The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it Resolved, Ukraine should be admitted to NATO

Episode Date: July 30, 2024

“We will continue to support Ukraine on its irreversible path to NATO membership”. It was this statement by NATO members at a recent summit in Washington that sent shockwaves through the foreign policy community and elicited strong reactions from both sides of this foreign policy debate. Those in favour argue that bringing Ukraine into NATO would solidify the West’s long-term commitment to Ukraine’s security, force Putin’s hand to end this war, and deter Russia from invading Ukraine in the future. Critics argue that admitting Ukraine to NATO would be a huge mistake. The US and its allies would be signalling a commitment to fight Russia should they invade Ukraine again which would lead to a showdown between the world’s two leading nuclear powers. And allowing Ukraine to join the alliance only at the conclusion of this war will motivate Putin continue the war indefinitely, the prospect from which Ukraine will never recover. Arguing in favour of the resolution is John Herbst, a former US ambassador to Ukraine and the Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Arguing against the resolution is Benjamin Friedman, the policy director at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank. SOURCES: Al Jazeera, New York Post   The host of this Munk Debates podcast episode is Rudyard Griffiths. Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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Our goal with each and every program of the Monk Debates is to arm you with enough information to make up your own mind. Today's debate, be it resolved. Ukraine should be admitted to NATO. Ukraine will become a member of NATO. Our purpose at the summit is to help build a bridge to that membership and to create a clear pathway for Ukraine. It was this statement by U.S. Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, at the recent NATO summit in Washington, that sent shockways through the foreign policy community and elicited strong reactions on both sides of this important foreign policy debate. Those in favor of Ukraine membership in NATO argue that it would solidify the way.

West long-term commitment to European security and Ukraine's security and forced Putin's hand to end this war. Also, it is vital to deterring Russia from continuing to invade other parts of Ukraine and possibly other parts of Eastern Europe. Critics argue that admitting Ukraine into NATO would be a huge mistake that the U.S. and its allies may be signaling a commitment to fight Russia to the bitter end, and elicit in turn, a strong and persistent Russian response that will take the form of armed conflict and armed opposition to NATO's expansion into Ukraine. Here's leading realist scholar and NATO expansion critic John Mearsheimer. The real issue here is that from a Russian point of view, there's nothing more important

than making sure that Ukraine is not in NATO. So the more we promised to bring Ukraine into NATO, the greater the incentive for the Russians to wreck Ukraine as a functioning country. On this installment of the Monk debates, we'll challenge the essence of these arguments by debating the motion, be it resolved, Ukraine should be admitted to NATO. Arguing in favor of the resolution is John Kervost. John is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and currently serves as the senior director. of the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center.

Arguing against the motion is Benjamin Friedman. He is the policy director at Defense Policies, a foreign policy think tank. John, Benjamin, welcome to the Monk debates. Thank you. I'm delighted to be here. Thanks for having me on. Important debate today, be it resolved, Ukraine should be admitted to NATO. John, you're arguing in favor of the motion,

so we're going to put two minutes on our proverbial debate. the clock and turn the program over to you. Okay, look, we are nearly 80 years into a period that is unique for its prosperity and peace in history. The principal reason for this has been the wise use of American power and influence in creating with partners an array of alliances and institutions that have contained and deterred hostile actors. The key alliance has been NATO, which played an essential role in containing peacefully the Soviet Union until its implosion. American power's been used less wisely after that. When a reaction to 9-11, we not only went after al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which we had to, but began an effort in utopian nation building. Among other things,

that distracted us from paying attention to the hostile intentions of two large powers, China and Russia. The greater long-term threat to the United States and the free world is China, but the greatest short-term threat is Russia, because it has nukes, it's our only pure nuclear power, and it has now conducted two aggressive wars in Europe, first Georgia and now Ukraine. But both wars, were a natural result of the frozen state, frozen conflict policies, then Moscow began the very day the Soviet Union fell apart. And 15 separate nations emerged. All this was done without Western opposition or attention, which is why it has metastasized into a global crisis. Moscow's war in Ukraine is a part of the long-term Russian effort to restore its control over the

lands that were under its control in both Soviet and Tsarist times. A point clearly made in the draft treaty, Putin sent to NATO, in December of 2021. before the big invasion, and in numerous Putin statements about following the example of Ivan the Third and Peter the Great in quote-unquote collecting Russian lands. When Putin attacked Georgia and then Ukraine, there was no prospect of either joining NATO. Only a propaganda meme from the Kremlin says there was. Supported closely by China, Iran, and North Korea, Moscow's conducting a merciless war in Ukraine. Philip Zellico points out that cooperation among these four hostile actors is greater than that amongst the access powers before the start of World War II.

