The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Dialogue with Ambassador Dennis Ross: a new Middle East strategy

Episode Date: April 23, 2024

One of the most volatile regions in the world seems to be sitting on a tinder box. How can the international community avoid tensions between Israel and Iran from escalating further? Is it possible for Israel to achieve its war aims in Gaza without further inflaming the Middle East or jeopardizing the prospect of an enduring peace? It’s hard to find someone more qualified to delve into these questions than our guest on this week's podcast. Ambassador Dennis Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process in the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama administrations. He also served as a special advisor on Iran to former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.   The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Executive Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Senior Producer: Daniel Kitts Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

You don't help the poor by making everybody poorer. The media has a frame, and the frame is Israel is the oppressor, and the Palestinians are the oppressed. I shouldn't be forced to acknowledge my privilege unless I desire for that to be part of my interaction with somebody else. What I know to be true and what all of my fellow Gen Z know to be true is that this is the most talented generation yet. With respect to every indicia of disadvantage, there is still a racial hierarchy. And though I am, of course, an Anglo, I'm certainly not a fucking Saxon. Hello, Monk listeners. Rudyard Griffith here, your host of moderator.

Welcome to this, our continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogues. These are in-depth questions and answers with some of the world's sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. On each Monk dialogue, we go deep into the big issues and ideas that are moving public conversation. Even by the standards of the Middle East, it's been a tense couple of weeks. As the war in Gaza rages on with no end in sight, two of the region's superpowers came close to an all-out war. Iran, which had never before attempted a direct attack on Israeli soil, fired off a barrage of missiles and drones towards the Jewish homeland. Israel and its allies were able to successfully repel the onslaught, but everyone knew that a response was coming. And sure enough, in the early hours of Friday morning last week, Israel struck back at targets in Iran.

It was a more modest response than many anticipated. At least for now, Iran seems content not to retaliate. Still, one of the most volatile regions of the world seems to be sitting on a proverbial tinderbox. How can the international community avoid increasing tensions between Israel and Iran from escalating further? is it possible for Israel to achieve its war aims in Gaza without further inflaming the Middle East or jeopardizing the possibility of an enduring peace between Israelis and Palestinians? It's hard to find someone more qualified to delve into these issues than my guest on this week's monk dialogue. Ambassador Dennis Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the region,

starting with the presidencies of H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama. He also served as a special advisor on Iran to former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Ambassador Ross, welcome to the Monk Dialogues. Good to be with you, thanks. So much to talk about, but as a scene setter, allow our audience to kind of begin to think where you're thinking from. Could I have you answer for us what you believe to be the current state of Israeli security or insecurity? as we enter this, the seventh month of the war in Gaza? Look, it's not only the right question.

It's an important question because I think Israelis are still suffering the trauma of October 7th. It's not just the sheer brutality of it. It was also the shock of it. It was the disbelief that something like this could happen in Israel, not saying, simply the surprise, but the unpreparedness, the time it took for the IDF to respond, the fact that you not only had unprecedented numbers of Israelis who were killed, but 253 taken as hostages, as young as nine months old, as 85, and the impact of that is still being absorbed. And so there's a, we've often talked in the past when I was negotiating, it was not only Israel's need for security, but it was a sense of security.

And I think what happened is Israelis lost that sense of security, and that's not a left-right issue. Historically, you might say the right in Israel tried to use security as a justification to explain why all sorts of approaches and issues and so forth. And the left was least susceptible to that line of argument. And now they're the ones who are just as much convinced of the need to restore a sense of security as anyone else. And the reality that it's still not reestablished is you have 80,000 people evacuated from their homes in the north, and you probably have still close to 70,000 evacuated from where they were living in the south. So that's a kind of constant reminder that the sense of security has not been restored, number one, Number two, that Israel is contending effectively with Iran and all of Iran's proxies is something else that sort of cements this notion that there's still much to be done.

So what you get is in Israel that is still living with a body policy, but still living with a profound sense of insecurity. Thank you, Dennis. If we think of the situation right now, we've just had this extraordinary attack of Iran from Iran. Iranian soil directly on Israel, followed up by a reprisal attack, a highly calibrated reprisal attack by Israel, and a war in Gaza that seems to have, I don't know how to characterize it properly, Dennis, stalemated, stalled. You pick the euphemism. Talk to us a little bit about where we find ourselves right now. I feel that the exchange between Iran and Israel effectively took a shadow war out of the shadows.

