The Munk Debates Podcast - Friday Focus: Trump is learning that Iran is not Venezuela

Episode Date: March 13, 2026

Rudyard and Janice unpack the big surprises in the war from this week, specifically Iran's escalating attacks against Gulf States beyond their military bases, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz which is disrupting the world's oil supply. Did the U.S. fundamentally misunderstand their opponent before heading into this conflict? Why did this administration not understand that Iran is not Venezuela? This president relies on his gut to make important decisions, and now it will be hard for Trump to end the war without an agreement from Iran and U.S. concessions to the Islamist regime. In the second half of the program Rudyard and Janice discuss the big winners so far. There is an increased demand for Russian natural gas and there are less missile interceptors flowing to Ukraine. The U.S. is overextended at home and abroad. Could Russia and China use Iran as a way to undermine the U.S while it is vulnerable? Will this war spread beyond the Middle East?   Become a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up.Become a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

And you can just hear the difference in the way the Iranians are speaking this week as opposed to last week, right? There's confidence. They understand that frankly the momentum is with them now, not with the United States. Welcome to the Friday Focus podcast for the 13th of March, 2026. I'm Rudyard Griffiths, Chair of the Monk Debates, joined by my co-host, Janice Groves Stein, the founding director of the Monk School. of global affairs. Janet, so much to unpack this week. We're going to dedicate the whole show, obviously, to the war in Iran and unfolding events. Let's begin by having you summarized for the audience, what surprised you since we last talked on Friday a week ago? I think there are two big stories of the

week, Rudyard. One is the escalating attacks by Iran against Gulf states, but not restricted to American bases against energy infrastructure, against tourism, a much broader swath of attacks than if this were simply designed to go after American basis in the Gulf. This is going after much broader targets. And the sense in the Gulf of outrage, the second big story, and it's surprising to me that the United States did not anticipate and prepare for this, the effective closure of the Straits of Moose and the huge disruption. The International Energy Agency called this in terms of volume, not proportioned, but volume, the largest disruption of oil supplies ever. And the Americans

were caught, flat-footed. They're discussed. assorts, but, quote, they're not ready. It will take some time. Yeah, Janice, so many directions to go. Let's focus a little bit on the Trump administration because they've come under significant scrutiny this week. And let's pick up where you just left off on the Straits of Harmos. There seems to be reporting, Janice, that the energy secretary and advisors around the president had effectively discounted the very situation. that we are in now, which is the Straits of Hermuz, this vital global shipping artery shuttered, closed under the threat of Iranian strikes on tankers and cargo ships. How is that possible, Janice?

I mean, wouldn't every single war plan that the Pentagon have developed, have indicated this as one of the kind of key risks of attacking Iran in the first place? And I guess, you know, you've got 40-odd years of observing international crises and decision-making inside governments and particularly inside the United States. I mean, how is it conceivable that we got here to this point with this kind of own goal, frankly, on the U.S. strategy to win? And we can talk about how that might be defined or not by this administration in the coming days and weeks. Let me tell you about the energy secretary said. I know you know, but I read it with absolute astonishment. He said, well, in our discussions, I look back at the 12th Day War, which happened last June.

And there was just a blip in the market. That's all. The market's price of oil went up for one day. It dropped. The market's adjusted. there's nothing to worry about. Now, you're right that I have read and written about these kinds of comments all my life because they are absolutely always astonishing when you read them after.

But what's one of the things that decision makers like other human beings do? They go back, it's called the recency bias. You go back to the most recent like event and you say, oh, that's. That's the same as this. And so what happened then? What happened then is a good predictor of what will happen now. Here's the big mess. That was a short, intense war that was focused largely around nuclear installations.

In fact, that's all the United States did. It did one bombing run. This is an all out of assault. on Iran, on its military capabilities, on its political infrastructure, on its literally across the board, it's an all out of assault. How could you think that that last event would be a good predictor of this one? But people do this over and over, and that's why we get some of the consequences that we get. Do you think, Janice, behind that one decision was another miscalculation, which was fundamentally misunderstanding Iran, the nature of the opponent that they are? And the extent to which, you know, a combination of size, ideology, preparation, deep experience with asymmetrical kind of conflict.

in warfare where, you know, Iran and its proxies know that they don't, and we'll never have their superiority. So they fight wars differently. They strategize differently. Their doctrine is in some ways already adapted for the very type of assault, which they've now sustained for over 10 days. Where do you think that came from? Because again, the United States has a vast intelligence apparatus. It has, you know, a trillion dollars a year at spending on the Pentagon. Surely there would have been professional staff, advisors, area experts that could have helped this administration understand that Iran is not Venezuela. You know, there's so much from what you just said there.

