The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it resolved: The west should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia

Episode Date: December 22, 2021

Russia has moved more than 100,000 troops close to disputed areas in Ukraine, setting up fears of a new Russian military intervention following their invasion of Crimea in 2014. US officials have responded by threatening Putin both with economic sanctions and the cancellation of a planned gas pipeline to Europe. Some security experts believe that the west must do more to defend Ukraine; standing by and allowing Russia to invade the country sends a message to other aggressive powers like China that their attacks on smaller countries like Taiwan will be met with similar weak responses. Geopolitically, an independent Ukraine creates an important buffer between Russia and Central Europe and prevents military buildup in the region. Others argue that the US has no business in Ukraine. A string of failed military interventions overseas has left thousands of Americans dead and foreigners scrambling to deal with the mess left behind. Russia also has every right to feel threatened by western attempts to defend border territories and NATO's alliances with border states. Furthermore, now is not the time to start a fight with Putin when conflicts are escalating with China and Iran. Russia's fight is with Ukraine. The west, isolationists argue, need to stay out of this fight and away from this conflict. Arguing for the motion is Dov Zakheim, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former US Under Secretary of Defense in the administration of George W. Bush. Arguing against the motion is is Anatol Lieven, senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry QUOTES: DOV ZAKHEIM “If Mr Putin is allowed to invade Ukraine, then everybody else is going to notice it. It will weaken the NATO alliance and the Chinese will see that perhaps we, the Americans, really are a paper tiger” ANATOL LIEVEN “If you try to defend everywhere, you end up defending nowhere, which is what America risks vis-a-vis China, when it comes to Ukraine” Sources:  NBC, DW, CNBC, BBC, MSNBC, France 24 The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ The Munk Debates podcast is produced by Antica, Canada's largest private audio production company - https://www.anticaproductions.com/ Executive Producer: Stuart Coxe, CEO Antica Productions Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Reza Dahya Associate Producer: Abhi RahejaBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

There are options, and that's why we need to take this opportunity seriously. There's no way you can prevent global warming unless China is part of the solution. This is not normal male behavior. This is predatory behavior. We don't know how bad this bug is. We don't know what this bug does. All of that was thrown away in those eight minutes and 46 seconds, and that's the moment that I became an abolitionist. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Welcome to the monk debates. Every episode we provide. provide you with a civil and substantive debate on the big issue of the day to arm you,

the listener, with enough information to make up your own mind. Today's debate, be a resolved. The West should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia. New satellite images tonight show Russian forces at the ready near the Ukrainian border. In recent weeks, evidence has emerged of an estimated 100,000 Russian troops building up on Russia's Western border. America's top diplomats sending a direct warning to Russia. If you invade Ukraine, there will be severe costs and consequences. The Kremlin, Bittre Peskov, has called for cool heads, insisting Moscow isn't planning an invasion,

while stressing it has its own red lines. Russia wants guarantees that Ukraine will not be allowed to join NATO. Hello, I'm your moderator, Rudyard Griffith. Well, with over 175,000 Russian troops now gathered at the Ukrainian border, fears of a full-blown invasion are at all-time highs. Some security experts believe economic sanctions are not enough, and the West must respond in kind to Putin's threats. Large-scale military aid is necessary not only to protect Ukraine,

but also to send a message to other great powers like China that are threatening to evade recalcitrant neighbors. This simply will not be tolerated in our DNA. Here's former NATO Supreme Allied commander, Admiral James Stavridis. If Putin, for the third time, crosses a border and anger, don't forget, in 2008, he invaded Georgia and still runs a chunk of that country. If we let him get away with it a third time, all of a sudden we're Neville Chamberlain from the 1930s. Others argue that Russia is right to feel threatened by the West's expansion of NATO eastward, first through extending membership to the former Soviet republics in the 2000s, and now by

making Ukraine the world's single largest recipient of American military assistance and weaponry. Russia supposedly has real and lasting national security interests in making Ukraine a neutral buffer state between its homeland and NATO-Allied Europe. Continuing U.S. and NATO military support for Ukraine will again, supposedly, exasperate the conflict, raise the risk of a Russian invasion, and a resulting mass humanitarian crisis in Eastern Europe. On this installment of the Monk Debates, we challenge the essence of these arguments by debating the motion, be it resolved, the West should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia. Arguing for the motion is Dove Zachim. He's a senior advisor