The defeat of Russia and Ukraine is essential to peace and stability, not just in Europe, but globally. To achieve that, first we must give Ukraine all the arms and economic support to drive Russian forces out of much of Ukraine, make Russian control of Crimea very difficult, and ensure no future Russia and Ukraine by making it a NATO member. I think I'm under two minutes. Thank you so much, John, for that succinct and exactly to time opening statement. Ben, your opportunity now, you're arguing against our motion today, be it resolved, Ukraine should be admitted to NATO. Advocates of putting Ukraine and NATO want to threaten a war for Ukraine, which might escalate to a nuclear exchange and mass destruction. That's what NATO and its Article 5 commitment to common defense means in a political sense.

And for that, extraordinary risk and sacrifice of its own security, the United States and other NATO states would receive virtually nothing of security value by putting Ukraine in the election. alliance. Even if you doviously assume that the threat would work to protect Ukraine, that would have no real benefit for Americans whose security is essentially unaffected by Ukraine, whatever spiritual, moral attachment we might have to its cause. People tell us Ukraine's security is essentially our own, usually with some argument about punishing aggression and not allowing violations of sovereignty to go unpunished. But that's not really how international relations work. That is, via examples in different times and places. China doesn't see Russian Ukraine as a model for Taiwan. But even if Russia's war was a model, it's really just shown how aggression does not pay,

having been bludgeoned and bogged down. Russia has shown in Ukraine the peril of violating sovereign borders, not the benefit. And putting in Ukraine and NATO would not affect that. So if we're fighting for the norm of sovereignty, we've basically won already. The other big reason people want Ukraine and NATO is because they don't actually care about U.S. interests. They just think we have some moral obligation to do what Ukraine wants. It's virtually any problem. And I think this is basically a deranged way to think about U.S. foreign policy. But if you do think that way, the benefit of putting Ukraine to NATO is very doubtful. In fact, on balance, it's likely to harm Ukraine.

There's two reasons for that. One, the open door to NATO, the unofficial promises of NATO membership were a major cause of the invasion. That's evidenced by lots of evidence, not just Russian propaganda, as we just heard. And putting Ukraine in NATO were saying we will, would preserve a flower. point that will make Russia more likely to attack Ukraine. If the idea is to put Ukraine in after the war ends, you've just created a clear incentive for Russia to keep the war going. The West has for two years been demonstrating, if not for longer, that it will not go to war for Ukraine due to the risks and lack of interest I just discussed. So the threat of going to war

for Ukraine through NATO or any other security guarantee will never be credible, not believable. It's not a good deterrent. And a treaty commitment does. doesn't change that. People used to think hard about credibility. Now they just assume it with the stroke of a pen, but you can't. That means the promise NATO offers Ukraine would be a false one. It would continue the long-running de facto U.S. policy of giving Ukraine false hope that it can escape its geography and neighbor through outside support. This affects Ukraine's decision-making and I think does it a fundamental disservice. Thank you, Benjamin. Okay, an opportunity for rebuttals now, your chance to react to what you've both heard from each other. John, you're up first,

another two minutes on the clock for your comments on Ben's opening statement. American interests are directly involved in Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, because Putin's objective, as I mentioned, as he's demonstrated by actions and by words, is to go well beyond Ukraine if he wins there. So Ukraine is a large country fighting valiantly and with a great deal of success against Russian aggression. It's much easier for us to send weapons to Ukraine to stop Putin there than to have to defend Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania. Various small countries could be easily overrun by Russian troops. That's the first point. The second point, I mentioned since the end of World War II, we've been in a unique historical period of peace because there's been no great power

wars, and that's been because of American strength. And never before this crisis, the crisis provoked by Moscow's heavy invasion of Ukraine, did you have an American administration which publicly spoke about unwilling to do certain things because it might need to nuclear escalation? That's a very weak policy, and it's inconsistent with the policies that we pursued during the Berlin crisis in 61, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 62. And that flawed policy is echoed by Mr. Friedman right here. Point to fact, we have as much ability to deter Russia as Russia has to deter us we choose to use it. And we've seen multiple times Moscow threaten nuclear, possible nuclear use. For example, if Finland and Sweden were to join NATO. For example, if American or NATO weapons

were used to strike Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine, which they consider to be part of Russia. And yet, we've seen these things happen and no nuclear use. Putin does not want to use nukes because it's as dangerous to him as it is to us. And Ukraine is not so vital. This war in Ukraine is not so vital to Russia because, well, as we saw at the beginning, Putin's Siloviki pals, who he addressed in that video just before the invasion, were horrified by what he was saying. Same when his defense minister and General Gerasim spoke with him a few days after it began and said, and he talked about raising the nuclear alert. They were not happy campers. And if You paid attention to right after the Russian big invasion began, you had many, many national

security analysts, oligarchs writing against it, and you had hundreds of thousands of people in Russia demonstrating. This is Putin's war, and for him to go nuclear because he's losing in Ukraine is not impossible, but highly dubious. And to have senior American officials fretting about that in public is a signal of weakness picked up by analysts who are, you might say, ideologically inclined not to defend American interests overseas. Thank you, John. Okay, Ben, you're up. A similar opportunity, a couple of minutes here to react to John's opening statement or what you've just heard now. To begin with invoking the virtue of NATO during the Cold War is irrelevant to the question of whether or not we should expand it, especially to Ukraine.

