The History of Rome - 146- The Spear of Destiny

Episode Date: August 8, 2011

In 363 Julian launched an invasion of Sassanid Persia. He would die in battle just three months later.

Hello, and welcome to the history of Rome. Episode 146, The Spear of Destiny. Last week, we covered the wide range of reforms Julian initiated after becoming emperor. Though he is usually remembered as the man who tried to stem the tide of Christianity, we should not forget that he was interested in more than just religion. And given enough time, it is possible that we could have been sitting here talking about Julian as a major transformative figure. But instead, we talk about him merely as a brief detour,

an accidental left turn, noticed and corrected within a block of the mistake. This week, we will get into why Julian's imperial course correction never got the empire further down his pagan, principate side road. In the end, it wasn't because of institutional barriers, entrenched interests, or even the irresistible destiny of Christianity. It was because of a forgotten breastplate and an anonymously thrown spear. After a frustrating winter spent budding heads with the citizens of Antioch, Julian was eager to leave behind the aggravating belligerency of his fellow citizens and focus his attention on a much easier enemy to grapple with, the Sassanids. He didn't have to worry about placating the Sassanids or

making friends with the Sassanids or even caring what the Sassanids thought about his reform agenda. He just needed to beat the crap out of the sassanids. I imagine that as much as Julian was looking forward to the political bounce he would get from a successful campaign in the East, that he was also looking forward to the cathartic relief he would get from a good, hard fight. Much to Julian's consternation, however, the sassanids were presently trying to duck that fight. The Persian King Shepur II spent most of his epic reign, which was an amazing set. 70 years long, vacillating between aggression and pacifism towards Rome, and it appears that with the death of his old enemy Constanches II, that the king was ready to once again enter one of his

passive phases. His recent victories, which had included the sack of Amita, had turned out to have been of the Puric variety. That is, the cost of the campaign far outweighed the benefits. Further fighting at this point would probably only shift the border between Rome and Persia a few yards in either direction. So what was the point? Shepur reached out to Julian and tried to work out a peace agreement that would satisfy both leaders, but Julian was not having it. He had come east to make war on the Sassanids, not to make peace with the Sassanids. Though the terms were reasonable, and it is hard to see how rejecting them benefited Rome in the final analysis, Julian had designed a game plan to take him through the early years of his reign, and that

game plan said very clearly, win a great victory against Persia. So Julian refused to listen to terms. If I make peace, I won't be able to win a great victory against Persia, and it says very clearly right here that I need to win a great victory against Persia. You get the feeling like Shapur could have offered control of the whole Sasanid Empire, and promised to become the emperor's private footstool, and Julian still would have demanded a war. So in March of 363, Julian left Antioch at the head of an army,

telling those lousy ingrate Antiochians on his way out the door that he was never, ever coming back. Though the estimates for the size of Julian's army vary from a low of 65,000 to a high of 90,000, there is one thing we can be sure of. Julian was mustering every available soldier he could get his, hands on. He even demanded that the King of Armenia send an auxiliary army to help shore up the Roman ranks. Julian wanted nothing less than a total, complete, and overwhelming victory,

and he did not want to leave anything to chance. However, though an army the size of Julian's eastern invasion force, whatever size it actually was, would have made the emperor an unstoppable juggernaut back in Gaul. Out here in Syria, it made him merely equal to the task. By most estimates, the army Shepur had in the field was able to match the Romans man for man. When you throw in the fact that most of the soldiers in the Roman army were either recently recruited or had been transferred over from the West and were unused to desert fighting, well, even a hundred thousand men might not have been equal to the task. In other words, Julian might have thought he wasn't leaving anything to chance, but he was still going to need a

healthy dose of luck to pull this thing off. Beyond questions about whether his army could do what Julian wanted them to do, the emperor is often criticized for marching east without a clear strategic aim beyond victory for victory's sake. Sadly, for the men of the Roman army, though, no one realized quite how rudderless this war actually was in the beginning, because Julian appeared to have a very clear idea of what he was doing. He was going to attack the Sassanid capital of Tessophon.

