The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Dialogue with John Mearsheimer: why Ukraine needs to break ties with the West

Episode Date: February 7, 2024

In May 2022, just a few months into the war between Russia and Ukraine, we convened a public debate in Toronto about whether the West needed to acknowledge Russia’s legitimate legitimate security interests in order to bring the conflict to a resolution. John Mearsheimer, one of the world’s leading realist scholars in international relations, argued on stage that the West deserves some blame for Russian aggression.  After almost two years of fighting, the war, as John predicted at that debate, is nowhere near its conclusion. Mass casualties, a country in ruin, and billions of dollars in western aid has done little to advance the goals of either side. On this Munk Dialogue, John offers his thoughts on how to resolve this conflict as soon as possible, the threat of a growing alliance between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, and why military power has its limits in a multipolar world.   The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/   Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran Lynch  Become a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

You don't help the poor by making everybody poorer. The media has a frame, and the frame is Israel is the oppressor, and the Palestinians are the oppressed. I shouldn't be forced to acknowledge my privilege unless I desire for that to be part of my interaction with somebody else. What I know to be true and what all of my fellow Gen Z know to be true is that this is the most talented generation yet. With respect to every indicia of disadvantage, there is still a racial hierarch. And though I am, of course, in Anglo, I'm certainly not a fucking Saxon. Hi, Monk listeners. Roger Griffiths here, your host and moderator.

Welcome to this, our continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogues. These are in-depth questions and answers with some of the world's sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. On each Monk dialogue, we go deep into the big issues and ideas driving the public conversation. We took away their nuclear weapons. Then we encouraged them to join. NATO. We said they were going to join NATO. We in effect poked the Russian bear in the eye and we left them defenseless. We in effect have led the Ukrainians down the Primrose path. Well that was John Mearsheimer, one of the world's leading realist thinkers on international

relations at our monk debate on the Ukraine-Russia war. It took place in Toronto in May 2022. The war between Russia and Ukraine had only just begun, and John was arguing that the West needed to recognize Russia's legitimate security interests in order to bring the conflict to a resolution. Well, it's been almost two years of fighting, and the war, as he predicted at that debate, is nowhere near its conclusion. Mass casualties, a Ukrainian nation in ruins, Billions spent in Western dollars in military and civilian aid seems to have done little to advance the goals of freeing Ukraine from Russian domination. So where does this conflict go from here? How is it affecting other world players like China and Iran who are engaging in their own regional showdowns with the United States?

John shares his thoughts on all of this and more on today's monk dialogue. Professor Mearsheimer, welcome to the program. I'm glad to be back. I'm glad to have the opportunity to speak with you again since your amazing debate for us on the Russia-Ukraine War, May 2020. So much has happened since then. And I want to start there, John,

because I want to play back to you the resolution that we debated on stage that night. You, Michael McVall, Radix-Korski, and your debating colleague, Stephen Walt, be it resolved, ending the world's worst geopolitical crisis in a generation, starts with acknowledging Russia's security interests. John, where are we? Are we any closer to the pro statement that you were arguing for that night, that we do need to acknowledge Russia's security interest to ultimately? bring this conflict, this crisis to an end?

Well, I think to bring this crisis to an end and get the best possible deal for the Ukrainians, it's absolutely essential to recognize Russia's strategic concerns and to try to accommodate them. I mean, I think it's been clear from the very beginning that the Russians were profoundly concerned about Ukraine becoming a Western bulwark on their border. And the key issue at play was Ukraine becoming a part of NATO. And they made it clear that that's not going to happen. Now, where we are today is that the war shows no signs of ending. And it's quite clear that the West is unwilling, completely unwilling, to recognize Russia's security concerns and work out a deal with the Russians. And what we want to do is continue to fund and provide weaponry to the Ukrainians to keep this war going.

