The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it Resolved, the United States should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression

Episode Date: May 23, 2023

It’s no secret that both China and the US are preparing for war. Some American military experts think that an armed conflict between the two superpowers is inevitable and could begin as early as 2025. And while there is a general consensus among Americans that the US should defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression, there is also widespread disagreement about whether the US government should make a public commitment to do so. Some foreign policy experts argue that strategic ambiguity will signal that an invasion will be met by a weak response, thus bolstering China’s resolve to attack. Strategic clarity in the form of a pledge to defend Taiwan would intimidate Xi Jinping, deter his re-unification ambitions, and send a strong message of support to allies in the region. Other analysts say that a security guarantee by the US could force Xi’s hand and lead to a military conflict that would have otherwise never come to pass. The US should focus on deterring China from attacking Taiwan without resorting to military commitments that could spiral into a long, protracted and devastating war with a rising superpower. Arguing for the motion is David Sacks, Research Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, where he specializes in U.S.-China relations Arguing against the motion is Michael Mazarr, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He previously served as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   SOURCES: CBS, CNN, ABC, China Policy Research   The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/   Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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Every episode we provide you with a civil and substantive debate on the big issue of the day to arm you, the listener, with enough information to make up your own mind. Today's debate, be it resolved. The United States should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Growing tensions this morning in Taiwan as the U.S. begins drills with the Philippines in the region the move following days of China's aggressive drills. Tonight, the drumbeat of war. Taiwan says 28 Chinese warplanes, including fighter jets and nuclear-capable bombers,

crossed into its airspace as the tension between Taiwan and China is growing. Chinese fighter jets and warships are simulating sealing off Taiwan on the third and last day of its military drills. The Joint Sword exercise is show a force following a meeting between Taiwan's president and a senior U.S. politician. Taipei has condemned the exercises and Washington has called for restraint, saying it is monitoring Beijing's action closer. Hello, I'm your moderator, Rudir-Griffis. Well, it's widely acknowledged that the U.S. and China are preparing for potential conflict

with some military experts suggesting that armed hostilities between these two superpowers could commence as early as 2025. While there is a consensus that the U.S. should defend Taiwan in an event of an attack, there is a significant disagreement regarding the U.S. government's public commitment, to do so. Some foreign policy experts argue that the Biden administration must publicly pledge to protect Taiwan as a means to deter Xi Jinping and his ambitions for unification, along with demonstrating unwavering support for its regional allies in Asia. Conversely, other analysts contend that a security guarantee by the United States could provoke Xi and China into military action that

might not otherwise have happened. Instead, they propose the United States should focus on deterring China from attacking Taiwan without resorting to military commitments that could escalate into a prolonged and devastating conflict. In this installment of the Monk debates, we challenge the essence of these arguments by debating the motion be a resolved. The United States should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Advocating for the motion is David Sacks, a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, specializing in U.S.-China relations. Opposing the motion is Michael Mazar, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, who previously served as a special assistant to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

David, Michael, welcome to the Mug Debates. Thanks. Great to be here. Thanks for having me. Well, very timely topic or resolution today, simple. but provocative, be it resolved the United States should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. David, you're arguing in favor of the motion, so let's put a couple of minutes on the show clock and turn the program over to you for your opening state.

Sure, thanks again for having me. So I'll take a step back to begin, and I will start by saying that the United States has a vital strategic interest in defending Taiwan against Chinese aggression. And why do I say that? Number one, if China were to forcefully take over Taiwan, annex the island and station its military there, the United States would find it far harder to operate in the Western Pacific, to project power through the region, and to come to the defense of its allies above all Japan, but also the Philippines. If the United States did not come to Taiwan's defense, I believe that Japan, the Philippines, and even South Korea, Australia, and other allies and partners in the region would lose faith in U.S. commitments to their defense and would either pursue strategic autonomy, developing potentially nuclear weapons of their own, or for weaker countries cutting the best deal that they can with China and accommodating Chinese interests. Either result would be a recipe for less U.S.

influence in the world's most consequential region. Number two, we should come to Taiwan's defense because it is a pivotal part of global order. If this were to occur after a Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would be yet another example of an authoritarian regime acquiring territory through force and extinguishing a smaller Democratic neighbor, which would have chilling effects throughout the world. So we can't minimize Taiwan's economic importance. Taiwan is a top 10 U.S. trading partner. It is also the global hub of semiconductor manufacturing.