There's a sort of idea that these commitments to expand NATO are free. And during the Cold War, people thought really hard about how to make these commitments, even to far more important countries in a geopolitical sense like Germany credible. Tom Schelling's book, Arms and Influences, about the difficulty of threatening what could be suicide in a age of mutually assured destruction. We think of the weapons on behalf of allies. And now we just hear, as we just did, this sort of just blithe assumption that our credibility extends easily. And I think it's false.

And I think, I mean, you know, to invoke the behavior during the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis is really perverse. In the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was very careful to avoid nuclear war. We were terrified of nuclear war, and it turned out Khrushchev was, too. So we pulled our missiles out of Turkey in a secret deal to end the Cuban missile crisis during the Kennedy administration. So that's not a good example for, you got nothing to worry about with nuclear weapons. It's far from it. It's the opposite. I don't think it's likely that Russia will use nuclear weapons over Ukraine. I agree. But what we're talking about in the event of NATO extending security guarantees to NATO and threatening war on its behalf is a threat of war, which could go nuclear.

And that is Armageddon, like end of civilization risks. And when you look at risks that are that profound and large, I think you want to give them a wide berth. You don't want to say, ah, they probably won't do it. So we're fine. We're talking about that cataclysmic risk. And it's been the fact, whatever Ambassador Hirsch, John and others want, U.S. policy to be. The fact is that U.S. presidents, including Biden and whoever the next president is, have behaved in a way that says we're not going to risk nuclear war for Ukraine. We're going to be

very careful about that. We're not going to give them security guarantees. And even if we do, I'll bet a lot of money, they're going to be phony, false ones. We're not actually going to go to war for Ukraine when the penny drops, right? So that means that we can't, in a meaningful sense, extends security guarantees to Ukraine, not credible ones. So I think we're really talking about the virtues of fake, phony promises to Ukraine to defend them. And for my money, that has been a bad thing for Ukraine. I think that we have walked them down a path towards destruction by promising them things and putting, painting a target on them and manipulating their politics unintentionally so that they're more risk-acceptant that they would otherwise be because they think there's

great powers behind them. There's a kind of moral hazard. So I think, think, you know, the moral high ground that people on John's side claim is not theirs. I don't think, I think whatever their intentions and love of Ukraine, they have not been its friend in their policies of wanting to extend security guarantees to Ukraine would be bad for it, not helpful. Thank you, Ben. Let me now join the conversation with some questions that are on the minds of our audience tuning into this debate.

And John, let's come to you first on Ben's point there about these. security guarantees. Everyone's familiar with Article 5, an attack on one is an attack on all. How do you see that actually happening in the case of Ukraine that conceivably in the years to come is inducted into NATO, is made a full member? Is it a policy that will simply rely on the deterrence of NATO to prevent any Soviet attack of any sort on Ukraine? Is that a reality? Is that a realistic expectation given the historical and geographic and security importance of Ukraine to Russia. This is, John, you would concede a different type of geography, at least for Russia. There's a greater intensity around this piece of real estate for whatever Russian regime

is in power in Moscow. It is true that there have been close and very complicated relations between Russia and Ukraine historically, but it's largely been a case of Russian repression of Ukraine, which is why for many, many decades, use of Ukrainian language was banned in Tsarist Russia, just as one example. But coming back to Ben's major point, you know, the very concerns he raised about nuclear holocaust vis-à-v Ukraine were discussed about. Berlin and Paris when I was a kid in the mid-60s. I can remember reading about this. Are we willing to risk New York for Paris? Our precisely, our willingness after close consideration, Ben's right,

when you talk about possible nuclear war, you have to be very, very sober. Our calculation was to protect our interests in Europe, vital interest in Europe, we needed to be willing to tell the Russians nuclear war was on the table. And that, as it turned out, worked very well. We're not doing quite the same now with Ukraine. Now, why is that? Is it because Ukraine is peripheral to American interests? You know, if it was clear, that Putin's goal was Ukraine and nothing more, that would be awful for Ukrainians, but it would not necessarily directly affect the United States.

