The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Dialogue with Rose Gottemoeller: assessing Russia’s nuclear threats

Episode Date: March 13, 2024

Following the Cold War, the US and Russia entered into a series of arms control treaties that gave the world hope that, one day, nuclear weapons may be a thing of the past. But as tensions have risen between the two nuclear powers over Ukraine and other irritants, Russia has been abandoning these agreements. Most recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow would walk away from the last major arms treaty with the US, New START, in 2026.  What does all this mean for the prospect of nuclear war, and what can the United States and its allies do to get arms control back on track?  On this Munk Dialogue, we’re joined by someone who has been at the very centre of international arms control efforts. Rose Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019. In 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of New START, and she is now a lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.     The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Executive Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Senior Producer: Daniel Kitts Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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These are in-depth questions and answers with some of the world's sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. In each Muck Dialogue, we go deep into the big issues and ideas that are driving the public conversation. Following the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia entered into a series of arms-controlled treaties that gave the world the hope that one day nuclear weapons could be the thing of the past. But as tensions have risen between the two great powers over Ukraine and other bilateral irritants, Russia has been abandoning these agreements. Most recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Moscow would walk away from the last major arms treaty with the U.S. New start by 2026. So what does this all mean for the prospect of nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and

and the risk of nuclear war, can the United States and Russia get arms control back on track? On this monk dialogue, we're joined by someone who's been at the very heart of the international arms control effort for nuclear weapons. Rose Gautemuller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019. From 2009 to 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator for the new start tree. She's now a senior lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogley Institute for International Studies. Rose, welcome to the Monk Dialogues. Thank you so very much, Roger. A lot to talk about, privileged to have someone with your deep knowledge and expertise to assist our listeners through this very important topic.

So let's begin with some basics. What is the current state of play between Russia and the United States when it comes to arms control agreements for the management and supervision of their respective nuclear stockpiles? The New START Treaty, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, remains in force and it limits the United States and the Russian Federation to, 700 delivery vehicles each. That's 700 missiles or bombers, as well as 1,550 warheads deployed on those delivery vehicles. Now, that sounds like a lot, and it is. And that's why I believe we need to continue efforts to reduce and limit nuclear weapons. But I just want to say, for your listeners, that's down from a level of about 12,000 deployed warheads on each side back in 1994, when the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Start 1 came into force. So it's a big reduction, down to 1,550

in each country. Russia has decided to suspend some aspects of the New START Treaty. Can you tell us what those are and do you think they're important, something we should be concerned about those elements falling off the original agreement that you were so instrumental in putting together? Russia has suspended the verification regime of the treaty, which means the on-site inspections that each of us could conduct in the other country's sensitive nuclear facilities, 18 per year. And also, the Russians have suspended the notifications that we exchanged every time the Russians moved one of their intercontinental ballistic missiles, their ICBMs from a silo where it was deployed to a maintenance facility. They had to tell us about that movement. And vice versa. The treaty was totally reciprocal. But it meant that we had a really good 24-7 idea of where Russian nuclear weapon systems were that are strategic in nature, that is, that are targeted at the United States. The third thing I'd say is that they have suspended the data exchange, a regular two times a year data exchange where they basically tell us everything that they have deployed at the present time, and we do the same. So the Russians are shooting themselves in the foot because they are losing visibility into the U.S. nuclear arsenal just at a time when we are starting our modernization program.

So it's a bad thing for both sides, but it was Putin's decision. Explain to us a little bit more about what these exchanges of information, especially information regarding the movement of strategic weapons. What's the purpose of that? Is it to reduce the risk of? one or other adversary misunderstanding and subsequently making a miscalculation, give us the purpose of that aspect of the policy? Absolutely. The overarching goal, objective of these big strategic arms reduction treaties is to give

each side predictability about what the other side is doing. So we need to understand day and day out just how many of those Russian strategic nuclear weapon systems are pointed at us, are targeted at us, and they need to understand the same. And it helps to know exactly which ones are in operational status, which ones are in their deployment bases, which ones are in maintenance, which ones are moving from one place to another, and those notifications give us that kind of predictability. So it's really quite an accomplishment compared to where we were in the deep, dark days of the Cold War, when we didn't really know what they were up to and they didn't really know