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former U.S. Undersecretary of State for defense in the administration of George W. Bush. Arguing against the motion is Anatole Levin. He is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Ukraine and Russia, a fraternal rivalry. Dov, Anatole, welcome to the Monk Debates. Thank you. Hello.

Very much looking forward to today's debate. With both of you, this is surely one of the big geopolitical topics that has a emerged in the last few months. Needless to say, along history here, we can dig into it. But I think of all the big geopolitical risks that our listeners will have to consider in 2022, the threat of a conflict, an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine stands out as one of the major strategic security risks that the world will have to face. Our motion today is simple to the point. To the point, We're going to debate what is, I think, the key question on everyone's mind. Be it resolved, the West should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia.

Dov, you're going to be speaking in favor of our resolution today. Let's get your opening remarks first. Well, thanks very much. It's a pleasure to be on this. Just for a little bit of background, President Biden has threatened Russia with sanctions, but these are to take place after the fact. That is to say, if Mr. Putin decides to invade Ukraine, then certain sanctions will be imposed. We can discuss what they are later on. My contention is that this will not be enough. Russia has survived previous sanctions, and Iran whose sanctions

are much tougher than those than anything that Russia is being threatened with seems to have managed to keep going with its nuclear program. So what can stop Putin and why does it matter? First of all, I'd like to be clear, military intervention does not mean American combat troops on the ground. President Biden has already ruled that out, and they're not really needed. It doesn't mean air support either. He hasn't talked about air support, but it's the same thing. What the United States can do before Mr. Putin tries to do anything, and indeed to dissuade him, is, first of all, to mount a massive airlift, a Berlin-type airlift, or or a 1973-type airlift to Israel, which meets all of Kiev's requests, not merely just for javelins

and a few other items, but really allows the Ukrainians to have the full plenaply of capability to deal with the Russians. The United States could also send in special operations forces. These forces don't only fight. They also train. They can back up the Ukrainian military and provide them with guidance on the ground, on the spot, should the Russians be thinking of going in. And so could the Allies. The British have excellent special operations forces. So do the French and many others as well inside NATO. Then the United States could even send the naval forces into the Black Sea to reassure the Southern allies. Now, why do all of this? This would make it much more difficult for Mr. Putin to consider going in. And frankly, he has never said he's going in.

In fact, his spokesmen have said that right now they're simply on their own territory. He has a way out. He can say it's a massive training exercise. He doesn't have to do this. And he wants a deal on NATO expansion, but we're not talking about the partition of Poland here. And so at the end of the day, if Mr. Putin is allowed or is able to invade Ukraine, then everybody else is going to notice it. the NATO allies, and it will weaken the alliance, as well as the Chinese who will see that perhaps we really, we, the Americans really are a paper tiger, and it might encourage them either to

accelerate their plans for attacking Taiwan or actually simply to gear up in order to face down the Taiwanese far sooner than perhaps we all think would happen. Thank you, Dev. Our debate today, be it resolved, the West, should intervene. militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia. Anatole, you're going to be arguing against our motion today. Let's get your opening statement, please. Thank you so much. Well, firstly, I should say that I agree completely with those who say, including Dove, that the U.S. and the West should threaten massive economic sanctions if Russia invades Ukraine. And as Dov said, you know, it does not appear that the Russian government

