The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Dialogue with Richard Haass: a crumbling world order

Episode Date: April 9, 2024

We are in the midst of one of the most dangerous and unstable geopolitical moments in recent history. Wars are intensifying in Ukraine and the Middle East, the rise of China as a superpower is threatening the entire Asia-Pacific region, and an unprecedented migrant crisis in the US and Europe is paving the way for right wing populists who threaten to destabilize and destroy the international rules based order that has given us eight decades of relative peace and prosperity. And in the backdrop of this chaos is a United States that is deeply divided and unable - and sometimes unwilling - to provide leadership at a moment of global instability. Our guest on this Munk Dialogue is uniquely qualified to speak on these conflicts, and offer prescriptions for how the US should navigate these dangerous waters and steady the ship, so to speak. Richard Haass is widely considered to be the embodiment of America’s foreign policy establishment. He was president of the Council on Foreign Relations for 20 years and served in multiple presidential administrations. He’s also the editor of a new weekly newsletter called Home and Away, which is published on substack.    The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membershipMembers receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Executive Producer: Ricki GurwitzSenior Producer: Daniel KittsEditor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

You don't help the poor by making everybody poorer. The media has a frame, and the frame is Israel is the oppressor, and the Palestinians are the oppressed. I shouldn't be forced to acknowledge my privilege unless I desire for that to be part of my interaction with somebody else. What I know to be true and what all of my fellow Gen Z know to be true is that this is the most talented generation yet. With respect to every indesia of disadvantage, there is still a racial higher. And though I am, of course, an Anglo, certainly not a fucking Saxon. Hello, Monk listeners, Roger Griffiths here, your host and moderator. Welcome to this, our continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogues.

These are in-depth questions and answers of some other world's sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. On each Monk dialogue, we go deep into the big issues and ideas that are driving the public conversation. Right now, we are in the midst of one of the most dangerous and unstable geopolitical moments in recent history. Wars are intensifying in Ukraine and the Middle East. The rise of China as a superpower is threatening the Asia-Pacific region and an unprecedented migrant crisis in the United States and Europe is paving the way for right-wing populace to threaten and destabilize our democracy and the international rules-based order.

My guest today on the podcast is uniquely qualified to speak to these conflicts and issues and to offer prescriptions on how the U.S. should navigate this dangerous period and steady the international ship of state, so to speak. Richard Haas has widely considered to be the embodiment of America's foreign policy establishment. He was the president of the Council on Foreign Relations for 20 years and served in multiple presidential administrations at senior levels within the Department of State. He is also the editor of a new weekly substack newsletter called Home and Away. I highly recommend you check it out. But first, let's get Richard Haas on the program. Richard Haas, welcome to the Monk Dialogues.

Great to be with you. Looking forward to this conversation today. So much to talk about, but I want to start a big picture with you. You've got decades of experience thinking and participating in international affairs. How would you characterize the current state of global affairs at this moment, looking back through your storied career? What stands out for you now? How exceptional is this moment? Your question reminds me of that old Soviet-era joke.

When Leonhard Brezhnev, this is apocryph, was asked about the Soviet economy by a Russian Soviet journalist. And he said, good. And the journalist said, Comrade General. Secretary, I have to write a story. Could you please use more than one word to describe the Soviet economy? And he said, not good. And state of the world is not good. It is, look, it's three and a half decades after the end of the Cold War. You've got geopolitics back on steroids. You know, here we are talking against the backdrop of two wars, one in the Middle East or several in the Middle East. one in Europe. Everyone's worried about what might happen in the Asia or if you prefer Indo-Pacific. You've got weak states that can't do what sovereign countries are meant to do when it comes to

maintaining order within their borders and things spill over. We just got out of a pandemic, global management of the climate challenge, shall we say, is lacking in all sorts of ways. and all this plus the fact that the United States, which for three quarters of a century, has played an outsized role in the world. And despite our mistakes, I would argue for the most part a beneficial and successful role, we increasingly are divided and increasingly are having doubts about our willingness, not our ability, but our willingness to continue to play such a role. And indeed, so you're coming to your final question, what's different about this moment?