This is the first time since the creation of the Islamic Republic, since its emergence in 1979, that they attacked Israel directly from their own territory. And it was not for those who say it was meant to be just a statement. It was meant to be just a statement. or 15 drones and cruise missiles or a ballistic missile. You don't fire off 110 ballistic missiles, 30 cruise missiles, and 170 drones. This was not meant to be just a statement. It was a statement, but it was designed to inflict damage. That it failed says more about a combination of the Israeli capability, the fact that we and others helped, and that Iran is still not a match for the

Israelis technologically, that the Israelis could send three missiles in return and take out a radar that guides an S-300 defense missile system, which is effectively the most advance they've gotten from the Russians, shows, again, the kind of a symmetry here. We have an interesting reality that both sides decided they were going to use force against the other. Iran acted because Israel did what it has done frequently, which is to take out revolutionary guard officers who are in Syria, planning all sorts of attacks against Israel. And Iran wanted to say, okay, you can't do that any longer with impunity. And Israel wanted to respond by saying, we will continue to do it with impunity.

So they, you combine what amounted to both sides saying they were going to make a statement militarily, but they didn't want to make a statement militarily that was going to erupt into a wider direct war between the two. So this was within bounds, but they still crossed the threshold. So that's element number one. Now, how about the war in Gaza itself? It does seem like it's settled in at a certain level. On the other hand, the Israelis have basically dismantled 19 of 24 Hamas battalions. There are five left. One of the things I have wanted the Israelis to do, I have actually wanted the administration to do with Israel was to say, okay, you're not far from achieving your objective because you will have demilitarized Gaza. You were never going to eliminate Hamas any more

than we're able to eliminate ISIS. This is an idea, an ideology, you don't defeat ideologies militarily. So settle on an objective that is achievable. We and others can assume responsibility to help ensure that Gaza cannot be remilitarized. You can also tie. reconstruction assistance to Hamas not being in power. Truth is, no one is going to invest in Gaza if Hamas is in power because they will seek to do this again. So it seems to me that we are not that far from being able to achieve an end to the war if you define the objective in a way that's connected to something that these Israelis are not that

far from achieving. If you don't redefine the objective, then this is very much, as you said, an ongoing you know, it's basically it's an ongoing humanitarian disaster for the Palestinians who live in Gaza. But it's not making Israel any more secure. So for me, it's critical to sort of redefine, or at least define what the objective is and define how much is enough. And as I said, I don't think we're that far from being able to achieve that. Would be right to assess that seven months into this war, or Israel is now much of more insecure than it was after the attacks of October 7th, that there now is this new

doctrine asserted by Iran of not simply tit-for-tat strikes, but a threat of more direct retaliation on Israel itself for any strikes on Iranian assets, either inside or outside Iran. There seems to be done as some credible reporting this week that Israel had ideas for a bigger counterstrike that in no small part were were dialed back because of fears about Hezbollah increasing the war in the north, the intensity of it, and the large missile reserves that Hezbollah has that could threaten Israel proper, not just the northern border. and then Sinwar, unfortunately, continues to survive intact with a number of battalions in Rafa. Dennis, is it right to say that Israel has kind of, you know, through errors of a mission and commission, has backed itself into an increasingly deteriorating situation when it comes to its own security. I actually think there's a duality here. On the one hand, that I said earlier, the whole issue of sense of security has not been reestablished.

And there is, Israel is effectively fighting what amounts to a kind of seven front war. But that also connects you to something that is new and different. We've had two, I would say two developments that are unprecedented. One is Iran deciding that it will attack Israel with a large barrage from its own territory. But the other unprecedented reality is that one third of what the Iranians launched, the cruise missiles and the drones, to be specific, were not intercepted by the Israelis. They were intercepted by the U.S. through Central Command with the British and the French and Arab participants in Central Command playing a role.