But it's not going to lead to victory. The Russians are ultimately going to win. And I think if you want to end this war now, there's only one plausible scenario. It's not likely. And that is that Ukraine recognizes that there's no hope of victory here. And what they do is they work out a deal with the Russians on their, own. Now, if the Ukrainians were smart, they would divorce themselves from the West, work out a deal with the Russians, and accept neutrality, which means that they would have to break their security

ties with the West. I can understand why for many Ukrainians, this is not a very attractive end game. But the question is, what is the alternative to continue fighting on and on and suffer huge numbers of casualties, lose more territory. I think it makes no sense at all. At bottom, what has to be done here is that either the Ukrainians by themselves or the Ukrainians in the West together have to recognize that the Russians are unalterably opposed to Ukraine being in NATO. What we're seeing, John, is the European community coming forward with a new funding package over 50 billion euros, I guess stepping in here in the absence of continuing U.S. financial support, which is tied up in your Congress. We're also seeing discussions in Europe, active discussions.

They will take many years, but they have certainly started to bring Ukraine into Europe as a member state, along with parallel discussions that are happening inside NATO to begin the onboarding process, the partnership process that could ultimately lead to Ukrainian membership in NATO. What do you make of this? It is the opposite, is the antithesis of what you just explained to our audience. It seems that the major institutions, the major powers, Europe and the United States, are going in 180 different degrees in terms of direction about their thoughts, about how this conflict could or should be brought to a conclusion.

These Western policies, to be blunt, are foolish in the extreme. There is a war that is taking place now between the Russians on one side and the Ukrainians on the other. The Russians are winning that war. And the reason is that there is a huge imbalance in weaponry, especially artillery, and there is a huge imbalance in manpower. This is devolved into a war of attrition. This is two armies standing toe to toe and beating each other up. And in a war of attrition, the side that ultimately wins is the side that has more manpower and that has more weaponry.

And the Russians have a decisive advantage in both weaponry and in manpower. And when people talk about this money from the EU now going to Ukraine, this is a decisive advantage. this money is useless in terms of stopping Russian tanks and providing artillery for Ukraine. What Ukraine needs is not money. They need weaponry. And we in the West do not have enough weaponry to satisfy their needs. In fact, we don't even come close. The Russians, on the other hand, are pumping out weapons like,

And furthermore, if you look at the manpower balance, because of this past summer offensive, a bad manpower imbalance, an imbalance against Ukraine, got even worse because the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which was launched on June 4th and went into the fall, was a colossal failure, and the Ukrainian suffered enormous casualties. They're in no position to win this war. And what is likely to happen in the months ahead is the Russian steamroller is going to move further and further western. Ukraine is going to lose more and more territory. It's now lost about 23 percent of its territory.

Remember, the Russians have annexed Crimea, and they've annexed the four easternmost oblasts in Ukraine. And they're talking about annexing maybe another four or. war oblast further to the West. This is a total disaster for Ukraine. And again, we cannot provide them with the weaponry, and they don't have the manpower, right, to make this a fair fight over time. So it's in Ukraine's interest to cut a deal now, get the best possible deal while they can. But the West thinks in very different ways. And of course, it's easy for the West to think that way because the West is comprised of incredibly rich countries that can throw lots of dollars or euros at the Ukrainians and throw some weaponry in their direction. But most importantly,

we're not doing the fighting and dying. They're doing the fighting and dying. And this is a country Ukraine that is in, these are not my words. These are words you see in the press, the mainstream press. Ukraine is in a demographic death spiral. Think about those words. Ukraine is in a demographic death spiral. Think about those words. Ukraine is in a demographic death spiral. What we should prioritize is making sure that no more Ukrainians die, that this war is brought to an end. But instead, you have lots of people in the West. I can't believe they say this, that it's good that the Ukrainians are doing the fighting and dying and we're not, but they're serving our purposes because they're helping to bleed the Russians white. The Ukrainians should realize what

