The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Debates Podcast: Stephen Walt and Evelyn Farkas on Trump's plan for Ukraine and the changing world order

Episode Date: February 28, 2025

Harvard Kennedy School's Stephen Walt and the McCain Institute's Executive Director Evelyn Farkas join us to debate and discuss what a good peace deal for Ukraine would look like, Russia's imperialist ambitions, and how Trump's reverence towards strongmen like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are remaking the world order and challenging America's longstanding alliances.    The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

People don't like to hear this, but the way to solve this is going to involve both reassurances for Ukraine but also reassurances for Russia. No one who is steeped in, you know, Russia watching and Putin watching thinks that he's going to turn away from his imperial designs. Hi, monk listeners. Welcome to this, our regular podcast series on world events featuring two thoughtful and informed guests with vastly different perspectives. It's what we think we do best here at the Monk Debates, offering competing viewpoints on the big issues of the day to bring nuance and hopefully some keen analysis to our highly polarized world. Our guests on this series are Stephen Walt and Evelyn Farquist. Stephen Walt is the Robert and Renee Belfor professor of international affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School. He's also a calmist at Foreign Policy Magazine and one of the leading realist. scholars in America today.

Evelyn Farcas is the executive director of the McCain Institute at Arizona State University. And from 2012 to 2015, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. Evelyn, Stephen, welcome to the Monk Debates. Thank you so much. Nice to be with you. A lot to talk about, but where we have to begin, I think, is obvious. It's what's happening in Ukraine, the fast-changing policies of the Trump administration

regarding the fate and future of Ukraine negotiations with Russia, Europe, what happens next? Evelyn, I want to come to you first. I think all of us on this show are probably not fans of how the Trump administration is handling these negotiations and its push for a ceasefire and maybe ultimately a peace settlement. But should we, acknowledge that it was time for this war to end, and while it may be ending imperfectly and on terms that are less than ideal, the inevitable is happening, and President Trump is bringing that about? No. So yes, we should acknowledge the fact, Rudyard, that it's time for the war to end, that both sides are tired, that it was a war of aggression that Russia launched, you know,

against Ukraine, unprovoked, and it should never have started. Having said that, it can only be ended under terms that ensure that Ukraine is not re-invaded by Russia, because Vladimir Putin has made it very clear in his writings and in his spoken utterances that he is interested in reconstituting a kind of new Russian empire with Ukraine as the starting block, with Ukraine at the core, and then including other countries as well that are now independent. So we need to make sure that Vladimir Putin's foreign policy is stopped, not just that the war is stopped. Okay, Stephen, let me come to you. What do you think? Maybe an end here that could have been brought about on different or better terms,

but the killing could, should, will end, and the sooner that happens, the better. I agree. Some of what Evelyn said, but not everything. I mean, I agree it was time for the war to come to an end. And I believe if Kamala Harris had become president, she would have moved rather directly to try and bring the war to an end as well. Where I agree is that the way in which it's ended does matter. And you want to do it in a way that gets Ukraine the best terms possible. That doesn't appear to be what the Trump administration cares very much about. I think the Ukrainians were clinging to a set of unrealistic expectations. The idea, for example, that they were going to regain their lost territory, I think, was not in the car.

and in that sense, recognizing that fact was important. But the United States and Ukraine's other backers wanted to get it the best possible deal, and most of that revolved around the security arrangements that would then be part of either a ceasefire or a subsequent peace settlement. Where I disagree is whether or not this is like the first step in an attempt to reconstitute some new Russian empire. I think there's actually very little evidence of that. And the real question that we'll see going forward is if we do get this war stopped, is that really where Putin's ambitions end? I believe if we get a reasonable agreement there, the likelihood of Putin then trying for something else is quite small. So, Evelyn, if we accept Stevens contention here that

Russian aggression does not extend beyond Ukraine to Poland or the Baltic nations, does that open up some flexibility. And again, maybe does it suggest that some of the latitude the president is taking is on point? In other words, NATO membership for Ukraine isn't required. A pathway to European membership isn't a necessity for a long-term settlement of this conflict because, again, Russia has been beaten to a pulp, frankly, by this war. They paid a heavy price. And they'll be satisfied with whatever territorial concessions are granted to them in a settlement? Well, they have been beaten to a pulp. They are very weak economically. They have lost incredible amounts of manpower. You know, it's staggering. I think it's something like 800,000

