The Munk Debates Podcast - Be it resolved: Withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan is a tactical and strategic blunder the US will come to regret

Episode Date: July 20, 2021

Twenty years and counting. 800 billion dollars spent. Over 2,000 US service members killed. America, Canada and NATO's longest war is finally coming to a close as troops begin to withdraw from their bases in Afghanistan this summer. While fully three quarters of Americans applaud President Biden's decision to pull out ground troops completely, many security experts are sounding the alarm. Leaving Afghanistan without a secure national government and strong army in place, they warn, will almost certainly lead to a Taliban takeover, ethnic cleansing, mass slaughter, and the destabilization of a country that has long been a regional powder keg. It's a risky move that would destroy the West's credibility as an ally at the very moment China is on the rise as a global player. Also, without a foreign military presence, the very real risk exists that Al-Qaeda will use the country again as a base to expand their recruitment and plan terror attacks against the US and its allies. Others see 20 years of fighting and little to show for it. The Taliban remains a major force in the country and controls more territory now than it did in 2001. Efforts to build up Afghan forces, install a stable government, and curb corruption ended in failure at great expense of blood and treasure. America, NATO and the West can no longer afford to be Afghanistan's policeman. It's time to end a conflict that is no longer in the national interest. Arguing for the motion is Elliot Ackerman, former US Marine and intelligence officer and best-selling author of 2034: a novel of the next world order Arguing against the motion is Andrew Bacevich, President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and author of After the Apocalypse, America's Role in a World Transformed QUOTES: ELLIOT ACKERMAN “The current policy in which the US forfeits the entire enterprise is strategically ill-advised and nearsighted, particularly given current costs, which are relatively minor.” ANDREW BACEVICH “Afghans don't want to be occupied by foreign armies. Afghans want to be the masters of their own fate. I think we should allow them to exercise that privilege.” Sources: NBC, ABC, BBC, MSNBC, Democracy Now! The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail]. To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ The Munk Debates podcast is produced by Antica, Canada's largest private audio production company - https://www.anticaproductions.com/   Executive Producer: Stuart Coxe, CEO Antica Productions Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran Lynch Associate Producer: Abhi RahejaBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

There are options, and that's why we need to take this opportunity seriously. There's no way you can prevent global warming unless China is part of the solution. This is not normal male behavior. This is predatory behavior. We don't know how bad this bug is. We don't know what this bug does. All of that was thrown away in those eight minutes and 46 seconds, and that's the moment that I became an abolitionist. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Welcome to the monk debates on every episode. we provide you with a civil and substantive debate on the big issue of the day,

to arm you, the listener, with enough information to make up your own mind. Today's debate, be it resolved, withdrawing troops from Afghanistan is a tactical and strategic blunder. The United States will come to regret. The U.S. began its final withdrawal from Afghanistan today. The goal is for the last 2,500 American troops plus 7,000 NATO soldiers, To be out of the country by the end of the summer. Major news coming in from Afghanistan to night, more than 90% of American troops now out of Afghanistan.

As the NATO forces in Afghanistan withdraw, the Taliban are gaining ground. The militants say they've taken more than 10 districts over the past day. Hello, I'm your moderator, Rudyard Griffith. Well, 20 years and counting, $800 billion spent. Over 2,000 U.S. service men and women killed and thousands more wounded.

America, Canada, and NATO's longest war is finally coming to a close as troops have begun to withdraw from their bases in Afghanistan. And while three quarters of Americans applaud President Biden's decision to pull out ground troops completely, many security experts are sounding the alarm. Let's be very, very clear. We went into Afghanistan. We have stayed in Afghanistan not to protect Afghans. but to protect Americans. And this military withdrawal and withdrawal of all the other American agencies that are affected by it, I think risks very grave danger to American national security.