going on here and go to great lengths again to shut this one down. John, let me try on you the now, I don't know if it's persuasive, but it's pervasive argument that this war must continue to be fought because it is the first stage of a larger campaign that Putin wishes to wage not just against Ukraine, but against Russia's former Baltic possessions, which are now NATO countries, against Poland, that this is a tripwire. And if we don't hold Russia in Ukraine, Europe, at least parts of Eastern Europe and the Baltics could fall under Russian dominion. You know this argument well. It's not only framing the debate right now, it's probably framed the debate since the Cold War to a certain extent in terms of how we think

about European security. Let's have your take on it. There's zero evidence to support this argument. And what this is is classic threat inflation. And it's threat inflation that's designed to keep the public supporting the Western effort in Ukraine. It's quite clear, especially in the United States, but even in places like Europe, that support for the European. That's support for the European. It's support for this war is beginning to evaporate. And the governing elites are deeply concerned about this. And whenever that happens, they threat inflate. Let's talk a little bit about the evidence. First of all, Putin has never provided any evidence that he's interested in conquering any country, including Ukraine. Putin has made it clear that he's not going to conquer all of Ukraine.

and he has talked about the fact that Western Ukraine, this rump state that's left after the Russians conger a huge chunk of eastern and central Ukraine, this rump state is left that might be gobbled up by countries like Romania and Poland, which once owned the territory that is now Western Ukraine. And Putin has told the Ukrainians, and he's told the world more generally, that this is a real possibility that the Poles and the Romanians may swallow up what is now Western Ukraine. The mere fact that he said that tells you he's not interested in conquering that area. Furthermore, he'd be out of his mind to try to conquer Western Ukraine because it's filled with ethnic Ukrainians who hate Russians. He would be an occupier and he would have a giant insurgency on his hands.

That's the last thing he needs. So he's not even interested in conquering all of Ukraine. Furthermore, you have watched his army over the past almost two years now fight against the Ukrainians. This is not the second coming to the Vermaq. This is not an army that's big enough and capable enough to overrun all of Ukraine, much less all of Eastern Europe, much less all of Europe. The idea that we're dealing with the Red Army after World War II,

we're dealing with the Soviet threat in the Cold War. This is a laughable argument. World War III in Europe, you know, second coming of Adolf Hitler, second coming of Nazi Germany. This is just not what we're dealing with here. Again, what Putin is going to do is he's going to end up conquering, I would guess, about 40 plus percent of Ukrainian territory. And he will leave in place in Western Ukraine a dysfunctional rum state. And he will go to great lengths over time to make sure that that rum state remains dysfunctional. But I think, you know, this rhetoric

that we now hear in the West about Putin on the march is not a serious argument. Let me try another argument on you. I appreciate you playing along here. This argument is that, you know, what happens in Europe doesn't stay in Europe and that there are other autocratic powers that have their eyes on what they perceive as a decadent and declining West.

These autocratic powers, most notably Beijing and China, have ambitions for territorial reunification of their own, most notably Taiwan. In other words, we have to hold the line in Ukraine because if we don't, we emboldened the autocrats, and specifically we possibly move up. And it would be a much bigger conflict, which much bigger stakes for the global economy, a conflict with China over the fate and future of Taiwan. Yeah, I basically don't believe that argument. When I was young, I was in the American military.

It was during the Vietnam War. And when we lost in Vietnam, and it was a decisive defeat. We were decisively defeat. in Vietnam. Many people at the time said this would be disastrous for our position in the rest of Asia and especially in Europe where the main Soviet threat was located. This was not true at all. If anything, what we had done was convinced the Soviets that we were willing to expend enormous resources to fight a war that had little strategic significance, which meant that we would surely

expend enormous resources in an area like Europe that mattered. And the same thing is true here. The United States is committed to containing China. Actually, the real problem here is that because we are pinned down in Ukraine and because we are now pinned down in the Middle East, the United States is not able to fully pivot to Asia. So the real problem, here has to do with capabilities. It has to do with our lack of sufficient planning to deal with a China threat, which is the real threat out there. So from the point of view of China, what's happening in Ukraine is mana from heaven. What's happening in the Middle East is mana from heaven. If you're playing China's hand, what you should hope for is not that the Russians win