what we were up to, except insofar as we had some satellite images that we were able to gain our so-called national technical means, satellites and other kinds of collection capabilities that we ourselves maintain and the Russians as well. And now in the absence of that type of information, what kind of uncertainties is that creating for military planners? Have you, has the American government had to take additional steps of the changes in processes and procedures around America's management of its own nuclear arsenal as a result of the loss of this information. Thanks to over 30 years of experience now with monitoring and verifying these arms control treaties, we do have a good idea of

what the Russian nuclear arsenal looks like, strategic nuclear arsenal looks like on a day-and-day-out basis. So what we're doing now, of course, is using our national technical means, our own satellites to track carefully what they're up to. And so that is useful and helpful. And our government has been able to say that we have detected no major change in what the Russians are doing with their strategic nuclear arsenal in the year since Putin suspended implementation of the treaty. So so far, we're able to say that we are confident that no big changes have occurred. But it is a danger that in future we could begin to lose that confidence. Russia has also revoked the ratification of the 1996

comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, citing America's similar failure to ratify. What's the significance of that treaty? Why is this also now part of the impasse? Yes. Back in the 1990s, the United States, along with Russia, China, the other nuclear weapon states under the NPT, includes France and the UK as well.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the NPT. They, together with countries around the world, negotiated a comprehensive ban on the explosive testing of nuclear weapons. And this meant that we could not test at sea, under the sea, we could not test underground anymore. Such tests have long been banned in the atmosphere since the 1960s. But it was a great measure to constrain further modernization, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. And so a really significant step along the road

to controlling these terrible weapons of mass destruction. The United States tried and failed to gain the Senate's advice and consent to ratification back in 1998. That is on us that our political system did not allow the ratification process to happen. But the Russians ratified early. And for my mind, it was a great moral high ground that they were standing on that they had ratified the treaty while we and the Chinese had not. Now, I want to stress that due to something that's called the Vienna law of treaties, once you've signed a treaty, you are bound by its constraints, whether or not you have ratified the treaty. So the United States is bound by the CTBT. We do not engage in explosive nuclear testing, neither do the Chinese. In fact, it's only the North Koreans who have,

have tested in this century, countries around the world are constrained and restrained from nuclear testing by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if they have signed it. Better, of course, if they've ratified it and then it can enter into forcefully, but the signature on the treaty is important. So the Russians say, well, now we're back to where you are and the Chinese that we have withdrawn our ratification, but we have signed the treaty and we will continue to live up to its constraints. You mentioned the U.S. quote, modernization, close quote, of its nuclear arsenal. This, as you know, Rose, has caused some sense of consternation and debate in capitals like Beijing and Moscow, the extent to which the United States is going through a, I believe it's an excess of a

trillion dollar exercise to update not just its long-term strategic forces, but also to continue. continue to advance the potential for the miniaturization and applicability of nuclear weapons to tactical battlefield-type uses. What is the rationale for the modernization program? How is that helping advance the cause of nuclear disarmament? The modernization program, our so-called program of record for modernizing our nuclear triad of strategic nuclear weapons systems. These are the intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed on land, submarine-launched missiles, and then also the air-launched missiles that are carried on bombers. The rationale for this was stated by President Barack Obama himself. When in Prague back in 2009, he gave a famous speech

where he talked about the need to seek a world without nuclear weapons. But he also said that as long as nuclear weapons exist, we must maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. The problem with the nuclear weapons systems that the United States is deploying today is they are old. The bombers, for example, some of them were built in the 1950s, the submarines, some of them were launched in the late 1970s, early 1980s, and the intercontinental ballistic missiles are also rather decrepit at this point. So they're no longer safe to operate, nor can we be sure that they would be. effective necessarily if they had to be called on in the terrible instance of nuclear deterrence essentially failing. We don't want to see that ever, but to ensure that, we must ensure that

our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and effective. And I want to also underscore that the importance of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties is that that modernization would take place under limits, we would not build up our nuclear forces beyond the 700 that are allowed under the New START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. So this is not a launch of some kind of arms race. As far as the United States is concerned, we will conduct what we consider to be a judicious and necessary modernization, but not go beyond the limits of the arms control treaty that is in force. So I think that's another reason why it's important to get back to the negotiating table, as our national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, said the United States wants to do

