The Paikin Podcast - World on Edge: Intervention in Iran, What China Wants, and the Rising Nuclear Threat
Episode Date: February 26, 2026Ryan Hass joins Janice Stein to discuss the prospect of an American intervention in Iran, regime change, and the negotiations between America and Iran on the nuclear issue. They then look at how close... China is to invading Taiwan, what China wants, how China sees its role in the new emerging world order, the rising global nuclear threat, and what sort of relationship Canada should build with China.Support us: patreon.com/thepaikinpodcastFollow The Paikin Podcast: YOUTUBE: / @thepaikinpodcast SPOTIFY: https://open.spotify.com/show/1OhwznC...X: x.com/ThePaikinPodINSTAGRAM: instagram.com/thepaikinpodcastBLUESKY: bsky.app/profile/thepaikinpodcast.bsky.socialEmail us at: thepaikinpodcast@gmail.com
Transcript
Discussion (0)
Hi, everybody, Steve Paken here.
We want to tackle two issues this week on this edition of World on Edge.
First, Iran.
You may have noticed two things happening.
First, a lot of American military hardware moving towards Iran,
and the president has been threatening for weeks that an attack could come at any time.
Plus, negotiations between Iran and the U.S. are scheduled to take place this week in Geneva on the nuclear issue.
Then, China.
How close are they to an invasion of Taiwan?
and how do they see their role in this new emerging global world order?
Iran and China coming up next on World on Edge on the Paken podcast.
Delighted to welcome back, Janice Stein, the founding director of the Monk School of Global Affairs
and Public Policy at the University of Toronto.
She joins us this week from London in the United Kingdom.
And Ryan Hass, who is with the U.S.-based think tank, the Brookings Institution.
He's also director of the John L. Thornton, China Center,
and he joins us from just outside Washington, D.C.
Janice, tell us, first of all, what are you doing overseas?
Oh, there's a series of meetings related to what Ryan and I might just generally call defense
and new defense industrial strategies in a world that is changing so fast,
see that last week's discussion is outdated before it finishes.
Oh, my goodness. Well, let's hope by the time we finish taping this that the world has not completely changed on its axis.
And, Ryan, I'm going to put you to work right away because I'd like to know, in your view, how we should regard this U.S. military buildup in the region at the same time that, you know, negotiations are supposed to be taking place between the United States and Iran.
How should we regard all of this?
Well, I think they, Steve, first of all, thank you for having me on your show.
I think that the first way to think about this is President Trump looking for leverage for negotiations.
That would be the most benign interpretation that he is trying to build up military capacity in order to really impress upon the Iranians that now is the time for them to make concessions on concerns that the United States and others have.
Now, in reality, 40 to 50 percent of America's deployable air power is in theater right now, which is an extraordinary amount of air power.
I'm not familiar with an instance where the United States has massed so much force and not used it.
And so it is deeply concerning to me that we appear to be drifting in the direction of a potential conflict.
And the reason why it's concerning to me is, first of all, it's not entirely clear what imminent threat Iran poses to the United States.
Second of all, if the goal or objective is regime change, regime change is incredibly difficult to achieve from
the air. And then thirdly, and I'll stop here, the American public just has not been
psychologically prepared for the possibility that the United States will find itself in conflict.
We've had the Olympics. We've had many other things going on throughout the past several
weeks. Iran has not been a prominent feature of discussion in the United States or in Washington,
D.C., and yet, here we are on the cusp potentially of military conflict.
Janice, how are you interpreting these moves?
So, look, I agree with Brian. It's an incredible amount of force that is concentrated.
and the United States has pulled equipment from other theaters in order to do this.
The Gerald Ford, the big aircraft carrier, is just a day or two away now.
But that was taken out of the Caribbean, Steve.
Ryan's comment about the air power, there were shots over the weekend of the Basin Jordan,
where you see the air raid, a really sophisticated aircraft, warning aircraft,
combat aircraft.
Wow.
If this is to back up diplomacy,
we are talking about billions of dollars
to the U.S. budget as a result of this deployment.
