The History of China - #292 - Qing 27: The Wonder Years

Episode Date: May 14, 2025

The Yongzheng Emperor brings Peace, Justice, & Security to his new Empire. Time Period Covered: 1723-1728 CE Major Works Cited: Perdue, Peter C. China marches west: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia. Qin, Han Tang (秦漢唐). 不同於戲裡說的雍正皇帝 [A different Yongzheng from the work of fiction]  Rowe, William T. China's last empire: the great Qing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. you'll pay the same thing every month. With all of the mysteries that life has to offer, a few certainties can really go a long way. Subscribe today for the peace of minds you've been searching for. Public Mobile, different is calling. Hello and welcome to the history of China. Hello and welcome to the history of China. Episode 292 The Wonder Years. If it is a trivial matter, do not just simply neglect the issue because it seems insignificant. If it is a complex matter, do not just simply conceal away the issue because it could become a challenge. To have good governance and dissuade seditionists is all in the ruler's wish. If civilians see a judicious court that is loyal and wholeheartedly

for the country, and see that the court embraces its people and civilians feel the virtue in their court-martials, then the people would not perceive the court as a threat. Thus, there would be no reason to have seditionaries. The Yongzheng Emperor, from Qin Hang Tang's A Different Yongzheng from the Work of Fiction, 2012. Last time, we closed out the titanic era of the Kangxi Emperor's singular 60-year-long period of rule. Then, with great flurry and confusion, launched directly into the reign of his son and, almost

accidental, heir, Prince Ian Jun, a true dark horse candidate of a monarch who, in spite of seeming to come out of effectively nowhere, nevertheless true dark horse candidate of a monarch who, in spite of seeming to come out of effectively nowhere, nevertheless overcame the controversy of his inheritance to prove himself both the worthy and even admirable sovereign of Great Qing, the Yongzheng Emperor. Today we continue on through what can, on the whole, be adequately characterized as the halcyon golden years of the early Qing dynasty, a period of good governance, balanced laws, and, by all appearances, a genuinely magnanimous sovereign.

So let's launch right in. When Inzhen, aged 45, ascended the throne in 1723, now as the Yongzheng Emperor, he brought a wealth of political experience and a keen understanding of state affairs, surpassing even that of his father, Kangxi, at the start of his own reign. Viewing his emperorship as a divine mandate, Yongzheng believed his virtue and practical knowledge uniquely equipped him to govern. Thus, he approached his role with a reformist's zeal, convinced that Kangxi's leniency had only weakened the overall Qing bureaucracy.

Yongzheng saw administrative reform as his sacred duty to strengthen the Qing empire and ensure its continuation. In his first major address to ministers, issued before his reign had officially even begun, Yongzheng set out his reformist tone, declaring, quote, If you know of any aspect of governance that should be carried out or that should be eliminated to the benefit of the government's finances or the people's livelihood, you should write to me about each one by Secret Palace Memorial, end quote. This directive signaled his intent to tackle systemic issues through direct, candid communication with his officials. The Yongzheng Emperor prioritized addressing the pervasive deficits in the government's treasuries. By 1722, despite two decades of relative peace, the Ministry of Revenue's treasury held only

8 million tails of silver, approximately 27% of the government's annual tax quota. Deficits also plagued other treasuries and granaries all around the capital. Unlike Kangxi's administration, which attributed tax shortages to public non-payment, Yongzheng identified official mismanagement and corruption within the bureaucracy as the root cause. This shift in perspective prompted a broader examination of the flaws within the Qing fiscal system overall. Yang Zheng also rejected Kangxi's sympathy for officials who struggled to collect their taxes, instead attributing such deficits to sheer embezzlement.