But Putin's interests are not limited to Ukraine. You know, the Russians have been conducting clear hyper-warfare against the Baltic states, certainly since their cyber attack on Tallinn in 2007, if not before. Putin's own statements call into question what they may do vis-a-vis the Baltic states after winning in Ukraine. And of course, if they were to win in Ukraine, they would have Ukrainian resources, manpower, scientific power, etc., on their side for any future confrontation with the United States and the West and with NATO. And if he wins in Ukraine, you can be sure he'll be testing NATO in the way that Ben says he'll be testing NATO if Ukraine joins. much smarter for us to have Ukraine on our side in that confrontation. Putin calls us the U.S. its principal adversary, just as China does.

We need to stop Putin and Ukraine. That's the smart play. And as for the dangers, again, of bringing Ukraine into NATO, Ukraine is a place of conflict because it's a gray zone. Bring it into NATO, it's no longer a gray zone. Hey, Monk, listeners, you can now vote on who you think won this debate and all our other podcast debates by Facebook. becoming a free monk member. Do this right now by going to triple w monk debates.com and punching in

your email. You get a say on all the big debates that we're covering at the monk debates from the war in Gaza to whether TikTok should be banned to the benefits of DEI in the workplace. Again, go to monkdebates.com and register your email now to get voting on these important debates. So Ben, let's come to you and build on what John just said, because again, I think audience members are probably thinking about these arguments about the risks that Russia under Putin or even if some future leader is an expansionist power. It is motivated by grievance, by history, to reclaim some or all of the lost territories of the Soviet Union. In that case, why isn't it wise, smart, prudent to draw a clear, bright red line in Ukraine by inducting them into NATO and making it clear to Russia once and for all

that these territories are off limits forever. Okay, so let's assume for a moment that it's true that Russia wants to reimpose its Soviet empire or something along those lines. I don't think it is. Let's assume for a moment it's true. The reason we shouldn't put Ukraine in NATO even then is because Ukraine contrary, what we just heard is not at all like Germany or France. Those countries, particularly Germany, were the heart of European industry in the first half of the 20th century, massively important to the global economy. Ukraine is not irrelevant. It's a good-sized country. There's a lot of people there, but it's not like Russia could take over Ukraine and then sort of harness its vibrant industry

to its war machine. There's just not enough material there for it to matter much. Ukraine's not a rich country. And by the way, I think that we're Russia, and also putting Ukraine and NATO isn't necessarily going to stop Russia from taking it over. But putting Ukraine and NATO is going to be a burden to Russia, not a, sorry, putting, if Russia took over Ukraine, that's going to be a burden to Russia, not a benefit. There's going to be all sorts of resistance. It's going to be a massive cost to them, somewhat like having an actual fighting war like they're having. You know, it's not just going to be as if, you know, there's de facto control of Ukraine and everybody in Ukraine kind of gives up on its nationalistic, on their nationalistic ideas of having their own country and

put down their guns and show up for work with a salute to Putin. No, it's going to be a huge burden. So the point is that even in this dream world where, you know, Russia is on the sort of Napoleonic or Hitler-like quest for control of Europe and has the capability to do it, which they fundamentally don't, even then, it's a bad place to draw a red line. How are you going to defend? those borders all around Ukraine. You know, I mean, John's position at least should be that we need to send hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops into Ukraine in the event of peace to secure it, not just make fanciful nuclear threats that are hard to believe, given our behavior.

It's, you know, Ukraine obviously is doing a pretty good job defending its territory, but if you just look at its geography, it would be a huge burden on the NATO alliance to try to take its defense seriously. So I don't think that it makes sense even under that scenario to defend Ukraine. And I'll just say Russia has shown that it does not have the capability to get across the Nepper River in a major way. They got knocked on their butt at the beginning of the war. They're a second-rate power.

They have an economy the size of the Iberian Peninsula. They've done a pretty good job getting their act together, unfortunately, over the last two years militarily. But there's still not a real threat to Poland, let alone Germany. let alone all these other places in Europe that we're supposed to spend a lot of money to defend. So that's a kind of gross threat inflation. And I think that putting Ukraine and NATO has got really nothing to do with that. It's not going to make Russia's capabilities shrink.

It's just a way to kind of sting them like a lasp and see what they do. So, John, let's hear just a little bit more for you on this idea of the bigger threat that Russia represents to the West and Europe, in particular and why it's important to bring Ukraine into NATO in order to once and for all deter any kind of Western advancement predations of Russia on other NATO powers like the Baltic region. Ben makes a series of points here, but the relative small size of the Russian economy, vis-a-vis the European and American economy, the extent to which the Russian military has not perform well in this conflict. The extent to which Putin himself seems to be looking right now for some kind of peace deal to end this war, doesn't this all suggest, John, that, you know, the risk here

to the larger West is somewhat already contained and curtailed in this moment? The short answer is no. And Ben's argument is highly optimistic about how we could, how we could how well we could do abandoning Ukraine to Putin. First, it's a little bit peculiar for analysts sitting safely in the United States to draw conclusions opposite the statesmen of, for example, Finland and Sweden. Two long neutral countries, decades, centuries neutral, who decided once Putin went into Ukraine, they needed to join NATO. Just like those peculiar analysts who claim that there's no relationship between Taiwan and Ukraine,

and the United States must focus only on the China threat. And that analyst was contradicted by the leaders of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan who say it's absolutely essential if you wanted to deter Xi in Taiwan to defeat Putin in Ukraine. So statesmen whose countries, lives and futures are on the line are drawing conclusions about the dire dangers of Putin's aggression in Ukraine. So again, it's, I think, kind of presumptuous for analysts to come to other conclusions. But let's talk about the specific dangers.