To pull this off, the emperor knew that he would need to keep Shapur off his back for a little while. The Persian king was up in the north near the Armenian border with the bulk of his veteran army, and that is exactly where Julian wanted him to stay. To keep Shapur in place, Julian peeled off 20 to 30,000 of his men, the variation depending on how large you think his overall army was, and sent them to feign an attack on Medea. The emperor hoped that in the fog, of war, this decoy invasion force would be taken for the main invasion force and confound

Shapur's reaction time accordingly. Even if the king saw through the Medea faint, Julian reckoned that Shapur would, at the very least, assume the Romans would be taking the easy route down the Tigris to attack Tessifon. And so, while the decoy army marched northeast, Julian himself chose the tougher but less expected route down the Euphrates. Despite his lack of a coherent strategy, Julian did not neglect his logistical responsibilities, and after reaching the Euphrates, he rendezvoused with a fleet of some thousand ships that he had ordered constructed to keep the food and munitions flowing. With his years in Gaul marked by constant supply problems, Julian was making damn sure

that he would not have to worry about some Latter-day Barbatio, seizing his grain, and burning his supply transports. The preparations were complete by early April, and Julian spent the next month methodically making his way south towards the Sassanid capital. As the Romans marched, they seized control of any cities or military outposts they happened by. Since the majority of these were only lightly garrisoned, the resistance they met during these first few weeks was sporadic and short-lived. It wasn't until they were closing in on Tessophon that Julian and his army finally ran into some real pushback. Two cities in a row shut up their gates and attempted to resist, and though in both cases

the Romans won after a quick, hard battle, the fights did lay bare the realities of siege warfare in the desert heat. As the Roman army neared Tessophon, the big question became how to get his men and his thousand ships over to the capital. You see, part of the reason the approach along the Tigris was easier, was because Tessophon is actually located on the Tigris. Having tens of thousands of soldiers and 1,000 supply ships doesn't do you much good if you're on the complete wrong river.

The obvious answer was to take the long way around, that is, head down to the confluence of the rivers and then turn around and row upstream. But that route was arduous and fraught with danger, and Julian had no intention of exposing his army if he didn't have to. And he was pretty sure that he didn't have to. You see, Julian knew a little secret that had been lost to the ages.

Once upon a time, the kings of Persia had built a canal connecting the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. But due to excessive flooding, the canal had long ago been blocked up and now sat around as an innocuous dry ditch. Julian located this royal canal and had his men knock out of the canal. had his men knock out the dam that kept the long-forgotten channel dry. Just like that, the Romans had a straight path from here to there. Thus, in mid-May of 363, the Sassanid garrison defending Tessafon was dismayed to discover

a massive Roman invasion fleet descending on them, not from the north or from the south, where attacks were to be expected, but from the west, which, wait, what? With Shepur stalled, but by this point no longer completely fooled by the decoy army in the north, the soldiers defending Tessifon were also dismayed to learn that they were on their own. At this point, Julian had to have been delighted by his prospects, and even more delighted by the result of the initial encounter between his men and the Tessafon garrison. The Persians lined up for battle in front of the city, but rather than attack them directly, Julian spent the day lulling them into a false sense of security by making a big show of settling in and not paying much attention to the opposing army.

