The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Debates Podcast: Trump's trade wars with Jared Bernstein and Oren Cass

Episode Date: March 7, 2025

Can Trump's trade policies and US protectionism bring economic gains to the middle and working class? On this episode we hear from two people with vastly different perspectives:  President Biden's former economic advisor Jared Bernstein, and American Compass Executive Director Oren Cass, whose thinking on these issues have influenced a number of younger Republican politicians such as Tom Cotton, Josh Hawley and most importantly, Vice President J.D. Vance.     The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Hi, Monk listeners. Today we're talking about the economy and specifically Trump tariffs and his trade policies. We've got two thoughtful and informed guests with vastly different perspectives on offer. It's what we do best here at the Monk debates, offering competing viewpoints on the big issues of the day to bring balance and nuance to our highly polarized world. Orrin Kast is the founder and chief economist of American Compass, a conservative think tank who's thinking about trade policies and protection. has influenced a number of prominent Republicans such as Tom Cotton, Josh Hawley, and most importantly, Vice President J.D. Vance. Our other guest on the program is Jared Bernstein, the former chair of President Biden's Council of Economic Advisors. Orrin, Jared, welcome to the program. Thank you. Thanks for having me.

Could not be a more timely conversation to dig into everything economics. as some big changes come out of the Trump administration on economic and trade policy, certainly having impacts here in Canada and around the world. So, Jared, I want to come to you first. We've seen a flurry of activity from the president in the last number of weeks, specifically around tariffs, different countries, different levies, different sectors and industries being affected. how surprised are you by the scale, the scope, the seeming intensity, I'll put it politely as I can, that the president is bringing two tariffs as a key plank of his economic agenda?

Well, first of all, great to be with you and with Orrin. On a scale of 1 to 10 in terms of how surprised I am, I would score zero, meaning I am not the slightest bit surprised when the president says tariffs are my favorite word dictionary. I think we have learned to believe him. We've been to this rodeo before. I think a tougher question, maybe one will get to, but related adjacent, is why is the administration pursuing a tariff policy that seems to be deeply unpopular with almost, every sector, investors, of course, consumers who are nervous about higher prices, as well as producers themselves. And I would even add to that group the administration themselves, which continues to

walk back a matter of hours after they announced them, the very tariffs that they're threatening. So I would say not at all surprised. I think it's a lot, you know, it's trickier to figure out the rationale given the economic record. Thank you. So, Orrin, to come to you, let's step aside from specifics at this point because it's such a fast-changing kind of news environment on the tariff file. I want to hear from you a little bit about your kind of theory of the case of why, in broader terms, it could be. It should be in America's interest to see tariffs as a powerful economic tool that can help shape the economy in ways that this administration, promised in your most recent elections? Well, I think probably the best way to understand it is to start with sort of a basic principle

that certainly I think is correct, that making things matters, that not all GDP, not all economic activity is totally fungible and interchangeable. So, you know, with all of your industry moves overseas, but, you know, you open up lots more Chipotle's and barber shops, that we should just be indifferent between them. And maybe that sounds obvious. It's important to say that economists, in fact, have held very strongly to the principle that making things does not matter, that it is nostalgic and jingoistic to think you should care about the actual physical economy.

The models that they use, including to estimate the effects of trade policy, assume that making things does not matter. And we should be indifferent to the kind of things that we are doing in our economy. And behind that thinking, we obviously embraced a quite radical model of free trade. We embraced China. We said if things to be made in cheaper in China, then it is all to the good to make them there. The case for tariffs is the opposite of that. It's to say if we actually care about the kinds of things that are happening in our economy, if we think some kinds of investment are more valuable than others, then we actually want to have a finger on the scale in favor of

domestic production. We actually want to be concerned about trade deficits, which reflect essentially demand that is very much alive and well here in the United States that we are not serving from within the United States, nor are we finding other demand overseas to serve instead. And, you know, tariff policy, if done well, I think, can and does create very powerful incentives to, in fact, invest in domestic production. And I think that is something that it is encouraging to see the policymakers in Washington focus more attention on. So, Jared, let's come to you on this argument because it was at the core of your most recent

