The Jordan B. Peterson Podcast - 326. Israel, Russia, China, Iran: The World in Conflict | Walter Russell Mead

Episode Date: January 26, 2023

Dr Jordan B Peterson and Walter Russell Mead cross continents in a broad discussion over world affairs. They go in-depth on the state of China’s totalitarian regime, Vladimir Putin's plans for the war with Ukraine, the growing unrest under Iran’s iron fist, the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine, and how a push for American optimism is necessary to best face these emboldened challengers on the world stage. Walter Russell Mead is a writer, professor, and academic, focusing his efforts on international policy and affairs. He is the James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and taught American foreign policy at Yale University. Mead has worked as a columnist for publications such as The Wall Street Journal and was editor at large for The American Interest. His books include “Mortal Splendor,” “Special Providence,” “Power, Terror, Peace and War,” “God and Gold,” and most recently “The Arc of a Covenant.”

Hello everyone, I met Mr. Walter Russell Mead at a dinner party in Washington. He's a prolific author and a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, a very astute commentator on foreign affairs. I'm talking to him today about, well, about the situation, the international situation in the world, as experienced by the United States and its Western allies, let's say. We talk about, we're going to talk about Russia and China and Iran and Israel and Palestine. All the, what would you call it? all the, what would you call it? Predictable villains. And so Mr. Walter Russell Mead is a writer, professor and academic focusing his efforts,

as I said, on international policy and foreign affairs. He is the James Clark Chase professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College and taught US foreign policy at Yale. Mead has worked as a columnist for publications such as The Wall Street Journal, and was editor at large for the American interest. His books include Martel Splendor, Special Providence, Power, Terror, Peace, and War, God and Gold, and most recently, 2022, the

Ark of a Covenant. So, Mr. Mead, you've spent an awful lot of time thinking about foreign policy in very many different aspects, not concentrating necessarily on any particular part of the world, but taking as much as it's possible a relatively global view. And so maybe we could start our discussion by having you summarize what you think are the most important, what are the most important issues that confronted the United States and the Western world more generally

on the foreign relations front in 2022? And maybe we can also talk about what you see happening in 2023 as we move forward. What's currently be setting us in the West on the foreign policy front? Well, this is a really difficult time. It's important that maybe to help people get what's happening in the world is to realize sort of what the basic framework of world politics is.

And that is that beginning about 300 years ago, the British began to build this sort of global commercial order, where there's trade, there's commerce, and the British also were concerned for creating balance of power in Europe and developing their power globally so that this commercial maritime system would develop. The Americans more or less inherited, or some would say took over that system at the end of World War II, and this liberal international maritime commercial system

of trade, of power, of political relationships, is the dominant reality in world politics. And the world is more or less divided between countries that are fairly happy with this system and would like to see it continue. Countries who have some grievances would like the system adjusted, but are basically willing to work within that system.

And then countries who want to bring the whole thing down. And today, the leading countries that are in that are, as a, you know, China, Russia, and Iran, along with certain smaller hangars on, like Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and a few others. And we've seen, since, you know, at the end of the Cold War, 1990, it looked as if this Anglo-American system

would last forever, people talked about the end of history. But partly because countries like China have developed and become more powerful, but maybe more fundamentally because the Americans and our close allies have not done a very good job of understanding how to build and nurture and maintain this system, we've seen gradually a kind of a crisis of opposition approaching. 2022 between the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China's continued sort of menacing of Taiwan and Iran's progress refusal to rejoin the JCPOA. It's deepening alliance with Russia.

We've seen this alliance of revisionist powers assemble themselves for a real challenge to this international system. Well, so maybe we could walk through each of those countries in turn. I mean, the first reaction I have to what you said is that, say what you might about the Anglo-American sphere of influence, it's by no means self-evident that either China, Russia, or Iran stand out as shining moral lights to emulate as an alternative. I mean, China is a desperately terrible,

totalitarian communist state. Iran is basically Islamophascist regime. And while Russia seems to be the outlier to some degree, but because at least, nominally, it could be allied with the West, but it certainly proved extremely problematic in new ways since the end of the Cold War. So, I mean, on what grounds can countries like China and Iran, for example, offer anything even remotely like an alternative to the sphere of Anglo-American

domination. Let's start with China. Right. Well, you know, China offers, what China offers countries or at least did offer because its offering has gotten less attractive with between the mounting totalitarianism, the economic trouble that they're in and the reaction to COVID, they were saying, look, you don't have to buy the Western package in order to become rich and powerful. And furthermore, they were saying to somebody like the ruler of a country like Zimbabwe or other countries,

we'll give you money, we'll give you tech. We won't ask you any questions about how much money your brother-in-law is making out of the deal. No pesky auditors, we will, you know, we're not like the Anglo-Americans, we won't try to make you behave, we'll let you do, we'll empower you to do exactly as you like. Now that is not a positive agenda for an alternative world order, but it is an offer that a lot of governments or a lot of powerful individuals might find attractive. Yeah, powerful and corrupt individuals.

I mean, it's for you. Okay, so let's take that apart a little bit. So the first part of that is the proposition that you can actually be wealthy or let's say have abundant resources and a reasonable standard of living for your citizens, not for you, without adopting something like the underlying metaphysics of the Western moral code. And that proposition strikes me as highly improbable, given that the only reason that China's rich at all is because it managed to integrate itself with the West and essentially adopt quasi-capitalist principles without actually adopting the underline

metaphysic. And I don't think their system is stable. I don't think they're going to be able to propagate that well-being into the future. I mean, you said yourself that China has tilted very heavily under Xi towards an increasing totalitarianism, not pretty much self-evident. And the fact that they can only pedal their wares with regards to what would you say, their profitability on the dictator front to corrupt governments also indicates the moral bankruptcy of their offerings. So if what China has to offer is the ability to bring together the corrupt dictators of the world, that doesn't seem like a very plausible or sustainable alternative

to Anglo-American domination. Right. So, and I mean China seems to be facing a whole host of problems now too, including demographic problems that are deadly serious. Right. Well, you know, George, this Anglo-American order is 300 years old, and a lot of people have tried to shake it over the centuries. You know, you can go back to Louis XIV and France who said, I'm going to have this centralized,

powerful plan economy. We're going to have all the economic and military power of the British, but we're not going to have all that messy political liberalism. And it didn't work, but he put up a good fight that convulsed the world for many years. Napoleon really exactly the same, challenging that Anglo-American still at that time, British world order, and saying, my dictatorship, my enlightened dictatorship, can create a powerful economy that the stupid British cannot match and an army that they can't defeat. And he rampaged for quite a while. He did ultimately fall apart and rightly so.

I think Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hitler, Tojo and Stalin all in their different ways, had the same idea that the sort of technocratic dictatorships centralized our and planning could create an economy in a society that could challenge this Anglo-American hegemony, this, or called the liberal world system. And they've all failed, but that, you know, they all thought, okay, I learned from the past now I win. And I think China is thinking along those lines too. Yeah, well, I think there's a fallacy at the bottom of that presumption that basically is biological in nature.

I mean, one of the things I've observed as a consequence of watching the United States as an outsider, let's say, for 50 years, 50 conscious years, let's say, is that diversity of approach beats efficiency of monolithic view. And so what I always see happening in the United States is, well, you guys are crazy, about 80% of the time, and going off the rails in five different directions. But there's always someone in the United States doing something crazily innovative and sane,

always. And so what seems to happen is that the US washes up against the shores of various forms of political idiocy, but there's so much diversity of approach in the US, especially given its massive population and its federated system and its genuine freedoms, that someone somewhere is doing the next right thing. And then America is, what would you call it, open-minded enough and adaptive enough so that if someone is doing the right thing, then they spawn imitators extremely rapidly. And Americans just capitalize on that like mad. And you get this situation where you could imagine,

and I think the Japanese managed this for a while, you could imagine that if you just happened to stumble on the right vision, if you were an efficient and benevolent totalitarian, you could be more effective over like a five-year period. But you're going to have a hell of a time with power transitions, that's a deadly problem. And then if the world shifts on you that's not in a way that isn't commensurate with your ideological vision, then you have no alternative approaches to rely on.

And my observation is being not just scuttles all these countries that try to compete with this distributed and creative free Anglo-American ethos. And I do think there's a biological reason for that, is that one of the ways that biological systems compute adaptation is by producing a very large variety of mutations, of variant offspring. And most of those offspring perish, but the only solution to that problem of excess mortality, let's say, on the biological front, is the provision of multiple variants.

And the Anglo-American system, because it's distributed, and because it places a substantial amount of power in the hands of individuals and subsidiary organizations, it's medium to long-term creativity, simply can't be beat. And it is inefficient in that a lot of the variants that the US produces, a lot of businesses and so forth fail. But those that succeed can succeed spectacularly, and that happens continually, and that seems like an unstoppable force.