It's not so much that the foreign policy or international relations inbox is crowded. That's not fundamentally new. What I think is new is really two things. One is that you have more capacity and more hands than ever before, more centers of decision-making. The world is structurally unruly. And then secondly, the principal ordering instrument of the last 75 years, the United States has to some extent turned inward and turned on itself and is no longer willing to play the sort of role that it played. And it's the combination of the two, a world that's unruly or to use my favorite word and disarray at a time the United States is going through an extraordinarily difficult movement. And that's what makes this period of history different, but also so worried.

So let's pick up on the second of those two features that you describe as as critical to this moment, that that inward turning of the United States and increasing kind of capture by domestic political divisions, by polarization, the breakdown of consensus on a whole series of issues, including foreign affairs. Explain for us how you see that playing out internationally. What are the symptoms that we see globally that diagnose, this internal American condition? We're seeing several things, though it's a little bit, what's the word, hedged or incomplete the international reaction because no one around the world is sure whether this is temporary or something longer term. And that would have a big impact. And an awful lot of people are waiting to see what happens in November,

principally at the presidential level, but also at the congressional level. But the mere fact that the question has to be asked means that regardless of what happens in November, things will be somewhat different. I think what you're seeing are doubts in the minds of America's friends about whether we will be there. One of the principal characteristics of being a successful, great power is to be reliable and predictable. We are many things, but I probably wouldn't put those at the top of the list just now. obviously some of our foes think that this is a good time to test us. I think we're seeing that from Iran, say, in the Middle East, I believe, I can't prove it, but one of the reasons Mr. Putin did what he did in Ukraine just over two years ago,

when he initiated this phase of the war, was because he didn't think the United States was prepared to do a whole lot to resist Russian military intervention. So I think those are the two principal characteristics is that our friends are less certain, and they're all going through some really interesting conversations. And they're beginning to ask fundamental questions about whether they ought to become more self-reliant. You see the debate in Europe. Some countries are saying, can we find new security partners? And even if they can't substitute and hold for the United States, maybe they could substitute in part.

I expect some countries are saying to themselves, though they won't broadcast it, if we can't count on the United States and if we don't have real alternatives to an American-based security, maybe we need to become a little bit more deferential to a certain country, be it a Russia, a China, and Iran, or what have you. So I think a lot of our friends are going through that exercise. eyes. And again, I think the Chinese, in terms of Taiwan, I think the Russians, obviously, the Iranians, and you name it, want to see what happens in November, and whether they see the United States more divided, and whether they see the United States more inward-looking, in which case I expect they would take advantage of it. And if we return back to the United States and the kind of origins of a theory of the case, a series of views that have fractured some of the key pillars of American post-war consensus about the United States being an indispensable nation and partner

to so many of its allies, including Canada around the world. Do you see the roots of that erosion as exclusively a Trump phenomenon, something that emerged distinctly with his presidency and is encapsulated now in his second bid for the White House, or is it something larger, Richard? Are there a bigger set of trends? Is Trump simply, again, a symptom and not the prime driving force of this kind of shift in America, this problematization of how Americans view their role in the world? It's a great question.

My own sense of it is that he is, he is to some extent an accelerant. He's an intensifier. But this was going on before him and it will go on after him. But I do think he has a unique hold on the Republican Party and on his followers. But no, these things have been in place for decades. For first of all, American isolationism never totally disappears. It's a bit like a recessive gene or cancer in remission. And every now and then it it surfaces. To some extent, it was a little bit predictable after the end of the Cold War. After periods of extended exertion, democracies have been known to get a comfortable chair and put their feet up. It's not the first time that happened. I think that what happened with Iraq and

Afghanistan over the ensuing years had a real impact in discrediting elites and in making a lot of Americans think that the foreign policy involvement simply wasn't worth it, was unmasguided. 2007-8, mortgage financial crisis also shattered confidence in elites. We've had several decades of largely static economic circumstances for a lot of middle-class Americans. You had the pandemic. You had 9-11. It's a long list.