That's former national security advisor, John Bolton. Critics of America's withdrawal argue that leaving Afghanistan without a secure national government and a functioning military in place will almost certainly lead to a Taliban takeover, massive human right abuses, and could create the preconditions for the re-emergence of extremist groups in the country planning terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. Others see 20 years of fighting and very little to show for it. I am very glad that we have a president who has finally recognized that this is not a militarily winnable war, that we're spending $50 billion there, that it's not.

leading to more deaths of Afghan civilians, and it's putting our troops at risk. That's Democratic Congressman Roe Kana, a fierce critic of the war in Afghanistan. Like Kana, many Americans argue that efforts to build up the Afghan forces, install a stable government, and curb corruption were misguided, and have ended in failure. America, NATO, and the West can no longer afford to be Afghanistan's policemen. It's time to end the conflict that is no longer. longer in the national interest. On this installment of the monk debates, we challenge the essence of these arguments by

debating the motion, be it resolved, withdrawing troops from Afghanistan is a tactical and strategic blunder. The U.S. will come to regret. Arguing for the motion is former U.S. Marine and Intelligence Officer, Elliot Ackerman. He served five tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. He's the author of numerous bestselling books, including the most. most recently published, 2034, a novel of the next world order.

Arguing against the motion is Andrew Bacevich. He's a retired U.S. Army colonel, the president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an author of, After the Apocalypse, America's role in a world transformed. Andrew Elliott, welcome to the Monk Debates. Thank you very much. Thanks so much. Very much, looking forward to this conversation

between the two of you, we could not be having, in a sense, a more topical debate at this moment. America's longest war, probably Canada's longest war, too. Many of our NATO allies coming to a conclusion with the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. What is the fate and future of Afghanistan from here? What have we learned from this conflict? These are some of the key questions that we're going to dive and dig into with both of you, your considered experience and background. It's a privilege indeed for us to have access to that over the next 45 minutes or so. Our resolution simple to the point, be it resolved, withdrawing U.S.

troops from Afghanistan is a tactical and strategic blunder. The United States will come to regret. Elliot, you're up first. You're arguing in favor of our motion. So let's hear your opening statement, please. Thanks so much, Red here. I believe, you know, this debate is ultimately about costs as measured in blood and treasure, and which is the more prudent course of action, to cut our losses and leave Afghanistan, or to continue our support for its government and people through an enduring troop presence. At the time of the Biden administration's announced withdrawal, the U.S. troop numbers have hovered at around 3,500. Just to give this a sense of perspective, there are nearly 40,000 troops currently garrison in Western Europe, and their presence

has secured a generation's old peace in the countries where the Second World War was fought. And we also stationed 30,000 troops in South Korea in a decades-long effort to ensure stability in the Pacific. Obviously, Afghanistan today is more volatile, far more volatile than Western Europe or East Asia. But U.S. troops stationed there have remained relatively safe in recent years. four Americans died in combat in Afghanistan in 2020. In that same year, more service members died in training accidents at the Camp Pendleton Marine Base alone. Indeed, since 2015, Defense Department training accidents have exceeded combat deaths worldwide. I raised this point not to sound callous about combat deaths, but rather to put them in a context that allows us to create sound policy.

You know, Afghanistan today is not the war it was for Americans, say, 10 years ago when I fought there. We've incurred many sunk costs in Afghanistan, the 2,500 dead service members as well as the trillions spent. I'm not here to debate that the Afghan war has been well prosecuted. It has not. The question before us is how to set sound policy for the future. The current policy in which the U.S. forfeits the entire enterprise is strategically ill-advised, and near-sided, particularly given current costs, which are relatively minor. It will lead to greater chaos in the region and bolden adversaries who are open in their

antipathy to the United States and ultimately places a greater risk of having to redeploy numbers of troops, numbers that far exceed 3,500, back to Afghanistan in the future. Much like what we saw occur in Iraq after our wholesale withdrawal in 2011 and our subsequent return after the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. And depending on who you speak to, and particularly among veterans, Afghanistan is an emotionally charged subject and understandably so. You know, many who've been touched by the war want the war to end. But what does it mean to end a war? Does the war really end when all the troops come home? If you look at our history, the only wars where the troops have all come home are the wars we've lost,

like Vietnam. The wars we've won, or at least haven't lost, have all involved an enduring troop presence. I would argue that with 3,500 Americans deployed in minimal combat deaths, the war in Afghanistan, for Americans, largely ended a number of years ago. So why are we pulling out all the troops now? Is this about ending a war, or is it about healing a national wound? If it's about the latter, which I suspect it partly is, unsound policy, you will only keep the wound festering on long after September 11th, 2021. As much as this policy signals that America is done with Afghanistan, I fear Afghanistan might not be done with America. Thank you. Thank you, Elliot. Terrific opening statements, setting out some important arguments there

