The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it resolved: There is no credible military defence of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression

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Starting point is 00:00:37 to arm you, the listener, with enough information to make up your own mind. Today's debate, be it resolved. There is no credible military defense of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. Two Chinese jets cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait on Sunday in what Taiwan's government condemns as an intentional, provocative and reckless act by Beijing. Another day, another escalation in U.S.-China tensions. China's Air Force has released a video showing a simulated attack on what looks to be an American military base in Guam. Sparks have also been flying over Taiwan.

Starting point is 00:01:17 The Taiwan's trade is on high alert amid back-to-back military activity by the U.S. and China. Taipei has also deployed its own forces to monitor escalating tensions. Oh, I'm your moderator, Rudyard Griffiths. China's takeover of Hong Kong and it's increasingly a... aggressive military maneuvers in the South China Sea have many wondering whether Taiwan is the country's next reunification target. While politicians debate whether it's in the West's interest to step in, strategists say the more pertinent question is whether a military defense of Taiwan is even possible. China now boasts the world's largest army, conventional air force,

Starting point is 00:02:01 Coast Guard, and Navy. In the heart of Beijing, a display of precision. thousand soldiers, sailors, paramilitary police, air force, all saluting their commander-in-chief. But this celebration also contained a warning for the world. A new intercontinental missile, supposedly capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 15,000 kilometers, dubbed the longest missile on earth, and column after column of military hardware. Some experts argue that it's wishful to think that the United States can defend Taiwan militarily from half a world away unless there's a radical rethink of American military strategy and posture towards China. Here's Admiral John Aquilino recently testifying about the threat of a

Starting point is 00:02:49 Chinese invasion of Taiwan before the U.S. Armed Services Committee. My opinion is this problem is much closer to us than most think, and we have to take this on, put those deterrence capabilities like PDI in place in the near term. And we're, with urgency. Others contend that despite China's clear military superiority over Taiwan, the island nation enjoys many advantages when it comes to fending off a potential invasion. Taiwan's unique geography and navigational challenges of the Taiwan Strait mean that an amphibious invasion is a daunting task, even for a navy the size of China's.

Starting point is 00:03:29 The almost 2 million Tijuanais who are trained to defend the country, guerrilla tactics included, vastly outnumber any possible Chinese invasion force. Add in U.S. aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles, armed drones, high-tech minefields, and a Chinese military conquest of Taiwan could end up handing Beijing its biggest military defeat since World War II. Here's Taiwan's democratically elected president. We have been trying very hard and making a lot of effort to strengthen our capability. I do think we have a pretty decent capability here.

Starting point is 00:04:09 Invading Taiwan is something that is going to be very costly for China. On this installment of the monk debates, we challenge the essence of these arguments by debating the motion. Be it resolved, there is no credible military defense of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. Arguing for the motion is Oriana Skylar Mastro. She's a center fellow at the Freeman Spogley Institute for International Studies at Stanford University

Starting point is 00:04:35 and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She's the author of The Best Seller, The Costs of Conversation, Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime. Arguing against the motion is Michael Beckley, associate professor at Tufts University in Boston, and also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He's the author of his own bestselling book, Unrivaled, Why America Will Remain the World's Soul Superpower.

Starting point is 00:05:03 Oriana, Michael, welcome to the Monk Debates. Thank you. Thanks for having us. Really looking forward to today's conversation. One of the pleasures of the series is that we get to think about big questions, big issues, and this certainly is one of them. It's probably one of the possibly defining geopolitical risks of the next period of time. Our resolution today is concise to the point, be it resolved.

Starting point is 00:05:32 there is no credible military defense of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. Oriana, you're arguing in favor of the motion. So I'm going to put a couple of minutes on our show clock and turn the program over to you. Thanks. There is currently many situations in which the United States cannot defend Taiwan. And I'm going to focus on the military defense of Taiwan, though I think it's important to note that the Taiwan economy completely depends on China. So if China decided to use economic coercion, for example, which we would define as aggression, the United States has absolutely no way of protecting Taiwan from any economic harm coming from

Starting point is 00:06:10 the PRC. So China, if they were to use force against Taiwan, there's a number of campaigns that they are most likely to go for because these are the ones that the People's Liberation Army have been preparing for decades. These preparations probably had an end date of 2020, and some mentioned 2025, but 2020 was definitely the end of the last five-year plan in which a lot of the military buildup in terms of equipment and training was focused on achieving. So at this point, China is in a good military position. So the first thing that China can do is something called a joint missile campaign.