He argued that taxes that had been collected locally were simply not being remitted to the central government, leaving the state unprepared for emergencies and unable to fulfill its current obligations. Local officials, protected by superiors, mislabeled embezzled funds as quote-unquote, shifted for public expenses or in gong nol yi. Going so far as to just ignore the repayment deadlines until the officials responsible for collecting them left their posts, essentially just waiting out the clock. Even the Ministry of Revenue itself was complicit, accepting bribes in order to conceal such embezzlements. In 1723, Yongzheng established the Office of the Audit, led by trusted allies including

his brother Yingxiang and his uncle Longkado. Tasked with investigating questionable provincial accounts and auditing the six ministries, the office aimed to end bribery-fueled evasion of scrutiny and clear central government deficits. To address local corruption indirectly, Yongzhong directed governors and governor generals to investigate deficits in their jurisdictions without fear of punishment for honest reporting. investigate deficits in their jurisdictions without fear of punishment for honest reporting. All deficits had to be repaid within three years, with severe penalties for dishonesty or extortion to cover shortfalls. Yang's aggressive stance on corruption signaled his meticulous oversight and intolerance for provincial underperformance.

Initially, he dismissed claims that deficits resulted from funds used for unauthorized public purposes insisting on full treasury replenishment within three years. This pressure strained local bureaucracies, as reports revealed long-standing deficits often tied to departed officials. The Ministry of Revenue argued that current officials should repay all deficits, while calling for stricter provincial account supervision. By late that year, Yongzheng struck a decisive blow against prevailing fiscal practices, banning customary fees and salary contributions to local officials used for public projects. This however threatened to paralyze Qing fiscal administration altogether, as magistrates

and higher officials relied on these fees to simply operate. However, the moratorium on sanctions for fiscal malfeasance encouraged candid reporting, exposing the fragile foundations of the Qing public financing system. Secret palace memorials revealed a critical truth. The Qing fiscal system failed to provide sufficient revenues for local and provincial governments to meet state expectations. Land and labor services, the primary revenue source, were supplemented by salt taxes and smaller region-specific levies. According to the Yongzheng edition of the Daxinghui Dian, only about 21% of land and

labor service tax revenues were retained in provinces as of 1685. These funds, tightly regulated, covered official stipends ranging from 80 tales for magistrates to 180 tales for governors general, Yamun runner wages, ceremonial expenses, student stipends, and welfare for the vulnerable and impoverished. Central authorities often redirected these retained funds, leaving local officials underfunded for essential tasks like infrastructure maintenance, wages for additional staff, or even emergency relief. Lacking formal budgetary support, local officials resorted to two strategies – either diverting

central government funds, or extracting additional revenues during tax collection time. In practice, they employed both, creating a complex informal funding system that operated alongside the statutory fiscal structure. Though not officially sanctioned, this system was highly effective and even standardized, with consistent fee structures and transmission paths across decades. Magistrates, those closest to taxpayers, imposed surcharges like wastage allowances—the haomi for grain, or the haoxian or huohao for silver—originally intended to offset transportation losses but often inflated to 50% or more of the overall tax quota.

Other methods included weighted scales and fees for tax-related services. When insufficient, magistrates would divert funds from designated budgets or falsified arrears to retain taxes loyally. Higher officials, without direct tax collection duties, relied on customary fees from subordinates, contributions from customs and salt administrations, deductions from taxes remitted to the Center, and sums skimmed during government projects. This informal network enabled local government functionality but did pose significant challenges. Fund diversions, while not always corrupt, violated administrative codes and required

secrecy, risking unpreparedness for emergencies like famine. Falsified arrears directly caused central deficits, while surcharges increased taxpayer burdens and arrears. The reliance on customary fees compromised official discipline, as superiors condoned subordinate misconduct in order to sustain their own operations, fostering a cycle of corruption. In all, Yongzheng's fiscal reforms targeted the systematic corruption and inefficiencies exposed by the informal funding system.

By establishing the Office of the Audit, enforcing accountability, and banning customary fees, he sought to centralize control and ensure remittances to the state. His use of secret palace memorials facilitated candid reporting, revealing the structural inadequacies of Qing fiscal administration. And while these forms strained local bureaucracies in the short and mid-term, they did lay the groundwork for a more disciplined and centralized state in the long-term, strengthening the Qing's capacity to govern and setting the stage for the Qianlong reign, despite ongoing legitimacy challenges.

By late 1723, the Yongzhong Emperor's fiscal reforms had exposed the full scope of the Qing government's financial crisis. The moratorium on punishments for reporting deficits encouraged officials to disclose widespread shortfalls in local and provincial treasuries, revealing the inadequacies of the statutory revenue sharing framework. Yongzheng's ban on customary fees and salary contributions alleviated some pressure on county officials, but left many of them without means to cover their deficits or fund yamen operations, as a crackdown on surcharges further constrained their resources.