Around 90% of the world's most advanced chips are made in Taiwan. And if China were to use force against Taiwan, it would lead to a global economic depression, the likes of which we haven't seen in a century. All of which is to say that I believe deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan is a vital U.S. interest, and I believe that the best way to do so is to publicly state that we would come to Taiwan's defense. We have to reckon with a much more assertive, even aggressive China under Xi Jinping and also a much more militarily capable China under the current leadership. And as a result, I don't think that our policy of strategic ambiguity will serve us well in the coming

decades. I believe that we need to signal to Xi Jinping that a use of force will be met by a direct U.S. intervention on Taiwan's behalf. Thank you, David. A terrific opening statement. Concise to the point. You're listening today to our debate, be it resolved. The United States should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan

against Chinese aggression. Michael, you're arguing against the motion. So let's have your opening remarks now. Yeah, I mean, I'm really thankful to David for and others for raising the issue. It's an important debate that we need to be having. But in terms of the choice to make a more public statement to come to Taiwan, defense. I think that there's so many things wrong with the idea that it's hard to fit the arguments into just a couple minutes. One thing people need to keep in mind is, and we can go into this

in the discussion part, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is a complicated mosaic of different commitments and limitations and constraints that is really one of the most obscure pieces of statecraft in U.S. foreign policy. And so the ambiguity of the U.S. policy that we have stated publicly, that aggression against Taiwan is not acceptable, but we do not have a formal defense commitment is actually an essential part of balancing the various considerations in terms of not provoking China, but sending signals that help prevent an attack on Taiwan. I think ending the policy of ambiguity is unnecessary as well as dangerous. It's unnecessary because, first of all, China is not about to invade Taiwan. They've made some more belligerent statements recently,

but there's no evidence that they are on the verge of using force. We don't need to make a new statement because just about everybody, including China, assumes that the United States would come to Taiwan's aid. That is a widely accepted fact. President Biden has said so four times. You didn't want to get involved in the Ukraine conflict militarily for obvious reasons. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?

Yes. You are? That's the commitment we made. That's a commitment we made. We are not, look, here's the situation. We agree with the one China policy. We signed on to it, and all the attendant agreements made from there. But the idea that it can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not appropriate.

It'll dislocate the entire region. And so if the potential aggressor already assumes, that we are going to come to the aid of Taiwan. There's no need to make a new statements. But more importantly, it's not necessary because it's not words that we need. It's military power. Taiwan needs to significantly increase its defense spending.

The United States, as it is doing, needs to enhance its posture in the region. And we need to recruit multilateral support for statements of deterrence. If we do those things, we will reduce the potential for aggression, whether or not we make a new statement. But apart from being needed,

Needless, a new U.S. public commitment to defend Taiwan, I think, is dangerous. It would clearly provoke China by signaling that the United States is abandoning many of the key assurances that have been part of its policy, this balancing policy over the last 40 years and moving to end what is called its one China policy. Deterrence in general, I think, tends to collapse not because an aggressor sees a momentary advantage or a window of opportunity, but because they become desperate and believe that they have to act. And pushing China into a corner with this kind of a public statement would create exactly that sort of a moment. It would also potentially emboldened Taiwan to make more explicit threats of independence, which is another red line for China. If a conflict then erupted, we could be blamed because it was our action that led to the crisis rather than out of the blue Chinese aggression.

And it would put our allies in a very hard place. They want to believe in American credibility, but they also don't want the United States to provoke China with a step like this. So there are a lot of ways that avenues we can take to improving deterrence. I just think that an unambiguous public pledge to defend Taiwan in the case of any aggression is not one of them. Thank you. Michael, great opening statements from you both. Let's move on to rebuttals now. So again, a quick opportunity for you to rebuttal. to each other's opening remarks, maybe just focusing in on a particular point that you want to

take exception with. We're obviously going to have lots of time over the course of this debate to unpack. Again, your different arguments and counter arguments, but maybe if you could just flag, what's the one thing you've heard from each other that you're going to start this debate by disagreeing over? David, let me come to you first. Sure. I mean, I do think that it's important that we differentiate between the U.S. One China policy and the question of strategic ambiguity. I believe that we can shift to strategic clarity in a way that is consistent with the U.S. one China policy. And even when we were crafting what we refer to as our One China policy, President Reagan, wrote in a letter to Deng Xiaoping, China's then supreme leader,

that the United States had an abiding interest in a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, essentially signaling that the United States reserved the opportunity to come to Taiwan's defense in the face of Chinese aggression. And the Taiwan Relations Act, which is a U.S. law, posits that the U.S. decision to normalize relations with the PRC was premised on a peaceful resolution of cross-strate differences. So I actually don't believe that shifting to strategic clarity means that we are recognizing Taiwan as an independent sovereign country. Indeed, I don't believe that we should do so. I think we should stick to our one China policy, maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan. But at the same time, I think that's consistent with saying that if China

