The Munk Debates Podcast - Munk Dialogue with Zhou Bo: Why China sees Taiwan as its biggest national security concern

Episode Date: January 2, 2024

On this Munk Dialogue we are speaking to one of China’s leading experts on military strategy and security. Zhou Bo is a retired senior colonel of China's People's Liberation Army and a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. He was also a director at the Ministry of National Defence of China. In this wide-reaching conversation, Bo talks about why Taiwan is the biggest national security concern for China, regional disputes over the South China Sea, and lessons that Chinese leaders are taking away from the ongoing war in Ukraine. The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths  Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to [e-mail].   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 15+ year library of great debates in HD video, access to our Friday Focus podcast, a free Munk Debates book, and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran LynchBecome a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

You don't help the poor by making everybody poorer. The media has a frame, and the frame is Israel is the oppressor, and the Palestinians are the oppressed. I shouldn't be forced to acknowledge my privilege unless I desire for that to be part of my interaction with somebody else. What I know to be true and what all of my fellow Gen Z know to be true is that this is the most talented generation yet. With respect to every indicia of disadvantage, there is still a racial hierarch. And though I am, of course, in Anglo. I'm certainly not a Frizzan. Hello, Monk listeners. Rudyard Griffith here, your host and moderator. Welcome to this, our continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogues.

On each monk dialogue, we go deep into the big issues and ideas, driving the public conversation with an important international thinker. On this monk dialogue, we are going to be talking with one of China's leading security experts. His name is Joel Bou. He's a senior retired colonel. in the People's Liberation Army of China and a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Shanghai. He's also a director at the Ministry of National Defense of China. In this far-reaching conversation, we talk with Bo about why Taiwan remains an ongoing security issue for China.

The regional disputes are occurring with other Asian powers in the South East. China Sea and the lessons the Chinese leaders are drawing from the ongoing war in Ukraine. Zhou Bu, welcome to the Monk Dialogues. Tai Rod, nice to be here. Let's talk a little bit about China's own sphere of influence. And surely, and correct me if I'm wrong, but would you characterize the increasingly uncertain status of Taiwan as China's biggest national security issue at this time? Well, Taiwan is always the biggest national security concern for China.

The reason is very simple. Actually, for all the militaries around the world, and territorial and national defense is top priority. What makes China different is that it has some other missions being a major power. But so, if you look at China, China has a very unique role. First, the major power is not reunified. This is extremely rare, you know, among major powers. And besides,

it has to go aboard and its interests are overseas. It's ubiquitous. So we're talking about such a major power that is so, so sophisticated and complicated. But this is a kind of natural feeling for Chinese, you know, to have a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Then there are a number of questions. First, are we becoming impatient?

Yeah. This is actually a big question. I would say we're still patient. This is a thing in a number of phenomena. For example, in October last year, in Xi Jinping's report to the Chinese Communist Party's Congress, He still talked about Taiwan issue using two phrases that impressed me most. That is, we still have utmost sincerity, yeah, and we would make utmost efforts in peaceful reunification.

In my understanding, that means at least by October last year, we still have confidence. And then we see from the facts, the fact is the fact is, There are a Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan invited a massive Chinese drill around the island with live firing of missiles and so on and so forth. But during Tai Ying Wen's meeting with Kevin McCarthy in California, we again did an exercise, but that exercise was only a simulated attack without firing a bullet. So there is a great subtlety. That means we know, you know, how to handle the situation, or at least our measures, you know, are actually cautious. They are measured. What is the feeling in China amongst the national security establishment regarding the increasing arming of Taiwan by the United States with sophisticated weapon systems going in, most notably.

promises of surface-to-sea missiles that could allow Taiwan, should it wish, in some unfortunate set of circumstances, attack and potentially sink Chinese vessels off its shores. Do these types of actions by the United States, are they received of as provocative in China, or are they just seen more as a nuisance, a pattern of behavior that you've, seen in the past and that you're not giving any more priority to now than you did previously? I think that's certainly considered provocative, but the question is, do they really matter or not? I don't think they would matter tremendously. For example, Taiwan recently made the first indigenous summary, right? And they're going to make eight, something like that. But how important are these?