And then you had a country that. more divided, any number of reasons. It's a separate conversation, perhaps, but a much more divided country. But in part as a result, was unable to meet, is unable to meet some of its domestic challenges, say the border. This combination of people viewing foreign policy with grave suspicion and a sense that we have serious problems here at home that aren't being met, not surprisingly, whatever the facts, whatever the reason. let's put those aside, it drives people towards an inward focus. And Donald Trump, whatever else you think about, I think, is a gifted reader of the American

mood and has been very adept at riding the wave, at surfing the wave of this desire to pull back a bit from the world, focus on things at home, and so forth. So sorry to be so long. winded. But again, I think he's added to it. But I think we're kidding ourselves if we think this is simply a function of one individual, or if he gets defeated this November, or if and when he passes from the scene, that somehow things go back to quote unquote normal. I think what our definition of normal has changed. Well said. I'm glad you mentioned the border because I wanted to get your views on what's happening at your southern border. Because for observers that's

of the United States, it's perplexing. And it's perplexing to the extent of exactly this conversation that we're having, that if you were an administration like the Biden administration, and you wanted to make a case for Americans for a kind of principled engagement in the world and a role for American values and power abroad to shape a global international order that's favorable to the United States and other democracies like Canada,

why would one allow at least the perception? We could maybe debate another day the reality of the crisis, the extent of it at the border, but certainly a growing feeling and perception in the United States of a border that is out of control, that is lawless, and that is allowing tens of thousands of illegal migrants into the country, seemingly with very little oversight or control? Well, the short answer to your question is you wouldn't. And this is a serious, serious error. The numbers are much, much higher.

I haven't checked them recently, but the last I look were over the last, what, three plus years, you're probably looking at six million people having come across the border. that is, again, just order back to maybe, what, four times what it was during the Trump years, any number of reasons why from what's going on in other countries that's propelling people to leave, but a totally flawed asylum system where people come here under very weak claims for asylum, and then it could take years or longer for their cases ever to be heard because we don't have the administrative machinery. We simply don't have adequate security arrangements at, in particular, the southern border. But your basic point is right.

It's actually, I think, become the biggest political, what's the word, vulnerability of Joe Biden as he seeks a second term. He can't do anything about his age. It's not, you know, it's good you're sitting down. He's probably going to be about seven months older than he is now at the time of the election. but he can do things about the border. And I think more than anything, it reflects not just the inherent difficulty of some of those issues, but also the politics and the Democratic Party. And in order to satisfy quote-unquote activists and progressives and choose your nomenclature,

I think you risk losing big chunks of America. And what you see Donald Trump doing is conflating. what's going on at the border with crime. And the perception that something is seriously amiss. I'm speaking to you from New York. And to some extent, the problem is migrants. To some extent, the problem is an epidemic of homeless. To some extent, there is petty crime and prosecutors in this city who have decriminalized

all sorts of things. So you go into an American drugstore, I don't know what you call them in Canada, chemists or farm. or what have you. And virtually every tube of toothpaste is under lock and key because shoplifting has become so watch. And so people get reminded on a regular basis that things are breaking down a little bit in this country. This isn't the way things ought to be. So whatever the, whatever is driving what is happening at the border here and abroad, whatever the effects, and by the way, not all the effects are negative. One of the reasons inflation has come down is because we've got all

is labor. So it's reduced the cost of labor and inflationary pressures there, which is ironic, shall we say. But whatever, it doesn't matter. Politically, the perception is, and the numbers are real, that something is badly, badly broken. And the Republicans have added to the problem because they won't pass the negotiated legislation that would have not solved it, but it would have improved or made it less bad. The situation at the border would have been. quite constructive. Obviously, Donald Trump prefers to have an open border as a political tool. So he essentially used his influence to stop the House Republicans from passing the deal that was negotiated by Republicans with Democrats. But that's where we are. So I think Republicans now see

political gain, but I would put a good deal of the responsibility, some of the things that Biden administration in particular did at the beginning in terms of signaling and openness and so forth. And they've just been slow to correct. And it's still not obvious to me sitting here, why the president doesn't do some very dramatic things, sending large amounts of troops to the border and so forth, just making a very visible effort to signal that. We're open to legal immigration. It's been a great contributor to this country's success, but we cannot have and will not have people coming across the border.

I'll be generous, extra-legally. We simply won't countenance that. And, Richard, the 100,000-plus deaths in the United States by fentanyl, the extent to which, again, this is perceived as a border and a security issue, yet it remains, you know, woefully unaddressed and unresolved. And again, a very complicated issue, very tough to interdict. No, but it's a good, it's good you raised that. I mean, there's a Chinese dimension, obviously.