were to seek to unilaterally change the status quo and use force, the United States would intervene on Taiwan's behalf. Thank you, David. Okay, Michael, similar opportunity for you. If you could pick out maybe one key point here that David's made in his opening statement or his rebuttal just now. And let's have your reaction to that. Yeah, I mean, I'll react to the rebuttal because I think it's a critical point. And again, it gets to just the incredible complexity of U.S. policy on this where, you know, from 72 to 79, as U.S. policy changes toward China, we eventually get to the point in the second communique in 79 where as part of the changing. of recognition that we agree not to have political relations with Taiwan as we did before. The government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one

China and Taiwan is part of China. Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples, but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and in the world. And I just think the idea that we could make a treaty-like commitment to come to Taiwan's defense as we do NATO or Japan or others and not have the effect of destroying this careful balance is just wishful thinking. It would clearly require us to treat Taiwan as some kind of an independent entity that we were pledging to defend. It is pretty clear to me, and I think the Director of National Intelligence, many China experts have said and testified about this, that China would clearly view this kind of a promise as a decisive break from our one China policy.

Yes, in the past U.S. statements in the Taiwan Relations Act, in the Third communique have indicated that we insist upon a peaceful resolution of these disputes and we reserve the right to take certain actions. if China undertakes aggression. That is different than saying, we have an ironclad promise to defend Taiwan if it is the subject of any kind of major aggression. I think that's a big, big difference. And to take that step would, especially given the condition of U.S.-China relations today,

create, I think, the most severe crisis in U.S. China relations in the post-war era and at a time when the relationship is already in a very rocky situation. So again, I don't think it's necessary. And I really don't think we can have our cake and eat it too. I don't think we can strengthen the promise and keep our traditional policy. David, let's have you react to that. It's been a key point in this debate so far.

The idea that this would, in a sense, force Beijing's hand. And as Michael has pointed out, in some ways, interesting parallels possibly here to Putin and Ukraine. I mean, accept the argument or not, but Russians in a sense feeling that they had to act, not necessarily that they wanted to act. Now, that is another debate. We'll leave that for another day. But I think Mike brings up a point that powers, once they feel threatened, are often maybe more likely to take,

as you correctly pointed out, David, a risk that would have huge repercussions for China, for the United States, for the global economy, it's almost impossible to imagine. Well, let me take a step back. I think that it's already clear what China has been doing is changing the status quo in its favor, and the deterrence is already weakening in the Taiwan strait. So the question is not so much what can we do to maintain where we're at. I think the question is that what can we do? We need to do more to prevent the further erosion.

of deterrence. And that's where I come out with the idea that strategic clarity, it's not the solution, and I agree with Mike. We need to do a lot more to actually increase our capability in the region, do a lot more with our allies above all Japan to prepare for a Taiwan contingency and also improve Taiwan's defense capabilities. I agree with him 100% on that. But I believe that strategic clarity is a complement to those. So it's not a substitute. I don't believe it's a cure-all. I don't think that we just go out there and make a statement and all of our problems go away. But I think we have to carefully look at this, see that deterrence is eroding in the Taiwan strait, see that China is preparing its military for a Taiwan contingency.

That is the number one priority of the People's Liberation Army. And if you listen to, you know, top military and civilian officials in the Pentagon, they all assert that Xi Jinping has put a target on a wall of, uh, 2027 to prepare for a potential Taiwan contingency and that they are going after this very consistently. So the question is, what do we do to prevent the further erosion? And I think the strategic clarity is an important element of that. To get back to the resolution as well, I think that the resolution is worded correctly, which is that this is about defending Taiwan against Chinese aggression, where China is clearly the aggressor and Taiwan is not provoking.

Beijing into attacking. And so, yes, we can talk about whether clarity will emboldened Taiwan to declare independence or to take other provocative moves. My own view is that I don't believe it will do so. But even if that's the case, this wouldn't be an unconditional commitment where if we see that Taiwan is provoking Beijing because it believes that it has a blank check that we would come to Taiwan's defense, I don't believe that we should do that. But if China looks for a pretext, you know, as frankly, I think Putin was in Ukraine and is the clear aggressor, then I do believe that we should come to Taiwan's defense and we should publicly say so. Okay, Mike, so let's come back to you now and put some of, I think, the key arguments

so far that David's raised in this debate and it's that there's inevitability to this. Isn't there, Mike, a sense that, you know, Hong Kong has gone, the South China Sea as being militarized by China, China's strategic investments. in its missile forces, the demonstration of the show of force in the aftermath of Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit. A torrent of Chinese aircraft, missiles, and ships moved towards Taiwan as soon as how Speaker Nancy Pelosi left the island. China marking off areas encircling Taiwan where its military is doing more than just drills. Taiwan says 68 Chinese warplanes. flew around the Taiwan Strait Friday.