The solution, emerging in late 1723, was the Huohou Guigong, or the return of the Meltage Fee to the public coffers, a landmark reform that reshaped Qing financial administration overall. The Houhou Guigong established a comprehensive revenue sharing system between central and local governments, marking a historic shift in Chinese governments altogether. For the very first time, the state formally accounted for officials' administrative needs and local governments' responsibility to provide public services and infrastructure. The reform balanced flexibility for local governance with mechanisms for provincial

oversight and intra-provincial resource redistribution. Although, of course, imperfectly executed, it was a cornerstone of the Yongzheng Reign's state-building project, reinforcing centralized control while addressing local needs. The reform's development echoed the late Ming single-whip reforms, with provincial officials taking the initiative. But Yongzheng played a pivotal role in mediating competing interests and driving the process forward.

The secret palace memorial system was instrumental in this process, enabling direct communication between the emperor and his provincial officials. This allowed experimentation with solutions, local condition assessments, and reform refinement away from public scrutiny. When does fast grocery delivery through Instacart matter most? When your famous grainy mustard potato salad isn't so famous without the grainy mustard, when the barbecue's lit but there's nothing to grill, when the in-laws decide that, actually, they will stay for dinner. Instacart has all your groceries covered this summer, so download the app and get delivery

in as fast as 60 minutes. Plus, enjoy zero dollar delivery fees on your first three orders. Service fees exclusions and terms apply. Instacart. Groceries that over-deliver. The earliest proposal came from the Hukwong governor general, Yong Zongren, who suggested legalizing meltage fees for public purposes. Yongzheng responded enthusiastically, but urged caution. A similar memorial from Henan governor Shi Wenzhuo earned praise for its practicality with Yongzheng emphasizing the need to calculate

available funds and expenses to ensure the continuation of smooth governance. Dismissing vague moral platitudes as empty words on paper with no real practical value, the governors of Zili and Shandong proposed legalizing fixed meltage fees retained locally except for a portion remitted to provincial treasuries for expenses and deficit clearance. However, these plans merely formalized existing illegal levies. Incidentally, I realize I have not explained this yet. A meltage fee or the hohao is a surcharge used to compensate local governments for losses during the process

of melting smaller units of silver into large ingots. Obviously, there's some wastage during the melting process, and so those governments are expected to cover those losses with money. This would be a very important revenue source for local governments, hence why it's targeted now by the Yongzheng Emperor. The model that became the Huhao Guigong was proposed by the Shanqi governor Nuomin and financial commissioner Tian Wenjing in the spring of 1723. Instead of allowing magistrates to retain most meltage fees, they recommended

remitting all fees to the provincial capital, where the financial commissioner would redistribute them as gongfei or public expense funds for infrastructure and yanglianyin, or the nourishing virtue silver, for officials' personal and administrative expenses, based on periodic assessments of the local need. Despite secrecy, the experiment became public as officials traveling through reforming provinces reported back to Beijing, thus sparking heated debate. Critics like Luo Qichang, who observed the reforms in Henan, argued that remitting fees to provincial capitals laced transport costs and stripped magistrates of their vital local revenues. Others, like Professor Shan Jin Su, claimed that reforms violated low-taxation principles, advocating frugality over legitimizing

embezzlers' debts. Local resistance in Shanxi saw magistrates refuse to remit fees, though swift impeachments quelled any such dissent. In Henan, literati and officials protested, culminating in a boycott of the Fengqiu County examinations altogether. In July 1724, Yongzheng escalated the issue by instructing Nongmin to formally request implementation through the Grand Secretariat. The Grand Secretaries raised objections, echoing Luo and Shen's

concerns. The Emperor countered by having Shanxi Financial Commissioner Gao Changlin submit a detailed rebuttal. Expanding the discussion to include the censorate and councils of ministers and princes, Yong Zheng urged calm deliberation, allowing for even split opinions. The court reluctantly approved the reform on an experimental basis in Shanxi alone to address the deficit crisis there, highlighting the limits of even Yong Zheng's supposedly limitless authority. Frustrated by his minister's short-sightedness, Yongzheng argued in an edict that the reforms