Let's just start there.
This is incredibly expensive.
I'm a little
I'm going to finally grade a little bit of what
Ryan said just in one respect.
There are now kind of orchestrated leaks
coming out of the way that the United States
is considering that
Trump is considering a limited strike.
What does that mean?
I was just going to ask you that.
What does that mean, right?
And the reason he's doing it is because he's getting advice from the military that are saying that even if they go all out, it is not possible to guarantee regime change at the end of the story.
And that is correct.
You don't do regime change from the air.
There's virtually, unless, you know, Donald Trump is prepared to go to war for months.
months and months in Iran.
And he's not.
And he's not because the first thing of what happened is a blockade of the
straits of Hormuz.
Oil prices will go up.
He's up against the midterres and a defeat by the Supreme Court.
So he's trapped himself, frankly.
He's caught in a vise of his own making.
So what do you do?
In limited strike against what?
The IRCG that led the violence, the brutal violence.
a few weeks ago, which fulfills his commitment.
But then you stop.
And what is that?
What do you do next?
And what do you do next?
And the Iranians have two choices.
Retaliate or do nothing.
Neither of them is a good option, frankly, for Trump.
So the easiest way for me to describe this, he's trapped himself.
Ryan, let me get you to comment on what you think would be achieved if the Trump
administration went with what Janice describes as a limited military strike?
Well, I think that the way that the Trump administration would explain it to themselves and to the
American people is that it has taught Iran a lesson and that it has set the conditions for
future negotiations going forward. That's, I think, the way that they would explain the rationale
for limited strikes. The reality, though, is as Janice has observed, it's not clear what objective
would be achieved by dropping a few more munitions on Iran. And that's the concern, because these are not
cost-free exercises. Iran has the capacity to retaliate and respond in ways that could be harmful
to the United States and its partners. The issue, though, is that President Trump has had
success thus far in its employment of force during the second term of his administration,
second term of his administration. And I think that he has gained a high degree of confidence in what the
military is capable of doing. And he's like a poker player on a hot streak. And so this is the backdrop.
One additional point that I would add, Steve, is that President Trump sort of began this cycle when
he observed on social media that if Iran did damage, did harm to protesters, that he would
respond. And so it was born out of that statement that he created a red line for himself,
that he now has himself backed up against a wall to either enforce or step away from.
Yeah, but he hasn't so far.
Just to wait and see just on this, it's really interesting because for the regime,
you could argue this is the greatest moment of peril of this regime,
the clerical regime in Iran has faced in the history of revolution.
But if it's a limited strike, if it's a token strike,
and then these forces cannot stay in position.
position from a, they have to start to draw down.
You can actually get the perverse effect that if it was used.
That they feel emboldened.
Yes.
Now, Ryan, just let me follow up on that last thing you said, which was that Donald Trump did promise several weeks ago when the public was rising up and there were hundreds of thousands of people in the streets protesting against the theocracy.
And essentially, I mean, the way I read it was, you folks take out the mullahs and we'll be.
right there behind you. They tried, and he did nothing. How much credibility does he have right now
with the Iranian public? Well, I think that he could make a credible case that it takes time to move
forces into place, and that over the past several weeks, there has been an air bridge that has been
built from the United States into the region. There has been carrier strike groups from the South China Sea
and the Caribbean that have moved into place. And so we are now at the moment, Steve, where
where this sort of this drama is going to reach its crescendo.
And I think that we will learn a lot in the coming days and weeks
about how the Trump administration plans to proceed.
Gotcha. Janice, let's pick up, and I'll get both of you to comment on this.
Janice, you first.
Ryan said that really, if the military is prepared to do something,
the American public has not really been prepared,
emotionally, psychologically,
intellectually, however you want to describe it,
for what may be to come.
what would you like to have seen take place over the last few weeks if in fact that kind of preparation had taken place?
You know, Ryan's comment is the comment of a committed Democrat.
How out of fashion that is.
Yes.