election. And now it seems to be driving a lot of the policymaking by the Trump administration. This notion that America has been a net loser in terms of global trade. and the division of labor, let's put it that way, in terms of the outsourcing of manufacturing to China, to Mexico, and to a certain extent with these tariffs applied to Canada, the goal is to re-shore, to create incentives for businesses to relocate behind the tariff wall into the United States, creating jobs,

and restoring important manufacturing capacity that maybe we'll get into this over the course of the discussion, seems to go beyond jobs. This is about national security. This is about having the capacity as a country to manufacture and make things that matter in terms of American sovereignty and, you know, the defense of America itself. Yeah, well, where you ended that question and some of what Warren was talking about happens to make a lot of sense to me. You mentioned the importance of national and economic security, which relates to making things here. Obviously, you know, I was a member of the Biden administration, so we're very proud of the

extent to which we were pulling in really very impressive magnitudes of investment to do exactly that, to stand up domestic production in semiconductors, in clean energy production, batteries, EVs, and so on. And that's very consistent, I think, with what. what both you and Oren were saying, where I think, you know, we depart somewhat is whether tariffs can get you there. I, for the record, think the tariffs can be a useful tool when targeted and a very unuseful tool, even a destructive tool, when sweeping. So a targeted tariff when, say, an unfair trading partner, China is the poster child for this, is trying to

dump over capacity into your economy, you know, they should definitely be tariffed and whoever's essentially exporting demand that way should be retaliated against. But the problem is with the sweeping tariffs, Orne was focusing on one effect, and there's three effects. The one effect that he was focusing on, and it's a true effect, is a change in relative prices. If you make an imported good more expensive, then there's every reason to the thing. think that domestic shoppers and investors will prefer the domestic good to the now more expensive imported one. And if it's stopped there, you know, the supporters of broad sweeping tariffs might have a point. The problem is there's two other effects. The first is the effect that I think of

as it's very hard to unscramble the globalization omelet. And by that I mean 45% of our imports are actually inputs into domestic production here. So when you tariff those intermediate inputs into our own domestic manufacturing production, you make producing here more expensive. Part three is retaliation. And we've already seen retaliation, even coming from our friends in the north,

but also up there, but also in Mexico and China as well. And you have to ask yourself, on net, do the relative price effects that Orrin was focusing on, what's their magnitude relative to part two and three, making domestic production more expensive and three retaliation? And all the research I've seen and all the evidence I've seen is that two and three outweigh one. And so sweeping tariffs are a bust. They hurt production here. They hurt employment here. I've got strong evidence on that from Trump one. So I do think tariffs can be a useful tool. I do think we should make things here. I do think, you know, that the trade deficit, it's not a scorecard, but it does embody some real

pain to American workers in American communities, and we should be mindful of that. Orrin makes good points on that front. But sweeping tariffs are an unfortunate tool, I think. Warren, let's have you come back on what you've just heard from Jared. Well, I think we actually agree mostly on his list there. I think that's exactly right that tariffs have a number of effect, they're not all a sort of a simple sword that you just kind of wave around over your head. I would make two sort of adjustments to the argument that he made, though. One is that I think how those three elements play out actually depends significantly on the existing balance of trade. And what I mean by that is, you know, I think we agree on

item number one. The point number two about intermediate goods would be a very important one. if what you were trying to do, if what you were focused on was boosting the global competitiveness of your producers. So if your theory of the case was we need to be a better exporter of cars, but we're going to tariff the steel that comes in, that goes into the car, that would obviously be a problem. You would end up with cars that were more expensive than the cars being made somewhere else. when like the United States you have a trillion dollar trade deficit to start with, what you're really overwhelmingly focused on is what gets produced and sold in your domestic market. You're hoping that more things that currently get sold into the domestic market from abroad

can instead be produced domestically. And you're hoping that the domestic producers that are already there can take more of that share in the domestic market first and foremost. And so while it is true that, you know, let's let's take semiconductors in an example, if a semiconductor plant setting up shop in the United States needs to rely on some, you know, set of inputs that is going to be some part of the cost of the semiconductor from overseas, that is going to affect how the semiconductor plant operates. selling that semiconductor made in the United States is still going to be far more cost effective than importing the semiconductor from abroad.