And you know, you just outlined 300 years of history showing that these monolithic centralists who believe that central planning and efficiency will defeat distributed creativity. They're just wrong one after the other. You'd think eventually we'd learn that that was just wrong, and maybe we have to some degree.

Yeah, well, I think the circle is spreading of countries or cultures and individuals who do see this advantage, but again, as a student of history rather than biology or psychology, what I see is that we keep having these wars. And so, you know, I can say, I actually do believe the Chinese system, the Russian system, in its own way, the Iranian system certainly cannot really continue as they wish, and will fail in the competition. I look at the devastation that we've seen in the Napoleonic Wars, the World Wars. And so, our problem on our side is not simply to wait for the time when our diversity and our innovation will clearly triumph, but we have to try to manage or work in foreign policy

and security policy to try to prevent new sort of new catastrophic wars on this scale, even though the chances are pretty good that we will prevail in the end. Right, right, right. Well, it looks to me right now on the Chinese front. I mean, they're experiencing a level of domestic unrest that for China appears to be somewhat unprecedented. And it seems to me that it's perhaps clearly in the interest of the Chinese authorities

to do something like saber-rattle extremely hard over Taiwan to divert their populace as attention from their domestic failures. And so that strikes me as a, I mean, maybe I'm being pessimistic about it, although obviously lots of people are concerned about China and Taiwan. I mean, Xi seems to be attempting to consolidate power in the same manner as people like Mao. He's turned out to be a real totalitarian dictator, rather than someone who's moving China,

maybe like Dao, like the Chinese leader who modernized, was it Tao, what's his name? Dung Xiaoping. Dung Xiaoping, yes, exactly. He doesn't seem like another Dung Xiaoping. He seems to be more like another Mao. And that's very worrisome on the Taiwan front. So what do you think on the horizon,

on the China front, and what do you think the West should do about it? Right. No, it's it's it's really interesting because from the Chinese point of view first of all we have to understand that the people that people like I and you would talk to from China are not to aren't representative of the mass of the Chinese in China. The average Chinese Chinese person has never left China, didn't study for years in the English speaking world of an American or Canadian university or what have you. And for them, it looks very frustrating. They see China as this great nation with a growing economy, largest population

in the world, at least until India catches up. And then they look at Iran, a tiny country backwards in many ways compared to China, which has been running the table in the Middle East. It's in Syria, it's in Lebanon, it's in Yemen, it's causing problems everywhere you look. Even Russia has gotten Crimea and it's achieved things. Where has the Chinese government gotten? What has it done? The answer is it's done less than Iran, done less than China, sorry, than Russia in terms

of expanding. So I think there's pressure on the Chinese government from a lot of Chinese public opinion. Why aren't you more effective? If we're as great as you're telling us, why don't the foreigners see that and give ground to us? So there's a clash between what a lot of Chinese people think China's place in the world should be, and what they actually see.

And the government, as you say, at this time of huge stress, the COVID policy, they locked them down for years. And now they're still having a massive epidemic. They, the housing market, which is where most Chinese have their savings in investment, house prices have been going down for almost three years. There's a major crisis building financially in China. And so the government isn't a real pickle as to what it does it do next.

And that makes it, obviously, that makes it a little bit unpredictable internationally. Well, I was just curious as to your evaluation of the Biden administration's response to the situation in Taiwan. Do you, what opinions do you have about the Biden formulation of foreign policy in relationship to China? Look, I think the Biden administration

has done a reasonably good job so far in terms of its messaging on Taiwan and on the U.S.-China relations, the chip act, and it's putting economic pressure. It is trying to stop the penetration. So much of Chinese growth has really come from the theft of IP and from intellectual property, from Chinese state subsidies to corporations in key sectors that are able to use those subsidies to compete unfairly in the rest of the world.

I think we are beginning to see, and it started in the Trump years, and even President Obama talked about a pivot to Asia. So, there's been a growing awareness in the U.S. on a need to focus more on China and not just sort of sit here and wait for capitalism to turn China Democratic, which is what we were maybe doing 20 years ago. So we're definitely ahead on that front. So since I was a young person, what's happened in China? Well, first of all, when I started to become politically aware, let's say, back in the 1970s, I remember going to a trade fair in Edmonton, Alberta, it was one of the first trade

fairs that the Chinese participated in, not probably about 1974 or something like that. And we went and looked at the Chinese had a display there of their industrial products, and it looked like stuff that had been manufactured in the West right after the Second World War. Like it looked like stuff that was built in the 1950s. But that was the first time in my lifetime that we saw anything at all of China. And then, of course, when I was very young, the threat of famine was still something that we associated with China.

And what I've seen happen in my lifetime is that China has become an economic powerhouse, that the threat of famine has receded substantially, that the Chinese had been integrated, at least to some degree into the world economy, that the West had benefited arguably from an influx of unbelievably inexpensive consumer goods as Chinese manufacturing quality improved, as it did in Japan.

And for a good while, it looked like the Chinese were going to settle in beside us in lockstep, even though as competitors and cooperators, and move us all towards a relatively integrated capitalist future. And of course, the presumption was that as that happened, that the state would liberalize, not least, because there would be all sorts of individuals in China who now had a certain degree of economic power. And you know, that the Chinese would incrementally transform into essentially into allies

playing under the same system. And I think that really was happening in a pretty damn optimistic way for a number of decades, till she decided to centralize control and turn himself into another Mao. And it isn't obvious that the optimism that the West had in relationship to China was exactly misplaced. I mean, I think the Western working class paid a big price for integrating China, but other than that, you know, the Chinese aren't starving anymore,

which is certainly a big plus. There were a lot of positives to attempting to integrate the Chinese into the world economy. The downside was we seem to become more dependent on their large S and good will than we needed to. Then, of course, China, as a totalitarian model, is a destabilizing force in the international order. Well, you're absolutely right. And I would agree with you completely that, well, until a few years ago, I would travel pretty freely in China.

And a couple of my books have been translated into Chinese. And I would speak at Chinese universities and talk with professors and officials. The view that you just expressed was very common. This is what they felt China was doing and should do was move toward this kind of integration to become what some Chinese used to tell me. A normal country is what they wanted China to become. And I think there are a lot of people there who still hope that. Obviously, they're not going to say so right now.

That would not be good for you or your family if you started talking that way. But there, I think that what happened in some ways is we tended to forget that the Chinese Communist Party is a real thing and it wants to hold power. Right. You know, and there are lots of people who see, you know, they look at Chinese history. Yes, the Communist Party has killed more Chinese than anything ever in the history of the world. Have died as a result of Mao mouse famines and other things.

Far-equipsing the death toll say in their war against Japan even. But that said, as you pointed out, the economic growth of the last 30, 35 years in China is one of the great miracles of human history. Yep. And you would have to have a part of stone, not to be glad that hundreds of millions of people have come out of poverty, that new ways of life are opening up,

new access to culture, to education. It's what we should all be doing, it's progress and it's good. Right. But that very progress of the society, I think, terrified the Communist Party, because they could see themselves losing control. They could see, you know, and there is in Chinese history and culture, you know, it's a country of a billion four people.

That's like what? Four times the population of the European Union. And it's not so easy to... Chinese history is a story of the balance between central and local governments. They've had periods of division and war and weakness when others have taken advantage when the central government was weak. So instead of in a way relaxing and liberalizing more as their economic policy succeeded, many

in the Chinese Communist Party became really worried that things were going to get out of control. And for a number of years, even before we saw the international hostility, what we saw was gradually in sector after sector, they were tightening up the control of this central communist elite and more and more under one man, Xi Jinping. They were tightening every using every lever they could to impose uniformity in China to reassert even in companies now. Every company has to have a Communist Party sell in it. So we're back to the kind of Communist Party dominance.

Yes, exactly. And obviously, it's a party dominant. Comin' the stars. Yes, exactly. And obviously, as a Western investor, that's a tough thing when you've got the communist party cell running your company. Do you really own the company, et cetera? So it's a, so they're moving from a good period into a much more difficult one, I think. Right, well, I think also that people were optimistic

and rightly so after 1989, because once the Soviets gave up the ghost, it looked for a pretty long period of time that you couldn't beat the communist drum very hard anymore, that the internal contradictions that were part and parcel of the ethos had made themselves manifest in a manner that was utterly unmistakable

and just as the Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of its own internal idiocy, so was the Chinese Communist Party doomed to eventual failure. And it's certainly, and now, but I guess part of the problem is that even in the West, we don't seem to be of one mind when we look at the contradiction between Western productivity and generosity, let's say, and general well-being at the level of the citizen, and the contradictions between

that and a radical leftist view of the world. Right? Our own society is rife with this culture war predicated at least on the part that capitalism is inherently oppressive, and so is Western culture in general. And of course, the Chinese communists believe that in spades. And if we can't get our own house in order with regards to the pathology of these ideas in the West, in some sense, it's not that surprising that the Chinese remain dominated by them. But the long-term consequences of that can't be good.