It's a dress rehearsal to what an embargo of Taiwan looked like. All of this shows that China has moved off the status quo. And really all David's arguing here is for the United States to catch up to the reality on the ground. The reality as it faces Taiwan, the United States and China now. So what I'd say is I agree with David that, China is changing the status quo in its favor and trends have been shifting. And that's one of the reasons why I think this debate is useful because the proposal of clarity along with other things is a possible answer to that. But I think there's always been a potential inevitability to it in that, you know, for a time, both China's claim to be the rightful government of all of China. And in the view of the Chinese Communist Party, the reacquisition of Taiwan has always been an inevitability. The question is on what timeline and what are they willing to risk to do it?

It is an entirely different question from Hong Kong or, you know, gradual steps in the South China Sea. The move to try to invade Taiwan would be betting the future of the Chinese Communist Party on one of the most difficult military operations you can possibly do. So it is a choice of an entirely different scale. Now, the way we have kept peace over time has been with this balance of reassurance and threat, the threat being, if there is an invasion, Taiwan will defend itself, the United States might well come to its aid. Increasingly, there are signals that other countries will at least seek to punish China in various ways. Japan, European countries increasingly making statements that aggression against Taiwan wouldn't be acceptable to them either. But, again, the reassurance part of this has been a critical part of the dynamic, and that is to indicate to China that the United States is not taking steps that permanently and irrevocably,

destroy the potential for peaceful unification with Taiwan. And I would just conclude by saying, I think I disagree strongly with David when he says U.S. officials have all said that China has a 2027 target on the wall. The public indications are that Xi Jinping has asked his military to be ready for certain contingencies in 2027. The United States is asking its military to do exactly the same thing. That is not the same as saying that China is determined to reoccupy Taiwan, by 2027 or any date short of 2049, the 100 year anniversary of the CCP, the PRC, and even potentially not then. So to create a false urgency and say, we have to do something in the next two or three years or they're planning to invade, there are a number of senior officials,

the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and others, most recently the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that have come out and said, look, there's no specific date by which we believe China is going to do this. The rhetoric can get too overheated, and we shouldn't make policy based on that. So I think that continuing to emphasize this balancing process that tries to maintain all the elements of convincing China, it doesn't have to act, and would pay a big price if it did act, is the right way to go. So the Secretary of State has also said that Xi Jinping has determined that the status quo is no longer acceptable and that he is moving on a much quicker timeframe.

He said that publicly. What's changed is this. The decision by the government in Beijing that that status quo was no longer acceptable, that they wanted to speed up the process by which they would pursue reunification. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the same interview said that we have three to four years

to get Taiwan ready, which just so happened, to be 2027. So I don't, I agree with you actually, Mike. I don't believe that this will happen the day the calendar turns over to 2027 or before we hit 2028. I agree with you. But Xi Jinping has clearly ordered his military to be ready by that date. So we have to take that seriously. And we have to prepare for the worst, which would be that Xi Jinping does decide to use force at some time. But I agree with you that I don't believe it's an inevitability and I don't believe that this is going to happen on a certain date. But we have to be prepared for that. Let me also take on a couple of more things. Yes, U.S. allies from NATO to Japan have said that, have indicated that they would make China pay

significant economic costs if it chose to use force against Taiwan. But in my view, that's not sufficient to deter China. I believe that if Xi Jinping is determined to act, He will do so with full knowledge of the economic consequences that that would create for China, and he will do so having accepted those costs. So that gets me back to the original idea behind clarity, which is that I believe that only U.S. direct military intervention will actually deter Xi Jinping and fundamentally shape his cost-benefit calculus. I do believe that Xi Jinping is willing to pay an enormous.

economic price to secure Taiwan, given the extent to which that is wrapped up in the CCP's narrative of the rejuvenation of China and frankly the extent to which a successful annexation of Taiwan would cement Xi Jinping's legacy among the ranks of Mao. And so my question and where I'm nervous going forward is that I believe clearly what we see is that economic growth is slowing in China. That was the basis for the CCP's legitimacy for decades. And so, yes, I don't, I think that until this point, the CCP has not wanted to do things that fundamentally hurt that economic trajectory because that was the basis for its continued

one-party rule. But as that is facing increasing headwinds, the question is, well, how does Xi Jinping justify his personal continued rule as well as CCP rule? And I believe that there is a good chance that the Chi turns to aggressive nationalism and foreign policy to do so. And Taiwan would be the number one scenario for that. So again, I believe that deterrence is eroding, continues to erode, and the United States needs to be much more active in taking steps to reestablish deterrence and the status quo.