has decided yet. This is what U.S. intelligence says. They're still considering. However, Putin and the Russian government have said that the reason they are doing this, the key reason there are others, is that America is threatening to turn Ukraine into a major non-NATO ally of the United States, arm Ukraine, and send U.S. forces there. In other words, the massive airlift of weapons that Dov has suggested would, in fact, be the signal for Russia to invade. It would be the provocation that would decide Russia, in my view, to invade with massive force. Before, that is, Ukraine could actually deploy those weapons effectively or learn how to use them. Now, forgive me for saying so, but the idea of, on the one hand, saying that the US should not send ground forces, as Dov did, but on the other hand should send special forces, I mean, that's a contradiction in terms. It is also, I'm afraid, strategic and military insanity. small numbers of special forces would not stop the Russian army in the case of a massive invasion.

They would be overrun and killed or captured. America would then face an appalling choice between basically humbly asking Russia to hand them back again or going to war with Russia, full-scale war. And by the way, forgive me, but if you really think that America's European allies would join in the fight, I mean, you know, we know what they are and what they would contribute, which is nothing, with admittedly the possible exception of the British. Now, finally, Dov has said that not to defend Ukraine would send a signal to China and so forth and so on. This is the old credibility argument.

But in the case of Ukraine, it fails totally. Because, of course, what would really be the signal for China to act, to invade or at least cow, Taiwan? it would be an armed conflict between the United States and Russia. If you don't think that China would immediately take advantage of that, then forgive me, but I don't think you've been looking at recent Chinese policy. And lastly of all, before putting any American soldiers or British soldiers into harm's way, including these special forces, you have to be very clear that this is in the really vital national interest. of our countries. Now, we're both of a certain age. If anyone had suggested 35 years ago that

America should commit itself in territorial disputes to Ukraine against Russia, including, by implication, the expulsion of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol, that they'd have locked us both up in lunatic asylums. How did we get to this point? Has it ever been discussed truly with the American people? and is there a real vital U.S. national interest involved? For me, all of these questions, all the answers to these questions are clearly no. Thank you, Anatole. Great opening statements from you both. Our resolution today, be at resolve, the West should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia. Dove, your opportunity now to offer a rebuttal from what you've just heard from Anatole? Sure. First of all, what is the vital American interest? I guess.

that's probably the most important question here that we have to address. The vital interest, frankly, is the unity of NATO. We know that there are some NATO troops already advising the Ukrainians on the ground. So the idea that you can't send troops in because they might get captured just doesn't hold up. It depends where they're located. But more important, if Ukraine, which obviously is a major concern to Poland and to the Baltic states is seen to be lopped off. And I don't think Mr. Putin would take all of Ukraine. He'll probably do what Hitler did with the Sudetenland, take over the eastern part and say, well, the people wanted us, just as he said with respect to Crimea. Should he do that and then offer the Baltic states or Poland some kind of deal as long as they get out of NATO,

that could really undermine NATO's unity and its ability to respond as one alliance against any sort of attack on its members. That is a vital American interest. There's no question about it. Second of all, the special forces, they are operating in many places like Africa, and they're not necessarily going to be attacked or killed, even if they're in a war zone. It depends where they are in a war zone. Could the Ukrainians absorb more than they have? Sure, because they already have some capabilities. This would give them additional capabilities,

and especially if they had special operators telling them how to use the material, it would, I think, deter the Russians. I don't think this would be something that would encourage the Russians to go in. It would raise the stakes for Putin. It just wouldn't be worth it. And again, sanctions are all well and good, But remember, they might not even pan out. Would Nord Stream 2 actually be shut off?

It's the gas pipeline project continuing to stoke tensions in Europe. Stretching 1,230 kilometers through the Baltic Sea, Nord Stream 2 is set to double Russian gas exports to Germany, and it's almost complete. I don't know that the Germans would agree to that. We simply cannot allow Putin to think he can march. into any part of Ukraine beyond where he already is and get away with it. And that in turn does tell China because the world is not compartmented. And the Chinese are watching this closely and we know

they're watching it closely. They are looking to see if the United States has bite as well as bark. And that fundamentally is another vital American concern. Thank you, Dev. Our motion today, be it resolved, the West should injure intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia. Anatole, your opportunity now for a rebuttal, you can react to Dove's opening statement or what you've just heard now. Well, on China watching closely, that's just what I said. They are watching closely.