Starting point is 00:06:46 This is basically raining down a lot of missiles on Taiwan. China has the most advanced cruise and ballistic program in the world. They have more missiles and more advanced missiles than even the United States. But this is less important than the fact that missiles are basically very, very hard to defend against. Taiwan does have missile defenses. They have hundreds of PAC threes, for example, and an own indigenous version of missile defense. These could maybe thin out some of the China's salvos of ballistic missiles,

Starting point is 00:07:16 but they certainly can't stop them. The majority of the shots would go through and given the sheer numbers that China has, they would be easily, easily saturated. Taiwan or the United States could try to hit back at China to say, okay, maybe we can't defend against them, but we can hurt you too. But even here, China has a home court advantage. Their bases are within their country, which is protected by one of the strongest air defense umbrellas in the world. The United States and

Starting point is 00:07:45 Taiwan cannot even get normal fighters through to get rid of what we call ayads, these integrated air defense systems. Only stealth systems can get through possibly, and the United States just has too few of them to take care of the threat. The next thing that China could do if Taiwan doesn't capitulate because of the missiles is a blockade. In this case, geography strongly favors China. In the case of this blockade, you need to have air and maritime superiority. And it seems very difficult to understand, but China, again, has the numbers when it comes to this. They can absolutely suppress any air operations that come out of Kedina. This is one of the U.S. bases or Guam. So if the United States, States did decide, for example, that it wanted to bring an air attack against Chinese surface

Starting point is 00:08:33 vessels for conducting this blockade, China could very easily take out the runways at these bases so that the United States couldn't fly and operate from them. The last big thing is the amphibious assault. China actually physically trying to occupy Taiwan, the PRC has the largest navy in the world. It has a battle force of about 350 ships and submarines. This includes 130 major surface combatants. The United States Navy in comparison had less than 300 ships in 2020. If they went for this amphibious assault, of course PLA casualties could be very high at the select landing sites. Taiwan does have defenses, artillery, short-range missiles.

Starting point is 00:09:19 They have hidden bunkers and tunnels. But even so, the PLA, still with the ship, sheer numbers by being able to airdrop in special operations and others and all the landing dot platforms that they have, the number of people that they would be bringing to these sites, at some point they would be able to overwhelm Taiwan defenses. And again, because of the umbrella of air defense that China has here, the United States, it might not even be able to have enough runway space to take off. And its surface fleet would be at severe risk from the Chinese surface fleet, but also their anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Starting point is 00:09:56 So yes, Taiwan and the United States can impose heavy costs on China, but it cannot defeat China, meaning that there is no credible military defense of Taiwan at this point. Thank you, Oriana, for that opening statement. So, Michael, your chance now to set out your case for why, indeed, there could be a credible military defense of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. I'll just open by highlighting three enduring obstacles that China would face to conquer Taiwan.

Starting point is 00:10:27 I think the first is history. So no blockade or bombing campaign in the last 200 years has let one country dominate and take over the sovereignty of another. So that means an amphibious invasion is the only reliable option China has to take Taiwan. And that's bad for China because an amphibious invasion moving an army across a body of water is literally the hardest mission in warfare. There's only been a handful of successful cases in the modern era, and they were all against severely overmatched forces. So on D-Day in 1944, the Allies dominated the seas and skies around Normandy, and they were fighting 40,000 or so German soldiers that were defending thin positions on French territory, mostly with small arms, machine guns, some mortars, a few cannons. China today would first have to fight for control of the seas in the skies, then take on 175,000 active duty Taiwanese troops, a million-plus Taiwanese reserves, and they would be defending

Starting point is 00:11:22 home soil with modern missiles and mines. So this would require, at minimum, the biggest and most complex military operation ever. So China wouldn't just have to buck historical trends. He would literally have to do something unprecedented in modern warfare. The second point is that geography makes Taiwan an especially tough nut to crack. So the Taiwan straight is perilous. Typhoons, 20-foot waves are common most of the year. Taiwan itself is a natural fortress too. So 90% of Taiwan's coastline is either cliffs or mud flats that extend miles out to sea and they're buffeted by severe tides. There's only 14 beaches on all of Taiwan where an invasion force could even land. And of course, Taiwan has booby-traped them, has its army bases very close to

Starting point is 00:12:05 those beaches for obvious reasons. The third factor I'd highlight is, and the challenge for China is the state of current technology. So we live in an era of long-range, precision-guided missiles. Taiwan has more than a thousand of them, many of which can not only sink ships pretty much anywhere in the Taiwan straight, but also hit ports, bases, runways on the Chinese mainland itself. So just think about how that complicates things for China. China's going to have to load hundreds of thousands of troops onto big slow ships and aircraft. That itself is probably going to take a day or more to pull off. Then it's an eight-hour trip across the Taiwan straight. And throughout all of this time, they're sitting ducks for precision-guided weapons. China, of course, would try to wipe out

Starting point is 00:12:47 Taiwan's missiles in a preemptive strike, as Oriana has mentioned. But I think history, again, shows that this is really tough because mobile missile launchers are pretty easy to hide. So in 1999, NATO pounded Serbia for 78 days straight, but only destroyed three of Serbia's 20 mobile missile batteries. Taiwan is a lot bigger than Serbia. It's a lot more advanced. China's not going to have 78 days to soften Taiwan up before it launches an invasion. So, you know, the bottom line is that Taiwan's defenders have these enduring advantages that provide a great foundation for credible defense, which is why I'm happy to oppose the motion. Thank you, Michael. Now an opportunity for rebuttal. So, Oriana, your chance to react here to Michael's opening statement. What key pieces

Starting point is 00:13:29 of his argument do you want to begin taking contention with? So Michael is absolutely right. You know, no blockade or missile campaign has been successful. But again, as he talked about technology, I'm not sure how relevant this is to the Taiwan scenario. Not only are we in this era of precision guided munitions, but as I mentioned in my opening, China has the most advanced cruise and ballistic program in the world. China's military executed a coordinated test launch of its top anti-ship ballistic missile into the South China Sea last August. The missiles are designed for launch to a general location intended to destroy the aircraft on decks, airplane launching gear, and control towers. They are the only country that has demonstrated the ability to hit a moving ship at sea.