And I think the clarity is a way of doing so. But again, just to underline that, I don't believe. that it's a cure-all. And we do need to take the steps that Mike and I both agree on, which is that Taiwan needs to raise its defense spending, spend more on asymmetric systems. We need to, you know, increase our own force posture in the region, do more with Japan, harden our bases in the region. But I do believe that strategic clarity is a complement to those steps. Yeah. And so there's, there are, you know, and I think at this time in the world, it's nice to emphasize where people agree on things. And you know, where our sort of common points are. And I think there, there is this common view that we have,

that deterrence is being challenged, the China's aggressive intentions growing and all that. I just think a couple of things in response to what David, you were just saying. One is, clearly Xi Jinping has become more anxious to get China in a stronger position militarily vis-à-vis Taiwan. I think that still begs the question of what would cause him to make this profound decision, to stake the future of the Chinese Communist Party on an attack. And I think that is not likely to be a sense that, oh, the United States hasn't said publicly it will defend Taiwan. So therefore, I have an opportunity to do this.

Because, again, if we think they already believe we'll defend Taiwan and we're preparing to do so, that's not going to make much difference. What would cause him to make the choice would be the sense that the United States is sliding toward a increasingly tight political, embrace of Taiwan that vitiates the pledges of the last 40 years, and they have to move. And then finally, I do want to mention Taiwan as the country that is threatened most directly, as the country that we're proposing to come and defend, it continues to be a country that spends significantly less of its GDP on defense in the United States, that bureaucratically has not been able to fully embrace a defense

strategy from several years ago that's designed to make it more able to defend itself. And what we are talking about here is a president making a unilateral declaration to effectively put into place the equivalent of an Article 5 alliance pledge to defend another country without congressional debate, without public debate, to defend a country that is not taking the steps that we believe it must in order to. to defend itself. And although I think the question of whether the United States has vital interests in Taiwan's security is separate, I certainly believe that the United States should continue to take the position that Chinese aggression is unacceptable and we would respond in some way.

But as an American citizen, I am very uncomfortable with an American president unilaterally putting into place a commitment that would cause us to fight potentially the most destructive war in our history in a way that has not gone through any kind of a democratic process to back that up. So that's another reason why I think that, you know, a presidential move in the direction of clarity just isn't justified. It might be our most important monk debate ever. On June 22nd, at Roy Thompson Hall will be convening two of the world's leading experts on artificial intelligence to debate the motion, be it resolved. AI research and development poses an existential risk.

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So I think you're right, Mike, that Taiwan needs to do more for its defense, but at the same time, I would highlight that I believe that especially in the wake of the war in Ukraine, is a new urgency in Taiwan. President Sai extended conscription from four months to one year recently. Taiwan is looking to overhaul the training of its conscripts, which was woefully insufficient. They're looking for U.S. support in doing that, and they are putting a lot of bureaucratic weight behind getting that right. They are starting to procure and have already requested from the United States and paid for weapons that we believe would make them a much harder target, things that have become household names because of the war in Ukraine, like stingers, javelins, and

Haimars. You know, President Sai also announced a double-digit percentage defense increase this year. So it is well above the NATO 2% minimum that we set for our NATO allies. I believe that Taiwan should be spending somewhere in the range of what Israel spends as a percentage of its GDP, given. the threat that it faces. I hope Taiwan gets there, but I think we should also recognize that Taiwan is taking steps in the right direction. I don't believe the trend lines are going in the wrong direction. I think the trend lines are actually encouraging, and more U.S. support, more U.S.

assistance would help Taiwan make these difficult transitions. Now, I'm all for having public debates like this on whether we should come to Taiwan's defense, because I think that this is an issue that the American people should know more about and that we should publicly debate. I do think that there is support in Congress for this, so I don't believe that a president pledging to come to Taiwan's defense would get Congress up in arms. Taiwan is one of the few foreign policy issues in the United States that has strong bipartisan support. You know, some bills introduced to support Taiwan are even past United States. unanimously in the Congress, which is unheard of. A lot of congressional leaders have actually

publicly called for the United States to embrace strategic clarity. But again, and I do believe that we should have public debates about this for our own democratic process. I just want to remind listeners that you are tuning into our debate today, be it resolved. The United States should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. And guys, I'd love in a debate when the moderator becomes superfluous. So here, here, the back and forth is really a rich exchange. I'm learning a lot in this conversation. As we move towards closing statements, though, Mike,