But the opportunity, the chance for them to act decisively is precisely a conflict between Russia and the West, or Russia and America. And once again, I mean, I think it beg us belief to say that Xi Jinping would not seize that opportunity. Whereas U.S. action to defend a country that is not, in fact, a U.S. ally. Remember, Ukraine is not a member of NATO. It is not covered by Article 5. And, by the way, President Putin has said that America will not go to war for Ukraine. America has not said that about Taiwan. It has pursued strategic ambiguity. So, I mean, that does not apply. The massive distraction of U.S. military force and attention to Ukraine, that really would matter for China.

Now, on the deterrence, if Russia is not deterred by the prospect of massive economic damage resulting from sanctions, why would it be deterred by a tiny deployment of U.S. military, which, according to Dove, would stop well short, in fact, completely short of actually going to war? Now, special forces for Ukraine, if, as you just said, they are not deployed anywhere near the actual fighting, well, what good are they? If they are deployed anywhere near the fighting, then they will once again risk death or capture. I fear that you are making exactly the mistake that American made in the years leading up to the dispatch of an American army to South Vietnam. What would have been a very small humiliation in 1960, with very small numbers of US advisers, had become a big humiliation by 1962, with far more, and a massive humiliation by 1964. As for the idea that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would lead Russia to try to put pressure on Poland to leave NATO. I mean, we know the polls. They would refuse point blank. And an attempt to pressure them into becoming a Russian satellite would be resisted by massive force, because that is the Polish tradition and character. And by the way, the Russian government knows that. There has never been the slightest suggestion of Russia attacking Poland. None, zero. Nobody in the Russian government has ever even hinted at this. After all, why?

Why should they? There is nothing to be gained from Poland as a bitterly angry and discontented vassal state. For Russia, for historical, ethnic, cultural, geographical, strategic reasons that anyone who knows the history of this part of the world should understand. Ukraine for Russia is not a stepping stone to somewhere else. Ukraine is by far the most. important issue in itself. And a critical error of speaking as a realist here of international relations is to threaten another great power's vital interests on behalf of what for you are essentially minor interests, because in the end, Russia will call our bluff. And the more cards we put on the table, the more we risk losing and the greater our humiliation when we lose.

Thank you, Anatole. These are great rebuttals, and we now get to move on to the moderated middle of this debate where I join the conversation and think up questions that are top of mind for our listeners. So let me just take a moderator's prerogative here, kind of re-centered this debate around our resolution today. The West should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine. So, Dove, I want to hear a bit more from you about why you think this is in the West's interest. Why is this essential to our interest when, as we've just heard from Anatol, if you put us in a time machine and took us back 20, 30 years and you had this debate, people, wouldn't they understandably, Dove, be perplexed as to why we're even having this conversation? Well, you know, 30 years is a long time. And if you look at where the states that I mentioned,

where they stand on this issue, the polls are terrified of this. And there are reports that there are already Polish troops on the ground. The Baltic states are terrified. Now, the question then is, well, why should we worry about a country that's not part of NATO? We went to war over Kuwait, for goodness sake. And to say that it was only about oil, well, perhaps, but it wasn't really, and we know it wasn't only about oil. And again, if our allies are so terrified of this and we sit there and simply threaten, well, if you go, once you've gone in, then there'll be sanctions, that's simply not going to stop Putin. To argue that, well, special operations forces are going to be killed or if they're useless if they're not at the front, they're not at the front in Africa