In the current White House, right, where congressional approval, which you would expect, frankly, given the scale, that's been moved to the Middle East now.
And George Bush did that, right?
when he invaded Iraq.
He did that.
Explain to the public,
some sort of address from the White House
in which you lay out the reasons for the use of force.
Nothing has happened,
and Ryan is quite right.
And nothing, by the way, very much happened before
the seizure of Maduro, either in Venezuela,
who was no really large-scale application.
And I think what Donald Trump,
beliefs and he's basing his success on two cases where he used force in the most limited
way possible and the work was done before the use of force. The first was the bombing of the
nuclear installations in Iran where all the work was done. The Israel was clear the skies.
There was literally no risk and the second was this very limited assault in Venezuela. He's now
convinced himself and the people around it that the American people,
will support success.
That all the matters is that it succeed.
And you don't have to go to the public or to Congress to ask for permission.
So sadly, I'm less worried about that, Ryan, than you are.
Not that we shouldn't be worried.
We should.
Ryan, how about it?
If he were going to lay the groundwork for some kind of military incursion,
what would you like to have seen so far?
Well, Janice may be right.
We may just be in a new era where the past practices and norms
no longer apply. As an American, though, Steve, I, you know, I've, I've grown up with the tradition
of American leaders having a responsibility to their citizens to explain why they are putting
their fellow brothers and sisters and neighbors in harm's way. And that's not a Democrat or
Republican statement. That's an American statement. And in this instance, that just has not
a court. And so if the American public is going to be asked to bear burdens to,
sacrifice, then they need to be able to understand and explain to themselves why they're doing
so. And thus far, there just is not a narrative in place that would explain it.
Well, if you were in charge.
Let me make clear. See, I completely agree with Ryan.
And the right word to have used probably was Republic in the sense of a republic for
the Constitution. This is not partisan. This is a, you know, an anticipation that anybody who
Because we would call responsible government accountable to the people.
But this administration has broken all the norms.
So, Ryan, if he were going to lay the groundwork, what kind of, you know, item one, item two, item three.
What would you like to have seen take place?
Well, the first item would be to explain what objective we are trying to achieve.
What is our goal?
Does he know?
How will the use of force help bring America and potentially its partners closer to that goal?
and why is use of force necessary? Why are no other options available in order to achieve that goal?
That is sort of the threshold question that every president prior to President Trump has felt an
obligation to explain to the American people. Now, let's keep in mind that the State of the Union
address is coming up, and that could present a venue for President Trump to explain this.
I think that it would be better for everyone if he chose to do so.
Let I should just also say by the time this drops the state of the union will have already taken place, so we shall see whether or not, I mean, we'll know by now whether he used the opportunity of the state of the union speech to do what you just suggested.
Okay, last go around on Iran before we pivot to China, and that is, Janice, do you think the United States should be in the business of regime change in Iran?
No.
And let me just say my answer is no.
Steve, because external intervention
through force doesn't work.
You know, one of the last great success is
Germany and Japan in World War II
after four years of war,
all out war.
And so we often intuitively go back to that,
but then it gets much, much, much harder.
And even when you decapitate,
leader as the United States did in Iraq.
We all know what came after.
20 years, violence.
And nobody said it better, really, than Colin Powell.
When he said, if you break it, you own it.
And that, I think, is the wisest advice,
a general who's ever given to a president in the modern Europe.
Having said that, Ryan, surely, you and other,
in the administration would love to get rid of this theocracy, rather. It's been misery for
the United States and the rest of the world for, gosh, how good my math here. I mean, almost 50 years now.
Yeah, look, I think, Steve, the world will be a better place when Iran is on the other side of
its current regime. I think the Iranian people will flourish when they have an opportunity
to have their interest expressed through their government.
But ultimately, I agree with Janus.
This is a choice and a decision for the people of Iran, not the people of the United States.
And the United States has painful history in recent decades of trying to impose regime change and really struggling to do so.
And so I hope that some of those lessons of the past 30 years feed into the discussions that are taking place in the situation room as we speak.
