The Munk Debates Podcast - Tension with Iran, Greenland's annexation rejection, and China provokes Taiwan (again)

Episode Date: April 3, 2025

On this episode we are joined by Stephen Wertheim, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Evelyn Farkas, Executive Director of the McCain Institute at Arizona State University, to discuss the likelihood of US military strikes on Iran, America's Greenland annexation plans, and Chinese military drills off the coast of Taiwan. Become a Munk Donor ($50 annually) to get 72-hour advanced access to the full length editions of Friday Focus and Munk Dialogues. Go to www.munkdebates.com to sign up. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Hi, Monk listeners. On today's podcast, we're talking about the top geopolitical stories of the week, America's annexation plans for Greenland, possible military strikes on Iran and Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. Wow, there is a lot going on right now. Our guest to help unpack it all our two of America's smartest commentators on geopolitics. Stephen Wirtheim is a U.S. foreign policy historian and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Evelyn Farkas is the executive director of the McCain Institute at the Arizona State University. From 2012 to 2015, she served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. Stephen, Evelyn, welcome to the Monk Debates.

Hi, Roger. Nice to be with you. Great to be in conversation with you today. So many issues to dig into, it is a busy time on the world stage, and we're, fortunate indeed to have you both here for the next half hour to share your reflections and insights and maybe some opposing views on different big geopolitical topics. Let's first start with a lot of noise. It may be rumor, but it may be more than that about a possible U.S. military strike against Iran, a significant amount of U.S. military assets moving into the region. Let me come to you

first, Evelyn. Is this, as some people are arguing, the moment. the time to acknowledge that Iran cannot be brought to some kind of peaceful de-escalation of its enrichment program and military action is necessary. Well, it's hard to tell, Roger, because we don't know what has happened diplomatically behind the scenes because President Trump is really the only one who's spoken out about the fact that Iran needs to obviously bring its proxies to heal or else and also halt its nuclear weapons program. So we don't really know what else has been tried, but it appears that President Trump is either, you know, increasing the serious optics on his threat or he's actually going to

engage with Israel on a strike against Iran. Stephen, give us your sense. Is this, you know, as Benjamin Menetna, who has argued, this is a threat that not just Israel needs to remove, but the world needs to remove. And there's been years now, decades of patient effort to try to deter Iran from its course of enrichment. It has continued on that course. It's obviously not broken out, so to speak, with an atomic weapon, but it certainly has continued to enrich its stockpiles to ever higher concentrations. Well, we're just a few months. We're coming up on 100 days into the Trump administration. So as Evelyn said, the notion that the diplomatic avenue between this new administration and Iran has been exhausted. It's hard to see how that could be,

even as, you know, there may be some contacts between the two governments that we don't know about. President Trump has referred to a two-month deadline. Again, not exactly clear when that starts for Iran to reach a new deal with the United States regarding its new. weapons production. But, you know, I think while you could describe some of the efforts in the past to prevent Iran from going nuclear to be patient, they have not been particularly consistent. Most notably, the United States and a number of other countries concluded the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. That appeared to work quite effectively for several years. years in terms of limiting Iran's enrichment of uranium that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon,

allowing inspectors into the country, and so forth, until President Trump pulled out of the deal in 2018. And since then, in addition, Trump added maximum pressure sanctions on Iran. Iran has crept up in the amount of enrichment that it's doing, getting to the point where it could break out in relatively short order. So unfortunately, the efforts to prevent Iran from going nuclear have not been as consistent as they would have needed to be. and we don't have great evidence that Iran, in fact, does want to acquire nuclear weapons for its own sake. That is still the assessment of U.S. intelligence that while Iran is building capabilities to put itself in a position to go nuclear, it is not necessarily decided that that is what

it wants to do. So I think there is still a good amount of space for diplomacy to play out. Evelyn, do you think this is an issue that somehow needs to be resolved? Or is Stephen Wright that we can play out this string longer, that there isn't a rush, let's say, to the extent to which some Gulf countries, Israel and others who are obviously living much more directly with the Iranian threat to deal with this, either to finally force Iran under extreme threat and extreme sanctions to the bargaining table or, if need be, take that military action? Yeah, unfortunately, Ruggard, it does feel like time is really running out because the IAEA reported recently on the increases in the weapons-grade material that Iran had on hand. And so they seem to be, again, narrowing the window of time even more. Ordinarily, I would say, yes, we need to continue with economic sanctions. The Trump administration needs to try with diplomacy and pressure, not including military pressure.

