The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it Resolved: Trump’s Sanctions Regime is the Right Response to Iran’s Regional Ambitions

Episode Date: December 11, 2019

Will Trump's 'maximum pressure' campaign against Iran force them back to the bargaining table, or are increased sanctions destabilizing the region and making the world a more dangerous place? In this episode of the Munk Debates Podcast, Mark Dubowitz and Robert Malley debate the motion Be it resolved, Trump's sanctions regime is the right response to Iran's regional ambitions. SOURCES: CNN, ABC, NBC, New York Times, whitehouse.govBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

I think it's time for this toxic binary zero-sum madness to stop. We're not an imperial power. We're a revolutionary power. We are no longer in a world where you can plot out moves statesmen to statesmen like a chessboard. You don't know anything about my background to where I came from. It doesn't matter to you because fundamentally I'm a mean white man. We can't do this to the next generation because America will cease to exist. Welcome to the Monk Debate podcast. I'm your moderator, Rudyard Griffiths. Our mission every episode is to provide you with civil and substantive debate on the big issues of the day.

Free of spin, focused on facts, and animated by smart conversation. By the end of each debate, our hope is that you'll be armed with enough information to make up your own mind about any given issue. On this episode, we debate the motion, be it resolved. Trump's sanction regime is the right response to Iran's regional ambitions. Always better to deny resources to your enemy than to provide those resources in order to fund their malign and destructive activities. That's a gamble that could risk many Iranian lives, many regional lives, and the security of the United States. Over the last couple of weeks, incredible protests have shaken the Iranian regime, calling into question its legitimacy. Reports of the Iranian government cracking down on protesters, killing hundreds, possibly thousands.

The protests began over increased gas prices, the direct result of punishing economic sanctions leveled by the Trump administration. Last year, President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement put in place by the Obama administration. Today, tensions between the U.S. and Iran are at all-time highs. In response to the sanctions, the Iranian regime has restarted its nuclear program, shot down a U.S. drone, and is now launching these brutal crackdowns on protesters. All of this has the world wondering if the U.S.-led economic war against Iran is pushing

the Middle East towards chaos and even more conflict. Or is Donald Trump right and tough economic sanctions will force the Iranian government's hand like never before? On this installment of the Monk Debates podcast, we challenge the essence of these arguments by debating the resolution, be it resolved, Trump's sanction regime is the right response to Iran's regional ambitions. Arguing in favor of the motion is Mark Dubowitz. He's the CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and was instrumental in convincing Trump to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement. Arguing against the motion is Robert Malley. Roberts, the president, CEO of the International Crisis Group, and previously served on President Obama's National Security

Council. Gentlemen, welcome to the Monk Debate podcast. So Mark, I'm going to put Two minutes on the clock. Over to you. Let's have your opening statement. Great. Well, thank you very much for having me on the show. And I really want to thank Rob Malley for everything that he's done for the United States, for his service to our nation. And also, in recent months, Rob stood up for me when the Islamic Republic and Iran designated me and my think tank and threatened to unleash their security services to counter us, deter us and quote, punish us. And Rob led a letter of 70 think tank professionals speaking out against this destructive and malign regime. So I want to thank Rob for doing so. This, of course, is a brutal

regime that's facing enormous economic and political pressure. And millions of Iranians, Iraqis, and Lebanese have been on the streets protesting against this regime. And the regime has responded characteristically with brutal repression. It's a regime as well that brings into sharp relief the failed strategy of the Obama administration, the belief that somehow you can economically seduce the hard man of Iran to become pragmatic and responsible global stakeholders. This is an economic seduction strategy that we've tried with the hard men of Beijing, the hard men of Moscow. It's a strategy of economic seduction that has failed repeatedly, and it was certainly going to fail with respect to the Islamic Republic. The other theory of the case that Rob has

promoted and very much been the architect of is this whole idea of realignment, that we can realign the Middle East by supporting Iran as a moderating influence in the Middle East, in doing so back away from the support we've provided to Israel and our traditional Arab allies. Again, a failed strategy because you cannot realign U.S. position in the Middle East by supporting such a dangerous, malign, and destructive regime. It also underscores the Fadley Flood, JCPOA, or Iran deal that Rob was a key architect of Let me step in here for a moment and just clarify what the JCPOA is. This is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

It's the formal name of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement between the West and Iran. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran had to dismantle much of its nuclear program. It gave international inspectors extensive access to its facilities, all in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. That deal gave patient pathways to nuclear weapons for the regime. with sunset provisions under which key restrictions went away. It gave tens of billions of dollars to fill the coffers of this regime so that it could engage in its dangerous regional activities. And it created a situation where at least 10 years from now

we would be facing a much more dangerous Iran with an industrial-sized nuclear program, near zero nuclear breakout, ICBMs, and a dominant regional position. The Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign has precipitated a huge economic and political. crisis for this regime, with millions of people on the streets over the Middle East protesting against the regime and a collapsing economy that is creating enormous difficulties for the mullahs to fund both butter for their people and guns for terrorists.