You would much rather have a semiconductor that had the tariff on a few of the elements that went into the factory than have to buy a semiconductor that had the tariff on the entire value of the semiconductor. And so I think if your actual focus is on the domestic market, on actually having a strong domestic market that is, in a way, protected from the kinds of distortions you're getting overseas, then I think actually you are much less concerned about what is happening to those intermediate inputs. The other thing I would then say about this point number three in the retaliation is likewise that you have a very asymmetric effect when you are starting from a point of a massive

trade deficit. And this is something that people have pointed out with respect to China in particular, You know, it is simply the case that China has much less that it can do to the U.S. than the U.S. has that it can do to China when the ratio of goods going each direction is, you know, three, four, five to one depending on how you measure it. And so, yes, there is retaliation, but it's really important to recognize that we are already in a trade war, in effect, that we are starting from a point where we're massive distortions and protective barriers in other countries. have contributed to the imbalances that we're dealing with. And so I struggle with the argument, well, you shouldn't do anything because then the other folks will retaliate when it is the fact that the other folks are already doing so much that has in effect put us in this position. If you're enjoying the Monk Debates podcast, come over to our website at triple W monk debates.com. That's MUNK DebateswithanS.com and check out our free monk membership. As a complimentary monk member, you get all kinds of great perks and benefits, access to our weekly email,

summarizing our best debates, and ticketing privileges at our main stage debates, special news information, and offers all courtesy of the monk debates. You can grab your complimentary monk membership again right now at triple w monkdebates.com. Simply look to the top navigation on the website and follow the last. links. Thanks in advance for joining our community. Jared, let's hear you on the topic of the trade deficits that the United States confronts. Because I think it's for lay people like myself, it's complicated. In the case of Canada, yes, there is a trade deficit, but it's the result of large energy exports from Canada into the U.S. where you access our energy at prices that

are low compared to other, you know, global benchmarks for hydrocarbons. So, I mean, how, for the Biden administration, how critical was, let's say, in the case of China, because that is the United States' largest trade deficit, is Warren Wright that, you know, we're starting from a situation that is, to say the least, exaggerated in terms of the balance of trade between China, the United States. So therefore, actions such as tariffs are necessary in order to deal with a situation that shows no sign after what is it now. How many years since China's entry into the WTO shows no sign of resolving itself on its own? About 25, I think. 25, yeah. So first of all, let me just clarify one thing more and said. He kind of ended his last

intervention by saying something like, you can't just sit there and not do anything or you won't want to do that. I want to be very clear that that's far from my position. And I think I have a good track record of doing things, although there are probably some critics who would say, you know, that's not the track record they're looking for. But certainly in the international trade space, I've long supported all the way back to NAFTA. Actually, let me take a slight break before I get to your question. Because I think it's informative here. And I think consistent with some of what Oran was saying. You know, I went to work at the Economic Policy Institute in 1992, having come out of graduate programs and economics, and learning all the rules of free trade

as in all benefits and no costs. I went to the Economic Policy Institute that was waging this really intense fight against the North American Free Trade Agreement, which I know you folks up there know very well. And all of a sudden, I'm cast into this think tank. where it was clear to the folks there, and eventually clear to me, that trade has both costs and benefits. And you can't ignore the costs and simply emphasize the benefits because, you know, A, that's economically wrong, but B, it will get you into the political pickle that we are really stuck in now. because people are hurt by that false assumption, and they will vote their hurt in ways that gives rise to a politics of the type that I think is showing itself to be extremely problematic, to use a polite word.