I mean, what I see happening, I think, in the West, in the US in particular, is that people are losing faith in China as a trading partner, and we're starting to pull back a tremendous amount of manufacturing capacity and decreasing investment and pulling away from China as a trading partner. And of course, that'll just make things more desperate in China, which is not a good thing. Yeah, it's a tricky thing. In the West, we read 1989 and the events in the Soviet Union as a glorious victory. But in China and Putin is on their wavelength here,

they saw it very differently. What they saw is, look at the Soviet Union. Gorbatov tried to liberalize and to introduce some democratic elements into the Soviet Union. And look what happened. The Soviet Union fell apart. Russia was impoverished for a decade. It lost its great power status in the world.

And the West, as they saw it in Russia and in China, just sort of walked all over them and did whatever it wanted. And the Iranians saw this too. So the message for these leaders is, don't liberalize. Liberalism is a poison. And even a little bit of it can begin to corrode and destroy your society. And if you let it in, it will wreck your power and devastate everything. So they actually became, they did not say,

oh, how enchanting Western democracy is, they said how dangerous it is. And we've heard Putin complain and talk about the color revolutions, different liberalizing revolutions in post-Soviet countries. And they see us, they see the West as leading this kind of subversion, and that Western ideas and Western freedoms are a fundamental threat to their own power, and given the uses some of them have made of that power, made of their personal survival. Right, right.

Well, that seems like a reasonable concern for totalitarian, for ideologically motivated totalitarian dictators. It's definitely the case that Western liberal ideals will not provide an environment where they're kind of psychopathic power playing is going to be successful. Right. So, they have every reason to be intimidated by that. Right. And I think our mistake was not to realize that we were saying, hey, we're going to wait

patiently for China to evolve. But on the side of the Chinese Communist Party, they were saying, well, we're not just going to wait patiently until liberalism comes in and racks us, we're going to preemptively do what we need to do to maintain our power. So I think we... Right, well, maybe we should have known that because they never wavered in their support for North Korea. That's right.

And they were also very careful always to say, we want economic liberalization, not political liberalization. Yeah, yeah, as if those... Well, okay, so let's concentrate on that a little bit. So it's not obvious to me at all that you get to have economic liberalization without political liberalization. In fact, I think the order of events in that causal link is reversed, is that the reason that we have abundance and material prosperity in the

West is because of liberalism. Liberalism isn't the consequence of wealth, it's the precondition for wealth. And you can think about that particularly with regards to such things as the right to private property and the right to the fruits of your own labor. If your society isn't predicated on the idea that the individual is somehow intrinsically worthwhile and sovereign in that manner that's not merely a gift of the state, but something intrinsic to the person. As soon as you have that, you have at least in principle an inviolable right to something approximating private property onto the fruits of your own labor.

And without that fundamental presumption, which I think most particularly is a Judeo-Christian biblical presumption, the whole capitalist enterprise, and it's because it's so reliant on trust and honesty as well, for example, to really flourish and on the right of private property. It's just an on starter. And so this is a favorite shibboleth of the West, is that while we can have all this economic prosperity or even more of it with a centralized top-down control system that's predicated on the idea of equality, but in reality, that never seems

to pan out. And so, and I mean, you could point to regimes maybe like Singapore as a potential exception, but Singapore isn't very old. And so we'll see how it does with regards to such things as power transitions. But the idea that you can have economic progress without that underlying ethos of individual sovereignty, I don't think there's any historical evidence for that at all. And there's plenty of evidence to the contrary.

You described that in terms of the constant failure of the dictator's states. You know what's interesting is that, I mean, I think you're right, and that human nature exists in such a way that this kind of private property and those culture of individual rights together with honesty is foundation for greater prosperity, but the foundations of different cultures around the world have a very different relationship to that set of ideas. And I remember the first time I started traveling in Russia, it was still the Soviet Union. One of the, I'm giving away how old I am, I suppose. But one of the things I noticed there was that Marxism was culturally attractive to a

lot of people in Russia, because there was a deep distrust of economic exchange, that the people kind of intuitively felt that if you, at least this is the way it seemed to me, that if a merchant went into the countryside and bought a bushel of wheat for five rubles from the farmer and then took it into town and sold it for 10 rubles to the consumers in the town. He was cheating somebody. Maybe he was cheating the farmer, Maybe he was cheating his customers, but that this kind of exchange was fundamentally morally illegitimate. And so Marxism felt right,

that capitalism was by nature exploitative. A lot of people were induced to believe that. Yeah, well, it's easy for that belief to be induced, because it can capitalize on envy. And envy is a deadly sin, let's say. And it's easy to become envious of anyone who seems to have something that you don't have, especially if you don't, like like look at the other person's life

in totality, you see one feature in their life that in some manner exceeds what you've been able to manage. And then it's also extremely convenient for you to assume that if someone has exceeded you in a particular dimension of attainment, that the reason they did that is because they're corrupt and malevolent, not because they're useful and productive compared to you. And so, one of the psychological advantages that NVS Marxism has is that it plays to NV

in an extremely powerful manner. The problem with that seems to be, and maybe this is another principle for economic advancement, if your society is predicated on the idea that all difference in attainment or socioeconomic status is a consequence of theft and exploitation. Then basically you set up a situation where no one can ever have anything more than anyone else, in which case you have no basis for trade whatsoever and you certainly can't generate anything approximating wealth, because there's just no way that everyone can become equally rich at the same instantaneous moment.

There's always going to be a gradation of distribution, and one of the weird things the West has managed, and this has something to do with that implicit trust, is that we've actually managed to develop a society where there's not only tolerance for inequality, but there's a certain degree of admiration for it, right? I mean, and I think this is particularly true of the US, where it's less true of Canada and Europe, but one of the things that's always struck me so positively about the US is that there is a general sense of admiration among the populists for people who've been able to achieve spectacularly and singularly in some domain. And some of that's associated with the desire in the US that parents have for their children to be able to perhaps accomplish the same thing. But it really is quite the miracle that any society has ever managed out at all.

You know, it's interesting in some dimensions, even in the Soviet Union, you could see that. Because if you went to a concert in the Soviet Union, classical music was a big thing. The admiration that people felt for a great violinist or a great dancer was extraordinary because in every other channel of life, it was utterly corrupted by the party. If you had a good job, it was because the Communist Party gave it to you. If you were a factory director, it was because your brother-in-law was the party commissar, something like that. But in the arts, that violinist is just up there playing it. You hear it. And

that gives you, so there was this direct contact with excellence. So the human spirit, I think, does instinctively respond to excellence with admiration. They weren't thinking, let's go break his fingers. He plays better than the others. So he should like lose a finger and then he won't play any better than anybody else. But in the realm of economics,

no, they had a very different view. Well, let's turn our attention to the Russians a little bit. So we know or we sketched out in a low resolution sense what's driving the reactionary Chinese and that's a reversion to the communist model and to the totalitarian state that it enables. And that's being driven by the people who are benefiting from that enabling. That seems relatively clear.

The Russian front is a lot more complicated because it's not obvious at all that Putin is a communist, for example. And I know that Dugan, who is Putin's favorite philosopher, is being trying to sketch out something approximating a different ethos for the Russians. And I know that some of that actually has its origins, both in Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn, who both proclaimed in various ways that the proper way forward for Russia was a return to something like its incremental progression along the Orthodox Christian path.

And I think the Russians are struggling with that to some degree, and Dugan has tried to outline an alternative ethos, but I don't see anything coherent coming out of that except antipathy to the progressive liberal excesses of the West. I don't see that the Russians have actually managed to elaborate anything approximating a vision. And so what do you think is driving the Russians? Yeah, I think, you know, it's, there is a tragic sense of history.

You know, Russian history has been a better thing. Putin is not a communist. He is, if anything, he's a czarist. He's a Russian nationalist. And he actually hates the communists because Lenin's nationality policy really destroyed the Russian Empire in some ways by creating this artificial Soviet union rather than the empire, the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine under Khrushchev was the kind of communist BS that Putin really loved.