But the fact that the time, the window for taking action is narrowing makes it difficult. You know, I definitely am not a fan of Iran going nuclear, and we have to prevent Iran from going nuclear any way we can. So that is a calculation, I guess, that the administration's making. when without having access to more intelligence, I can't say how I would come down on the decision. But I would certainly urge the administration to use every non-military tool available right now because Iran is in a weak position overall. Yeah. Well, Stephen, I mean, can we let this play out longer?

I mean, we're not Israel. We're not Saudi Arabia. We don't have to contemplate the risk. and it's probably not an insignificant one. It's certainly not zero of an Iranian bomb. And the effects that that would have, the destabilizing effects on the region, the risks of nuclear proliferation.

I mean, at what point, Stephen, do, does the calculation just indicate to a policymaker, regardless of ideology or preferences, that something has to be done about this because the cost of inaction are simply too great. Well, the fact that the United States isn't Israel and isn't Saudi Arabia cuts both ways. It also means that the United States has different interests from those countries and needs to

consider what its interests are. And thankfully, the United States is less exposed to risks, and it should be careful not to make the risks for U.S. interests worse. For example, striking Iran's nuclear facilities would surely cause Iran to retaliate, probably more against oil infrastructure in the region or against Israel than against the United States. But that could well draw the United States into a large-scale war in the Middle East, which is the last thing that the United States needs. Now, you're absolutely right.

It would not be good if Iran got a nuclear weapon. That could cause further nuclear proliferation in the region. For example, Saudi Arabia may well go nuclear. It could embolden Iran to be more aggressive in its regional activities because Iran might feel secure that it would not be attacked directly. Alternatively, however, it could also make Iran feel more secure and therefore less invested in leaning on proxies to provide deterrence for itself. But, you know, Iran-going nuclear would also damage U.S. credibility and a non-proliferation regime. So not a thing that we want to see. I totally agree on that score. But I think for the United States to be considering a strike, you know, there should be some

conditions that obtain. First of all, the United States should assess that Iran has actually made a decision to obtain a deliverable nuclear weapon. And that is not currently the assessment of U.S. intelligence from what we can see from the outside, it is quite possible that Iran still does not want to actually cross that threshold, in part because doing so would bring risk for itself and bring about negative consequences like other actors in the region going nuclear. So being a nuclear threshold state might be a better strategy from Iran's point of view, unless it can get a better deal with the West. Another condition we should consider for a strike is that diplomacy should be exhausted. And it hardly looks that way from where I sit at this point.

And then there needs to be a realistic strategy for converting strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities into a political solution. And this is really important because even strikes that the United States engages directly in would only set back Iran's nuclear weapons program. It would not stop it forever. And it would also cause Iran, if it had not already decided to go nuclear, to surely decide that now it really does need to accelerate its nuclear weapons program and actually cross the threshold and protect its facilities even better than they're protected now, because many are deep underground. So that would involve a realistic strategy. What do you do after the strike? And if you manage all the risks of large-scale conflict in the Middle East, and that might

well involve trying to reach some new political arrangement with Iran, which tends to be the opposite of what advocates of striking Iran want to see. Yeah. Let's move on, Evelyn, and Stephen, to another topic I want to address to you today, which has some similarities. to this. It, you know, it doesn't, it's not identical, but it rhymes in a way. And that's the increasing kind of noise out of this administration around the perceived threat of China, and it's particularly China's threat towards Taiwan. We've had obviously very public and conspicuous leaks. I don't know how you'd characterize them of large-scale U.S. sophisticated plans to thwart a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

as early as 2027, as at least these Defense Department estimates seem to be focused on. At the same time, this seems to have elicited a Chinese reaction. Evelyn, we've seen a large-scale impromptu naval simulation of a blockade of the island. Another problem, much like Iran, is there a need for the United States to do more now to harden Taiwan, to ensure that we deter the Chinese, or as with the Iranian situation, does intervention cause more problems than simply, again, trying to allow diplomacy to work to try to allow, in a sense, this process, this complicated relationship between the United States and China just to play out on its own?

Well, I would say that this one is easier because I think that the Chinese government has not made a decision to invade Taiwan, and indeed they would be more likely to try to seize Taiwan if they felt that the United States was not interested in helping Taiwan defend itself, was not giving the right signaling in terms of the political statements coming out of the White House, et cetera. Those things, the wrong statements, statements that indicate we're not supporting Taiwan, actions that don't support Taiwan would emboldened the Chinese leadership. But I think the Chinese leadership is not as a... much, how should I put it, there might be a little more risk-averse than Putin was when he

invaded, did the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. President Xi's military has not seen action, military, you know, has not seen combat. He does not know how they would fare. And if there's a chance that the United States would provide assistance to Taiwan, even indirectly, if not directly, that would that would convince the Chinese to probably wait a little longer. Yeah. Stephen, what's your assessment of this? I mean, we have, you know, we have the Chinese continually kind of harassing and asserting, you know, the proposition of a one China policy that would ultimately see the unification of Taiwan with China as a kind of crowning achievement of the, of the Xi regime. How seriously.