But as soon as night fell, Julian ordered a surprise attack. The resulting battle lasted well into the next day, and eventually the Sassanids were pushed back into the city. But critically, the Romans did not immediately follow up this success, and they retired before capturing the city in which. one fell swoop, which is unfortunate because that day's battle would prove to be the high point of Julian's invasion. From that moment on, it was pretty much all downhill. The first thing that struck the Roman officers the next morning, and the first thing that makes us think that perhaps Julian had not thought this through fully, was the impressive defensive fortifications Tecophon now boasted. You'll recall from past episodes that sacking Testifon,

was practically a rite of passage for Roman emperors there for a while, and really all they had to do was show up and the city would surrender. But the advanced fortification techniques that had begun cropping up at the end of the third century were not a strictly Roman phenomenon. Even with his full army, and he was still waiting for the decoy army to rejoin his main force, it would take time and effort to dislodge the Sassanids now that they were settling in for a siege. More to the point, the Romans would probably be unable to take the city before Shapur arrived with the main Persian army. And even if Shapur took his time getting to Tessafon, the Royal Canal, the one that had been closed because of excessive flooding, well, it was now flooding and creating a malaria-ridden swamp for the Romans to camp in.

So where did that leave them? What was the plan now? Initially, Julian argued in favor of launching the siege anyway. But in the command tent, he was pummeled by a nearly unanimous officer corps that told him in no uncertain terms that, in their professional opinion, a siege would be suicide. Finally, Julian relented and agreed to call off the assault. So, okay, now that that's settled, what's the new plan? Sacking Tessifon would have been nice, but what was she was. the greater purpose it would have served. It's clear we need to change our approach. So what's our

overarching strategic goal? Maybe we can rejigger our methods and achieve the same result. Are we trying to conquer Persia? Are we trying to remove Shapur from power? Are we simply trying to force him to give us a better peace deal? What are we doing out here? Though we do not have a solid record of these meetings, it appears that Julian did not really have answers to these questions. Sacking Tessafon had likely been an end unto itself. Now that he had run into a wall, literally a big, thick wall, Julian wasn't sure what to do. He was going to have to improvise his way out of this,

and the plan he came up with was pretty clearly not in the original playbook. Going back the way that they had come would have been too difficult. So the emperor decided to lead his army up the Tigris River, which was the quickest route back to Armenia and back to safety. The Roman soldiers were understandably skeptical of this plan. I mean, isn't that the direction Shepur is coming from? But they went from skeptical to appalled when they learned the next part of the plan, that Julian was also planning to burn the thousand supply ships.

It would have been much too difficult to haul them all back up river, and leaving them behind meant leaving them behind, meant leaving them gift wrap for Shapur. But the cold logic of command is sometimes lost on the average grunt. All the grunt sees is that the things that bring him food are going up in smoke. So on top of having to call an audible in the middle of a campaign, Julian also had to deal with the fact that his troops were now questioning his sanity. And then things got really bad.

When Shepur's scouts reported back that the Romans were heading, north up the Tigris, the king responded with a harsh but obvious strategy. Despite Roman fears to the contrary, Shapur was still not looking to initiate a set-piece battle, at least not yet, so he ordered his men to pour into the countryside and burn every single edible thing they could find. This scorched earth tactic was rough on his own people, but it was even rougher on the Romans. Julian had been expecting to be able to leave live off the land until they reached Armenia, or at least until they met Shapur in battle. But instead, the Sasanids were keeping their distance, offering no terms, and watching as the

Romans starved. By the middle of June 363, the situation was desperate, and it was at this point that Julian met his fate. Once he determined that the Romans had been worn down by their grueling march north, Shapur finally ordered his army to begin harassing the last. legions. Scirmishes in the front and in the rear of the Roman line gave way to heavier fighting, and pretty soon the two sides were locked in a running battle.

The Romans desperately attempted to push north, but could make almost no headway, and they were averaging just a few miles a day. But despite the bleakness of the situation, Julian never gave up. He never locked himself up in his tent. He never tried to run for it. And by all accounts, he never even hinted that he would do either of those things. He was constantly out in front of his men, leading them, fighting with them, encouraging them. There is absolutely no denying that he handled the situation as admirably as a man in his situation could.

There is also no denying that in the end, this admirable conduct is what killed him. The details of Julian's death are vague. despite the fact that Amiens Marcellinus was actually there and fought in the fateful battle, we still don't know exactly what happened. Which is understandable. We are talking about a clash between tens of thousands of men here. Unless he was right next to the emperor, even Marcellinus' account is going to be secondhand. And he wasn't right next to the emperor.