submarines. From my experience as a serviceman, I know the submarine is much more sophisticated, even than an aircraft. And because I came from air force, I'm not a pilot, but I know normally an aircraft can never be said to be mature until a pilot has flown it for many years. That means it was produced, it was trialed. But then only pilot can tell you how many problems they really have. So with submarine, the first made submarine, conventional submarine, I'm sure there's a lot of problems. And actually, it was delivered in a hurry because this would be a kind of a political legacy by Tai Yinwen, left by her. So, but even if they could produce eight submarines, even now altogether, would that matter? Yes, they could complicate decision-making in Beijing.

but generally speaking, you know, in comparison with China's military advances by leap and bounce, it doesn't really matter. I think the United States is now adopting a strategy. Gover turning Taiwan into a pocupine. Do they really believe Taiwan could be such a powerful pocahupy? I doubt about it. But it serves the interest. It serves the interest to show that what's supporting a democracy.

It serves the interest of the military industrial complex of selling weapons. Why not it is such a good opportunity, right? So I think it also served them as kind of bargaining chips in this ever-sophisticate relationship between China and the United States. I think Americans actually have made some progress through learning from the failures. For example, decoupling now looks totally like nonsense. So they call the derisking, which is actually the term borrowed from a wonderline. But why do they call derisking?

Because it sounds, okay, more moderate, because decouple is impossible. But what does the derisking mean? I think they would have to search their own soul to find out. Because even about, you know, derisking in semiconductor conductors and chips, they would find it increasing difficult. It's not we are asking them to do what they don't want to. Is these chips manufacturers altogether? We would have pressure on the White House

because they're losing Chinese market. So I think the United States is actually having a problem with this one-China policy because internally we know, and it's people like Richard Haas, The former president of American Council of Foreigner Relations has written an article about how American policy to China should turn from ambiguity to clarity. But some other scholars actually disagree with him because this kind of clarity actually would make the situation more dangerous. But why this kind of debate is happening?

I believe that is because the strength of PRC is growing. because in the past, because the PRC is so weak. So even if they maintain positive ambiguity, you don't know what kind of attitude they are having, and you are in doubt, you're constantly guessing. But because of mainland strength is growing, so they are afraid that unless they make it clear that they would defend Taiwan Mediterranean,

probably China would launch attack on Taiwan first. But if they make this kind of policy, you know, with clarity, some people are afraid this may just invite a preemptive strike from mainland in the first place. So I think they are now caught in this dilemma. And look at the American domestic situation, the Biden administration is so weak. And this kind of bipartisan, you know, rivalry is extreme. And economic speaking, it is doing good. But if you put it against a bigger drop, then if you listen to Donald Trump, you know, the American's whole situation is in the college, right? So, and democracy, the liberal democracy has been in steady decline for 17 years.

And who did that? Apparently it has nothing to do with China or Russia. And for Chinese like me, or even for anybody, it's so, so appalling to see an American president would ask, you know, the protester to take over Capitol Hill. This is unbelievable. This is an eye-opener. And this won't even happen in an African country. So putting all this together, how confident are we in a stable American policy toward China on Taiwan? I really have a serious doubt. You mentioned it, just to check this with you, because it is a debate, as you said, in American political circles, some Republicans arguing there should be an explicit U.S. security guarantee extended to Taiwan, similar to Article 5.

type commitment within NATO, what would be Beijing's reaction if that policy came into force? Would that be seen as provocative? Let's first look into the debate about one-china policy or about this ambiguity versus clarity. Eventually, they still talk about one-china. Why? Because they are actually hauling out this concept, but they still put it as a big basket, right because this would make things easier for them they kind of just you know use endless

the different explanation explain what is one china if you do not say it is one china then of course that is a kind of earthquake for them and for us so i think we can learn from lancy pelosi's visit that we are serious about it so some people ask me what will happen if uh uh an uh uh uh uh a new American house speaker visit Taiwan. I said, I don't know because certainly we have a plan B, plan C, but I can guess out of my God's feeling that our response has to be greater. Otherwise, how can we just tell ourselves that we're doing the right thing? So I think this is a kind of, I doubt they would actually,