when he made a speech back in June of 2023. So the U.S. wants to keep limits, but it also says we need to modernize because our systems are old, they are decrepit, and they are dangerous to operate. And what are your comments on the aspects not around strategic modernization, but the introduction of new gravity bombs that would have the ability to reduce yield to potentially be used in circumstances that might encompass tactical as opposed to strategic deployment. Why is the U.S. doing this and how is this playing into global concerns about the general, quote, innovation, close quote, that's going on amongst not just the United States, but China and Russia, too, when it comes to coming up with new ways to conceive of the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.

As far as the United States is concerned, we really live by the adage put in place by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be. fought. I think the weapons that you're referring to are the so-called B-61-12s that are deployed in Europe on the territory of our NATO allies. And this is for what is called the extended deterrence mission to ensure that the Russians realized if they would try to attack the NATO allies that there is the potential for nuclear escalation to occur on NATO territory. And this is important because it means that we're not only talking about the U.S. Central Strategic systems deployed in the United States in order to maintain deterrence of Russian attacks, because way back when it was decided, well, maybe the United States would never want to trade

New York City for Berlin, for example, and so would not be willing to really be credible in terms of offering that extended deterrence commitment. And that is why there are some few weapons deployed on the territory of NATO allies. They are controlled by the United States. And the B-61-12, It's interesting. People don't understand this, Rudyard, but it's a bit of an arms control measure because the older B-61s, we had to deploy many, many more of them because they were not, again, so safe, secure, and effective as the modernized B-61-12s. But as far as the U.S. policy is concerned, they are not an enhanced capability per se, but they are more safe and secure. And in terms of effectiveness, they are said to be more accurate, which means the idea of collateral damage that somehow a

civilian target would be destroyed when we were, you know, aiming at it at a military target, that is also an important consideration. So I know all this probably seems quite arcane, but I do want to stress that the United States is not seeking new nuclear military capabilities. It is trying to ensure that the capabilities we deploy are safe, secure. and effective and minimize the possibility of civilian deaths or destruction if the terrible day ever arrives when those weapons have to be used. So yeah, just to try to get clarity on this, just one more time. The idea that these bombs, though, can be, quote, dialed to yield. In other words, they can be a single device can be controlled in terms of its explosive force, including

providing the operator with lower yield options. Do you see that as a dangerous trend generally in the increasing technological focus on creating lower yield nuclear weapons that, as you say, would conceivably use against military targets specifically? Yes, there is a concern that Russia continues to sustain, that the Chinese are maintaining the thought. The thought, of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, that they might use them in certain scenarios, not as an everyday matter. And there was a time during the Cold War when the Soviets were thinking about using nuclear weapons almost like any other weapon in a more or less routine way. That's not what we're talking about nowadays, but the Russians clearly have deployed some

lower yield systems that, in theory, would be more usable on a battlefield in Europe. And so the of having that kind of also low-yield capability, at least available to the U.S. and NATO side, is that like-detters like, that low-yield weapons on the Russian side are deterred by low-yield weapons on the U.S. and NATO side. So that is the theory. This is all quite theoretical, but that is the idea, and it does not, at least as far as NATO is concerned, indicate some kind of preference for nuclear use on the battlefield. field. Over the last number of weeks, there have been a series of news reports, which seemed to

indicate that in the fall of 2022, as Russian forces were being pushed back, in fact, collapsing eastward in the face of the first large and to this date only successful offensive by Ukrainian troops, that Vladimir Putin and the military establishment in Russia were seriously considering the option of using a tactical nuclear weapon to reset the battlefield, so to speak. How do you interpret those reports? Are they credible? How close do you think we came to breaking the nuclear taboo in those fatal months of the fall of 2022? From the outset of Russia's second invasion of Ukraine, as I call it, their first was when they seized Crimea in February of 2014. So when they invaded again in February of 2022,

