The Jordan B. Peterson Podcast - 320. Climate Science: What Does it Say? | Dr. Richard Lindzen

Episode Date: January 5, 2023

Dr. Peterson's extensive catalog is available now on DailyWire+: https://utm.io/ueSXh Dr Jordan B Peterson and Dr. Richard Lindzen dive into the facts of climate change, the models used to predict it, the dismal state of academia, and the politicized world of “professional” science. Richard Lindzen is a dynamical meteorologist. He has contributed to the development of theories for the Hadley Circulation, hydrodynamic instability theory, internal gravity waves, atmospheric tides, and the quasi-biennial oscillation of the stratosphere. His current research is focused on climate sensitivity, the role of cirrus clouds in climate, and the determination of the tropics-to-pole temperature difference. He has attained multiple degrees from Harvard University, and won multiple awards in his field of study such as the Jule Charney award for “highly significant research in the atmospheric sciences”. Between 1983 and 2013, he was the Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at MIT where he earned emeritus status in July of 2013. - Sponsors - Exodus90: Is it time for your Exodus? Find resources to prepare at https://exodus90.com/jordan. Black Rifle Coffee: Get 10% off your first order or Coffee Club subscription with code JORDAN: https://www.blackriflecoffee.com/ - Links - For Dr. Richard Lindzen: MIT Page: https://eapsweb.mit.edu/people/rlindzen - Chapters - (0:00) Coming Up(1:19) Intro(4:40) Why you should listen to Dr. Lindzen(13:00) How Ivy league hirings work(16:00) Harvard or MIT?(18:00) Emphasis on racism in the sciences(19:22) Administrators outnumber faculty and students(20:00) Wasting time on a broken grant system(22:00) There is no money for questioning mainstream science(24:00) 1800’s science papers shock students(25:30) Scientific journals are not endorsements of the science they publish(27:40) 1970’s, they notice an increase in Co2(30:10) Classism and religious warping(33:40) Impoverishing ourselves for no reason(38:00) Objections to the narrative(40:00) Coriolis effect(45:48) Jordan plays devils advocate(50:05) Politicians base their policy on scientific summaries written by politicians(53:20) Bjørn Lomborg: even if they’re right, it’s not a big deal(54:22) Tipping points, how they actually work(57:00) Averaging anomalies(1:03:00) Climate threat still five thousand years away(1:08:00) Computer models, limitations and benefits(1:12:13) Fluid dynamics(1:14:45) Models on top of models predicting nothing(1:17:45) Where scientists actually agree(1:21:10) Money corrupts, “Climate Scientist” did not exist in the 90’s(1:25:10) Speaking for your values without asking you what they are(1:28:00) Gatekeepers holding back the world of science(1:32:20) Stoking terror, stifling science(1:38:30) You’ll falsify your own psyche if you falsify your words(1:43:00) Standing your ground, living toward truth   // SUPPORT THIS CHANNEL //Newsletter: https://mailchi.mp/jordanbpeterson.com/youtubesignupDonations: https://jordanbpeterson.com/donate // COURSES //Discovering Personality: https://jordanbpeterson.com/personalitySelf Authoring Suite: https://selfauthoring.comUnderstand Myself (personality test): https://understandmyself.com // BOOKS //Beyond Order: 12 More Rules for Life: https://jordanbpeterson.com/Beyond-Order12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos: https://jordanbpeterson.com/12-rules-for-lifeMaps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief: https://jordanbpeterson.com/maps-of-meaning // LINKS //Website: https://jordanbpeterson.comEvents: https://jordanbpeterson.com/eventsBlog: https://jordanbpeterson.com/blog // SOCIAL //Twitter: https://twitter.com/jordanbpetersonInstagram: https://instagram.com/jordan.b.petersonFacebook: https://facebook.com/drjordanpetersonTelegram: https://t.me/DrJordanPetersonAll socials: https://linktr.ee/drjordanbpeterson #JordanPeterson #JordanBPeterson #DrJordanPeterson #DrJordanBPeterson #DailyWirePlus

[♪ Music playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in background, playing in say, of climate science, the so-called settled climate science. I'm talking today to Dr. Richard Linsen. He's an accomplished professor, atmospheric physicist and meteorologist, having authored over 200 scientific papers and contributed to landmark theories in the realm of ozone photochemistry, atmospheric tides, and most recently climate stability. Holding a rare view in opposition to mainstream science, or perhaps not so rare, Linson disagrees on the role of water vapor in current climate change models, and argues that alarmism is widespread aided by political consensus, not unlike the once popular research on eugenics. Dr. Richard Linson is a dynamical meteorologist.

He has contributed to the development of theories for the Hadley circulation, hydro dynamic instability theory, internal gravity waves, atmospheric tides, and the quasi-biannial oscillation of the stratosphere. His current research is focused on climate sensitivity, the role of serious clouds in climate, and the determination of the tropics to pull temperature difference. His academic degrees are all from Harvard University.

He is the recipient of various awards, and is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Geophysical Union, the American Meteorological Society, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Between 83 and 2013, he was the Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at MIT. He assumed emeritus status as of July of 2013. Prior to 83, he held professorships at the University of Chicago at Harvard University. He's also

been a distinguished visiting scientist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, as well as a visiting professor at the Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, the E. Colne Normal Superior, the University of Paris, and Kyushu University. The first thing we're gonna determine before we dive into the topic at hand is why it might be reasonable and important to listen to Dr. Linson, so we're gonna go through his academic background

and then we'll proceed to the main issue. So you did your undergraduate degree at Harvard? Yeah. If that's right. In physics, from 1960, let's start from there. Okay. Yeah.

I graduated from Harvard in physics, 1960. So it was a long time ago. I realized at that point that I really enjoyed classical physics and actually modern physics seemed in some ways intimidating. So I continued and graduated work in applied mathematics. Harvard was different from other places in applied math. Places like NYU were very heavy into the theoretical aspects of applied math. Harvard applied math was solving problems with applied math, and they're heavily into problems in meteorology and other things. And so I ended up doing a thesis that was really atmospheric physics. It was the interaction of fluid motions and chemistry and radiative transfer.

Mostly in the stratosphere, and there were lot of good problems. I enjoyed it. The one problem with it was there was very little experience with data. And so I went for a post-doctoral period at the University of Washington and there was a superb data and now analysts are decreed who is on the faculty there, is now deceased. And after that, I went to Norway for a year and there was a very able and famous dynamic meteorologists there, Artileasin.

And that was also a pleasure. And during that time, I began working on some other problems, ranging from tides in the atmosphere to some problem called the equasite by any eloculation. Uh, you may not realize it, but the wind over the equator at about 15 kilometers roughly, plus or minus 10, goes from east to west for one year, turns around, goes the other way for another year. The average period is actually about 26 months, and that had been a puzzle. And we managed to find a solution to that puzzle as to how that worked, probably too complicated to explain.

It involves random waves generated by the cumulus clouds and the tropics interacting with the flow and forming something that essentially would be called a relaxation oscillator. And it's actually held up pretty well for almost 50 years or 60 years. So as theories go, that did well. There was also a problem with tides.

I mean, people familiar with tides in the ocean know that they're primarily 12-hour lunar tides, and they're lunar tides because the moon, although much less massive than the sun, is so close that its perturbation to the gravitational potential is greater than that of the sun. But then it was observed that in the pressure at the surface in the earth, the tides were also primarily semi-diurnal, that is, say, 12 hours, but solar. And so that was a bit of a puzzle because that had to be thermal. And Lord Kelvin, in the 19th century, was asking, given that the 24-hour component was much stronger, why was it 12 hours?

And he suggested the atmosphere was resonant at 12 hours. And that actually dominated the literature until the late 50s. Resonant meaning what? Meaning, let's say you have a violin or something. You've stroking, you get a certain note. That's because it's resonant at that note. It displays that. Pibrates at the note.