But there is something Putin deeply envies and misses in Russia today, which is that the Communist Party had, for most of its history, had an ideological hold in Russia. It had a network of loyal informants and co-workers and members, so there would be somebody on every block watching what everyone else did and reporting the bad guys to this suspicious activity to the secret police. And through the network of Communist Party cells, youth organizations, this whole culture, the government had means to control shape public opinion. Putin doesn't have that. He's trying with Russian nationalism, with the Orthodox

Church. He's trying to find, and of course in places where most of the Russian citizens are Muslim, he tries to work through Islamic religious authorities, remember that the Orthodox Church and the Muslim hierarchies were entirely controlled by the KGB under the Communists. So when the Soviet Union collapsed, all the KGB hacks and stuages were in place. Now, of course, there were some sincere believers here and there. And so the answer there was blackmail material, ways that you could control the Orthodox church, ways that you control. And Putin has tried to turn that into an instrument

of state control. Now, that's not as illegitimate in some ways in Russian culture as it might seem to some of us, because the Orthodox Church and its theology was always much more supportive of the Tsar, the emperor. It comes out of the Byzantine tradition, where so there's a kind of some people use the phrase Cesar O'Paypism, you know, that the Cesar, the Emperor, is a holy figure as well. So they've got a, it comports in some ways with traditional Russian ideas, but Russian society changed a lot in the last hundred years. You know, the Russia was a peasant society in 1920,

and today it's mostly an urban society, et cetera, it's in many, many different ways it's changed. And so Putin does not have the ideological elements of control. The other problem for Putin is that Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism don't export the way Marxism-Leninism did. At the height of communism, Stalin could count on the fanatical loyalty of even highly placed spies like Al-Jahiss and America and Kim Philby in England who out of loyalty

to communism would be willing agents and stooges for Stalin. Putin doesn't have that. He's hoping with his opposition to some of the crazy things that are definitely going on here. He and Orban and some others are sort of trying to kind of create a sort of conservative, traditionalist, international that can do for them what the international communists used to do for Stalin.

But it's not going to work that way. It's a much weaker position. But Putin is doing what he can with the tools he can find to make Russia a great power. I think partly it's weaker because if you try to ally Christian theology with the idea of a centralized quasi-fascist state, it actually doesn't work out very well because there's such a strong emphasis on individual sovereignty and individual worth in the Judeo-Christian tradition that you're fighting a pretty vicious rearguard action. I mean, it was definitely the case that when the Bible was printed and

distributed so that everyone could read it in the original, that what happened was people recognized their own intrinsic worth and were much more likely to what would you say take on both the rights and the responsibilities of informed citizenry, as soon as they became literate and could understand the implications of that tradition. And so it isn't obvious to me at all that Putin is going to be able to manage to Shanghai the Christian tradition into alliance with the idea that he should be something approximating a czar, even if the progressive West has aired in its excess, which it certainly has,

the story just doesn't seem to have a lot of power. I mean, it's definitely the case, the Eastern Europeans are quite upholded by the Western turn towards this radical progressivism, but that hasn't driven them into the arms of people like Putin. No, exactly. This is a very, you know, again, there was a very Russian tradition of the Tsar

as almost the leader of the church as well as the leader of the state. But it doesn't, and the concept of rights, as we understand them to be implanted in the Judeo-Christian tradition was much more minimized in the old Russian Orthodox vision. It was a much more collectivist kind of faith. And the gap between Orthodox Europe and both Protestant and Catholic Europe is a very deep historical when it's over a thousand years old. But so Putin put something that works in Russia at least for a time is not exportable in the way Putin would like it to be. Now he has another option which he works with which is this free floating, you know, so Putin will try on the one hand to be the champion of the people

who are in revolt against the progressive excesses of the West. But at the same time, he wants to pick up the other source of Soviet support, anti-capitalism, anti-Western individualism, the far left. And those are the two things that Putin is working with. And in US politics, it's interesting that you get people, you know, the squad tends to be very skeptical of US policy in Ukraine, as do people on the very far right. Now, there are a lot of legitimate questions you can ask about what we aren't doing in Ukraine, but this kind of sympathy, quasi-Putinist sympathy, you

will find it among anti-Americans on the left as well as among sort of some traditionalists on the right. And that's Putin doesn't care. You know, for him, he'll use any tool he can find. And that's how he sees these people, not as allies and partners, but as tools to be used to achieve his end, which is first, last, and always Russian state power. What do you think his goal was in the Ukraine?

When I looked at what was happening, I thought two things. I thought, well, three things, I suppose. Putin wasn't very happy with Western expansionism into Ukraine. He also was more than willing to extend Russian dominion, especially in the eastern parts of Ukraine. And then I also thought, it's possible that he didn't really care in some fundamental sense, whether Ukraine emerged

from this conflict devastated, as long as it didn't fall into the hands of the West. But I'm still relatively unclear about what his motivations and vision were for the invasion. I mean, do you think he thought it would be a cakewalk, like so many military leaders tend to presume when they march into a foreign country? Or what was Putin exactly imagining?

U.S. intelligence also thought he was gonna win. You know, the Americans were saying to Zelensky, we'll give you a plane so you can escape. And we were telling the ambassadors of all the countries, leave, leave, the Russians are coming. There was a panic. All right, so our message to Putin, by the way, was not a message of deterrence.

It was a message of encouragement. We think our intelligence is terrific, and it tells us you're going to win if you do this. So that's interesting. I think he did think he would, he would get a lot of success very quickly. But as to the threat of Ukraine to Putin, it's not like Western, it's not that like there might be Western troops in Kiev. It's clear, we don't want to invade Russia. No one in the West wants to invade Russia.

No one, there's no support in the United States for sending an army into Russia. All right? That is, that's not on the table. But what is on the table is suppose Ukraine democratizes and becomes a successful country. Putin's whole argument to the Russian people is that, oh, you know, democracy may work fine for the English and the French and the Americans,

but we Russians, we're different. We Orthodox Slavs, we have our own tradition in our own world. Kiev really is where Russian civil, the birthplace of Russian civilization, Ukraine for Russians, is part of their heartland. And if Ukrainian Slavs, Orthodox Ukrainian Slavs are happy and prosperous in a democracy, and achieving things that a corrupt, stagnant, sterile, putinist regime is unable to achieve in Russia. A happy democratic Ukraine without lifting a finger, without sending a single shot across the frontier is a mortal threat to Putin's power and vision at home. That's the problem. Okay, so does that make a devastated Ukraine and a Russian withdrawal of Putin victory?

I think yet Putin wants Ukraine to fail. He wants to be seen to be dominant in Ukraine. Those are the two things he needs. Right. And a minimum grounds for victory for him behind Crimea. Okay, so now what do you see We don't know how the Russia Ukraine war is going to continue I mean the Russians have been being pushed back, but they're unbelievably heavily armed in the final analysis

and it isn't obvious exactly what a Ukrainian victory would look like in the face of that ultimately overwhelming, let's say, nuclear threat. And so I've heard red, let's say, intimations that Putin might be willing to sit at the bargaining table now. What do you think, are we in for a long war? Are we in for a long deteriorating war that's moving to a nuclear exchange? Is Putin feeling pressure

to get to the negotiating table. What's your sense of where things, how things are going to unfold over the next year? Well, I think we're in back. The war has gone through several phases already, and it's important to remember, it's been so long since we were all thinking about a big war in this way. We've all forgotten some of the things that are normal in warfare. And one of them is that war changes. So like in World War II, you start with 10 months of Zitzkrieg.

No one is doing anything. Then Hitler conquers everything, and oh my gosh, he's going to win. But then another stalemate, et cetera, it changes. And in this war, there was the initial phase of Russian attacks and people for a while thought those might succeed. Then the Ukrainian defeat. Then we went into that long period of like slow grinding Russian advances. Then there were the heartening Ukrainian pushback. and everybody said, oh, their whole Russian army could disintegrate, etc. They seem at least for now to have stabilized their front.

We don't really know. With the missile attacks and Russia fighting on the boundaries, are we back to grinding war of attrition? Or because the morale in the Russian army is quite low in some places, could we see more military collapses like we saw on the Russian side, etc. So there's a lot going on. Both the Ukrainians and the Russians still think they have some cards to play. And neither one is willing to give up until they don't think they could gain something extra

by trying something else. So both now, the West is saying to Zelensky, come on, at least look like you want to talk peace. So he says, you know, I'm ready to sit down, you know, and discuss peace on the following terms, basically complete Russian withdrawal and reparations. And Putin also feeling some internal pressure to us and from some others to sound at least look like he's interested in pieces. Yes, I'm interested. I want peace talks on the surrender of Ukraine to me and

on exactly what pieces of Ukraine I'll take. But neither side at this point is ready to stop fighting. So I don't see immediately much change. And the future will be determined by how the armies do on the ground. The God of Battles will determine where we are. And then, you know, as the reality changes, the two sides' appreciation of what they can reasonably hope to achieve change. And at some point, maybe, there will be, we'll see, you know, a negotiated piece. Right, but you think there's a fair bit of war to come before that because it isn't obvious that either side is losing in some fundamental sense, right? It's still very ambivalent.