or more Russians have been killed or injured. So that's, that's just mind-boggling. And again, as I said, stunning. But again, Vladimir Putin has made it very clear. There's tons of evidence It's written and verbal about what he's trying to do. He has started, he started bemoaning the fall of the Soviet Empire almost as soon as he came to office 25 years ago. And since then, he's made it even more clear, again, in writing and in speeches, that he would like to reconstitute the former Russian empire that Ukraine is not a state, that the Ukrainian people are not entirely different ethnic people from Russia, that Ukraine should not exist as a sovereign

state. He's kidnapped hundreds of Ukrainian children, brought them by force to Russia and is holding them there. That's why he's actually got an arrest warrant over his head from the international criminal court. And of course, there are many more examples. But don't just take it from me, the Europeans themselves, our NATO allies, are quite worried about Russia invading their countries and trying to test NATO. So I don't think that we want to test Vladimir Putin. I think we want to make sure that we get the best deal for Ukraine that keeps the rest of Europe safe as well. Stephen, what do you think about that? Is it going to be a necessity that if we want this war to truly end and we want a chance that peace will be enduring, that we are going to need serious

substantial security guarantees, possibly the deployment of peacekeeping or other forces, NATO forces or NATO countries, maybe not as a NATO force, but NATO armies into UK. Ukraine and a quick pathway for Ukraine to European membership. People don't like to hear this, but the way to solve this is going to involve both reassurances for Ukraine, but also reassurances for Russia. Because the tap root of this conflict was not some genetic Russian desire for imperialism. The tap root of the conflict was their fear that the United States and its European allies were gradually moving closer and closer to Russia and going to incorporate Russia into NATO

eventually were increasing security cooperation with NATO, and that posed in the minds of Russians an existential threat. Lots of evidence to support that, and of course, American intelligence and American diplomats had been reporting that steadily back to Washington for more than a decade. And we never stopped. We kept pushing, and eventually Russia launched an illegal war to end that process. So if, you know, the United States were still trying to bring Ukraine into NATO, the war would not come to an end. Ukraine will definitely need some set of security guarantees. And one of the things that should be done in the negotiation is to work out what those terms are. How much collaboration with outside powers is permissible, et cetera. I think all that's very important. And I worry that the Trump

administration isn't going to pay any attention to any of that. And therefore, Ukraine will be some want more vulnerable. I think it's also worth remembering that, first of all, the Russians have had a terrible time trying to occupy just 20 percent of Ukraine over three years. So the idea that they're suddenly going to then turn and go after Poland to go after the Baltic states, I think is not very credible. Moreover, it's not obvious to me that they want to occupy the rest of Ukraine. What that does, it means that they now control millions of Ukrainians who are going to be extremely angry and looking for every opportunity they can to take a shot at the Russian occupiers. I don't think there's any real reason for Putin to want that. And people love to quote

selectively different things Putin has said. What they never quote is something he also said, which is that, you know, anyone who doesn't regret the loss of the Soviet Empire has no heart, but anyone who thinks we can get it back has no brain. And I think he realizes that as well. Evelyn, I mean, I'm sure you feel differently regarding the origins of this conflict. I want to hear the rebuttal to Stephen's argument. At one point, Putin also said that, you know, Russia could be part of NATO. That was, of course, early in the, you know, 2000, 2002 timeframe. So very early in his rulership, if you will.

But I think what is important, I do agree that we need to make sure that this is a durable piece, not a ceasefire. because I don't think that Putin, I agree that Russia is weak. I don't think that Russia is going to turn around the next day and attack Moldova or a NATO ally unless they really see some kind of red light coming from the White House. Otherwise, what Russia will do is take its time and reconstitute unless there's a change of leadership, but we can't guarantee that. We can't count on that because I do think there's a possibility that we could have another Russian leader or another group of leaders who are less revanchist and less neo-imperial. But right now we have Vladimir Putin,

that's a reality. And no one who is steeped in, you know, Russia watching and Putin watching thinks that he's going to turn away from his imperial design. So it's just a question of when. And so we need to make sure that Ukraine is equipped to deter Russia. But Ukraine can't deter Russia alone, we know that. And frankly, the fear that I have and many others have and Europeans have is that Europe can't deter Russia from invading Ukraine again or even invading Europe again, that America, the United States and our power is necessary to deter Putin from invading Ukraine again and also from invading some other country in NATO. Stephen, let me just to kind of build on Evelyn's argument there, because I think what

a lot of people are concerned about is that if Russia walks away with a significant amount of territory here, in a sense, awarded, yes, they've paid a horrible price for this illegal invasion, but nonetheless, they've acquired hundreds of thousands, millions of square kilometers of territory. What does that do in terms of their inclinations and willingness, maybe not to invade the Baltic countries or Poland or any other Eastern European nation, but to continue to meddling their fares, to undermine their democracies, to, you know, so disinformation. The fact is, aren't we, in a sense, allowing Russia another whack at the ball? It may be a different type of swing, but they're going to keep on swinging because we haven't