And so people had figured out how it might be resonant and so on. But after World War II, when one had rockets, one realized the atmosphere was not the way it had to be resonant. And we figured out why the 24-hour got trapped. And so that was kind of fun. It was problems like that that make, in some ways, atmospheric science, meteorology, geology, geophysics, kind of fun. It's a great field. So you liked the physics, you liked physics a little bit more on the concrete side, a little bit more data-driven, a little bit more down-to-earth than the theoretical realm.

And then, so you said you were at Washington to do a post-doc and then you went to Norway. What happened after that? And then I went to the National Center for Atmospheric Research. And I was a staff scientist there. And there was a sort of reason for it. It was slightly cynical. Some of my classmates had gone into academia. And I was watching at what a horror show being an assistant

professor was. You had insecurity, you had a heavy teaching load, you didn't have time to do the research. So I decided that I would stay at a research center until I was offered tenure. And I was, after a couple of years, offered a tenure post at the University of Chicago. And that was a very nice experience. I love Chicago. And but my wife was a little bit insecure about the crime situation on South Side of Chicago. And when Harvard made an offer of a chair,

we accepted it. I left Chicago. And he came to Harvard. And I spent about 10 years there, as I think eventually, as far as the Gordon McCabe, professor, and there was some other chair. But I had a close colleague at MIT, Jewel Charney, who was a preeminent dynamic meteorologist, but also a very interesting guy, good friend. And he died. And I was offered

his chair at MIT. And I took the- When was that? That had to be the early 80s. Okay, so I should just point out for everyone who's watching and listening that this is a pretty what would you call call it, stellar academic track. So first of all, an undergraduate at Harvard, and then applied PhD work at the postdoc level in a variety of different places, including research institutions. But the fact that Dr. Linsen was offered tenure at UChicago, a tenured position to begin with, that's not the normal mode of making an entry way into academia.

Usually you start as an assistant professor, and so that's untanured, and it's very rare to be offered a first-time job as a tenured professor. Was that associate level or full professor? That was associate. I wasn't promoted until a few years later. Right. And then, okay, so from the University of Chicago, then you were offered a Harvard chair, and I want to point out to everyone who's watching and listening again, that that's very

rare. So, at Harvard, the hiring streams are really broken into two segments. And so you have faculty members who are hired as assistant professors, so that's the most junior level of professor. And those positions are not tenured at the Ivy Leagues generally speaking. And so what the Ivy Leagues do is bring in promising young people at the assistant level, but turn them over. And that gives lots of people a chance to work at the Ivy Leagues, and it gives the students a chance to be in contact with dynamic young researchers, let's say. But the second hiring stream, and the more important one, is the senior professors,

and that's usually at associate or full professor level. And what Harvard did when I was there, that was in the 90s, was, and I'm sure the practice still continues and is characteristic of IVs in general, is they look all over the world for the people who are doing the top research in their areas at a relatively senior level and then make them an offer, see if they can entice them to come to Harvard. And so that doesn't happen to very many people. It's a very, very rare occurrence. It's not that huge university, Harvard, and there aren't that many professorships.

So to be offered a chair there is, well, it's a mark of, I would say, universal esteem devoted directed towards a given professor within the confines of their research. And they have to have made quite a splash on the research front for that to happen. And then to move from Harvard to MIT, well, the same thing is the case there,

because, well, Harvard and MIT battle it out for priority, let's say, for the most prestigious and highest quality university in the US, and possibly in the world, could have an argument about that. But to move from Harvard MIT is, well, that's another indication of a stellar academic career. So you went to MIT in the 1980s. Yeah. And you were there until you retired? Yeah. Till I retired formally in 2013. But they've been good to me. I have an office and some assistance occasionally.

And of course, one of the things is, you no longer have students. Well, that's a bit of a drawback. I've occasionally, however, have colleagues. And even at the end of it, for reasons that are obvious, I had almost no funding, but there were some postdocs who paid their way from South Korea. So that was helpful. So did you have a preference for Harvard or MIT in terms of the students you encountered? Not really. I mean, the students I encountered changed over time more than they changed with place.

changed over time more than they changed with place. When I came to Harvard, the students in my area were, I would say, in some ways, coming from math and physics mostly. They were the overflow, and there were lots of kids studying math and physics. So they were good, you know, very good in fact. And that was sort of true when I came to MIT. But by the 90s, things changed a little bit. First of all, good students were not entering physics and math at the level that they had once had, did. The best students often were going into finance, things like that.

And so there was no overflow. And I think there was a slight change in the nature of students. They were not as theoretical. They were more model oriented and so on. There was also a change at MIT, which was not something we wanted, which was getting harder and harder

to find people working with data. And so the students were getting less experience with actual data. But those are changes, I mean, compared to current changes, they're probably who are minor. I mean, at the moment, I just find it strange. There's so much emphasis on racism in the neuroscience, and so on.

I'm sort of glad I'm not teaching at this point. Yeah, yeah. Well, it's that one trick pony, that ideological insistence, that something approximating critical race theory should dominate every single discipline. And it gives people who really have no background whatsoever in these fields, the opportunity to dominate. And it's really quite an appalling thing to see. Yeah, we'll see one other thing too, which is the vast increase in both numbers, power

and importance of administrators. Yes, yes, definitely. Yeah. Well, you know, I think in some ways we live inside a giant whale carcass that's walking in the beach. Well, really, it's a good biological metaphor. And there's plenty of food for everyone for a very short period of time. And the administrative overload in the university is something remarkable to be whole, especially

because it's been built on the backs of students and their student loan, their student loan. Oh yeah, but it's like a denture and servitude, I would say. It's more than that. It's, you know, you now have administrators certainly outnumbering faculty. And in many places outnumbering faculty and students. And they need money, but they do not do the functions that the university gets paid for, teaching, research, and so on. And so we have overhead on the grants, and that has become critically important.

The more overhead, the better the administration likes you. So, you know, if you have a big laboratory, you'll have more overhead than someone who does theory. And if you're a judge... Well, when I was there, we were paying about 50% in overhead costs, so we were never correctly for a given grant. So, scientists spent about a third of their time in the United States. It's one of the reasons I was actually happy to come back to Canada. The scientists, I knew in the US, were spending one third of their time... Writing proposal. ...taking a shot at about a 5% chance at getting a large grant, and 50% of that went to overhead.

Yeah, it was quite the waste of time for the scientific community because that meant, you know, the brightest people in our community were spending 30%, 30% of their time, at least, writing grants that had a pretty low probability of success. Yeah, and then, you know, of course, that the problem with writing grants is that they tend to have to study trendy topics. And you also can't be very daring.

You have to take the next obvious step in some real sense and only in the approved direction. And so that whole granting system to me looked like something approximating the death of exploratory science. Well, that actually also evolved over time. When I entered academia, the National Science Foundation, actually had very few staff.

And they were eager to give out money. There wasn't that much demand for it. But as the administration grew, there was also, I mean, the administration plays a large role in the behavior of departments. Young faculty today, I mean, are sunk if they don't get grants. Oh, yeah. And when we get to climate,

you don't get grants if you question the current narrative. So, okay, so let's delve into that a bit. When you were at MIT and at Harvard, how many papers have you published approximately? Well, in your colleagues. 250 or so. Okay, so for those of you who are watching and listening, and correct me if you think I'm making an error in proposition here. So, when I was working as a faculty member, we kind of had a rule of thumb in the psychology department,

which was that if a student prepared three publishable papers that were sequentially linked, added an introduction to that and in the conclusion, we would basically accept that as a thesis. And so the rough equivalence was three published papers equals a PhD thesis. And you've published 250 papers, so in some real sense, that's equivalent to 80 PhDs. Now, what do you think of that for a lineologic? Not much, but to be honest. Okay, so I'm trying to give everyone... Well, I'm trying to give everyone watching and listening

in some sense, because people don't really know what it means to have a publication record like that. Well, I mean, because so that's what I'm trying to elucidate. Yeah, I think it's also a matter that has changed with time. I mean, people like, well, Joel Charney, who I mentioned, who is the leading figure in dynamic meteorology, probably published 60 papers, Arntaleeusson, who is also a terrific

influence, something that order. The pressures to publish have increased. And so people's behavior is different. Also, publication has become a very different issue. You probably know that before World War II, peer review was very rare. And if I have students read papers from the 19th century or the early 20th century, they're quite surprised to read them. Why? Because they're informal, truth. And, you know, after the war for a variety of reasons, a peer review entered largely because there was too much demand for publication, and even have

been a shortage of paper. But, but for instance the quarterly journal of the Royal Meteorological Society in the UK had a wonderful statement of what the reviewer was supposed to do. And it said, you can only reject a paper for two reasons. One is an overt mathematical era One is an overt mathematical era or lack of originality. The paper then would be discussed at the monthly meeting and the discussion would be included with the paper. There is no essential thought that peer review, the public has been made to think that this is a certification of the paper, that it is somehow proven right.