Gotcha.
Okay.
As I like to occasionally remind people, just before we have our discussion about China,
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Okay, apropos of that slogan, maybe we should talk about China and figure out what we think's worth protecting as it relates to them.
We all remember, of course, Mark Carney's speech at Davos, where he essentially said the old international rules-based order is over.
There are a new set of rules being written as we speak.
Ryan, to you first. How should we understand China's emerging role in this new global order,
whatever it is? Well, I think that China is clearly an ascendant power. It is not going to be
slowed or stopped. It is a country that has a vision of itself at the center of the world stage,
and it's largely using economic tools to arrive at that destination. I think that the Chinese
want a few things. I think that they want to be.
the leading power in Asia and a leading power on the world stage. I think that they want deference to
their core interest as they define them. So that would include things like territorial integrity,
respect for their political system, as well as respect for their economic and social models.
But I think that they also want greater freedom of maneuver. They want to have greater self-reliance,
less dependence upon the West for the inputs that will enable them to continue their growth. And so,
when you sort of take those pieces together and try to form it into a mosaic, I think that what it tells us is that the Chinese would prefer to avoid a head-on collision with the United States or others.
They would prefer to work around, not through the United States, and that they have a fair degree of confidence that they are making progress towards those goals.
One quick follow-up. You said the leading power in Asia and a leading power in the world, not the leading power in the world?
Well, I think that they, they don't think that they necessarily are in this mezzanic quest to
displace the United States and become the leading power in the world, in part because that
encumbers incredible responsibilities. The Chinese leadership is focused foremost on the challenges
that it faces at home. It does have one-fifth of humanity that it needs to look after, 1.4 billion
people. And so the Chinese leadership certainly would like to be consulted on every major decision
of global consequence, but I don't think that they want to have responsibility for leading
or providing resources for solving challenges beyond their borders.
Gotcha.
Janice, how do you infer China's role in the world emerging over the next decades?
It's very interesting, actually, when you look at China's record.
And you could argue that China's today more powerful than it has ever been in its history,
in modern history.
And I think that's true.
I agree with Ryan that it has used economic tools.
And what's accomplished is really astonishing if you think back to 1989?
And we're such a short time after that and the sophistication of what China does, the size of its economy, the share of world GDP, the share of global trade.
It has more international trading powers, partners, Steve, than the United States.
us even before Donald Trump.
That I haven't been said,
trying to face the challenges too.
And let me just talk about one for a moment
because I think there's a tendency
in the West to think that everything
that China does is about us.
And it's just that.
You know, we that I just want to just shade
a little differently.
Trina is a world leader in advanced technologies.
It is invested.
Massive amounts of capital.
in order to build a scientific infrastructure, which is now competitive with the very best,
including the United States, in some very specific areas, and then many more than we think.
And why did you do that?
Much of what it's done is attributed to a really terrible demographic problem inside China.
So China's leader in world robots, and even Chinese robots, by the way, are deployed.
Avoid at scale, but once you move beyond the relatively simple, they are facing the same kinds of challenges than robots and other parts of the world.
But why would you care about robots?
If you know that you're going to have fewer and fewer workers and that your population pyramid is going to be inverted,
and there's going to be more people with my color hair than people with your color hair.
Very fast and right.
And right.
Very, very quickly, you're going to invest in.
state-of-the-art technology to compensate for unforgiving demographics.
Ryan just said a billion point four people.
What are the projections by the end of the century?
600 million.
The United States could be the same size.
Let me make the argument that way.
So much of what China has accomplished responds to its own internal needs.
The second big one, which is roiling the world right now, is the incredible.
amount of exports, the trade surplus that China has.
Well, why does it have that trade surplus?
Because it is underinvested in consumption.
It doesn't encourage it's all people to buy and spend and borrow the way we in the West do, right?
And it does that in part because it is racing against history all the time.
That's the first because it was down.
graphics and because empowered consumers for an authoritarian regime are not to talk of your
wish left.