an ugly victory, which I think is going to happen. But you should hope the war just goes on and on and on and that the Americans remain pinned down in Europe and pinned down in the Middle East and therefore can't do that much in East Asia. And by the way, I would note to you that at the end of 2023, Xi Jinping and Joe Biden met in San Francisco. And they tried to tamp down. And they tried to tamp down. the hostility between the two countries. And you want to ask yourself, why were the Americans doing this? The Americans were remarkably hawkish towards China to begin with. But now all of a sudden, the Americans want to ameliorate the competition, the conflict between Beijing and Washington. Why is this the case? I think it's because the last thing the Americans need at this point in time is

trouble in East Asia. Can you imagine if shooting breaks out in the South China Sea or the East China Sea or over Taiwan, this would be disastrous for us. So you see that if anything remaining committed to this war in Ukraine hurts us in East Asia, not because it emboldens the Chinese in the sense that they think we're weak. It emboldens them because we are not dedicating the Chinese. the necessary resources to that contingency. Final argument. You mentioned it in passing earlier on in this interview, bleeding Russia white. Why isn't it in our interest?

If the Ukrainians are willing to do it and they're willing to die and fight using our weapon systems and money, why not do this to degrade Russia's conventional power? There are recent reports that possibly upwards of 80% of Russia's pre-war army, its professional army, has either been wounded or killed or is otherwise no longer on the battlefield. So if we want to be really cynical and really realist about this, why not continue this war to make Russia bleed white? make a couple points. First of all, the Russian army today is much more powerful and much more effective than it was at the start of this war. The Russians have learned and they've trained

up a quite good army. I think an army that's bigger and better than the army that they had at the beginning of the war. But that's a tertiary point with regard to your question. I would make two arguments. One is there's no need to bleed the Russians white because they are not a serious threat to the West. If the Russians were a serious threat to the West and this war were taking place, your argument might make sense. But the idea that Russia is a potential hegemon in Europe, that we have to fear Russia overrun in Europe, as I said before, is not a serious argument. Second, there is a moral dimension to this argument. If you think about what you're saying, talk about bleeding the Russians white.

And of course, in the process, you're bleeding the Ukrainians white. Do you really want to continue a war that involves the death of huge numbers of people on both sides? This is not how I think about the world. I mean, I am a realist, first and foremost, but I also have a moral compass. and the idea that you're going to perpetuate a war against an adversary who's not much of an adversary in terms of being a threat. And you're going to bleed the Russians and the Ukrainians white. I just find that this kind of makes me sick to my stomach.

The reason I wanted Ukraine to keep its nuclear weapons back in 1993 and avoid a war, and the reason I wanted to get the Ukrainians to abandon any thought of NATO expansion, was so that they could avoid a conflict like the one that's now taking place, because I thought it would be disastrous for them. And it is disastrous for them. And given where we are today, I think the best situation, as I said to you earlier, was just to do everything you can from Ukraine's point of view to shut this one down and not let yourself be bled white.

So that's my take on that one. Let's move to some more contemporary recent events. were the reports in the last week or so that a significant split may have emerged emerged between Zelensky and his very popular general, the commander of all of Ukraine's armed forces. The rumors are that Zelensky has asked his general to step down and resign ostensibly because of the failed spring and summer offensive. Others possibly arguing that Zelensky is worried about a political threat here in upcoming presidential elections. How are we to interpret this? Is this the sign of maybe a deeper fracture between Ukraine's

political administration and its armed forces? Well, it's quite clear from all of the newspaper reports on this conflict between Zelensky and Zaluzni, They just don't like each other. There's, you know, a personality conflict here. But there are also substantive differences between the two of them. It seems from all the news reports that Zilluzni would like to pull back troops from the Abdefka area and that Zelensky says this is a no-no, right? There's going to be no retreat.