in all cases, it's a matter of training and rapid training, which these people know how to do better than anyone else. The fact of the matter is that, you know, if NATO states are concerned and willing to commit forces, and we think several would be, then we certainly should do everything we can to deter Putin. And I don't think Putin will bet on Russia prevailing if indeed, and Anatole himself has written this, that the Ukrainians would give the Russians a bloody nose. Well, it'd be even bloodier if we provided a massive airlift. So let's have, let's have Anatole just address this key argument you've made, because it's an important one and it goes back through, wow, a whole series of debates that we've had about our responsibilities as Western powers to maintain

a rules-based international order. And one of the key tenants, one of the key pillars, and at all. Isn't it of that rules-based order is the idea of territorial sovereignty and integrity? And if you allow a regime like Russia, who's already done this with Crimea, to do it again with eastern Ukraine, you are effectively pulling out one of the central linchpins of decades of statecraft and diplomacy, which is generally it's hard. You can't argue. with this, has created a more peaceful world, you know, since 1945. I mean, isn't that what, where our interests are? Isn't that why we should intervene? Well, there was a great piece by Peter Bainart in the, in the New York Times a few months ago, asking just why it is that

recent American governments and some European ones, especially the British, have started talking about a rules-based international order, rather than the perfectly good old phrase, international law. Well, of course, the reason is that the United States has repeatedly violated international law over the years in Iraq, in Libya, and elsewhere in Central America notoriously again and again, whereas, of course, a rules-based order is whatever America says it is at any given moment. I would really, really be grateful if we could ditch that particular phrase. But secondly, we, of course, had to fight in Kuwait, vital American interest in oil, as Dov said. But also, after all, Iraq tried to simply swallow the whole of Kuwait, an exit as a state.

Russia is not proposing to do that. There is no talk whatsoever of that in Moscow. On the NATO unity line, well, I can only repeat what I've said already and then add something. to add, the thing that would really pull NATO together, really consolidate European desire, amongst other things to increase European military spending, to make greater real military commitments to Poland and the Baltic states, is precisely if Russia were to invade Ukraine. In many ways, this would be the best thing for NATO that has happened for many, many years in terms of internal coherence. If, however, as I say, there is an attempt to pull NATO against the will of many of its neighbors into a war in Ukraine, and they revolt against this as they would, that is precisely what threatens the unity and the prestige of NATO. Thank you, Anatole. Dove, let's come back again to focus ourselves around our resolution today, that it is in our interest. There's a clear case, a path to understand and support Western intervention into the dispute between Ukraine and Russia. Why do you think that support, that intervention could or would make a meaningful difference in either the,

the threat of this conflict or if the conflict actually happened, why it could be the turning point, the tipping point in deterring a successful Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine. Because as Anatole has mentioned, and I think this is widely believed in the public, that Russia has a clear national interest in this territory, in this dispute. It has a historical interest. You could even argue that it has a religious interest that is shaping Russian public opinion and support for intervention. So I want to hear a little bit more from you the case as to why you think that intervention would work, both to de-escalate, if need be, and or repulse a Russian invasion. A couple of things. I find it quite, I don't know how to react to the

the argument that, well, if Mr. Putin goes into Ukraine, that's actually better for NATO. I suspect that that's not how most NATO countries will look at it. Yes, Russia has an historical interest in Ukraine, but there are ways of dealing with that without having to set up puppet governments. No, Russia will not necessarily annex Ukraine, although it could. But at a minimum, it would be like some of the Warsaw Pact countries, which clearly were not independent, even though they nominally had votes in the United Nations and had their own flags and what have you. One doesn't necessarily have to annex a country in order to make it a puppet. And the Russians have a pretty good track record of creating puppets around their periphery.

This is the Russian modus operandi, which is to take over a country but have essentially a puppet government, and it does undermine a rules-based order. The argument that the United States doesn't particularly adhere to international law, one can debate that ad nauseum. But the point is that there is a consensus, and it's been a consensus that countries shared. I mean, let's face it, nobody was forced to join NATO. Nobody was forced to be part of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or GATT, or the World Trade. World Trade. organizations. We didn't force them. Countries chose this. Countries have wanted to be part of NATO, and by the way, the European Union as well, which Mr. Putin also opposes.