Starting point is 00:14:18 It's hard for me to imagine that they would be unable to locate and target, especially since a lot of those are going to be fixed targets and not just mobile missile launchers. if the United States has its ships in place, has its aircraft in the air, then China might have difficulty defeating the United States. But in all scenarios that China is considering, this is not a likely scenario. The United States has fewer ships than China, as I mentioned, but also that's the total size of the Navy. Most of those ships are nowhere near the Taiwan Strait and would take days, if not weeks to transit to arrive in the Taiwan Strait. The same with U.S. aircraft. Even if the United States had some sort of warning and so moved more aircraft into the region, there is so much vulnerability of what the United States needs at Kedina. It's based there in Japan and even at Guam to be able to operationalize this capability.

Starting point is 00:15:18 A fighter needs a thousand feet long and 50 feet wide of runway to be able to take off. Enablers such as fuelers and things of this sort need a lot more, maybe 12,000. thousand length of runway. So in the end, it's very easy with some cluster munitions for China just to put some potholes in these runways, and then the United States is unable to challenge them in the air. Michael also talked about geography. He is right. Typhoons are not great. Most Chinese war plans, if they have a say, they plan on not going in typhoon season. And so unless they're forced to for some reason, that's not going to be a huge factor. But the geography also helps China, because the Taiwan Strait is very noisy, which means anti-submarine warfare is very hard.

Starting point is 00:16:04 It's easier for them with less experience to be able to hide their submarines, given the acoustics there, than it would be somewhere else. The last thing, if I were Taiwan, even though they do have missiles, I wouldn't want to go up against the PRC. The PRC is a target sponge. You try to locate something in the country that is the size of the PRC that is much harder than the few places that you have to look at. for on the tiny island of Taiwan. And even if Taiwan managed to find all the targets that they needed to find, they just do not have enough of the capability they need and they don't have the range. I think it's a bit unfair even to put this burden on Taiwan because in this debate, I think it's pretty obvious that Taiwan has no way of defending itself against the PRC. The big issue is,

Starting point is 00:16:54 does the United States? Can Taiwan hold off long enough for the United States to come to its aid. And here we are really on some thin ice in that the United States needs significant early warning to be able to get the forces it needs into theater to defend Taiwan. And if we don't have that warning and if Taiwan can't last in this amphibious assault a number of weeks, then the United States couldn't even bring to bear the force that we have. Thank you, and again, both of you really appreciating the detail here that you're bringing to your analysis. This is exactly what we wanted for this debate today. So, Michael, your chance to come back here on Oriana's opening statement or what she's just said in your own rebuttal.

Starting point is 00:17:39 Well, Oriana is right to focus on China's missile capabilities. They really are the crown jewel of the military. And I don't doubt that China could hit lots of targets, both American and Taiwanese in a war. But what I would say in response is that, you know, blowing things up is a lot easier than taking and controlling territory. And so far I haven't heard any mention of how China is going to actually consolidate control over Taiwan. And there's a few areas of deficiencies I think the PLA has in terms of doing that. One is just basically in terms of hardware. So if you actually look at China's amphibious and airlift fleet,

Starting point is 00:18:11 a lot of experts think at most China could transport 30,000 or so troops in a single wave to Taiwan. That's obviously not going to be enough to conquer a nation of 23 million people. That means the bulk of any major invasion force is going to have to be going across on civilian ships which can only most, the vast majority of them can only carry a fraction, if any, of the heavy equipment that a military-grade transport craft would. And they're going to be driven by, you know, civilian captains that probably have not been shot at before, probably aren't thrilled to be pressed into service and thrown into a meat grinder at the 11th hour of a war. China also lacks a lot of the long-range power projection capabilities that it would need to

Starting point is 00:18:48 prevent the United States or other countries doing horizontal escalation options, you know, trying to choke China off in the Strait of Malacca. So there's a number of just hardware deficiencies the PLA has. I think even more important, though, are the software deficiencies. Because as I mentioned in my opening speech, this is going to be the most complex military operation ever. You're going to need combined arms where the Air Force, the Navy, the missile force are all closely timed together, coordinating, making sure they don't have friendly fire incidents. That requires a lot of experience, which China has none of. China hasn't fought a war since 1979.

