The History of China - Rebroadcast 2025: Special - Tiananmen Square: The Declassified History - 06/01/1999 w/ postscript 2024

Starting point is 00:00:00 You're listening to an Airwave Media Podcast. earn rewards for paying your bill in full and on time each month. Rise to rewards with the BMO Eclipse Rise Visa Card. Terms and conditions apply. T912, 1989. The Declassified History. Edited by Jeffrey T. Richardson and Michael L. Evans in the National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, number 16, published June 1st, 1999. Security Archive Electronic Beating Book, number 16, published June 1st, 1999. Before getting into this, I would just like to note that this article references many sources, about 35 of them in fact, which I will not be quoting directly, but I will link to them all in the show notes. Part 1.

Starting point is 00:01:01 Student Demonstrations in 1985 and 1986. The student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 were not the first time in the 1980s that Chinese authorities were faced with organized demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with their role. In late 1985 and again in late 1986, Beijing and Shanghai were the site of student protests. Students carried banners with slogans such as, Law, not authoritarianism, and Long live democracy. In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, demonstrators have often seized upon politically tolerable causes such as anti-Japanese sentiment or the commemoration

Starting point is 00:01:38 of a popular Chinese leader as vehicles to gather together and express their dissatisfaction with the policies of the Chinese government. Document 1, a U.S. embassy cable, suggests possible meanings of a tepid anti-Japanese demonstration in Tiananmen Square following a Sino-Japanese volleyball game on November 20, 1985. Embassy officials note that perhaps, quote, someone wanted to stir up trouble to embarrass the authorities, end quote, and that, quote, the semi-holiday atmosphere among the students at the square points to a lack of fear of retribution," end quote.

Starting point is 00:02:09 A subsequent cable, Document 2, reports the arrest of 23 of the students who were suspected ringleaders of the November 20th demonstration. The authorities, the cable notes, quote, "...knew whom to look for because they'd infiltrated both preparations for the demonstration and the demonstration itself, end quote. Furthermore, continuing the quote, one armed police installation shortly before last week's demonstration looked like it was preparing for a war, end quote. Document 3, a U.S. embassy report from late December 1985, notes that two student demonstrations had occurred in Beijing in the last several days. These demonstrations concerned student issues, the presence of the PLA on campus,

Starting point is 00:02:48 as well as nuclear testing in Xinjiang province. The cable comments that, quote, we do find a bit astonishing a demonstration in China on nuclear weapons testing, end quote. The following December, a new round of demonstrations, this time explicitly calling for political reforms, sprang up in China's cities. Document 4, a U.S. embassy cable from December 24, 1986, reports on a small student demonstration in Beijing on the evening of December 23, 1986. The cable cites an editorial in the People's Daily, the state news daily, expressing sympathy with the students, but making it clear that, quote, the limits of official toleration were

Starting point is 00:03:24 being approached. Later in the cable, embassy officials note that political stability has always been a critical consideration in China. There can be no doubt that the authorities will crack down and crack down hard if stability seems to be being called into question. Document 5. An intelligence summary from US Pacific Command reports that thousands of protesters filled Tiananmen Square on New Year's Day in 1987 and that, quote,

Starting point is 00:03:50 some 24 troublemakers reportedly were taken away by the police for education and examination, end quote. On January 17, another intelligence summary, Document 6, reports that noted reformer and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang had resigned, apparently, quote, a result of the recent student demonstrations, end quote. This would not be the last time that the fate of Hu Yaobang would be associated with student demonstrations. His death on April 15, 1989, proved to be the catalyst that brought about the massive demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. The demonstration that had begun as an expression of grief over the loss of a popular political figure had, by April 26, taken on a decidedly political character.

Starting point is 00:04:31 On that day, People's Daily published an editorial noting that, quote, after the memorial meeting, an extremely small number of people with ulterior motives continued to take advantage of the young students' feelings of grief for comrade Hu Yaobang. This is a planned conspiracy and a disturbance. Its essence is to once and for all negate the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system. All comrades in the party and the people throughout the country must soberly recognize the fact that our country will have no peaceful days if this disturbance is not checked resolutely." Part 2. On the brink.