Hi, Rudyard Griffiths here, your host and moderator. I have a favor to ask you, please consider becoming a monk member. Membership is free and you get access to a series of great benefits, including a 10-plus-year library of some of our best debates, dialogues, and podcasts. You also get free monthly newsletter featuring the debates that we're watching around the world. And you get a specially curated Friday weekly monk members only podcast that focuses on the big international events and trends shaping our world. All of that, again, free at www.w.com. I hope you'll consider joining and becoming part of our community. Now, back to our program. And it's all the one I want to to hear you respond to a bit more is the linkages that are going on. Dove made them. You've talked

about it a bit, but let's go a bit deeper here between the threat of a Russian incursion into Ukraine and the threat of a Chinese overt or covert takeover of Taiwan. You know, why aren't these two linked? America has just gone through a humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan, a withdrawal that arguably has emboldened its emerging pure opponents, Russia and China. Why isn't, it's unfortunate, we may not want the world to be this way, but why isn't this a moment because of Afghanistan, because of the failed wars in Iraq, Syria, why isn't this a moment where the United States and the West has to lean into this? We may not like it, but if we if we don't hold the line here, we're not going to hold the line in Taiwan.

Who knows what falls next? I'm sorry, but that's the old domino theory that led America into catastrophe in Vietnam. You know, the belief that you have to hold the line in Southeast Asia because of the consequences for East Germany. No, I mean, these things are decided by events on the ground and by local conditions, local circumstances, local interests, local ideologies.

The point about the difference between Afghanistan and Ukraine is that by the end, America only had a tiny number of troops in Afghanistan. It was actually a very small military commitment. Withdrawing from there, actually remaining there, did not affect the overall configuration of US forces, whereas a prolonged military confrontation, possibly leading to full-scale war with Russia in Ukraine would be a massive distraction of US resources, US forces and US attention. And Dov said that, you know, it's been 30 years, things are different. Well, they are indeed different. And the difference is that America now faces a peer competitor in China with an absolutely

clear interest and intention by one means or another to take back Taiwan and to achieve hegemony in East Asia. China has again said it will, quote, reunite Taiwan with the mainland as tensions ramp up further between Beijing and the self-governing island. Chinese President Xi Jinping told a Communist Party gathering that such a move would happen peacefully and said China could never tolerate any form of separatism. Taiwan has responded by saying it's a sovereign nation and that its people will decide their future. Now, I mean, surely, surely we can see that for, for, for, for, America to make a massive new commitment in Europe strengthens China. I can't imagine anything that the Chinese government would like better than a war in Ukraine, which is not to say that

they are behind this. They're not. But unfortunately, strategy requires making some painful choices. This is a choice that America has to make, in my view. Okay, Dove, similarly, big picture question for you, which is the following. We haven't talked about it. And it'll just use the phrase pure competitor. You know, Russia is a pure competitor in more ways than one. We're not just talking about conventional forces here. We're talking about a country with a large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Why isn't that just a, I don't know, a cold shower on anyone who's making a case for Western involvement in a military intervention between Ukraine and Russia?

Well, there's no question. I think they're a peer competitor in conventional terms, too. If you look at what they're building and what they'll be having over the next 20 years, whether it's artificial intelligence, which Putin is emphasizing, or hypersonics, which they already have. So I wouldn't deny that. And as far as hegemony is concerned, and the fall of dominoes, well, first of all, the domino theory had absolutely nothing to do with East Germany.