pressed them into a piece that hurts. Well, first of all, remember, the ship has sailed here. Ukraine did not win the war. Ukraine's offensive in the summer of 2023 was a failure. One can argue we should have done more. You could argue that the United States and NATO should have sent their own troops to fight for Ukraine, although there was no popular support for doing that. But we are where we are now. And the idea that you can reverse that by somehow rewriting the last three years, I think is wrong. Now, I think the larger question is, what is the larger European security order going to be going forward? I think that's a very legitimate question. And that has to be a security order that makes European countries feel reassured and safe. But of course, one aspect of making European feel safe is not having a Russia that also feels that it has to do things to try and challenge the existing security framework. And I obviously don't endorse any of those things.

I oppose them, but they're going to continue until Russia feels perhaps both deterred, but a key part of deterrence is also reassurance. And for the last 30 or 40 years, the security order we've been trying to build is one where it was basically based on open-ended NATO enlargement without much regard for Russian security concerns. And we now see what that resulted. It resulted in a tragedy for Ukraine and a terrible relationship between us, between Russia and Europe. So if you're thinking long term, you have to think about what that larger European security, order is going to be. My last point is simply to remind everybody that there are roughly 500 million people in Europe, only 140 million or so Russians. Europe's combined GDP is about eight times

that of Russia. And in fact, Europe combined can spend more on the military every year than Russia does as well. So yes, in the short term, an American role in Europe is very important. But if Europe gets its act together, it's able, I think, to deter Russia quite effectively. not immediately, not next year, but over time, and the United States should be working actively and cooperatively with Europe to build up European capabilities to where they don't need American protection. And I would agree with that. I do think that Europe could certainly beat Russia militarily if they do everything that Professor Walt just outlined. The problem is, of course, that right now you have a Russian military led by an autocratic leader. He can just tell them to do

whatever of over a million battle-tested individuals who have committed war crimes on a scale that we haven't seen since World War II on Europe's borders. And I would also say, I don't like creating an equivalence between Russia's security concerns prior to launching their invasion of Georgia in 2008 and then also the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Because there were mechanisms for Russia to raise their security concerns. They raised them diplomatically. We had an ongoing conversation mechanism inside of NATO. I won't get won't get won't get won't get wonky on that. But the Russians chose to invade those two neighbors of theirs rather than continue to have discussions and to continue to simply deter Europe from invading Russia if that was their fear.

But the reality that these countries chose of their own volition to join the European Union and in some cases to join NATO, that was a sovereign decision that they were allowed to make under international law. And likewise, the alliances were also empowered to make the decision to let them in. So Russia was trying to veto what smaller states wanted to do in terms of their sovereignty and their international associations, which was something that the international order did not consider legal. And we, the United States, of America did not consider in our interest or in the interest of those states. As we move towards the end of this terrific conversation, rich conversation, I want to talk a little bit about another country that seems to be vetoing the decisions of smaller nations and states. And that is the United States. The administration of Donald Trump here, Stephen, seems to be bent on negotiations with Russia that cut out Europe. The latest news is that there will be meetings in in Turkey as soon as next week, that those meetings will not feature European voices. They will not feature anyone from the Ukraine. It will be a bilateral negotiation between

the Trump administration and Putin's regime. What's your take on that? I think in a way, that's far more significant than anything else we've talked about, because the Trump administration seems to have come into office actively hostile to many of America. Americans closest traditional allies. It's really quite fascinating. Donald Trump appears to be very comfortable dealing one-on-one with autocratic leaders and not just Vladimir Putin. That also includes Xi Jinping. That includes Mohammed bin Salman. That includes someone like Erdogan in Turkey, Nehendra Modi, who's democratically elected in India, but has some autocratic tendencies as well. I would add even Benjamin Netanyahu.

Those are the kind of people. Kim Jong-un, North Korea, that he's very comfortable with. He's not been comfortable with traditional democratic leaders. He didn't get along well with Angela Merkel, didn't get along well with Justin Trudeau, as you know, up in Canada, and has been far more aggressive in going after them and sends his vice president to the Munich Security Conference

who doesn't meet with the Chancellor of Germany, but meets with the leader of a far-righter. extremist party. So this is what's, I think, really most worrisome is that in effect, he would like a sort of great power concert of autocratic leaders and is in many ways hoping to try and engineer the kind of political transformation in Europe that he's trying to engineer here in the United States. The thing that worries me most about this is, look, the United States is an incredibly powerful country. And other states have been willing to look the other way when they disagreed with us, back us up when it really counted because they thought we were a relatively benevolent great power.

