The History of China - #293 - Qing 28: Three Treks Across Eurasia

Episode Date: May 24, 2025

Leaving behind the imperial court of Beijing, we return to the far frontiers of the northwest, where China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Russia all converge and vie for power. Glory and riches to the victors, subjugation or death for those destined to lose. Into this mix, we follow the travels of three emissaries as they cross deserts, mountains, words, and wits to ensure their sovereign emerges on top. Time Period Covered: ~1712~1724 CE Major Historical Figures: Dzungar Khannate: Tsewang Rabdan Tsarist Russia: Tsar Peter I Leon Vasielevich Izmailov Captain Ivan Unkovskii John Bell Governor Gragarin of Siberia Glazunov Great Qing Empire: The Kangxi Emperor [r. -1722] The Yongzheng Emperor [r. 1722-17] Tulisen Mongols: Ayuki Khan of the Torghuts [r. 1673-1724] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You're listening to an AirWave Media Podcast. Whatever groceries your summer calls for, Instacart has you covered. Download the Instacart app and enjoy $0 delivery fees on your first three orders. Service fees, exclusions, and terms apply. Instacart. Groceries that over-deliver. Hello, and welcome to the History of China. Episode 293 – Three Treks Across Eurasia Your Emperor of China is indeed a most excellent and most divine personage. While he is thus occupied in promoting the prosperity and riches of his empire, and in

preserving on all sides the blessings of peace, your excellencies may no doubt happily and uninterruptedly follow your respective pursuits. In this empire also, while the late Chahan Khan, Tsar Peter the First lived, we were free from labor and care. In his reign, all men, whether of high or lowest state, rested in peace. But latterly, for these twenty years past, our empire has been engaged in incessant wars, and to this day we are still fighting and contending without any respite. China is at present the only empire which enjoys any peace or tranquility. Our present Tsar, even when he was yet a child,

was always fighting and contending with the children who were his playmates. Those children are now become generals in his army. We should have still been at rest at this time, as heretofore, if he had only followed the steps of his father. Attributed to Governor of Siberia, Matvei Petrovich Gagarin from the account of Qing ambassador, Tulisen, from his Yi Yu Lu, or Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Torguth Tartars, published 1723. We left off last time, taking in and then basking in the pleasant glow of our first new Qing Emperor in a long, long time, Yongzheng. Thus we stuck pretty close to home of our newly enthroned Manchu Sovereign, and let

him, and ourselves, get used to all the new trappings, and who could forget, costumes, that came with supreme executive authority. But today, we're boldly journeying back out to the hinterlands of the far, far northwest, leaving the uptight strictures of palace life thousands of miles in the rearview. Instead, we'll be following the journeys, largely via their own accounts, journals, and documentation, of three intrepid world travelers, each in, largely via their own accounts, journals, and documentation, of three intrepid world travelers, each in the service of their own imperial lord as they make their way across the vastness of Central Asia.

As military campaigns slowed, diplomacy took center stage. The Qing had drained their resources fighting Galdaan and weren't eager to start another war. During this pause, Sehwang Rabdon focused on reinforcing his defenses and exploring potential Russian military aid in exchange for access to gold deposits. After Russia secured its borders with the Treaty of Narchansk in 1689, fur caravans from Siberia to Beijing raked in huge profits. The Russians anticipated even greater gains following the Kyakta Treaty of 1727. All sides—Chin, Russian, Jungar, and beyond—were engaged in a flurry of spying, testing of boundaries, and ever-cautious diplomacy. We'll look today at three travelers from different parts of Eurasia, each of whom left behind vivid accounts of this moment of intensified cross-cultural interaction.