Israel has always prided itself, both as a source of pride, but also even as a moral principle that it will fight its own battles and nobody fights for it. You know, we defend ourselves by ourselves. And yet, for the first time ever, it turned out that a third of what was launched against Israel was intercepted by others. One of the reasons Israel didn't, it restricted what it did was precisely because there was pressure from us to say, you know, you can't do this. And here's the, there's two, again, I'll say two elements that are new here. One is that in effect, when others contribute to Israel's defense, not in terms of we will provide you material support, but you do everything with the military support, the military support.

When we actually play an active role and others play an active role in Israel's defense, they have a right to say to Israel, okay, we play an active role in your defense. You have to take into account our needs, our concerns, and our interests as well. That's new. But it also reflects something else that from an Israeli standpoint should be positive, which is the idea of a regional coalition of which Israel is a part that will counter the Iranian, what I call the, they call themselves the axis of resistance. I call them the axis of misery because wherever the Iranians are connected to a country

and have major influence, that country is either failing or paralyzed with no prospects of the future. here is a coalition that Israel can be a part of, and it's not an abstraction. Maybe before, this would be a theoretical possibility. Now we've seen in practice that it's not a theoretical possibility, and that actually can contribute to Israel's security, and it allows Israel to have a strategy that can be more effective in terms of countering the threats to it, especially when there's so many of them. Fascinating analysis, Dennis, and really it rings true.

So apply that to then to the war in Gaza. If there is a kind of dawning on Israel's security establishment, that in fact they have more and able-willing allies than they might have realized, including possibly a Saudi Arabia that might welcome an opportunity to proceed with the previous plans that were derailed to officially recognize Israel and restore some form of diplomatic, and long-term economic relations, how could this map over Gaza for the benefit of everyone? I do see a connection here. The Biden administration and the Saudis are not backing away from the idea of brokering this normalization deal. The Saudis are requiring, however, that there be either an

end of the war, at least be some kind of unmistakable ceasefire or pause. It may not have to be an enduring one, but there has to be. They're not going to try to negotiate or finalize this deal so long as the war is going on. There is, and interesting for me, there's a kind of logical connection here. I would like to see an extended pause called a ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities, to allow that negotiation to take place. I understand it's problematic in some respects from an Israeli standpoint for a very simple reason. Hostages are still being held, and one of the things we've learned now is that

at least Yacacinwar has very little interest in releasing them. You had a U.S. compromise proposal, again, where I think President Biden, I say pressured Bibi Netanyahu to not just on the humanitarian issue, but specifically on the issue of giving his negotiators a mandate, a broader mandate to be able to negotiate. That was done. The Israelis did respond to the compromise American proposal, and Hamas not only rejected it, but they hardened their terms. They said, instead of, this was supposed to be 40 hostages released for a 45-day pause or cessation. And Hamas came back and said, we'll release 20, not 40. And there had been previously, they had agreed through Qatar

that there would be three phases to complete all this. There would be a clear link between the ceasefire and the release of hostages. And the first phase didn't require a commitment to a complete and enduring ceasefire. That would be only in the second phase. In this proposal, Amas

also not only reduced the number of hostages that would be released, they also said that there had to be the commitment to the commitment to the, and during ceasefire in the first phase. So they walked back what they had previously been prepared to accept. And so that indicates that they're not, at least Sinwar. Maybe the political leadership of Hamas is more interested,

but Sinwar, who is the guy who holds the hostages effectively, he is not. So you're not going to get what the administration, I think, in many ways, have built a strategy around a hostage deal that created a 45-day pause where they could go and they could negotiate, this final deal with the Saudis and get a breakthrough, it would require the Israelis to have a Palestinian component to this. The Saudis want to see a political horizon. They want to be able to say

we have achieved something for the Palestinians that has not been achieved in the past. What that precisely is hasn't been defined, at least the two sides, at least the U.S. and the Saudis haven't revealed in public. There's a long-wind way of saying. It seems to me that if you're not going to get a hostage deal, but you still need a pause, why not do the pause unilaterally? It is true you're breaking this link on ceasefire and release of hostages, but one of the things you're doing is you can address in this pause period, the 45 days, let's say it's, you know, let's say it's 45 days. You can put it in place on the ground, not just the ability to get humanitarian assistance in, which has gone dramatically up since the