It's true. I agree with Ben, that the importance of Ukraine to the United States today is not comparable to the importance of Germany to the United States when we established NATO and then when we brought Germany in. Fine. That doesn't mean that Ukraine is not important. And let's, again, go over the reasons why it is important. If Putin wins in Ukraine, he will find ways to move beyond Ukraine, maybe not to say.

succeed, but we will have a far greater problem. We'll have to spend far more money. We may need to use American lives to stop Putin. He could easily move into any of the Baltic states. They are tiny, they are flat, and he has enough troops in that part of Russia to move there. And he's been playing games with those countries via Belarus for the last year. And Ukraine, of course, is not a major industrial power. But their army is sure damn good, as I think Ben would agree, as we've seen them fight off the Russians. And not just their army. Their technological innovation has been one of the major and surprising features of this war. Their drone technology, they've driven the Black Sea fleet out of Sevastopol, out of Crimea.

They're using drones in an extraordinary way. You want to add that capacity to Moscow's war machine, especially as it sets its sights on Estonia or Latvia, Lithuania? No, you don't. This is the smart place to defeat Putin by arming and resourcing Ukraine properly, which we are not doing and then secure they all with NATO membership. Thank you, John. Ben, to expand this a little bit, do you concede or would you acknowledge that what happens in Ukraine vis-a-vis NATO and the West will matter to not just the people of Ukraine and this particular conflict, but this larger conflict between the West and China

as the peer global competitor. Why isn't it right to think about this conflict in broader strokes and that by sending a clear message of deterrence and solidarity by bringing Ukraine into NATO, we're also sending a message to China about our resolve, our resolve to stand up for the international rule of law, for the sovereignty of states and nations, the sanctity of borders, can and should we,

Ben, be looking at this debate on a bigger canvas? Yes. Okay. I'll answer that in a second. I just want to say, first of all, the reason Finland and Sweden signed up for NATO is they, you know, they changed their minds and decided they'd like free security from the United States and sneakily-rored in the West. That's not the same thing as having a totally different view about the Russian threat. Finland has 25,000 active forces. They have a big reserve, but they have 25,000 active forces. I think if they were really scared of Russia, the way John says they are, they would be changing that rapidly. So I don't think that's super relevant. And then with some of his other arguments, he's basically arguing about what he's conflating putting Ukraine in NATO with not abandoning Ukraine. And I don't believe I argued for abandoning Ukraine. I argued that we can't extend security guarantees credibly to NATO. And I don't think it's good for U.S. interests. That doesn't mean I want to abandon them. I wrote a whole paper about how we should continue to give them weapons and money, you know, under certain conditions, certain war strategies.

So I'm not, it's not fair to say I'm arguing in favor of abandoning them. On the broader canvas and the lessons we might take, I'll just sort of repeat or expand upon what I said in my opening remarks. The risk of sounding overly academic, there's good international relations theory on credibility of threats. That's what we're talking about here. And how countries like China evaluate U.S. threats, even strategically impuous ones like the U.S. threat to go to war with China on behalf of Taiwan. And if you look at books like calculating credibility

by Daryl Press or Professor Jonathan Mercer's work, they largely conclude, I mean, there's some debate about this in academia, but they largely conclude that what matters is your interest and your capability to act, not what, and they get to this conclusion through case studies, including Cuban missile crisis, Berlin crisis, lots of stuff. What matters is your interest and capability. And And so if China is looking at whether or not the United States will sit on its hands during a war in Taiwan, it's attack on Taiwan. I think that they'll be looking at whether the United States has a big enough interest to take that risk. Both sides will be risking nuclear war. And what capability the U.S. has to stop them.