Each side has reasons to believe that it can gain from where it is now. And as long as that's the case, the tendency is for the war to continue. Yes. Okay. Okay. Let's turn our attention momentarily to the situation in Iran. I'd like to talk about two different streams there. The first would be the protests. And then also we could talk about Iran in relationship to Israel and also the Iranians nuclear program. When I was in Jerusalem, I met with some senior people who worked in various ways for the Israeli government over the years, and some of them were very concerned about Iran's capacity to move very rapidly towards the development of a nuclear bomb. And my understanding is that they're still experimenting quite heavily with sophisticated centrifuges that are designed

to push them to the point where developing a nuclear weapon could take place if necessary within a few months. And so, and it seems to me to be the case that Iran is Israel's most fundamental enemy and is devoted in some real sense to the eradication of Israel. And so that's all extremely worrisome in some real sense to the eradication of Israel. And so that's all extremely worrisome in some sense. Counterbalance against that is the fact that the Iranians themselves seem to be pretty

damn sick and tired of their state and God only knows what's going to happen as a consequence of the protests. I mean, we could get lucky possibly and see the Iranian regime collapse, although a collapsed regime is often replaced by a worse regime, unfortunately, rather than a better one. So anyways, tell me your views about Iran in relationship to the US, in relationship to Israel, in relationship to the ongoing protests. What's happening there as far as you can tell tell and what do you see happening in the future?

Well, in the first place, I think that hostility to the United States and Israel and more broadly to the West is baked into the nature of the current Iranian regime. You know, in a sense, they need a bad relationship with the United States. They need a bad relationship with the United States, they need a bad relationship with Israel.

How else do you justify a clerical dictatorship if you don't have terrible enemies out there who are going to destroy you? And they also remember that Iran is a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multicultural country. It has a large, a zary minority in the north. It has a lot of Kurds, and the Kurds in Iran are restless like Kurds. In other countries, they want independence for Kurds. You've got the blocs in the south.

You have a large group of Arabs in Iran, and most of the oil in Iran, or a lot of it, is in the part that's inhabited by Arabs, and the central government wants to keep pumping the oil, but spending the revenue, not on the Arab provinces, where it's come from, but to maintain its power regionally. So Iran is filled with these ethnic tensions, and you need something to hold a country like that together. And Iran, for example, looks at what happens when the Soviet Union lost its faith and communism,

so to speak, the cement that held it together, the Soviet Union fell apart. So the fear in, there's a tremendous fear in the government of Iran, that without an ideology that legitimizes and empowers central authority, who knows what could happen, and especially with other countries,

whether it's turkey russia the united states anybody trying to pull away at its territories so that's one reason they're not i think this whole fantasy that we can reach an agreement with the iranians and everything could be nice was never very likely but more than that because they need an enemy.

Well, I also think it's been very convenient for the Iranians to have Israel, as an enemy, as well, and to final support to the Palestinians and keep that conflict boiling away madly. Because as you said, there's nothing that helps legitimize an authoritarian state than the presence of obvious malevolent enemies.

So one of the preconditions for peace agreements, obviously, is that both sides actually want peace. And that doesn't seem to me at all obvious as you pointed out in the case of Iran, quite the contrary. Exactly, and when it comes to Israel, they've got something else going. Iran entertains the fan, we've talked about Iran's fears. What are its hopes?

The hopes are if a single country could control the Persian Gulf and all the oil there, even in this time of oil in other places and alternative energy, that's huge power globally. You could sort of blackmail the world. And the Iranians look at the small Arab Gulf states. Many, you know, 90% of the population in some is foreign workers. Bahrain has, you know, is a country ruled by Sunni Muslims, but has a large, you know, has a large Shia majority. There's a rest of Shia minority in Saudi Arabia. So Iran really sees opportunities and look at what it's been able to do. Thanks, I think, to American stupidity in Syria,

but also in Lebanon. Iran is really moving, has been moving across the Middle East. It's in Yemen. So, but here's the thing. Shia Islam is not popular among Sunni Muslims. It's considered a heresy and the Persians are not really, you know, the Arab Persian problem is real. So to be the most anti-Israel is a way of advertising your credentials.

I hate, we're such good Muslims that we hate Israel, and unlike all these nasty golf rulers who are willing to compromise and all of this, we're in this to the death. If you hate Israel, you know, right, you love Islam, we're your leader. They are not going gonna give that up. They are not gonna give that up. And if the other Arabs are walking away from violence among the Palestinians, well, the Iranians would be more than happy to fill that gap. So this idea that somehow they're these moderates,

and they're just ready to make a deal. I'm sure there are moderates in Iran, but the hard core of the power structure, I think sees the logic both in terms of the fears and the hopes, and they don't see an advantage in changing. So let's discuss a little bit. One of the things that struck me, I was reading your book, the latest book,

Arch of a Covenant published in 2022, and it's an analysis at least in large part of the situation in relationship to Israel and the Zionist state and Palestine. And I thought that your book was remarkably even handed. I've been fascinated by the developments on the Abraham Accord front. I've interviewed a number of people who are associated with Abraham Accord. And from what I've been able to understand, what essentially happened was that a group of people who were outsiders in relationship to the foreign

policy establishment decided to buck conventional wisdom, which was that there was no possibility for peace between the Israelites, the Israelis, and Arab world without including the Palestinians, just to do an end run around that, and to start to talk to Arab countries who are actually interested in, while keeping Iran under control,

but also in making peace with the Israelis for strategic reasons, partly because they're a major military power, but also for economic reasons, because so many Arab states are now looking to differentiate their economies away from reliance on the petrodollar. And so what seemed to have happened with the Abraham Accords was a very large group of Arab countries, decided that peace with Israel was definitely in their best interests, and that did circumvent the Palestinians. Now, I've been pretty sympathetic, let's say, to the operations of the Israelis in the

Middle East, and I've been criticized to a large degree for failing to take into account the oppression of the Palestinians. And your work seems to be remarkably even handed in that regard. And you commented just before we started this interview that you wrote a book on a very contentious topic. And so that would be the Israel-Palestinian situation. But you didn't really contribute to an exacerbation of the culture war, and you really didn't get pilloried for it. And so what that seems to indicate is that you struck kind of a nice balance between advocating on the Jewish side in relationship to Israel, and also pointing out that by no means a

majority of Jews around the world even support the Zionist project, and also extending a certain degree of sympathy for the displaced Palestinians. So maybe you could, could you walk us through your view of the Abraham Accord and your view of the situation in Israel, vis-a-vis the Palestinians? Sure. Sure. Let me start with the root, the Israeli-Palestinian situation. You know, it's Americans were actually, you know, pro-Israel before the Jews were, not Jewish Americans.

And in the 1890s, before Teodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism had written his book on the Jewish state. President of the United States got a petition asking him to use his influence to promote a Jewish state in Palestine. And this petition was signed by John D. Rockefeller, JP Morgan, and the entire sort of American establishment was on board with this idea. And I, myself, thousands of years of persecution, the horrors of the 20th century, if any people on earth need a state, and for that matter, deserve a state, surely it's the Jews.

At the same time, the Palestinians are a people. They became a people in part because of the struggle with Israel and with the Zionists. And their human beings and human beings have rights. And as an American, I believe in rights and rights like self-determination. So my hope is still, although it's difficult and complicated, that someday I'd be able to travel from the Jewish state freely to the Palestinian state and have friends in both places. That's what I would like to see. Now, in the book I don't make recommendations,

I think right now, it's very hard to get there, but that's what I think most Americans would like to see. And that's what I would like to see. Okay, so you cite Mark Twain in your book. Let me just see if I can find that here. Yes, here's a citation from Mark Twain. Now, see, when I talked to Netanyahu, one of the claims that was put forward on his part

was that before the Zionist movement, the Palestinian territory, now Israel, was pretty damn desolate and abandoned. And the Palestinian observers of that conversation are very upset about that characterization, feeling that it's in the best interests of the Zionists to portray pre-Jewish Palestine as a desolate and abandoned wasteland. Now, but you cite, let me read this, yet to Americanize, the land that the Bible famously described as flowing with milk and honey appeared bone-dry and deserted in the 19th century.

And it's handful of it, inhabitants, Arabs, and Jews seemed deeply wretched and prey to disease and poverty. Mark Twain in one of his popular travel columns wrote, For Mabel Ham's time till now, Palestine has been people only with ignorant, degraded lazy, unwashed loafers and savages. For Twain and for many Americans, the Holy Land was wasted on its current inhabitants, whose poor stewardship had turned the land of King Solomon and King David into as Twain

quipped, the most hopeless, dreary, heartbroken piece of territory outside of Arizona. Now, it's certainly the case that one of the claims to Israeli legitimacy in my understanding is the idea that this was a particularly God-for-Sake and peace of territory. The Ottomans themselves weren't that interested in holding on to it. It hadn't been utilized particularly effectively. And one of the consequences of this high-ist enterprises that was, once was an essentially barren desert wasteland has been turned into an extremely populace and productive and economically thriving and blooming country. And I have some sympathy for that viewpoint, but then that leaves that brings into clear focus the problematic elements of that story and relationship to the Palestinians.