And it's denied this regime money for this destructive and repressive activities. The United States is also maximizing its negotiating leverage against a weakened regime and really providing an opportunity for this regime to come back to the table to negotiate a much more comprehensive agreement that deals with a full range of Iran's malign activities. Now, Rob will say that it's either the JCPOA or war, but clearly it was going to be the JCPOA and war against a much more dangerous and destructive regime. We're now in a situation where this regime is weakened. It's on its heels, and we are in a position now to push forward, maximize the leverage,

and negotiate a much more comprehensive agreement that deals with Iran's destructive and dangerous. activities in the Middle East. Mark, thank you for that opening statement. I think we've got the beginnings of a debate on our hands here. So, Robert, over to you. Let's get your opening statement opposing the resolution, be it resolved. Trump's sanction regime is the right response to Iran's regional ambitions. So thanks, and thanks for being on. And I'm glad to be on with Mark. And thanks for his kind words. Of course, we disagree about almost everything else. But that's what this is debate is about. Let's say what the debate is not about. It's not about whether the nuclear deal was going to moderate Iran's behavior that was never the

argument I made, and it was not the argument President Obama made. And it's not about whether Iran is a moderating or should be a moderating actor in the region. It's not a point that I've made either. The argument in this debate is whether the strategy that's been adopted by the Trump administration that has been backed by Mark and his organization, which has been to rip up the nuclear deal, reimposed the sanctions that had been lifted or waived as a result of the deal, and pressure other countries to do the same, whether that has put the U.S. in a better or in a worse position,

and whether U.S. interests have been advanced or been weakened and undermined as a result. And I think the track record is pretty clear. Number one, by walking away, it's undermined the U.S. credibility, U.S. legitimacy, particularly with our allies. I mean, let's not forget that the U.S. led this effort to reaffirm. reached this deal, did it in concert with a number of European countries, that the deal was then endorsed by the Security Council, and now we're in this very strange situation where the U.S. is punishing other countries or threatening to punish them for abiding by their international

obligation. Number two, it's imposed hardships on the Iranian people, and you don't have to believe me, just go read the Human Rights Watch report on what it's meant in terms of Iranian access to medicine and basic goods, and that's not defending. Iran's regime's way of dealing with its own population, but these sanctions have made things much worse. But most importantly, let's judge the results by the metrics that the administration and its supporters have put forward. Number one, President Trump's strategy was supposed to moderate Iran's behavior in the region. It has done nothing of the sort. And since the U.S. walked away

from the deal, we've seen an increase in Iranian attacks on regional tankers. We've seen, according to the U.S. administration, increased use of their proxies in Iraq to go after the U.S. And most brazenly, the Iranian attack on Saudi Arabian oil fields. This morning, Iranian officials are denying that they're behind a series of brazen drone attacks against a pair of giant oil facilities over in Saudi Arabia. The attacks already adding tensions between the White House and Iran. Overnight, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly accusing Iran of mounting the assault. None of that was happening before we ripped up the deal.

Again, this is not to defend Iran, but it's just to say that as a result of those actions, we're now seeing Iran saying we're not going to take this lying down. Second of all, by moving away from the deal and ripping it up, the goal was to bring Iran back to the table to negotiate a better deal. And what we've seen over the last year is Iran gradually walking away from the restrictions as the U.S. violated the deal. Iran is walking away from the restrictions, step by step, coming back to the position that had ignited such concern and such fear five years ago,

and which is what led the Obama administration, to negotiate this deal. So this has not been a strategy of let's repeal the JCPOA, the nuclear deal, and then replace it. It's been a strategy of let's repeal and then destroy, destroy what had been achieved, and put Iran exactly where the administration said it would not be, a more aggressive actor in the region and one that has resumed its nuclear program. So one could criticize the nuclear deal as much as one wants, but to say that we are now in a better position than we were back in 2017, I think, is to live in a fantasy world. Robert, a great opening statement. So, Mark, coming back to you, let's have you deal with Robert's top line point there that this kind of extreme sanctions regime, this maximum regime that the Trump administration has put into place has exacerbated.

Iran's threats, its behavior within the region. It's having the opposite effect of the stated policy. How do you respond to that specific criticism that Robert is leveling at you and other supporters of the current U.S. administration's policy with regards to Iran? Well, let's set the record straight. I mean, the Islamic Republic's destructive behavior preceded the JCPOA. It continued during the JCPOA and it continued after the JCPOA. So the notion that somehow it's become more aggressive and more destructive as a result of Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran deal just is not supported by the facts. This is a destructive and malign regime that continues to push against the United States, against our allies and certainly brutalize

its own people. Okay, Mark, that's a key point. Before you go to the second one, let's have Robert come in and rebut that, Robert. I mean, I'm just a bit puzzled. The administration itself says that Iran has ramped out its aggressive behavior, and don't believe the administration. Don't believe me, just look at the facts. When was the last time that Iran attacked with missiles in oil field in Saudi Arabia? When's the last time that it engaged in a series of attacks against tankers in the region? That's by the administration's own saying and just looking at what's happened. So to say that things haven't gotten worse is a bizarre assertion. You could say that things were bad before the JCPOA during and immediately after. And obviously they were. And the goal of the

