The Munk Debates Podcast - Friday Focus: Iran flexes its leverage and Ukraine goes on the attack

Episode Date: June 19, 2026

Janice and Rudyard unpack another wild week in global affairs, beginning with news of heavy Israeli strikes overnight on Hezbollah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli troops. Although both sides have agreed to another ceasefire, these skirmishes could jeopardize the fragile memorandum of understanding between Iran and the U.S., potentially giving Tehran leverage over Israel by threatening to walk away from the deal.How does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu respond to this latest escalation when Israel's deterrence credibility may be constrained by the agreement with Iran? And what if the MOU is merely a tactical ploy to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, lower oil prices, and buy time without resolving any of the underlying issues—setting the stage for renewed conflict after the U.S. midterm elections?In the second half of the show, Janice and Rudyard turn to this week's G7 meeting in France and ask whether there is any evidence that meaningful pressure is finally being brought to bear on Russia. President Zelensky has helped Ukraine build one of the world's most formidable drone capabilities, and the country's growing confidence was on display as dramatic images emerged from a brazen overnight drone strike on Moscow.If the tide is indeed turning, Putin—already under significant political pressure—may have few conventional options left. What are the risks that, as he is pushed closer to the brink, he resorts to increasingly dangerous or destructive actions?Become a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

You know, Iran is the one that is likely to overestimate and increasingly so as the midterms get closer because Donald Trump needs that straight open. But what about on November 5th and 6th? Yeah. Right? And what will Iran want to try to leverage before November in order to be in a better position after November when they realize their leverage goes away? It's... A hundred percent. It'll be interesting to say the least.

That's the 3D chessboard here. Yeah. Welcome to the Friday Focus podcast for the 19th of June, 2026. I'm Roger Griffiths, Chair of the Monk Debate, joined by Janice Gross Stein, the founding director of the Monk School of Global Affairs. Happy June Teeth, Janice, the U.S., much of it observing this holiday, but we're here in the studio, ready to talk about another wild week in global events from the G7 to the beginnings of this ceasefire. Let's dig right into the news this morning, which is overnight

continuing heavy strikes by Israel on southern Lebanon. This is in response to cross-border attacks by Hezbollah. Supposedly, the parties have agreed to yet another ceasefire to come into effect in a matter of hours. What's going on here? And to what degree is this imperiling this very fragile MOU, it seems, between Iran and the United States. Roger, neither of those two parties, neither Hezbollah nor Israel are parties to that agreement. Iran claims that the ceasefire applies to Lebanon, and the Trump administration has spoken with conflicting language. It certainly said to Prime Minister Netanyahu,

you need to stop the strikes in Lebanon present, said very colorful language three days ago. But he then said, and his team said, well, yeah, but you have a right to self-defense. So in your introduction, the scenario here is Hisbalah starts by firing missiles and you get these response, these strikes in response, and then Israel claims it has a right to self-defense. This is the weak point of the ceasefire.

All ceasefires are problematic, especially in the first 72 hours, but this is clearly the most vulnerable part of the ceasefire. So let's unpack this a little bit. I mean, surely Hezbollah is not launching these attacks without some. some kind of tacit approval from Iran, but Iran is saying that they're holding off on this initial meeting that was supposed to happen today in Switzerland to begin, you know, discussing the substance of the MOU. So Iran must be aware that it's telling Hezbollah that it can take these actions, that it knows will cause a counterreaction by Israel, which then it in turn can use, I guess,

guess to lever. Is this what this is all about, Janice, about applying leverage to the Americans to show that Iran can control and limit Israel's behavior through the MOU? I mean, is that as brass taxes we're getting? I think that's exactly what's going on. Roger, you know, there have been all series of interviews that the president has given that Marco Rubio has given it, has And Jady Vance is given in the wake of the signing because predictably it's come under withering criticism in the United States. And Trump made one comment, which I think encapsulates it all. He said, Herbert Hoover, it's a president.

I did not want to be. And then he went on to explain. Herbert Hoover, of course, presided over the Depression, known for his failure, in fact, to mitigate the worst of it. And he said he did not want to be that president who pushed the world into recession as a result of energy prices and energy shortages. The Iranians know when he speaks this way, the Iranians know they have leverage. So what are they doing here?

They're doing exactly as you said. They're upping the ante. They're not going to move forward unless the strikes. against Hezbollah stops, but they do, the Iranians certainly have the capacity to say to his bollah, stop the firing of the rockets across the border into Israel, and they're not giving those instructions to Hezbollah. Isbala is not doing this without talking to Iran. There's no way.