Biden-Natina phone call, but there's still a problem with the distribution of it within Gaza so that it gets to the people who most need it. There's still an issue with how do you secure the distribution. You could use this 45-day period to basically put all that in place. You could use this 45-day period to be able to negotiate and try to produce this breakthrough. And at a certain level, I would ask the question, what is – it's not clear to me Israel's giving something up. The argument that they need to increase the military pressure on Hamas to get the hostages released, when they had five divisions in Gaza, which was true in November, it was pretty clear there was a lot of pressure there. Now they have one brigade.

So there's no way that brigade puts the same amount of pressure on that was previously the case, number one. Number two, Israel has pledged to the Biden administration. It will not go after the four battalions in Rafa unless they've evacuated the 1.3 million, 1.4 million Palestinians in Rafa. Well, they can't do that. That will take at least six to eight weeks, at least, maybe more. So they're not going to be going into Rafa in that period anyway. So if that's the case, it's not clear to me exactly what they would be giving up. It's clear to me there's a lot that could be potentially gained.

And if Israel calls a pause and Hamas still doesn't release any hostages, then the focus and onus shifts much more onto Hamas. I would have always liked to have seen that to be the case. But the simple reality is that has not been the case. The focus has been more on Israel. So it seems to me there is a way to connect all these. I would like to see this kind of, I'd like to see the administration propose to the Israelis a unilateral pause

because I see all the potential benefits from it. And the reasons not to do it strike me as not being particularly compelling when Israel isn't going to be acting in Rafah anyway. If you're enjoying the Monk Debates podcast, come over to our website at triple w monk debates.com. That's MUNK DebateswithanS.com and check out our free monk membership. As a complimentary monk member, you get all kinds of great perks and benefits, access to our weekly email, summarizing our best debates, and ticketing privileges at our member. main stage debates, special news information, and offers all courtesy of the Monk Debates. You can grab your complimentary monk membership again right now at triple W monkdebates.com.

Simply look to the top navigation on the website and follow the links. Thanks in advance for joining our community. One of the counterarguments to, you know it well, to the idea of a cessation and hostility, is that without the military destruction of Hamas and the capture of Sinwar and the other kind of leadership cadres of the organization, Hamas will reconstitute itself, that it has enough fighters,

enough supporters in the population, certainly a minority now, and they will be a formidable terrorist, organization operating throughout the strip sorting whatever ambitions Israel, the United States, the Gulf states might have for some kind of future for the region because that future amongst those partners does not constitute a future for Hamas. It's a fair point, but as I said before, the Israelis have dismantled 19 of the 24 battalions. Hamas is already no longer a military.

It's reverted to what it was before a militia, but it's not a coherent militia. These units that no longer exist doesn't mean all the fighters were killed or captured. You know, nobody knows the exact number who have been killed. But what we do know is they no longer have a command control structure. They no longer have units that are organized. They have lost most of their military industrial base. So the things that made them a military and made them a formidable threat, that has already been largely dismantled. They still exist, obviously. They still can cause trouble, clearly.

Just because they're no longer organized into units, there still are plenty of Hamas who are armed. Now, having said that, and your point is fair, but having said that, we also know that there are a number of of Arab states that are prepared to play an unprecedented role. I've spoken earlier about we've seen a number of thresholds crossed a number of things, a number of steps that are unprecedented. The Iranian strike from its own territory, but a coalition that actually actively comes to Israel's defense. Now, if there's a breakthrough on the Saudi, frankly, even if there isn't, I know from my own conversation with Arab leaders, there is a readiness for Arabs to go in to manage a transitional administration and even security with forces on the ground

if there's either a political horizon, which would be part of a breakthrough with the Saudis, or at least an unmistakable effort at reform on the Palestinian Authority. Why is the latter so important? Because those Arabs who would come in on the ground don't want to be in Gaza forever. and they want to be able to be in a position where they can hand off to a Palestinian alternative to Hamas. The combination of, I think, sheer exhaustion of the Palestinians in Gaza, the level of destruction and the requirement for reconstruction, and Arabs force administrative security, probably with some local Palestinians under their being folded into this,