Starting point is 00:19:21 It's only conducted one joint combat campaign in its history, which is in a lot of. in 1955, both of those operations went pretty badly for the PLA and none of China's current troops have ever been in combat. So it's hard to see how starting them off on like the double black diamond of military operations is possibly going to go well for them. I would also note that the PLA is a highly corrupt and highly politicized institution. China's military authorities recently took the rare step of releasing on their official website a list of 16 senior military officials who were put under investigation for graft in the past year. The release at the graph list came on the heels of a three-day plenary session

Starting point is 00:20:01 of the Central Commission for Discipline inspection of the Communist Party of China. During Ridge, President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping said there will be no let up in the battle against corruption. For decades, promotions were based more on political connections or bribes. Xi Jinping has obviously pushed through an anti-corruption campaign, but it's been for largely political purposes. He's punished more than 13,000 PLA officers to get rid of political rivals. And the political science literature on what happens when you do this is clear.

Starting point is 00:20:31 When you try to coup-proof a military to scare people, to stay loyal to you, that absolutely guts the effectiveness of the military. Because then people say, well, I just need to be loyal. I don't necessarily need to be the best and brightest to get ahead. It also discourages any officers from taking initiative or innovation, which is definitely going to have to occur in such a complicated mission. It also just cuts into training. I've heard reports that PLA officers spend 50s.

Starting point is 00:20:53 15 hours a week doing political work and doing things like studying Xi Jinping thought instead of gearing up for an operation against Taiwan. The last thing I would say is just that China's military has other things on its plate besides Taiwan. And so it's not like it can just totally throw itself into an invasion. China is surrounded by 19 countries, 10 of which claim parts of Chinese territory as their own. We've seen just most recently the skirmish with India where there's fatalities in both countries massing on their shared border. I've seen estimates that suggest the PLA has to devote more than a million troops, which is almost half the active duty force, just to do internal security and border defense missions. Actually, the very last thing I want to say is Oriana, I think rightly

Starting point is 00:21:33 points out that for the United States to respond effectively, it needs to have some kind of early warning. And it's not clear that the intelligence and satellite assets in the region are sufficient for that. But what I would say in response is that, look, this operation is going to involve hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions on the Chinese side. They're going to be calling up troops from around the country. They're going to be fueling up hundreds of aircraft and missiles. You know, you don't exactly need high fidelity assets to spot this much mobilization. And there's been at least unofficial estimates suggesting that the U.S. and Taiwan might have warning as much as 60 days or even 30 days in advance. But at the very least, at least a few

Starting point is 00:22:10 days, enough to do targeting of fixed sites like ports where you know the Chinese are going to have to be embarking from in order to invade Taiwan. Hi, among podcast listeners, Rudyard Griffiths here, your host and moderator. If you're enjoying our one-on-one debates, please consider checking out our new Monk Members Only podcast. It's a half-hour program that airs each Friday on our podcast feed and website. It provides you with a half-hour master class in current events. We dig into the big issues and ideas, changing our world, hopefully providing you with some original analysis and insights. You can access the podcast and program for free by becoming a Monk member, which is also free.

Starting point is 00:22:53 You can do all of that on our website, www.munkdebates.com. Again, that URL is monk with a k and debates with an S at the end.com. Hey, thanks for listening. Let's get back to our program. Now my opportunity to join this conversation and try to think through what some of the questions our listeners would have for you, having just listened to these two really fascinating opening statements and rebuttals. And Oriana, to come to you first, you know, I think a lot of people, tuning into this debate just might be kind of shocked at the idea that China would risk taking on American U.S. military capacity in the region and globally. Maybe you could talk to us. I'd just like to hear a little bit more of why you think China is in fact contemplating that jump into the unknown.

Starting point is 00:23:53 It shocks me the idea that two great powers would actually consider lining up against each other over the future of Taiwan or any other global fault line. Well, thank you for that question. And I will say that it is very common to see, try to understand Chinese thinking or Chinese military doctrine in the context of what the United States does. You know, why would they consider taking on the United States? Taiwan is the most important thing.

Starting point is 00:24:21 If they had to choose between the border with India, which, again, uses different force structure, so it isn't really a substitute. And Taiwan, they choose Taiwan. If they have to give up their base in Djibouti because the United States is strangling them in the Malacca Strait or Taiwan, they choose Taiwan. Xi Jinping, the leader of China,

Starting point is 00:24:41 has promised to the Chinese people that during his tenure, they will see Taiwan, in their words, reunify with the mainland. China will not attack Chinese people. We're willing to negotiate sincere, and expend all our efforts in striving for the prospect of peaceful reunification. We do not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the right to use all necessary measures. In the 1990s, they did not have the capability to even consider this.

Starting point is 00:25:18 They were mainly focused on having to respond if Taiwan moved towards independence, for example. So they have spent the past 25 years building this force so that they can take Taiwan by force. This is the number one mission of the military. Now you say, why would they want to take on the United States? Well, if you talk to the Chinese military, there is an additional benefit to beating the United States. They think that they can choose the time and place so that they have the most advantage and that they could win. And so the benefit is not only that they get Taiwan back, but it's that they've defeated the United States, which means they are now the regional superpower. And the United States role is largely diminished.