I want to just table one point that I'm sure is on the mind of a lot of our listeners, which is that if the United States adopted a policy like this, in a sense of security pledge, Article 5 like, it's one thing to, I guess, make that pledge. It's another thing to think about how this conflict could actually evolve or how it could happen. And some people have postulated the idea that China's first step would not be an invasion of the island of Taiwan. It would be to engage in something maybe slightly ambiguous, a blockade, let's say, of the island of Taiwan, to interdict American weapons shipments into Taiwan that it would say,

to its allies into the world was destabilizing the Taiwan Straits. Maybe, Mike, you could talk to us a little bit more about your concerns here about the degree to which ambiguity could swamp a policy of clarity, right? That these things are in tension here and how this could play out. And then, David, I'd like to hear you on that same issue. How do we continue with a policy of clarity? if the conflict itself is more ambiguous than we might assume. Yeah, I mean, I would say two things about that.

First is exactly. I think that increasingly folks who are considering the operational issues here are concerned that China would not use an all-out invasion as the first step or even the main step to kind of gain control of Taiwan. And if that's the case, then a promise to defend Taiwan against invasion doesn't necessarily solve your problem. But the second point is, and it added a risk of that sort of an approach to me, is that it constrains U.S. options at those moments. So during, you know, the visit of Nancy Pelosi, China undertook a variety of steps around Taiwan to declare various military exercises that closed huge areas of sea and air transit,

and that a lot of people interpreted as a dry run for a problem. potential soft blockade or something similar in the future. Now, if the United States has a pledge of unconditional defense of Taiwan in place, there is a strong chance that its reactions at those moments would have to be different than they have been. The existing U.S. approach has given a significant flexibility and the ability to be sort of patient at those times, realizing that, you know, they're probably not a prelude to an invasion. But increasingly, I think this kind of a promise would drive us to a much more rigid response to a lot of Chinese actions. And another piece that I had mentioned yet is I am convinced that if we put this kind of a policy

in place, it will lead inevitably to the presence of U.S. combat troops on Taiwan. Because once we have the promise, what people will start saying is, well, it's not credible because we don't have sufficient military force there. And China would believe, you know, whether or not we have the promise. When they're getting ready to take military action, they're going to build capabilities that are designed to achieve a shock effect and achieve their goals very quickly and either scare the U.S. off or paralyze a U.S. response. That's what they're planning to do anyway. So our public statement isn't going to change that. What needs to change is our ability to operate in that kind of environment and to make it clear that we would fulfill the promise that we have in place. And

And what I think would happen is a lot of folks in the United States would start saying the promise isn't credible. We need to put combat troops on Taiwan. We need to move in the direction of an alliance, a formal alliance. And once we are moving down that road, then war is inevitable. Regarding whether China will do an invasion or a blockade or something even short of a blockade, you know, that's a perennial debate in these kind of communities on what its preference is for. you know, I think what we need to do is look at what China would seek to achieve if it were to use force against Taiwan. And so we should keep in mind that China wants to rule the island of Taiwan indefinitely. It wants the PRC flag to be raised above Taiwan's presidential office. It wants to administer the island's affairs. It wants to station PLA forces in the ports and the airfields. And so in my view, the only way that China's, China can achieve that is through a really strong use of force against Taiwan. Because I think we could have had this debate five, ten years ago and some could argue,

well, one country, two systems in Hong Kong isn't so bad. Hong Kong still has a lot of autonomy. Maybe the Taiwanese will go for that. But having seen what they saw in 2020 with the national security law in Hong Kong, the Taiwanese no longer have any illusions about what their future would be under PRC rule. You also now have Chinese ambassadors to other countries openly talking about the need to re-educate Taiwanese people after unification. And one thing that I think we have, we've danced around a little bit that I would raise is that,

you know, as Mike pointed out at the beginning, President Biden has said on four occasions that we would come to Taiwan's defense in the face of PRC aggression. So I think that we have to look at that and take that as a very important. where the current kind of U.S. policy is. I don't think those were misstatements. I don't think those were gaffs. And so in my view, you know, if a successor to President Biden, be it a Democrat or a Republican, walks that back, that would be incredibly damaging to U.S. credibility.