The most familiar to Chinese historians is the Manchu envoy Tulisen, who lived from 1667 to 1741, and who journeyed to see Ayuki Khan of the the Torguts between 1712 and 1715. In the Manchu language, he wrote a detailed report that was later translated into a slightly different Chinese version. Around the same time, a traveler from Scotland, one John Bell, crossed Central Eurasia in the opposite direction for the Russian Tsar. Then, from 1722 to 1724, the Russian envoy Ivan Unkovsky visited Tsewong Robdon's court in Tibet. These travelers gave more than just geographic details, they also revealed the various perspectives from

all over the supercontinent perceived the rising Qing power. Each of these travelers was acting both personally and officially. Bell was part of the Russian diplomatic mission led by Leon Vasilevich Is My Love, which aimed to learn more about the Chinese military strength and to explore potential trade opportunities. The Manchu Tullisens mission, at least on paper, was to help escort Ayuki Khan's nephew, Arupjur, from the Chinese frontier back to the Torgut homeland along the Volga River. Tullisin thought Ayuki might suggest a joint military campaign against the ever-troublesome Jungars. But if this were to be the case, his orders were clear.

He was to politely refuse. Ayuki Khan, frustrated as were so many Central Asians with the increasing Russian encroachment on their own authority, confided to Tulisin that he felt more aligned with the Manchus than with the Russians, and asked Qing officials to help smooth things over between Russia and the Mongols. While traveling through Russian lands, Tulisin also quietly assessed their military and commercial capacities, and even prepared for the possibility of meeting with the Tsar himself. At Selenginsk, Tullisin met Bell, who later accompanied him on the road back to Beijing.

Though coming from opposite ends of the continent, the two found that they had a great deal in common. Each served a rising imperial power, and each built their career by advancing its interests. Unkovsky's mission, on the other hand, was part of Russia's attempt to explore a possible alliance with the Jungars against the Qing Empire. Sehuang Rabdan was even considering becoming a vassal of the Russian Tsar, like Ayyuki Khan already had. In return, he offered the Russians access to potential gold deposits in Greater Turkestan, and asked for 20,000 troops as well as weapons to help defend against a potential Qing attack.

These three accounts provide a rich mix of state agendas and personal reflections on Qing expansion across Central Eurasia. They're essentially simultaneously travel narratives, spy documents, and diplomatic briefings altogether. With details on geography, strategy, diplomacy, and personal impressions, they offer various perspectives across four different languages, Manchu, Chinese, Russian, and personal impressions, they offer various perspectives across four different languages, Manchu, Chinese, Russian, and English. Tulisen and Ukovsky wrote their reports for their rulers, yet their tone is often more

like that of a personal journal. Bell's Travels, a private record, wasn't published until nearly 50 years later. Back in the early 1600s, the Torghets had made a massive migration across the steppe to the lower Volga, where they entered into Russian service. Though they kept family ties with the Djungars, they never accepted Djungar suzerainty. Life under Russian authority, however, wasn't easy either. Though they were exempt from taxes, they were forced into military service. Of all Mongol groups, the Torkhats had traveled farthest in search of freedom, but even they

found that they couldn't escape the expanding power of neighboring agrarian empires. They kept up their Buddhist faith as well as their ties to Tibet. Known today as Kalmyks, they remain an autonomous republic within the larger Russian Federation, the westernmost outpost of Buddhism in all of Eurasia. Tullisan's mission was deeply tied to the increasingly complex connections among the Qing, the Djungars, Russia, and Tibet. Aurobjör, the nephew of Ayuki Khan of the Torguts on the Volga, had traveled to Tibet on a pilgrimage sometime between 1698 and 1703, but found himself unable to return to the Volga because of wars between Ayuki Khan and Sawang Rabdan. The Kangxi Emperor gave him refuge, allowing him to set up a more or less permanent encampment

in the northwest. Finally, in 1712, Ayuki demanded the return of of Arap-Jir just at the time when a Russian caravan was setting out from Beijing. Seizing the moment, the Qing emperor asked the Russians to escort five imperial envoys with a message for Ayyuki about his nephew Arap-Jir's return. Tulsun was not their lead envoy, but he was the only one who wound up writing about the trip or at least the only one whose records we have. His Manchu language account, one of the longest such texts that exist on Central Eurasia,

reveals a great deal about Qing thinking in the region. Arupjur, as it turned out, never joined the mission and never returned home. The Qing had much bigger aims than simply sending one man back to his tribe. The instructions Tuli-san carried with him were a masterclass in Qing ideological messaging. The Kangxi Emperor sent a carefully worded edict to Ayuki Khan, thanking him for his tribute and expressing a desire to see Arupjur reunited with his uncles. Still, Kangxi suspected Ayuki would propose an alliance against Soang Rabdon, and gave Tully-san very clear instructions in that case.