maybe with some security contractors as well, that combination altogether, I think, would make it difficult for Hamas to resist, given the fact that they're weaker, given the fact that the public itself, I think, will react fairly negatively to Hamas trying to reconstitute itself in that circumstance, especially if it's going to cost reconstruction. Because, as I said, there will not be investment in reconstruction if Hamas in any way looks like it can divert materials, it can in any way reconstitute itself, because it just means we'll revisit this all over again. I think there's an interesting combination of factors here that would preclude Hamas from being able to come back in control and would limit its troublemaking capabilities. The price to Hamas of trying to do that in a circumstance where you have Arabs coming in, the population craving the ability to begin to restore life, I think all this together gives you the possibility. There is this point I was making shouldn't be underestimated. We focus on the issue of political horizon, but I can tell you from my talks with Arab leaders, they want to see a reform Palestinian authority.

They understand it might be 12 to 18 months before they could reconculted themselves in a reform way, so they could then come in to Gaza and be the alternative to Hamas. So there is a need to build a bridge from the time when this comes. conflict ends to when you have a housing authority that assumes that kind of responsibility. That is a critical element. We haven't seen it. We've seen a new prime minister announced. We've

seen no sign of any reform at this point yet. And that has to be a part of a process that gets us beyond Hamas. Otherwise, what I fear is you can end up with a vacuum in Gaza. Maybe that makes it possible for our mask. Maybe it makes other forces emerge. One thing we know from a lot of experiences that when there are vacuums in the Middle East, moderate forces never tend to fill it. I appreciate you letting us pressure test, you know, some really interesting thinking here, how to bring this conflict, if not to a resolution to some better state for everyone. But just to continue on this pressure testing. Talk to us a little bit about the political realities in Israel.

Yeah. How would they play into this type of thinking, the type of solution that you're proposing? Is this predicated on a new government in Israel? Do we simply have to acknowledge that there will be, there has to be a change in the current Israeli coalition that is supporting Netanyahu and that, you know, forms the basis of his authority within the war cabinet?

Look, there's no doubt in my mind that ministers Ben-Gavir and Smotrich will oppose everything I was just outlining from basically start to finish. The idea of a unilateral pause, they will oppose. A breakthrough with the Saudis that is predicated on a palsing component, they will oppose. the fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu depends on them now is one thing. What I'm in effect suggesting is there are ways out of this, but unless he makes a choice, you're going to find it difficult to proceed. For sure, there's going to be a political reckoning in Israel.

That's a matter of time. I can't tell you exactly when it's going to come, but it's a matter of time. There's no way that you've already seen today the head of military intelligence, who's from the beginning of assumed responsibility, said that he's offering his resignation and he will leave as soon as a replacement is found for him. He will not be the last of the military leaders to resign. You'll see the chief of staff. You probably see the head of intelligence, Shinbet. you'll see others resign and they will assume responsibilities. That will sharpen the issue that it can't be only the military and security elements

that assume responsibility because, after all, they were carrying out a policy. So they'll have to be the political echelon. You're going to see, if not resignations, there'll be a pressure point that produces an election at some point. And, you know, maybe if there's a breakthrough, with the Saudis and the administration is presenting the Prime Minister Netanyahu, here's what it takes to finalize this on the Palestinian side. Then he makes a choice.

And my expectation is if he really, if there is a clear choice that there's a deal here, he then has to think in terms of legacy from the standpoint, does he want his legacy to be October 7th or does he want his legacy to be that he presided over a transformation of the Middle East and Israel's changing, in a sense, the coalition that is much better equipped to counter the Iranians over the long haul. Again, continuing this kind of pressure testing approach, let's talk about Iran. Iran, as we've discussed, has articulated a new doctrine, what they call, what they've characterized as harsh and severe retaliation against Israel on the basis of attacks on