And so I think that we have to take stock of actually where U.S. policy is right now and not where we think it actually should be or was had President Biden not made, you know, a quote mistake. And we need to grapple with that. Two quick things for what Dave was just saying. That last point, I disagree with it as a general claim. I think you can talk to folks in various places throughout Asia and the idea that whether the United States militarily responds to Chinese aggression is the litmus test of whether they can trust us. I think there's attitudes all over the map. And it is, I think it's unfair to U.S. policy and puts us in an unnecessary box to say we really have no choice because people expect us to respond.

And if we don't, credibility will collapse. The other thing I would say is just in terms of what President Biden said, you know, it's a great point. And so to me, that kind of begs the question of, well, what haven't we done that we need to do? Now, as you have said in your writings, his officials have walked back to a degree some of his statements. I agree with you that he meant what he said. And so partly what's happened is that the United States has become a bit more explicit in, you could say, informal ways tied to specific presidents about the implicit pledge, the ambiguous pledge that's always been there.

But I still believe that the formal shift to a different kind of public policy would be a different thing. Final question before we go to closing statements. David, let me start with you. The United States, for better or worse, over the last decade and a half, has pursued an economic strategy that might be best described as financialization. You have a highly financialized, globally interconnected economy that certainly even in the last 12 months has evidenced some serious vulnerabilities in the face of high inflation. You've had two major bank failures.

You have, what is it, $9 trillion of a balance on your central bank balance sheet. To what extent, David, you mentioned at the very beginning of this debate, just the kind of apocalyptic economic scenario that would ensue from a war between China and the United States over Taiwan. on. If you think inflation is bad now, if you think supply chains were snarled during the pandemic, it's almost hard to imagine how those forces would be amplified during and after a conflict like this. So this is a roundabout way asking, David, just to what extent could this pledge ever be real? To what extent could it ever really be followed through on in the context of that if it was the suffering and economic pain that would be brought about, not just for China, but for the American people,

would be, I think, David, as you said, something that would have parallels to the Great Depression. Well, I think that the way that you phrased that question actually reveals that the Chinese might be thinking along the same lines. How real could the U.S. pledge to defend Taiwan be, or should we even be sure that the U.S. would come to Taiwan's defense regardless of what it says publicly because of the cost to the United States. And I think that that is something that is contributing to the erosion of deterrence and why we need to make this pledge. Because I think that Beijing looks at it and they say, okay, well, maybe we assume 20 years ago the United States would come to Taiwan's defense because it would be

much less costly. We don't, you know, the United States military far outmatched the PLA. China wasn't such a hub of global manufacturing. We didn't have such a reliance on semiconductors manufactured in Taiwan. The economic cost wouldn't be so great. So, okay, we'll assume that the United States would come to Taiwan's defense. Well, now Chinese leaders look at it and they could say, geez, this would cause a huge economic depression. The United States military has to know that the PLA now has serious capabilities, especially in the Taiwan straight, the military costs would be incredibly high.

So would they come to Taiwan's defense? And I think that that contributes, in my view, to the logic of strategic clarity. What I would say, though, as you're sitting in Canada here, is that we shouldn't believe that all these economic costs would be borne by the United States, China, and Taiwan. It would be every country, regardless of whether you are involved. in a sanctions regime or in the defense of Taiwan. You know, any Canadian manufacturer relies on semiconductors manufactured in Taiwan to produce goods, right? These are in everything from cars to phones to computers to dishwashers and microwaves.

So, you know, this would go span the entire globe. You know, most manufactured goods that use any kind of electronic component, or semiconductor would find their assembly lines crawling to a standstill. You know, stock markets around the world would plummet. Your 401k or equivalent would be in the tank. So I think it's important that we talk about this issue also in the context of what it means for Europe, for Japan, for Canada, for countries in Africa and Latin America. Because I think it would be a mistake for countries to assume that, well, this is really a problem

for the United States to work out with China and Taiwan. And therefore, you see, for instance, when President Biden is in Canada a few weeks ago, reference to Taiwan in his statement with Prime Minister Trudeau. That's why you see reference to Taiwan and NATO statements in U.S. South Korea presidential level statements. And so I think it's important to think about this in a much, much broader context. Mike, let's have your, you come back on this also because David's flipped this in an interesting way. look, the stakes in effectively are too high. We can't get this wrong. We cannot create any doubt here regarding China and a sense that they could move because the effects for the United States,