Quote, If Ayuki says, let us, having joined together, strive to attack Soang Rabdon in a pincher movement from both sides, you should definitely not say anything. Say only, Sehwan Rabdan is on very good terms with the great Khan Kangxi. He has been sending countless emissaries to ask after the Khan's health. The great Khan likewise has been moved to bestow grace in the same manner. We can strongly affirm that the Emperor has no intention of disturbing Sehwan Rabdan." In short, the Qing envoys were to avoid any open commitment and politely insist that Ayuhi Khan had no reason to oppose, much less attack, Sehwan Rabdan. Even though Kong Shi had once

vowed to wipe out Galadon and the Jungars, he now claimed to have moved past such ambitions. The Torghats, however, saw things a bit differently. Meanwhile, the Qing envoys were also told to be receptive to meeting with the Russian Tsar, again from the Kangxi Emperor, quote, "...if the Tsar sends you an envoy, it is all right that he sends, previously when Nikolai of your country came to our country, he behaved badly. If asked about Qing values, they were to reply, our way of life takes loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, righteousness, and faith as its chief principles.

Because our country puts first such principles, we have no wars and no heavy punishments. We have lived in well-being and peace." This gave the Qing a chance to project a benevolent, peaceful image to outsiders. The Emperor didn't mention alliances or trade deals outright, but he did issue a firm warning about any military threats that might be issued in the future. Quote, If Russia dispatched troops to its borders, we might become suspicious and send our troops there. Yet, once troops have been sent to the frontier for use, they will be used.

I do not have any doubts. End quote. Still, envoys were told to stress that a full-blown war would be incredibly difficult due to the landscape. "...The distance is very far. There are very many mountains, cliffs, woods. There is certainly no way to bring cannon there. Even if our Sage Lord ordered it, he certainly could not attain it." They were also reminded that Russian customs were viewed as coarse and corrupt, and warned

not to drink excessively or behave badly. The goal was to show the Qing as disciplined and peaceful, but at the same time they were expected to collect detailed intelligence on Russia. Tulisen's map of Siberia, drawn upon his return, was at least as good, if not better, than those produced by Russian or European cartographers at the time. Tulisen offered some revealing observations about Russian attitudes. He records a moment when Siberian governor Gragarin praises the Kangxi Emperor, quote, Gragarin then said, Your Emperor of China is indeed a most excellent and most divine personage.

In this empire also, while the late Xia Han Khan, that is, Tsar Peter I, lived, we were free from labor and care. But laterally, for these twenty years past, our empire has been engaged in incessant wars. China is at present the only empire which enjoys any peace or tranquility." End quote. Now it's pretty hard to say whether Gregarin truly said this, or if Tullysen crafted the speech to fit Qing ideals. Gregarin may have genuinely believed that Peter the Great's European ambitions were a distraction from defending Siberia and managing

Qing diplomatic relations. But either way, the narrative supports the image of Kang Xi as the wise peaceful ruler, a sentiment echoed by both Bell and Tulen. Later, back in Selenginsk, Tullysen sent Gregorin a very different message. Seywang Rabdan had launched an attack on Hami, and Tullysen made it clear, quote, "...the disposition of Seywang Rabdan is by nature deceitful and false. He definitely cannot change. We have sent an army to make war against him." End quote. cannot change. We have sent an army to make war against him." He urged the Russians to arrest Sawang Rabdon and his followers if they tried to flee across