for us to consider. Well, Andrew, your opportunity now, you're arguing against our motion, be it resolved withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan is a tactical and strategic blunt the U.S. will come to regret. Let's have your opening statement. Yeah, I think I'll begin by focusing on the word blunder, which is contained in the resolution. The blunder, I think, occurred in the autumn and winter of 2001, 2002. When following the entry of U.S. forces and the overthrow of the Taliban,

the United States and his partners committed itself to an ambitious, nation-building project that has proven to be a failure. We have had two purposes in Afghanistan. The first was to build a legitimate government with capital and Kabul, able to govern to preside over this territorial expanse, and also to bring it into existence security forces, able to protect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and also to provide for internal security. So we've been doing that now, tempting to do that now, for going on 20 years, and all the evidence suggests that we have failed. So to my mind, stay in longer, trying harder, is unlikely to convert that failure into success. indeed, to a very considerable extent, at least as I see it, one proximate cause of the violence and disorder

that racks that country is the presence of foreign forces. In other words, it's when foreign troops leave that the possibility of Afghans settling their own differences and putting the nation on a better track improves. So it just seems to me that the decision of the Biden administration to call an end to a failed war makes all the sense in the world. Thank you, Andrew. Terrific opening statements from you both now on opportunity for rebuttals. So, Ellie, you're up first. Let's hear your reaction to Andrew's opening statement. Well, first of all, I agree with much of Andrew's opening statement and that the history of the Afghan and war over the last 20 years is certainly a history of blunders.

And it's also a history of mission creep and a project that many times has become far too expansive. So you're not gonna hear a lot of disagreement from me there. I think, however, that in order to make sound policy today, that policy is about engaging with the future and less engaging with the past. And it's also about recognizing that the true presence in Afghanistan today and our commitment there in 2021 with a somewhat de minimis

number of troops that has led to a stable Afghanistan in so much as the conflict there is relatively stable and the Afghans have been able to shoulder much more of the burden. To me, seems like a reasonable, enduring expense for Americans to take on because whether we like it or not, we own the Afghan problem and we can't just walk away with it and believe that it's not going to follow us. Furthermore, yes, I think one of the mistakes the United States made early on in the Afghan war was conflating the Taliban with Al-Qaeda and not understanding that those are two different groups that view the world differently. Al-Qaeda being transnational terrorists, the Taliban being Afghan nationalists. However, I am unconvinced that the U.S.

withdrawal from Afghanistan is what is precipitating the violence in Afghanistan. If we look at the 1990s, for instance, there was no significant foreign troop presence in Afghanistan really at all, and that was surely a decade. That was marked by massive violence in the country. And I fear that those are the conditions that Afghanistan will return to in short order if this relatively diminishedness amount of U.S. troops is withdrawal. Because what those troops signal is that Afghanistan and the Afghan national government, at least, still enjoys the backing of the United States. Thank you, Elliot. Andrew, your opportunity now for a rebuttal also. You know, Elliot has referred to use the phrase sunk costs. And our sunk costs in Afghanistan

are extraordinary. He made brief reference to them. We don't need to rehearse the details. I have to say that I don't think sunk costs provide any reason to persist in a failed enterprise. It ends up being throwing good money after bad. So we disagree on that. He raises the question of strategic priorities. And I think that probably ought to really be central to our further discussion here. And I'll give an opinion that Afghanistan, the future of Afghanistan should not figure as a strategic priority in the United States. The world today is not the world that existed in 2001 when we first intervened in Afghanistan. And the list of issues that should take priority over Afghanistan, in my judgment, is rather extensive. What are we talking about here?

Well, of course, we're talking about the changing in the geopolitical order with the rise of China being the most prominent example. We're talking about the changes in a natural order, with the worsening climate crisis, demanding greater attention, more resources. We're talking about the disunion within the United States and America, embodied by the rise of Trumpism, and of course, in particular, exemplified by the January 6th assault on the capital. The events in Washington have taken a violent and tumultuous turn in the past few hours. as thousands of supporters of President Trump stormed the U.S. Capitol building, venting their anger at the victory of Joe Biden in the presidential election.

We have enormous work to repair our country. That will require attention. It will require resources. By the way, I've just skipped over the pandemic, which has killed 600,000 of our fellow citizens over the course of the past year. So it just seems to me that Afghanistan figures as a peripheral U.S. interest at best, and I must say that from my point of view, without trying to be naive about it, my guess is that the people of Afghanistan are actually better equipped to address and to remedy the problems of Afghanistan than we are. You know, we've made a stab at that for the past 20 years, and it hasn't worked.