for Canada, for Europe, for everybody are so outsized. So hence, we need to move off ambiguity towards clarity. So yeah, I mean, I agree that this would be a hugely distraudely. war. And in fact, you know, a lot of the unclassified war games that have been held end up producing tens of thousands of American casualties, something that the United States hasn't had to consider since World War II. And then you've got the risk of nuclear escalation, apart from economic concerns, even if we succeed and China is losing. If they've bet the future of their regime on Taiwan, they are not going to stop with conventional weapons. So there are enormous stakes. The question is just, what is the most likely strategy to keep the peace? The U.S. going into Iraq, the Soviet Union going to Afghanistan

in 1979, when six months before they'd sat around and said it would be crazy to do this, Japan attacking in 1941. These are not countries that made carefully calculated decisions that, well, their promise might not be strong enough or they got to the point that they felt they had to act. We need to keep China away from such a moment. And I'm very concerned. that a public statement would, you know, create exactly that kind of a perception. So I agree entirely that this would be an incredibly destructive war. I just think there's a roster of steps other than public clarity that would be the best way to keep from falling into that disaster. Well, let's give David the last word in our debate today, be it resolved. The United States

should publicly pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. David wrapped this fascinating conversation, really appreciate your exchange today with Michael. No, I really appreciate the opportunity to be here, and Mike has provided very thoughtful, you know, counter arguments to what I've put on the table here. But I think that most observers who carefully study this issue believe that the United States has enormous stakes in the Taiwan straight, whether you look at what it would mean for U.S. alliances and our ability to come to their defense, our ability to project power in the world's most economically consequential region against the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, what another authoritarian country

swallowing up a smaller democratic neighbor would mean for global order and for democracies elsewhere, Taiwan's economic importance. I think that there's a vital strategic interest for the United States to deter a Chinese attack against Taiwan. And the question is, how do we best deter it? In my view, given China's growing strength, given Xi Jinping's increasing assertiveness and frankly the fact that he hasn't paid a price for this assertiveness so far, if you look at the South China Sea that he militarized without much pushback, if you look at Hong Kong where he essentially violated an international treaty with the United Kingdom without much consequence at all. And Hong Kong is essentially now a Chinese city. You look at the border clash that he has had with India. Yes,

he has alienated a lot of countries in China's periphery for sure. But from his perspective, he's accomplished a lot, I think, for Chinese foreign policy without really paying a big price. and he might look at Taiwan and say, well, I can do the same thing here. And so I think that the United States needs to take a much harder look at how we deter somebody like Xi Jinping. I don't think we can assume that what has worked for four decades with a much more cautious Chinese leaders and frankly a China that didn't have the military capabilities to invade and annex Taiwan if it wanted to, that playbook might not work anymore. And one thing that I think is important to keep in mind,

And this, in my view, is that our playbook for Ukraine would not work in a Taiwan scenario. I don't believe that we can say, well, we'll just sanction China like we sanctioned Russia and we'll signal to China that it will do so and that will deter Xi Jinping. I don't believe that's the case. So in my view, the only way that we can really affect his cost-benefit analysis or calculations is by showing him that we are ready to defend Taiwan military. and that we are willing to come to its direct defense. And so is strategic clarity to be all end all here and we'll solve all of our problems?

No, it will not. Do we need to do a lot of the things that Mike and I both agree on that we should do from strengthening our alliance with Japan, you know, increasing our presence in the region, preparing for a Taiwan contingency 100%. But I do believe that strategic clarity is additive and is a complement to those steps. Thank you for those remarks, David, and thank you, Mike, for your participation in this debate. It is the geopolitical issue of the moment. Broce if you have brought an incredible amount of knowledge and substance to this conversation today. So on behalf of the Monk membership,

thank you so much for coming on the program and for having this debate with us. True thing. Delighted to be here. Thanks for having me. Well, I want to thank David and Michael for a terrific debate today. They certainly gave us a lot to think about. We'd love your feedback and reflections on what you've just heard. Please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates.com. That's MUNK, DebateswithanS.com. Also a friendly reminder that on this very same podcast feed,

you can grab a sample of our critically acclaimed Friday-focused current affairs podcast that comes out each and every Friday and gives you a deep dive into the big issues and ideas moving the news. You can again access that complementary sample, the Friday Focus podcast, in this very same podcast feed. Also a reminder that our big debate on AI, artificial intelligence, is approaching fast on June 22nd in Toronto, Canada at Roy Thompson Hall. We'll be joined by two top AI experts to debate the motion, be it resolved, AI research and development poses an existential risk. Go to our website, www.w.munkdebates.com for more information on how to listen and learn from this important debate on artificial intelligence.

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