the border. In Qing eyes, by rejecting Imperial grace, Sawang Rabdon had forfeited any chance of mercy. The Chinese version of the text calls the campaign a zhengjiao, or righteous extermination, while the Manchu simply calls it dailambi, or to make war. Qing emperors consistently used language of complete destruction when dealing with zhenggar resistance, a rhetorical styling that would eventually be made reality. Ayuki Kan also had questions for Chulisen about the Manchu rulers, their lifestyle, and the Qing Empire's geography. He noted similarities between the Manchus and Mongols, and asked why they had parted

ways. He considered the Torghuts a people of an outer state, but remarked that they shared more in common with the Qing than with the Russians. He was also interested in Tibetan medicine, which he could no longer access due to Russian interference. Tulisen's account shows how the Qing could appeal to multiple identities—Tibetan, Manchu, and Mongol alike—to bring other Mongol leaders into their orbit. Tulisen's report, originally titled the Lakaaha Jeisen de Takaraka Jehebithe, or the Joddings on the Places Where One Sent Me in the Outcut Frontiers Outside the Empire, was published in Chinese in 1723 as the Iyulu, or the record of strange regions.

Europeans quickly took notice once it arrived on their shores. It was translated into French in 1726, and into German and Russian later that century, into English by Sir George Staunton in 1821. Many Europeans at the time, and for centuries after, saw the mission as a rare instance of China sending officials abroad for once, overlooking completely the empire's long history of going out and being diplomatic in their own way. In a broader Central Eurasian context, Tilesan's mission fits into a broader lineage that includes Emperor Wu of the Han dynasties searched for Fergana horses nearly 2,000 years prior,

Zhang Tian's mission to the great western unknown regions, and even Tang embassies to India and the Byzantine Empire. To put it briefly, Chinese empires had long been invested in learning about new peoples all along their frontiers and those beyond them. The Qing were no different, and like the British and Russians of their time, their missions mixed diplomacy, strategy, and trade. But one still must ask what was the true goal of this mission? Did the Kongxi Emperor really hope to ally with Ayuki Khan against Sawaang Rabdon? Since the Qing had once allied with Sawaang Rabdon in order to defeat Galdan, it's plausible that they were playing one rival off another yet again.

Though Tilly-san was told to initially decline any such alliance, that could have just been an opening gambit. If Iyuki had enough military strength, the Qing might have reconsidered. The real alliance with Saban Rabdan was carefully hidden. The Torghats believed that the embassy was an offer of alliance, and Tillerson's contact in Beijing may have proposed exactly that. According to the Russian envoy Glazunov in 1730, Kangxi's main aim may have been to draw the Torghets back into the Chang Fold.

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not sustain strong, centralized empires for very long. Despite the Mongols' unprecedented conquests, for instance, even their state didn't last so long as a century. Instead, Inner Asia was shaped by what might be called the Cycle of the Step. Powerful nomadic empires would rise quickly, expand rapidly, and then fragment, divide, and re-atomize just as quickly. These cycles typically followed a familiar pattern. Some powerful, single, charismatic leader, usually from some prestigious lineage, would unite the various tribes, typically through both diplomacy and conquest.

Once united, the confederation would turn outward, launching raids or full-scale invasions of sedentary societies nearby. These campaigns brought wealth, prestige, captives, all the essential resources for keeping the alliance together. But those same forces that would initially unify would also carry the very seeds of its own division. After that singular founder inevitably died, internal rivalries and the strain of administering conquered lands would often cause the empire to split apart. Whether we're looking at Attila, Alexander, Genghis Khan, Galdan, the cycle remains the same. In other words, Inner Asia was marked by a pattern of perpetual boom and bust. It wasn't that nomads couldn't build empires, time and again they could.

The challenge was always in holding them together across generations. This was not just a Mongol story. It would repeat itself time and again all across the region in many different forms. In the centuries after that initial great Yeke-Mongo-Ulus empire fractured, various new powers tried to follow the same playbook. The Oirats, for example, the Confederation of Western Mongols, spent much of the 15th and 16th centuries trying to unite Inner Asia under their singular leadership. So did the Mughals, the Uzbeks, and even the Russian-backed Kalmyks.