Now it's fact, right? Yeah, and it's nothing of the sort. It is to see if the stuff is interesting and it's not overtly wrong mathematically and not plagiarized. On the other hand, it's become something more. I mentioned, you know, I had two papers that appeared in the bulletin of the American meteorological society that dealt with climate and my objections to the current narrative in various ways. And they got published, they got reviewed, but in both cases the editor was fired immediately.

Oh yeah, that's cute. That was win. Well, win, win, win, did that happen. One was 2000, one was 1991 or two, and the other one was... So you were on this early. Oh, well, you know, this issue actually began in the 60s. Mm-hmm, right. And it was clear there was a lot of hunting around

for some environmental issue that would give people power on the energy sector over the energy sector. And so, you know, you had an earth day in the early 60s, but then you had global cooling, and the villain there was... That was the 70s, yeah. Yeah. Well, it was 60s and 70s and continued to the 70s. And the notion there is you wanted to get rid of coal-fired plants because they were polluting and creating

sulfates that were reflecting light and causing global cooling. You also had acid rain at that time. And again, get rid of the energy sector. And both of those turned out to be duds. And the this global mean temperature metric, whatever it is, started increasing the 70s. And they said, well, this won't go. And for a number of reasons CO2 came into the issue. One of the reasons was the international geophysical year began a measurement program for CO2 at Manolo Observatory, Hawaii. And this was Charles Keeling and it was promoted by a man called Roger Revelle

who was director at Scripps, which is an oceanographic institution in California. Anyway, they noticed CO2 has been increasing. And the evidence is it's been increasing since the industrial era began, but serious levels, at least measurable, were being reached in the 50s, 60s, where it was perhaps significant in terms of heating. Why did they start measuring it? Well, curiosity. Yeah, okay.

So that was just, they were just curious to begin with. Yeah, I mean, it's an interesting chemical. It plays a role in the, I mean, photosynthesis, it's vital. We have, you know, like 40,000 parts per million in our breath. So, you know, it's an interesting substance. And part of the reason it's interesting is, of course, that it has infrared absorption. And so it plays a role in what is called the greenhouse effect.

OK, so they found it. And the question then was, what are the implications? But more than that, if you were interested in controlling the energy sector, is the fact that no matter how clean you made the burning of fossil fuels, you would inevitably be left with the product of clean burning, which was CO2. I see, I see. So this was one. You couldn't get rid of it.

Polluted, I see, I see. So not a polluted. How clean the fossil fuel energy became. They were never going to get rid of carbon dioxide. Just like that was a good. Now, why do you think there was attempts to... You talked about control of the energy sector. Why bring that into it?

Well, I mean, your guess is as good as mine, but it obviously is at the heart of industrial development. It's the heart of the prosperity of the West. You had all these mouthhucy and movements, Paul Ehrlich, John Holdren, and zero population growth. And you know, you see now, I mean, a kind of antipathy to the working middle class. You know, you begin to feel there were people who resented the fact that ordinary people were aspiring to live decently, have a car on a house. And for some reason, I think that-

That warm? Yeah, right. Have a dishwasher. And I don't know why, but there is almost an antipathy to this. I was talking to Alex Epstein recently. He wrote a book called Fawcilfield. Oh, yeah.

He attempted to lay out some of the, you might think, theological or metaphysical presuppositions underlying this. And, you know, your comment on envy is an interesting one that, you know, there's some antipathy towards having ordinary people thrive, which is a pretty nasty form of antipathy. His point was that the Melththu, so there's, I guess there were two, one on the Mellthusian front and one on the Morkoza religious front is that there's an idea that the only acceptable natural landscape

in some real sense is one that's been completely untouched by human beings. And so if that's your presupposition to begin with, then anything that has to do with industry is going to be, let's say, persona non-grata. And then if you combine that with this melthusian notion, which we could go into a little bit, so the melthusian notion for everyone watching and listening is it's based on something like a petri dish model.

So a petri dish is an enclosed plastic container that has a media minute, often agar, which is a kind of gelatin that you can grow microorganisms on. And if you throw a microorganism in there, it'll start to multiply until it eats up all of the agar, and then it'll all die. And so there's this idea, that's in some sense, a biological idea, that populations left to their own devices will multiply until they devour all their resources, and then they will perish on mass. And the Malthusian predictions of population collapse that started to emerge in the 60s

were based on this petri dish model in some real sense. And the problem with that model is that it isn't obvious that single-celled organisms are a good metaphor for human beings because we're capable of extremely radical adaptation and transformation, whereas single-celled organisms just basically run out something like an algorithmic program, even though they're quite complex. And so the notion that human populations are destined to a Malthusian end is not, what would you call it, it is not a canonical biological fact. Let's put it that way. It's certainly driving a lot of this sort of thing we're

talking about. Yeah, I mean, it's a little bit tricky in a sense what motivates people. It's clear that at the top, they have no interest in restricting their own consumption. It's also very much, I mean, you know, when you try and figure out what's the right population, I guess in some sense you could say there must be some limit, but you know, you'll look at India in my lifetime. I mean, before independence, and even shortly after, its population was what, under 200 million, and famine was common. And today it's 1.3 billion and they're food exporters. Right, right. Yeah, I just saw

a chart the other day too that showed that over about the last 10 years, a fair bit of farmland has been taken out of production and some of that's reverted to the wild. And yet, despite there being less farmland being used now, the amount of food that the world is producing is still increasing at a pretty damn rapid rate. And so it isn't obvious at all what the upper bound is for population capacity. Oh, yeah, I mean, you know, agriculture has become far more

efficient. And you know, this leads to this peculiar emphasis on food that has not used fertilizer and so on, which would be- Yeah, like that's gonna, we're not at that point yet. That would lead to starvation. Mm-hmm. Without ammonia, it's four billion people would die without ammonia fertilizer.

That's the instruments at the moment. Yeah, I mean, so everything about this is sort of nuts. Alex Epstein, who you mentioned, is, you know, pointed this out, but it's kind of obvious. I've noted this, I mean, you could do everything, you know, bury the U.S. Canada, get rid of all their emissions, period, all dead and buried. And it would make very little difference to the growth of CO2 since most of the world is not this stupid as to commit suicide. And so if you really believe the cataclysmic claims, which have no scientific basis, but let's say they're true, You're doing nothing to stop it.

On the contrary, you're impoverishing your societies and making them less resilient. Because if you think natural disasters are coming, where would you rather be today? Haiti? Or in Chicago or New York? Or Los Angeles. Well, it's also the case. It's also the case that I don't see any evidence at all because you could make a case,

arguably, if you believe the carbon dioxide, climate, catastrophe, narrative, you could make a case that it's ethically required to impoverish people. If you could demonstrate that that impoverishment actually produced, let's say, a decrease in carbon output, but that certainly isn't what's happened in Germany since Germany's gone madly green. In fact, there are energy production is much less efficient than it was 10 years ago,

and it's five times as expensive, and it pollutes far more. And so my sense is that, and I think the data bear this out too, is that if you provided people with cheap, clean energy on a world basis and eradicated absolute poverty, or at least, ameliorated to the degree that was possible, then people start caring about the long term, and they start working for environmental preservation at a local level. And that's a far more effective way of taking care of the planet. So not only do you impoverish people, you impoverish people and make the planet worse.

