The Opinions - Is the Ukraine War the Next Afghanistan?

Episode Date: June 5, 2025

After speaking with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday, Donald President Trump says Moscow plans to retaliate against Ukraine for the country’s drone strike over the weekend. Despite President Trump’s ambitious campaign promises, an end to the war still seems far away. On this episode of “The Opinions,” the columnist David French joins Megan K. Stack, a contributing Opinion writer and former Moscow bureau chief for The Los Angeles Times, to discuss the state of the conflict today and why there may not be reason for optimism even in a post-Putin world.Thoughts? Email us at [e-mail] episode of “The Opinions” was produced by Derek Arthur. It was edited by Alison Bruzek and Kaari Pitkin. The rest of the show's production team includes Vishakha Darbha, Kristina Samulewski and Jillian Weinberger. Mixing by Carole Sabouraud. Original music by Sonia Herrero, Pat McCusker and Carole Sabouraud. Fact-checking by Mary Marge Locker and Kate Sinclair. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta and Kristina Samulewski. The director of Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

This is The Opinions, a show that brings you a mix of voices from New York Times Opinion. You've heard the news. Here's what to make of it. I'm David French, and I'm a columnist for New York Times Opinion. Over the weekend, we saw some of Ukraine's most audacious attacks against Russia since this war started. At the same time, the economist reported that Russia may have passed the grimest possible milestone and may have suffered more than one million total casualties in the war, killed and injured. And so it's time to ask, once again, what should the U.S. be doing now? So today I'm talking with Megan Stack about Ukraine.

Megan is a contributing writer for the New York Times and was the Moscow bureau chief for the L.A. Times for more than three years. Megan and I have been writing about the Ukraine war since the Russian invasion, and I wanted to have a conversation with her about the state of the Constitution, the state of international diplomacy, and what might come next. Megan, thanks so much for joining me. Thank you so much for having me. You wrote a piece last November after the presidential election in which you argued that

President Trump needs to move to try to end the war right now, to try to stop the bloodshed right now, even if that means ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia. But as we've seen, Trump has not solved this problem in 24 hours. As we've seen, Trump seems to be growing increasingly frustrated with the state of negotiations. What do you think has changed since the November election? Well, I think fundamentally, Trump has come slamming into the wall of reality, several realities, the first being that Putin actually doesn't want to end the war yet and doesn't see himself as having any real incentive to make a deal. The other problem is the security guarantees.

We tend to talk about Ukraine and its territorial integrity, which is a very real and very deep and emotional issue. But it's actually not the most difficult issue in resolving this. The biggest problem in the view of the Ukrainian government is if we have a ceasefire and Russia comes back and attacks us again, who's going to do what for us? Who can we count on? And what they really want, first of all, would be an invitation to join NATO and barring that, they want something that's basically, I think, a carbon copy of Article 5 of NATO without formally being NATO. And that is a real problem because there has always been a reluctance to allow Ukraine into NATO. And so this becomes kind of an intractable puzzle that Trump, I don't think he fully understood those

realities. And I think he was overconfident in his own ability to kind of talk his way through them. So here's how I would describe sort of in broad brush strokes, how I see the state of not just the conflict, but people's perceptions of the conflict. And I would say two cycles of irrational optimism now replaced by grim reality. Cycle number one of irrational optimism would have been Russian. It was the idea that they, with a really a relatively small force, could invade this large country by European standards, and take it in essentially end its independent existence in 72, 96 hours, whatever the original timetable was. And that turned to ashes almost immediately.

But then you had this Ukrainian cycle, and maybe not truly Ukrainian in the sense of the Ukrainians themselves having this optimism, but certainly the supporters of Ukraine in the West, when Ukraine repelled that initial assault, I think people thought for half a second, Ukraine can just push them out. But then the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 was a bloody failure. And now it seems, Megan, as if we're in this position where it looks like nobody has grounds for optimism. There's not a rational reason to believe that there's going to be a clean breakthrough from either side, although there's certainly rational reasons for one side or the other to think it could ultimately prevail. But where do you see the state of the conflict right now? Who has the upper hand? How meaningful is it?