All of them attempted in one way or another to gather steppe populations into a coherent political force. Some succeeded for a time, but none would ever manage to break the cycle entirely. After arriving in Selanginsk on May 29, 1720, John Bell offered a vivid description of the Mongol lands and people, and this is a bit of a long quote, but I think it's worth quoting. So, quote, The Mongols are a numerous people and occupy a large extent of country, from this place

to the Kalgan, which signifies the everlasting wall Wall, or the Great Wall of China. One may easily imagine, from the vast tract of land which the Mongols occupy, that they must be very nomorous, especially when it is considered that they live in a healthy climate and have been engaged in no wars since they were conquered, partly by the Russians on the west and partly by the Chinese on the east, to whom all these people are now tributaries. In former times, the Mongols were troublesome neighbors to the Chinese, against whose incursions the Great Wall was built. Kam-He, his way of writing Kang-She, the present emperor of China, was the first one who subdued

these hardy tartars, which he affected more by kind usage and humanity than by his sword. For these people are great lovers of liberty. The same gentle treatment hath been observed by the Russians towards those of them who are their subjects, and they themselves confess that under the protection of those two mighty emperors they enjoy more liberty and live more at ease than they formerly did under their own princes." Bell's Mongols were in fact the Kalkas, or Eastern Mongols, especially those under the Tushietu Khan. Their gratitude toward the Kangxi emperor was rooted in his intervention during the

Kangxi between Jasak-Tukan and the Tushietu Khan, which had triggered Galdan's overall invasion. Kangxi's kind usage began with humanitarian aid, taking in refugees from internal Mongol strife and providing famine relief. But this aid also came, as it so often does, with strings attached. The Qing-delimited Khalkha territories took control of succession of the Khan ship and required the Mongols to provide horses for chain campaigns. The Russians, for their part, ruled their Mongol subjects with less consistency but often more harshly.

Tribute collections by Siberian governors and Cossacks were more arbitrary, though the Mongols under Russian rule retained slightly more freedom in their day-to-day lives. What Bell calls liberty really meant a life without war, but not necessarily one with the freedom to move and pasture as they pleased as before. The treaty between Russia and China also limited options for any idea of escape. The ill-defined frontier meant that Mongols could no longer simply flee to avoid pressure from either empire. A few groups, like the Gantamur and the Torguts, managed to evade these restrictions, at least for a time, but

most found themselves stuck. Bell's take on Mongol relations with China and Russia echoed narratives that served both imperial powers and even segments of the Mongol elite themselves. But it almost totally glossed over the true complexity of the situation. When Bell wrote in 1719 and 20, Kangxi was, as we know, in the final years of his reign and appeared to have succeeded in calming the Mongolian frontier through his policies of quote-unquote kind usage.

The memory of his campaign to eliminate the Jungar threat was already two decades old by that time, and most of whom who would have had terrible memories of it had been killed in the process or had subsequently already died. Bel reflected both the Russian desire for peaceful commerce and the Qing image of themselves as fair-minded peacemakers. Bell also commented on the Qing wars with Sehwang Rabdan. Upon reaching Toblos on December 16th, 1719, Bell wrote, quote, the Emperor of China was some time ago engaged in a war with the Kuntaisha about some frontier

towns of which the latter took possession and maintained his claim with a strong army. The Emperor sent against him an army of three hundred thousand men under the command of his fourteenth son who reckoned the best general of all his children. Notwithstanding that superiority in numbers, the Kon-Tai should have feed to the Chinese in several actions. The Emperor thought it would invest to accommodate that difference, and a peace was concluded to the satisfaction of both parties." This account refers to Tsewang Rabdon's 1715 incursion into Hami. Prince Yinti, Kangxi's 14th son, was appointed the Fu Yuan Jiang Jun, and did lead a large, but not 300,000 strong, army to both Gansu and Mongolia. While no major battles occurred, the Qing did regain Hami and Turfan, and eventually

did negotiate a truce, so technically a victory. It's unclear where Bell got his version, though this Kantaisha figure from Hong Taiji was the standard Russian term for the Junggar rulers. Likely, this story came from Russian officials in Toblosk and reflects their own grasp of Qing-Jungar affairs. Russians often saw Qing armies as lacking in quality, but they did credit the Qing emperor with benevolence and strategic insight.