Starting point is 00:25:58 And most of the signals they're getting from countries in the region, even U.S. allies, whether it be Australia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, is they are not going to get involved. Even the Australians call it kind of a war of choice for the United States. And so the Chinese also don't see any real long-term costs, whether they be diplomatic, economic, in the aftermath of their use of force against Taiwan. They've basically, their whole foreign policy has been designed to convince the world that how they treat Taiwan is not in of how they would treat everyone else, that Taiwan is an outlier. So I've asked Chinese military, you know, what if the United States intervenes?

Starting point is 00:26:33 And before that was enough to convince them, then we're not going to do it. The big question is, is the United States in or out? But now they say, if the United States intervenes, we'd still win. And so U.S. capabilities needs to be the focus of U.S. deterrence, not U.S. resolve. So, Mike, I want to hear you on this point. I mean, Oriana's painting a picture here of a China that has reached kind of military parity, at least in the South China Sea and its immediate kind of sphere of influence. And what would have surely been key to a credible military defense of Taiwan,

Starting point is 00:27:08 which would have been the perceived deterrent effect of American power force projection in the region and globally, has now been removed. Do you buy that assessment? I do think Oriana is right that the local military balance has definitely been shifting in China's direction over the last 10 to 20 years. I just think that's undeniable if you've seen the buildup of their missile force, etc. But the point I would make is just that Taiwan and the United States have these enduring advantages, that to my mind, China cannot clearly overcome, at least easily.

Starting point is 00:27:38 And I also think, you know, you have to remember that there are real risks for the Chinese Communist Party. If they try this and the war does not go well and they lose, or even if it's sort of a long, drawn-out stalemate, that could be catastrophic for the Chinese Communist Party. the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. And so I think that then opens up a window for the United States and Taiwan to not necessarily have to absolutely wipe the floor with China, but be able to just credibly threaten to show that this may not succeed.

Starting point is 00:28:07 That itself could be enough to deter China from trying to launch an invasion. That said, I do worry very much that China, you know, just because I think that China would have a tough time taking Taiwan doesn't necessarily mean that China won't take a huge risk to make it happen. And I think Oriane is exactly right that this issue has extreme emotional resonance for the people in China. The fact that the United States has been interposing itself for 75 years in the Taiwan Strait is something that the Chinese see is just absolutely intolerable. Recently, a certain large country has been taking negative action on Taiwan-related issues. Taiwan is a sacred and inseparable part of China's territory.

Starting point is 00:28:47 So I think we are right to worry about the resolve of China to want to do something like this, but I'm more skeptical as to whether it's actually physically possible, and therefore that's why I'm more hopeful about the possibility of deterrence. I want to spend just a moment more on deterrence with the Oriana, because the other part of this that I think alarms a lot of people listening to the show right now is the acknowledgement that both China and the United States are nuclear powers, with not insignificant, certainly on the part of China, nuclear forces. So to what extent does the threat of escalation here, the known unknowns that would spiral out of a Chinese assault on Taiwan, again, create a level of uncertainty that allows America and Taiwan

Starting point is 00:29:38 to have an advantage here when it comes to this conflict? So I would have thought about it the opposite way when it comes to China, the risk to nuclear war. The possible risk of escalation is to the benefit of China and not to the United States, largely because the United States does not have the resolve to lose even one U.S. city to defend Taiwan. And so from the Chinese perspective, you know, they have the resolve. And the United States shouldn't waste its time trying to convince China that we are willing to lose as much as they are for Taiwan because we are not. We need to convince China that we are so capable that when it reach that threshold of cost. So if you introduce the possibility of nuclear war, then the United States is out.

Starting point is 00:30:30 And that's why it's very interesting to me that to date, China has been very reasonable in its nuclear posture. They have not used nuclear weapons to try to gain an advantage in the conventional sphere, like some countries like Pakistan has. China hasn't said, listen, if we're losing conventionally, we'll go nuclear. They still have a no-first-use policy. And their training and the size of the nuclear forces, at least from now, suggests that they plan on keeping that up. So whether it's correct or not, both Chinese planners and U.S. planners believe this war can stay limited.

Starting point is 00:31:04 And so they are planning for limited war. The escalatory threat is more whether the war becomes protracted. And in that case, which side has the advantage of we're talking about not a conflict of a number of months, but we're talking about a conflict of a number of years. So, Michael, in this back and forth, I think one issue that's kind of bubbling beneath the surface of the debate is just what is America's commitment to the defense of Taiwan? You know, it's always been ambiguous. There's some suggestions now that, you know, Congress, the U.S. Congress should be more explicit. Is this part of this debate that the lack of a credible military defense of Taiwan rests in no small

Starting point is 00:31:46 part because the United States is still kind of painting in a gray area when it comes to what it actually would do to try to protect Tijuana and independence? Yeah, I think for decades, U.S. policy has been to be very clear about the ends that it seeks, namely a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, but to be ambiguous about the means and the timing of how it might intervene to make sure that that is upheld. And what a lot of people on Capitol Hill now are saying is like, we should have an unambiguous policy and say, look, we are going to fight to defend Taiwan. We're going to pass a U.S. law that says we have to defend militarily Taiwan from invasion. This Tuesday, two pro-Taiwan acts were introduced in the House,

