The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Dialogue with Dmitri Trenin: when nuclear war becomes inevitable

Episode Date: August 27, 2024

While the war between Russia and Ukraine drags into its third year and out of the front pages of newspapers, some surprising developments in recent months are giving experts new cause for concern. The US, which has already supplied over fifty billion dollars worth of military aid and weapons to Kiev, has signaled that it is open to sending long-range cruise missiles to enhance the capabilities of Ukraine’s newly acquired F-16 fighter jets. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s army caught Russia off guard this summer with a surprise incursion into the western Russian territory of Kursk. Putin’s response so far has been more muted than expected. Our guest on this Munk Dialogue is sounding the alarm. Dmitri Trenin, a member of Russia’s Foreign and Defense Policy Council, is warning western leaders not to confuse Putin’s silence with tolerance. On the contrary, he argues: we are on a path of direct collision between two superpowers who are unwilling to back down. Once two many Russian red lines are crossed, the use of nuclear weapons will be inevitable.   The host of the Munk Debates podcast is Rudyard Griffiths Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Executive Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran Lynch  Become a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

You don't help the poor by making everybody poorer. The media has a frame, and the frame is Israel is the oppressor, and the Palestinians are the oppressed. I shouldn't be forced to acknowledge my privilege unless I desire for that to be part of my interaction with somebody else. What I know to be true and what all of my fellow Gen Z know to be true is that this is the most talented generation yet. With respect to every indicia of disadvantage, there is still a racial hierarch. And though I am, of course, an Anglo. I'm certainly not a Frizzan. Hello, Monk listeners.

Rudyard Griffith here, your host and moderator. Welcome to this. Our continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogues. These are in-depth questions and answers with some of the world's sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. On each monk dialogue, we go deep into the big issues and ideas that are driving the public conversation. As the war between Russia and Ukraine drags into its third.

year. The surprising developments keep coming. They are giving experts new cause for concern. The United States, which has supplied now over $50 billion worth of military aid and weapons to Kiev, has signaled that it's open to providing the government in Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles to enhance the capability of the newly acquired F-16 fighter jets that will be deployed in Ukraine over the coming months. Meanwhile, Ukraine's army has caught Russia off guard with a surprise incursion into the Kersk region, the first invasion by foreign troops on Russian soil since the Second World War. Interestingly, Putin's response to all of this has been more muted than many expected. So to find out what's going on and what could happen next, we're exceedingly fortunate to host on the monk dialogues today, Dimitri Trent.

Trent. He is a member of Russia's prestigious foreign and defense policy council. He has a warning for Western leaders. Do not confuse Putin's cautiousness with the potential for a bigger risk, for the risk of a conflict between Russia and NATO. Dmitri argues that a path to that type of direct collision is starting to set up as these two big powers refuse to back down over the war. in Ukraine. Red lines are getting crossed. The big worry is which one could trip us into a larger, bigger conflict, possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons. Demetri Trennan is a research professor at the Higher School of Economics and Lead Research Fellow at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations. Previously, he was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center,

part of the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Security. Dmitri, welcome back to the Monk Dialogues. Thank you, Radion. Great to be in conversation with you again today. It's just a privilege to be able to cut through the various media filters here and speak to someone who is a deep expert on Russia, who's in Russia right now, just outside of Moscow and get a sense of, where Russian politics, geopolitics, the special operation in Ukraine, how this is all unfolding

that war. We're going to get into it all with you. But I want to begin to be true by just telling us a little bit about the mood right now in Moscow after this surprise, Kersk offensive. What do you sense when you're either walking down the street, talking with friends, just observing your own media. What is this moment like right now in Russia? Well, I think it's a new and highly unwelcome development. For a lot of people, this came as a surprise. As we all know, it's the first time that the territory of Russia that's internationally recognized, if I may say so, has been invaded since the days of, since the days of the Second World War, frankly.