That image of a weak but well-meaning Qing regime aligned with Russia's aim to secure peaceful trade ties. Bell continued, quote, "...it must be observed that the Chinese, being obliged to undertake a long and difficult march through a desert and barren country lying westward of the Long Wall, were so encumbered with artillery and heavy carriages containing provisions for the whole army during their march, had their force greatly diminished before they reached the enemy. The Kon-Tai-Shao, on the other hand, having intelligence of the great army coming against him,

waited patiently on his own frontiers till the enemy was within a few days march of his camp. When he sent out detachments of light horse to set fire to the grass and lay waste to the country, he also distracted them day and night with repeated alarms, which together, with want of provisions, obliged them to retire with considerable cost." This account likely refers to the Qing defeat at the Kara-Usu River on October 5, 1718. There, two Manchu generals, Selang and Elun Te, led a force of 2,000 Green Standard troops, 10,000 local auxiliaries, or or tu-si, and a small Manchu contingent only to be surrounded and crushed by Sèwang Rabdan. The defeat prompted the Kangxi emperor to dispatch his son.

Bell perceptively captured a core challenge of Qing warfare against nomads, that is, the very logistics of the steppe. Nomadic scorched-earth tactics were devastating against sedentary armies, much as Crimean Tartars used them against the Russians and Parthians against the Romans. Bell wrote, quote, This method of carrying on war by waste in the country is very ancient among the Tartars and practiced by all of them from the Danube eastward. This circumstance renders them a dreadful enemy to regular troops, who must

thereby be deprived of all subsistence, while the Tartars, having always many spare horses to kill and eat, are at no loss for provisions." Kong Shi, and later Chinese rulers, had to address this logistical problem just as the Russians had in Crimea. Russian armies developed a tabury, or mobile wagon fortress, with grain stores surrounded by soldiers. By mid-century, the Qing had built a network of supply posts stretching from Gansu deep into Xinjiang. They'll recognize not just the logistical challenge, but the nomads' skill in turning it to their advantage. skill in turning it to their advantage. Captain Ivan Unkovsky's 1722-1724 mission to Jungaria was Russia's last major attempt

to coax the Jungarchan into alliance or submission. Even after Russian defeats at the hands of Tsawang Rabdan, Tsar Peter remained fixated on the possibility of gold in the region. Although Sehwang Rabdan had fended off earlier Russian incursions, he was still open to discussions of an anti-Qing alliance. Unkovsky, dispatched for this purpose, arrived in Sehwang Rabdan's camp in November of 1722, just after the Kangxi Emperor's death. But the Junggar ruler had grown more cautious. He launched attacks on the Kazakhs and demanded the destruction of Russian forts. By September 1723, Unkovsky left without securing any agreement

at all. Still, he had gathered valuable intelligence, offering one of the rare first-hand accounts of dialogue with a Central Eurasian steppe ruler. On December 11th, 1722, a Jungar noble met with Unkovski with questions from Sawang Rabdan. The journal recorded this Q&A between the Jungar ministers, or Zaishang, and Unkovsky. It reads, quote, Zaishang. Cheradov told the Khan that fortress towns were built by Russia along the Irtysh in case the Tsar wanted to make war on China. Unkovsky. Cheradov was not authorized to say that. The towns were built not for war, but to search for ore. Zaisang.