This is the big battle that's now taking. place in the Donbass region. And the Russians are going to win. And what Zilluzni is saying, it doesn't make sense to stay there and let the Russians bleed us white. Let's withdraw. And Zelensky says, no. There's also a big fight between the two of them on further mobilization of troops inside of Ukraine. What is going on here is Zillusioni says, and this is understandable from purely military point of view, that I need about 500,000 new troops, and we have to have a mobilization that produces about 500,000 troops. Zelensky, who is looking at the matter, not simply from a military point of view, but from a political point of view, because he is the political leader, says that's undoable. And I think that he's talking about smaller numbers, you know, probably in the 200,000, 300,000 range, 200,000, 300,000 range. And he's also talking about bringing people in and keeping them in the military for limited periods of time, you know, two or three years.

I don't know all the details here in terms of what they're arguing about, but that's the broad outline. And that dispute really matters, just like the one with regard to withdrawing. from the Avdifka area matters. And what Zelensky wants to do is to fire Zeluzni. And he faces two huge problems. One is that Zaluzni is very popular. He's not only popular in the military, he's popular in the body politic. And he's more popular than Zelensky. Zolensky's poll ratings aren't that bad. He's not in Joe Biden territory, much better than that. But Zilluzni is, you know, he is way up there in terms of his popularity. So firing him over 80%. Yes, yes, exactly. I think I saw 83% somewhere. But so, and he's very popular in the ranks.

So firing him is no minor matter. The other thing, Rudyard, is that it matters whether you have somebody to replace him. And there were two generals who looked like they might be replacements. and both of them have said they don't want to replace Zillusini because I think they obviously understand that this is not going to work out very well. So now Zelensky is in a position where he's had this very public fight where he's talked about firing Zilluzni and it's hard to see how he can do it. I mean, he may end up doing it, but he's going to have a lot of blood on him once that's done. And the truth is he's going to end up with a lot of blood on him even. if he doesn't fire Zaluzhny. So here we have a situation going back to our earlier discussion

where the Ukrainians are doing poorly on the battlefield. It's hard to see how they rescue the situation. And now at the same time on the home front, back in the capital, you have a huge battle taking place between the political leader and the military leader that doesn't seem like it can be fixed easily and effectively. So this just adds to the trouble in Ukraine. It's a disastrous situation from the Ukrainian point of view. And of course, from the Western point of view, because we're so closely tied together with them.

Now, Zaluzni had also earlier in the fall had used the word stalemate. He had come out in the Western press and was attributed to him that he believed, that the war was in a stalemate. So I guess what I'm trying to understand, John, is since then, we've seen, I think, credible reports that Putin has indicated an interest in having negotiations, whether there's an ability to reconcile the Russian position with, say, Zelensky's position, I think remains an open question. But I wonder, John, should we at all be optimistic if we want to put these different pieces together. You know, a military command in Ukraine who feels the war is at an impasse, a political leader in Ukraine who is increasingly struggling to rally international support

and the funding and financing required to keep his government operating. And then a Russian interlocular in the form of Putin, who at least seems open now or increasingly open to the idea of having negotiations, some type of resolution on some set of terms. to be determined? Or, John, because of all the other issues that we've talked about, do you believe that this war will go on for months and possibly years longer? I believe the war will go on until the Russians win. And that means conquering more territory. As I said before, I think they want about 40 plus percent of pre-war Ukraine. And they want to turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state. until they achieve that end, I believe they will go on. I do think that Putin would agree to negotiations, but as he's made it clear, those will be negotiations on my terms, right? And if you listen to people in the West talk about what negotiations would end up producing, it's laughable. He's not

going to accept those terms. The return of Crimea, for example. Yeah, or, you know, or allowing Ukraine to become part of NATO. Western leaders can't get it through their thick skulls that he is never going to allow Ukraine to be in NATO. He has said this so many times that I find it hard to believe that they don't understand that this is the taproot of the conflict. But he's not going to negotiate a deal that's favorable to the West or that's favorable to the Ukrainians. And the war is going to go I just, I don't think that Putin is worried about a stalemate. Because the truth is, it's not a stalemate, right? Zeluzni says it's a stalemate to the economist last year, as you point out.

