The NPR Politics Podcast - 2022 Reshaped the U.S. Relationship With Russia, China

Episode Date: December 27, 2022

The U.S. has dispatched billions in military aid to Ukraine to support its territorial defense after Russia invaded at the beginning of the year and joined with allies to issue stringent sanctions against Vladimir Putin's government. And a dust-up over U.S. support for Taiwan, an independent democracy which China considers part of its territory, was a recent point of tension with China — though Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping recently met for several hours of diplomatic talks.This episode: political correspondent Danielle Kurtzleben, White House correspondent Franco Ordoñez, China correspondent John Ruwitch, and national political correspondent Mara Liasson.This episode was produced by Elena Moore and Casey Morell. It was edited by Eric McDaniel. Our executive producer is Muthoni Muturi. Research and fact-checking by Juma Sei.Unlock access to this and other bonus content by supporting The NPR Politics Podcast+. Sign up via Apple Podcasts or at plus.npr.org. Connect:Email the show at [e-mail] the NPR Politics Podcast Facebook Group.Subscribe to the NPR Politics Newsletter.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy

Danielle Kurtzleben, I cover politics. And I'm Mara Liason, national political correspondent. And today we're looking back at some of the biggest international political news of 2022. And more specifically, we are focusing on two countries, Russia and China. They made a lot of international news in their own right this year, but both play huge roles in U.S. politics as well. So let's get right into it. We're going to start off today with Russia and more specifically, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And for that, we're joined by NPR's Franco Ordonez.

Hey, Franco. Hey, Danielle. Hey, Mara. So, Franco, in addition to being one of our White House reporters, you've spent some time on the ground in Ukraine this year. So I'm really curious to hear your perspective on this. A year into the conflict, I know there's been a fair amount of news over that time about Ukrainian momentum, some real strength that the country is showing. How has the conflict evolved since February? You know, it has evolved quite a bit.

I mean, within days, you know, the Russians were knocking on the door of Kiev, taking control of suburban communities. I was actually in the briefing room when the White House was telling us that Kiev could fall rapidly. But as you just noted, Kiev did not fall. It has been an extremely painful battle. Tens of thousands of people have been killed. Millions have fled the country and billions and billions of dollars worth of damage. But as you again, you noted a story of resilience. You know, those same Ukrainian troops who are largely outgunned and outnumbered have really fought back. I mean, Putin clearly misjudged both the will and the ability of the Ukrainians to resist. Also, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, he kind of led this masterclass in galvanizing domestic and international support for the war, which has led to these comparisons to Britain's leader, Winston Churchill. Soon after the war started, people will remember that he reportedly refused an offer of the U.S. to evacuate. Zelensky allegedly said, I need ammunition, not a ride. And the's been a huge part of Ukraine's success since. Ukraine did not only push back the Russians from Kiev, they also pushed back the Russians from much of the northeastern region, and more recently from the southeast. When I was there, pretty much every

military official that I spoke with would tell me to send a message of thanks and then request more U.S. provided HIMARS, which are those long range rockets that really helped shift the battle. And guys, all that said, there is a long way to go. Moscow is also escalating its attacks, increasing attacks on critical infrastructure, on energy plants across the country. And this is a real big deal as the winner kicks in. So it's going to be a tough winner. Mara, I want to get into the political implications of the war, which really have been global. But let's start with the economic side of things. I know from my reporting that the invasion really helped drive inflation upward,

both in the U.S. and elsewhere. Why is that? And what other economic effects did we see? Well, it drove inflation because it disrupted supply chains, especially delivery of grain. It made the cost of energy go up because, of course, a lot of Europe gets its energy from Russia. And what was so interesting about that is those economic implications really formed a very strong political test for the Western alliance. And surprisingly, NATO has held together. Joe Biden and the European allies have stuck together. They have not wanted to sue for peace. Vladimir Putin expected that they would. So in some ways, Ukraine showed NATO what it was supposed to be.

This is a country that wants to be part of the West. It wants to be part of the EU. And it surprised an alliance that I think a lot of people were saying were searching for meaning. Like, what was the point of NATO? Well, the point of NATO is to defend a European country or to help a European country defend itself from naked Russian aggression. So, yes, it's driven inflation. The citizens of Europe and the United States don't like that at all. And there are definitely political fault lines around what the U.S. support for Ukraine's defense has meant for us.