So we need to attend to other matters that are actually far more relevant to the security and well-being of the American people. Thank you, Andrew. My opportunity now to join this debate and think up some questions that are top of mind for our audience members having listened to you both. And thank you for the excellent opening statements and rebuttals. Elliot, let me come back to you with some questions now that I'm thinking. up having listened to you both. And the first goes to Andrew's point of priorities. You know, some people would say of the 101 priorities facing America now, many of which are urgent and which Andrew has just outlined some of the key ones. Afghanistan's just not on that list anymore.

The world has changed. This is two decades later. American policy needs to change with it. I think I want to hear a bit more from you about why you still think this really is an urgent national priority that warrants putting American and allied NATO soldiers' lives on the line in Afghanistan, potentially for years to come. Yeah, I'd like to just begin by addressing something that Andrews say, which I think might actually be a miscommunication between us. I think we're actually in agreement, but we just reach different conclusions. With regards to sunk costs, my concern, I also believe that we should not pay attention to the sunk cost of Afghanistan.

as we make a decision going forward. So I am in total alignment with Andrew on that. However, what I fear is that when we look at the sunk cost, which is a 20-year war, more than 2,500 U.S. service members killed with a massive price tag, that leads us to the conclusion that even though the price tag moving forward is relatively de minimis, we have to leave no matter what. So I agree that the United States has more pressing issues to face than, in what is going on in Afghanistan.

I mean, the last book I wrote, for instance, is about China. And I think that the pivot that is going on in national security circles to China and to the idea of competing with a peer-level adversary is an essential pivot. My concern is that I believe that by pulling all of the troops, meaning 3,500 thereabouts, as opposed to the in excess of 100,000 troops who were fighting there at the height of the war when I served, we're going to throw that region into a level of chaos that involves us then having to pay attention to it once more. If you don't really want to think about Afghanistan for the next four to six years, station about 3,000 troops there, keep support, nominally supporting the Afghan government.

And I think that that is the route to stability in that part of the world, not pulling all the plugs and turning Afghanistan into a black hole like we saw in the 1990s or repeating the types of strategies we saw at the end of the bomb administration with the pullout from Iraq. Okay, great points. That's where I wanted to go with you next, Andrew, which is to say you're arguing, obviously, on the basis that this has been a war that has wasted American blood and treasure and will continue to do so indefinitely. But isn't Elliott right that there has been a substantial change in the tactics and strategies over the last 12 to 18 months? It's a far smaller, scaled-back mission that provides America with some real potential concrete outcomes here, the suppression of al-Qaeda, the prevention of the rise of an ISIS-type event or movement in Afghanistan at a very low cost in terms of material, men, and footprint. Why isn't that the right way to go forward with this?

Well, I don't think I'd agree with the characterization. I suppose, you know, given the trillions of dollars that the United States has expended since initiating the so-called global war on terrorism, the amount of money that we're spending in Afghanistan may seem relatively small, but only relatively. I guess the larger point is that stability is going to require a political resolution. I don't believe that the continued U.S. military presence facilitates that. As a matter of fact, I am persuaded that from the point of view of the government in Kabul, the continued presence of U.S. forces provides an excuse to avoid making hard decisions. Again, I think the bottom line comes down to, does the presence of U.S.

forces, whether it's mostly symbolic or largely, you know, if it's substantive, does the presence of U.S. forces actually facilitate some kind of resolution to the crisis afflicting Afghanistan? My answer is no, it doesn't. And quite frankly, my answer, I give that answer not simply because of the American experience over the past 20 years, but also because of the Soviet experience, because of the British experience. Afghans don't want to be occupied by foreign armies. That seems to be a pretty clear theme in the history of Afghanistan. Afghans want to be the masters of their own fate. I think we should allow them to exercise that privilege. So, L.A., come back on that point, by extending, even if you are with a much smaller footprint, you know, a lower, you know, cost,

And if we could just kind of assume the sunk costs or the sunk costs, regardless, are we fundamentally missing a piece here in terms of resolving this conflict, which is getting foreign troops out of Afghanistan, letting the Afghan people find their own way, make their own, hopefully progress towards some type of national reconciliation? Again, the reason I am for or I am against the withdrawal from Afghanistan is because I believe that the outcome is not going to be what Andrew predicts. And were it to be what Andrew predicts, I would completely be aligned with him.

