzheng also relied on Chinese official Jiang Tingshi and Jiang Tingyu from prominent

Jiangnan literati families. Jiang's official was a Kangxi-era Grand Secretary, and Jiang's brother was a noted painter, with Jiang himself a renowned painter and poet. Both were awarded high posts – Jiang as superintendent of the Ministry of Civil Appointments and Grand Secretary in 1726, and Jiang as Grand Secretary and Minister of Revenue. As intercourt advisors, they drafted edicts and aided policy deliberations, joining Yin Xiang in secret Zhenggar campaign preparations as of 1726. Yongzheng took a hands-on role in the Zhenggar War, addressing logistical and strategic challenges and corruption risks.

In 1729, he established the Hubei Junxiufang, or the Military Finance Section, under the Ministry of Revenue. However, Inshang's 1730 death paused the campaign and prompted a formalized inner court advisory body, called the High Officials in Charge of Military Strategy, or the Banli Junjidachun. These informal bodies, outside of any statutory structure, collaborated with an expanded inner court in order to manage military affairs up until the reign's end. The Yongzheng Emperor's approach to provincial administration reflected his deep distrust

of degree-holding elites and his emphasis on robust institutions of governance. He therefore relied on a select group of trusted officials, often from non-traditional backgrounds, in order to implement his most ambitious and controversial policies. Fiscal reforms, incorporation of native chiefdoms, and territorial consolidation in the northwest. Many of these officials, including Manchu or Hanjun manor men and those who purchased their degrees, rose through the irregular route and were held up as exemplars of practical, risk-taking governance in the service of the state and its people. Three key figures dominated Yinzheng's provincial administration, and they are Ou Artai, Li Wei, and Tian Wenjing. Minor officials under Kang Xi, they ascended rapidly under Yongzheng's patronage, serving as his eyes and ears in the southwest, central, and northern regions, respectively.

Ou Artai, a member of the Border Blue Banner and a 1699 Junren, was educated in both Manchu and Chinese. By Yongzheng's accession, he was an assistant department director in the Imperial Household Administration. Sent to Yunnan to proctor provincial examinations, Ou Artai was promoted to Jiangxi financial commissioner upon his return. In 1725, he became governor of Yunnan and acting Yunnan Guizhou governor general, serving in the southwest until 1732, when he joined the inner court in Beijing to advise on northwestern military affairs.

Ouartai's activism was pivotal in convincing Yongzheng to integrate native chiefdoms in Yunnan and Guizhou, which was a major military endeavor. He also advanced the land and salt tax administration, transportation, water control, mining, and copper coin minting throughout the southwest. Li Wei, a native of Xuzhou Jiangsu and a holder of a purchased rank, was a department director in the Ministry of Revenue when the Yongzheng emperor took the throne. Sent to Yunnan as a salt attendant, Li's aggressive stance against corruption in civil and salt administration earned Yongzheng's trust. In 1727, he was appointed the Zhejiang Governor General, with responsibilities expanded to Fujian in 1728. A staunch opponent of literati privilege and bureaucratic corruption,

Li faced frequent attacks from peers. His practical governance led Yongzheng to commission him, alongside Tian Wenjing, to co-author the Qianbang Zhouxian Shiyi, or the Imperially Commissioned Guide to County and District Administration, which was, like it sounds, a manual for magistrates. The eldest of this trio, Tian Wenjing, held various posts under Kang Xi, including magistrate, controller of the Zhanglu Salt Administration, and a variety of mid-level ministerial roles. In 1723, Yongzheng tasked Tian with supervising famine relief in Shanxi, followed by a role

as the Shanxi Financial Commissioner, Henan Financial Commissioner, and finally Henan Governor. He concluded his career as Henan Shandong Governor-General, which was a post created specifically for him. Tian's tenure exemplified the Yongzheng Emperor's reliance on trusted provincial officials. He combated literati privilege, targeting litigation-mongering and tax farming, and enforced Yongzheng's ban on literati tax exemptions. Tian also developed a model for returning the meltage fee to public coffers, aligning with Yongzheng's fiscal reforms, something we'll get into a bit more later. Their shared purpose is evidenced in their correspondence, with Yongzheng's value in