And as far as I can tell, that's just essentially unforgivable. So why do you think, so two things, we left out, we left something hanging. You said two editors got fired, one in 1992. When was the second one who got fired? For publishing. After you wrote. 2001, it was immediate. 2001, okay.

And so now, what, when you started to object to the narrative, what narrative were you objecting to? And what grounds, this is Baxi in 92, what narrative were you objecting to? And what grounds were you objecting to? You're touching on something that took me a while to understand.

Gerbils famously said, if you tell a big enough lie and repeat it often enough, it will become the truth. There's been a lot of that in this, but there are aspects of establishing the narrative I.E. what makes something the truth that I hadn't appreciated. So the narrative was the climate is determined by a greenhouse effect and adding CO2 to it increases it, causes warming, and more over the natural greenhouse substances besides CO2, water vapor, clouds, upper-level clouds will amplify whatever man does. Now that immediately goes against L'Chattelierze principle, which says if you perturb a system and it is capable internally of counteracting it, it will. And our system is.

And you think that applies? Okay. And so that's a very germane issue because. Well, but let me, even if, if we, please go ahead, let me finish because, okay, so that was a little bit odd. You began wondering, where did these feedbacks come from? And immediately people, including myself, started looking into the feedbacks and seeing whether they were any negative ones or how did it work.

But underlying it, and this is what I learned, if you want to get a narrative established, the crucial thing is to pepper it with errors. Questionable things. So that the critics will seize on that and not question the basic narrative. The basic narrative in this sense was that climate is controlled by the greenhouse effect. In point of fact, the Earth's climate system, which has many regions, but two distinct different regions are the tropics, roughly the minus 30 to 30 degrees latitude, and the extra tropics outside of 30 degrees plus or minus. They have very different dynamics.

In the tropics, the crucial thing for the earth, by the way, and this is a technicality and much harder to convey than saying that greenhouse gases are a blanket or that 97% of scientists agree, this is actually a technical issue. saying that greenhouse gases are a blanket or that 97% of scientists agree. This is actually a technical issue. The Earth rotates. Now people are aware of that. We have day and night.

But there is something called the Coriolis effect. When you're on a rotating system, it gives rise to the appearance of forces that change the winds relative to the rotation. And the only component of the rotation is the component that is perpendicular to the surface. So at the pole, the rotation vector is perpendicular to the surface. At the equator, it's parallel to the surface, it's zero. And this gives you phenomenally different dynamics. So where you don't have a vertical component to the rotation vector,

motions do what they do in the laboratory and small scales. If you have a temperature difference, it acts to wipe it out. And so if you look at the tropics, the temperatures at any surface are relatively flat. They don't vary much with latitude. On the other hand, if you go to the middle attitudes, extra tropics, they, their temperature varies a lot between the tropics and the pole.

We know that. I mean, temperatures are cold at high latitudes. And if you look at changes in climate near history, what they consist in is a tropics that stays relatively constant. And what changes is the temperature difference between the tropics and the pole. During the ice ages, about 40 degrees centigrade.

Today it's about 60. Today it's about 40. During 50 million years ago, something called the Eocene was about 20. And so that's all a function of what's going on outside the tropics. Within the tropics, the greenhouse effect is significant. But what determines the temperature change between the tropics and the pole has very little to do with the greenhouse effect. It is a dynamic phenomenon based on the fact that if you have a temperature difference with latitude, it

generates instabilities. These instabilities take the form of the cyclonic and anti-cyconic patterns that you see on the weather map. Now, the tropics are very different. I mean, you know, even a casual look at a weather map, the systems that bring us weather travel from west to east at latitudes outside the tropics. Within the tropics, they travel from east to west. The prevailing winds are opposite in the two sections. And we're saying that what changes due to the greenhouse effect, however you look at it, is amplified at the poles. That is not true. There's no physical basis for that statement.

All they do is determine the starting point for where the temperature changes in middle attitudes and that's determined mainly by hydrodynamics. Okay, that's complicated to explain to someone. And yet it's the basis for claiming that these seemingly large, small numbers, you know, they're saying, if global mean temperature goes up one and a half degrees, it's the end. That's based on it getting much bigger at high latitudes and determining that. But all one and a half degrees at the equator would do, or in the greenhouse part of the earth, is change the temperature everywhere by one and a half degrees, which for most of us is less than the temperature

change between breakfast and lunch. And the thought that this is the end of the world. There's a little bit of crazy. All right, so let's play devil's advocate here for it. Sure. And so let me lay out the narrative and correct me if I've got it wrong. So first of all, the world at the moment is making a big deal out of climate and associating climate change with the greenhouse effect, the trapping of heat, and they're associating. We're all associating the greenhouse effect with an increase in carbon dioxide, and at least initially, we were associating that increase

in carbon dioxide with global warming. And then we've added the proposition that, well, not only will there be warming, say, up to a degree and a half or two degrees by the end of the century, and maybe there's some variation in those predictions, but we're also looking at a system that's characterized by a variety of positive feedback loops. And the danger here is that a one and a half degree increase might not be catastrophic,

but that that might trigger a sequence of cataclysmic events. We hear sometimes about the melting of the Greenland ice cap, for example, the rapid rise in sea level that would occur as a consequence, the increase of temperatures out the poles, the release of methane as a consequence, let's say, of the permafrost thawing, and then a runaway greenhouse effect because of that. And you evinced some skepticism well about the whole narrative, but also more particularly, and perhaps more importantly,

you don't sound like you're a big fan of the idea of runaway positive feedback loops. Oh, well, there are a lot of things in meshed in what you've said. Even the one and a half degree depends on the positive feedbacks. Otherwise, CO2 would be even less significant, much less significant.

So those, you assume that water vapor increases and amplifies it. But the whole picture is one-dimensional. So you'd have to know the area with water vapor is important, it goes through a mess of things. And we know now that that probably isn't occurring, even people who support the narrative. So you keep the water vapor isn't amplifying carbon dioxide effects. If it is, it has to be considered as part of an infrared feedback,

and nobody is detected that that is actually positive. Okay, okay. Well, I heard that I read that the punitive contribution of carbon dioxide to global warming is less than the margin of error for measurement of the effective water vapor. Do you know if that's true? That's really sad, if that's true. That's really sad, if that's true.

It is true if you want to measure it rather than hypothesize it, then what you're saying is true. It's been hypothesized. In other words, we're planning on spending $2 trillion to remediate a problem whose magnitude is so small that it could easily be hidden within another measurement error on the water vapor front. I think so. But I mean, that's really quite something. No, I mean, it's caught the fancy of the political world.

I mean, I'll give you an example of it. You know, we're falling into the trap I mentioned, you know, going along with the narrative because it has so many weaknesses, ignores the fact that the whole picture of the greenhouse is misconceived. Okay, well, let's not go too far down that rabbit hole because I'd like to stay focused on on critique of the major narrative. Yeah, no, I mean, you know, I'm quite willing to talk about the other problems. Yeah. I'm quite willing to talk about the other problems,

but the fact that you don't have this polar amplification that it's gonna be bigger at high latitudes. It may be, but it's not due to the greenhouse. It's due to processes in the extra tropics where the greenhouse is secondary by a long shot. There's one example of what you're saying, and it helps, I think, understand why this issue gets so distorted.

In one of the international panel on climate change, you know, the UN body reports. I think the third report somewhere in the early 2000s where I was a lead author, but that we can get to that later. In any case, they have this thousand pages that deals with the science has no index. It's totally unreadable. And then they have a summary for policymakers, which isn't really due to the scientists, and they can manipulate the text because that comes out six months before the text of which it's a summary. But, you know, they know people aren't even going to read that. So you have the thousand pages they're not going to read, then you have 20 pages they're not going to read.