JCPA was simply to deal with a nuclear file. That was all that it was supposed to do, and it did that. But to now say that things have not gotten worse and everything would have been the same, I just don't understand, Mark, how you reconcile that with the facts before us. Well, Rob, we can spend the entire debate talking about Iran's destructive behavior, but let's remember before the JCPOA, during the JCPOA, and after the JCPOA, Iran was supporting Bashar Assad's brutal slaughter of half a million people creating millions of refugees. I would put that against an attack on an oil tank or any. time in terms of the scope of destructive behavior. Iran took our sailors hostage on their knees

after the JCPOA was signed. I mean, that's a pretty bold statement against the United States to actually take our sailors hostage. Iran was testing multiple long-range ballistic missiles after the JCPOA was signed. They're building an ICBM program in order to threaten the American homeland after the JCPOA was signed. So let's just acknowledge for the sake of this debate that Iran is engaged in destructive activities before, during, and after the nuclear deal. But we're acknowledge that they got worse in the last year? If you don't say that, then I'm not sure. Then we're dealing with alternative facts, which is the custom of the day. Rob, the fact of the matter is, during your administration, during the negotiations, and after the agreement, Iran supported Bashar Assad and his vicious slaughter of the Syrian people, half a million people dead, right?

The testing of multiple long-range ballistic missiles, taking our sailors hostage on their knees. Iran's destructive activities have not subsided, but they certainly do not have the resources today to fund both terrorists and by butter for their people. And that's why they're facing a massive budgetary crisis. Rohani himself admitted that he can't even support a third to a half of his own budget, which is why he cut fuel subsidies, which precipitated massive protests inside Iran and outside Iran in Lebanon and Iraq. These protests broke out after an at least 50% increase in gas prices and following a brutal

crackdown. They've morphed into a wider call to bring down the Iranian government. All this is linked to U.S. sanctions on oil exports, which are clearly taking their toll. That was a move by Donald Trump to force Iran back to the negotiating table over its nuclear program. It's putting real pressure on the government and the ruling clerics, especially since these protests are concentrated in poorer areas, normally loyal to the regime. So you have a situation today where Iran is making painful budgetary decisions. Your nuclear deal alleviated that, gave them both, billions of dollars to support their county and billions of dollars to support Bashar Assad. Before we relitigate the past, and we will get to the original agreement in this podcast more than once, I'm sure. I want to have Robert come back on your key argument from your opening statement. You've just mentioned it. The sanctions seem to be working.

You know, 50% or more inflation in the last year, this has put Robert. It seems like critical maximum pressure on this regime. And it's having real consequences for it that are arguably in favor of American interests, an American view of diminishing Iran's influence and power in the region. Why is that wrong? If the goal of maximum pressure is to put pressure, then yes, that's a totology. Of course, Iran is under greater pressure. Once the sanctions have been imposed, by definition, Iran's economy is going to suffer. And it's suffered quite significantly because the Trump administration was prepared to flex its muscles and to threaten other countries that wanted to implement the deal saying that countries and companies would fall under U.S. sanctions.

But that was never the test of whether pressure was going to work. If the goal was to hurt Iran's economy and nothing else, then yes, it succeeded. But the goal, as I said, from the very beginning, if you listen to what the president and everyone in the administration said, the goals were, it was to moderate Iran's behavior. and it was to get Iran to accept a more stringent nuclear deal that also would address other issues. The United States has never been afraid to pursue diplomacy with our adversaries. And as president, I decided that a strong, confident America could advance our national security by engaging directly with the Iranian government.

As I just argued, and although Mark disagrees, I will stick to my position that Iran's behavior has not moderated and has become worse, in fact. And on the nuclear front, Iran is now closer. to where they were before the deal in terms of advancing their program in terms of resuming activities that had been frozen. So it's very hard to argue that it succeeded other than to say it's put Iran under economic pressure. But that was not, you didn't have to be an economic expert

to know that if sanctions get reimposed, Iran is going to suffer economically. And I've never argued otherwise. I've always said it would hurt Iran economically. It's hurt them in quite a devastating manner. But that was not the goal. That was the tactic. the goal was to change Iran's behavior in its regional sphere and nuclear sphere, and it is done exactly the opposite of what the administration and its supporters said it would do.

Okay, Mark, come back on that point, and let's get you to focus on enrichment and the fact that Iran has recommenced enrichment. Robert's saying this is not part of the stated goals, yet it's happening, it's accelerating, and as you know, better than anyone else, it has huge consequences for the region. Well, the fundamental problem, of course, is that Iran was allowed to retain a vast nuclear infrastructure and the right to enrich. And that was the fundamental problem with the JCPO to begin with. There are 20 countries in the world that have civilian nuclear programs, including such threats to the world order as Canada, which have civilian nuclear programs, are not allowed to enrich. Rob's nuclear

nuclear deal gave Iran the right to enrich, retain its infrastructure, and over time, as restrictions disappeared, Iran could actually develop a industrial-sized nuclear breakout capability with a clandestine sneakout capability. They're allowed to use their advanced centrifuges and test them from day So the nuclear deal was always fatally flawed. And so now the administration has got to come into office and deal with this reality of a JCPOA and nuclear infrastructure and enrichment capability and Iran's patient pathways to nuclear weapons and ICBMs. What the administration has done, I think, is smart. I mean, it's not good sense. It's not good foreign policy sense to give your enemy money to kill you.