Starting point is 00:32:32 and the Senate. The Taiwan Defense Act would call on the U.S. military to prevent China from taking over Taiwan. Well, I really hope the Taiwan Defense Act passes. I mean, that would be very reassuring for us here in Taiwan. I mean, here's an area where I actually agree a lot with Oriana. I think that this is talking loudly, but not necessarily building up the big stick you need to back it up. In some ways, it's the worst possible scenario. I agree with Oriana that if it's a battle of resolve between the United States and China, the United States is going to lose. China, at the end of the day, cares a lot more about Taiwan. And so the key is building up the capabilities to back up whatever commitment the United States wants to retain. You know,

Starting point is 00:33:13 we've seen historically that tough talk without being able to back it up actually can lead to a catastrophic first strike. And so it's actually better to, you know, walk softly and carry that big stick instead. And that's why I favor a big military buildup, but less so these changes in diplomatic stance. Thanks, Michael. So, Oriana, the key to Michael's argument in this debate so far, as I understand it, is really that the successful military conquest of Taiwan would require occupation. And as Michael has pointed out, it's not only the impressive physical defenses, which have been built up over decades. It's potentially a million-plus reserve army. It is a population fighting on their homeland.

Starting point is 00:33:59 It is a complicated geography. I want to hear a bit more from you as to why, I mean, how do you actually go about suppressing and conquering a nation like Taiwan? I mean, this seems a massive undertaking. So this is actually what China is best at. China invests more in internal repression than it ever has in power projection. We're talking about the Chinese military, but the people's armed police, which are largely in charge of doing the population control. you know, there is between 1.5 million and 2.3 million of these individuals. So if we look at how China has, you know, in some people's views, occupied Xinjiang and Tibet,

Starting point is 00:34:40 right now there is an estimated 1 to 3 million people in camps in Xinjiang, according to Amnesty International. The number of young men in Taiwan is 1.4 million. Right. So right now, China has been capable of putting more people in camps than all. the young men in Taiwan. And so when you talk about the people of Taiwan fighting for their own land, you know, it is very difficult to predict resolve, but they haven't been able to meet their targets for volunteers. So no one is really volunteering to be a part of the military.

Starting point is 00:35:16 A third of the 220,000 people in the military are conscripts right now, more or less. And so even if the 220 people in Taiwan that have some sort of military training fight, and just as a side note, the reservists have an average of four days a year of experience. And so I don't know if I would necessarily put them in the fighting camp. But if they all were still going to put up a fight, I think in the end, China has the numbers and they have, you know, in their mind, efficient tactics to dealing with this sort of thing. Michael, what's your take on that? I mean, the cost that China would pay in terms of the international court of public opinion with probably the horrors that would have to result

Starting point is 00:35:57 from a physical kind of conquest of Taiwan. Do you see that as part of a credible defense here of this island nation, simply the soft power costs that would spiral out of this conflict for China? No, I don't think China would care that much about soft power costs. I think at the end of the day,

Starting point is 00:36:18 the velvet glove of soft power only matters if there's the iron fist of hard power backing it up, What I would say, though, is that China is not insensitive to costs. So, you know, a horizontal escalation campaign that basically tries to choke China off from its oil supplies could have some effect. But, you know, maybe not enough to prevent it from undertaking the invasion in the first place. I think the broader point would just be that you could make it this long quagmire that ultimately degrades Chinese power, even if it launches the invasion in the first place. I mean, Oriana is right that, you know, China seems to be specializing in, oppressing large numbers of people at one time. So you could imagine them trying to do something

Starting point is 00:36:58 similar on Taiwan. But what I would say in response is that, of course, but it's a lot easier to put Uyghurs in camps when they are trapped on your territory and under your massive surveillance system. It's a hell of a harder to go into hostile territory and try to subdue an entire population. I mean, the United States of any country knows that extremely well, having tried multiple times in much smaller areas. And, you know, Taiwan itself, just the geography of it, it's a mountainous jungle, jungle-covered area. And the Taiwanese have built all these tunnels and supplies because they expect to have to ride out a protracted conflict.

Starting point is 00:37:33 So they at least do not give the impression that they're just going to bow over and that there's not going to be continued fighting. Even if the invasion, which I still don't think is necessarily going to work, somehow does work. Now, I think Oriana is right, that morale is very low in the Taiwanese armed forces, in part because we tend to infantilize the Taiwanese and say,

Starting point is 00:37:53 you have no hope. You know, there are no credible defense options for Taiwan. So of course, that's going to hurt morale. I do think, though, that morale changes in the context of conflict. And I think we're already seeing some of that in the Taiwanese population, which is looking at things like Hong Kong, just looking at China's more aggressive stance overall in the Taiwan straight. And it's actually had the opposite effect. You've seen more and more people identifying solely as Taiwanese, not as Chinese. You saw the party in Taiwan that leans more towards independence get resoundingly reelected in 2020 despite problems with the economy. And in a more extreme scenario where you actually have a war going on,

Starting point is 00:38:29 what we've seen over and over again in history is that civilians who never thought they would be soldiers or willing to fight in a war become suddenly willing to endure enormous punishment to stick it to foreign invaders. This is why blockades and strategic bombing have failed over and over again because people just get mad that they're suffering so much and end up sticking it out. So I think it's far from a foregone conclusion. that the Taiwanese are just going to roll over if China is able to land, you know, 10,000 or 20,000 or 30,000 troops on their island. Thanks, Michael. Before we go to closing statements, I want to just take a moment here, move this debate beyond pro versus con.