Starting point is 00:05:04 On May 20, the Chinese leadership imposed martial law on the Beijing municipality and appeared to be moving toward the use of force to clear the square. Nevertheless, U.S. officials were still hoping to see the standoff between the government and the student demonstrators resolved peacefully. While the documentary record is far from complete, Document 7, a heavily excised summary transcript of a May 23 meeting in Washington between President George Bush and Wan Li, chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations did come up at the meeting.

Starting point is 00:05:33 Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short his U.S. visit and, on May 27, publicly endorsed the government's martial law order. As the crowds continued to gather in Tiananmen Square in the first days following the death of Hu Yaobang, hardliners in the party leadership prepare to move against both the students and the more conciliatory leaders within the party itself. Document 8, a State Department Intelligence summary submitted to the Secretary on the morning of June 2nd, notes that hardliners, quote, remain unable to resolve the leadership crisis or to remove students from Tiananmen Square, end quote.

Starting point is 00:06:04 The next day's morning intelligence summary, Document 9, reports on the first use of force on both sides, with the police firing tear gas on crowds gathered near Tiananmen and the crowds retaliating by stoning the police. The next two documents report on developments at Tiananmen shortly before the PRC employed force against the protesters. Document 10 describes the quote-unquote organized retreat of a first wave of lightly armed soldiers and notes that it might have been intended quote to prove that much stronger force will be necessary to regain control, end quote. Document 11, reporting the advance of more heavily equipped soldiers toward the city center,

Starting point is 00:06:40 concludes by noting that the fact that the troops are heloted and are armed with automatic weapons suggests that the force option is real." Part 3. The crackdown. It would not be long after the U.S. Embassy in Beijing warned that the use of force was an option, that it began reporting the PLA's attack on demonstrators. Their reporting, as well as information obtained by other means, is summarized in Document 12, a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. The cable notes that troops using automatic weapons had advanced in tanks, armored personnel carriers, APCs, and trucks from several directions towards Tiananmen Square. The cable also reports that the

Starting point is 00:07:17 American Embassy believed that the 50 to 70 deaths reported in the foreign media was probably much too low. It also notes that several American reporters, quote, were severely beaten by Chinese troops on Tiananmen Square, end quote. As events in Beijing unfolded, the American embassy provided a near continuous flow of reporting based on the accounts of newsmen, residents, and the observations of embassy officials. The Secretary of State's intelligence summary for the following morning, document 13, reports that, quote, deaths from the military assault on Tiananmen Square range from 180 to 500, thousands more have been injured, end quote.

Starting point is 00:07:52 It also describes, quote, thousands of civilians stood their ground or swarmed around military vehicles, APCs were set on fire, and demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails, end quote. In addition to providing information on the events of June 4, the cables provide dramatic besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails." In addition to providing information on the events of June 4th, the cables provide dramatic examples of the kinds of intelligence provided by diplomatic reporting. Document 14, an embassy cable from June 4th, reports on confrontations between soldiers and protesters, some of which ended in deaths and vandalism by military personnel, who one source claimed were breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings. On the same day, another cable from the US Embassy, Document 15, reports, among other things, the statement of a Chinese American who had witnessed

Starting point is 00:08:34 the crackdown who claimed that, quote, the beating to death of a PLA soldier who was in the first APC to enter Tiananmen Square in full view of the other waiting PLA troops appeared to have sparked the shooting that followed, end quote. In addition to these eyewitness accounts of the other waiting PLA troops, appear to have sparked the shooting that followed." In addition to these eyewitness accounts of the crackdown, other cables, Document 16, also provide information on PLA troop positions and casualty estimates. One section of the Secretary of State's morning summary for June 5, Document 17, titled After the Blood Bath, focuses on developments in Beijing. It reports that, quote,