But I think, you know, some mix of those things has probably been important to preventing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan here to form. So that's, I think, that's kind of the bottom line, the 101 International Relations 101, and there's credibility. Threats, credibility doesn't kind of ricochet around the world from time and place. Like, you know, Obama didn't stand up for the red line in Syria, so Putin went into Crimea. There's no evidence for that. That's, I think, a complete misapplication of logic and evidence. Now, as I said, if there were to be a lesson to be taken from Russia, if everybody's standing

around with their notebooks and saying, what can we learn about ourselves in our own situation? I'm pretty sure the lesson would be, geez, the normal sovereignty is a bad thing to violate. The Russians have shown why wars like this are so rare. They suffer great losses. They were broadly sanctioned. Yes, they've recovered to a significant extent from sanctions. They rebuilt their army to a significant extent. But I intend that no one around the world would look at what Russia did in Ukraine and say.

there's an example to emulate. And whether or not we put Ukraine and NATO, I think, is basically irrelevant to that. That fact stands. And, you know, it might change if Russia sort of has a smashing success in the near future, although not much. But even then, that's basically irrelevant to whether or not Ukraine goes to NATO. So that's how I think were there to be big examples and lessons to be learned, the lessons would play out. Thanks, ma'am. To come back to you, John, with this question the other way around, does including Ukraine and NATO establish a precedent that would then require the United States and NATO powers to extend similar explicit security guarantees to a country like Taiwan that faces arguably just the same threat that Ukraine faced prior to.

invasion by Russia and is existing right now in the same way that Ukraine was before the invasion of Russia without an explicit security guarantee for its sovereignty and its territorial integrity. In other words, John, can we just look at this whole debate in the context of Ukraine or are we setting precedents here that are going to demand our engagement? Some might say our entanglement with other bigger, thornier geopolitical issues? Okay, first, I want to say I never conflated Ben's position on NATO with his view on arming Ukraine. And I commend him with the fact he's been arguing publicly to arm Ukraine and resource Ukraine properly to give Putin a hard time. So that's great.

But it's also true that the timidity of the Biden administration that we've seen on NATO is of a peace with its timidity on army Ukraine properly. And in both cases, it's because it's been intimidated by Putin's nuclear bluff. And that's important and that's problematic. And it's one more reason, not the only reason, why China has been ramping up its efforts to become a pure nuclear power with the United States, because it sees how we've been intimidated. And again, so that's a very dangerous thing for our future, not just vis-a-vis Russia, but also vis-a-vis hostile China. Now, coming to your question, Roger, look, we need to bring Ukraine to NATO for reasons I've already stated to pull it out of the gray zone after Ukraine defeats Russia on the battlefield, which we need to do more to make it happen, and to secure not just Ukraine but Europe.

That might have a presidential value with a C presidential for Taiwan, but not necessarily. as you know, we have never made a commitment to defend Taiwan by force, although President Biden on several occasions has basically said we intend to do that. It's certainly critical for us to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan because that means that China has the ability to run rampant in its sphere, problems that's creating for the Philippines, for Vietnam, etc. So the smart play there, too, is also to make. make sure that that does not happen. An important way to do that without violence is to defeat Putin and

Russia, excuse me, in Ukraine, and to demonstrate strength also in the Western Pacific. And these things are related. But again, it does not necessarily mean when you have to extend our security guarantees to Taiwan or bring, well, I'll leave it at this, we're not talking about NATO for the West Pacific. Thanks for that, John. As we move towards the final moments of this debate, Ben, I want to give you an opportunity to circle back and talk to us a little bit more, because I think this is a key issue for many people, about what you see is the bigger existential risk here, that we are managing for one set of outcomes, which maybe you would agree, are legitimate, less conflict in Europe, a Russia that is contained and constrained. But Ben, you believe that at the same time in doing that,

maybe, again, sensible legitimate policy is we're courting something bigger, a bigger threat, a bigger risk that obviates our current policy. And maybe, Ben, a sense that our current policy doesn't fully internalize these bigger risks of how Russia could ultimately react to a Ukraine inside NATO. Yeah. I mean, look, as I said, I think that chances are Russia is bluffing on most of its nuclear threats, certainly threats that it makes internal to Ukraine. I mean, yeah, they said this is our territory, these oblasts, these areas of Ukraine. And that's sort of an attempt to, you know, among other things, to kind of build the credibility they have when they say, you know, we're never going to give up this land.

And indeed, we might have been used news to defend it. But I don't think that that's entirely believable in the same way that I don't think it was really believable. The United States, for example, would have gone to nuclear war over Cuba or we would go to, you know, risk a nuclear war over the Monroe doctrine. It's a sort of penumbra of claimed interests, but not, you know, that vital. But that said, you know, I think that the Biden administration is right to be cautious about this. And I think, you know, what's more important, even with talking about weapons and U.S. aid to Ukraine, is that I think there's just very limited upside to, you know, the sort of extended aid that people are in favor of. You know, you're running some risk of greater escalation. It doesn't have to be new.