Do you think we should take this threat? Because it is a big geopolitical risk. Is it not if we were to look out over the next two to three to five years? If there's one thing we should probably worry about, it's this issue. Absolutely. This is a significant risk, no doubt about it. And the United States needs to be really thoughtful as does Taiwan in how it manages this problem. I'm less concerned than others.

And it sounds like Evelyn and I agree. about this, that the Chinese leadership has made a decision to force unification by a certain date, such as 2027. We know that President Xi has tried to get his military to be capable of achieving that goal by 2027, but let's be clear that having a capability is not the same as having an intent, a political decision to exercise that capability. And ironically enough, that goal now seems to be kind of motivated planning on all three sides, Beijing, Washington, and Taiwan itself to try to have plans in place. But that doesn't mean necessarily that any of those capitals actually expect a large-scale conflict to break out. So,

you know, the notion that the PRC wants to unify with Taiwan one way or the other, at least, you know, over the long term, that's a very serious problem. But the notion that it has made a decision to do that by any date certain, I'm much less convinced of that. And the United States and Taipei need to be careful in the kinds of signals that it sends, definitely we want to send the signal that it would be very risky, very costly for China to launch a cross-strait invasion or even to blockade Taiwan. At the same time, we want to avoid the dynamics of a spiral into war where China might

perceive that Taiwan is trying to render itself permanently separate from the mainland that the United States is degrading the one China policy that is the basis of USPRC relations and dates back to the opening to China in the 1970s. And that can create a sense in China that there's a closing window of opportunity and that from its perspective, it has to move on Taiwan sooner rather than later

lest it lose the opportunity forever, which is something that a leader in Beijing would have very difficult time tolerating. So it's a very difficult balance that the United States and Taiwan have to try to strike. Before we move on to our third topic, Evelyn, let's just have you wrap this up. Do you find it interesting how, you know, the Trump administration having campaigned on a kind of an America first sloganeering, an idea that America would return to the homeland, the heartland, and would disengage from foreign conflicts, and now seems. you know, fully invested, fully engaged in the Middle East, telegraphing the potential for

major defense and, if need be, coming to Taiwan's aid in the face of Chinese aggression. It seems like the American First Policy has not really survived, at least in terms of foreign policy, the first 100 days. Well, I think what's interesting is that we see a scenario that's different from the one that Stephen was talking about and, you know, as our number one worry. Now what we see is that actually it's the opposite. You know, I was in Taipei in February. The Taiwanese were really worried about things that President Trump was saying,

the fact that he was trying to make a deal with President Putin. It indicated to them that President Trump might try to do the same thing with President Xi. And if that were the case, then President Xi might see an opportunity, not that the window is closing, but that maybe President Trump would say, okay, you can have Taiwan. So either way, I think what we have to do is make sure that we provide the Taiwanese with everything they can have to defend themselves. Ideally, our government should also be asserting support for Taiwan. We don't necessarily have to get rid of the strategic ambiguity, the fact that we don't clearly say that we'll come to Taiwan's defense,

that we leave that as a question mark, although frankly, I think, it's better deterrence to say it. But if we don't say it, we must, you know, indicate with every other word that the president says that we are behind Taiwan, because I'm afraid of China being emboldened by the fact that President Trump may not be taking our commitment to Taiwan sufficiently seriously. Okay. And our final topic, let me now totally contradict myself and go to Greenland, where indeed it seems like, I don't know, some strange version, Stephen, of America.

First is working itself out. In this case, it's not an American first regarding kind of isolationism, but it is an America First doctrine in terms of looking at the homeland, North American security, in some kind of continental aspect. It's been obviously a hot topic here in Canada with the president's kind of claims that Canada is the 51st state of the United States. There was a trip by J.D. Vance to Greenland just recently rebuffed by the Greenlanders kind of self-evidently. Where is this policy at, Stephen? The president most recently has reiterated that this is going to happen. What are we to make of this? Is this serious or not? It is a very good question. So I can only ask your question again. I happen to think that

President Trump seriously would like to bring Greenland into the United States, but that does not mean that he has willed the means to those ends. President Trump has a pattern of throwing out big ideas, and often somehow the rest of the world ends up going towards his direction. that happens a lot in domestic policies. It's a lot harder to do on foreign policy, and I think the reaction of Greenlanders and Canadians will probably bear out that point. But nevertheless, this is a way that Trump likes to present himself,

create a narrative, and perhaps negotiate. So one way it could play out is that a deal is struck to give the United States, you know, more military facilities, more mining rights, exploration of oil and gas off of Greenland's coast, maybe get the Danish government to do more to invest in security around Greenland, even though Denmark already has plans to do just that. So we could end up with a resolution of the theatrics, you know, probably with an outcome. that could have been reached without threatening annexation in the first place.