So, but yet that, that trade surplus and the fact that Chinese electric car industry could
wipe out the auto industry everywhere, if there were no tariffs against it, is a response
as much to domestic imperatives, and it actually creates global problems for China.
So let's balance the picture we have of China in the world.
Lots to pick up on there.
Ryan, where do you want to go with that?
Well, I just want to tip my hat to Janice for making that observation,
the sets of incites of observations.
I've been trying to make a similar case in Washington or sometime,
that China's strengths need to be viewed alongside its weaknesses
in order to form a full picture.
And it's hard for a lot of people to hold those too.
competing thoughts in their mind at once, but it is absolutely essential to form an accurate
diagnosis of the challenge that China poses and where specifically it does pose a challenge to
our collective interest. And I couldn't agree more. I think that by 2050, which is halfway to
the endpoint that Janice is describing, already the dependency ratio will be up by 60% from where it
is today. That is, the number of people who are retired depending upon the state for social
services for their retirement. And so if the dependency ratio is increasing 60% in the next 24 years,
we should begin to ask ourselves what that will do to China's external behavior as well as
its domestic behavior. And my hypothesis is that it will require more resources to be devoted
to caring for an increasingly aging population. China is a massive economy, but it is not
an infinite economy. And it will have to make trade-offs and choices in how it allocates its
resources to meet the demands of its people and the aspirations of its nation. And as more
resources are devoted to carry for elderly, there just naturally will be fewer resources
available in absolute and relative terms for the types of sort of what people outside of China
would perceive to be aggressive or expansionary activities.
And so we need to hold the line.
We need firmness and steadiness and resolve and confidence now to get through this next
decade, this next two decades.
But we also need to be able to have a longer-term view as well, which Janice has
helped me pointed us towards.
Janice, what do you want to pick up on there?
Let's talk about these next two decades, right?
And what it takes.
and, you know, we have a United States.
Let me put it this way if I were in Beijing,
I would have enormous difficulty time to interpret
and even do a short-term forecast of what the United States
is likely to do in the region,
whether the United States is going to continue to invest
to be with its allies,
because the United States with its allies is more powerful than China without allies.
China has very few deeply committed allies.
It's a towering power in its own neighborhood,
which makes it very tough for the other Asian countries.
And their strategy up until now is playing with China and invests with China
and then turned to the United States and say, well, yeah, but we want security with you.
And that's a nice deal, right, if you can get it.
And that's part of what the people in the White House are calling out right now.
But if you're the Chinese leadership, how do you forecast what the leader of the most powerful alliance in the world is likely to do?
even if there is a change at the top,
there are social and political forces that are now
have a strong voice in the United States
that makes it very difficult.
So I'm worried about the near term,
how we navigate this next decade, frankly.
I think it's very, very challenging.
Ryan, at the risk of doing some naval gazing here,
I do want you to weigh in on Canada for a moment
because there's a good debate happening in this country right now as to what we should be doing.
You know, we are, I think it's safe to say, probably two-thirds of Canadians, maybe more,
are very disappointed with the state of our relationship with the United States right now.
And we have already seen the Canadian Prime Minister go over to China a few times.
And most recently come back with a new kind of auto-packed, if I can put it that way,
which will allow Chinese cars to be sold in Canada with a...
somewhat down the road hope that they will set up some kind of Chinese manufacturing here.
Not sure if that's ever going to happen, but we shall see.
Given all of this, how should Canada be relating to China right now?
What kind of deals should we be making?
What kind of deal should we not be making lest we tick off the United States too much?
Help us on that.
Well, Steve, I'll offer an outsider's perspective, but only slightly outsider.
I grew up in Bellingham, Washington, just in the shadow of Vancouver.
Many of my closest friends growing up were Canadian.
So I offer that at the outset just to share a perspective on where some of my sympathies lie.
But to try to be responsive to your question, I think that it is entirely understandable and really, frankly, predictable that Canada and other countries would try to find a new equilibrium point between Washington and Beijing as the international system evolves.