nuclear saber rattling was part and parcel of the propaganda line that they were putting out there. So they were always threatening the use of nuclear weapons should NATO and the United States come to the assistance of the Ukrainians on the battlefield. And so that was a clear message from the very outset from Vladimir Putin and from his lieutenants. It does seem, from news reporting that in September of 2022, that nuclear saber rattling was transformed, at least inside circles in Moscow, into a real discussion of whether some tactical nuclear weapons needed to be used on the battlefield because the Ukrainians had the Russian army on the run in the southeast of Ukraine. And there was apparently some panic in Moscow that the Russian

army would be defeated at that point. Evidently, again, according to news reports, the general staff of the Russian Ministry of Defense basically convinced Vladimir Putin that nuclear weapons would not turn the tide and would not make a difference on the battlefield and would in fact cause greater harm than help. And so in the end of the day, the weapons were not used. But I do understand, again, from media reports that those concerns were very real. Let's talk about even more recent news, reports that Russia has been considering the deployment of a nuclear device primarily as an anti-satellite weapon into space. How serious an arms control threat is a weapon system like this? And what, if anything, could be done to try and head off or thwart this?

this effort by Russia. It's not clear whether they will follow through with it, but it does seem to be a threat. Definitely. And it's got long roots, this system. Back in the Soviet era, the Soviets were regularly talking about using so-called electromagnetic pulse, basically blasting a nuclear weapon off in space in order to ensure that communications of NATO and the United States deployed in space and on the ground as well, too, the effect extends to the ground would not be effective, that it would cut off all communications, including so-called National Command Authority for commanding the nuclear forces. So it was part of Soviet doctrine way back when, and it evidently remains part of their doctrine now to try to interrupt what are now more and more space-based

communications of the United States and NATO. And so this, You know, nobody knows exactly what the system is about. It hasn't been deployed yet. It seems to be still on the drawing board. But it does seem to be, in my mind, associated with that longstanding Soviet doctrine that they need to do everything they can to cut off communications, command control and communications for the United States and the NATO allies. If you're enjoying the Monk Debates podcast, come over to our website at triple W monkdebates.com. That's MUNK DebateswithanS.com and check out our free Monk membership. As a complimentary monk member, you get all kinds of great perks and benefits, access to our weekly email, summarizing our best debates, and ticketing privileges at our main stage debates, special news information, and offers all courtesy of the monk debates. You can grab

your complimentary monk membership again right now at triple w monkdebates.com. Simply look to the top navigation on the website and follow the links. Thanks in advance for joining our community. Let's move to China because we know that China is engaged in an effort to significantly increase their strategic nuclear forces. They're building a large array of silos in the Mongolian desert, significantly increasing, at least estimates are potentially tripling or quadrupling their strategic force. What's behind this? How risky is it now if China enters, in a sense, into a competition with the United States and Russia to similarly become a global, strategic nuclear player? Well, that's clearly what the Chinese leadership is about. They want to

become a global player as they see it on a par with the United States and on a par with Russia, although there the relationship is different. And of course, Russia is dependent quite a bit on China in the midst of this war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, China seems ready to try to build up a triad of nuclear forces, land-based, sea-based, and air-based that is similar in its structure to what the United States and the Russian Federation are deploying. They also, as you've said, clearly are building up their ICBM force by putting in place new silos, 300 new silos in the deserts north and west of Beijing. So we are watching this with great consternation, but two points here. First, the Chinese are building up from a very small base.

They have approximately 500 weapons today. And the U.S. Department of Defense says that by 2030, they should have approximately 1,500. total weapons, total nuclear weapons. Today, the United States and Russian Federation, under New Start, deploy 1,550 weapons, but we also have a total of 4,500 weapons, some of which are held in reserve, some of which are kept in storage facilities for potential use in the Russian case, particularly on the battlefield. So, long story short, we're talking about the Chinese building up to a total number of weapons of about 1,500 in 2030, while we have already, and have been for many years sustaining an arsenal of about 4,000

total weapons. So I want people to understand that there's still a big difference there, and as I keep saying, no need to panic. But nevertheless, we really need to ask the Chinese, what are their objectives, what are their goals? Because that's the greatest danger at this moment to my mind as they're just doing this buildup, but they refuse to talk about what they have in mind. And will they ever be willing to come to the negotiating table and talk about constraining those weapons? Just in our closing moments, I'd like to go a bigger picture with you. Because, you know, on one level, as we just had, we've had a very interesting, you know, factual, helpful exchange to allow hopefully our members to better understand, you know, what is a very complex issue