And so you have the press release. And the press release is the iconic statement, and that's what gets the headlines. So the iconic statement was they now are, I forget how certain that most of the warming since 1960 is due to man. Okay, in truth, that doesn't mean much. It was about a half degree. It was most consistent with the climate being relatively insensitive. It was basically a statement. There's not much of a problem here, but they didn't say that.

They just said, most of the warming since 1960 is due to man. What does most mean, does most mean 95% or 51%? Could mean 51%. Yeah, okay. Even if it meant 100%, it wouldn't matter. It was small. Yeah, got it. But how did senators McCain and Lieberman respond to that?

They come out immediately with statement, this is the smoking gun we must do something. So as long as the scientists can make innocent remarks and be assured that politicians will convert them into alarm and increase funding, why are they going to complain? And so you have this insidious interaction where scientists, and there's another guy Bill Steve Koonen, who's written this book.

And I know Steve well. And the point is he could use the documents that are cited on behalf of Alam to say, look, nobody here is saying it's the problem that the environmentalists and the politicians are saying where did this come from? And the answer is it came. Well, Bjorn Lomburg has done the same thing. I mean, he accepts the IPCC predictions, essentially, with some criticism, but says, look, well, if they're right, this is straight from the horse's

mouth, let's say, with regard to the UN. Even if they're correct, that'll mean two things. The first is, we'll be slightly less rich than we would have been 100 years now, because economic growth is so high. And we won't even notice that in some real sense. But even if it's slightly bigger than we predict, we're so good at adapting. And you can see, like the curves, for example, in terms of number of people who are dying from natural disasters each year, which has declined precipitously over 100 years,

we're so good at adapting that the probability that we can just adapt to this is 100%. Now, that of course, that assumes that there are none of these runaway positive feedback loop effects, but my problem with that on the scientific front was, well, how the hell do you predict a runaway positive feedback loop? You can't predict that as far as I can tell. By the way, the feedbacks are not runaways that they're using.

They just amplify. You'd have to get a much higher level of feedback to be a runaway system. The tipping point is a different argument. And I find that kind of nutty because tipping points in the climate system are virtually unheard of, and there's a good reason for it. They're usually characteristic of systems that have what I would call few degrees of freedom. So friends, so it's saying if you want to make a transition from one state to another, you don't have many places to go, so it has to take a leap. Oh right, oh I see what you

mean. So, a system that's constrained in its modes of possibility. Yeah. Because there's only a couple of states to be. Exactly. But a complex like a complex system. But a system like ours? Oh, that's very good. Has an infinite number of degrees of freedom, essentially. And it can go smoothly through anything. Okay, has that been, has that proposition been quantified? Like, do people, do I've never heard that before? It makes a lot of sense to me that, you know, a system that flips

would flip because it could be frozen or liquid in the case of water. But a system that's complex and highly entropic because of that has many, many ways of dispensing. That's an extra- Yeah, so- It looks like a formal argument. Yeah, I haven't seen it explicitly expressed, but I'm pretty sure there's something in the literature about that.

Well, it makes sense if a system has multiple ways of dispersing with increased energy input. Yeah. Then it's not going to, yeah, the probability that it's going to do something dramatic has got to be proportionate in some sense to the number of options that it is. I mean, look, you know, the number, as I was saying, if you want to pepper something with craziness, this issue has lots to speak of on that count. I mean, one of the ones I like is this metric for climate, which is a very peculiar metric, some global temperature. Yeah. What is it? Global mean?

What is it? How do you get it? Where is it? I mean, how do you take temperature? Well, let's walk into that. Well, some of that, okay. Well, some of that, okay, so some of that is a consequence of many, many weather stations distributed on the physical surface of the Earth. But the problem with those is that many of them were built in places where urban encroachment has expanded over 100 years.

And so that's a huge problem on the measurement from. Yeah, but that's sophisticated. How do you average Mount Everest with the Dead Sea? Well, I'm curious about that. How is that done? To think of the Earth as having one temperature. Yeah. So you're making the case there

that the mean is the crucial variable, right? That's really what it boils to. Well, it's saying that, but it's hard to tell how you get it. They don't get it, by the way, by averaging. What they do, well, how else can you get it? Okay. What they do is take each station, take a 30-year average, I forget it's like 1950 to 1980 or something, and look at the deviation of the temperature from that average.

And they average the anomalies, the deviation. Okay. So, let's say it went up three degrees at one station from the 30 year mean, went up two and one and so on. They average those numbers instead of the temperature itself. Okay, why? And who's they? The British Met Office, Noah, NASA, so on. Everyone producing a temperature record is doing that.

OK. Maybe it makes sense, because you don't want an average Mount Everest in the Dead Sea, but maybe the changes in temperature at those places you could average and get an average temperature change. Okay, so you do that. And they show you the graph, but they never show you the data points.

And if you show the data points, and this is a guy at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, you did this around 1990, he died in 92. He showed the data points. And whereas this global mean temperature record is changing a degree, a degree in a half over a century, a century and a half, the data points are scattered over 20 degrees. Right, right. And they're densely scattered. It's a huge error. Not error. It's just huge range.

Just scatter. And if you chose any given period of time, any moment, there are almost as many stations cooling as warming, even though the trend is slightly warming, because it's slight. And so when you see somebody at a given location saying, this is a cold day, how come they say it's warming? The data says it could almost be as likely to cool as warm, except there's a slight bias. And it's, you know, when you look at the media, if there's an extreme at any given place, they say, it's climate. The data doesn't suggest that. Okay, so part of the problem here is that we have a single measure, which is this average

change in the temperature. Now that's become the standard for assessing something like global planetary health. Oh, yeah. Now our entire industrial enterprise is being bent to serve that particular master. So what do you think is wrong with the average mean temperature as a univariate variable? I mean, you talked about scatter, so that's a problem, but a problem with it. The other one problem with it is,

and it explains why, for instance, textbooks on climate from the 40s through the 60s, didn't discuss this metric. They discussed the fact that the earth had many climate regimes, dozens, and they wanted to know what accounted for the different regimes of climate on the earth, something called KERPEN classification. This metric became popular with global cooling, global warming and so on because you wanted to have something singular that showed one or the other. I think they were capitalized also on the fact that as a British physicist and novelist, C.P. Snow, realized many years ago, that we

have two cultures. Well, I think we have more than that. Maybe we have no cultures. But if you're not a scientist, it is amazing how enumerate and deliberate you can be. Right. And so or even if you are a scientist. Yeah. But there's a different kind of ignorance, specialization and so on. But most people looking at a graph can't read a graph.

Right. And so, you know, if you look at the financial page, people, you know, see the same graph, if it went up 10 points and went up 100 points and went up 200 points, all they see is it went up. And they resale and they show you that because if they only show you something that is objective, some days it wouldn't look like it's doing anything. And so what would you regard as the major drivers of, okay, let's go back even further. Do you think that we have any real existential concerns

on the climate front? Not for the next 5,000 years. Okay, okay, so we probably don't have to worry about that for at least 4,000. I think so. And we would see it. I mean, we had these massive ice ages and every roughly 100,000 years.

And the glacial part of it is longer ages, and every roughly 100,000 years. And the glacial part of it is longer than the interglacial that we're in now. So yeah, I mean, but we're talking about scales of thousands of years for that. That's a major change, and it was understood by a Serbian astronomer in the 1930s, early 40s, that this was largely due to the orbital variations of the earth in summer in the Arctic of a hundred watts per meter squared. Remember with CO2 you're talking about two watts per meter squared, three watts per meter, one and a half between the ice ages, hundred. And why summer in the Arctic? Because you always have snow in the winter in the Arctic.

The question is how much of it survives the summer? If it's cold during the summer, the snow lasts and builds up on a new base each year. And over thousands of years becomes a kilometer or two of ice so for you. On the other hand, if the summer is a warm, the snow doesn't last and you don't build your ice. Okay. So the main drivers of that kind of, that was orbital bit. Pataclysmic change, that's orbital.