You know, Russians, there's talk about Russians, the Houthis in Yemen to get back at us for strikes they see. And as attacks, well, strikes on their territory that came from Ukraine and Crimea and so forth, territory that. hold. So, you know, there are other forms of escalation other than nuclear weapons. So, you know, I think the Biden administration has been right to give that threat a wide birth. And the benefit of, you know, for example, striking into Russia, going after supply depots and giving them F-16s to bomb deep inside Russia is very limited, I think, militarily. We've seen in the war there are these tremendous defensive advantages. Modern technology is granting, which is good for us. You know, we're in favor of the territorial status quo in Europe.

And this is an example of how warfare aids defense these days, the technology, the politics. So I think neither side is likely to have a big breakthrough. Russia is more likely at this point to have a big breakthrough. But just giving a bunch of more longer range weapons to Ukraine isn't going to make a big difference. What they really need is more men. And maybe they can generate that through more description. That's sort of a decision for them. But I think that's their fundamental problem that has bothered them down, not some high-tech wizardry that the West has withheld from them while giving them extraordinary amounts of aid.

Let's go to closing statements with this excellent debate, be it resolved, Ukraine should join NATO. Ben, you've been arguing against the motion. What are the key thoughts, ideas, concepts that you want to leave our audience with as we wrap up today's debate? One is, I'm going to paraphrase the late great columnist, Walter Lippmann, and said something once like, I'm happy to be called an isolationist compared to people who think they know how to run the world. And, you know, I'm not an isolationist. I'm for free trade. I'm not for exiting diplomatic relations or not engaging.

I think it's funny to think that if you don't want to have, you know, threaten nuclear war on behalf of a certain amount of countries, you're an isolationist. you know, if you're, let's say you're for 29 countries in NATO that you'd threaten nuclear war on behalf of instead of 32. Somehow you're in isolationist. So I don't think that's a good word to throw around. Even if we're talking about Trump, by the way, who I'm not a big fan of, but, you know, he's no isolationist on Iran, sadly. He's not an isolationist on China. He, last I checked, wanted to send U.S. troops into Mexico to go after drug cartels and so did Vance. So, you know, I don't think there's a lot of, whatever that movement is, I don't think that isolation is a good word for it.

Another point, whoever is present, I hope they're more worried about nuclear weapons and escalation than John is. I respect his experience, but I think that we need presidents who are intimidated by nuclear weapons. That's common sense. That's normal diplomatic behavior. If you're not intimidated by nuclear weapons and Russia's got a lot of them, There's something really wrong with you in the way you're thinking. So my overall point is that U.S. leaders have been terribly irresponsible for decades now with Ukraine by pretending our interests and their interests are the same. I think this is a kind of fraud that tries to escape through rhetoric, the clear evidence that U.S. interests are, in fact, at odds with the idea of defending Ukraine.

And that would still be the case team if we put them in NATO. And that's because of the nuclear revolution. And this point that U.S. interests and Ukrainian interests are different, and that thus we shouldn't threaten to defend them or promise to defend them, I think it's kind of overwhelming common sense. So I want to focus in the end here on the wheel argument for putting Ukraine and NATO, which is just that we kind of owe it to Ukraine because they fought bravely and suffered. So the first thing I'll say about that is I don't think we owe it to anyone, any country, zero countries, not even Canada, to sacrifice our interests. and risk our own security on their behalf. We should do things like that. Take those sort of risks when there's something important

in it for us and our own security. And one of the reasons for that is if you make commitments where you don't have a big interest, or you send troops to fight a war where you have no real interest, which we've done plenty of, you find that either your threat, if you didn't send troops, it's not very credible and it's not easy to believe,

or if you send in troops that you don't have the real public support, can't tolerate any casualties, and your sort of mouth has gotten you too far, and you're not going to be committed to your cause. So I think it's important in international relations to keep sort of interest and commitments along the mind. And we've gotten out of whack in the United States for a long time, and extending NATO to Ukraine would be even much further out of whack for interests and commitments. Advocates of expanding NATO, have sort of relentlessly asserted that they are morally superior to people on my side and, you know, denounce

their intellectual opponents as Putinists, traitors, and the like. But it's the policies of expanding NATO. And we didn't debate the causes of the war. But I think it's more or less irrefutable that it was at least an important, not the cause, but at least an important cause, was the prospect of NATO, not necessarily membership, but NATO forces in Ukraine, that that drove the Russians berserk, as George Kennan long ago said it would. And it helps make the Russians anger enough to invade Ukraine.

That doesn't make it our fault if they did it. The Russians are guilty and they deserve to be blamed for it. It makes us reckless and irresponsible. And I think the policy of saying will defend Ukraine via NATO or some other kind of security guarantees would extend that recklessness. And I think it's bad for Ukrainians, not only because it preserves the cause of the war. And as John says, advocates, if you say you're going to do it after the war, the war, then the Russians have a big reason to just keep the war going as long as they can.