There were some skirmishes in the post-war period, but they are not very important. And I think that the sight of thousands and thousands of people who have had to flee from their homes, including children, including old people, and there are pictures of that on television everywhere. This is something that is different in the public mind from seeing refugees from or internally displaced people, if you like,

from the various regions of what used to be Ukraine, which is now recognized by the Russian Constitution as Russian territory. So in the sense of the Russian constitution, the war is being fought in the territory of Russia everywhere. Donbass and Novorosia are now formally integrated within the Russian Federation. But that's one thing. And when a region that has not seen any foreign flag since the days of Hitler's verma, when that region is being invaded, that that's a very different story. It's also a very different thing to have Russian civilians living in the territory occupied by a foreign power. It is also different from Donbass,

from those territories that are broadly defined in Russia as the new territory. So that's the old territory. And I wouldn't say that there is panic. There's none. I wouldn't say that there's a big fear that the enemy may expand. It's offensive and reach other regions and go as far as Moscow. It's frankly, it's not that far away. It's roughly 500 kilometers from where I sit, more or less. But it still came as a shock, as a moderate shock to the ordinary people of Russia. But as I said, people are getting used. I hate to say that. But people are getting used to being at war in a wartime environment. And that includes things like what we're now seeing in Kursk. It's an important point that you make. This is the really since the Second World War.

since the Nazi invasion of Russia, we all know the famous tank battle of Kursk, one of the largest tank battles in probably history, occurred in that geography. So this is kind of blood-soaked lands. And I guess what's the feeling in terms of how the government is responding to this, given both the symbolism and the reality of seemingly thousands

of Ukrainian troops. troops now on, as you say, Russia proper, Russia soil inside your officially recognized international sovereign borders. Is there a sense of urgency here? Is there a sense of crisis? Or I'm getting for you, Dimitri, maybe a view here that this is manageable. It will take some time. And the response of the government is to see this as one of any number of series of problems that they've had to address in the course of this war? Well, the government is a very broad term. And there's a lot of criticism of the local authorities, local and regional authorities who were running aboard a region. And somehow the two plus years of the war, they got used to the fake feeling or a treacherous feeling of being safe,

bordering directly bordering a country that Russia was at war with. Somehow they believed that they will not see foreign troops, although foreign, troops were just a few dozen kilometers away or a few kilometers away, as the case may be. And they did not prepare the people for a potential incursion or a potential invasion from across the border. There were no minefields, as I understand. The border was not fortified. evacuation plans were not properly executed if they existed.

As a result, we have a few thousand people in enemy occupied territory that can be and are being used as human shields. This is a terrible thought, and yet this is the grim reality of today's Russia. There's certainly a lot of criticism that you can, find on telegram channels here in Russia. This criticism doesn't get very far. Essentially, Putin's standing has not been impaired as a result of what has happened. But certainly the people of Russia are waiting for Putin's pledge to free the region from the occupying forces to be honored to be executed in the soonest time possible. Now, the soonest time may take some time, actually, and we are getting used to elements of position warfare in Korsk, in the Korsk region.

And this, unfortunately, is likely to be the reality for the next few weeks at least. And then we'll see. Demetri, you've thought a lot in your career about bigger issues of kind of strategy. And I'm curious as to this ongoing conversation that we've been having dialogue, in effect, between Russia and the Biden administration on red lines. At various points in this conflict, both parties have drawn red lines about different types of weapon systems or different types of responses to those systems. And at each point, we seem to have kind of moved along or pushed through those red lines to consider additional features of escalation in this conflict. I'm wondering how you're feeling about where we're at right now. What are the risks? Do you think we're in a stage of heightened

risk in this conflict with the Kersk incursion having happened, with the Biden administration rolling out yet more military support and musing about releasing to Ukraine, powerful, long-range, sophisticated cruise missiles that could be attached to American F-16 and European fighter planes, which are now being deployed in and around Ukraine. Well, my concern is that the U.S. strategy of incrementing, raising of the stakes, incremental escalation of the war in Ukraine, from the javelins at the beginning to the F-16s today, takes us straight in the direction of a direct collision, including the use of nuclear weapons. I think that it is a false interpretation.

of Putin's restrained, if you like. There were so many red lines crossed, mostly the red lines that Western observers drew for Russia. So the sinking of the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, a drone attack on the Kremlin, an attack against the base for strategic air force, on the Volga River, drone attacks against elements of the early warning missile attack, early warning system in Russia.

And some of these things actually qualify as reasons for the use by Russia of its nuclear weapons. If you look at the Russian doctrine, it actually stipulates that if elements, critical elements of the strategic weapons infrastructure hit, then Russia has the right to respond with nuclear weapons. I think that the West has become emboldened, the United States primarily emboldened by Russia's actions or failure to act in certain cases, or failure to act as predicted. and they've become even more bold in recent times. The F-16s and the long-range missiles represent a very serious material escalation of the fighting.