There are three gems buried in what you just said. So let me pull out. these jacks. Yes, the United States has a very large and actually very good intelligence community. But Donald Trump decapitated a big chunk of that intelligence community at the beginning of Trump to administration, as well as disabled the National Security Council. So you take the, you up the top off your best analyst. And boy, you send a message, don't mess with me, you tell me. Now, the intelligence assessments we know because they're leaked. And it's really interesting. People are leaking like crazy now because they want to position themselves as dissenting from what the press is doing, but not owning their dissent. They leaked their assessment. And the assessments were that this regime was not going to

collapse or implode. I would bet you that that was said by somebody once in a row. room or more and the president just dismissed it. Let's go to the second thing, which is kind of strategy 101. Who cares more about this, Iran or the United States? Well, it's obvious. For the United States, this is one of several. If they lose, it's not the world, although it could certainly damage this president in the term. for the Iranian, for the Revolutionary Guards, everything, everything is at stake here.

And if there's this asymmetry of interests and asymmetry of stakes, you fight to the last drop because your back is against the wall. This is a desperate regime. It is existential for that. You know, Vladimir Putin made the same mistake about Ukraine. He made exactly the same mistake. But it's such an important question to ask right out of the gate. Who cares more?

We are seeing this. And the third thing was, and here's astonishing to me too, because before this war started, there was a story, and I think it was in the New York Times. I don't have to go back and check, and I will. We'll send a note in. But there was a story in the New York Times about how Ali Homanie, the supreme leader had put in place leadership four levels down.

So, Roger, you're nominated to be a success. And if you're taken out, I'm next in line. And the people were designated. He prepared for this. He decentralized power. He established commands across the country so there didn't have to be centralized decision making. That was in the press before the war.

So the real issue here, it's not that they lack the information. They had the information. But this president relies on his instinct and his gut to make big, important decision. Yeah. So Janice, it seems like we're in a moment that you and I have been really worried about for the last year, which is President Trump instigating a crisis that he then loses control of because up to this point whether it was China and having you know to back down in the face of rare earths or Greenland and ultimately maybe having to back down because Europeans were threatening not to buy American debt all those things even his threats against Canada were we're all in a sense he could walk those back he was controlling the the escalation and

de-escalation It seems like this week, Janice, that it's gotten out of his hands and that he, yes, could, as we discussed on last week's show, he could tackle tomorrow and say the war is over. We've achieved our war aims, whatever those were. It could be a stretch to say that they've achieved them, however defined. But the problem now, Janice, is that Iran has a vote as to where and when and how. this war is over. So what is your concern now? If we are finally in this scenario that we knew that was coming, that we talked about with our listenership for the better past the 12 months, the crisis that is greater than the president himself, created by the president,

what happens next? Does he double down? Do the Americans accept that the Iranians have a vote? and are forced to come forward ultimately with a series of concessions that allow the Iranian regime to say, okay, we've reestablished credible deterrence and we're satisfied that we're not going to get attacked again because we've shown exactly what we can do and the chaos and the economic damage that we can rot. So what is your sense of all this kind of murk that we're looking at now that we've crossed this threshold for the first time, into a genuine global crisis that's outside of Donald Trump's control. So really important point that you have made here, is that Iran has a voice now.

Donald Trump could say I'm stopping war tomorrow. That's not good enough. The Iranians have to agree and they have to ceasefire. So he has only one of the two critical voices. The Foreign Minister of Iran has already said, and you can just hear the difference in the way the Iranians are speaking this week as opposed to last week, right? There's confidence. They understand that frankly the momentum is with them now, not with the United States. I think that's true, as surprising as that is.

And actually, just said, we will only ceasefire if the United States guarantees. that they will not attack us again. We're not getting into any substantive negotiations about our nuclear program. That will come later. We need an ironclad guarantee from the United States that they will not attack us again. Now I was even surprised to hear that

because who would believe? You know, what does that mean an iron cloud guarantee? But effectively, this is about Donald Trump saying publicly, this regime stays in place. renouncing regime change as a goal of this campaign. That's a big ask for this present, because he would have to climb down from an objective that he established the first night.

He's walked it back several times in those incoherent press conferences, but that's a big one, frankly. Second more worrying thing is, the United States has squandered its coercive advantage. Let me just tell you what I mean here. The Iranians were at the table talking about their nuclear program and under tremendous pressure because the threat was most powerful before it was enacted, right? And yes, they said they would continue to insist on some kind of arrangement,

but they could have been rich to 5%. They could have, in fact, disclosed where this enriched uranium is inside Iran and there could have been a consort of Gulf states to save everybody's face and the deal could have gone 25 years or forever if they stayed at the table.

Why would they come back now and make any kind of a deal about their nuclear program how credible the United States has renounced to squander the coercive advantage that it has.