openly support Taiwan in such a manner. But I'm fully confident that mainland China, being stronger now, has more means to handle this. This debate over American posture vis-à-vis Taiwan is unfolding within a larger American strategy in the South Pacific. It has a name, Ocas, doesn't roll off the tongue, but it's a supposed alliance of the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom. Around that, there is an effort to develop closer security ties with Japan, the Philippines, to a certain extent, South Korea. How is this being perceived by Chinese security officials? Is there a feeling of encroachment here? A feeling of an adversary setting up a concerted opposition against China's rob.

China's expansion. Let me start by talking a bit about an American's grand strategy. I believe that the fact that the United States is focusing on what we called Asia-Pacific or what Americans said, Indo-Pacific, is actually a reflection of the fact that American strengths has really declined. So therefore, that is why you would find the American official talking about. about importance of allies and partners. Because the own strength is not enough.

So they have to rely on these allies and partners. And you have mentioned all these people. Then there are different situations. But I believe this, generally speaking, is an American effort to contain China in this region. The problem is, after I have read the Indo-Pestan strategy, I found that they have many purposes, but without adequate tools. No nations are stupid, black and white.

You see, now I believe the world has entered into an area that all countries are picking sides with issues rather than with sites. But when it comes to Japan, which has a kind of treaty of obligation to support the United States. Should there be a conflict in Taiwan State in terms of logistics supply? So probably Japan would have to do that. But for Australia, well, they talked about it, but it's hard to say. You won't know what a man really wants to do unless it has come to the final moment.

If you examine the history of Australia, you would find this country very interesting in that. Historically, it always fought other people's wars elsewhere, be it in Glippily in Afghanistan or somewhere far away from continental Australia, except during the Second World War when Japanese bombed Darwin, for example. So this is an interesting country. other people's war. But now China's, you know, one set of export goes to China. And yes, they are, again, buying eight submarines. But how important are these eight submarines? It's almost like the submarines in Taiwan. They could complicate decision-making in Beijing,

but it's not a big deal. Because in terms of number of ships, we are already the largest in the world. And these eight submarines will be delivered probably up to 10 to 15 years, to say the least. So, and by then, how stronger PLA will become. I think this has a lot to do with the Morrison government. Right now, the Albanese government is also making changes. So all this whole picture is not so black and white. But the Philippines is interesting in that In that, you know, President Marcus, the policy of China seems to be a U-term from its predecessor.

I personally ask myself, why is this? Because President Duterte, certainly, has carried it a lot of favor from China, even if he himself would support the ruling of the tribunal. That, of course, was in favor of the Philippines. So on this policy issue, he actually did not mention it so often, but he certainly was supportive of the tribunal's ruling. But then he knows the fact. That is the fact.

Then he just went along to have good relation with China, you know, for better than for some other benefits. But then when it came to present. Marcus, it's difficult for me to understand because I believe there are something to do with his personal background, yeah, because he's a personal background or he's a firmer or stronger connection with the United States and the Filipino military, basically all the senior officers were more or less trained in the United States, yeah, and but still it doesn't make sense to me. Why doesn't make sense to me?

Because in China's relationship with any claimants in South China Sea, you have never heard Chinese threatening to use force against them. You know, China actually has laid down three conditions when it, I mean, China laid down three conditions when it might adopt a non-peaceful means regarding Taiwan issue. But on South China's issue, China has never threatened any other country. So if all of a sudden, the Filipino government would open up nine bases from American use, then we would ask why. This doesn't really make sense. Actually, it would make the Philippines more vulnerable.

Because if Americans use these as kind of forefront of battlefields, then, of course, they become targets for Chinese strikes. which is on the soil of the Philippines. Is that in the interest? Sign up now for a complimentary monk membership. As a free monk member, you get all kinds of great perks and privileges, including streaming of select debates, dialogues and podcasts on our website, a 24-hour advanced ticketing window to access seats to our in-person debates before the general public, written transcripts of all of our content, and email updates on special offers and promotions. You can grab your complimentary monk membership right now at triple W monk debates.