with a whole bunch of different developments going on geographically in space in terms of modernization of weapon forces. But Rose, there's something at times here that I struggle with, which is, you know, we're talking about arsenals that still exist in the thousands of warheads on either side. They're attached to increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, the emergence now of hypersonic missiles. We'll soon have to contemplate the application of artificial intelligence to the management

and potential command and control of these systems. All of this rose just seems like risk piling on risk, piling on risk. And we're now doing this largely without substantive international agreements to manage those risks. So why wouldn't it be fair to say that we're in a bad place? This is a significant existential threat to humanity. And we can have very rational fact-based conversations about this. But, you know, is it time to become a bit angry about how and why our political leaders have allowed us to end up in this situation, contemplating truly existential threats? that would end our collective civilization, our way at life, as Daniel Ellsberg has eloquently written,

conduct an act of omniside. It's not just our extinction. It's potentially the extinction of every other living species on this earth, a horrific, incomprehensible crime. Absolutely, Rudyard. We are in a bad place, and I cannot agree more about this. but I would ask your listeners to direct their anger, as I think angry we should all be, at Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin and Xi Jinping in Beijing, because they are, to my mind, not at this time willing to engage in efforts to constrain and control these weapons, whereas Joe Biden and his administration in Washington, D.C., have been very, very clear that they are ready to negotiate without preconditions to place

further constraints on nuclear weapons systems. And moreover, are really interested in talking about what we can do to constrain and control new technologies that will indeed have a mighty influence on how effective these weapons are in the future. You referred to artificial intelligence and also the emergence of hypersonic weapons systems of all kinds. I think these are excellent topics for the United States, Russia and China to be really sitting down and discussing seriously. But at the moment, we are not able to because doors are shut in Moscow and Beijing. Rose, I mean, why not, though, in the face of the existential risks, regardless of what, you know, bad actors like Putin or Xi may do,

we have potentially very limited control over their actions, let alone their morality or lack of. what about considering, if not outright unilateral disarmament, a significant unilateral reduction in Western stockpiles? Scientists have now, I think, convincingly argued that even the use of a small number of large thermonuclear weapons would cause an immense change in global climate, potentially the deaths of billions of people through the collapse in food and various ecosystems. In other words, why are we maintaining 4,000 plus thermonuclear weapons when a handful of them alone would be enough to seriously threaten human civilization as we know it? These are all fair points, Roger, but the stability of deterrence for a long time has rested on the notion of some kind of quantifiable balance.

And that's what we have today between the United States and Russia. There are some in my country who are arguing with China's buildup that we need to build more. We actually need to build up our nuclear weapons stockpiles. I don't agree with that. And in fact, I believe that we can continue to sustain the balance we have today with Russia and deter China with clever ways of structuring our nuclear forces in deployment. So I do think that the United States is in a difficult place right at the moment, but I think we need to be the ones delivering the message clearly again and again that we are ready to reduce and limit.

We need to be thinking in those terms. And furthermore, there are certain unilateral steps that the United States has been taking. For example, it has said that we do not want to have any kind of direct assent that is, anti-satellite systems that can shoot from the earth and kill satellites in outer space, creating a great deal of debris. We've already said we want to ban that and that we are willing to do so unilaterally. We're asking other countries to join us. So there are some unilateral steps we're taking, and we will continue to try to be the leader in this area. Would being a leader involve once and for all the United States abandoning as the only nuclear power that has a first strike

policy. Is it time to remove from U.S. strategic doctrine the stated option of a first strike? Well, actually, the Russians have a first strike option as well. For a while in the 1990s, they embraced no first use, and then they backed away from it. So again, this is a very arcane area. To be honest with you, Rudyard, I think it would burn a tremendous amount of capital for the United States to try to walk away from that in terms of our national processes, working with the Congress and with the community overall. I always say keep your eye on the prize of getting the hardware limited, getting the nuclear warheads limited. Let's let the doctrinal statements just live by themselves. At some point in the future, the United States may be

able to back away from no first twos. But that's not where I would put my energy right now. I guess, Rose, just for the average person listening, there's something about no first use that invokes moral questions. Why would you ever be the first to strike to use these horrific weapons on civilian and other populations? Why isn't this, in a sense, a moment for America to, in this very difficult arena, this fraud arena, claim some moral high ground? Well, once again, I have to say that the philosophy, the theology around no first use is very much associated also with the extended deterrence commitment that we grant to our allies, not only our NATO allies in Europe, but also our allies in Asia.