But I think that the economic implications have really been overwhelmed by the political unity so far of the West. And politically, what has this conflict meant for the Biden administration? How well has the administration met this challenge? Well, if you talk to foreign policy experts, they would give the Biden administration high marks for having met this challenge. President Biden has kept the Western alliance together. He hasn't wavered. He has sent tremendous amounts of aid to Ukraine, as Franco said, and he wants to continue doing that. The big question is, now that we have a Republican majority in the House of Representatives, large numbers of Republicans do not

want to continue funding Ukraine. There's always been a strain of isolationism in the Republican Party. But also, don't forget, there is a kind of underlying pro-Russian sentiment in the MAGA wing of the Republican Party. Remember, Donald Trump was very, very favorable and friendly to Putin. He absolutely despised the Ukrainian government. As a matter of fact, the first impeachment was all about Donald Trump withholding aid to Ukraine in exchange for a political favor. You know, there have been there have been cracks in both parties. You know, there were remember the in October, there was that group of progressives that issued a letter, you know, really urging Biden to kind of enter into talks to end the war.

They they then quickly retracted that an embarrassing, very embarrassing mistake in a tough moment for Biden, you know, kind of showing, you know, demonstrating the challenges that he still has with the progressive wing of the party. Absolutely. But Mitch McConnell, the Republican leader, minority leader in the Senate, he is for sending aid to Ukraine. I think probably the Franco can can check me here. I think probably the majority of Republicans are willing to continue to assist Ukraine. What the anti-aid members of Congress, people like Marjorie Taylor Greene, are talking about is auditing the aid, looking into seeing how the money is being spent.

I think it will be a tougher fight, but I think that the implications for the United States to literally cut Ukraine loose are so dire that I find it hard to believe that they would prevail. We know there's plenty more to talk about with this ongoing crisis, but that's about all we have time for. So thank you for joining us, Franco. Thank you, guys. And when we come back, a look back at the year in U.S.-China relations. And we are back and now we're going to take a look at the U.S.-China relationship. And for that, we are joined by NPR's John Rewich. Hey, John.

Hey there. So the relationship between the U.S. and China is tense, to say the least. At least that's how I understand it. Last month, President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for the first time since Biden was elected. John, I want to start with a really basic question for you. What are some of the biggest sources of U.S.-China tension? Well, what aren't sources of tension in this relationship, right? I mean, China and the U.S. have tension across the board. In trade, technology, human rights, Taiwan. There's a gigantic trust deficit between the two countries, between the two leaders now. You know, Biden and Xi Jinping know each other. They met as vice presidents over a decade ago, but they hadn't

met face to face since Biden became president. As you said, they had five calls or teleconferences in that time, didn't manage to really improve their relationship. So the meeting in Bali last month at the sidelines of a G20 meeting was really an attempt to put a floor under things. And they both went into this meeting in positions of strength domestically, Biden coming right after the midterms and Xi Jinping after party Congress that solidified his position as the leader of the party there. And what came of that meeting? Well, they agreed to keep meeting. They agreed to keep talking.

And for senior officials from both sides to work together where they can sort of, you know, the U.S. has been talking about putting guardrails around the relationship and sort of maybe they took the first baby step toward doing that. Fundamentally, though, there's really no change. I mean, you know, it remains a very tense relationship. They, as I said, they mistrust each other. The Biden administration sees it as a competitive relationship. They say they don't want conflict, but it's a very serious competition. I mean, a few weeks before the meeting, the administration imposed new rules to restrict China's access to advanced microchips and chip making technologies.

China just launched a case against the U.S. at the WTO on that issue. But, you know, experts say it's the kind of thing that could really hobble China's development going forward. I want to bring in one more U.S. political leader, and that's House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, because this summer she created headlines when she visited the democratic, self-governed island of Taiwan. Now, China does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country. And so Pelosi's visit led China to do military exercises around the island. How much did that complicate the U.S.-China relationship? What was the fallout there?

Yeah, it made things a lot more difficult and complex, frankly. China's military drills raised tension in the region, across the region. And in addition to the drills, China ended or suspended various mechanisms for dialogue between Beijing and Washington. Two of the key ones were climate and military to military dialogue. On climate, this is an area where everybody thought China and the U.S. clearly have overlapping interests for cooperation. They suspended that. In military-to-military, that just makes the world a more dangerous place. These are two huge, two of the world's biggest militaries,

sometimes operating in close proximity in the Western Pacific. For them to not be talking is just dangerous. John, I wanted to ask you, if the goal of the U.S. is to make Taiwan into a porcupine, in other words, so heavily armed that it would be really, really hard for China to invade and take them over, how is that project going? For years, I mean, there has been this sort of not quite a sleepwalking project to continue to fund Taiwan's military, sell them F-16s,

that kind of thing. But now I think what they've done is, in light of China's military modernization, in light of Xi Jinping's, you know, more, what would you call it, more aggressive, more urgent sort of approach or thinking on bringing Taiwan, quote unquote, back into the fold. Yeah, they're looking towards things that maybe are maybe more cost effective than F-16s, but are going to be more effective. You know, we just finished talking to Franco about Ukraine. If you're the leader of China and you take a look at what Russia tried to do, I mean, what's the takeaway for China from what's happening in Ukraine? They are definitely watching carefully. It's a reminder that invading a neighbor, invading a Democratic neighbor, a smaller Democratic neighbor with a populace that's not happy about being invaded is probably going to be a difficult thing.