Starting point is 00:09:09 troops continue to fire indiscriminately at civilians in the area near Tiananmen Square, end quote. It also notes the destruction of a large number of military vehicles, threats to execute students, and the potential for violent resistance by students. The intelligence report also provides details on the worldwide reaction to the massacre, noting the unanimous condemnation of the,-unquote bloody repression by foreign leaders, quote, regardless of ideology, end quote. After the square had been cleared, Chinese Army troops continued to occupy the city, with continuing reports of sporadic gunfire and interfactional fighting among PLA units. The possibility that units of the PLA would turn on each other was raised in the June

Starting point is 00:09:45 6th edition of the Secretary of State's morning summary, as well as embassy cables from June 5th to 6th. What's better than a well-marbled ribeye sizzling on the barbecue? A well-marbled ribeye sizzling on the barbecue that was carefully selected by an Instacart shopper and delivered to your door. A well-marbled ribeye you ordered without even leaving the kiddie pool. An embassy cable from June 5th, document 18, reports that armored units from the PLA's 27th Army, quote, seem poised for an attack by other PLA units, end quote, and notes that a, quote-unquote, Western military attache largely blames the 27th for the June 3rd massacre,

Starting point is 00:10:37 and says that the 27th, quote, is accused of killing even the soldiers of other units when they got in the way, end quote. The June 6th edition of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary, Document 19, states that the 27th Army is, quote, "...being blamed for the worst atrocities against civilians during Saturday night's attack on Tiananmen Square." And also notes that, quote, "...some clashes between military units reportedly have occurred." Document 20, an embassy cable from June 6, refers to, quote, persistent rumors of splits among the military and fighting among military units." Meanwhile, as embassy officials continued to report on the events on the ground, the

Starting point is 00:11:16 State Department went to work assessing the political ramifications of the crackdown. Document 21, the Secretary of State's morning summary for June 7, discusses the reaction of Asian leaders to the violence, and reports rumors, quote, that at least some leaders may have envisioned an outcome that would blame most atrocities on the 27th Army, relieve its top commanders, and remove senior officials who ordered armed action against civilians, end quote. The June 7th summary also reports that PLA troops had fired shots in the direction of U.S. Embassy Apartments, an incident covered in greater detail in Document 22, an embassy cable from June 7.

Starting point is 00:11:49 It reports that as a PLA troop convoy was passing near the embassy residence, quote, heavy automatic weapons fire was heard. AMBOS, U.S. Embassy officials, reported bullets shattering the windows of many apartments in the Jianguo-Wenmai diplomatic compound, end quote. An uneasy calm returned to being by June 8, according to the Secretary of State's morning summary for June 9, Document 23. It reports on missing dissidents, police actions at universities, martial law directives, and the first public appearance of Premier Li Peng since the massacre.

Starting point is 00:12:20 Shortly thereafter, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research published an intelligence brief titled, The Current Situation in China, Background and Prospects, Document 24. The document observes that, quote, At the heart of the crisis in China is the power struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping, end quote, and goes on to analyze the various elements of that struggle. The first appearance of Deng Xiaoping since the crackdown was reported in Document 25, the Secretary of State's morning summary for June 10th, noting that, quote, Deng Xiaoping since the crackdown was reported in Document 25, the Secretary of State's morning summary for June 10, noting that, quote,

Starting point is 00:12:48 Deng Xiaoping's public appearance yesterday signified his endorsement of martial law and the military's action against the population, end quote. The Secretary of State's morning summary for June 14, Document 27, reports on the efforts of the Chinese leadership to demonstrate unity and portray a return to normal government operations, even while continuing the crackdown on the efforts of the Chinese leadership to demonstrate unity and betray a return to normal government operations, even while continuing the crackdown on the alleged leaders of the demonstrations, reports of which were then appearing in the Chinese press. By June 21, the Morning Summary, Document 29, was reporting that, quote, "...more than 1,500 have been arrested, including at least six of the 21 most wanted

Starting point is 00:13:20 student leaders." The June 14th Morning Summary, and the one for the following day address one of the many problems in U.S.-Chinese relations that resulted from the Tiananmen Crisis. The U.S. Embassy's decision to provide sanctuary for Chinese dissident Fang Lijie in the days following the crackdown. The June 15th morning summary, document 28, notes that the treatment of the issue in the Chinese media indicates that it represents an important conflict of interest with the United States. Arrest warrants for Fang and his wife had been issued by Chinese security forces on