And so, and those are, you said, a hundred watts per square meter, right? Essentially. And now you're pointing out that the putative effect of carbon dioxide warming is something like two watts per meter. That's order. And that's going to produce a comparatively small perturbation. Nothing of the order of magnitude that's associated, say, with glaciation or the lack thereof. Yeah. I mean, and also, not an amount that will produce positive feedback loops. You know, producing positive feedback loops, I think, is a kind of funny phrasing. The feedback loops are intrinsic to the system. And the question is, do we have positive feedback loops? And I don't think so.

Not really serious ones. And yet they're assumed in order to get a big bang out of the CO2. Yeah, okay. So what on what basis are they assumed? Because you already made the case no degrees of freedom. So like what's going on here scientifically? How can that story be put forward with any degree of credibility? By saying it's credible. I mean that's what we're doing. I mean, you know, in other words, Suki Minabi did some papers in the early 70s

where he assumed essentially one dimensionality for the system, no clouds, no nothing. And he said, if I assume relative humidity remains fixed, and I have no clouds, or I don't let clouds change. And then, because of something called the Clausius-Clappiron relation, the warmer it gets, the more moisture the atmosphere can hold, and if the relative humidity is fixed,

you'll have more moisture. Okay, and he showed you could get an amplification, a doubling of the effective CO2 from that. It just happens to only apply in the tropics, and it is not the clouds are not fixed. They are also changing and counteracting. I think much of what's happening due to the water vapor and changing the area over which the water vapor acts.

So it's a much more complicated affair. And the measurements from satellites are suggesting that the whole Shabang, when put together, is not producing the feedback that you needed to double the effect. Now, you've also, you've expressed a lot of skepticism about computer models. Now, when the average person reads that a computer model makes a given prediction, especially if it's reported in a peer-reviewed paper,

they're inclined to presume that that means two things. It means data and it means fact. But I'm very skeptical of computer models because you have to make all sorts of assumptions and the devil's in the details with something as complex as climate. So on what grounds have you gone after the climate models? Well, you know, actually, I have a use for the models. actually I have a use for the models. There's no way that models can accurately, well, there is a way maybe, simulate fluids. I mean, you know, the trouble is our atmosphere, our ocean, have motions on every scale. They have motions on the scale of your fingernail.

They have motions on the scale of the planet. They all have an impact. That small-scale turbulence in the boundary there, the clouds, which have a scale of a kilometer or so the weather patterns that have scales of thousands of kilometers, and you're modeling them on a computer. And even today's massive computers can't resolve a centimeter that would be incredible. So they have to assume what the small scale turbulence does. They have to assume what the clouds do. They have to assume what, you know, all sorts of things are doing. And even then, there are some systems where you can prove mathematically that is

you reduce the mesh size over which you're approximating things because you're not doing it continuously, you have to just make points, that it converges to the right answer. But no one has ever done that for fluid dynamics. We don't know where they even converges to the right answer. But no one has ever done that for fluid dynamics. We don't know where they even converges. So you have to, in these models, put in, you know, often you'll run a model and it goes haywire. You throw in damping to prevent it from going haywire. The damping has no physical basis

is just to keep the model from blowing up. You're doing all these things, and you're hopeful that it may still have some insight. Now I said, I actually am not against models. So for instance, if you do theory for a phenomenon in the atmosphere, you usually do what's called order of magnitude analysis. What that means is you take the full equations and you try to estimate how big and small the terms are.

And you're trying to see if these terms are small, can I approximate the system with a simpler system? And can I test it in this way? And you learn a lot from that. Almost everything we know came from that sort of analysis, not for models. But once in a while, if things get complicated, I'd like to look at a model and see whether there were things possibly going on in the model that might go on in nature that I hadn't

thought about. And so the models can be useful promoters of more thinking about possibility. Sure, promoters of more thinking about possibility. Sure, of course. Of course, that's very different than assuming that there are valid models of what's going to happen with a real climate. Of course. And so, two questions on that front, is it hard to approximate fluid dynamics regardless of mesh size because a fluid system has so many degrees of freedom? It's very hard to do. I mean, nobody would pretend.

Let's say you have a gurgling brook with pebbles and so on, it's doing all sorts of things. Nobody's going to predict the eddy for, let's say, a mile. I mean, that would be hopeless. You might make a statistical forecast on certain things, and you might get useful information, and you might be able to make an approximation that tells you how the roughness of the surface affected the flow rate and so on. Right. And, you know, all you do is scale that up, many orders of magnitude, and you have

the earth's atmosphere, and there's little eddies that you couldn't track on how your weather system is and so on. You still have trouble tracking them. Well, so part of the issue here is that the, we're dealing with temperature changes that are of relatively small magnitude compared to the potential range of temperature change, and what that means is that for that degree of accuracy and prediction, let's say you need accuracy of one to three degrees over 100 years, you have to have an unbelievably finely tuned model at an extremely high level of resolution.

And then with the difficulties in modeling fluid dynamics, it isn't even obvious that you could do it in principle. I think that's probably true. You can restrict, as I say, you damp the models, you keep them from blowing up, you do all sorts of things. And, you know, for instance, with the greenhouse picture, I've been critical of it because I think it only really is useful in the tropics.

But it is useful if I'm comparing Venus and Mars and Mercury. For them, you know, the gross idea of the greenhouse does tell you why they're different. But, you know, the changes in the Earth's climate involved menisky temperature changes compared to the temperature differences between the planets. Right, right, right. Well, then we have the additional problem on the political front that, so imagine you have an unstable climate model and inaccurate climate model at the scale of resolution we're discussing. And then you put on top of that an economic model.

And the economic model uses the climate model as an axiom. And then it tries to predict out a hundred years, which like I just don't see that as getting anywhere at all, because you can't predict economic development with any degree of accuracy over a hundred-year period. If you could do that, you'd have all the money in the world almost immediately. If you could generate a model that accurate, you simply can't do it.

No. So if you stack a bad economic model on a flawed climate model, you really do have a tower of wealth. Well, and they don't even do that. I mean, the economic models that people like Nordhaus and so on use just take that metric for climate and assign, but they assume it's accurate. And they assume that you can put a monetary value on it.

Yeah. And then, you know, tune the... I mean, you know, model... There are various kinds of models that do these things, but I don't know what to say. I mean, I don't think any longer that is the models that are driving the perception. I think it is the pure repetition.

And this was understood from the beginning. In 1980, when Jim Hansen gave testimony to the Senate about finding that there was global warming. And Newsweek, Newsweek had a cover. And the cover showed the earth on fire and had the label all scientists agree. Right, right. Now, you know, you had all sorts of funny problems at that time. Like most weathermen disagreed.

And the American Meteorological Society decided they needed re-education. I mean, the march to the institutions was pretty effective. And we could talk about that. I mean, that's been... Well, I'd like, well, let's talk about this, because I was gonna push back at you again, playing devil's advocate. So we hear all the time this idea that,

well, 97% of scientists agree that climate change is real, which is different than saying that global warming is real, by the way, but 97% of scientists agree. And so, and now we're hearing from Dr. Richard Linsen, and he doesn't agree, but 97% of scientists do, so why the hell should we listen to Dr. Linsen? And so, let's start with the 97% of scientists agree claim. Well, yeah, I mean, there are a couple of aspects to it.

There are some studies, like one by a man called Cook, that were just bogus. They ended up looking at 50 papers, specially selected and found this percentage. And this was taken apart in the Wall Street Journal by Spencer and Past, and it was nonsense. But there are some issues where I think you could say there was 100% agreement. So for instance, if you were to say CO2 is a greenhouse gas,

and adding it will probably create some warming. I don't think too many people would disagree. I think the only thing would be how much and many people would think it would be negligible, but no one would disagree with that. And so given this telephone game where you can say something perfectly innocent and the politicians can interpret it as saying, oh, so you agreed that we'll have warming. And that warming, however small, you know, they'll assume is the end of the world. Well, yeah, there's agreement. But it's not agreement with what they're ultimately claiming that it's an existential threat.