Does anyone? My feeling is that Russia retains the upper hand in a very slow, grinding way on a pure military level. You know, Russian history is full of these wars that are won not by skill or daring, but really by endurance, endurance of horrible conditions for the civilian population at home and an unbelievable amount of death suffered by the troops. and then eventually you just wear the other side down. I kind of wonder what Putin is thinking right now, because if I were Putin, I would be looking at how things are going in Europe

and how quickly the dialogue about Russia is changing in Europe. And I would think that there was a chess game going on that I was in fact losing a bit. You know, dynamics are changing very fast, and partly because of Trump, ironically, on this level, I think Trump has been very bad for Putin. I think that by making Europeans understand that it's possible, Trump will simply disengage and that the U.S. could just disappear. And having to like contemplate what that looks like for Ukraine and for the rest of Europe while facing Putin has actually caused, I think, a more productive discussion in Europe.

And it seems like they're now suddenly willing to pay more. There's discussion of peacekeeping troops. Things are happening in Europe that haven't been happening ever. this point, I think because they actually realize that there's some, even if it's a faint possibility, there is a possibility that Trump will just pull the U.S. out of this somehow. And I think that's really bad for Putin strategically. I think that's terrible for Putin. I've sort of been thinking about it in the terms of three time periods, short term, medium term, long term. If in the short term, I don't think there's any real prospect for a true Russian breakthrough. In other words,

the lines, they're moving backwards, but very slowly, at immense cost to Russia. There's just no short-term prospect for that kind of breakthrough. Medium term, though, Megan, that's what really alarms me for Ukraine. With the United States potentially pulling all the way back out from its support, the Western allies are not nearly in the position that they need to be to fill that gap. And that's where Russia's going to have an opportunity. But then you click over long-term. where these large-scale promised European defense expenditures will begin to bear fruit. And that's where, as I see it, turning against Putin. So I'm very worried about this medium-term span of time.

Well, let's talk about what you just said, because I actually think it's pretty interesting. I do agree, especially with your middle-term assessment. And I am positive that Putin is also looking at that middle term and thinking, why should I get into these ceasefire talks? Like, I'm going to hold on because personally, I suspect that there's a part of Putin that is still at least entertaining the idea of taking Kiev and actually trying to take the entire country.

Let's suppose, you know, okay, he does it. What's going to happen at that point? I mean, look at these Ukrainian forces. Can they beat the Russians? Probably not. Can they make the Russians' lives absolutely miserable? Absolutely. I mean, they have become phenomenal at this sort of asymmetric warfare.

Yeah. The kind of insurgency that would no doubt get mounted with, you know, enthusiastic backing from the West. Does Putin want to deal with that? I don't want to deal with that if I'm Putin. I also think we have learned that Putin is extremely ambitious, extremely focused, and he does play a very, very, very long game. Realistically, I don't know, because so much of it hinges on Trump. And so then it's sort of looking at Trump. and trying to figure out what's realistic from him,

and he changes his mind so often and sort of reverse his course. I have the sense lately that he actually does not want to just hang the Ukrainians out to dry altogether. It does seem like he has walked back a lot of his most sort of angry and churlish and, you know, America first absolutist statements, like when he was saying he wanted Ukraine

to pay him back for the military aid they'd received. And he came in, he cut off aid to Ukraine, then he restored the aid to Ukraine. He asked for this very ambitious minerals deal. Then he kind of settled for a much less advantageous from a U.S. sort of pure economics perspective, mineral steel. And so I no longer feel like I have a strong sense of where he's going with all of this.

Like, I don't know what he's doing. So that's one factor. What do you think? I don't think I know where he's going either. I don't think he knows necessarily where he's going, to be honest. Because I actually think that he thought he could cut a deal with Vladimir Putin, that he thought he had a kind of relationship with Vladimir Putin where he could cut a deal.