Zelensky doesn't like that because Zelensky wants to say, we have the upper hands, right? Okay, the summer offense of the counteroffensive, whatever you want to call it, did not do that well. But nevertheless, we have the upper hand. And you understand that Zelensky has to make this argument to continue getting Western support. When Zaluzni says it's a stalemate, that is huge trouble for continuing Western support. And Zelensky understands that. He's the political leader. So that's the basis of that fight.

But both of them are wrong because it's not a stalemate. The Russians are slowly but steadily eviscerating the Ukrainian forces. You want to think about this. The Russians have almost complete control of the skies, right, in terms of fighters and bombers. And they are tearing apart Ukrainian infrastructure. They are killing reserve forces. They are destroying the lines of communication, right? And then in these battles that take place, the losses are asymmetrical.

Because of the great advantage the Russians have in terms of artillery and in terms of air power, they're pounding the Ukrainians in ways the Ukrainians are not pounding the Russians. The Russians mobilized about 500,000 new soldiers last year. They're training those people up. They're getting ready to launch a major offensive. So the Russians are in quite good shape. I don't want to overstate the case. Again, this is not the second coming of the Vermeck, but this is an army that is in quite good shape, especially when you look at it compared to the Ukrainian army. So if you're Putin, you want to wait to see what

2024 looks like, to see how well this army does. Now, if that army goes out there and it stymied the way the Ukrainian army was stymied in the summer of 2024, then he may be willing to talk about freezing the status quo in some sort of negotiation with Ukraine in the West. But we're a long way away from that point. And again, I don't think that's where we're going to end up anyway. I think he's going to end up defeating the Ukrainian army. Let's play out a scenario in 2024 where the Russians do make not insignificant gains on the battlefield. Let's say the Ukrainian government politically becomes even more embattled. Let's say the consensus in Ukraine and its society around another large-scale conscription

effort is contentious and polarizing. Do you see, John, any scenario where Western powers get more involved than they currently? are now, given the potential gap between their rhetoric and that reality of a 2024 that really goes in Russia's favor? It's an interesting question for sure. I think that if the Russians end up conquering, as I argued, 40 plus percent of Ukrainian territory. And let's just say that the Ukrainian army is badly damaged and can barely hold the line. What will the West do? I don't think we will come in with ground forces or air forces.

I'm not 100% confident of that, but I find it hard to believe that we would do that. And what are the risks there, John, if we did do that? We'd be in a war with Russia. It would be a great power war between the United States and Russia. And if the United States and its allies started rolling up the Russians, clobbering the Russians and the Russians were losing, then you're beginning to talk about nuclear war. So you do not want to send American or Western troops into Ukraine. I think, by the way, that Biden understands that.

I think Biden in many ways has been quite cautious. If, you know, we go over to the Middle East, he's not been cautious in supporting Israel, right? But in terms of picking a fight with Iran, even picking a fight with the Houthis, he's not anxious to see the war between Israel and Palestine expand in the Middle East. And he's made it very clear from the get-go with regard to Ukraine that he doesn't want to see that war expand either. I mean, he wants to see the Ukrainians win. does not want to get the Americans into the fighting because I think he understands the escalatory dangers here. So I don't think Biden would intervene.

A lot of people would say, oh, Trump, he's a wild and crazy guy. If he was elected, he definitely send the troops in. I actually think it's less likely Trump would do that. Trump is not a warmonger, right? I am no fan of Trump. I want to make that perfectly clear. I did not vote from in 2016 or in 2020, and I won't vote from in 2024. But in terms of his basic aggressive instincts, right, there's, you know, a big difference between him and Joe Biden.