Starting point is 00:13:50 June 11th, and an embassy cable sent on that day, Document 26, reports that Chinese radio and television announcers had read a letter on the air, quote, which accused the U.S. government of supporting rebels and providing refuge for the criminal who created this violence, end quote. the US government of supporting rebels and providing refuge for the criminal who created this violence." Part 4. The Aftermath. As the day-to-day crisis atmosphere faded, the US sought to come to a precise understanding of the events and determine how they would affect China's future and US-Chinese relations. Reports based on the accounts of eyewitnesses, Documents 30 and 31, represented an effort

Starting point is 00:14:24 by the American Embassy in Beijing to provide a concise description of the events that had led up to the deaths at Tiananmen Square and to quote-unquote, set the record straight. Document 31 is based on the eyewitness accounts of embassy officials, Western reporters, and diplomats, and U.S. students present on or near Tiananmen Square. In its introduction, it notes that while civilian casualties probably did not reach the figure of 3,000 as used in some press accounts, quote, they surely far outnumbered official figures, end quote. The body of the cable consists of three parts, a press sea of events, an analysis of the

Starting point is 00:14:56 extent and causes of military and civilian casualties, and a chronology of the developments from 3 p.m. on June 3rd to shortly afternoon on June 4th. A final note states that, quote, sporadic killing continued at least through Wednesday, June 6th, end quote. In the days immediately following the crackdown, U.S. and Chinese officials were already sensitive to how recent events would impact the bilateral relationship. On June 5th, President Bush had announced the imposition of a package of sanctions on China to include, quote, suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial On June 5, President Bush had announced the imposition of a package of sanctions on China to include, quote, suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons, end quote, and the, quote, suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders,

Starting point is 00:15:34 end quote. Document 32, an embassy cable sent three weeks later, notes that a military official had lodged a formal complaint that, quote, strongly protested recent U.S. military sanctions, end quote, and had cancelled the planned visits of U.S. military officials. Embassy officials felt this to be a, quote, measured response to U.S. sanctions, end quote, indicating that the official, quote, did not adopt a confrontational attitude and emphasized that both sides should take a long-term view of the military relationship, end quote. Two days later, on June 29, the State Department

Starting point is 00:16:06 prepared Themes, Document 33, in support of Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Advisor Brent Scrowcroft, who were to leave the next day on a secret trip to China to meet with Deng Xiaoping. Themes provided the framework for the discussions the two emissaries would have with Deng. It focused on the global strategic benefits of the US-PRC relationship for both sides, the impact Chinese internal affairs could have on that relationship, characterizing the American people as being, quote, shocked and repelled by much of what they have seen and read about recent events in China, end quote, Bush's view of the importance of the long-term relationship between the US and PRC,

Starting point is 00:16:44 and the impact that further repression could have on US relations with China. As Scrowcroft later remembered, quote, the purpose of my trip was not negotiations, there was nothing yet to negotiate, but an effort to keep open the lines of communication, end quote. By late July, INR analysts continued to update the situation in China under martial law and also have the opportunity to address the impact of the crisis on China. Document 34, a July 26 status report, discusses the development since the crackdown. An intelligence research report, Document 35, asks, quote, how did China get to this point, end quote, explores the impact of the crisis on China's domestic and foreign policy, and measures the international reaction to the crackdown.

Starting point is 00:17:28 Among the judgments breached is that the situation in China would remain unsettled at least until Deng Xiaoping and other party elders die. Scrabcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989 to brief Chinese leaders on President Bush's summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta and to quote, explore the possibility of developing a roadmap toward better relations, end quote. In the interim, Bush, in a concession he hoped would elicit a positive response from the Chinese government, had vetoed legislation permitting Chinese exchange students to remain in the US until the Chinese government improved its human rights records.