reduced taxpayers' burdens and fostered official morality, but he left implementation to the governor's discretion, guided by secret palace memorials to ensure alignment with his vision. The finalized Houhao Guigong incorporated Nuomin and Tian Wenxing's proposal, refined under Tian's Henan governorship. A fixed meltage fee for coining, collected alongside regular land and labor service taxes, was remitted to provincial financial commissioners, who redistributed it as first the yanglianyin, or the nourishing virtue silver, which were substantial salary supplements ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 tales for magistrates up to 10,000 to 20,000 tales for governors and governor generals, covering both personal and yaman administrative expenses.

The second was the gongfei, or the public expense account. This accounted for funds for infrastructure like roads, bridges, walls, granaries, and waterworks. And the third was the Provincial Discretionary Fund. Throughout many provinces, it was used as a reserve for emergencies like famine relief or flood repairs. By centralizing these meltage fee collections at their provincial level, the reform enabled redistribution from wealthier to poorer regions, thus addressing fiscal inequalities.

Yongzheng's use of secret palace memorials allowed to tailor implementation, with provinces like Guizhou and Yunnan integrating commercial taxes due to low land tax bases. Meldage fee rates were set inversely to regular tax quotas, and yanglianyin amounts varied by post-responsibilities. Crucially, Yongzheng exempted meltage fee reporting from Ministry of Revenue oversight, freeing magistrates from rigid quotas and budgetary constraints that otherwise plagued regular retained funds. In terms of its impact and implications, the whole Haoguigong institutionalized a predictable funding source for public services, fostering an activist state ethos that prioritized infrastructure

and welfare as state responsibilities. Yongzheng's defense against accusations of violating low-taxation ideals was twofold. First, that regulated surcharges reduced the real tax burden, and second, that the reform supported a centralized state vision that countered the decentralized, literati-led Fengjian model favored by early Qing anti-Manchu thinkers. By addressing local government needs while maintaining provincial oversight, the reform resolved tensions between centralization and decentralization, strengthening Qing's fiscal administration and laying a foundation for the reins to follow. The Yongzheng Emperor's governance was guided by the fundamental principle that the

state must balance his fiscal needs with the people's livelihood, ensuring that its citizens could live contentedly without excessive state extractions. This dual commitment shaped his reforms, which not only bolstered state finances, leaving some 60 million tales in the treasury by his death in 1735, but also addressed the welfare of the populace through significant fiscal and social measures. The early Qing tax system relied heavily on the land tax, or ti, and the labor service tax, or ting, levied on adult males aged 16 to 60. By the Qing period, the ting was paid in silver rather than labor, with rates varying widely

across the provinces. As it was not tied to land ownership or to income, it disproportionately burdened the poorest households. Merging the labor service tax into the land tax, now called the tīng suì tì, as was proposed in the late Ming dynasty, would relieve landless households, but was impractical until the labor service quota was frozen as of 1711. Progress stalled until the Yongzheng reign. In August 1723, the Jili governor Li Weijun proposed immediate implementation via a secret

palace memorial, bypassing the Ministry of Revenue to avoid any opposition. The emperor championed the proposal, submitting it to the ministry himself, which approved it about three months later. In order to build consensus, he circulated the memorial to the nine ministers in relevant capital offices, addressing their concerns through further consultation with Li. Implementation itself was left to the provinces, guided by secret palace memorials in order to account for local conditions. In most provinces, a fixed Ting unit was added to each tail of land tax after adjusting for land productivity.