So on the trade deficit, I think we have to be somewhat nuanced and case by case on how we think about this. I think it's a mistake to say there's this broad, big number, and it's bad, and it should be, you know, a lot smaller. I think what you have to ask yourself is, what are the sources of that deficit? To the extent that it is what economists call mercantile trade, meaning that you as a country, not the U.S., China does this, others, Germany has done this in the past, some other Europe, you are suppressing your consumption and investment. such that you are exporting your excess savings, your excess production to other countries at considerable cost to those countries, that is, your essentially imbalancing or distorting, I think was the word or in use, domestic demand by flooding that country with overcapacity

because your model, the China model, in some cases it has been the German model at some points, is so export-oriented, that's the mercantile part. that you're going to eat somebody else's lunch in order to improve your own economic conditions. In those cases, and I said this earlier, I'll underscore it again, tariffs are important, and they should be targeted. We did this in the Biden administration, but we're subsidizing, standing up domestic production very much in the spirit of what I think Orrin was asking for. I think we're probably doing it more with carrots than with sticks, both in clean energy production and in semiconductors we work. But that's,

was incentives to investors. But at the same time, we were tariffing the heck out of Chinese excess over capacity kinds of exports from them here in the areas of solar panels, clean energy, electric vehicles, minerals, things like that. And that's an area where I think the trade deficit is distortionary and exacerbated. But when I think of Canada and Mexico, for example, I don't think that at all. all. I think that that's, and I would probably put Japan and a bunch of other European countries in that, in that bucket as well. I think trading, you know, robust trading with, you know, reliable friends

is a great way to increase your global supply that helps you in terms of both economic growth and prices. At the same time, you have to make sure that you're pursuing full employment, domestic production here in our country. So I have a very much both and perspective. So, Orrin, I mean, is it, is China in your view the sine qua non? Is that the problem? Or is it legitimate to look at tariffs and the type of, let's call it, economic nationalism that the Trump administration is pursuing vis-a-vis countries like Canada and Mexico as fair game also because, yes, there's manufacturing and other capacity in Mexico and gas. Canada that conceivably could be resured to the United States that could provide jobs, that could

add to your manufacturing base. And you have, you have the market. We want to be in that market. We want to be selling our goods into that market. So you have the ability to change fundamentally how manufacturers in, let's say, not China, but in Canada, Mexico, think about their own futures as companies and businesses? I think China is in a category of its own for a number of reasons. The scale of the mercantilism, the scale of the resulting distortions, the reality that it is an adversarial authoritarian non-market economy. I mean, there are a lot of things that kind of put China its own class. But I think then when you get to something like Canada and Mexico, you know, I would argue that Jared's answer was a little bit question begging.

in that he switched quickly back to, well, you want mutually beneficial trade and robust trade, and everyone can benefit from that, which I absolutely agree with. But we just skipped over the question of why we have massive trade deficits, even within USMCA, why there is a giant trade deficit with Mexico, let's say. And there, I think it comes down to a sort of partly very practical, partly philosophical question of what do we, what do we really mean by trade in a sense? I mean, it would be terrific if there were lots of things in this larger market that Mexico was making efficiently, that it was selling into the United States. And in return, there was all sorts of stuff that the United States was making and selling to Mexico.

The economic models are correct that that can be very beneficial to both sides. To a significant extent, though, going all the way back to NAFTA, that's not quite what happened. What the trade deficit reflects is instead in exchange where Mexico makes stuff that in the past we would have made domestically and sends it in the United States. But instead of being a bigger market for new things that the United States can make, what Mexico trades for its production is American assets. And economists like to call this, quote, investing in America. But let's be realistic. For the most part, there's no actual useful investment going on. what it means is that Mexico is acquiring, not stuff that we produce, but ownership of our real estate, ownership of our corporations, a lot of treasury debt, other debt, just pieces of paper saying we will pay you someday later. And that relationship, whether it's with China or Mexico, is a fundamentally broken one, I would argue. So, Ryan, let me jump in there because a lot of what Orrin said there, I have to say I disagree.