Iranian military and other assets, not only in Iran, but they seem to imply the doctrine extends to territories outside of Iran. We know, Dennis, don't we, that Hamas was able to turn itself into a functioning military because of Iranian assistance, persistent Iranian assistance. What do you see is the threats here for Iran to try to undo whatever progress might be made in a Gaza undergoing a ceasefire and then contemplating options beyond that? How could those threats be thwarted? I think this is a really critical question because in a sense, these more positive future we've been discussing is obviously a negative future from the standpoint. of the Iranians, and will they do nothing in the face of that. I think you have to assume that

they're unlikely to sit back and do nothing. Now, having said that, I'm not sure we've seen a real change in Iranian risk-taking propensity. I think part of the reason for what they did was a perception that Israel was alone, that there seemed to be signs of dissonance with the United States, and this was a moment where it could carry it off. And yet, this doctrine, as you described it, of harsh retaliation, Israel in the end, hit in Syria in response, may have hit in Iraq. It's not entirely clear, but it certainly hit in Iran, even if highly calibrated. And Iran, you know, said, you know, basically acted as nothing had happened, which is to say the Iranians, decided they really weren't interested in continuing this. So my guess is their efforts at trying

to thwart the kind of scenario I was outlining will again revert to a use of proxies and different kinds of terror threats. The question is, is that enough? The fact that the Saudis, as part of this breakthrough, what do the Saudis want? The core is a defense treaty with the United States. And that's because the Saudi priority is Vision 2030, internal development and transformation. And they look to a security guarantee from the United States that is formalized as providing a deterrent against what the Iranians would do. So my guess is Iran will probe to see what it can do to try to thwart this. But it clearly doesn't want a direct confrontation with the United States, and it clearly we've just seen is hesitant to really have a direct confrontation with

Israel. Now, does it decide, okay, now's the time to unleash Chisbella? Well, the only problem with that is that Chisbalah does have its own equities within Lebanon. The level of opposition to Chisbala and Lebanon has never been greater between the Druze, the Christians, the Sunnis. And I can tell you, having spoken to recently a Lebanese, not official, but someone who's pretty well connected, he was asking me how likely was it that Israel would really come in and go after Hezbollah? And I said not very likely. And I could see the kind of disappointment because the sense was this is a point where Hezbollah has real vulnerability within Lebanon.

on. One thing we know about Iran, it was never prepared to trade his Bala for Hamas. And even now, I mean, Hamas, Sinwar probably got an interesting object lesson in terms of what just happened. Iran never did anything directly in response to what Hamas has done. It did something directly only when it paid a certain price and it then sought to impose a price in Israel. And then when Israel responded, it chose not to do anything. So the lesson there for Hamas is, Iran will support you verbally and materially, but don't count on anything beyond that. Is Iran really willing to put at risk his Bala? And I'm not so sure, because Hizbollah, for a lot of it's not just that

his Bala is the one that trains and helps build up all of these local military industrial bases for Hamas and the Houthis and the proxy militias within Iraq. it's the ultimate deterrent against the Israelis going after Iran's nuclear infrastructure because of 150,000 rockets. Do they really want to potentially lose that? Which is, as I said, the kind of insurance policy for something they've invested the last 40 years in developing. There is, however, a factor here. Do the Iranians decide in this context to suddenly go for a nuclear weapon?

that I'm not I mean I don't think that's a scenario we should dismiss so I do think they're look even as I can paint a more hopeful picture I'm mindful of some of the risks that are inherent in trying to produce it final pressure testing question the Palestinian people themselves what is their willingness to contemplate you know an alternative future with the state of Israel a future that recognizes its legitimacy, its right to exist, the necessity for cooperation, for dialogue, for de-radicalization. I guess Dennis, the skeptics listening might say, look, this whole conflict has just played into the hands of the radicals, of the supremacists, and that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to convince the Palestinian people, you could say, arguably after the traumas of Gaza, to commit themselves to a peace process inside Gaza, and by default, would not that peace process in Gaza require some larger form of rapprochement between the peoples of Israel and Palestine?