I think if you've posed it that way, you had for instance, noticed that the UN's IPCC and to governmental panel on climate change, never in its working group one, which is the only part dealing with science, speaks of an existential threat. Right, right. Well, Longberg has been telling people that constantly. No, he's with his attempts to shed some light, some intelligent light on this issue. He keeps saying, well, look, I'm willing to accept the IPCC forecast,

even though he has some problems with the forecast, he said, look, I'll give you that. But the negative consequences that are often assumed are simply not realistic. You know, even there, I mean, you know, in the part I participated in. We said that, you know, the models cannot handle water vapor in clouds, and thus there is no basis for our assertions about the feedbacks. That was in there. And it was interesting because, I mean,

the whole procedure is a little bit nutty. I was responsible with two other people for three pages. For this, we traveled around the world twice or three times. I mean, the meetings, and you had, quote, thousands of the world's leading climate scientists, which is a field that probably had a few dozen at, you know, early in my career. And suddenly when you piled in the money, you know, in the US, I think the increase with Clinton Gore was maybe a factor of 15, you suddenly had thousands of quote climate scientists. Now, no one in my department claimed there were climate scientists in 1990.

Cause nobody met, I didn't know everything about paleo climate, I didn't know how you assess dice cores, I knew dynamics, I knew radiation, other people knew other things. Right, right. It's not a field of specialization, climate science. Right. I mean, it is the definitive interdisciplinary thing, and nobody has mastered all the disciplines.

Trouble is when you increase the funding 15 and the condition for funding was supporting the narrative that you then could get lots of people, all of them calling themselves climate scientists and most of whom have not familiarized themselves with the physics and the chemistry and so on. So you have this idiocy of impacts. So you know, you've seen it, you know, global warming and obesity, global warming and diabetes. I mean, you know, anyone can get a piece of the action. Right, right, right. Well, what happened to you on the funding front when you started

to, well, let's say, swim against the tide to some degree. That's cool. Really, what you were doing was just pursuing your research. Right. No, I mean, for a while, I would say in the 90s, I continued to get money from this National Science Foundation, but never for climate. I was working on hydrodynamic instability, other things that were pure meteorological. But by the late 90s, I was known well enough for my skepticism

of climate that people were rejecting it saying, you know, you'll use some of this money for that. NASA also was pretty open in the 90s. And so, for instance, my work on feedbacks, my colleagues were from NASA. And it was okay, but by the end, there was a NASA administrator who was skeptical of climate, and they got rid of him.

They got stictored. The Department of Energy was actually trying to keep balanced funding, and then the government just clamped down on them. So that also means that, so that's very interesting too because it means that Not only does the narrative spin itself up to chase the funding, but any elements that would run contrary to Just vanish. Oh, yeah, I mean at MIT for instance We had a celebration of the work of two distinguished faculty members who had

died some years ago, this Jewel Charnie and Edler Rents, Chaos Theory, and so on. And because of my closeness to Jewel, they asked me to speak on that. And the administration from MIT decided, no, given his position on climate and that we have a climate initiative, we can't do that. The department was quite okay. They found someone else to do that talk and I gave another talk. So be it. But the administration was upset with that. You know, it again, I mean, now, it's really appalling to hear of that sort of thing happening

at MIT. I mean, I'm always hoping that the engineers and the STEM types will have what would you say, clout and political conviction to push back against this hyper administrative invasion of the technical technical schools in the universities? How should I say? How does it MIT? You have to think things are very, very sad. That's very sad state of affairs. Hope springs eternal, but you know, we just went through the issue of Dorian Abbott. I don't know if you heard about it.

Yeah. Oh, yes, yes. And Dorian. He was going to give a talk on exoplanets. Pretty, I mean, you know, he's keeping away from this issue in a way. Exoplanets is easy. But on the other hand, he had written a piece with someone from Stanford for Newsweek in which he said, you know, they really didn't think diversity, equity, and inclusion

was that great. They preferred maintaining meritocracy while having school choice for children, including poor children, black children, so that they could be qualified for equity. Instead of it being a kind of trap. And so MIT's administration decided that this was not consistent with MIT's values. Yeah. And you know, a statement. And you know, then it got the point, who speaks for our values? And yeah, well, that is the question, all right. And, you know, this is very much the case with almost every university, every professional society, and you probably know this. Yeah, yeah. You know, the people in these, the faculty, the people in professional societies, are busy.

They like their work, they're doing things they like. the people in professional societies are busy. They like their work, they're doing things they like, and so you often choose one person to be executive director or so on, and they're happy not to have to do it, or to be president of the university or dean. Not everyone wants to do it, they'd rather do their science, their research, and so on. They're all search, yeah.

Well, that's a big problem because it leaves the administrative avenue open, eh? And they can speak for you and speak of our values without ever polling you. And that's true in the professional societies. It's true of the National Academy in the US. There are a handful of people who can speak for the organization, and the organization is full of people who would rather do their work and happy

to leave them that power. Yeah, yeah. So, what's been your experience with cancellation? You said it got harder and harder for you to get grants. So that's that's that that run lab at MIT. It also makes it almost impossible to publish. As I say, editors get fired if you get published. The more common thing is among the peer reviewers, they insist that they be gatekeepers. So you'll send in a paper and a lot of people reviewers, they insist that they be gatekeepers.

So you'll send in a paper, and a lot of people have had exactly this experience. At first, it was pretty crude. So one of the papers I published in the early 90s, I had submitted to science, pointing out questions about climate. And they sent it back without review saying there's no interest in this. Oh yeah, right. Okay. But then you know interest. Right. And then they got a little bit more, I don't know if I'd call it sophisticated. You would send it to a journal

and they would reject it immediately. And it was so good. And then it came, that wasn't very effective because you'd send it to another journal. So what happened is, you typically, and again, this is a common experience, you send it to a journal, they take about six, seven months to review. And they send back a review that says, accepted with major revision. And so you spend six months making major revisions, if you pay attention to them, send it back. They take another six, seven months and reject it. That got them

to stand me for a year, you know, so that you're not sending it to other journals. Well, it's also a very good way of wasting the time. Oh, yeah. Who might be actually trying to conduct research. Right. So, you know, all these things happen. And even with my students, I couldn't tell them, to oppose global warming, it would ruin their careers. They couldn't even get a part of the door. Well, well, was being associated with you eventually, was that enough to make it difficult for your students to get a job? No, I don't think so.

Oh, well, that's good. That's good. You know, that would have expected that to have happened. No, I hadn't seen it happen, but you know, I think most of my students, I think all of them pretty much, have steered clear of climate. There are other things you can work on, just like with Dorian, I mean, you know, he doesn't

want to get in trouble with climate, pick an area which isn't climate. The only difficulty with it is funding in balance can give preference to climate. On the other hand, they've induced so many people to support climate alarm that they probably don't have enough money to support all of the people who want to go feed at the drop. of the people who want to go feed at the top. Well, the other problem, of course, is that the very people who are hell-bent on pursuing their actual research, that's where all the real scientists are. And so now, for in a situation where the real scientists,

and those would be the ones who want to do their research, are refusing to have anything to do with so-called climate science. Then, what happens is that we're deprived of the very expert voices that we would need to bring some sense and stability to the overarching narrative upon which so many of our economic decisions are made now. So, that just doesn't seem like a very good state of affairs. Not a good state of affairs, but it's desired't seem like a very good state of affairs. Not a good state of affairs, but it's desired by the people who want this state of affairs.

Right, right, right. Well, so let me recapitulate, because we're running out of time on this section. So we talked about your career and where you worked, MIT, and at Harvard, primarily on the academic front. We talked about the fundamental climate narrative, which is that, well, climate's a major concern.