Starting point is 00:39:05 Look, I was born in 1970. I really have no, certainly no lived experience, very little memory of any kind of conflict globally, you know, on this scale, potentially involving superpowers. What, Oriana, is your view of the actual risks of this? I mean, where are we at in terms of, you know, our defcon rating? Is this something that you think is a real and imminent risk? The risk is real, but I don't think it's real this year for a number of reasons that Michael alluded to. I mean, one being that they just finished their military reforms. And I do think they want to do some more realistic exercises and training in order to refine this joint operational capability, the ability of the Air Force and the Navy to come together to do such a complex operation

Starting point is 00:39:54 that Michael suggested over the Taiwan Strait. So the risk is real, but I think Xi Jinping is still trying to give the military some time to work out some kinks, in particular, I think the command and control, the joint command structure before they decide to go for it. So I say probably five to seven years. But unless the United States make some serious changes to its force posture in the region spends a lot more money building up. I would argue ground-based missiles,

Starting point is 00:40:24 but other people might argue other capabilities. Then I think it's just a matter of time. Xi Jinping has promised the Chinese people that he's going to get Taiwan. And I don't know why he would do that if he wasn't actually hoping and planning that he would be able to do it during his tenure. Thank you, Oriana.

Starting point is 00:40:42 So final question to you, Michael, before we go to closing statements. And I know you're going to be opposed to what I've been. about to say, but that's why I'm asking is, you know, listening to Oriana and just thinking about, you know, the divisions in American society, American politics, the fragility of the American economy, why isn't it just time to acknowledge that the United States is not coming to the defense of Taiwan? Thousands of U.S. citizens will not be giving their lives for the liberty of the T1E's.

Starting point is 00:41:12 America will not be plunging its highly financialized economy into. to possibly a great depression to thwart China's reunification of Taiwan. Why isn't it time just to acknowledge that and kind of start having those conversations with the Chinese and kind of move on? Maybe that's a lot of real politic in one dose, but isn't it the truth? Well, it's certainly the truth for a sizable portion of the American population. If you look at public opinion polls, I've seen some that suggest only 35% say they would be, favor of militarily trying to defend Taiwan. And that's without any concept of the kind of horrible

Starting point is 00:41:52 costs that the United States might have to bear. Now, what people who say we should defend Taiwan would say is, like, first of all, there's enormous strategic importance of Taiwan. It's an unsinkable aircraft carrier right in the heart of maritime East Asia, the most vibrant, important region in the world. And it's also, you know, critical to keep the potential emerging superpower China pin down in its own neighborhood because if it has Taiwan to use as that launching pad, suddenly Japan becomes much more vulnerable to coercion or some kind of blockade strategy, the Philippines as well.

Starting point is 00:42:27 And so, you know, it's just this fear that if it's not going to stop with Taiwan, that once China has Taiwan, it's going to be emboldened and have this important strategic asset under its belt. And the second factor that people would highlight who want to defend Taiwan would say, look, this is the world's only Chinese democracy, right? Like, you cannot let this. If the United States lets this nation get crushed by the Chinese Communist Party, not only does it shatter any kind of faith in any sort of democratic solidarity around the world or any credibility

Starting point is 00:42:55 the United States might have had as a pro-democracy actor, but also as an alliance partner. I mean, other allies would have to look at that and say, well, so when the going gets tough, the United States just abandons its allies, even to its most important potential peer competitor in the future. So those would be the arguments I think people would put out. I think that's an important debate that Americans need to have, because it's a It's really important that we have clarity about what exactly our interests are there. And so I'm actually not as hostile to your question as maybe you had assumed.

Starting point is 00:43:22 But I think there's important arguments on both sides that need to be heard out. Thank you, Michael. Well, let's go to closing statements. Michael, you're up first. We'll put two minutes on the clock. What do you want to leave our audience with when it comes to making your argument, your point, that yes, indeed, there is a credible military defense of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression? Sure. I mean, I will certainly acknowledge that defending Taiwan will be tough, although I don't think it's nearly as tough as invading and conquering Taiwan.