But not only that, but I think it kind of corrupts Ukrainian politics because we're lying to them about what we're going to do for them in a way. And of course, they realize that to some extent. But, you know, they're in the middle of war. I think they're naturally hopeful that, you know, the U.S. big brother is going to come bail them out of trouble eventually. And so they don't have to make these terrible consequences. And I think it's unfortunately the case.

before the where I said this, and I say it now, that their geography and the lack of U.S. interests or NATO interests there means that they're going to have to make these terrible consequences. They are not getting all their land back, period. Doesn't matter if they join NATO. It doesn't matter if the United States gives them our whole arsenal of arms. And we do them a grave disservice, I think, of pretending they will. And I think we do them a grave disservice of pretending we're to defend them when our interests clearly don't line up with that. and that I think has had a bad effect on them. Thank you, Ben, for those closing remarks.

Okay, John, as the proponent of today's debate resolution, be it resolved, Ukraine should join NATO. We're going to give you the last word in today's debate. Ben, I don't consider you an isolationist. Let's be clear about that. But I am concerned when we talk about our policy towards Ukraine and Russia that you said that it would not be, you want to have statesmen. who are intimidated by the use of nuclear weapons. No, that's wrong. And in fact, if people understand that our leaders are intimidated by the possibility of nuclear war,

our enemies will be relentless in pushing that against us. That's a sign of weakness. And again, you know, back early in your comments, you said that the Cuban missile crisis does not apply, but then the Cuban missile crisis, we confronted the Soviets at sea in ways we've done nothing comparable in our aid to Ukraine. And not Kennedy and Dean Rusk, who was on the Secretary of State, did not say, well, we can't do X or Y or Z because Moscow may go nuclear. And that's what this administration has done at cost to our leadership and it costs to our interests.

So you want leaders who are very wary, very concerned when they're in a confrontation with nuclear state, but not to the point where they're actually intimidated and that affects their judgment. That's a very bad look and very dangerous for American security. And again, the Chinese are noticing this, and there have been numerous articles about how they are ramping up their nuclear arsenal, in part because they see that we can be intimidated. Very bad look. Okay. The argument, the argument for Ukraine joining NATO, it's this. Moscow's intentions go beyond Ukraine.

You're right, Ben, that they've taken a lot of damage for this invasion. But if they wind up winning this war because the United States says, uh-oh, Putin may go nuclear, we there have to stop army Ukraine properly. he can then not just consolidate in Ukraine, but use the same number type of tactics to take a militarily much easier country, again, like one of the Baltic states. And that's something we have to be very much aware of. And that's why this is the same way, the easier way, the less American blood, less American treasure way to deal with the Kremlin threat and with it help deter China.

That's the argument. And the way you seal it, the way you seal security in Europe is by then bringing Ukraine into NATO. Yes, doing it is not so simple, which is why I was part of a group that sent a memo to the president in the fall of 23, arguing using the Washington summit not to invite Ukraine to join NATO, but to invite it to begin a session talks as an interim step to demonstrate it's serious. But again, Russia did not go into Ukraine because they thought NATO were going to put troops into Ukraine. That was not going to happen. You know that France and Germany would have been very much against that. And the famous 2008 NATO summit, which said Ukraine and Georgia would

become members, that was the consolation prize because they refused to give either of those countries a map, a membership action plan. So everyone knew NATO membership was not in the cards. And perhaps because of that, that was one of the additional reasons why Putin invaded Georgia in 2008. And of course, why he went after Ukraine in 2014. Having Ukraine in a gray zone invites instability invites aggression. We need to pull them out of the gray zones first by, again, army Ukraine properly so that it puts Russian forces in Ukraine at risk, makes Crimea a very difficult area to control, and imposes a serious political cost on Putin for his war in Ukraine. That is eminently doable, and then again, let's finish the job by bringing Ukraine into NATO.

Our aid to Ukraine represents 4% of our defense budget, that with the aid coming from other Western partners have led to a destruction of roughly 50% of Moscow's conventional military capability. They will be able to recoup that, especially helped by their pals in Pyongyang and Tehran and in Beijing. But let's keep this up until Putin has to cry uncle in Ukraine. Thank you. Thank you, John. And thank you, Benjamin, for a terrific, far-ranging debate. We did today what exactly I hope we would cover the big issues and the big ideas.

you've done it with civility and substance. And on behalf of the Monk Debates community, I thank you for your time today. Thank you. And thank you, Ben. Thanks. Thank you both. Well, that wraps up today's debate.

I want to thank our participants, John and Benjamin. You've certainly given us a lot to think about. As a reminder, you can go and vote on who you think won this debate. Do that right now on our website, www.w monkdebates.com. Look for our Monk Debate on NATO and Ukraine and cast your vote for who won today's debate. If your feedback or reflections on what you've just heard, please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates.com. Thank you for helping bring back the art

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