And what this administration has done is come in, take away Iran's money that Rob and his colleagues gave Iran in 2015, denied the resource. it has to support both its economy and its regional proxies and put it under immense pressure. These are the highest sanctions ever imposed on a country. We've never done it to this level. And it's too bad what's happening with Iran. It's going to hell. Doing poorly. They're practically broke.

Now this is what Ronald Reagan did to the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He recognized the Soviet Union was economically bankrupt, ideologically bankrupt, and even though it had thousands of nuclear-tip missiles aimed at our city, was to actually use all instruments of American national power to undermine the Soviet Union and consign it to the ash heap of history, which in 89 the Berlin Wall came down, and a couple years later was the end of the Soviet Union. That is actually the end goal of this administration, is to keep that pressure on a bankrupt regime economically bankrupt, regionally bankrupt, ideologically bankrupt, and not give it the resource it needs to flex its muscles in the region

and continue its destructive and bloody activities. That is ultimately the goal. Now, in the meantime, as Reagan did with the Soviet Union, you can negotiate arms control agreements. You can negotiate nuclear agreements. And this administration has made it very clear it is open to negotiations on a comprehensive agreement that deals with a full range of Iran's activities. But the fact that Iran is now using nuclear blackmail to try and undermine European support for our strategy was predicted by many of us in 2015. We said that's exactly what Iran would do. Robinie's colleagues, by the way, in 2015, said unilateral U.S. sanctions wouldn't work without European support. I don't think you'll find me having said that. Well, his boss,

his boss, President Obama said that and so does Secretary John Kerry. Everybody told us that you needed European multilateral support for sanctions to work. Rob, I'm glad, is acknowledging you don't. You have the immense power of the U.S. market. The point is not simply to post-sanctions. So if you're going to use the Soviet Union as an example, we have a long time to go and a lot of hardship for the region and for the Iranian people in the meantime. But again, we are now in a worst position when it comes to the nuclear threat that you and your colleagues were claiming was an existential threat not that long ago. And now we're treating what with complacency, the fact that Iran is going to start reenriching. Perhaps the next step it will take would be

to enrich at higher grades. We had a deal that, and again, the theory of the case was not Iran is going to become a moderate actor and now everything's going to be fine. It was you freeze their nuclear program sufficiently so that you are not concerned about them trying to rest, I'm just not concerned about to get them to rush to a bomb. And if you then use that period to try to negotiate a bigger deal that will deal with missiles and rejectivity, that's fine. Let's try to do that. But why bring this crisis forward by about 10 years by ripping up a deal and telling Iran basically our word is not worth anything? And now we see them resuming their activities.

Okay, good point, Mark. Come in on that. Yeah, sure. No, the reason you do that is, Rob, in 10 years' time, under your nuclear deal, with the restrictions going away, Iran's nuclear program industrializing, going to near zero nuclear breakout, under the deal, testing advanced centrifuges to give in an easier clandestine sneakout, under the deal, testing long-range ballistic missiles and ICBMs under the deal. In 10 years time, Iran would be a much more dangerous and formidable enemy. In that period of time, Iran would develop. But now they could do all that much better. Well, that's much better because right now they're weaker. It's better for them to create a nuclear crisis within a year or two, rather than have them freeze that program and try to then negotiate the better deal that you want. It was smarter to tear it up and to say now you're not under any restrictions because we're not.

So go do whatever you want. I wish you had frozen their nuclear program. We didn't freeze it. That was the problem. That was the threats that you yourself and that Prime Minister Netanyo and others were talking about, which is enrichment at 20 percent and an expansion of the centrifuge capacity. that was not going to happen. And certainly today, more is happening than when President Obama left office. So again, let's just look at the facts. The nuclear threat is greater today than it was in 2017.

You can keep asserting these things, but here's the reality, and that's what their debate is really centered around. Would you prefer to confront a weakened Iran today facing an economic and political crisis or a stronger, more formidable, more dangerous Iran in 10 years under the nuclear deal, where you've given them hundreds of billions of dollars, you've integrated. and backing the global economy. They now have the money for guns for terrorists and butter for their people. They have ICBMs. They have an industrial-sized nuclear program and they have regional dominance. Under your nuclear deal, that's where we were heading. That was the end state that you established. Now, Rob, let me finish. Let me finish for once. I will let you finish.