And I think he thought he could get this thing done. And that I think he thought that Ukraine was the real barrier here. I mean, by all words, by all actions, that's how he was behaving. And then to encounter Vladimir Putin, surprise, underneath the Vladimir Putin mask is Vladimir Putin. He's the same guy. he's always been, and to the extent that he's changed at all, he's hardened. There's been so much blood spilled, so many resources expended, that Putin is more intractable,

not less. And so my question, and I don't think the administration knows the ultimate answer to this, is do they respond to Russian stubbornness, and do they respond to Russian aggression, further aggression and escalation of attacks on cities by restoring support for Ukraine or re-upping next round of support for Ukraine, or do they respond by just washing their hands, just sort of walking away from the whole thing, which I think maybe the J.D. Vance preferred outcome to just leave this thing entirely, walk away from it, say, we tried, you deal with it, your problem, Europe. And I feel as if that might be the most realistic, anticipated approach from the Trump administration. And if that's the case, my short, medium, long-term analysis grows even more

acute. That medium term grows even more dangerous. So it seems to me that the Russian theory of victory would go something like this. And I'd love to get your thoughts on this. And then I can walk through it. I think the Ukrainian theory of victory is. And the Russian theory of victory is not necessarily taking Kiv and having to deal with a partisan insurgency and all that, but what you might call annexation plus Belarus. In other words, the parts of the non-bos and Crimea that they have already annexed would remain annexed, the new gains they would annex, and then continue to place pressure on Ukraine and the hopes that the Zelensky government ultimately falls, and they get something like, you know, the satellite state that they had before. So that way there's a, quote,

unquote, independent Ukraine. It's just a satellite. And so that what I would say would be the Russian, quote unquote, realistic Russian vision. And the Ukrainian theory, I don't think Ukrainians think they're going to sweep the Russians back out. I don't think that they think that they can retake the Donbos, that they can retake Crimea. I don't think that they necessarily believe Putin would keep his nuclear weapons on the shelf if Crimea, say, for example, we're about to fall. But I do think that they think that a South Korea kind of arrangement could be possible. Maybe not where they're joining NATO and not where there's American boots guaranteeing security, but taking advantage of potential French and British willingness to deploy troops as that kind of tripwire force,

as that deterrent force. And I could see that as a Ukrainian theory of victory, ceasefire, deployment of European troops, massive military assistance to turn itself into something like a porcupine, just too tough for Russia to try to attack again. How attainable do you think it is that you could get a ceasefire agreement out of Russia that would ultimately allow, say, French or British troops to help backstop Ukrainian troops after a ceasefire? Is that even something realistic to think about? I don't necessarily see Europe easily

even contributing peacekeeping troops. I know that the British and the French have talked about it. I think the Germans talked about it, but it's sort of like a non-committal, squishy way. And I just, I do think one of the conversations, contributions that Trump can make here is to force a greater Europeanization of this situation and the response to it, because I think that is appropriate. I do think, you know, we can talk later about what are America's interests in this situation at this point in geopolitics and

to what extent can we afford to be the guarantors of former Soviet republics faced with a revanchist threat from Putin. You know, but I think to a certain extent, Europe is a bit lost in that puzzle because I do think for Europe this is an existential threat. And I don't think it's an exaggeration. And this is the other problem that's unsolved by the sort of idea of just the peacekeeping troops is that there is sort of the existential problem of Putin and what will Putin do. And, you know, and I think we use Putin and I think sometimes we make the mistake of understanding Putin as a single person. And I don't really see him that way anymore. I think he is not the only, would not be the only one to continue the project of Putin. I think

if he were not there, there are other people who would come into power, probably, and whose politics are quite similar, and in some cases even worse. And I just, I don't think we have an answer of how to deal with Putin. If I had that answer, I would have written it in the New York Times already. You know, like I don't know what we should do with Putin. I think it's really, really hard, you know, not to be a downer and not, you know, I wish I could say, like, I think that would solve things. I think it might put a band-aid on things for a little bit, but I still think there would be a lot of disintegration and eventually another blow-up, really.

Well, I'm glad you raised that this is beyond Putin, because one of the other cases of irrational optimism I've seen is sort of this idea that if Putin goes away, this goes away, that Putin is some sort of unique manifestation of Russian ambitions and not a historical manifestation of Russian ambitions, which he absolutely is. And it's not as if there is this vibrant, lively, liberal, democratic alternative that's just hovering out there ready to take the scene.