Tian's loyalty and practical insight. Tian did, however, face significant opposition, notably during the 1724 Fengqiu Henan County Examination Boycott over his handling of emergency dyke repairs. The emperor reassured him, stating, quote, If you are fair and loyal, what have you to fear? If you have even a tiny private self-interest in this, you could not fool me. You are one of those who really understands my wishes, and I trust you to do your best. End quote. In 1726, the governor general of Zhejiang, Li Fu, impeached Tian for his harsh treatment of degree holders, but the Emperor's investigation deemed the accusations a factional attack

by examination peers, siding with the defendant. Tian's skepticism of degree holders stemmed from their reliance on Confucian classics over practical texts like the sacred edict and collected statues and precedents. The advocated functional specialization, proposing circuit attendance for Yellow River conservancies and transferring waterworks management from magistrates to specialized river officials. In the Qianbangzhouxing Shi'yi, Qian and Li cautioned officials against close ties with the local literati, advising quote,

Do not entertain them, or be entertained by them, except when absolutely necessary. Above all, do not accept their gifts, or their requests, to become your student or vice versa. This can only lead to entanglements, which will make it impossible for you to deal with them impartially and according to the law. Tian proposed sending expectant generals to provinces for apprenticeships, arguing that book-based knowledge made officials rigid and outdated. He noted, quote, "...they follow the old beaten path without question. Even if there are some among them who have read extensively in statecraft, if they cannot adapt themselves to circumstances, but only hold to the fixed and established say settings of the ancients, they will not see that which was appropriate

in ancient times is not appropriate now." Though initially deemed radical, by the reign's end, the Shigong Yuan, or Official-in-Training system appeared throughout the provincial reports. The absolute cornerstone of the Yongzheng Emperor's personal governments, however, was his expansion of the secret palace memorial system, which, as you may remember, had been initiated by his father, the Kangxi Emperor, during his own succession crisis. While Kangxi had used it to monitor factional struggles and communicate with selected confidants, the Yongzheng Emperor transformed it into the primary channel for non-routine government business.

Upon ascending the throne, he extended memorializing privileges to officials below provincial governor rank and to more central bureaucracy members, using these memorials to gather information, test administrative solutions, and even bypass the outer court. Delivered directly to the inner court by a memorialist's retainer and returned the same way, secret palace memorials avoided Grand Secretariat scrutiny. Read and endorsed solely by Yongzheng, they allowed officials to propose ideas without fear of reprisal or of outer court suppression. Unlike formal responses to routine memorials, which carried edict-like authority, secret

memorials enabled free exchange between the emperor and his ministers. They fostered a sense of trust with Yongzheng's rescripts often personal, inquiring about officials' health or offering gifts. For instance, he sent Nian Gengyao a pearl and earrings for his wife, symbolizing future success and favor,all of this before Nian's tumultuous fall from grace. In 1729, when illness prevented Tian Wenzheng from preventing New Year ceremonial duties, Yongzheng's rescript prioritized obedience over ritual, stating, quote,

"...you should rest and recuperate in a warm room, and you should wait until you are completely normal before you go out and move around. Even if it is the New Year, you need not overexert yourself to participate in ceremonial activities. Showing respect for your sovereign and fulfilling your ritual responsibilities does not require that you perform ceremonies, but that you follow my orders. Even if it causes ignorant types to engage in unfavorable criticism, you have me to stand up for you. What is the harm?" Secret memorials facilitated controversial policies as well, such as returning the meltage

fee, merging the labor service tax into the land tax, and appointing officials in training. After extensive correspondence, Yongzheng would instruct officials to submit routine memorials for court approval, guiding them through the process. He received anywhere between 10 to 60 memorials every day, initially reading and endorsing each personally. Later, overwhelmed by the sheer volume, he came to rely on trusted confidants like Yin Xiang. Yongzheng noted, quote, I am determined to be the first in the empire in diligence, and

through outsiders, and though outsiders do not believe this, I endorse personally the palace memorials of all the major and minor officials. During the day, there are innumerable oral methods and palace memorials from the ministers at court, and I get no peace. This is not as good as working at night when I can operate as I please. Of all the memorials which come to me from the provinces, I endorse 80 or 90% of them in the evening." Covering officials from water control to criminal justice, secret memorials allowed high officials to report on subordinates' performance and consult on appointments and even impeachments.

Unlike routine memorials with strict reporting rules, secret memorials encouraged candid observations, reducing cover-ups as officials feared exposure by others. This flood of information empowered the Yongzheng Emperor to combat inefficiency and corruption both, which he saw as legacies of his father, reinforcing his centralized, activist model of governance. And that is going to be where we end off today. We will pick up again next time with the continuation of the Yongzheng reign, the cosplay king as it were.

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