I'm sure Anatole knows that. Second of all, should Ukraine become a Russian puppet, that does start pointing to hegemony given what Russia's done to other places around its periphery. So at the end of the day, you have to ask yourself this. Do you want to threaten Russia with sanctions that will probably not work? And in any event, would only be implemented once Russia has actually bitten off a bit of a slice of Ukraine, or would you try to deter? And if we cannot deter credibly, then we're not going to deter China-Kre.

credibly. We're not going to deter anybody credibly. And oh, by the way, China is building up a nuclear force. And years ago, they were already saying, would you trade Tai Bay for Los Angeles? So the fact that the Russians are nuclear armed, sure, but the monkey would be on their shoulders, though, because they would have to be the ones to invade Ukraine when we are airlifting equipment and providing support, training support, that would make. make the Ukrainian military, which is already much more capable than it was some years ago, even more capable. And Atole, what is your take on the larger risks here?

I mean, is it right to be concerned about the potential for escalation or maybe, as Doves suggests, this is somehow contained. If it does come to war, it will be a puric victory for the Russians. In fact, strategically, maybe this is actually very good for NATO, very good for the West. Russia embroiled in a horrible occupation, wasting men and material that it can ill afford with an economy the size of New Jersey. Well, yeah, I mean, we might also want to remember that this might look very nice for the West, perhaps. it would look very nasty indeed for millions of Ukrainians who we say we want to defend. Washington over the years has been a little bit too fond of playing grand strategic games

with the lives of the populations of other countries who might very well, given the choice, advocate a political solution to all this. I need to say here that nobody in Russia is talking about annexation of Ukraine, even to the best of my knowledge, the annexation of more areas of Ukraine, possibly the rest of the Donbass maybe. And on, I mean, sorry, but on the domino theory, and no implications for East Germany, I'm afraid you just contradicted yourself with this beloved Washington word credibility. In other words, you know, we have to intervene in Syria. We don't know why or we don't know what we would achieve because our superpower credibility depends on this. Well, of course, the result is that America then gets dragged into local conflicts where its credibility suffers far more

than if it had kept out of them completely. Dove, let's give you a rebuttal and then I'm going to go to an atoll for his closing statement. Sure. First of all, I suppose if the Ukrainians don't want to fight, they won't fight. They give every indication that they will fight. And should they fight, it'll be very, very bloody for the Russians. The Ukrainians know they're going to lose people. The Ukrainians know what they're going to be sacrificing. They evidently care more about having an independent nation than they do about cutting some deal with the Russians,

at least not while the Russians are threatening them with over 100,000 troops. And oh, by the way, the fact that the Russians aren't going to annex Ukraine, well, the Soviets never annexed Czech Slovakia. They never annexed Hungary. But as soon as those two countries started acting up in a way that Moscow didn't like, the tanks showed up. A wave of national pride ran through the capital. But the triumph was short-lived. While Budapest was still burying its dead, a shocked world learned that the Russians had denounced Nage's government, set up one of their own and begun to occupy Hungary in its name.

And I guarantee you, if the Ukrainians were to be somehow partly swallowed up by Russia, but not necessarily as annexed to Russia, but simply semi-independent states, and if they acted up, the Russian tanks would be there as well. So that argument simply doesn't hold. ultimately the point is simply this. The United States does have an issue with credibility. This isn't Syria. This is the heart of Europe where NATO allies clearly feel that they are threatened as well.

What could argue back and forth whether we should have been in Syria or for that matter, Libya. And in most cases, I happen to be on the same side of these issues as Anatol. But this is different. And because we fundamentally have, as we've all agreed, two peer competitors, if one peer competitor is seen to be essentially outsmarting, outmaneuvering us to the point where it can act with impunity against a country that we have said should be allowed to operate as an independent state, that will certainly allow the other peer competitor to say, well, the United States simply cannot defend and support what it says.