This is another crucial question. Not always a crucial, in many ways it goes to the heart of what has to happen on both sides. I think we have to understand there's been a trauma on each side. I started off by talking about the trauma in Israel. And when you're suffering from trauma, you are aware only of your own pain. You're absorbed by your own pain. It's not a criticism, it's a reality. Well, it's just as true for the Palestinians.

there's been a trauma on the Palestinian side. And the pain is not imaginary. It's real. It's physical, but it's also psychological. You have parallel sets of trauma with each side incapable of looking at the other and appreciating the level of suffering on the other side. That absence means that it's almost impossible to contemplate the idea that you will make a concession to the other side. So the context doesn't lend itself to being able to suddenly say, gee, we're going to transform this, we're going to make peace, there's going to be a reconciliation, we're going to bring them together, and going to sing kumbaya.

That's not on the horizon. So we have to think a little bit differently. One of the things we have to think about is can we use, again, something like a breakthrough with the Saudis as a way of getting the Israelis to make some choices. Now, the Israelis can make some choices. Palestinians, you put your finger out. We'll also have to make some choices. For one thing, just internally, what do they want their identity to be? Do they want their identity to be an Islamist, armed resistance identity?

Or do they want their identity to be a secular, national identity? That has to be sorted out before anything else can happen. There has to be real reform. I've said it before in the Palestinian Authority. if it is to have a future. And if it is to be capable of being able not only to assume a responsibility in Gaza, but if you don't politically reunify Gaza and the West Bank, how can you even talk about a Palestinian state?

So that's another essential element here. Can we use this kind of Arab role on a transitional basis within Gaza, investment in Gaza and in the West Bank, and its relationship with Israelis, can we use the Arabs to help promote a process? They've never, I've been using the word unprecedented, at least on three occasions so far. I'm going to do the fourth one now. I can tell you from having worked in this issue and been a, you know, the American negotiator for multiple decades, we've never had the Arabs assume a responsibility.

Never. Partly in the past it was, they would always say it's up to the Palestinians, but it was also a way never to be responsible. I think their role has to change now, not that they can make peace for the Palestinians, but they can help create a process that affects the Israelis and it also affects the Palestinians. We have to create some building blocks before we can get to real peacemaking between Israelis and Palestinians. We have to start with some low-level forms of cooperation. are purely functional. You know, look, we know issues like health don't respect borders, environment, don't respect borders. You know, there we need to start focusing on restoring functional forms of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, again, just to show it can happen.

There already is a little bit of it even now, but that has to be part of the building blocks. This is an enormously difficult process to put together. It's a little bit like a Rubik's Cube, where all the different pieces have to fit together and being able to orchestrate that is going to be difficult. But we know what the alternative is. People who often ask me, you know, why still make an effort on this? And obviously, I'm still sort of active on the side. Why still make an effort on this?

And for me, you know, part of it is once you get invested in it, it's hard. to sort of disinvest, even emotionally. But second, my answer always is, what's the alternative? We've just seen, we've got a picture of what the alternative looks like. And for those who say, look, one state outcome, a one state solution, there is no such thing as a one state solution. There are two national movements and two distinct national identities. They're competing for the same space.

They will not coexist in one state. If you think Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, even Iraq is what makes sense. That's what you want for the Israeli-Palestine future? Basically, you're saying one state means a forever conflict. So, you know, it's hard to put together two states. It's even harder now. In a lot of ways, we're back to 1948 in terms of an existential nature of the conflict. but there isn't an alternative, and there may be, in my mind, new elements here, especially with the Arabs,

that gives you possibilities with both the Israelis and the Palestinians, and I don't think we have the luxury of not making the effort. Well, Dennis, just on behalf of our 100,000 monk members, just to thank you for your remarkable efforts over a remarkable career of diplomacy and dedicating yourself to the cause of peace and very difficult situations like the one today and your continued commitment to this issue is clearly heartfelt and greatly appreciated. So Dennis Ross, thank you so much for coming on the Monk Dialogues today. Really a pleasure. Thank you. Well, that wraps up today's dialogue. I want to thank our guest, Dennis Ross.

They've certainly given us a lot to think about. If you have questions or feedback on what you've just heard on this and any of it, of our podcast, please send us an email to podcast at monk and debates.com. Thank you for lending your time and attention to our efforts to bring back the art of civil and substantive public dialogue, one conversation at a time. I'm your host and moderator, Rudyard Griffiths. The Monk Debates are a project of the Aurea and Peter and Melanie Monk charitable foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwitz are the producer.

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