A lot of the precursors come from China. There's a Mexican dimension. A lot of things get, cocktails get made there, come across. Even if though you did much better at the border, the history of drugs, narcotics, whatever words you want to use, suggest that enforcement only gets you so far. Demand reduction is critical. So even if we had a much better border situation,

it wouldn't solve the fentanyl problem. It might reduce it somewhat, but in no way would it solve. No, we've got a bigger problem in the society. And I think that gets connected with, in particular for young people, some of the implications of the pandemic, We have high levels of truancy in this country, probably a quarter of school-age kids aren't going to school.

We have too many young people on devices too much of the day. The Surgeon General issued a really interesting report some months back about what he described as the epidemic of loneliness in America. There's all sorts of statistics showing that the average young person, particularly young men, have fewer friends. their social networks have shrunk. So there's lots of things going on in this society. So again, but the drug problem is real. And it's also one of those problems that, how do I put it, you don't have to listen to this podcast or read Foreign Affairs magazine to appreciate.

And we're seeing it in all sorts of communities and it's real and it's immediate. And too many people either know someone or know of someone who's been a victim. Yeah. Now, the border in these issues are connected very much to the current congressional impasse over more funding for the government of Ukraine, particularly arms and supplies that would allow Ukraine to fend off what looks like an increasingly concerted Russian attempt to push back along the entire front line. Any hope there, Richard, that there could be some grand bargain of a controlled and secure. border, appeasing these elements and extreme elements at times in the Republican Party and an ability to fund not just Ukraine, but actually funds for Israel, which are also bound up in that same legislative dispute. Yeah, you're right that there's funds not just predominantly Ukraine, probably two-thirds are for Ukraine. There's also some funds for Israel, Taiwan, and the border.

Israel, though, has been the recipient of any number of special shipments. of arms and the rest. So they are not suffering as a result of the legislative impasse. It's principally Ukraine, to some extent Taiwan, but principally Ukraine as well as the border situation that we discuss. Look, the rumor machine is an overdrive. And there's all sorts of rumors that the Speaker of the House is looking for a way to break the impasse. My guess is it will be broken at some point. You won't see the passage of the original legislation. That would be seen as too much of a backdown. But my guess is you will get a lesser amount. So for Ukraine, it might not be $65 billion. We'll just throw a number out there. Maybe it's $45 billion, whatever the number is.

So Republicans can say it's less. Some of the form of it may change. There's a lot of talk about loans rather than grants in terms of the military articles. But I don't think at the end, of the day, I don't think most Republicans want to be held accountable for a failure in Ukraine. So my guess is sometime in the next couple of months before the summer, before we have the long breaks as you go into the, because this summer has the two national conventions, my guess is a package will pass. Again, I say that without specific knowledge, with a degree of optimism, I wouldn't necessarily bet the farm. But it's just my point. political reading of the situation is the administration and Democrats would settle for half a loaf.

And my guess is at some point the Republicans will decide that it's politically smarter to sign on to half a loaf. And when we think about this deal, the prospect, again, that Trump probably wants a stalemate between now and the election. He wants an administration and a do-nothing Congress to continue to. do nothing. What is the risk there, Richard, of that being actually the state of affairs between now and November, a kind of legislative impasse? It certainly would be the president and the you know, the Donald Trump's preferred strategy going forward. And does it say something,

Richard, about what's happening to American politics and how, in a sense, the periods around these elections, it's not simply you have lame duck presidents after the election. The dysfunctionality in the system has reached a point where the system itself becomes a lame duck, seemingly in the presidential year itself. Not just in the presidential year. Lots of things you put on the table there. See if I can remember them all. That's why I guess one's meant to take notes. I worry about American politics in three phases. One's the way it phase we've been talking about, which is the run up to November, whether things will get past. And as I just said, I'm mildly optimistic.

You'll get something on Ukraine. I am not optimistic. You'll get something on the border. I think the government will avoid being shut down. But essentially, we're not going to get much done. Now, Donald Trump's interests in this are different than Republicans in Congress. Donald Trump, I think, likes things that frustrate Joe Biden. but I think the Republicans in Congress may be a little bit worried about being seen as a do-nothing Congress.