with and I see differently. So first of all, I just wouldn't characterize our current trade deficit as massive. You really have to look at this as a share of GDP, and we've been in the three to four percent range for years now. And by the way, over the Trump years, that didn't change. So there's a good lesson there about the impact of all this trade warrior stuff on your trade deficit. We can argue whether three or four percent is too big or too little, but that's been pretty close to the average for a long time. I think where I get concerned is I think it was in the maybe latter 90s where we had trade deficits that were 6% of GDP. And in fact, we've seen China with trade surpluses that are even larger than that. I think those are globally distortionary. But I would

reject the massive adjective. Secondly, I just think about what we're doing. Maybe this gets to kind of the nub of our disagreement. I would think about what's going on in Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, very differently than what Warren just described with, you know, these different dynamics of assets and treasury bonds and who's eating, who's lunch. I think we have a North American production system. I think automobiles are the best example. And it's been working really pretty well for a pretty long time. And by the way, that's just not me who thinks that. The Trump administration, of course, in their first term, orchestrated a trade deal that was very much in the spirit of bolstering North American production. We have shown time and time again that we can

achieve full employment, that we can support workers in our manufacturing sector, and, you know, equally important, a word that has, I shouldn't say equally, far more important in terms of just the numbers, the shares. So I very much support, uh, business. building things here, making things here, having a robust manufacturing sector. But look, the fact of the matter is is that we have way more workers in the services. Even a country like Germany, which has had persistent trade surpluses for decades, has lost manufacturing employment as a share, meaning increased service employment as a share. So when we focus, when we overfocus on that sector, I think we risk losing the importance of a better

jobs in services where more and more people are going to work. I just wanted to make sure that was part of the discussion. So, you know, just want to be very clear about this. I think we should be careful quantifying or which adjectives we are using about the magnitude of the trade deficit and historical terms relative to share of the economy. And secondly, there is, you know, nothing wrong in a lot right with a regional production system. respectfully, that was a giant pile of non sequiturs. I mean, of course, we're now mostly a services economy. That's not an argument against what we have been talking about this whole conversation,

that we do care about manufacturing, that we do care about trade deficits. And within that framework, again, the fact that we have a North American production system would be great. That sounds very nice. That doesn't explain why it's imbalance. and why from the perspective of capital investment and production and so forth, we are getting the short end of the stick. And so the question fundamentally... Let me ask you to define a term.

So what do you mean by imbalance? So our trade deficit with Mexico is about $64 billion. I'm sorry, Mexico is about $170 billion. Our trade deficit with Canada is about $64 billion. Put them both together and you're still well under 1% of GDP. So say more about what you mean by that. Well, first of all, I don't think it's a share of GDP is the right way of looking at it when you're looking at a bilateral relationship. I'm interested in it as a share of the trading volume. That is, what is the ratio of what we are buying from Mexico to what Mexico is buying from us. And, you know, there's a second very interesting debate to be had about whether we should care about bilateral deficits at all, you know, versus accepting that you'll have deficits with some places and surpluses. with others. And in a world where we actually did have deficits with some and surpluses with others,

and it was moving toward balance overall, that could in fact be fine. In a world where we are sort of systemically and consistently in deficit with, I would say, most of our major trading partners. And we've already talked about China as sort of, of its own, you know, in its own class, but then looking at something like this North American market and recognizing that even within that, I would say that trade is not working as well as it could, and trade is not working as well as it should. And so, you know, the compared to what, in my mind, is, well, what would it look like if we did have balanced trade? What would it look like if you had within NAFTA, now USMCA, a world where, yes, some things that we used to make here started being made in Mexico,

but just as many things that used to be made in Mexico, now we were making. And you can do your comparative advantage charts on the blackboard if you want. You can see how that would, in fact, make us all better off. But I think unquestionably, that would be a better outcome than the one we have. And so I guess that would sort of be the question I would pose to Jared is the sort of structure that has solidified within the North American market. Do you think that is a better one for the U.S. than one in which we did have balance? I think it's challenging to take what Orrin is saying and understand it in a concrete way that would impact jobs and incomes and wages and ways that I think we both care about.