He's done a very good job of stamping out those elements of society. And he does have critics from his right, in other words, people who want greater aggression. And so I'm starting to feel like this is not the most uplifting podcast that's ever been recorded. I will say this. I do think that, yes, I agree with everything you just said about Putin. He is not singular. And in fact, yes, he does get criticized from his right. And there are probably political figures in Russia who already might have veered toward the nuclear option in dealing with some of the things that have happened in Ukraine. And Putin didn't. And he was criticized. So let's get that established. That's all true. With that said, I think, you know, no sensible Russian leader is going to want to stay mired in the kind of. kind of isolation and the, you know, and I think in many ways it's like a cultural isolation. Like, Russia is isolated from the part of the world that it really feels it belongs with, which is Europe. And I think eventually when Putin is gone, whoever comes in, at least there will be a clean slate. With Putin, I think there's so much damage and there's so much,

it's not even like water under the bridge. It's blood under the bridge. I mean, it's just a, you know, he doesn't like us. He will never trust the U.S. He will never trust the West. And I don't think the U.S. and the West will ever trust him. And so I think there is too much optimism. I agree with the idea that when Putin is gone, these problems will be resolved. I don't think that's true. I'm starting to think that if we have a title for this podcast, it should be called Too Much Optimism. So let's end with maybe trying to forecast a little bit of what the historical perspective will be. So the Biden administration, when this conflict kicked off, the Biden administration was an administration that was still part of a, you might call the post-war consensus, which to the extent that

we had a lot of consensus in approaching, say, the Soviet Union after World War II, it was centered around NATO, it was centered around a global network of alliances. That is not the case now. I think America will still be in NATO in 2028. I think it will be. I'm not certain that it will be. There is a lot that's much more contingent. It's just very different. When we're looking back at history at this war, where's this going to sit? Is this going to be considered a tipping point? Is this going to be considered one of those conflicts that's the harbinger of a sea change? Or is it going to be sort of seen as an aberration in a hopefully long and enduring record of post-World War II great power piece? And I know that's a very hard question. I'm gathering my memory. I'm gathering my

Many thoughts. I think, look, I think we are in an era that will be remembered as the changing of world order in some way. There is the rise of China. There is, you know, the sort of, I would say, weakening of the West to a certain extent. But there's also, there are new forces that are getting a greater stage to talk about world affairs from their own perspective. You know, we'd talk about like the global south.

And I think we're in a moment now where there are rising countries like China, but also India. You know, you see the BRICS countries. And they have a different view of world affairs. They have a very different view of world affairs and they have a different set of priorities. So I think that the Ukraine war is challenging the U.S.

to explain what our priorities are as a country and where we need to go and fight and what is worth defending and what is not worth defending. And I think, you know, we're seeing the U.S. turn inward more culturally at this point in a way. I mean, I think that the movement and this idea that there's a cynicism, unfortunately, not unfounded after the series of conflicts that I would say started probably with the Vietnam War and have gone forward. You know, Americans are no longer as easily convinced that this is a moral war and therefore we're just going to go fight it because they've seen too many holes in that argument and they've seen too many things happen that didn't correspond to that. So I guess I'm being vague, but I do think that the Ukraine war,

I think it is possible that the Ukraine war will be remembered a bit, I don't know if this is a good comparison, but a bit like the Afghan war by Americans in that they may end up seeing it as a place where they sank a huge amount of effort, and there was a resentment about the money spent there and that somehow we still didn't get, we didn't forestall what was going to happen anyway. I also think it's possible that somehow, you know, Ukraine will drive along and that Europe will sort of step up

and that we will maintain some kind of level of support that at least, like, allows the situation to limp along until, you know, some sort of Ukrainian independence is somehow safeguarded. You know, but Biden was a lot of, a very, he sort of thought of foreign policy in terms of NATO. And I just, I don't think 20 years from now NATO is going to have, you know, much relevance. So yeah, I mean, I don't think it is like the catalyst for these changes, but I think it will be remembered as an inflection point. Wars don't really become, they don't make their mark in history until the end comes. Right. In the run up to the