China also has the problem of 100 miles of ocean between Taiwan and the mainland, which complicates any kind of an invasion. They're studying it. They're studying both sides. They're studying not only Russia's failures, but what Ukraine has done to, you know, protect itself and defend itself. And the Taiwanese are doing the same. All right. There are a couple other recent stories out of China that we have to talk about. One is a wave of street protests this fall because experts said that was the most significant civil unrest in the country in decades. John, what caused that? The immediate cause was a fire that killed 10 people in the far west of China. The thing is

that it was widely believed in China that these people died because they were locked into their apartment building and the fire brigade couldn't get there in time because of lockdown controls under this zero COVID policy that China's been following. So that was the fuse. The fuel, I guess, was really just people being fed up, this widespread sense of unhappiness with China's zero COVID policies, the lockdowns, the quarantines, the closed borders, the ubiquitous digital surveillance and testing. I mean, there's uncertainty about personal freedoms. People couldn't travel freely. All of this just underpinned this sense of anger. I was in China over the summer and the fall, and I really felt it. You know, people there were not happy with this policy across the board. Right. And then the Chinese government just recently announced that they would be rolling back some of those COVID restrictions. So does that mean the protests worked? A lot of people point to the protests as

being a catalyst for the pivot, right? Sort of like accelerating the move. But I think it's pretty clear that Beijing had been thinking about an exit roadmap before the protests. You know, the government had introduced a number of tweaks to policy in the weeks before the demonstrations. They're baby steps. You know, there's also anecdotally, it's a possibility that the virus wasn't quite as under control as China might have made it out to be. So the protests sped things up. I mean, there's a political dimension to it all too. In October, the ruling Communist Party had a party congress, which happens once every five years. It's the most sensitive event on the Chinese political calendar. And this year was

even more so because Xi Jinping was angling for and eventually got a third five-year term in office. So stability in the lead up to the event, including keeping the pandemic at bay, was a critical priority for the party. The Congress is over. Xi Jinping got that third term. His position was strengthened. And so the sort of political imperative to stick by a policy that was clearly unpopular and that had really outlived its usefulness, given how virulent Omicron is, the urgency was gone. Well, I want to round this out by asking a question of both of you. John, you just mentioned that Xi Jinping is going to be sticking around for another five years, at least. I want to ask you, what are his priorities vis-a-vis the U.S.? And Mara, I'm curious about the U.S.'s priorities regarding

China. Let's start with you, John. Yeah, sure. So in terms of Xi's priorities, there's big themes and then there's sort of immediate problems he has to deal with. Bigger picture, Xi Jinping's on a mission. He's been on a mission for 10 years, and this is why he wants to stay in office. He's been on a mission to make China strong, self-reliant, a global player. That's what's animating him. And underlying all that is this belief that just keeps getting strengthened in Beijing that the U.S. has turned against China, that the U.S. is out to thwart China, whether you're on the Democratic side of the aisle or the Republican side, by, for instance, keeping microchips out of China's hands, by building alliances to put pressure on China.

So Xi, you know, is out to strengthen China's own partnerships around the world in Central Asia, in Africa, with Russia, for instance. He wants to make China more self-reliant in technology, energy, food, these type of things. You know, Taiwan looms large for him. More immediately, he's got a big economic problem. The economy has slowed a lot. Zero COVID is part of it, but he's also taken aim at the tech sector and he's trying to solve these really deep-rooted problems in the real estate sector. People are unhappy about that.

His most immediate problem, though, for the next two months at least, if not the first half of the coming year, is COVID. They're facing a potentially humongous surge of cases now that they've let up on zero COVID. The elderly population is under vaccinated and experts say the hospital system simply does not have nearly enough ICU beds to cope. Mara, what about the U.S. view? Well, you know, this is the most important foreign policy priority for the United States. There's a lot of bipartisan agreement on this. China is poised to take over the U.S. as the world's biggest economy. All the efforts to return chipmaking to the United States, to not rely on China for various technologies,

looking at whether the U.S. should ban TikTok. I mean, for the first time since the Cold War, the United States has a new number one geopolitical competitor, and that's China. It's no longer Russia. And the U.S. has woken up to that. They've passed legislation. They're shifting the U.S. military posture when necessary. I think this is going to be the biggest story, the biggest rivalry, and the biggest potential for conflict for the next couple of decades. And the interesting thing about it is for a lot of countries, the U.S. is the security guarantor and China is their biggest trade and economic partner. So it's a different ballgame than the Cold War. All right. Some huge implications, but we are going to have to leave it there today for this international roundup. John, thank you so much for joining us. You're welcome. All right. Until next time, I am Danielle Kurtzleben. I cover politics.

And I'm Mara Liason, national political correspondent. And thank you for listening to the NPR Politics Podcast.