Joe Biden has never seen a war. He didn't want to fight. And Trump is not a warmonger. He's not interested in fighting wars for all his other flaws. So I don't think Trump would send troops in either. If you're enjoying the Monk Debates podcast, come over to our website at triple W monkdebates.com. That's MUNK DebateswithanS.com and check out our free monk membership.

As a complimentary monk member, you get all kinds of great perks and benefits, access to our weekly email, summarizing our best debates, and ticketing privileges at our main stage debates, special news, information, and offers all courtesy of the monk debates. You can grab your complimentary monk membership again right now at triple W monk debates.com. Simply look to the top navigation on the website and follow the links. Thanks in advance for joining our community. Let's just end on because some of you've thought long and harder

about the state of American power in the world today. Because I struggle a bit to understand at times the policies of the Biden administration. There was the bungled and humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan that kind of opened this presidency. Then, as you say, there was a war in Ukraine that maybe to Biden's credit, as you've indicated, he escalated cautiously in order not to trip any of those red lines that could have led to a nuclear conflict. But we're now seeing in the Middle East, as you mentioned, that cautiousness playing out again. Even in the face of three American soldiers killed by an Iranian-backed militia, most likely using an Iranian-manufactured drone. This was after over 150 attacks on American air bases in the region, which were not significantly answered.

by U.S. forces. So I guess what I'm struggling with a bit, John, is just what's happened to America's confidence about using its power and where necessary military force to reinforce deterrence, not to start wars or punish its enemies, but to extend over the world that I've grown up in, I'm in my early 50s, a world that has benefited in measurably from American deterrence,

strong American deterrence at various key points over the last number of decades. What's happening now? Am I right to be concerned about a possible change, a shift that's underway, where American deterrence is just is no longer what it used to be? Maybe we can't put Humpty Dumpty back together again? These are big questions, but they're ones that I think about. worry about. And I wonder what you think the future of America's great power, not simply its status, but its ability to shape the world through deterrence. What does that look like? Well, a couple points.

First of all, you spent most of your adult life in the unipolar moment when the United States was the only great power on the planet. It was incredibly powerful. And it created this rules based order and it was able to enforce that rules-based order and there was simply no other country in the world that could challenge the United States. What happened starting around 2017, 2018 in that time frame is you move from a unipolar world to a multipolar world. And you now have three great powers in the system, Russia, China, and the United States. In the Russian case, what Vladimir Putin did was he brought the Russians back from the dead. And Russia that you knew in the 1990s does not equal the Russia that you're looking at today in 2024.

It is a great power. But China is the more important case because it's a peer competitor. It's much more powerful than Russia. And it looks like it might at some point, you know, either catch up or get close to America in terms of how powerful the United States is. So we have three great powers now. We're in a multipolar world. And by definition, your ability to influence events around the world is going to diminish when you go from unipolarity to multipolarity. So that's the first thing that you want to keep in mind. Second thing you want to keep in mind is that when you're really powerful, there are still limits to what you can do with that military power. And this is one thing that Western elites don't seem to understand. You talk about Afghanistan.

We were in Afghanistan for 20 years, and we lost. And you say to yourself, how is that possible? The United States versus the Taliban. That's what we're talking about here. It's impossible that the United States lost. Go back to when I was young, the United States versus North Vietnam and the Vietnam, who were located in southern Vietnam, we lost. How is that possible?

We were the most powerful state on the planet, right? Let's talk about the Houthis. Virtually everybody agrees that there's nothing we can do to the Houthis to win that war. You say to yourself, the United States versus the Houthis, and this gets to the whole business of attacking Iran. If we attack Iran, what's the happy ending in that story? How do we end up winning or prevailing? And I can tell you all sorts of nightmare scenarios that result if we attack Iran, including

a nuclear Iran. So what I'm saying to you, Roger, is it's very important to understand that even when you're powerful, I mean, really powerful relative to the countries that you want to whack with military power, it's important to understand that there are limits to what you can do. in lots of those cases, right? Military power only buys you so much. And again, to go back to my first point, that is certainly true in a world that's multipolar. And just to go to Iran, what we now see happening very clearly is that because of American policies and Western policies more generally to include countries like Canada, we have driven the Russians, the Chinese, the

North Koreans and the Iranians into a quite close alliance structure. So if we start to fool around with the Iranians, you can rest assured that the Chinese, and especially the Russians, will help them out. And you notice that the North Koreans and the Russians have become quite close. And there's all sorts of talk about the Russians using North Korean ballistic missiles. and they're certainly using North Korean artillery against Ukraine. So we're in a multipolar world where military force, you want to have a lot. I'm a good realist, as you know.