Starting point is 00:43:51 You know, this, again, would be the biggest, most complex operation in history. And I just don't think China's military is the greatest military in history. Is defending Taiwan difficult? Yes. Should Taiwan the United States be doing more to get ready for it? Absolutely. But to say that there's no credible defense option for Taiwan just strikes me as going way too far. And in fact, there is a fair amount of consensus of, among defense experts about what a credible defense of Taiwan could look like and why it's actually achievable. And the plan is fairly simple. Basically, Taiwan would continue to stock up on mobile missile launchers and armed drones and mines and basically maintain an army that can surge tens of thousands of troops to any beach in an hour backed by a million strong reserve force that is trained to fight guerrilla style in Taiwan cities and jungles. And also build and maintain shelters and massive stockpiles for a population that is psychologically prepared to ride out a conflict. And the hope would be just by doing those preparations, you could potentially deter China because

Starting point is 00:44:52 the Chinese would realize what a hard slog it would be. At the same time, the United States also has pretty clear marching orders. The United States would disperse and harden its base infrastructure in East Asia. It would pre-position missile launchers and armed drones at sea and on allied territory near Taiwan. And these forces would basically act as a high-tech minefield. that could take apart a Chinese invasion force early in a war. So this is all hard, but for a country with a $700 billion plus defense budget, to me, this is a tractable problem. And in fact, Taiwan and the United States have already taken important steps to implement

Starting point is 00:45:26 these type of recommendations. Taiwan is prioritizing asymmetric capabilities. They just bought hundreds of additional anti-ship missiles and rocket launchers. They're increasing defense spending by 10%. And the United States right now is pushing forward what it calls the Pacific deterrence initiative and basically has plans to start. starting stringing missile launchers, austere airfields along islands opposite China's coast, and bringing online lots of new long-range missiles and mines and sensors.

Starting point is 00:45:52 And, you know, in war games where Taiwan and the United States follow these basic plans, the island usually wins. And so there is a viable strategy that's been endorsed by top policymakers in both governments. So to me, the question is not whether Taiwan can be defended. I think in theory it definitely can. But there's just a question as to whether Taiwan and the United States are going to fully implement and consolidate their defenses. And that's a question of political will, which I agree needs to be debated and cultivated very rapidly. And hopefully this lovely conversation will be

Starting point is 00:46:22 one tiny little part of that broader conversation. Thank you, Michael. Oriano, terrific debate. We're going to give you the last word to make the key points that you'd again like our audience to leave this conversation with. I want the audience to leave this conversation with a sense of urgency. Listen to what Michael just said. And all of what he said is absolutely true. There's theoretically a viable strategy here. He posed a question of what would a credible defense look like? That's because we currently do not have a credible defense.

Starting point is 00:46:55 Credible to who to China. And China does not find the force posture and the tactics and the relationship that the United States has with Taiwan that's been the same for decades and decades to now be able to defeat what is a seriously, larger and modernized force. What China has been able to accomplish in the past 25 years has been exceptional. In 1996 in the third Taiwan-strait crisis, when China was lobbying missiles over to Taiwan, the United States sent in an aircraft carrier. The United States thought China learned the lesson of

Starting point is 00:47:29 don't be aggressive towards Taiwan, instead China learned the lesson of let's never let that happen again. Let us not be deterred. And since then, they've built the capability to not only hold the United States assets at risk, but also Taiwan. There are many things that we could do. Michael mentioned base resiliency. We have been talking about base resiliency for 15 years, and our bases in the region are still not resilient. We've talked about the fact that the United States

Starting point is 00:47:56 does not have enough firepower to rain down on an advancing force into Taiwan straight for decades. And not only have we not started the process of trying to build any sort of ground-based systems, that we need, but then we also have to build new relationships to be able to host them. Taiwan cannot do this by itself. You cannot expect Taiwan, even with all the tunnels and mines in the world, to be able to defeat what is now a military only second to the United States. The United States needs to act. And for the United States to act, it seems to me that it needs

Starting point is 00:48:33 a sense of urgency. And so what I'm here to say today is that the United States and the international community does not have forever. The Chinese are not happy with just maintaining the status quo, and they will soon believe, whether it's correct or not, but they will believe that they have the military capability to do this. We also need a coalition. And the United States is telling the world we can do this without you, I think is one of the reasons why countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea think they can sit it out. If China thought that taking Taiwan would threaten its rejuvenation, meaning that in the end, there would be long-term costs, a coalition that formed against it. It would not do it. And so what would that credible defense look like?

Starting point is 00:49:16 I think you've heard some of this today. My only hope is that you agree with me that we currently do not have that credible defense in place and that this sparked some urgency in capitals in the region and in the United States and with our allies and partners to finally do something about it. Thank you, Orion, and thank you, Michael, for a spectacular debate. So much for us to kind of reflect on and your kind of considered opinion, engagement, and study of this complicated and important issue just comes through in every word that you spoke with us. So on behalf of the Monk Debates community, thank you for coming on the program and debating each other today. I thank you for having me. It was a pleasure. Thanks so much.

Starting point is 00:50:05 Well, that wraps up today's debate. I want to thank our participants, Oriana and Michael. They certainly gave us a lot to think about. If you have feedback or reflections on what you've just heard, please send me an email at podcast at monkdebates.com. Again, that's podcast at monk munk, bates with an s.com. Here's a note from Andy about our latest weekly members-only podcast. Andy writes, I'm really pleased that you explain the fallacy that the AstraZeneca vaccine is really risky. It clearly is not. At the root of it is mass ignorance of the population regarding statistical probabilities

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The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it resolved: There is no credible military defence of Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression

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