If this was an issue of the Afghans simply needing to fight it out within their own borders, to figure out how they wanted to live, I would, you know, I would say that, hey, 20 years of war, it's too bad it had to take that long, but that's ultimately they need to resolve this for themselves. The challenge I find is that, you know, the world is interconnected in ways that it was not before. Recent past has shown us that Afghanistan, certainly, if we look at its history, I mean, it is a crossroads and that that conflict will swell outside of Afghanistan's borders. And I believe that when we leave, we will see a spike in violence in Afghanistan akin to what we saw in the 1990s. We will see other actors getting involved in Afghanistan in ways that go against U.S. national interests.

And we will find ourselves once again involved in Afghanistan. or in the region on terms that are unfavorable to us. And, you know, we saw this occur in 2001 with the September 11th attacks, and we saw this occur again in 2014. So for me, at a certain point, if our insurance policy on that not happening is the deployment of around 3,000 troops and sustaining them in Afghanistan to provide a modicum of stability, I believe that that is the less dangerous path. Because, for instance, in 2011, we pulled out of Iraq,

and suddenly we weren't talking very much about Iraq. And then in 2014, 15, 16, the entire conversation and all national security priorities were on the Islamic State. Overseas tonight, another attack being blamed on ISIS. The third mass terror attack carried out by the terror group in the last week. This one, the deadliest in Baghdad in nearly a decade. And so if we were to see some type of repeat of that,

I think would make it very difficult for the United. United States now to pay attention to many key issues like the rise of China, like climate, and like our internal dysfunction. So I actually think the way to pivot and pay attention to those issues is to keep the Band-Aid on in Afghanistan. Andrew, you know, there's the old adage, Colin Powell and others, you know, you break it, you own it. Don't you feel any kind of responsibility to the Afghan people, to the women who were to a certain extent given new opportunities that they could not have pondered before foreign occupation, to the people who have placed their faith, their future with the allies

and their troops in trying to rebuild this country. I mean, aren't those people owed something? Absolutely. Absolutely. No question about it. I have not suggested otherwise. So how does it with complete withdrawal of troops provide those people with any protection, any security?

I mean, the way you're posing the question that suggests. that there are no methods of responding to the needs of the Afghan people other than foreign military occupation. I don't think that that makes sense. I would make two arguments. The first is particularly related to Afghans who have directly supported U.S. forces, the U.S. effort, there is a moral imperative and question moral imperative to provide expeditious exit visas for all those individuals and their families who wish to leave Afghanistan and resettled in the United States. It's their choice whether or not to do so, but we should facilitate that choice. And indeed, Elliott probably has better numbers than I do. I think the current number of

these special exit visas authorizes somewhere in the vicinity of, I think, 25,000. That number is totally inadequate, and there should be no red tape that gets in the way of doing that. That's point number one. Point number two, if the Taliban succeeds in overthrowing the government in Kabul, it is quite likely that there will be a humanitarian disaster on a massive scale. We know that happened, for example, after the Soviet invasion, when I think the number was something on the order of five million Afghan refugees who left. left the country, some for Iran, many to Pakistan. Again, we have an absolute moral responsibility

to do whatever we can, at whatever cost, to the American taxpayer to try to alleviate the suffering of those people. So it's not my argument that we're just going to wash away from Afghanistan and forget a tragedy to which we ourselves have directly contributed. So yeah, we, we have work to do. As the U.S. war comes to an end, we still have responsibilities there. Hi, Redyard Griffiths here, your host and moderator. I have a favor to ask you, please consider becoming a monk member. Membership is free and you get access to a series of great benefits, including a 10-plus-year library of some of our best debates, dialogues, and podcasts. You also get a free monthly newsletter featuring the debates that we're watching around the world.