Fascinating. It is a chess game. Let's go to the other man of the Arab Benjamin Netanyahu. How does he respond to this, Janice? Because if it's as clear as you and I think it is, that this is, in a sense, Iran kind of flexing the MOU, its leverage over the United States, to curb and limit and delineate Israeli behavior vis-a-vis, you could say, charitably from an Iranian-Lebanese perspective, to respect the sovereignty and sanctity and territorial integrity of Lebanon from a cynical perspective,

you could say to demonstrate some raw Iranian power to basically limit and prescribe what Israel can and can't do in a very specific situation. Such as these cross-border attacks, what does Benjamin Netanya, how does he respond to this? It seems impossible to imagine that Israel would allow itself to have its hard one post-October 7th kind of the credibility of its offensive and deterrent capacity suddenly limited and curtailed by Iran in this surreptitious manner. I don't think I think the prime minister is in the worst, let's just talk domestic politics for one moment. I heard the worst political position he's ever been in his career. You know, we have heard the scathing criticism. that is coming from some elements in the Republican Party in the United States.

It's far worse in Israel, though, is it not? Far worse. Far worse. And traditional supporters of the Prime Minister media outlets that have been supportive of him for years and years have turned on this issue. And some of the criticism is so scaling that it threatens the, the question. core elements of domestic political support for him. So I agree with you.

I think it's inconceivable that he will knuckle to pressure, even from Donald Trump at this point. So this is an example, yet one more example, when Iran and the United States are in a contest of wills. The Iranians are saying to the United States, you reign in your guy. But the answer back from the United States is, yeah,

but our guy's not firing first. It's your guy that's firing first. You rain in your guy. This is what we've seen since the 28th of February when the war broke out. The Iranian Institute said feel empowered now. If they hold up,

if they hold up any participation in the next stage of technical talks, nothing in that MOU moves forward, except U.S. one thing has already happened. The U.S. has ordered the lifting of the blockade. Yeah. I've got a theory on that that I want to get to a second just to wrap up this, the first half of the show. But before we get there, enjoying this playing through this 3D chess with you. So Iran would know that Benjamin Nett, you could not allow himself to be concerned.

strained through U.S. leverage applied indirectly by Iran vis-à-vis the threat of, I guess, spiking all or key elements of the MOU. So what is Iran expecting Israel's reaction to be? And then is it not Janus running a risk here that it's going to have to escalate more directly with Israel as it did in the past, most recently threatening and then acting on ballistic missile attacks into Israel on the basis not of Israel attacking Iran, but Israel attacking Lebanon. And asserting in that instance, what was that a week or 10 days ago, that this would somehow be part of a new, almost strategic doctrine on Iran's part.

I mean, they didn't go as fully to commit themselves to that. But, Janice, it seems like is that where this is headed that Iran is testing and pressuring a new kind of doctrine, which is any direct attacks on our proxies, in this case, Hezbollah, will warrant a direct strike on Israel by Iran. Yeah. Look, first of all, right here, you know, in the decades of research I've done about how, leaders understand the situation. They often get it wrong or we wouldn't have the wars that we have. It's entirely possible that Iran is right now miscalculating. Yes. And that's possible. And he's reading Donald Trump's weakness and capacity on the one hand and

overestimating his capacity to reign in Israel. That's probably the most likely thing. It's feeling empowered. You know, one of the experts on Iran, Nate Swanson, just had a really interesting piece in which he said Iran could lose this piece if it overestimates its own strength. So that's big risk, number one. If in fact that's what they're trying to do, we will see the ceasefire break down. This MO you will not ask because even inside the United States, United States, it would be very difficult for this administration to, in the wake of a ballistic missile attack against Israel by Iran, to stand by and to urge the Israelis not to respond. That is what Trump did, what that was, a week or ten days ago. That's exactly what it did.

But now what he did. You're absolutely right he did. But he did that because a ceasefire. was imminent. And he said to the Israelis, look, you are at risk of spooking the ceasefire proposal. That's one rule. But when the ceasefire is already in place and the Iranians would use ballistic missiles, that would be seen as the disruptor of the ceasefire, frankly. So this is a moment. You know, this is one of these moments you watch for. The erroneans understand, yes, they have come out of this more powerful than they went into it, but do they understand the limits of their power? Yeah, they're certainly flexing right now.