for election. The one thing I knew beyond a shadow of it out is a hundred years from now, historians will be talking about this war. I did not know a hundred years from now will historians be talking about much of anything else that's happening right now. But I do know, I do know they'll be talking about this war. And the outcome of this war could very well dictate what happens in Western Europe and by extension much of the rest of the world for a generation or more. And so the way I have thought about it is that I've thought about it in a different terms from Afghanistan. I think one of the things that was so discouraging about Afghanistan, it wasn't just the difficulty in defeating the Taliban and the inherent just incredible frustration of counterinsurgency warfare,

but the sense that we poured resources into a people who didn't really stand on their own. and that when the instant we lifted American presence from Afghanistan, the place just folded. I mean, almost faster that a house of cards collapses. It was remarkable how fast. Ukraine, on the other hand, is very, very different in two senses. One, it's not American boots on the ground. And number two, we have poured resources into people who are fighting with unbelievable courage. Now, that's not to denigrate.

there were Afghans who fought courageously. But as a whole, the people of Ukraine are fighting with unimaginable courage and sacrifice. And my own view is, so long as the courage is sustained, so should the support. That if Ukraine is going to fall, it should not fall because of a lack of American and Western support. And if it falls because of a lack of American and Western support, then that will make the conflict even more important for a generation and even more catastrophic for a generation. I mean, I see that and I hear that argument. I don't see it in exactly the same way.

I mean, we definitely have, like, it's interesting because I don't think we disagree at all about the, like, the foundational causes of the war or who's good and who's bad, but we kind of have a different take on, I think, where it fits into American interests, where it fits into, like, sort of what, you know, in our own involvement. because, I mean, to me, I look at it and I don't think this is all it is, but I also don't want to ignore the fact that, in my view, after watching the U.S. interact with Ukraine and Russia over many years and watching almost like the train wreck of this war coming about,

I don't think we can ignore the fact that there is a strategic, or there is a perceived strategic advantage in this war for the United States And I wrote that piece some months ago in which I said, I think it is fair to call Ukraine a proxy war. I don't think Ukraine is only a proxy war. And I completely agree with you about the courage of the Ukrainians, the righteousness of their cause. But I do think that to some extent the question of what do we do about Russia and what do we do about Putin has found an answer in the idea that one thing that we can do, since the Ukrainians are fighting anyway, we can back them and we can put as much resource as we can into their fights so that we can drain Russia and wear Russia down and hopefully weaken Russia to an extent where they become a less

formidable ally, where there's a strategic advantage in doing that. And I fully believe that that is a crucial layer of what the U.S. thinks when they look at Ukraine and why we've decided to do this. And I don't know if that's moral or immoral toward Ukraine because I think on the one hand, our strategic interest in that sense does align with what Ukraine wants to do anyway. On the other hand, I have watched over and over, as we and the West have sort of encouraged Ukraine and dangled things that we weren't really going to deliver and kind of emboldened them to face off against Russia, but never really come in at a level that would be required to protect them from Russia

when the wrath comes their way. I am not sure that our behavior as the U.S. has been ethical, You know, I have a lot of disagreements with it, really. That's, I guess, the counterpoint to what you were saying. Well, I think that if there's one thing to take away from this, it's that we should approach this situation with humility because it is extraordinarily difficult, extraordinarily dangerous, with a very, very long entangled history.

And so it does not lend itself to easy answers. So I appreciate you very much coming on and hashing this out. These are the conversations we have to have. We have to have these tough conversations about what might be one of the toughest challenges in the world. So, Megan, thank you so much for joining me. Thank you so much for chatting with me. I enjoyed it.

If you like this show, follow it on Spotify, Apple, or wherever you get your podcasts. The Opinions is produced by Derek Arthur, Veshaka, Christina Samuelski, and Jillian Weinberger. It's edited by Kari Pitkin and Alison Bruzek. Engineering, mixing, and original music by Isaac Jones, Sonia Herrero, Pat McCusker, Carol Sabro, and Afim Shapiro. Additional music by Amon Sahota.

The fact-check team is Kate Sinclair, Mary Marge Locker, and Michelle Harris. Audience Strategy by Shannon Busta and Christina Samuelski. The director of Times Opinion Audio is Annie Rose Strasser.