The fact of the matter is, is that was the situation that your administration created. And with the best of intentions and you're all great patriots, but your entire theory of the case was based on it didn't matter in 10 years because you were going to moderate this regime. You couldn't moderate the regime. It's not the theory of the case. Don't tell me what my theory of the case was. Or what President Obama's theory of the case was. I don't know if you spoke to him.

Maybe you did. I had numerous conversations with him. And he always said, I have no idea where the regime will be in 10 years. It could be worse. It could be better. It could be the same. What we want to do is I want to give my successor and my successor's a chance to have more time.

And he said we may not have to wait. We may not wait 10 years. Let's see where we are in two years, three years, four years. Once we've started implementing the deal. let's see if Iran does its share and then we don't have to deal with it at a time of mounting crisis you have brought the crisis up

the theory seems to be well we're going to have a crisis in the future let's have it now you say Iran would be much stronger but there was not a need to wait 10 years you could have negotiated another deal in good faith in two years and three years and four years but why would Iran today trust the United States when the United States

tears up a deal that took years to negotiate that the U.S. led the negotiations, endorsed by the Security Council, and then says, sorry, we don't like it anymore. We're going to tear it up. If you were in their shoes, why would you believe the next administration would respect its word? So you just made it harder, and I think that's part of the goal, is that you want to make it much harder for any future administration to negotiate a deal with Iran. Mark, a final point in this, and then we're going to move on to another theme on this debate. But, Mark, let's have you respond to that specific charge.

So we had a furious debate in 2015 with the Obama administration, Many members of Congress, including 29 Democrats, were opposed to this deal. And yet we never heard in 2015 Rob Molly, John Kerry, Wendy Sherman, or Barack Obama ever say that the goal was to negotiate JCPOA 1 and lay the predicate for JCPOA 2 that would address some of the fundamental flaws of the agreement. We never heard that debate. We never heard those points being made. Those are powerful points. I'm not sure why Rob didn't make them in 2015 or why he's colleagues to make them. But the fact of the matter is, well, maybe there's a good reason.

maybe the goal was always to do this, but you never told the American people that was the goal. The reality was you understood one thing. You understood it was a temporary deal that put temporary restrictions, and it was leading to an end state in 10 years that would create enormous difficulties. You fundamentally believe it, and Barack Obama said that in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg. He believed that there was a chance, not the high likelihood, but the chance. You could moderate this regime, economically seduce them by reintegrating them into the global economy. And you know why that was your theory of the case? Because the deal made, sense. That was, the deal made no sense unless that was the fear of your case.

No, that's, I mean, again, if, but I just, I mean, just, let me finish my point. Let me finish my point here, but you're, you're quickly making your moderator obsolete in this debate, which is a sign of a great debate. I'm all in favor of that, but there are a couple key themes I want to get through. Which is, this deal is good whether the Iranian regime moderates or doesn't, because if it is not going to moderate, then we'd much rather, we could constrained their nuclear program and when we were fearing that they were advancing it at rapid speed. It was never his theory of the case. The predicate of this deal was never Iran has got to moderate. This was a hedge whether they moderated or didn't moderate. Of course, the best scenario would be

that they moderate, however unlikely it might have been, but that was the best scenario. But if it didn't happen, we still were happier and safer with these restrictions in place than without them. The deal made no sense unless they moderated, Rob. I disagree with you. You're listening to the Monk Debates podcast. Be it resolved, Trump's sanction regime is the right response to Iran's regional ambitions. Arguing for the motion is Mark Dubowitz. He's the CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Arguing against the motion is Robert Malley, the CEO of the International Crisis Group. I'm your moderator, Rudier Griffiths. Now, back to our episode. Guys, I want to just pull out a little bit from the specifics of the nuclear deal and talk a little bit about not the policy but people. And the effect that these sanctions maximum pressure is having on the people of Iran. And Robert, I want to start with you because with the international crisis group, you really are looking across the world in a case-by-case basis, including in Iran, at the on-the-ground effects. I wonder if you can just paint a bit of a picture for us of what's happening to the Iranian people, not the government, but the people as these sanctions roll out over the last number of months.

So let's posit, as I'm sure Mark would agree, that much, if not the majority of the hardships of the Iranian people are due to the malfeasance of the government itself. And I don't think that's the argument. The argument is that the sanctions have made things worse. And I think what we see in Iran, but we see it elsewhere, depending on what kind of sanctions get imposed. those who are hurt most of those that we say we want to help, which is the ordinary people, and those who always find ways to circumvent sanctions in terms of their own well-being, the Revolutionary Guard, the top layers of the regime, they know how to circumvent the sanctions or to take advantage of sanctions of contraband

to make sure that their needs are met, the individual needs are met, or whatever other needs they have. And the top layer, the funding that they have, they'll always privilege and prioritize the money to help sustain their place in power, make sure that Hezbollah and other organizations get enough to project their power in the region. Ordinary citizens, ordinary Iranians, the ones who we say we're supporting, the ones are protesting in the streets are the ones who've been hurt massively by these sanctions. And that's just a reality.