So their incentives here might not be totally aligned with Mr. Trump's, just a hunch. You then have a second phase of concern. There's a 75-day period between America's Election Day in early November and inauguration day in late January. And that was the period, as everyone will recall, four years ago where we had the January 6th insurrection. whatever word one wants to attribute to it. And the question is, what happens this time? Even if there's not a violent takeover of the Capitol, could there be violence in the streets? Could there be takeovers at the state level when electoral slates are being certified at the state level, before they're certified at the federal level? Answer is quite possibly, particularly in a close

election that went Joe Biden's way. So I worry about that two and a half months. And then what you're also getting out is after the election, imagine Joe Biden wins, but also imagine the Republicans control one or both chambers of the Congress. We could have a version of what we had now, where America may not have a crisis in the sense of going over a cliff, but we could be dysfunctional. And it might continue to be difficult and at times impossible to meet domestic or international obligations. So any of that's possible. I mean, I'm not feeling wildly sanguine these days about our situation. Again, I think the Ukraine issue and the border issue are the two most, and probably the Middle East, and the three most pressing, though the congressional inaction, again, is not central

to the Middle East. I think for Ukraine, I'm hoping there is some kind of a deal, but the president's hands are really tied without it. In the case of the border, his hands are less tied. And there, I believe he does have more unilateral executive authorities, and I think he would be wise to use them, indeed, to define them generously and dare Republicans or Democrats or the courts to stop him. I think he would be wise to, if anything, exceed his authority, and if he's forced to pull back, so be it. But he'd get credit for trying. Terrific. You're following the puck, as we say, in Canada. We love our hockey beautifully here, Richard. You mentioned Israel, and that's where I wanted to go with you next. It's surely the next big security in foreign affairs file for the Biden administration

outside of the border and Ukraine. Sense of how this is likely to play out. Can I say before we go there, can I say one thing about Ukraine, regardless of what happens. You know, what's been accomplished for the last two years is quite remarkable. Ukraine is essentially for Russia. to a standstill. Russia is gaining a little bit now, but I wouldn't over-dramatize it. So even if there's no more aid as tragic and as they're responsible as that would be, Ukraine will still be in decent shape by the end of the year. Russia may have picked up a little bit more territory, but it won't be decisive. If aid has resumed in any meaningful way, Ukraine will more than hold its own.

And then we'll see what happens in 2025. And the question is, again, whether there's enough of a a stalemate on the ground that prospects for negotiation finally begin to emerge. And I think, you know, so I don't think 2024 is going to be a decisive year militarily or diplomatically when it comes to Ukraine. The real question is what happens and then what might follow from that in 2025. And I apologize. I know you want to transition to the Middle East.

I just wanted to say that one thing. Good detail to have. So if we go to Israel, so many known unknowns, there's hostage negotiations. under continuing underway right now. We've no idea how that will turn out. But what we do know is that the Biden administration is paying an increasingly steep political price for what has been and continues to be when, as you mentioned, the arm shipments continuing as recently as the last week significant munitions approved as a new batch

to go to Israel. Does that support hold, Richard, through the election? or is there a breaking point? Could an operation, for instance, in Rafa against the remaining Hamas battalions be a moment where the Biden administration makes a firm and permanent break with the government of Benjamin Netanyahu? It's a good question. What is that?

I get mixed up with Mr. Rumsfeld's approach, whether that's a known, unknown, or unknown or something. Whatever it is, it's possible. possibility. Look, some would have said, here we are at the six-month mark of the war. It's been six months since the horrific attacks of October 7th. And what Mr. Biden has largely relied on for six months is persuasion to essentially bring Bebe Net to Yahoo around on three issues. He's tried to get him to use military force in a much more measured, targeted way. He's tried to get him to allow humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza in much larger quantities, and he's pressed him to complement anything he does militarily with something politically, to open up some sort of a political process that not immediately, but somewhere down the road would hold out a meaningful prospect of satisfying at least some Palestinian political aspirations

through something that would ultimately lead to a state, however conditioned. And essentially, he's failed pretty much on all three fronts. So the real question is, what does he do next? And it's been a very bad couple of days. And in recent days and weeks, we've seen Israel expand land controlled by the government for settlements. A further, additional 2,000 acres were expropriated just the other day, given over to government control.