Starting point is 00:18:05 Despite these concessions, the Bush administration soon realized that their efforts had not borne fruit. Scrowcroft later recalled their disappointment, quote, "...after the Chinese released only a handful of dissidents, it became apparent that the entire slow process was grinding to a halt, and we had no significant steps to point to in order to justify any normalization of our strained relations." It is my sense that one of the most dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe, the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu, was the main reason."

Starting point is 00:18:33 The Chinese had watched anxiously as communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, but were apparently unmoved until the bloody end of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. When Ceausescu was toppled, Scowcroft recalled, quote, I believe the Chinese leaders panicked, and it appeared to me that they had taken great comfort from his apparent impregnability, end quote. China, Premier Li Peng told his American emissaries at the December meeting, had witnessed similar eruptions during the Cultural Revolution.

Starting point is 00:19:00 Quote, had we not adopted the resolute measure on June 4th, he added, the present situation in China would be even more turbulent today. End quote. Part 5. Postscript, 1999, 10 years after. In the months preceding the 10-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, Chinese government and party officials have re-examined and often revised the official version of the military crackdown.

Starting point is 00:19:30 In April 1999, Zhu Muzhi, the president of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, a government think tank, observed that, If the way we handle the Tiananmen Crisis was incorrect, we would not have today's prosperity. China would be in chaos. The people would have risen and resisted the government. He added that, At that time, the police were poorly equipped. They had never witnessed such large-scale protests. They did not have rubber bullets then, nor gas masks. The only weapons they had were their guns. In a slightly more conciliatory gesture during the US tour, President Zhu Rongji told reporters that, quote,

Starting point is 00:20:02 The episode of 1989 happened because they wanted democracy but they didn't want the rule of law. That's why it happened, end quote. Zhu, who was mayor of Shanghai in 1989, was credited with peacefully resolving the demonstrations there, thus became the first Chinese leader to acknowledge the democratic aspirations of the demonstrators. Post-postscript, 2024, 35 years after. This section is my own. In the quarter century that has elapsed since the publication of this document, much has

Starting point is 00:20:35 changed in the People's Republic of China, and also very little. The CPC has retained its informational lockdown on the incident, and even amplified it, enforcing a policy of total silence in order to affect a régime oubliette, a kingdom of amnesia. Yet, ironically enough, like a black hole, the very weight of the PRC's continued and violent silencing of the matter internally, and, to a blessedly limited extent externally, has only served to create a lensing effect of sorts, an amplification of the very absence, thereby bringing attention to the matter that they hoped to conceal.

Starting point is 00:21:12 This, at least for now, bothers the architects of Xi Jinping's neo-Maoist-Revanches regime very little. It is only along the peripheries of their neo-hermit kingdom that they have to worry about seepage into their informational control schema, areas such as the benighted city of Hong Kong, where they act on it with alacrity and brutality. Yet within the People's Republic of China writ large, they have been broadly successful in achieving what Louisa Lim termed the People's Republic of Amnesia. And not just about Tiananmen, but about virtually any aspect of social and ideological repression so ordered by the government. From the Hong Kong protests, to

Starting point is 00:21:50 the Covid lockdowns and subsequent near-revolt across the country, to the banking and financial crises being met with both police and private security violence, to the ongoing repressions occurring in regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. The CPC's insistence on total informational lockdown control continues to pay dividends to its deeply paranoid, xenophobic, and increasingly insecure grip on power. It remains up to each of us to ensure that its desire to enforce amnesia remains unsuccessful. asshole. Good night, good luck, and as always, thanks for listening. The Civil War and Reconstruction was a pivotal era in American history. When a war was fought to save the Union and to free the slaves.

Starting point is 00:22:37 And when the work to rebuild the nation after that war was over turned into a struggle to guarantee liberty and justice for all Americans. I'm Tracy and I'm Rich and we want to invite you to join us as we take an in-depth look at this pivotal era in American history. Look for the Civil War and Reconstruction wherever you find your podcasts.

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The History of China - Rebroadcast 2025: Special - Tiananmen Square: The Declassified History - 06/01/1999 w/ postscript 2024

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