And so if you were going to make a case for the Palestinians, vis-a-vis the Israelis, if you would, how would you characterize that in light of these sorts of descriptions of presinist Palestine? Well, I don't want to pit them against each other, but I would say that my Palestinian friends would say, and I would have some sympathy with this perspective that you have to remember that, you know, the Palestinians weren't self-governing in the 19th century. They'd been for 500 years or 400 years at that part of the Ottoman Empire.

And so they were ruled from Istanbul by Anturks who saw the Arabs more as a cow to be milked than as, so they were victims of Ottoman imperialism then before the British came. And that I think would be the kind of argument that people would make. I would go a little deeper and say a lot of the redevelopment and the blooming of Palestine has come about because of modern techniques of agronomy and irrigation, which no one

knew in the 19th century, in a sense. And the Israelis have really brought, I mean, people all over the world are using their dry farming techniques and their irrigation techniques and some of their desalination and other stuff. So they really have brought something, but to compare a 21st century Israel to a 19th century Palestine,

you know, it's a 19th century Palestine. You know, it's a little tricky as a historical comparison. I think we just say that. Right, right, right. So you have multiple problems with that kind of comparison. Yeah. The advancement of technology being one of them. So how many people, how many people are we talking about inhabiting the place

that is now Israel in the, in the, say, in the late 19th century? Again. You know, the estimates vary wildly, because of course, again, the Ottoman Empire was not a place where you had careful statistics. So you don't have every 10 years the decennial census with an organized modern bureaucracy

counting the numbers. So how do you estimate that population? What is your basis for it? And when you have such a politically contentious question as Israel Palestine, where everybody's got a point of view, everybody's got an agenda. Without even cheating, you can find all kinds of ways to get to different population estimates for 1890, if you see what I mean. So I honestly don't think, and in all of these, one of the things I, in Ark of the Covenant,

the book I try to make clear is that in many ways this dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians is one of a hundred such disputes. You know, Croats and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, Hungarians versus Romanians in Transylvania. They're all these national disputes. And in all of them, what you find is these scholars and historians and ideologues, they make all kinds of claims based on history.

I was in Romania and somebody said, yeah, the Magniars, they have no place in here, they're interlopers. They only got here in the ninth century AD, which is right, right. To an American that's not very convincing argument. But anyway, everybody comes armed with these battalions of facts that they just throw each other at each other. We're not going to get the solution by sifting ultimately through those facts. That is, if you have a husband and a wife who've quarreled,

raking over every quarrel in the marriage is not actually the way to get them moving forward. No, no, no, right. You need something like a uniting vision. No, I think that's a very good point. And I mean, part of the reason that there is conflict everywhere when there is conflict is because the facts themselves are open to question. I mean, that's almost like the definition of the precondition for a war.

We don't agree what the realities are on the ground at all. And we disagree with them so vociferously that we can't even discuss them. We have to now kill each other. And we disagree with the rules, you know, like what should adjudicate something? Is it, you know, so the Zionists will say, and they're right to say so, the League of Nations recognized the British mandate over Palestine as a national home for the Jews. So it's legal. The UN reaffirmed it in 1948. How much more legal, 47?

How much more legal could that be? And a Palestinian might say, well, you know, the British were colonial interlopers who stole the land from the Ottoman Empire, or, you know, and the Palestinians never had a voice. What gave the League of Nations the right to say that the British had a right to the territory? That's imperial.

Right, right, right. You, and they're both arguments, and people will have different reasons for supporting them. Well, then there's ideological reasons too. I mean, there's two things that you do very masterfully, at least in this book, The Ark of the Covenant. The first is, I would say, you make this remarkable case,

which you touched on earlier, that a tremendous amount of impetus for the Zionist movement wasn't specifically Jewish. It happened to dovetail with a stream of Christian evangelism, that's probably the right way to think about it, that viewed the emergence of a Jewish state in the Middle East as part of the fulfillment of biblical prophetic tradition. And you point out, as you did with the Rockefellers, for example, and with J.P. Morgan, that there were

Zionist movements on the Christian front that at least developed in parallel with the Zionist movement on the Jewish front and in many places preceded it. And so one of the things I found quite compelling about your book was the detailing out of the remarkable and strange support that the Zionist project found in the Christian West. And so you also point out that if it was up to the Jews worldwide and they had a democratic vote, let's say, with regards to Israeli policies, it's by no means obvious that the hawks on the Israeli side would be the most popular, let's say, put forward

the most popular viewpoint in relationship to what Jews themselves believe, and that there's no evidence at all that what do you call it? The Vulcan planet theory, it's something like that, that the whole Zionist project is the conspiratorial consequence of imperialist Jews. And then you also make a parallel case, which I really also appreciate. So first of all, the Zionist story is much more complex than the Jews are trying to steal the Middle East. That's for sure.

But then there's an ideological issue too, which is that on the radical left in particular, there has developed this anti-colonial narrative that's predicated in part on the claim that every human relationship is predicated on power and exploitation. And then what seemed to happen was that that narrative, which accounts, let's say, for the colonial activities of the Westerners, although it's curiously absentee claims about, let's say, the Ottoman Empire, is that Israel is just written into history as another example of the same thing, which is convenient for people that can only have one historical idea, but doesn't seem to me to be very much in accordance with the historical process that actually gave rise to the Israeli state. And if we look at, you know, again, people, you hear all of this people talking about how

it's sort of, Israel is a European colonial venture in the Middle East. It's a white occupation of a brown country, so to speak. And certainly the haresil and his Zionist movement were strong among European Jews, but the largest groups in Israel today are not European. They're Middle Eastern Jews. Many of them were actually driven out of their homes in the Arab world in retaliation for what happened

to the Palestinians, although these Jews who'd lived in Iraq for thousands of years, or their ancestors, in Egypt, and so on, had had nothing to do with either the Zionist movement or the war in Palestine. They were driven from their homes as refugees and came to Israel. And these people sort of get overlooked in the discussion of, and there were about as many Jewish refugees from the Arab world, more or less. And people obviously argue about all these numbers. And I'm not the great arbiter of everything here,

but comparable to the number of Palestinians who either fled or were driven out of Israel in the time of that war. So it's, and these Jews who are the supporters, by the way, that that's the core of Prime Minister Netanyahu's support, not the European Jews, but the Middle Eastern Jews, and the Russian Jews who have a different story. But these Jews feel no guilt about the Palestinians.

Hey, he's a refugee, I'm a refugee. But where's the global sympathy for me? Where the Jewish refugee would say, where is the United Nations with education for my child and free medical? What have I ever gotten? I'm called a colonizer. Right, a European colonizer.

Yeah, exactly. And then on the other hand, I visited Auschwitz some years ago, and I saw a group of teenagers following a star of David Flagg, so I went to see what was going on. They were Jewish teenagers visiting Poland because they were actually descended from Polish Jews, and they were coming back to see, you know, where, where their ancestors had been. And I said, well, how's the trip been going? And they said, well, it's not been so good. I said, what do you mean? And they said, well, you know, we went to visit the memorial in the Warsaw ghetto, you know, the Jewish resistance

against the Nazis. And a crowd of people formed there and they were yelling Jews go home. Oh my God. But you know, they go to Palestine and it's, you know, they go back to Israel and people will say, Jews go home to Poland. Poland, Jews go home to Palestine. People have to have a home. It definitely seems, what would you call it, bordering on malevolent to regard the Jews who escaped from European persecution into Israel as European colonizers. I mean, you can say what you want about the British and the hand they played in establishing Israel, and you can make the case for the Palestinians that the UN didn't have the right to do what it did. There's some credibility to that argument, but to regard European Jews fleeing Nazi

Germany, for example, or Poland as European colonizers is, I mean, Jesus, talk about Pan in both directions at the same time. Well, you know, it's also true, and this is one of the things that in Ark of the Covenant just sort of, I learned the most about and surprised me the most. It turns out that Stalin had a lot more to do with the Jewish victory in the war of independence and the Nakba, the exile of the Palestinians, than either the British or the Americans. The British actually sided with the Arabs in the Israeli War of

Independence and they armed the Arabs and the Arab forces that were the most successful were the British Legion of British trained, British led, British equipped soldiers in the Jordanian army. equipped soldiers in the Jordanian army. And there, you know, there are the reasons that the West Bank was held by the Arabs until the 1967 war. And on the other hand, the Americans, while we set all kinds of nice things about the Israelis, we put on an arms embargo that meant that the desperate Israelis and for much of the war they were losing the war and they were being besieged in Jerusalem. They couldn't buy weapons from the United States.