and you get a specially curated Friday weekly Monk members-only podcast that focuses on the big international events and trends shaping our world. All of that, again, free at www.w.munkdebates.com. I hope you'll consider joining and becoming part of our community. Now, back to our program. Elliot, for a lot of people listening to these various arguments, some would say, look, there's a seduction to your, I think you've characterized it as a Band-Aid, but isn't there reality that what begins as a Band-Aid suddenly becomes something a lot bigger, becomes, you know, surgery, it becomes, you know,

stitches, it becomes a critical wound, and suddenly, you know, we're back to surging. I mean, why do you think a Band-Aid is a sustainable approach when we see the Taliban consistently gaining territory, now uparming on the basis of large caches of weapons captured from an Afghan military that is kind of collapsing. So why are you confident that your idea of a Band-Aid remains a Band-Aid and that we're not back having a conversation like this a year or two from now with a substantial surge of U.S. troops into Kabul and Kandahar? Well, first of all, you know, if we were talking about, you know, cost numbers here and sustaining a U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, that was, significant amounts of troops, you know, 50, 60, 70,000 U.S. troops surging into Afghanistan

with the attendant price tag, I would probably be sitting on Andrew's side of the debate saying at this point it's not worth it. So with the information we have now, it is a relatively modest size force and, you know, and we're talking about the decision to be made today. You know, that being said, we can't look, I think, at what is going on in Afghanistan right now in these Taliban advances outside of the context of this political reality, which is that we are leaving. You know, ultimately, they say, you know, politics is retail. Well, guess what? Counterinsurgency is very retail, too. I've spent a lot of my life sitting down from tribal elders and others, intriguing tea with them and looking them in the eye and providing them with assurances that American Resolve is strong. and if they throw their lot in with us, that their future is secured for the next decade or two decades. I think when we're going forward, we need to be very pragmatic.

What are the costs? And just to Andrew's point, I agree with everything that we have an obligation to the Afghan people, whether it's visas, whether it's supporting the humanitarian disaster that I imagine will probably follow. My retort to that would simply be, hey, if we're going to be paying for something as the American people, why not pay for those troops to stay in Afghanistan at a relatively low rate as opposed to paying for the humanitarian disaster that we know is going to follow? Thank you, Elliot. Let's go a bigger picture in our remaining moments together. Andrew, come to you first about how does a withdrawal of all troops from Afghanistan signal America's ability to continue to project and defend a liberal international order internationally?

I mean, to what extent does this really create, as Elliot's suggestion, suggested some awareness on part of America's other allies, think Taiwan, that America's not really in it for the long haul. They're not really there to provide the necessary support, as they did in South Korea now, as Elliott mentions for decades or in Europe for decades. Also, you know, this is a new America, a cut and run America, not an America that you necessarily want as a global partner. The question recalls a comment made by George Kemp, the famous diplomat and historian in the context of the Vietnam War. When that war went badly, some arguments for staying the course insisted that we needed to do so

in order to shore up American credibility, that if the United States withdrew from Vietnam, that we would no longer be viewed as a trustworthy ally. And Kennan's response to that was no, that if you were, embark upon a foolhardy war than terminating that war actually signals to others good sense, wisdom. My judgment is that the Afghanistan war has been a fool, foolhardy war, and that therefore terminating the war doesn't signal, doesn't hurt our credibility. The signals that we finally wised up. Now let me admit that to my mind, this discussion happens in this larger context, a larger context related to the central themes of U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War.

I believe that since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy has become excessively militarized. The failed Afghanistan war is one example of where this militarization of U.S. policy has misled us. In a new world, new geopolitically, new in the sense of other concerns rising to the fore, it seems to me to be very useful to do what we can do to begin to walk away from, back away from this excessive militarization. and to my mind, terminating U.S. involvement in the Afghanistan war offers one small step toward that larger purpose. Interesting analysis. So, Ellie, what's your perspective on that? I mean, people would say, look, we are in a new geopolitical reality. It needs to be acknowledged. And as Andrews said, you know, this militarization of America's engagement with the world is precisely, at the root of, you know, the failure of the policy in Afghanistan, Iraq.

It's at the danger of being at the root of America's next military failure, possibly Taiwan. What's your view? I don't disagree with Andrew that U.S. policy post the Second World War has become excessively militarized. You know, where I think there might be a little bit of daylight between us is the idea that, you know, Afghanistan has been a foolhardy war. And let me just explain. I would say that there were, there have been a number of Afghan wars.

The first is the war fought immediately after the September 11th attacks, which, you know, there was much to be desired in the prosecution of that and the hunt for bin Laden, but I would not say that was a foolhardy conflict. I remember what those attacks were like. I'm sure Andrew does as well. I think, you know, the nation was at that point going to war, the scope of that war and allowing it to creep into all sorts of facets in a nation-building project, I think, is what was foolhardy. I don't think, you know, a response in Afghanistan to the September 11th attacks was full-heartedly.