So we take autos. So we have a North American production system for cars. I think it works quite well. You want to get to balance. Well, our trade deficit with Canada, I believe most of the market. recently was in the $60 billion range in their recent years where we had a trade surplus. I think relative to the way this system is working for workers, for auto workers, for prices, for groceries, for American farmers who export extensively to both of those countries,

is much better than any solution, you know, I've heard from you or from anybody else. So the question of how we get to balance and why we need to get to balance has to be weighed against how you get there. Now, the way the Trump administration wants to get there, and I'm not sure, you know, if you're for this or against it, is through these sweeping tariffs. I can tell you that the evidence, and I suspect you'd agree with me, is, you know, very clear that that dog won't hunt. That won't get you there. The relative price effects are going to get slumped by the input effects and the retaliation effects. So that doesn't get you there. So I guess what I'd like to hear from you is what is it that you want to do concretely to get to balance

and explain to me why that's better for workers making cars now between, you know, Michigan and Canada or trading agriculture with Mexico than the current system? Well, I appreciate that we've sort of conceded the point on why we're talking about balance and moved on to how to get there because I agree that the how to get there is a lot harder and there's downside cost with doing it poorly. And I would certainly say that some of the wild swings out of the gate from the Trump administration are in that latter category. But I think to make it incredibly concrete and sort of thinking at the margin, you just had

last week an announcement from who was it? Was it Honda that a civic plant that they'd been planning to put in Mexico, they're going to put in Ohio instead. And so it seems to me that at the margin, even when you're talking about, you know, there are many upsides to the U.S., particularly I think with Canada integrated auto supply chain. If you extend it to Mexico, I think there are many more problems associated with it. But if at the margin you had a pattern of investment across North America such that a higher share of those supply chains, of the value chain, were being built in the U.S.

So that a higher share of the content of these vehicles being sold throughout North America were being produced by American workers, I think that would be beneficial. And how do you get from here to there? The question is, well, what is your diagnosis for why we aren't there? In other words, if you start from the sort of blackboard model of comparative advantage, and we're going to find things to trade with each other. It was, in fact, a core embedded assumption of all the classical economists, Smith, Ricardo Mill, that trade was of stuff for stuff, that the money was almost beside the point, that you were,

you were bartering in goods. And we have obviously gotten away from that in a way that fosters a lot of these imbalances. But I think it's really important to grapple with why it comes out this way. Why is it that the pattern of investment, the shape of the supply chains, has ended up being one that is not ideal from the perspective of the U.S. economy and U.S. workers? And I think there are two elements to it. I think one element of it is that other countries, including Canada and Mexico, have pursued more policies to make it relatively more attractive to build and invest and employ in those places, especially in Mexico, where, for instance, labor standards have typically been much lower.

And I think the second piece of it is a currency problem. And we'll probably have to save for another time a discussion of the strength or weakness of the dollar and how that plays into all of this. But I do think we need to be striving toward a global trading system and a North American trading system that actually makes sure that other countries understand that the equilibrium we are open to and looking forward to foster is one that is balanced, that the model of the U.S. as just protector of a global trading system, no matter how it works out for the U.S., is not a good model. Well, you know, look, again, and I want to let Runyard get it back in here, I hear a lot about

destination and not a lot about how to get there. You know, but I think you make a good point about the Honda plant. However, if you dig into that, it's at least my understanding, it's not a new plant. It's that they want to build Honda's in an existing plant in, I thought it was Indiana, but you might be right. And these vehicles, as I suspect, you know, they end. up with parts and production from Mexico, U.S., and Canada. Every car goes back and forth, parts go back and forth, and so all they're saying here, and it may be a good thing. And maybe something that both of us would agree is better than not.

But that's, that doesn't, that, I think that barely nudges the domestic content. That just dictates where the final product comes off the line. And again, you know, I think that what I haven't, you know, really quite heard is what's wrong with this regional integration. Now, you did make a very good point, though, which is if we're lowering costs by supporting lower labor standards in another country, you know, I think that is problematic and I think that's competitively problematic. And actually, again, USMCA, and this is under Trump, USMCA actually made some progress things. They actually gave some bargaining claim to Mexican unions, at least under, you know, Biden. And I think even under the Trump won. They pressed some of those cases.