Opposition came, of course it did, primarily from landowners, especially the degree-holding elites who evaded part of the Ting who now feared higher land taxes. They and other critics argued that all subjects should pay some tax regardless of land ownership, and that varying land productivity, known as mole, across provinces could create inequalities. Despite this resistance, the reforms would go on to alleviate the burden on the landless, aligning taxation with economic capacity and advancing fiscal equality. Land reclamation was a long-standing Qing priority to restore arable land that had been

lost during the Ming-Qing transition, which reduced registered land by nearly 2 million Qing. By the Yongzhong era, registered land slightly exceeded that of late Ming levels, with 1,732,225 Qing added to tax rolls between 1661 and 1724. While earlier reclamation focused on China's economic heartland, Yangzheng's efforts targeted frontier provinces like Sichuan, the northwest and southwest such as Huguang, Guizhou, and Yunnan, as well as Guangdong, Guangxi, and Henan. These regions, often less densely populated, supported growing populations and emerging industries like mining and cash-cropping. Techniques included liberal tax-exempt grace periods, such as six years for paddy fields, ten years

for dry fields in 1723, which was later tightened down to five years. It also included rewards for officials and elites promoting reclamation, and loans for seeds, cattle, tools, and even food. The Houhou Guigong reform provided local governments with funds to subsidize these settlers, while expanded frontier controls facilitated settlement in former native tribal territories. In 1725, Gansu's wastelands were surveyed, with owners given one year to cultivate or else forfeit uncultivated hillsides. Fujian and Hubei set three-year deadlines for productive use.

Government programs supported individual reclamation. In Sichuan's Red Basin, Governor Xian De allocated 30 to 50 mole per household in 1728. In Ningxia and Anxi, former military pastures were converted to farmland, with 100,000 tails invested in water conservancy for 20,000 planned households, though only 4,600 settled by 1728. In Yunnan's Chaotong Prefecture, migrants received travel stipends and 20-mo homesteads, with 20,000 tails allocated for rice support. Loans and supplies, including buckwheat seeds and lime in Yunnan and Guizhou, aided settlers

in remote areas, significantly boosting taxable land and food production. Turning to the elites and the literati of the realm, Yongzheng viewed the literati privilege as a threat to both state finances and public welfare overall. Degree holders often abused their status to evade taxes and exploit communities. In 1724, Yongzheng outlawed differential tax classifications inherited from the Ming, such as the Dahu and Xiaohu, or small and large household, and Guanhu or Minhu, or official and commoner household, differentiations, which favored official households and lower rates and exemptions from extralegal charges. In 1726, the Emperor limited labor service tax exemptions to degree holders themselves,

ending extensions to their families or commoners consigning lands to them, which reduced the tax burden on ordinary households. Tax arrears, particularly in prosperous Jiangnan, where over 50% of the taxes went uncollected due to resistance and tax farming, prompted a 1726-30 official investigation. Yongzheng targeted elite tax evasion, requiring magistrates in 1728 to list degree holders' tax status in registers and receipts, with separate lists for those in arrears punishable as tax resistance. By 1730, Sheng Yuan, or the first-degree holders, were tracked by education officials to enforce their tax compliance, with magistrates facing penalties for non-compliance. Yongzheng also addressed literati mistreatments of tenants.

Regulations penalized first-degree holders using excessive force against tenants with loss of rank and even their regalia, with officials failing to report such acts facing impeachment. Tenants defaulting on rent faced state penalties and dunning, protecting landlords' rights while curbing elite abuses. Yongzheng's reforms extended to emancipating the Min people, or the Jianmin, marginalized groups like the southeast coast's Boat People, or the southeastern Pengmin, the Anhui Hereditary Servants, Shaoxing's Fallen People, and the Shanxi Shanxi Singing People. Historically denied social and political rights, including civil service examination access, these groups faced occupational restrictions and were very much castes in their own right.

Responding to provincial officials' requests, the Yongzheng emperor sought to remove these discriminatory classifications in order to reduce social discontent. While not fully successful, these efforts marked an ideological shift towards legal equality, aligning with his vision of a state responsible for all of his subjects' welfare. And that is where we will leave off today. Next time, we'll get through the latter half of the Yongzheng era of rule, and in particular, the military achievements on the borderlands that he built atop of his father's already outsized legacy.

All that and much more next time. And as always, thanks for listening. The Civil War and Reconstruction was a pivotal era in American history. When a war was fought to save the Union and to free the slaves. And when the work to rebuild the nation after that war was over turned into a struggle to guarantee liberty and justice for all Americans. I'm Tracy and I'm Rich and we want to invite you to join us as we take an in-depth look at this pivotal era in American history. Look for the Civil War and Reconstruction wherever you find

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