Russia has publicly announced that the basing of F-16s in NATO territory for missions against Russian forces, would invite Russian strikes against those bases in the territory of NATO countries neighboring Ukraine, say Romania or potentially Poland. And yet, you see those planes flying in Ukraine sky. You don't see them in action yet, but the action may not be too far away. My problem is that it often happens that when, you, when you show a lot of restraint and you fail to respond to initially needle tricks and then some knife cuts, you're sending the message that you're either indecisive or weak

or whatever. But then when your life is at stake, as it will be inevitably, I think, And if this conflict is played to the end, according to the goals proclaimed by Secretary Austin, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, i.e. strategic defeat of Russia. If it goes that far, then the use of nuclear will be inevitable, and it will not be on a small scale. So I think that the West is misreading Russia's reactions or lack of reaction as an invitation to move ahead. Russia will not, I don't think, and I'm sure it will not give up. It will not surrender. It will seek to reach the objectives that were spelled out at the beginning of this campaign. and we can, without wanting it, without either side wishing that outcome,

when they find ourselves precisely in the situation that we were afraid of during the entire period of the Cold War, and yet when we managed to escape unscathed, now this time we may not be as lucky. Yeah. So let's talk a little bit more about this, Demetri. what could be that scenario that would lead to the breaking of the 75-year-plus kind of nuclear taboo? What situation might have to transpire? Some people wondered, because indeed you mentioned Russian nuclear doctrine.

One of those elements of that doctrine is when the state is deemed to be under, you know, acute threat. And some might argue that the incursion into Kursk, as you say, the first major invasion of Russia since the Second World War might start to be raising this conflict into the zone where Russian nuclear doctrine could start to, unfortunately, see a case for first use. give us a sense of what some of the scenarios that you're worried about playing out might look like. Well, Radyard, I will certainly speak my own mind, and I have no idea whatsoever what the thinking in the general staff or in the Kremlin is on these things, even if I knew I wouldn't share it with you. So to be trying to let me let me try a hypothetical scenario to you. Let's say Ukrainian F-16s are equipped with these long-range and powerful cruise missiles and that these Ukrainian planes begin flying across the border, risking being shot down by Russian air defense, certainly. But they're trying to penetrate into Russia proper to then launch these cruise missiles. at targets deep in Russia. And we know that in the past,

some targets have included the radar arrays that are used for your strategic nuclear forces to detect ballistic missile attacks from abroad. Is that the type of scenario, Dmitri, that you might worry about? Well, I certainly worry about that kind of a scenario. Even a scenario that is not as dramatic as you've just laid out. In my view, any use of the F-16s over Ukraine would give Russia the right to attack the bases

from which those F-16s have started. Not necessarily the, you know, the lillopads, the bases in Ukraine where they touch down and then continue on their mission, but their principal bases. So that would be an attack against NATO territory, not necessarily a nuclear attack to begin with, but certainly an attack against NATO territory. If that is answered by a more robust attacks against Russia, then I would anticipate Russia using nuclear weapons first to demonstrate its resolve as a firing shot. And then if that fails to produce the impact that that action, that step is supposed to be aimed at, then the next nuclear shot will be a live one and against a target, not in Ukraine, but in a NATO country. And from there, I think we may see the West, as I've read in some Western publications, the West giving a massive non-nuclear response against high-value Russian targets. Well, this, I think, would provoke Russia to launch a massive nuclear response against NATO targets,

including U.S. bases in Europe, and maybe not just in Europe. By that time, I think we'll be already in World War III. And if that line is crossed, then I don't think we will be able to escape mutually short destruction. Yeah, because I think for listeners, you're bringing up a good point. And just to remember listeners that Dimitri spent years at the Carnegie Endowment, you know, thinking a lot about issues of kind of peace and security. And one of the challenges, Dimitri, is it not that NATO has a very large conventional force when you add up all the different NATO members plus the United States troops and capacity in Europe so that any large-scale NATO attack on Russia would very quickly risk a nuclear response because, in a sense,

there isn't a conventional response that they could deliver that would any way approach the parity in terms of that NATO attack. If there was a significant NATO attack on Russian military assets inside Russia in response to Russia's use, let's say, of a tactical nuclear weapon against some NATO base or NATO asset, that is the kind of the doomsday scenario. isn't it, Dimitri? Well, it absolutely is. What baffles me, what stuns me,

is that very few people think that we're going down that road. There's not enough pushback on the Western side against the reality that may follow those scenarios. And it's a major difference that we see today from the days of the Cold War. When I was serving as a military officer in a liaison capacity in Germany, I was there during the Euro-Missile crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. And I remember what sort of pushback, those plans initially received, in a number of European countries, people were genuinely worried about being a battlefield.