That's MUNK, Debates with an S.com. Simply click on the membership tab in the top right of our navigation. Grab your monk membership and open your mind to a world of great debate. What are the lessons that Chinese, leaders are drawing from the war in Ukraine. There is an argument that part of what provoked Putin into his invasion was a perception. We don't need to debate it here, whether it was valid or not, but it was a perception on his part of NATO and Western powers, arming Ukraine, supporting political movements and political actors that were not in Russia's interests, and that,

ultimately Ukraine was becoming a security risk for Russia because of its proximity to Moscow and other decision-making centers in the country. So does China feel similarly that there's a risk here, a pattern that had unfolded in Ukraine could potentially unfold vis-a-vis Taiwan or the South China Sea? or is history going to repeat itself potentially in Asia replicating the example of Eastern Europe? Well, on the war of Ukraine, I would say if Putin knows what would happen, you know, he probably would adopt a different strategy. Whether that strategy is a war or not, I just don't know.

But of course, there is a reason why he would have to do this. The truth is actually all the Soviet and the Russian leaders, starting from Mikhailov to Borisov and two presidents pudding, all warn against this. So he's not the first person to make a warning, but he's the first person to say enough, he's enough, right? But apparently the Russian armed forces proven to be extremely resilient, but, but, but, it was not fighting so well in the beginning. I would not say that this has any direct link with Taiwan issue because that actually is recognized by more than 170 countries to be China's internal affair, right?

And many people, as I said in the beginning, I believe the Chinese government is still patient. And many people would say, hey, some people in Washington believe this is kind of a conflict inevitable. I actually have some doubts even by quoting what Secretary of Defense Lord Austin said himself. I was in Shangriela Dialogue and actually I have attended seven or eight Shangrila Dialogs. But for this year, Shangrila Dialogue, what impressed me most is, that he talked about a conflict, not imminent, not inevitable.

So the background is, before his remarks, there are quite a few, you know, remarks made by some American generals talking about 2035 scenario or 2027 scenarios that China would definitely launch attacks or so on and so forth. But that was not responsible, I would say. But because American Secretary of Defense should have all the intelligence information reports whatsoever to support his argument. So it is important for him to make it clear on such important meeting of Shangriela dialogue. So that actually is a relief to me because it confirms to what I believe is the real situation. Some people say, okay, Tavernjeans people do not want to be, you know, integrated with you. And I believe this may not.

not be so true. Why? Because before COVID, actually, more than 1.5 million Taiwanese people are living in Manichina, mostly around Shanghai. And that would be more than 6% of Taiwanese population. What does that mean? That means if Mani China can provide Taiwanese with better opportunities of employment or making money, these people actually. don't care so much to live in a different society with different system. Right. So then the question is, could China continue to provide this kind of environment? I believe it is possible.

Why? Because, first of all, Chinese economy is so integrated with the rest of the world. So China has to open up, like it or not. And China wants to continue to open up. And so long as China continues to opens up, while the world is becoming smaller because of this kind of globalization, so therefore the speed of people's interaction will simply become faster. People everywhere, I mean people everywhere. So this kind of integration between China and Taiwan will also become faster.

So it is in this logic, I believe this kind of integration is in never. And finally, mainland China has never announced a timetable to say, okay, we must become reunified. If we did, if we have done that, that is another issue, but we have not done that. So we're still patient. I believe time might just give us the best help in this regard. We're coming to the end of our time. So let me just ask some final bigger picture questions. We've talked a lot about China's rise, its status as a civilizational power in the 21st century.

To what extent are your colleagues, the senior security officials in China, concern that you now face an adversary in the United States who is trying across a series of domains, military, technological, and economic to prevent China's rise, to thwart your ascension to potentially, either economically or whatever other metrics you want to choose, to become the world's dominant power. Is that on people's minds, or is this more of, again, a Western misinterpretation

of what you and your colleagues are actually thinking and what you're actually concerned about. This is really the biggest questions. And out of the questions, there could be dozens of smaller question, and each one of them could be extremely important. So let me repeat what I said to some people, whether we have entered into a new Cold War, for example. And my answer is very simple.