Cheredov spoke of a search for gold and ore. Unkovsky. And I was ordered to ask permission of the Kantaisha for this search. And if the search for gold and silver succeeded, the gains for you would be large, as explained in detail to the Kantai-sha," Sewang robbed on. Zaisang. The Kantai-sha asks that the Mongols submit themselves to the beneficent protection of your Imperial Highness, as Ayuki Khan submitted, and we would rejoice at this and request

an army of 20,000 men to be used against the Chinese Khan, and nothing else. Munkovsky. On this subject, I explained to the Kantaisha in detail that when he committed himself to written negotiations, as were done with Ayuki Khan, then his Imperial Highness would defend you as his subjects, and he would first attempt to persuade the Chinese Khan by his orders to commit no injuries against you. And if the Chinese Khan did not listen, then he would find ways of bringing support to you." This frank exchange revealed the differing expectations on each side.

The Jungars wanted firm Russian military backing against the Qing, even hoping Russia would help them subdue the Kalkas, just as it had once aided Ayyuki Khan. They cited previous oral discussions with Cheridov to hold the Russians to commitments. Lankovsky, however, refused to promise aid outright, emphasizing diplomatic steps first. Sehwang Rabdon was unaware of Ayyuki's dissatisfaction with Russian rule, or his overtures to the Qing. Once he heard of the Kangxi Emperor's death and received Qing and Mongol envoys, he judged

it wiser not to bind himself to the Russians. His recent military successes and the transition in Beijing may have inflated his confidence and obscured his isolation. Still, Sehwang Rabdon was clearly curious about Eurasian geopolitics. He asked Unkovsky repeatedly about Peter the Great's navy, his conflicts with the Turks and Swedes, Russian religion, and even whether Russians drank tea. In another private conversation, he probed China's real power, again quoting this dialogue. Kantaisba. The Chinese boast that no one is stronger and braver than them, and all peoples bring them tribute.

Nkoski. I hope you will not take it amiss if I say this, but his Imperial Highness ordered me to bring various things for you. What do you consider them to be? Tribute or something else?" He replied that the Tsar sent gifts in gratitude for Sehwang Rabdan's beneficence, not as tribute. I said it is just the same with a Chinese Khan. People send gifts, not tribute. Khan Taaisba.

Whom do you consider to be stronger, the Turkish Sultan or the Chinese Khan? Nkowsky. We consider the Turks to be braver than the Chinese, and the Chinese behave poorly in military actions. After that, I told him among all peoples there are bad characters who bring unreliable reports." This discussion about tribute versus gifts echoes the later debates around Lord McCartney's mission to China, which I promise you we will get into at length. Was a gift a gesture of friendship or a signal of subordination?

In the Eurasian context, the answer varied depending on the audience. The Qing considered the Russian trade missions as tribute. The Russians, while formally complying, downplayed this when speaking to the Jungars, portraying all exchanges as equal diplomatic gifts to avoid appearing subordinate to China. At the same time, the Russians took care to downplay Chinese military prowess. Saoong Rabdan had seen Chinese armies in action, and likely knew about the fall of Albazin. Still, hearing the Russians describe the Qing as militarily weak may have reinforced his belief that he could survive without outside help.

That assumption led him ultimately to reject Russian protection, which in turn closed the door on any hope for Russian military support. Russia, in any case, ultimately gained more from trade with Beijing than from any dreams of mythical Central Asian gold. During his ten months in Jungaria, Unkovsky met frequently with Serang Rabdon and his ministers, and observed religious rituals and horse competitions. Despite the competing interests of their empires, the two sides shared a middle ground, to borrow Richard

White's phrase, a space where mutual curiosity and overlapping concerns allowed genuine dialogue. Like both Bell and Tullysen, Lunkovsky reported facts that served the needs of his state, but his journals also captured the personal dimension of diplomacy. For a brief moment, Russia looked east as well as west, and the Qing turned away from hegemony towards diplomacy. Through their journeys, these envoys helped sketch a vision of a shared Eurasian world. Stay safe, keep your powder dry, and as always, thanks for listening. I, and as always, thanks for listening. was over turned into a struggle to guarantee liberty and justice for all Americans. I'm Tracy and I'm Rich and we want to invite you to join us as we take an in-depth look

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