You want to have a lot of power. You want to have a lot of military force. I'm not opposed to that. But you want to understand at the same time that there are limits to what you can do with that power. So just one final, this fascinating discussion. You're helping me a lot here, John. It's just, does there come a point, though, where you have to use that military power in order to reestablish credible deterrence? Because I just, if one thinks of the Biden presidency, and again, these might have all been the right decisions that we don't know what hasn't happened because we're not really, I'm certainly not party to any of the intermachinations of each of these episodes.

But if you go from Afghanistan to Ukraine, now to Iran, maybe to China next, in each one of the, those instances, the United States has seemingly followed, and again, maybe this was the right call. I'm not going to second guess them, but a policy of caution, of rectitude, of gradualism. And I guess at what point, maybe wrongly, do some of your opponents begin to anticipate or think the emperor has no clothes? Uncle Sam is as naked as a newborn. And whether I'm North Korea, threatening my southern neighbor in ways

in the last few weeks that we've not seen before, or if I'm China, thinking about finally unifying my country and achieving probably the Communist Party's single greatest legacy that it would feel that it realized for the Chinese people, does there come a point, John, where you have to use that first, force, even if it's not your time of choosing or it's not the ideal circumstances or victory is not assured, does there come that moment and are we close to it?

I disagree with this whole idea that the United States is naked, that its power has been eviscerated, you know, we're basically wussies when it comes to using military force. The United States is addicted to war. The United States that you're describing, not the United States that I know. It's addicted to war. We're fighting wars all the time. We're up to our eyeballs and alligators in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, right? I just, we have military bases all around the world. There's no evidence that we're reluctant in general to use military force. Just to go to some of the cases, Afghanistan, what would you suggest that we do? We were there for 20 years, okay? It didn't work. What did you want to do?

stay for another 20 years? Is that what you're suggesting? 20 years? Don't you think it would have made more sense to get out in 2009? Obama was thinking about that. Remember, he's elected in 2008. He comes in in January 2009. I mean, I don't understand. What are we supposed to do? And with regard to Iran today, I want you to tell me, what's the happy story as to how we use military force against Iran and reestablished deterrence? I mean, What you're saying is you think if we whack Iran, they're going to throw their hands up and say, we understand you mean business and we're not going to cause you any more trouble anymore. This is not my understanding of how the world works, right?

Usually when you punch people in the face in international politics, they punch back, right? So do I think there are cases where you want to use military force to reestablish deterrence? Absolutely. There are those cases. But you have to look at these situations on a case-by-case basis, and you have to be able to tell yourself, you do and I do, how this ends up in a positive way, right? And I think if you look at our record since the Cold War ended

in using military force effectively, it's a pretty abysmal record. I think we get a D-grade, maybe even an F-grade. If you took away the first Gulf War, the 91 War, where we were wildly successful, you take that off the table, I think we almost certainly get an F-grade for using military force effectively. John, as always, a fascinating conversation. You played along with me. I really appreciate it. I know our audience does, too.

We so enjoyed you at that very prescient debate now two and a half plus years ago on Russia and Ukraine. We've caught up with you today on all those issues and more. So thank you so much for coming on the program and sharing your wisdom and insights. It's my pleasure, Bridget. And thank you very much for having me. Well, that wraps up today's dialogue. I want to thank our guest, John Mearsheimer. He certainly gave us a lot to think about.

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