We won't know until we have avoided our own. hot wall because this is actually what happened during cold wall every day people actually were preparing for the hot wall right so but uh people went through it and uh had a big relief oh okay we didn't have a hot wall so what happened instead is a cold wall yeah uh then my argument is we never know the future and we would only you know know the future until we have gone through it So this kind of question is meaningless. But apparently there are so many different things, you know, from this kind of competition between China, US, and the one during the Cold War, between two superpowers.

So I think what happened is that if you look at China's policy, China's policy toward the United States is fairly consistent. Yeah? It didn't change tone much. And the United States would behave like a roller coaster, you see. That's much more difficult to predict. I think that has a lot of things to do with the own mentality, because this country wrongly believes that they are the city upon the hill.

I told people, where is the city upon the hill? The Pasoenal is the only city upon the hill. That is empathy, broken, somewhat grandiose for tourists only, right? So that is the only city on the hill. And again, recently Biden repeat how the United States is indispensable. That is right. But every nation is indispensable. Yeah.

It is indispensable for people to know that there is a small country called Maldives deep in the Indian Ocean. That is so, so beautiful. Because it is so important for our human being to remember that this whole whole. human society is just like a forest that has different in the foreign and flora and that is why the world is beautiful it is fine that you don't know it has NBA McDonald's Hollywood but so what the Maldivians don't have any of these but they just know every morning thousands of tourists would come and just tell them how beautiful their country is so about finally back to your question in the beginning so I

I believe so far China's rise is very peaceful, and this is unprecedented in human history. In China's rise over 40 years and plus, the only sacrifice we made is four soldiers on our side and 20 Indian soldiers on the other side, right, because of a clash along the border. But that was interesting because they were not shooting at each other. They were fighting with each other. It is most interesting to see the two modern militaries were fighting each other in a matina found in Stone Age. Why is that? War is not popular.

And people from both sides know, in any circumstances, we should not shoot at each other. So back to your question again, China's rise is peaceful. And probably in less than 10 years' time, China may become the largest economy in the world. I say maybe again, but this then would be unprecedented in human history to see a country reaching the apogee, of fame, of glory, without firing a bullet. This is still stand. We're not firing, we didn't fire a bullet. How unbelievable that is.

You see, in human history, people give all kinds of reasons or justifications for all kinds of war. But eventually, who remember all these reasons? That people died, yeah? And nobody gave a damn about all this reason whatsoever. But look at the United States. How many people have died? They may just give reasons, but people died, you see. And China has made a difference.

And the Chinese military overseas is remarkable in that it only committed itself to humanitarian operations, be it peacekeeping. counter-piracy or disaster relief. I, as an ex-serviceman, as a veteran, my hope for my country is China continued to rise peacefully. And China's PLA will only do humanitarian operation overseas. In that way, you just provide assistance to people around the world. You're not killing anyone. If for a country that rise to the top of the world

and for its military to behave. So, you know, mildly or blindly overseas, aren't the world lucky to have such a power? So my hope is, I don't know whether the world would become, you know, more beautiful. But I hope with China's rise, China can actually make the world safer. And with China's growing stress, China probably can contribute in that right. regard. Joe, those are great words for us

to end this fascinating conversation on. I really appreciate your time coming to us from China to have this conversation with us today. It's an important one and your messages

are heard and received. And let's keep these dialogues going because I think that's really what is important for us to do is to have conversations to expose each other to different ideas. And through those ideas

come conversations. and through conversations hopefully come understanding. So thank you for your contributions today. Thank you, Rod, for all this conversation. Well, that wraps up today's dialogue. I want to thank our guest show, Boo. He certainly gave us a lot to think about. If you have reflections or comments on what you've just heard,

please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates.com. Thank you for spending your time with us, lending your attention to our efforts to bring back the art of public dialogue, one conversation at a time. I'm your host and moderator, Rudyard Griffiths. The Monk Debates are a project of the Aurea and Peter and Melanie Monk Charitable Foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwitz are the producers.

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