Forget about American aid to Israel. They couldn't even buy with cash money. We put an arms embargo. Stalin ended up selling the through Czechoslovakia, where the Czech arms factory, the Skoda arms factory in Czechoslovakia had been making weapons for the Vermacht. And when the Germans surrendered, they had all these surplus weapons in the factory. To help the communist take control of Czechoslovakia, Stalin allowed the Czech government to sell these weapons, these Nazi war surplus weapons to the Jews and smuggled them into

British controlled Palestine. And it was those weapons that allowed the Jews to turn the tide in the war. So to call this an act of Western colonialism, this was, if in it, call an act of Soviet colonialism. And the reason that Stalin did it, okay, was because he believed correctly that the emergence of a Zionist state in Palestine would so disrupt the British relations with the Arabs that it would dramatically weaken the power of Britain and the power of the British Empire in the Middle East.

You also thought rightly that it would help drive a wedge between the US and Britain. So the whole story of, you know, the story that impupils minds, this is the West imposing something of its grand imperialist capitalist colonial project. it just doesn't match the historical record. And of course, in those days Israel was a left-wing cause. Right, right. And the democratic socialists of America who were now extremely anti-Israel, for them in the 1950s, Israel was proof that socialism worked. Right, right. Because Israel's policies were far from that. For them in the 1950s, Israel was proof that socialism worked.

Right, right. Because Israel's policies were far that with the glorification of the cabootces. Yes, exactly. And Israel had a planned economy, and the labor unions were incredibly powerful. Israel was far more left-wing in its economic policy than any even of the social democratic countries in Europe. So when people said, oh, under socialism, there's no freedom, the democratic socialists of America say, no, Israel shows you're wrong.

Do you think that part of the reason that the left has switched its position, let's say, in relationship to Israel, is because Netanyahu went to war, so to speak, against a lot of these socialist predispositions and rekindled the Israeli economy towards something much more approximating a free market capitalist state. Yeah, it was a combination of several things. And this was a factor that in the 70s, Israel goes from being a poster child of socialism to being a poster child of socialism to being a poster child of factorism and Reaganism. That those were, you know, they began to introduce those economic reforms,

which have helped create in particular the incredibly dynamic tech sector that now gives Israel allies all over the world and will come to the Abraham Accords in a minute because this is obviously a major factor. Yeah, well, Netanyahu's claim is that, okay, so he made two claims when I talked to him, and not only obviously when I talked to him, but one is that he worked very hard to make Israel a formidable military power, but also worked very hard to make Israel a formidable capitalist enterprise. And that it was the combination of those two things that enticed or forced, let's say, the Arab states

that did sign the Abraham Accords to go along. They wanted Israel as an ally against Iran. And Israel was powerful militarily and it showed its prowess in that regard. But also because the Israeli economy had been freed from the strictures of an idiot centrally planned socialism, it had become an industrial and technological powerhouse, rivaled perhaps now only by Silicon Valley.

And that also made the Israelis very attractive as trading partners to the Arab states that were interested in modernizing their economies. So that's Netanyahu's pitch. What do you think of it? What do you think? Well, I think claims fundamentally this is correct, that Israel thanks to its economic reforms, but also thanks to some intelligent state, it isn't less a fair, but, you know, the state has been very much involved in promoting its tech sector, but it has done essentially under capitalist principles

and has worked brilliantly. And that then, the tech investments help reinforce the economy overall, but also increase military capability. And this, by the way, is a little bit worrying globally. In the old days, when you spent money on defense, it would weaken your civilian economy. Instead of building a school bus, you would build a tank. But increasingly today, because so much defense capability is linked to IT, advanced information processing, and all kinds of stuff, a lot of that technology is dual use, but also firms that are excellent in military

planning and in military investment are extremely powerful economically. So in fact, in large defense budgets tend to promote economic growth rather than restricted. And that change, I think, is propelling the world in a dangerous direction towards more arm races. And that's something to be genuinely to be concerned about. And is it propelling the world to more pseudo-fascist collusion between large enterprises at the pinnacle of the state? Well, you know, it's, well, hopefully, again, this is going to be one of the tests

of the 21st century. It's clear that information and state power are very closely aligned. And in some ways, information is becoming the currency of power. And so you, you certainly, if you're the United States, you don't want TikTok or Huawei to have access to all the data about your population and a good vice versa if you're China. So one of the kinds of fantasies maybe we had in the 1990s was that the tech revolution would make national borders obsolete and create a single global

commons. It doesn't look to me right now as if that's the way things are working, that the tech revolution may in fact be recreating blocks and strong national entities. Yeah, well, I think I think I think the idea of a centralized global control elite and mass of citizens at their Beck and call is a tower of Babel model. Yes, no, that we need you right You see this in AI systems as well for for an AI system to process See this in AI systems as well, for an AI system to process information about the world properly, it has to have a very differentiated hierarchy of distributed computation. There can't just be a centralized, what would you say, algorithmic system operating on

the basis of a few algorithmic principles and then an undifferentiated massive activity. And the proper model for governance has to be something like, I think, something like the Catholic principle of subsidiarity, where you have sovereignty inherent in various strata of the hierarchical system and that the hierarchy is quite deep and dense and differentiated. And so the problem with the globalist view is that there's this notion that you can have a centralized cabal that can make relatively simple centralized decisions and all the power that should be distributed

in all these subsidiary organizations can be accrued to the central authority. That just can't work. And so there's going to be a place for something like sovereign nation states because you want Governance to operate as locally as you possibly can so you need countries. You need states. You need provinces You need towns. You need municipalities. You need families and every single one of those levels of organization have to be Given their due in with regard to political and economic power

Yes I know the overwhelming amount of information isn't going to eliminate that. Yeah to be given their due with regard to political and economic power. Yes, I think that's true. An overwhelming amount of information isn't going to eliminate that. So that's the problem with the globalist vision as far as I can tell. What do you think of the Abraham Accords? Well, I think it's broadly speaking. I think basically, in some ways, the story that you told, I think, is the right story. The thing I would add, which is to say that the Arabs and the Israelis are both looking at Iran, and by the way, down the road they might be looking at Turkey. Because remember the Ottoman Empire ruled both Palestine and the Arab world for hundreds

of years. And as Erdogan has tried to revive this idea of an Islamic Turkey, he's made a lot of his neighbors quite nervous. So the sense is, well, Iran might be the threat today, Turkey tomorrow. But yes, the Arabs in the Israelis now understand that they have a core strategic interest in common. Neither one of them wants any country to be able to dominate the Middle East because if any country did, it would directly threaten

the independence of both the Arab states and Israel. Now, they didn't recognize this in the past because many Arabs had this dream that there could be an Arab state that would dominate the Middle East. That was Saddam Hussein's vision. It was Nasr's vision. In his Kukki way, it was Kedafi's vision, but this Pan Arabic, or in some cases, Pan Islamist vision of the Middle East. That is sort of, the Arabs have lost faith in that by and large. And so there is an understanding that their interests and Israel's interests are connected in this very geopolitical way. But at the same time, you've got the problem of energy transition. The Gulf Arabs in particular used to think,

hey, we've got all this oil, it's going to be around forever. Now they're not so sure. You know, will we still be using an oil-driven economy in 100 years, et cetera? And with all of these talks about carbon neutrality and so on by 2030, 2040, whatever year, I mean, I'm a little skeptical that all of these things are going to happen in the ways. Yeah, they're not good.

They're definitely not going to happen. I mean, the Biden administration itself has projected that it'll take till 2240 to produce something like 100% rely on some renewable energy. Right. So these ideas that we're going to get there by 2050, they're not only preposterous, they are outright lies. But even so, the Arabs have to figure, because on the other hand, they've got fracking and they've got greater competition from other sources.

The Arabs have to figure the price of oil, their income from oil over the long term is going to be trillions of dollars less than they once thought it would, that there's a long term downgrade for income streams from oil. And so that means in a country like Saudi Arabia where the population is growing and the government in order to stay in power needs to keep the people happy in some way,

you've gotta be thinking about economic growth. Well, that means you need technology, it means you need investment, it means you need to have good relations with the people who are good at this. So there's an economic dimension to that as well, that's new, and that is added now to the strategic. The third thing though, and I think some of the Americans involved in the Abraham Accords

have not talked about this as much, but it's real. Is that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis trust the Americans as much as they used to. And it's partly because of things like the Iran nuclear deal that they thought was sacrificing their interests to America's interests. But it's also, we elect Bush in 2001, then we'll turn around 180 degrees, we elect Obama, then eight years later, we turn around, we elect Trump, and then four years later, we elect Biden. So people in countries where America plays a large role in their security, they have to

think harder than before about, well, we don't know who the Americans are going to elect in 2024. Will it be Elizabeth Warren? Will it be Donald Trump again? You know, they have no idea what we'll do. And frankly, we don't either. So, so they, that means that they have to work together more. So American weakness actually helped push the Abraham Accords. So one of the disappointments that I've experienced in relationship to the Biden administration was what I saw as their ideologically motivated rejection of the advances made on the Abraham Accord front.