And then I suppose the other possibility is that, you know, the U.S. threat encourages Greenland to move forward in its desire for independence. Most Greenlanders do want independence from Denmark, but they realize that they get a huge amount of subsidy, financial subsidy, for their essential needs from Denmark as well. So, you know, if you, you know, if you United States is willing to offer the same or more, as J.D. Vance actually seemed to suggest that it might be willing to do, then I suppose we could see a Greenland that breaks away from Denmark and perhaps has some sort of relationship to the United States, though it's awfully strange from an America-first transactional perspective because that would involve the United States

making major investments in Greenland for a return that is quite unclear, given the long odds that successful mining projects have in that area. And then I guess the third option, which everyone worries about is a forcible annexation scenario. But fortunately, I think we're quite some ways from that being a possibility. And I rather doubt that President Trump has thought through what that would look like. Yeah. So Evelyn, to wrap up the show, what's your take? Is this something, is this a space we should watch? Or is as Stephen said, and it's an interesting analysis that it's just Trump doing what he does. He throws something out there. And, you know, it's a bit like a roulette wheel. Sometimes it comes up black. Sometimes it comes up red. And politically, when it,

when it lands on his number, he can claim a big success. And when it doesn't, he and the administration just forget about it in a matter of weeks. Well, I am also concerned that this rhetoric could, you know, turn into something kinetic, turn into something actionable, not as much in the case of Greenland, because I agree with Stephen that this, you can see a negotiated outcome and we could have gotten there without all of this pain. So I don't think we're going to have to resort to military force, especially if it seems that we're really serious and we're willing to use carrots. The problem I see is more with Canada because I don't see that we have carrots that we can use with Canada. And so I would be afraid that if President Trump is really serious about controlling Canada, he might turn to sticks. And because we are contiguous,

territorially speaking, with Canada, he can send troops to the border to menace Canada, to intimidate Canada. And that scenario worries me, because there's a great amount of miscalculation that could occur. It could have a tremendously damaging impact on our not

just our body politics, but on the military, military morale, rule of law, et cetera. So that would provide a real crisis for us here in America. In the Greenland scenario, I just don't see us using military force. Stephen, I just let me add on one final question for you, because everyone does bring up something, you know, it's obviously urgent on the minds. A lot of Canadians and no doubt Greenlanders, too. To what extent is any of this constitutional? Like, can a commander chief give orders to the military that are in a sense legal to, let's say, yes, invade Greenland, you know, cross north of the Canadian border to, you know, turn on a power plant that those nasty Canadians have turned off as part of their counter response to two tariffs. To what extent, if the

president cares, are there kind of constitutional limits on his use of force? Because that's ultimately where these conversations go to. And even if it doesn't happen, it's still part of everyone's calculus. Glad you brought that up. I mean, the Constitution says that Congress has the power to declare war. Now, there can be an exception in the event of, you know, responding to a direct attack to secure American persons and property abroad. But when it comes to initiating a war, that is for Congress to do. The problem is Congress has stopped declaring war. So Congress authorized the post-9-11 wars, hasn't taken back any of those authorizing. authorizations. Right now, there's a conflict in Yemen. The United States is now renewing its bombing

of the Houthis there, has not been authorized by Congress. So for a long period of time, the power to declare war has been eroded. And so it does raise, I think, a practical worry that the commander-in-chief could attempt to justify, you know, offensive military action by citing precedents that have already, in effect, been accepted by the American political system, though I do think there would be quite a lot of resistance as well. Yeah. Well, that is a fascinating debate that we've got to pick up on a future show. And Evelyn and Stephen, I just want to thank you both so much on behalf of the Monk Debates community for coming on the program, sharing your analysis and insights with civility.

and substance. That's what we're all about, and we appreciate your contributions to that effort. So let's do this again. I look forward to these conversations. Wonderful. Thank you. The Monk debates are a project of the Aurea and Peter and Melanie Monk Charitable Foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwitz are the producers. Be sure to download and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. And if you like us, feel free to give us a five-star rating. Thank you again for listening.