And they become quite alarmed when the United States appears to be, moving in that direction. President Biden at the outset of his administration, for example, wanted to move toward a statement that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter other nuclear weapons. So this made the allies very nervous because they thought that in some way the extended deterrence commitment of the United States was being weakened. So these are very arcane arguments, but again, they are real political arguments and the strength of our extended a deterrence commitment to our allies in Asia and in Europe means that they are not themselves building and deploying nuclear weapons. It is a nonproliferation measure, and the value to my mind

is enormous in that area. So, yeah, just a final question to try to help me and some listeners understand. I mean, if one is not going to remove the option of first strike, if one is going to maintain weapons stockpiles numbering in the thousands, when one would think that any rapid, calculation on the part of the Russians or the Chinese would understand that a few hundred American strategic nuclear weapons deployed on submarines, deployed in ways that are very difficult to, if not impossible, to remove vis-a-vis a first strike of their own. Are we counting angels on a head of a pin here, Rose? Well, sometimes it seems that way. And I know for listeners, it seems quite crazy, but I do want to just reflect once again that there is a certain strength

to equal numbers to a parity, as we used to describe it. And this is not parity in the way we, you know, exact parity that we have to have one for one in each way we deploy these weapons. But it does, I think, grant a certain stable foundation to nuclear deterrence. As irrational as nuclear deterrence overall is, nevertheless, it does grant a somewhat stable foundation. to it. I just struggle with the idea of the Russians thinking, well, because they've reduced from 4,000 to 500, but they still have 500 thermonuclear weapons of a megaton or more, that's enough to end Russian civilization Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, you know, any day of the week. So I guess for those, maybe some people, maybe you can enhance a bit of my skepticism in here.

There are powerful lobbies behind this industry. This is a, this is a multi-hundred, billion dollar industry that's deeply integrated with with your military industrial complex, with manufacturing in different, you know, congressional districts. To what extent are we really doing justice to a rational discussion about nuclear weapons? And to what extent is just politics and entropy? And well, we've always done it this way. So we're going to continue to do it this way. We're going to continue to have thousands of these devices of mass destruction. Look, once again, the policy of the U.S., and I embrace it fully, is to continue to reduce and limit these weapons. 4,000 weapons is too many weapons, 1,550 deployed weapons is too many weapons,

but we should not do it alone because we do not want to give any sign to the Chinese and the Russians that they can gain superiority over us in nuclear weapons and therefore threaten not only us, but also our allies. So we need to be looking for ways to continue to reduce and limit. But I also want to, again, for your listeners, give the sense of how far we have come since the Cold War years. In the Cold War years, the U.S. built 32,000 nuclear warheads, and we're now down to approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads. The Russians built over 40,000 nuclear warheads, and we're down to about 4,000 on their

side as well. So the reductions have occurred, and that's the trajectory we need to continue that downward push to reduce limit and really get rid of these nuclear warheads. I agree with that. Well, thank you, Rose, for your analysis and insights today. This has been a hugely informative conversation. I've certainly learned a lot. I know our listeners have too. So thank you for your time, your insights. Greatly appreciate you coming on the program. You're welcome. My pleasure. That wraps up today's dialogue. I want to thank our guest, Rose Gauton, She certainly gave us a lot to think about. If you have feedback or reflections on what you've just heard on this or any of our podcast, please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates.com.

Thank you for lending your time and attention to our efforts to bring back the art of civil and substantive conversation, one dialogue at a time. I'm your host and moderator, Rudyard Griffith. The Monk Debates are a project of the Aurea and Peter and Melanie Monk Charitable Foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwitz are the producers. Be sure to download and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. And if you like us, feel free to give us a five-star rating. Thank you again for listening.