So just to wrap up to the section of the show, let me try a theory on you. As you know, I'm a fan of Occam's Razor. You know, the simplest answer is usually the right one. And I wonder with all this, you know, back and forth, worth the last 72 hours about the 14-point deal, the minutia of each and every point, and the language contained within it. Maybe what we're missing is something simpler, which is that there was one particular thing that both the United States and Iran wanted for different reasons, which was the reopening

of the Straits of Hermos. Iran wanted it because, as you've mentioned, I think, with great insight, the Iranian economy is probably in worse shape than we understand. certainly the lack of information coming out of Iran, I think has probably allowed them to cover up to a certain degree the profound collapse in their economy, the extent to which their oil capacity had hit the top of their tanks and was at risk of permanently damaging their wells and oil infrastructure. So the Iranians had an interest in getting the straits open, and summer driving season is arriving in the United States in a matter of two weeks. And there's something

symbolic about a $4 gallon of gas. In U.S. politics, that usually represents the proverbial hangman's news. So what if, Janice, we just took everything away, cleared the decks, and just understood that there was a clear alignment, a short-term alignment of interests, not around the nuclear program, certainly not around Iran's ballistic capacity, nothing to do with the proxies, nothing to do with regime change, human rights, maybe even nothing to do ultimately with Iran's position vis-a-vis Israel. What this was and is is a short-term alignment of 30 to 60, 90 days to clear out the straits, to release the choke point and its effects on the United States politically and on Iran economically.

So the ceasefire will hold, the MOU will hold, As long as the two parties are each getting their specific benefit from the reopening of the Straits of Hermuz, and nothing is going to happen on the nuclear file. Nothing is going to happen on this $300 billion reconstruction fund. Yes, some funds will be released by Qatar as a symbolic gesture in terms of frozen sanctions. But what we really need to focus on is how long does either party feel that they need to wait to have the choke point of the Straits-H-H-H-H-Hur-Fer-H-Muz off to release either enough political or economic pressure for them to then understand that they have more, not less leverage vis-a-vis their

opponent, in this case, Iran, the United States, in terms of either the negotiations themselves, substantively, or a return to conflict. Look, I agree with you, Rogers. at the core of this was the Strait of Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and it's for both, as you just said. You know, I've been arguing that the Iranians are running out of running room. They could not. They were reaching the point where it's going to be very difficult for them to store the oil

that the wells were pumping out. And when you have to shut down these oil wells, it can take years afterwards to restart with a doubt. They were not far off. They were weeks, maybe a month or two away from that. They need that straight open. Donald Trump, for obvious reasons, needs that straight open. You said three months, and I'm going to put a more precise date on this.

All right. Now, I'm going to make a guess here. That's all it is. This will hold until after the midterms in the United States, right? And all we will see is a discussion. around the terms. And 60 days will become 90 days and become whatever it is, 100 days to the November 4th midterm.

That's right. And it will be focused on how much of the frozen assets get released and it won't be all by any. And neither side may have an interest in substantially advancing the actual negotiations because that's really not what this is about. And neither of them, the Iranians don't want to give up their enrichment and nuclear capacity. And actually the Americans don't fundamentally care about that, at least in the short-term

political needs of the midterms and the fate of this presidency and whether it's a lame duck for the next two years. And that's why, you know, when you and I were talking about the details, I wasn't overly fixated because I was really focused on, okay, the fighting has stopped for now. The straight is open for now. Those are the two things. The timeline will drag on. And, you know, I think the United States is interested in reigning in Iran's nuclear program.

It understands the risk. But that can wait until after the midterms is the way they talk about it amongst themselves. So I think we're on pause, at least until after the midterms. But on pause, that's it. Yeah, I think we're on pause. And it just makes you wonder, though, Yeah, what happens as the leverage that the Iranians enjoy increases the closer we get to the midterms. And as you say, you studied these conflicts, someone either overestimates their own relative power in position and makes a fatal error or underestimates their opponents, you know, willingness to accommodate.

And I think that on both sides, that's what I see is, you know, the known unknown. It's the risk of underestimation and overestimation on key behavioral inclinations and characteristics and desires vis-a-vis Iran in the United States that could just derail this whole thing overnight. I completely agree with you. I think those are absolutely dynamics. And you painted one scenario. Let me just put one more on the table. Iran is the one that is likely to overestimate and increasingly so as the midterms get closer. because Donald Trump needs that straight open.

But what about on November 5th and 6th? Yeah. Right? And what will Iran want to try to leverage before November in order to be in a better position after November when they realize their leverage goes away? It's... A hundred percent.

It'll be interesting to say the least. That's the 3D chessboard here. Yeah. Well, let's say goodbye to our complimentary listeners and viewers. We're going to join Monk donors on the backhand. half of the show to talk about the G7, what came out of it, these escalating Ukrainian attacks. This one on Moscow has some people nervous. We'll get into that. And it's all, again, exclusive to monk donors. You can become a donor for as little as $2 a month and enjoy all kinds

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