That said, the standard account is that on June 26, 36, 36th, A.D., the Sassanids hit the Romans with a multi-pronged assault. As Julian was trying to rally the men on one side, they were attacked from another. When he rushed over to rally the men on that side, they were attacked from a third side. In the midst of all this rushing around, Julian had neglected to don his breastplate. When word came of the attack, he had simply dashed off to lead his men. admirable, but more than a little short-sighted. He was on his horse in the thick of the fray on that third front

when a spear came flying out of the Persian line and struck Julian in the side. Marcellina says specifically that the spear grazed the emperor's arm and then lodged itself in his liver. Julian tried to remove the spear, but the blade was too long to get a firm grip, and he cut his hands in the process. weak from shock and a loss of blood. The emperor fainted, then regained consciousness long enough to announce that his wound was not mortal, and then he fainted again. Julian was then rushed away from the scene, and his doctor immediately began to save the emperor's life.

In his biography of Julian the Apostate, the last pagan, Adrian Murdoch spends a good amount of time at the end of the book, trying to parse through the different versions of Julian's death to try and reach some tentative conclusion. Though Marcellinus is usually deferred to when it comes to Julian, Murdoch argues that the soldier historians believe that the emperor died on the same day he was wounded is suspect. First of all, the cause of Julian's death is described as strangulation, rather than something more directly related to the wound. This points to an infection, and infection is going to need time to build up. The reason this even matters is because as he lay dying, Julian, surprisingly, and not a little bit recklessly, never did name an heir. In Marcellinus's version, Julian spends his final evening engaged in some romantic deathbed philosophizing, but he never even hints at who ought to lead the army and the eminent.

empire when he inevitably dies. This seems so ridiculously short-sighted that it calls the whole version of the story into question. If, however, Julian spent three days in bed slowed by a wound that did not necessarily look like it was killing him until, whoops, it killed him, then the fact that he did not name an heir makes sense. Put simply, the emperor did not believe he was dying, and so he did not. name a successor.

This is why I tend to believe that Julian died on June the 29th, 363 AD, two days after receiving the mortal wound. Either way, though, he was 31 years old and had ruled the empire for just a year and a half. Julian's short reign is unique in Roman history. Previous emperors had initiated fundamental changes to the way the empire operated, and previous emperors had, of course, served very short terms of office. But never had they done both at the same time. Julian had tried to pull off a system-wide overhaul of the empire that, had it succeeded, would have made his reign a key hinge point on the imperial timeline.

Maybe his overhaul would not have been as grand as, say, Augustus's or Diocletians had been, but it certainly might have had the power to diminish the prominent part Constantine plays, in the history of the Western world. Perhaps it might have even served as a bookend to an anomalous Christian era for the empire. But the other emperors who dream big had the luck to serve a long time and see their reform cemented into the bedrock of the system. Julian dreamed big, and then he died young. I honestly think that in terms of ambition of vision and brevity of rule,

the only one who matches Julian is, and I know this is going to sound crazy, Eligobulus, who, like Julian, tried to reinvent Roman religion, but died before his reforms could firmly take root in the system. However, other than that superficial similarity, there is really nothing to connect the half-mad teenager Elagobulus to the genuinely conscientious Julian. So I really think that Julian the apostate is a unique figure in Roman history, which makes him interesting, which means that we will never stop pouring over his year and a half in office and wondering what might have been. All that said, however, in June of 363, the Roman army did not have the luxury of pondering what Julian's place in history was going to be. They were stranded in enemy territory, surrounded, and flailing.

The emperor was dead, and no air was in place. In other words, disaster loomed. Next week, Julian's officers will attempt to pick up the pieces and avert said disaster. But given the circumstances and the fact that the legitimate imperial line was now suddenly extinct, Well, in trying to solve the problem of what they were going to do next, they may have wound up simply swapping one disaster for another.