And let's remember that when this is over and assuming that some version of this regime is in place, at least in the short term, they know where the Inverst Uranium is. And they're not going to hang around without it's going to be one of the first things that they move to secure. So this is a self-inflicted own goal that comes from the income. coherence, the lack of staffing, and the absence of any kind of strategic patient. Yeah, I think the thing that I've sensed this week is that you're right, the momentum seems to be with the Iranians. And I think one thing I don't know, I've come to appreciate is that, you know, there is an analogy to October 7. So bear with me.

On October 7th, when Israel was attacked, it was not simply the horrific violence of the atrocities committed. It was a loss of deterrence that the state of Israel experienced its enemies and foes, particularly Iran, but also Hezbollah and Hamas itself. Israel subsequently went on a series of highly effective and highly destructive wars against Hezbollah. and Hamas to reestablish credible deterrence. And it went further last spring and struck at Iran itself, in a sense to press that point home. I think what's happened here is that the Americans have misunderstood that the combination of the Israeli attack last year

and then the American bombing of Fodor and Tans was barely tolerated by the regime, but they did tolerate it. We've talked about it before. It was kind of like watching two dueling, you know, partners meeting at dawn and firing their pistols into the air. There were obligatory rocket salvos. But in the end, Iran kind of accepted that it was what it was. And the regime was in power, and there were lots of reasons for them to, to back down in both of those instances.

This third attack, though, Janice, I think, has, like October 7th, has shattered Iran's credible deterrence. It is an object lesson that it had no deterrence because both Israel and the United States felt that they had open license to attack Iran in the most broad and expansive way. I think over 6,000 munitions dropped on the country now in under two weeks. do you think, Janice, that we should anticipate Moran a similar strategy as that pursued by Israel, which is reestablishing credible deterrence doesn't happen overnight. This has to be proven out over a period of time so that it becomes real.

And the Iranian government feels from a security perspective that they've done enough damage to the United States through the global economy or, you know, to the, their Gulf neighbors to create in the minds of the United States, the Gulf states and Israel, a wariness about attacking this regime again in the exact same way that Israel, after October 7th, was very effective in establishing a great degree of wariness about picking a fight with the Jewish state. Let me say, Howard, it's not only the United States. that lost its capacity to coerce by actually engaging in war. But Israel has given up some of the benefits that it got first in the attack against Hiswala. You notice what's happening on the northern front.

That problem, Hisbalah was obliterate, but it wasn't, all right? And Hezbollah did not hesitate to go back. It's fired a token five missiles, but the war is now escalated, and this is a major confrontation. And I think it's, again, Israel has lost some of its capacity to coerce and to deter Iran as a result of where we are in this confrontation. And the bigger question is, what would it take for the United States and Israel to do this again? It's really hard to imagine that they would do this again, that Donald Trump would go back and do this again in a year or 15 months. And if the answer is, no, he won't, then the deterrent credibility of both Israel and the United States has been damaged.

On the other side, Iran, there's so many ways to think about this, but one way is the following. this war will end at some point. I don't think the intensity is so high and the pace is so high. It really can't go on for very long. And the Straits of Hormuz are still so important to the world. Pressure is going to build here very quickly to find some sort of solution. So where's Iran left? It's left with a radicalized, vengeful regime.

All right. This is now a revolutionary guard regime with Mastabath Khomeini as the figurehead. He was put in place by the revolutionary guards. The old clerical regime effectively over, and this is revolutionary guards. So this has changed regime. But it's radicalized. It believes that Israel and the United States are out for regime change. And it understands that it has the momentum.

now and it will seek revenge. This is not the same regime as was in place before. Secondly, the constraints of spaces, and let's just talk about those for a moment, antagonize everybody in the Gulf. Their memories are long. No friends. Look at the resolution that went through the United Nations. Astonishing, really, 85 countries signed that resolution, urging Iran to stop its attack on the Gulf.

It was already resource constrained in the sense that water was an acute problem in or on because of the lack of investment in their water infrastructure. It will be a nightmare now. And they will not be exporting oil for a while because, as you know, it's going to take some time to reopen those straits and to repair the damage, not to speak of the damage to their infrastructure. this regime, whatever comes out of this war, is also facing a hostile Iranian population. I don't think that their lifespan will be very long. And they're also now demanding reparations for the attack on Iran. And it seems like the large-scale damage that's been done to UNESCO and World Heritage Sites and other. Yes, yes.

Other architectural kind of medieval Arab wonders of the Muslim world has increasingly turned the portions, greater portions, we don't know for sure, of the Iranian population against at least the war. It's not that they're favored of the regime, but it's hard to see these irreplaceable heritage and cultural sites being destroyed. Troy. Janice, we're going to say goodbye to our complimentary listeners and viewers. I'm going to join our monk donors on the other side of this short break. Monk donors get the first 72 hours of every premium audio and video content that the Monk debates released as a small thank you for their generous support. So please head over to triple W Monk Debates with an S.com. We are registered charity in Canada dedicated to returning civility and substance to the public square. So if you'd like to support that mission and get all of our best audio and video at full length,

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