And it could be, I mean, that seems to be Mark's view that, well, maybe it's sooner or later, they will rise up to such an extent that the regime will collapse. It may happen. We're still waiting in Cuba. We're still waiting in Venezuela. there are many cases where that theory of sanctions leading to an implosion of the regime hasn't succeeded. In fact, it's much more often the case that it doesn't succeed than that it does. And meanwhile, it's the ordinary people who are going to suffer and who are going to have to, you know, fight to get medicine,

fight to get the basic necessities of life. Okay, let's bring Mark on this. Because Mark, you've lived this file for the last decade. Respond to that kind of moral argument that there's a kind of a collectivization of, punishment here, that in imposing, especially this new regime of maximum pressure, you are punishing the innocent many for the crimes of the few. So I haven't only lived this file for 16 years, but I also lived in South Africa during apartheid when South Africa was under punishing sanctions. And most anti-partite activists, including Nelson Mandela, supported the sanctions against the Afrikaner regime

in South Africa because they realized that only that kind of economic pressure could potentially changed the risk-reward calculus of that brutal regime. And the sanctions were very effective, even though black South Africans disproportionately paid the price of that. A key fact that everybody needs to understand is that Iran today has $85 billion in foreign exchange reserves, much of that accessible sitting in escrow crowns around the world. Under U.S. law, they can use that money to pay for food and medicine. This Treasury Department has set up a humanitarian channel to facilitate banking relationships and banking transactions. And indeed, exports of pharmaceuticals from Europe to Iran have actually increased, not decreased,

since President Trump walked away from the Iran deal. So the fact of the matter is, as Rob acknowledged, I think he's right, the majority of hardships are due to the malfeasance of this regime. But the majority of hardships are also due to the fact that this regime is not spending those billions of dollars on food and medicine to support its people, but spending it on Bashar Assad and Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations and proxies on regional destruction and bloodshed. The fact of the matter is the Iranian people,

like Black South Africans in the 70 and 80s are not rallying around the flag. They're not rallying against the United States. They're, in fact, they're on the streets protesting in the thousands and tens of thousands, and indeed in the Middle East, in the millions, against this brutal regime, its repression, but also its corruption. And as anybody who knows who follows this, the regime is spending its money, stealing its money, and not spending its money on humanitarian relief for its people. So that $85 billion, Rob, is sitting in the government.

those accounts, you should be going out there and asking foreign ministers, Zarif, with whom you have a very close relationship. Why is not spending billion? That's a great point, Mark. Thanks for that. No, no, you should ask him, why is he not spending billions? That's okay. I meet with people, no, I meet with people. That's the ethos of our organizations. We speak and talk to everyone. You may not speak to some people you disagree with. I have a different view. Great credit to you for speaking to him. So that's why you should ask him. Well, but the point that I just said earlier that this is a regime that's going to look after itself first. So I'm not saying we can't count on them being generous to their own people. But for you to say that this has had no impact on the cell of food and medicine

and that the U.S. has been very generous in that regard, just read the Human Rights Watch report. Read other reports of people on the ground who say how the price of medicines have skyrocketed. So to say that this does not have an impact, again, is just not taking into account the facts that objective observers have reported now for quite some time. Rob, let's deal with the facts. First of all, of course, the Iranian people like black, South Africans are going to suffer disproportionately from the hardships of sanctions. I don't think you could compare the sanctions on South Africa with sanctions on Iran. They were sanctions. They're not of the same, of the same ilk. I think you know that better than I do. Well, as somebody who lived in South Africa at the time,

I could tell you, black South Africans suffered immensely under the maximum pressure campaign that the West imposed, rightly so on the brutal apartheid regime there. But let's also talk about facts. There's been an increase in the export of European pharmaceuticals to Iran, despite the derisking that's taking place from financial institutions. Do you know what the prices are? Nobody's before then. The Treasury Department as well has opened up a humanitarian channel. There's $85 billion, Rob, in foreign exchange reserves that Iran has sitting in bank accounts

around the world that they can use and they can subsidize all of those purchases of medicine and food. The reason the regime is not doing so is, as you know, this is a brutally corrupt regime that is stealing the money, and whatever food and medicine they're actually buying, they're putting in pharmacies and hospitals for the revolutionary elite or not for the people. There's no doubt sanctions have a significant impact on ordinary people. They always have. They always will. But the fact of the matter is that the only way we're going to change the risk-reward calculus of this brutal regime

is to put it to a fundamental choice between the survival of its regime or to make the kind of choices where it begins to moderate its behavior. Because you think their calculation is going to be when they see people on the street, my goodness, now we have to moderate our behavior. So if that's your theory of the case, I think it's, again, quite unrealistic because I'd like to see the precedence for that. And South Africa, you could mention, but that's been some time ago. I don't think of many other cases where regime under this kind of pressure decides that it's going to moderate for its own survival. To the contrary, they clamp down, they repressed because they believe that their existence is at stake.