So, you know, I take your point there and I agree with you. A sign of a great debate is when the moderator becomes completely obsolete. So honestly, my hat, if I had one, is off to you both. But I'm conscious of our time. So, Orne, I want to give you, in a sense, a quick rebuttal here. and then just in the spirit of equanimity, we'll let Jared wrap up the debate for us. That sounds great.

And I think there is a lot we agree on there. And the USMCA renegotiation, I think, is a good illustration of what we're steps in the right direction in a lot of ways. I think what you're hearing from the Trump administration and frankly, one possible way to understand all of the initial swings going on right now is an end game.

focused more on what is the next round of USMCA, which in fact has to be renegotiated next year. And there is both, I think, a desire to, again, look even further at those kinds of rules, which I think we agree done right can be to the benefit of U.S. producers. And then I think the other piece that is increasingly in focus is the idea that if you are going to have this sort of integrated North American market, it is going to have to more aggressively hold hands in how it collectively faces toward China. And I think one thing you're hearing a lot of from the U.S. from the administration, not necessarily Trump himself, but folks like Scott Besson, Treasury Secretary, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, is that part of what they have in focus is for those

whom we do want to have free trading relationships with, they are all going to have to agree with us on how we then present barriers toward a mercantless country like China. And so as I said, I don't think, the way that the Trump administration has come out swinging at Canada and Mexico is, is in all cases, the most constructive. But in terms of where on Canada and Mexico, I would like to see us go, it's not that big tariffs are the end game that solves these problems. It's that I do think a better trade agreement would be better for the United States. And as a matter of negotiation, some matter of willingness to say, we are not going to accept the status quo anymore. We are going to, in fact, insist upon some changes is potentially part of getting from here to there.

Thank you, Warren. So, Jared, wrap this debate up for us. What do you want listeners and viewers to leave with in terms of insights into, yeah, this very, very live live debate. It's playing out right now between Canada, the United States, around the world stage. It's going to be probably the center of this Trump administration for a number of weeks and months to come. Well, I like where Oren was just going there. And I'd probably extend it a little bit, maybe outside his comfort zone. But the idea of holding hands with your trading partners, I think is exactly the way forward, in part because I do think that a regional production. system like the one we've achieved with Mexico and Canada is a very productive and useful one.

Could be improved in the spirit that we've said, talked about in this debate. But that's the way forward. And also as a block against unfair traders, I think that's true too. I would extend that. I'd hold more hands maybe than Orrin would. You know, I think some of our European partners, Japan, those countries also should be our friends when it comes to a global trade. I think the one thing that I'd want folks to take away,

which is very much in the spirit of current events, and I'm pretty sure we kind of mostly agreed on this, is that the Trumpian approach to sweeping tariffs versus targeted tariffs is not a productive one. It does more harm than good. It did a lot more harm to good in Trump one, and I think it would, if implemented, do more harm to do more, harm than good in Trump too. Now, the Trumpies themselves seem to be dialing this back, so maybe

they're getting the message. But it's actually pretty hard to unite commentators like Paul Krugman on one hand and the Wall Street editorial board on the other. But they're all making that same point. And again, I think the administration might be hearing it. And so I would hope that listeners would take that point away as well. Well, Jared Bernstein, Orrin Kass, thank you for a civil and substantive debate. on an otherwise crazy time in economics and politics. So to have your cool heads prevail here and to share some thoughtful analysis and insight is greatly appreciated by our Monk audience.

So thank you so much for coming on the program today. This was terrific. Thank you. Excellent guys. Thank you so much. Viewers, thank you for tuning into this edition of the Monk Debates. If you're listening right now,

you can check out a video version on our website. just head over to triple W. Munk Debates.com. We'll see you there and we'll see you on this podcast feed. Thanks again for watching and listening. I'm Rudyard Griffiths, chair of the Monk debates. Bye-bye.

The Monk Debates are a project of the Aurea and Peter and Melanie Monk charitable foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwitz are the producers. Be sure to download and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. And if you like us, feel free to give us a five-star rating. Thank you again for listening.