You had the awful experience with the World Central Kitchen and aid workers. And it was a reminder that even though this awful incident got a lot of attention, you've roughly had on the order of 200 international aid workers and Palestinian aid workers killed. And you've had another, what, 20,000 Palestinian civilians killed in addition to the 10 to 15,000 or so estimated Hamas fighters who have. have been killed. So it's clear to me that President Biden's efforts of persuading Israel to do things differently and to do different things has not succeeded. And the question is whether he sticks

with it. Now, you could be right that if Israel decides to go into southern Gaza in a heavy way, that would lead the administration to what, condition certain military deliveries or support maybe an unconditional ceasefire, possibly. But one would have thought that what Israel has done or hasn't done over the last six months would have led the administration to do more than it has. President Biden is clearly reluctant. Less for political calculation than I think more emotionally and psychologically. I think he is just not comfortable being that much at odds with the government of Israel, even when he disagrees with profoundly. I think it's a generational and an experiential thing as much as anything. Politically, he'd probably benefit if he were taking a tougher line

towards Israel, certainly among younger Americans, certainly among Arab and Muslim Americans. I don't think he'd lose that much with the Jewish committee, because a lot of the Jewish committee falls under the rubric of younger Americans or progressives. And probably his verbal criticisms have already proven too much for those who are in Israel right or wrong. camp. So I think the president's probably in the worst possible place where he's doing too much for the quote-unquote friends of the Israeli government. I don't like to call them friends of Israel because we could have a fundamental argument of what does it mean to be pro-Israel? So I just wanted to put that on the table. And he's not doing enough for those who are critical of either Israel or

the Israeli government compromises aren't always the best places to be. And I think he's found himself in a compromise and this compromise isn't working. And it's possible. possible that something will put them over the edge and do something more for us. But even then, my bet is you still have a policy that has various dimensions to it. I don't think it's almost like the image should be one of rotating a dial, not not flipping a switch. If you're enjoying the Monk Debates podcast, come over to our website at triple W monkdebates.com. That's MUNK DebateswithanS.com and check out our free monk membership. As a complimentary monk member, you get all kinds of great perks and benefits, access to our weekly

email, summarizing our best debates, and ticketing privileges at our main stage debates, special news information, and offers all courtesy of the monk debates. You can grab your complimentary monk membership again right now at triple w monk debates.com. Simply look to the top navigation on the website and follow the links. Thanks. in advance for joining our community. Just finally in our remaining moments, here in Canada, as you might appreciate, there's a lot of nervousness about your election. Our dependency on access to the U.S. market is, as you know, from your time in government,

absolutely critical to our economy. Our experiences during the Trump years were tough around the renegotiation of what we still like to refer to as NAFTA, but is now a trilateral trade agreement, including our friends in Mexico. That's coming up for renewal in 2025. How worried do you think Canadians should be? And maybe scope out two scenarios for us. One, the Trump victory in what happens to a country like Canada, let's admit it, has very little leverage over the United States. And second, a Biden win, And I think you're right, a prediction odds on that you would have a divided Congress. How concerned should Canadians be about what could be in store in the coming couple of years?

Well, first, I want to thank you for not asking me about softwood lumber and that issue, which every staff meeting I had for years in the State Department when I was working on these issues would come up. So I just want to express for anyone listening to this, my appreciation to you. Look, it turns out that Joe Biden and Donald Trump do not disagree all that much on trade policy. They disagree a lot on a lot of things. That's not one. There's a difference of degree. But neither one of these guys is a free trader. They are, to varying degrees, skeptical of free trade, protectionist, and industrial plans.

They like big government. neither one made a move towards joining what we used to call the trans-Pacific partnership. The Biden administration invented something called the Indo-Pacific economic framework, which was kind of a diluted weak sister of the trans-Pacific partnership, and then wouldn't even go ahead with that when several Democratic senators, in particular the one in Ohio, Sherrod Brown, running for reelection, said, any trade agreement at all would be toxic to my choice. chances. President Biden hasn't removed President Trump's tariffs on China. So, you know, the first

thing I'd say is I disagree with both. I'll be honest with you when it comes to trade policy. I think both of them are truly ill-advised in their lack of embrace of free trade. And I think we pay an economic as well as a political and strategic price for it. That said, NAFTA or the USMCA or whatever, I guess you call it USCMA. I can't keep your, you know, everybody's got his own version of it. That seems to be a little bit protected, in part because it was in existence before, kind of got grandfathered, and then Trump got associated with the repackaging of sort of what I called NAFTA 2.0. So my guess is you could have a NAFTA 3.0 at some point under either.