Donald Trump appears to be changing that. We're going to be a malevolent great power. If we want Greenland, we'll take it. If we want to annex Canada, we'll try to take that too. And this is a very different America that's going to push lots of other countries to start hedging, to start distancing themselves from us and in some cases to start forming coalitions designed to keep the United States in check. And that's not good for the United States in the long term at all. Evelyn, let's give you the last. Yeah, Evan, let's give you the last word in this great conversation. Yeah, I mean, I agree. I just came back from Munich.

But I just make one point about what's happening in Canada here because, you know, we're up at night in some ways, not simply because what we're seeing from the Trump administration, as as Stephen said, that's worrying enough. we're now worried that there's a precedent that's taking shape in Europe where Vladimir Putin is being allowed to keep these conquered territories. He's being allowed in a sense to have a sphere of influence and act within it seemingly with a high degree of impunity. To what extent, Evelyn, should all of us be worried that the Trump administration might similarly be looking for the same kind of permissive structure for it to operate here in North America and whether it's greeneruneration. And whether it's

Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, this might not just be rhetoric. This might be the basis of a kind of strongman theory of international relations that your president is bent on prosecuting. Yeah, I mean, I agree with everything that Stephen said. And I am also deeply concerned. I was in Munich. I saw all the speeches there. President Zelensky's speech was actually the one that shook me the most because

he basically said, Europe, if we're gone, are you guys ready to defend your And then I went from there to Taipei, where, of course, the Taiwanese are incredibly nervous watching what happened with Putin. They're thinking the next conversation is between President Trump and President Xi, again, you know, agreeing with Stephen on how President Trump seems to like dealing with these strong men. It's a very dangerous world because President Putin all along has been pushing this idea of going back to the 19th century sphere of influence system, you know, put dumping the UN system into the, you know, into the garbage camp. even though for all of its flaws, it's kept us out of a large global war on the scale of a World War I or World War II. And so I'm worried that President Trump might adopt this mindset that President Putin might convince him, you can have North America and South America, I'll take Europe and China can have

Asia and, you know, we can rule the world. It's simplistic, it's dangerous. And I do hope that our Canadian friends understand that President Trump, was narrowly elected. It wasn't a landslide. And I will tell you, and I think that the good professor will agree with me, most Americans want to be a country that upholds universal values and that acts according to those values. And we know from our history that we haven't always done that, but we like to be a strong country, but a country that is, if you will, principled. So most Americans will not like a foreign policy if it does evolve the way that you have described.

Stephen, I want to give you the last word in this conversation, sum it up for us. What should we take away from the half hour we spent together? I would like to think that Americans will be that upset by it. I'm not entirely sure. If you look at the span of American history, we've done some pretty hard-nosed things in the past. So I'm not entirely sure about that. I wanted to raise a slightly different issue that's connected to this. And that's this question of trust and reliability.

So, for example, I don't think what happens in your... Europe and Ukraine necessarily affects what happens in Asia with Taiwan. I can understand why Taiwanese are nervous. You can make a case that if the United States is less engaged in Europe and pivots and focuses more attention on Asia, that that might actually make Taiwan safer. And there are people in the Trump administration like Elbridge Colby who've been making that argument for a long time. The question is, does Trump actually follow through? What worries me, of course, is he doesn't appear to believe in long-term commitments with anybody. He declared that the U.S.-Canada-Mexico trade agreement was an incredible deal back when he signed it. And of course, he takes office in the second term and

immediately wants to tear it up and inflict tariffs. The difficulty there is when other countries can't trust the United States to deliver on at least most of its promises most of the time, then there's no reason for them to cooperate with us. There's no reason for them to adjust their behavior in the expectation that we will follow through. So this is the shortcoming of a transactional approach to diplomacy. Other states start looking for partners who are more reliable, who will tell you what they want, and once you've got an agreement, we'll stick to it. And that doesn't appear to be the way that this president wants to operate. Well, Stephen Evelyn, thank you for a fascinating, rich conversation. Good thumbs up. Yeah, we covered all the good issues that I wanted, and I hope we would get to,

and we really look forward to doing this again with both of you. So until then, thank you from the Monk Debates community, and we look forward to continuing these conversations. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. The Monk Debates are a project of the Aurea and Peter and Melanie Monk Charitable Foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwitz are the producers.

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