But I fully agree that our conception of war as Americans, post the Second World War, has left a lot to be desired. The Second World War, I think, is very much still our American-UR story. We expect our wars to kind of adhere to that narrative where there's a beginning, there's a middle, there's an end, and where the good guys. And everyone comes home. And I would just offer one observation. I remember when I was in high school, I read the Iliad. The copies of the Iliad that they handed out to my class had a single image on the cover.

It said in red lettering, Iliad, and there was a photograph of a bunch of U.S. service members landing on Omaha Beach. And I think we as Americans need to kind of update our national Iliad as we imagine wars going forward, for instance, in a place like Taiwan. Well, so as we move towards closing statements, I want you to respond, Andrew, to this idea that, you know, we're in a twilight period. And it's going to be a period of the necessity for America's continuing engagement in the world, including using military power and force. Maybe that engagement is going to have new features. It's going to be a little bit more judicious, more calibrated, as Elliott is suggesting, in terms of a way to extend the Afghanistan mission. Am I right to characterize your view? Andrew is one that, you know, it really is time to focus on America at home and you oppose any foreign intervention or like, where do you draw the

lines? I'm kind of interested in your, you're thinking here in that process. If you're saying, Andrew, are you an isolationist? The answer is no. Matter of fact, I think isolationism is a fiction. I believe that it's absolutely imperative. for the United States to be actively, comprehensively engaged in the world. We can't solve our problems unless we are comprehensively engaged. When you think of things like the climate crisis or cyber crime, we have to be engaged. I do believe, however, that the emphasis on military power as a preferred instrument for engagement, particularly since the end of the Cold War

has been profoundly misguided and therefore we need to rethink the terms of our engagement and rethink our priorities where, frankly, Afghanistan doesn't rank very high. Now, Elliot said something that was genuinely profound when he referenced World War II and the overhang of World War II down to the present moment

as sort of a narrative source or reference point to which we reflexively return. I think he's exactly right. In some respects, in our collective consciousness, we still imagine that it's, you know, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill standing arm in arm, fighting the good fight against the Third Reich. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization.

Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed, and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit upland. But that's not where we are today. History has moved on. And I think we need to wean ourselves from this conviction that somehow the narrative of World War II provides essential guidance to understand where we are today and what we need to do today.

And I believe that to do that, to rethink that narrative, brings us to a clearer understanding of why the emphasis on military power, Afghanistan being one example, has been misguided and we really need to rethink that. Thank you. Look, before we go to closing statements, I want to ask you maybe somewhat personal questions. but, you know, having served in combat with distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan, what are the conversations that you're having with your fellow veterans about the end of this war? How do they feel about this?

What are they kind of trying to understand in terms of the decision now that's been made and how that possibly reflects on their own perceptions of their own service and sacrifice? You know, I would offer that sort of, you know, friends of mine who are veterans who kind of fall into, generally speaking experientially, one of three camps, right? Those of us who fought in Iraq, those of us who fought in Afghanistan, and those of us who fought in Iraq and in Afghanistan. You know, the conversations I've been having with those who just served in Iraq, is they're sort of looking at the Afghan war veterans saying,

well, you know, I've sort of been through this before when Iraq ended and having to reckon with what the ending of a war meant. I think for those who just served in Afghanistan, it's a new experience to see your war coming to an end. And then among the most interesting conversations I've sort of had have been among my cohort who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan because we're kind of going through this for a second time. And speaking to someone I really respect who served in the Marine Corps as a contemporary of mine, he and I were both noting the other day, you know, why does this one

feel a little bit more bitter than Iraq? And I think that's sort of the consensus that we landed on was that, you know, the Iraq war was always ill-advised. Even when we were there, most of us were fighting it knew that, at least from a strategic point of view, as we were combing the desert for WMDs, that were obviously they didn't exist, that this was not a war fought with a clear pretense. And that Afghanistan stings, because, again, this was a war that was initiated based off of an attack on our homeland. That happened once before, which led to this story of the Second World War. And now it's happened. It happened a second time, and this will be a war that we have lost and we are the veterans of that lost war. And that stings in a different way. So I would offer that