It's changing primarily because of the greenhouse effect. That's a consequence of carbon dioxide. Most of that's warming. There are a variety of potential runaway positive feedback loops involved. You're not convinced of any of those propositions that climate should be our major concern that the greenhouse effect as popularly conceptualized

is an existential catastrophe that carbon dioxide is a contributor, again, of existential proportions, or that the positive feedback loops that are often put before us are likely to manifest themselves. In fact, you think that the climate system has enough degrees of freedom to be relatively immune to large-scale perturbations. Yes, is that a decent summary? Yeah, I mean, I'd modify it a little bit.

You know, I think feedbacks and tipping points are slightly different and you're conflating them. I don't think this system has tipping points. It has feedback. Right. Okay. Well, that's the critical issues. But they're not run away.

You have to see back loops in it. Yes. Okay. So it's the tip. Okay. I'll make sure that I use that technology from here on in. And then we talked about the, well, we tried to investigate some of the reasons why this more apocalyptic narrative has gained a foothold. We talked about the Malthusians. We talked about the political tilt of the funding regime.

We talked a little bit more implicitly about the fact that more apocalyptic and doom-saying prognostications tend to attract a lot more attention. And so that's a big problem. Constant repetition and the fact that children, I mean, you know, Al Gore, or no, who's John Kerry who made this statement? I mean, it was just astounding.

I think it was in a talk in Indonesia. He said something to the effect that we all know how difficult physics and chemistry can be, but climate is easy enough for any child to understand. Right, right. Which showed you the level of his understanding. Well, yeah, but also the impact is we're starting to teach kindergarten children climate. Yeah, but you don't teach them.

And terrifying them. Yeah, right. Your world is coming to an end in 10 years, unless your parents stop eating meat or, you know, God knows what? Right. Or driving their vehicle or eating their house. Or or or or are recharging their electric car. Well that. All right, so so so let me let me offer a set of propositions to the listeners and and stop me or clarify what I'm saying

if I get it wrong. So there are lots of drivers of climate variation. The big drivers have to do with oscillations in planetary orbit or other. The comparative effect of or other factors. Yeah, there are so many factors that would impact it. There are ocean currents, you know, for instance, again, it's a technical term, but the surface of the earth is not isolated, you know, it's not in equilibrium with space.

It has the oceans underneath it. Ocean circulations have time scales up to a thousand years, and they're constantly bringing fluid up and taking fluid away from the surface, and fluid is carrying heat. And so the system is never quite an equilibrium. It varies on its own. Until we understand these systems perfectly well, we don't necessarily have a good theory for the fact that, you know,

there was a medieval warm period, there was evidence of a warm period, you know, 2000 years ago, all sorts of things. There were things, oddly enough, I mean, let's say at the beginning of the 19th century, in New England, every town had a learned society, and they had their proceedings, and you would look at these old documents of ordinary people, well warmer than it is at their time. They're still in little ice age. And they were wondering if it was just reportage or there was something really different, had climate changed. They were doing sophisticated thinking about it, which is virtually disappeared from our world. We also talked about the 97% of scientists fallacy and you pointed out that 97% of scientists likely agree that

carbon dioxide plays a role in greenhouse warming phenomenon. But that doesn't mean that 97% of scientists believe that there are tipping points built into the climate and that we're going to slide off the edge of an abyss within the next hundred years. Oh, no. Those are very different claims. No, and it's, you know, as I say, I mean, I was speaking at a group, I think, doctors for disaster preparedness. They'd give me some recognition. And I decided that I would point out who opposed this narrative during the early 90s or the 90s or the 90s. And it was leading figures in the field. And Bill Nye, the science man

on TV or something, was saying that, you know, these are just old people who they'll die soon. And we won't have these objections. And there was some truth to that. I mean, you had directors of major labs, directors of the Mox Plunk, people who are heading the European medium range weather forecasting, it's a premier group. All of them objecting to it. Presidents of the National Academy and so on. But starting in the 90s with the takeover of major funding institutions and so on, you weren't going to get many younger people.

Right, right. Okay, so if we close this off, and maybe we could do this, if you, if you, maybe you could take 30 seconds, and we're good a lot of relatively young people watching this YouTube channel, and, you know, they're worried because they've been fed a non-ending diet of apocalyptic catastrophe and oppressive patriarchy since they were like three. And so, if you wanted to address them directly

and say what you wanted to say about what we can expect over the next 50 years, let's say, because that's kind of not a bad lifespan viewpoint or 75 years, what do you think, what should we be contemplating on the climate front? What should we be contemplating on the climate front? Much the same as we've seen. You'll see variations. They've always occurred.

There will be places like the Gulf Coast of the U.S. which had been a citrus country in the 40s and now is too cold for citrus. Other things will change. Things always change a bit. There may be several inches of sea level rise, but not a lot more. There's no evidence. it'll be much more. You'll still have a situation where if you live in New England, Mark Twain's remark, wait a minute, and the weather will change, will still be true. And that's life.

That's why you have overcoats and gloves and swim suits. And there will be nothing special. It's not cataclysmic. You're not going to be inundated with hungry polar bears fleeing the Arctic. You're not going to have cities underwater. And you know, get on with your life, but the question is, if your teacher insists on your saying the world is coming to an end,

or you won't get promoted, I'm not sure what I should tell them. Well, I've told my students my whole life said, you don't, don't falsify your words because the thing is, you know, I'll tell you an experiment, a psychological experiment. It's quite interesting. It might even be valid. So imagine you bring people in to the lab, young people, and you give them a political attitudes questionnaire regarding their views on a particular topic, maybe abortion, maybe climate, whatever, some topic that's relatively contentious.

Then you have them sit down and write a 500 word essay arguing against their position. Now they know they're doing this in a lab. Then you bring them in a week later and you give them the same political attitudes questionnaire. You find that there are attitudes have shifted substantially and significantly towards the direction of their writing. And so the problem is you can't falsify your words

without falsifying your thinking. Because your words construct your perceptions. And so if you cout out to the teacher's ideology, we found this too, and we were looking at what predicted politically correct beliefs. So the trait agreeableness did, being female did, having a lower verbal IQ did, but another major predictor was whether or not

you'd taken in any courses at all that were explicitly politically correct in their orientation. So you have to be very careful about cow-towing to the ideology because you can't get away with it. You'll falsify your own psyche if you falsify your words. I agree with what you're saying, but 1984, you know, was a fairly good example of how society can break that down. Yeah. And so you've maintained your ground. You've maintained your ground.

How come? Age. In other words, you know, it's the business that for scientists of an older generation, up to mind pretty much, maybe a little further, we could develop our reputations, our work product over a freer time. Yeah. our work product over a freer time. The other thing is,

theoreticians don't need as much money as experimenters. And so, I needed money just to support students. I didn't need equipment. I didn't need very much of anything else. Right, right. But it was mainly that people were advanced in their career, if you were a director of a lab and so on, if you were near retirement, you could speak freely. The more said were the weathermen, the people, the media, forecasters, and so on, who had a love of meteorology, in

many cases, were very knowledgeable and objected to this by and large. I would go on a train ride or something. Meteorologists from the media who would see me in there and say, thank you for that. But the media have been firing people who don't attribute every weather event to climate. And the meteorologists know this is nonsense. But they just, you know, are being pressured immensely. And we were lucky. Our jobs were not at issue. We had 10 years and so on.

But younger people don't have that luxury. Yeah. While I'm being counseled, there's no fun. I mean, I've known like 200 people who've been counseled. And it's about equivalent to a major illness. It's no joke. So all right, sir. Well, look, for everybody who's been watching and listening

on YouTube, thank you very much for your time and attention. And Dr. Linson, thank you very much for your calm and dispassionate and kind, I would say, analysis of the current situation and for agreeing to speak to me today and to be providing all the people who are watching and listening with the fruits of your decades of labor. And if I'm gonna talk to Dr. Linzen

for another half an hour on the daily wire plus platform, by the way, probably on a more biographical front time, interested in how his career developed. Hello, everyone. I would encourage you to continue listening to my conversation with my guest on dailywireplus.com.