Germans on both sides in West Germany, in East Germany, where I was stationed. But today, we hear about plans of deploying U.S. medium-range missiles in Germany, successors to the missiles that were first introduced in the 1980s, in the early 1980s. almost as a matter-of-fact thing. It's just one story among 20 or 30 that make up the day's list of stories, you know, worth looking at. That's where we are. That's very, very frightening, frankly.

Be interesting for our listeners to, again, benefit a little bit from your expertise and explain to them how Russian nuclear doctrine differs from, let's say, American doctrine. There are some obvious differences. Russia doesn't have a first strike doctrine. It has a variety of different features, but is not one of them, Dmitri, and I get this is not precise, but it's this kind of notion that if in Russian nuclear doctrine, if Russia is under acute threat, they will, quote, escalate to deescalate, that they will, in a doctrinal way, looking at it, will use a nuclear weapon to prevent.

from their perspective, their opponent or enemy from escalating further, is that an accurate assessment of where Russian nuclear doctrine is? And what is maybe the West not fully understanding about the dangers here in terms of these conventional escalations that you're right? We continue on seemingly week after week, month after month, and how those could interact in a very negative, it may be unintended way, but potentially catastrophic way, with certain features of Russian nuclear doctrine? Well, I think the problem is that a lot of Western observers look at the Russian doctrine and

look at the Russian nuclear arsenal through the prism of the U.S. doctrine, through the prism of the U.S. doctrine through the prism of the nuclear strategy developed within the United States. So basically, you overlay a Western matrix on the Russian reality, and you kind of think for Russians, but you think using your Western software, which is fine, which is normal. However, I don't think that, A, you know, this escalates. to de-escalate is, I think, is a case in point. This was essentially a Western strategy during the Cold War. When the West was afraid that the conventional superiority of the Soviet-led the Warsaw-backed forces would very quickly overwhelm Western forces in West Germany, the

low countries, and get to the English channel within, I don't know, 48 hours, or 72 hours. And the only way To stop the Soviets was to use nuclear weapons on German soil, on German territory, east and west, and then send the message to the Russians in that way that, you know, you guys have gotten too far. We are serious. Unless you stop, there's a nuclear war coming, and you don't want it. We don't want it. So why don't you just stop and let's negotiate?

I don't think that the Russians think in those terms. The fundamental difference between U.S. military doctrines, nuclear and non-nuclear, and the Russian doctrine, is that all U.S. doctrines are about fighting foreign wars. It's about fighting in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, wherever. The Russian doctrine is all about fighting around Russia, essentially to protect the Middle East, in Africa, wherever. protect Russia, or to prevail in a region that is of exceptional strategic importance to Russia, as, for example, Ukrainians. So there's a difference.

The stakes for Russia in any conflict are way higher than the stakes for the United States. We're not talking full nuclear exchange, but anything below that, including a limited nuclear war would certainly devastate parts of Russia or parts of the country's neighboring Russia, and Russia will certainly feel the effect. For the United States, a limited nuclear war in Europe or Asia or anywhere else is a war very far away from U.S. shores that will probably have a very limited impact on the United States. So that's a fundamental difference.

We are also at the point, this is new, we're also at the point where Russia is not the Soviet Union, so there's a huge asymmetry between the two countries. And whereas the United States and the Soviet Union could be engaged in a sort of symmetrical fight, each party had relatively comparable nuclear forces, conventional forces, bevy of allies and all these things. Russia in today's conflict with the West over Ukraine stands alone against 50 odd countries on the other side. So Russia is not to be expected to play a gentlemanly fight. It's a little bit like Napoleon invading Russia in 1812 and then discovering to his aura that Russian partisans or guerrillas, just like the guerrillas in Spain. We're not fighting, you know, according to the laws of the war against the French invaders. And similarly, I wouldn't predict what Russia would be doing and when. My concern is that Russians, and in particular Putin, are capable of enormous restraint.

But then at some point, and it's not easy to pinpoint when that point, is reached, it all snaps, and then you start a full-blown war, or you just shift gears and you are in a full-blown war against your opponent. And that includes, for Russia in this conflict with the collective West, it does include nuclear in a big way. So I'm very, I'm very worried. And I think that we are continuing to go down the path that leads us to a direct collision that has to be avoided. But unfortunately, few people believe that that collision will take place. They think that they can win. They can wear Russia down.