It cannot support its friends. It cannot guarantee its allies that it will support them. And it will be very bad news for the Taiwanese. Okay, let's go to closing statements. You're listening to our debate, be it resolved the West, should intervene militarily to defend Ukraine from Russia. Anatola, I'm going to put a couple of minutes on the show clock

and turn the program over to you for your closing statement, please. Yes, well, Russia. is not a peer competitor of the United States. As we've heard, its economy is a tiny fraction of Americas. A peer competitor in nuclear power, yes, and in ground forces close to Russia's border, yes. But it is no longer a superpower and never will be. China now has an economy roughly the size of the United States and growing much faster. The Chinese Navy is growing at a much faster rate than that of the United States. China is a peer competitor, and it is basic strategic sense to concentrate on your main enemy, not, I hope, enemy, but adversary. But that does require

compromises elsewhere. If you try to be strong everywhere, if you try to defend everywhere, you end up defending nowhere, which is what America risks vis-à-vis China when it comes to Ukraine. There is no possibility now, and that is recognized in Moscow, of turning Ukraine into a Warsaw Pact or Comic-Con style ally because of what happened in 2014. There will be a massive revolt against it. What Russia is aiming at is indeed Finlandization. That is to say a country which would be neutral between Russia and the West. That excludes a Western military alliance, but it also excludes a Russian military alliance. If US intelligence is right and the Russians are preparing for the possibility of invasion as early as January, then the first major new US shipment of lethal arms, especially if known, as it will be known to Russian intelligence,

that they are accompanied by actual US troops, whether they're called trainers or special forces or what, that would be the signal for a Russian invasion. Putin and the Russian government have made it absolutely clear they will not tolerate Ukraine becoming a military ally of the United States against Russia. And if they do invade, they will do so with massive force and they will overwhelm Ukraine before it could deploy those weapons. Now, if US soldiers are on the ground and they are killed or captured. That could very easily begin a spiral of escalation towards levels that, of course, cannot be foreseen, but in the very last resort, do end with nuclear war. Now, if you are willing to take the first step on that path, you should be prepared to go to the American people and

explain just why it is. You are prepared to risk the lives of American soldiers, the prestige of the United States and in the very last resort, the existence of the United States, for an issue which only a generation ago would have been thought of as of no significance to America whatsoever. Thank you, Anatole, for that closing statement. Dov, we're going to give you the last word in our debate today, be it resolved the West should intervene militarily to defend the Ukraine from Russia. Wrap up this debate for us. Let's begin with the fact that threats of sanctions simply will not work. Now, the next issue is simply this. If the matter is one of compromise, of Finlandization or something like it, why have the Russians massed 100 to 175,000 troops to the Ukrainian

border? That's not the way you negotiate. There's clearly something more going on here. Now, Mr. Putin has also said he wants NATO to guarantee that it won't expand. Well, it's not for him to decide. what countries want to do with their futures. And if countries want to join NATO, then they can apply for membership. That doesn't mean NATO will accept them. NATO has not accepted Ukraine yet. It hasn't accepted Georgia yet. But it's not up to Mr. Putin to decide these things. So if you want to make sure that Mr. Putin cannot bully the Ukrainians into Finlandization, but rather negotiate with them about their future, then you have to ensure that he is going to be deterred from sending his troops in. And again, this will threaten the cohesion of NATO.

And NATO is as much a vital interest to the United States. And maybe based on what many people have said, even what Anatola said, maybe even more of a vital interest than Taiwan, they're not a treaty partner. NATO is a treaty organization. We have to ensure that our NATO partners recognize and accept that we will support them. And there are enough of them that are terrified of what Russia is doing. And again, if Russia simply wants to get Ukraine to change its policies, there's a thing called the negotiating table.

It is not over 100,000 troops. The Ukrainians have every right to determine their future without Mr. Putin telling. them. Thank you, Dove, and thank you, Anatole, for a fascinating debate. You've helped illuminate just an incredibly complicated and high-stakes issue. I think we're all better off for this conversation and your considered analysis and insight. So on behalf of the Monk Debates community, Dove Anatole, thank you so much for coming on the program. It was a pleasure. Thank you very much. Thank you. Enjoyed it. Well, that wraps up today's debate. I want to thank our participants. And Anatole, thank you so much for a terrific debate, a lot to think about coming out of today's

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