That's not what you're going to do as a result of this. There's going to be more bloodshed on the street in Iran as the regime, if there's more protests, they will terror. I mean, it's a terrible thing, tragically, but they will repress their own people. The people will have fewer means of surviving. And we could sit here and say, well, that's for the better because 10 years from now, the regime would collapse. I just don't think that that's the right thing to do for the Iranian people. And I think particularly when we had, again, we had a very different reality two years ago that we could have built on to tear it up and to say, now we're going to roll the dice and see what happens when we put this regime under maximum pressure. So far what we've seen, as I say, is ramped up regional activity, ramped up nuclear activity,

ramped up repression at home. If that's a good track record for maximum pressure, then I fear what about. Well, let me give you an example of where you've seen at work is 2013. We're to the credit of Rob and the Obama administration. They put immense economic pressure on the regime. And the regime feared that the economic pressure, the fact they were down to their last $20 billion, they were four to six months away from a severe balance of payments crisis. And it was four years before where millions of North Tehranis were on the streets,

stealing death to the dictator, they came to the table in 2013 to negotiate a deal with Rob and the Obama administration in order to relieve that pressure. We have cut off every pathway for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. The reason we were able to unify the world community around the most effective sanctions regime we've ever set up, a sanction regime that crippled the Iranian economy and ultimately brought them to the table, was because the world agreed with us that it would be. a great danger to the region, to our allies, to the world, if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon. So, in fact, we have seen it work. Now, it's too bad that with all that leverage you had,

you ended up concluding a fatally flawed nuclear dealer that gave patient pathways to nuclear weapons and ICBMs. But I would contend that you actually had the right policy in place for four years, and if you had kept the pressure on and kept negotiating, you could have gotten rid of Iran's nuclear infrastructure, and you could have fundamentally changed this trajectory. That is what the Trump administration is attempting to do, and you're right. We'll have to see how that works out. Again, always better to deny resources to your enemy than to provide those resources in order to fund their malign and destructive activities. You're listening to the Monk Debates podcast. Be it resolved, Trump's sanction regime is the right response to Iran's regional ambitions. If you're enjoying

this debate, check out our website, monkdebates.com, for dozens of debates on the big issues of the day. Listen to Tony Blair and Christopher Hitchens debate whether religion is a for for good in the world. Watch freed Zakaria, Neil Ferguson, go head to head on the future of geopolitics. Read Stephen Fry and Jordan Peterson's debate on political correctness. All these debates, free to listen, watch, and read at monkdebates.com. I want to ask both of you as we move towards your closing statements. And it's about alternative futures and what each of you think could unfold over the next 12 to 18 to 24 months. And how that future coincides with your vision for the policy response, the right policy response

to the Iranian regime. So let's start with you, Robert. What does your alternative future to the one that we're in right now look like? How does this resolve itself in some way that's meaningful to the security and safety of the United States and the West and that could be meaningful to the region? You mean a preferable future, is what you're asking? Yes. Let's get Iran back into compliance with the deal.

Let's get Iran to agree to open negotiations on a whole host of issues, including the nuclear issues. And let's let the Trump administration go back to the situation that prevailed in January 2017 before it reimposed the sanctions. That, you know, how realistic it is, but it's something that at least Trump has agreed to in principle. The Iranians have agreed to in principle. There's questions of trust on both can one side or the other, trust each side trust the other to love up to its commitments. If we get there, I'd say that's far better than where we are now. It could lead to de-escalation in the region. It would obviously freeze, put Iran back into compliance with the nuclear deal, and it would remove the

sanctions that have been a cause of much of the recent tension. That's the alternative future. The truth is, President Trump doesn't want a war. He's made that clear. He wants a deal. He always wants deals. This is a deal that the French president has put on the table. It's not a bad one for either side, and I would hope that both would accept it, but again, I'm not holding my breath. Thank you, Robert. Let's go to you, Mark. What do you see unfolding over the next 12 to 18 months? And more importantly, what would you like to see in terms of your policy vision for the United States and for the region and America's European partners? So what I'd like to see is for the Democratic candidates, as well as President Trump, to acknowledge one fundamental reality, and is that there's no going back to the JCPOA.

There's no going back to a nuclear deal where the key restrictions are going to be expiring, starting the arms embargo next year, advanced centrifuges in 2023, and in the first term of a Democratic president, they'll be faced with most of the key restrictions coming off. So let's acknowledge we're not going back to the JCPOA, but let's acknowledge we've got to fix the deal. And I'm pleased to hear that Rob had this as his goal back in 2015. Well, let's do it now in 2019 and into 2021. Let's fix the fatally flawed nuclear deal by addressing some of the fundamental. problems of that deal. But let's make sure that we don't make the mistake of 2013. Let's maximize

the pressure. Let's keep the negotiating leverage. And the notion that somehow we're going to go back to January 2017 is fanciful because in January 2017, that would require us lifting all of the sanctions, the JCPOA sanctions and all of the new sanctions the Trump administration has put in place, giving this regime that is suffering an economic and political crisis tens of billions of dollars of money, that it can be used to support Bashar Assad, support terrorism, and sure its regional allies, as well as taking that money in order to harden the regime. That would be, in my mind, a very dangerous move, and I'm very skeptical that President Trump would agree to that.