observation. Let me reference Elliot's remark where he said he showed up late to two wars. I showed up late to my one war. I mean, I showed up late to the Vietnam War when obviously the war was already lost. At the time, in the immediate aftermath, let's say in the mid-late 1970s, I had a very difficult time reckoning with the meaning of that entire experience. I certainly had a very difficult time placing the Vietnam War in the narrative American history only with the passage of time. As I'm speaking for myself, I'm not presuming to speak for Elliot. Only with the passage of time did I come to have what I believe to be a clearer understanding of the Vietnam War

that it was an unnecessary debacle that did great damage to our country. My guess is that with the passage of time, as we think about the Iraq War and the Afghanistan war, they're always going to be linked together, that we will come collectively to a similar understanding of those two major post-9-11 wars while granting that at a particular moment, it's difficult to see those events in any kind of historical perspective. Let's go to closing statements. Our debate today has been be it resolved with drawing the U.S. troops from Afghanistan is a tactical and strategic blunder.

The U.S. will come to regret. Andrew, what key points or ideas do you want to leave our audience with, as you argue throughout this debate against our motion today? I think it's important for us to acknowledge. knowledge that just because U.S. forces are leaving doesn't mean the war ends. War continues. The war will be decided by the Afghan people. If we go by news reports at the present moment, the outcome looks to be bleak. And if indeed it turns out that the Taliban is able once again to prevail, that will be a tragedy. It's a tragedy for.

which the United States will be to a considerable degree responsible, and therefore to emphasize the point that I made earlier, despite the fact that I think it's time for us to end our involvement in the war, our military involvement into war. There's absolutely no question that as events evolve, the United States will continue to have a profound responsibility for what happens next. Thank you, Andrew. Well, we're going to have our last word in this debate to Elliot who's been arguing in favor of our motion, be it resolved withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan as a tactical and strategic blunder the U.S. will come to regret. Elliot, wrap this debate up for us. Well, although I've been arguing in favor of the motion,

I would certainly say that I am rooting for the motion's failure and that for this not to be a decision that we regret. You know, we spoke a little bit throughout this debate about the Second World War and how that story has loomed very large in the American national consciousness as we think about the ways that we prosecute wars. And I would also observe that, you know, the zeitgeist, the emotional zeitgeist of the country really matters as we make these policy decisions. And even though it shouldn't be the case, oftentimes our emotions can lead us to make faulty policy decisions that are not deeply rooted in kind of more pragmatic considerations. I would say that probably one of the first times we made a faulty and somewhat emotionally based policy decision that was rooted in the national zeitgeist was actually right after the September 11th attacks. one sort of bit of trivia I would offer is that because we talked about the Second World War,

the television series Band of Brothers, which I think is a pure distillation of that greatest generation American way of war, that television series premiered on September 10th, 2001. And I only bring that up because that to me was somewhat an indicator, at least a barometer of the National Zykeyes as we went into these wars. We craved a great national war story. And as we come out of these wars now, 20 years later, the National Zichies, I would say, has turned 180 degrees,

and there's a strain of cynicism and dysfunction that exists in the United States right now, and that I think makes it emotionally easy for us to walk away. And I think wouldn't it be a better irony if at the end of the Afghan war, it was a failure because we overzealously pursued to emotional moods in the country, and those moods led us to make poor policy decisions. Thank you, Ellie.

I had a profound point to end on, and I want to just thank both of you on behalf of the Monk Debates community, first for your service. I want to acknowledge that. And also for engaging in this debate in such a kind of civil, substantive, and rich way, filled with analogies to history, analogies to the current events and the current context that we find ourselves in. This has just been an incredibly rich and informing debate and we're all the better for your participation. So thank you again, both gentlemen, for coming on the Monk Debates today. Thank you. Thank you so much. Well, that wraps up today's

debate. I want to thank our participants, Andrew and Elliot. They certainly gave us a lot to think about. If you have feedback or reflections on what you've just heard, please send us an email to podcast at Monk Debates, that's MUNK, Debates with an S.com. Here's a recent listener email from John about our monk members podcast. John writes, Dear Rudyard, it appears to me that I and most internet users are blissfully unaware about the increasingly serious nature of internet security, such as you highlighted in your recent podcast. I, as a result, have maintained a landline and resisted wholesale going over to a smartphone. I find it interesting that your co-host, Janice, has also reconnected her

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