From what I've been able to understand, the Saudis were playing a large role behind the scenes in pushing the Abraham Accords forward, and it seems to me that had the Biden administration gone to the Saudis with an attitude that would have unfortunately also allowed Trump to claim some credit for the Abraham Accords. If this Biden administration had gone to the Saudis with open arms in some sense, that they might have been the next signatories for the Abraham Accords. And it looked to me like the Biden administration let an extremely narrow-minded, parochial, ideological view of both Trump and the situation in the Middle East, scuttle, unbelievably promising opportunity,

not only on the peace front, but, I mean, the Americans were also very much interested in getting their hands on some additional Saudi oil, which they seemed to have failed that, dismaly, and then had to turn to, you know, lovely, lovely regimes like Venezuela. So what do you think is going on with regards to the Biden administration and the Saudis

in relationship to the Abraham Accords? Well, you know, this is a really interesting story, and it's a complicated one, but I'll tell it as simply as I can, which is that the Democratic Party has been basically hating Saudi Arabia for 70 years. The last Democrat who really sort of likes the Saudis was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who visited in 1944. But during the 1950s, Democrats actually hated the Saudis in general because they were very pro-Israel at the time.

And they saw the Eisenhower administration, which tilted toward NASA and in general toward the Arabs. Well, you're preferring a bunch of evil, feudal monarchs over democratic Israel because you want the oil and the oil monopolies are your friends. So to be a good liberal Democrat was to hate the Saudis and hate Eisenhower for liking them. Then you come to OPEC,

you know, the 1970s and now you have the oil cartel. I think we've been protecting you from the Soviet Union and your enemies, and you turn on us and you're jacking up the price. Yeah. At that time, working class America was basically democratic and the price of oil tripled at a time when people were getting like 10 miles a gallon in a car and it was wrecking people's

lives and it was the Saudis who were doing it. Then you add sort of, you know, then 9-1-1 comes along and there were the Saudis, but plus the Saudis were friends of the bushes. The Bush family had a long connection with the Saudi royal family. Obviously, Hanky Panky is at work, it's the evil, it's the evil. Then now on top of all of that comes oil and the greenhouse gases. The Saudis are destroying the world because they're pumping all that oil into the atmosphere and any good relationship with the Saudis is sort of bowing the knee to big oil and to

the destruction of human life through climate change. I'm exaggerating, but you can see what I mean. Right, right. Well, you also saw widespread Saudi support for the Wahhabis as well, and they're, they're drug-beating on behalf of a pretty damn restrictive form of fundamentalist Islam. Exactly. But it looked to me like, so, so, okay, so that's a perfect storm, but it still looked to me like the American choice in the last five years was something

like, well, is it Iran or is it the Saudis in the Israelis? And it seems to me that despite the sins of the Saudis, which are manifold, the idea that they're not preferable to the Iranians is a form of political insanity. Well, I think we also need to throw in a factor here, which is, you know, there's been a huge scandal recently about Katari influence in the European Parliament, where they've actually arrested the Vice President of the former Vice President of the European Parliament and so on and so forth. The Katari's are very anti-Saudi, they've had a huge fight with the Saudis in recent years. They also have a kind of a softer relationship with Iran. They are heavily involved in the Washington Policy Network, the head of a major think tank,

got into big trouble because of a relationship. There's a sense in which all sides in the Gulf with a lot of money are put themselves into Washington politics and acquire networks of allies, let's just say. So there's, and the democratic side of the spectrum is more aligned with soft on Iran. Pro-democracy is a little bit tilting toward the Muslim brotherhood. Again, I'm not saying everybody does this, but if you watch Washington politics, you can see some threads moving forward.

Okay, but what in the world is the rationale for being soft on Iran? I don't see a rationale for that at all. I mean Iran is a terrible, repressive theocracy with nuclear ambition. It's a dangerous regime. So how can you be soft on Iran? It's a big challenge.

May I call you Jordan, by the way, or Mr. Peters? You certainly may. All right, well, and I'm Walter, by the way. It's after two hours, I think we should. But I think we could do that. But I think that, look, if you believe, and a whole generation has come to believe in the US, and not entirely for bad reasons, like the Iraq war was the worst mistake America has made in the 21st century. People would say that.

And a war with Iran would be even worse than the war in Iraq. And it's very easy to start a war with Iran, but once it's going on, it'll suck us dry, it'll divert us from China, the Middle East will be a flame, et cetera, et cetera. So you're numb, and furthermore, we got to get out of the Middle East and think about China. Okay? So what's the biggest danger? What is the biggest way you can easy as a way to get into a war in the Middle East? It would be a confrontation with Iran. Therefore, you can't have a confrontation with Iran. That's the way I think a lot of people are thinking. And they will say, and now I can't tell you this is what they think, because I can't read their minds. But I think

the logic of the position is, we have to say we don't want an Iranian nuclear weapon. But actually, if you're given a binary choice between a war with Iran, with the U.S. fighting Iran, to keep it from being not nuclear, and then just hoping that if they get a nuclear weapon, we can deter them, and Israel can deter them, like everybody else's with nuclear weapons has been deterred, they would say, better let them have the bomb than have the war. I think that's the logic of the position and that the Iranians smelling that as the logic of the position have taken a very tough line in negotiations and at this point are continuing to press the Biden administration. That's what I think is probably happening.

Okay, okay. We've wandered over a lot of territory. We talked about China. We talked about Russia. We talked about Iran. We talked about the Abraham Accords. We talked about the complexities of the Israel-Palestinian situation. So we've covered a lot of the territory. I was hoping we would cover.

Is there anything that is remaining that you'd like to bring people's attention to? Well, you know, there's been such a, there's been a great conversation. I really enjoyed it. And we touched on so many things. I guess I would like to close by giving a bit of a reason for optimism for folks, because, you know, the world situation is grim and there is real danger of war.

But this Anglo-American 300-year-old system of a kind of a commercial capitalist global liberal framework, it doesn't just stay there by accident. There are solid reasons why the world order that we've known. It's possible that it can continue lasting. Who knows how long, but there are forces that prop it up. One of them, and we've talked about this some, is that a diversified society with capitalist principles actually is incredibly creative and vital

and keeps coming up with new technologies, new economic productivity, new ideas, new institutions that enable it to continually adjust to changing conditions. And that gives it tremendous advantages over people who try to follow other systems or other approaches. The other advantage is geopolitical. See America is a see power. We don't have any interest in conquering France. Much is, there's some really nice places in France. We occupied Japan after World War II, but we got out.

We did not want to stay. But on the contrary, land powers, like the Soviet Union, keep expanding. And they want to dominate their neighbors in a way that a sea power just isn't going to do. So when a country like Russia, or Iran, or China begins to threaten its neighbors, they all want to be allies of ours. So as China has become more threatening, we can see how Japan is suddenly, they're doubling their defense budget. They are deepening their relations with Australia, with India. You know know they're really working very hard to build the alliance the indians are waking up and getting very geopolitically active

so this the the abrahama courts pop up in the middle east the polls and the politics are committed you know the suede's and the fends want to join nato So when this system is threatened by ambitious big powers, the other powers organize into alliances. And this is not new. This is how Britain defeated Louis XIV in the 16th and early 17th century. It's how the British were able to defeat Napoleon. It's what brought down Kaiser Wilhelm in World War I. It's what brought down Hitler and Tojo in World War II, and it's what defeated the Soviet Union.

So there are things on our side, and we need the courage and the vision, and maybe even a little bit of a knowledge of history that can help us understand and assess these incredibly threatening and dramatic trends in world history that we're living through. Well, I think that's an excellent way of ending this on that optimistic note. Yes, I do think that the principles upon which this lengthy Anglo-American productive piece have been predicated are rock solid,

particularly compared to all-known alternatives. And it is useful for us in the West to observe that and to take heart in it and also to understand that the degree to the degree that those fundamental principles have spread across the world, what they've primarily produced in their aftermath is unparalleled productivity and abundance and peace. And so we could have more of that.

And I also think that that's within our grasp. So that's a nice optimistic projection for 2023. And hopefully calm and stable and wise heads will prevail. Thank you very much for talking to me today and to all of you who are watching on YouTube or listening on the associated podcast platforms. Thank you for your time and attention. I'm going to turn now for an additional half an hour

to the Daily Wire Plus platform. I'm going to talk to Mr. Walter Russell need about his biographical progress. I'm very interested in delineating out the particulars of successful people's lives. It always makes an interesting story, and I think it's useful for people to understand how a productive destiny makes itself manifest

across a life course. And so that's what we're going to do. Thank you to the Daily Wire Plus people for facilitating this conversation. And happy new year to all of you who are watching and listening. Thanks again, Walter, for the conversation today. Hello everyone. I would encourage you to continue listening to my conversation with my guest on dailywireplus.com. dot com