They can win a war of attrition. Something will happen. Putin will be toppled. The Russian people will be disgruntled, get up with the war and stuff like that. that's in mind you're not going to have. Hi, Rudyard Griffiths here, the executive director of the Munk Debates. Well, if you're enjoying the kind of civil and substantive conversations that we have at the debates, where we're really trying to get at the big issues and ideas that are driving the public conversation,

I want to urge you to check out the hub. The hub is Canada's fastest growing digital and news outlet. And like the Munk debates, it's focused on those important conversations. and bringing them to you in ways that are enlightening, enriching, and again, focused on civility above all. You can check out The Hub right now at triplewthehub.ca or open your favorite podcast app and type in The Hub Canada. You'll go to the Hub's channel and see all kinds of great interviews,

roundtables, discussions with thought leaders from around the world. So, Monk Debate Community, check out the Hub. We think you'll like what you see, listen, read, and hear. Do that right now at triple-w the hub.ca. Now let's get back to our monk debates program. Two final questions, Demetri. You know, skeptic listening to us will say, oh, you know, this is just the usual nuclear saber rattling

that Russia is trying to use the threat of nuclear weapons to modify the allies of Ukraine and their behavior. This is scaremongering. We haven't seen the, you know, even the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia's strategic forces, thankfully, are not on any state of alert right now. You know, all of this is just, you know, for the cynic, they would say this is just propaganda. Well, I will say this. First of all, it is normal for a country in an asymmetric.

fight with a group of other countries that are more powerful than the country concerned to use all the weapons that it has at its disposal. The second thing I will say is that so far, Russia does not believe it's losing the war. In fact, it believes that it's winning the war. If it's winning the war, then there's no reason for Russia to use nuclear. First of all, there is no reason to use nuclear in the country called Ukraine, which is very close to Russia, if I say 500 kilometers from Moscow. That's pretty close. If you start nuking your neighbor, you're certainly going to have some of the effects in your own territory. That's the second thing.

The third thing I will say is that if the West still has the goal, which I think it still does, still has the goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, that is an existential thing for Russians, because a strategic defeat in Ukraine would have extremely, I don't think it would happen. But if it does, just hypothetically, if Russia were to fail on the battlefield and be defeated by the Ukrainians who will, with Western support, with Western guidance, Western backing, Western intel, Western everything, so it will, the Ukrainians will be a, you know, just a tip of the spear for the people waging, actually waging the war against Russia in Washington, D.C. then that is likely to spell the end of Russia, as we know it.

And I think that Putin was, you know, for all the restraint that he's been credited with, he basically said something five years ago, was it? I do not remember correctly, but a few years ago. He said, we don't need the world, which has no Russia. And I think it's serious. And I think that this is something that is shared by a fairly large percentage of pretty well-educated and the pretty influential people in Russia and even among the ordinary team. It's not that Russians value their lives less than others, but.

that for Russia, the worst thing that can happen to them. Unfortunately, it happened to Russia twice in the space of just 100 years is the collapse of the state. If you have a collapse of the state, this is the worst than any foreign invasion. Anything you can imagine. It's civil war. It's devastation. It's, you know, the kind of self-inflicting wound that is extremely difficult to heal. anything would be good to avert that scenario.

Also, there is, you know, Russians are not, this is another big difference between Russians and Westerners. Westerners are legalistic, particularly Americans. Legalistic, what's legal, what's not. You know, there's no paper trails, so it means that I'm not implicated and, you know, all these things. The Russians are very different. They are looking at the reality.

as they see it, it's justice for them. It's what's just, what's unjust, what's, it's not exactly fair and fair, but it's a deeper feeling. And they see themselves as being at war against the United States. Ukrainians are not getting off the hook, but Ukrainians are just the ram with which the United States is seeking to topple Russia. And there's also something in the psychology of at least an important section of the Russian people, that we are, you know, we are the heirs of the victors of 1945, you know, we bought the brunt of the war-guested Nazis, we defeated Nazis, we entered Berlin

and we hoisted the flag over the Reichstag building and all that, and we cannot allow ourselves to be defeated in this ignominious way. So if that's the state of the play, we will kill you. We will just kill you. It doesn't matter that many of us will be killed as well, but we will not allow you guys to triumph. Absolutely not. And I think that the Cusp thing is taking us in the direction of this war being understood by more and more Russians as a patriotic war. So far, this has been a slogan used by some people, some intellectuals, some propagandists, but not very broadly.