So let's put all of the partisanship aside. Let's acknowledge that we've got to fix the agreement, and let's move forward as Democrats and Republicans, as indeed as Americans, along with our European allies, to ensure that the next deal that we signed, the comprehensive deal that Rob talked about earlier, addresses the full range of Iran's malign behavior and doesn't give them a patient pathways to an end state that ultimately results in a much more dangerous and destructive Iran. Thank you, Mark. Robert, I'm going to put a minute on the clock for your closing statement just to sum up any

of your final points that you'd like to make or respond to anything you've just heard from Mark. Well, I think this discussion obviously starts from, as I said, alternative. facts. But there's one fact that is inescapable, which is that we are in a worse position today than we were the day Donald Trump took office. And I'll just repeat this point, but it's the crucial one, the very justifications that the administration gave for ripping up the deal, for alienating our partners, for going back on its word, was that Iran would, as a result of those steps, moderate its regional behavior and come back to the table to negotiate a better nuclear deal.

we are further away from both those goals than we were a few years ago. And this was predicted and predicted by us and by many others who said, if your goal is to get a better deal, if your goal is to try to negotiate and to put things like the primary embargo on the table and to try to get Iran to change all of its regional behaviors, that's going to take a long time, but the best way to do it is to build on the trust that could be created by implementing the deal for several years and then telling the Iranians,

you want more from this than you have right now because you're still under the U.S. primary embargo. We want more from this because obviously see our issues about your policies that are of deep concern to us. So let's build on the success of the first deal to now negotiate another one, as often happens in arms controls deals. Rather than doing that, the administration threw it out on an ideological basis. And I think if you listen to Mark today, it's clear the goal is regime change through maximum pressure. That's the only argument that really holds water based on what he says. And that's a gamble that could risk many Iranian lives, many regional lives, and the security of the United States. So it seems to be the wrong gamble at a time when we had something solid on which we could build.

Okay, Marcus, same for you, a minute on the clock, and maybe you want to address that charge, that this is really ultimately not about bringing Iran back to the negotiating table under maximum pressure. It's about regime change. So there are millions of Iranians, Lebanese, Iraqis, that have been on the streets over recent. and weeks and months. Actually, in support of regime change, they want to get rid of this regime, and they're actually deeply fearful that President Trump, or the next Democratic president, could do a deal with this regime that essentially gives this regime hundreds of billions of dollars, reintegration back into the global economy, and keeps this brutal, repressive regime in power

that continues to murder and torture the Iranian people and lend support to Bashar Assad's slaughter in Syria and regional proxies around the Middle East and their bloody and destructive campaign. So yes, the end goal is to do to Iran, what Ronald Reagan did to the Soviet Union, because it is inevitable that this regime is going to end up on the ash heap of history. Its nuclear infrastructure is small today than it was before. It has been denied the tens of billions of dollars that it needs in order to fund its terrorist proxies and regional destruction. It is facing a significant political crisis with millions of Iranians, Lebanese, Iraqis on the streets, protesting against Iranian imperialism and the illegal occupation of this. their countries by the Islamic Republic. And so I think we actually are in a stronger negotiating position.

The net effect of this now is the Islamic Republic is in a much weaker position. Nobody in the Trump administration predicted that the Islamic Republic would moderate because they understood fundamentally that ideologically this regime cannot moderate. There is no ability to moderate. There are no moderates in this regime. The Iranian people understand that. And U.S. policymakers increasingly, I think, appreciate that. the way forward for Democrats and Republicans to come together, and while we're putting immense

pressure on this regime, negotiate these temporary arms control agreements that restrict Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapons program, but make it permanent, don't make it temporary, don't have sunset provisions that give Iran the patient pathways to the end state that it is angled for and that it has sought as its key objective. Thank you, Mark. And thank you, Robert. I want to say, having listened to this debate, both of you are hugely informed. You've been deeply involved in this conversation over Iran for the last number of years. And I think to both your credit, while having sharply divergent points of view, you're willing to engage with each other. You're willing to have this argument and to have this conversation really for all of our benefit. So on behalf of the Monk debate audience, I just want to thank you both for stepping in with your strong opinions, your strong views. and sharing with us some real wisdom on a really complicated issue. Thank you. Thanks. Appreciate it.

Thank you. And thank you, Rob, for everything you've done for our country. Thanks, Mark. Thank you for listening to the Monk Debates podcast, a place for civil and substantive debate on the big issues of the day. To listen to more debates on everything from climate change to religion to geopolitics to the future of human progress, visit our website, monkdebates.com. You can also find show notes on today's debate along with a full truropolitics. transcript. Thank you for helping us bring back the art of public debate one conversation at a time. I'm Rudyard Griffith. The Monk Debates are produced by Antica Productions and supported by the Monk Foundation. Rudyard Griffiths, Laura Aguirre, and Ricky Gerwitz are the producers.

The executive producer of Antica is Stuart Cox. Be sure to download and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. And if you like us, feel free to give us a five-star rating. Thanks again for listening.