And the question is, does it re, somehow? remain slightly exempt from the normal debates and passions. And the answer is quite possibly maybe. Canada is still seen in a very benign way. And Mexico is important. Could be also tied up with a deal on the border, which would be tempting for any president that we do something on trade to get something on Mexican cooperation on the border. So my guess is, how would I call it, to use Washington lingo, there's a little bit of a carve out. It's treated differently than trade. policy writ large. So if I were a Canadian, I would not be all that worried about problems there with either the existing agreement or when it comes to having a successor agreement.

But I think, you know, Mr. Trump has talked about 10% tariffs across the board being opposed. Not clear to me how that would be consistent with our current obligations. So again, the question is, does he introduce an exception? for that agreement, which is quite possible. And given that Mexico's, what, our largest trading partner in Canada is high on the list. It seems, you know, my guess is it's hard for me to see the case for starting a trade war in this part of the world. And I think, you know, what's even, I think there might be some opportunities also for French shoring and near shoring and certain types of things. if industrial planning and larger government roles become the new normal, as I fear they could be.

Again, my enthusiasm for these policies is finite. Then it puts Mexico and Canada in a position to take advantage of it in a good sense of the world, to participate in this and to have, if you will, much more of a North American economy and not just a trade area. So I think there's real possibilities there. So I worry about things around the world, but probably less so in North America. Excellent, Richard. Let's just end by having you tell listeners a little bit about your substack newsletter. What are you doing there? What can they find for, I'm sure, all of us who've joined for this last 40 minutes with you and really appreciated your insights and the sophistication rigor you're bringing to some really complicated issues. I would love to see all that in a substack format. So how do they go about doing that and what's on offer? Well, thank you, first of all. Look, I've spent my entire career working on national security,

but when you think about it, if you imagine national security is a coin, and one side is the stuff of foreign policy, but the other side of national security is domestic policy, and it's the strength of our economies, our societies, our democracies. And increasingly my own work, two of my last five or six books have been about things domestic. My most recent book, The Bill of Obligations, the habits we need from American citizens to preserve our democracy. I wrote a book probably 10 years ago called Foreign Policy Begins at Home. So, again, I don't think we can see national security just through the lens of foreign policy. It's got a large domestic.

So I ended up about a year ago, saying, I want and I write about this regularly. So I crowdsourced the name, came up with the name, Home and Away. And as you might expect, it's about things domestic and things foreign from an American perspective. It comes out every Friday morning. It runs around, I don't know, 1,500 words plus or minus. Some days it's a little bit longer. And I write about whatever domestic or international subjects. In the last six months, I've devoted an awful lot of time to the Middle Eastern Ukraine,

just exactly what we're talking about. But every once in a while, I also try to look at issues that don't get the attention that is there. I think it was one or two weeks ago I wrote heavily. you about the American debt and budget deficit. And I saw every once in a while, I try to look at things that may not seem urgent, but they're important. And the really good news for those who subscribe to it, and again, it's on substack.com, home and away, that you can't beat the price. It's free. I'm not looking to this to pay my greens fees or to support the new kitchen my wife wants. instead, I really want to get my ideas out there in circulation.

So now, others, my critics would say it's the perfect market, and the price reflects the value. I'm hoping not, but again, sure, if anyone wants to look at it, it's easy to find, then I hope they find it rewarding. Okay, well, I subscribe today, home and away. Check it out on Substack. Richard, thank you so much for coming on and spending some time with our community, the 100,000 strong Monk debate. members really appreciate again your analysis and insights let's do this again soon

thank you again thank you all for your regular debate you all are important part of civil society and I appreciate what it is you and your colleagues do so thank you very much well that wraps up today's dialogue I want to thank our guest Richard Haas you've certainly given us a lot to think about if your feedback or reflections on what you've just heard on this or any of our podcast please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates com. Thank you for lending your time and attention to our efforts to bring back the art of civil and substantive debate one conversation at a time. I'm your host and moderator, Rudyard Griffiths. The Monk Debates are a project of the Oriah and Peter and Melanie Monk Charitable Foundation.

The Monk Debates podcast is produced by Rudyard Griffiths, Ricky Gurwitz, and Daniel Kitts. Karen Lynch is the editor. Be sure to download and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. And if you feel like it, give us a five-star rating. Thanks again for listening.