But if it turns into a patriotic war, then there's no limit to what the Russian people will actually be able to do. I think this war has also changed many things in the, I wouldn't say the mentality, but certainly the composition of the Russian people in Russia. Many of those who were Western-orientated, pro-Western, liberal, chose to leave the country. And chances are, in my view, that most, at least many of them will never return. Final question, Dimitri. Many of us, myself included, knew you before this war as a key figure for the Carnegie Endowment in Russia. You were someone who was very involved with groups outside of Russia, around issues of kind of peace and security.

I'm curious, many people might have assumed that when this war began, that you would have been someone who would have left Russia. Many of your compatriots did, some, not many, but some. Why have you decided to stay, Dimitri? What is it that has brought you to this point? Having had this career of continual engagement, you're doing it right now with the West and trying to bridge kind of understanding between Russia, the West and the West back to Russia, why have you decided to remain in Russia and to be part of this moment with your country in your country? Well, Rudyard, there was a notion of global Russians walking around the world from the 1990s on.

And there were some global Russians. There are some global Russians. I was involved in a global operation. The Carnegie Endemort for International Peace called itself rightly as the world's first global think tank. But within that global think tank, I've always been a Russian-Russian. And I never actually hid that from my colleagues. So many of my colleagues would congratulate me on the Army-Navy Day, because, again, I never, how could I.

I never denied that I was a member of the Russian military forces, and I was very proud of that. I had my own views about Russian-Western relations, how those relations could be better managed. Again, I was not holding those views secret. I was publishing. I was giving interviews right up until the moment that the special military operation was announced. I did not think it likely that operation at that time. I was looking at the numbers.

I was looking at the chances. I was looking at many things. To me, that didn't add up to a credible scenario. But when it was announced, well, I didn't spend too much time. Actually, I spent no time deciding where I should be. I said, I will be with Russia, will be in Russia, I will be with the Russian people, I will be with the Russian army because I am a reserve officer of the Russian army. Although I'm retired now and I still think that the oath of allegiance means something,

even if it was given to another state, but the same country was given to the Soviet Union, but to me the Soviet Union is just a historical name for Russia. There were so many names that the Russian state born in its thousand-plus years of existence. So I think that to me it is an existential fight in many ways, more ways than one. It's not just winning in Ukraine. It's mostly winning inside Russia because I think that Russia gained a lot from its very close engagement with the over the 30 years after the end of the Cold War. So I do not belong to those who say all that was harmful.

And no, we learned many things and learned to do them pretty well. And we understand the world and ourselves so much better now than we did, let's say, in 1990. And as long as Russia is in an actual fight in that war, I don't think that we should spend time publicly criticizing the actions of the decisions of the military, the decisions of the commander-in-chief, because war is a serious thing. War is a serious business. A lot will depend on whether we win in the very broad sense of the word or we lose. So I'm here for winning, no question. I certainly continue to think hard about what's happening. I'm still reading a lot that's being written and hearing what's being said about the war from many quarters, making my own conclusions. but again, what I say publicly is what I think privately.

And I've been saying a lot of things publicly recently, and quite a few of my former colleagues thought I did the wrong thing. I don't want to repeat that, but they vehemently disagree with the position I've taken. Fine, it's their privilege, is they're right. to me, they are not, many of them have ceased to be interesting conversation partners or interesting authors, because when you live abroad in emigration, you lose touch with your home country very quickly. So you have to be in order to understand what's happening.

Well, Dimitri, thank you so much. spending this time with us today, giving us a kind of authentic view there from Russia as to how many Russians are thinking about this war, about its threats. And yeah, I just urge listeners to check out Dmitri online and his kind of storied career in international relations. He's a go-to voice on this conflict. And it's been a privilege, Dmitri, to have you on the program today. Thank you very much, Radia. Thank you.

Goodbye. Well, that wraps up today's dialogue. I want to thank our guest, Dmitri Trennan. He certainly gave us a lot to think about. If you have questions or feedback on what you've just heard on this or any of our other podcast, please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates.com. Also a friendly reminder that if you're interested in current affairs and contemporary events, check out our Friday Focus podcast that yes comes out every Friday.

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