American behavior becomes more erratic and unpredictable.
So I think that the prime minister is certainly in good company with many other world leaders
who are conducting similar exercises of looking for a new balance point.
And I don't want to oversell this, though, because I don't think that any country is turning
their back on the United States and running into Beijing's warm embrace, in part because
China has not changed its offering to these countries at all.
they've just presented themselves as an alternative to to heavy exposure to the United States.
Now, to your specific question of what should Canada be doing, it's not really, it's not my
position to be, you know, offering counsel to any foreign government on how to navigate this.
But I would say that I think that in the coming years, middle countries, middle powers,
will increasingly bandwagon with each other. They will find each other in ways that help
to insulate against sort of crises as well as predations from other major powers. And they will do
so for economic reasons, but they will also do so for security reasons. And I think that that's
natural, normal, and to be anticipated. The one sort of wildcard that I will put on the table for
Janus and you to react to is the risk that there will be expansion and nuclear powers.
as countries, particularly in Northeast Asia, find themselves less confident in the protection that their alliances provide, they will look for other ways to defend and protect their interest.
And there has been a lot of discussion, particularly in Seoul and even in Tokyo, which has a long, you know, taboo against discussion around nuclear issues, around whether or not it will be necessary in the future and what conditions would require those countries to make those hard decisions.
And so that is a space that I think we certainly will need to watch and think through in the period ahead.
You know, and maybe we can add to that, Steve, that there is a very, very hot discussion going on right now about China's modernization of its nuclear forces.
It has, Ryan, what would you put the number at right now way behind Russia?
That's right.
Yeah.
600 nuclear missiles.
Yes.
Yeah.
But it is digging new silos.
There is an alleged nuclear test, which the United States has just revealed through leaks.
That occurred five years ago.
And the hypothesis among experts is that that nuclear test was of a smaller nuclear missile
that multiple missiles could, multiple warheads could be put on a single missile.
And this kind of technology has not been tested before.
And that's why the Chinese tested.
So in that sense, that could allow for a rapid increase in the number of warheads that China would have.
And that, I have to say, creates just huge problems.
it's possible with a lot of hard work to think about regulating a competition between two.
But just think of adding a third party.
How do you do the math?
It's very, very hard.
When one of the other two could always rebalance.
It's called the third body problem in physics.
And frankly, it's just brutal.
It is really brutal.
And what does that do?
It pushes everybody up to get to acquire more and more and more and more
in the event that the other two collaborate in any kind of attack
and your own nuclear missiles then don't survive.
If anybody takes this seriously, and I can tell you,
there are war planners in the United States that take this seriously.
There are war planners in Beijing that take this seriously.
And Russia already has a very large one.
We are at the beginning of another round of expansion of nuclear forces by the biggest powers.
That is only going to increase the incentive of insecure neighbors who live next door.
We are having a discussion.
Ron is right in South Korea and Japan, but we're having it in Britain, France and Germany.
The Europe needs its own nuclear deterrent.
Janice, that's very disquieting.
Yeah. Sorry.
Okay. Ryan, do you believe that China is about to embark on a new nuclear building program,
which will lead to a future nuclear arms race, the likes of which we saw between the United States and the Soviet Union 50 years ago?
Well, I hope that the answer is no, but hope is not a strategy.
I think that if you look at the trajectory that China is on as well as the information that the U.S. government has provided in various reports,
it suggests that China is on a path towards 1,000 nuclear warheads by,
2030, from 600 today to 1,000 and 2030.
And that compares to Americas and Russia's out.
1,500 Americans and about 1,700 Russians, right?
Yes.
And so China, as Janice is observing, China is really sort of pushing itself up to the top
tier of nuclear powers around the world.
And the Trump administration is trying, I think, to draw attention to this in order to
apply pressure upon China to enter into arms control discussions that could involve the United States
as well as Russia. With the premise being that unless China is brought into arms control's
discussions, they will be incomplete and they will not address the core security concerns that the
United States has. And as a consequence, the United States will need to ramp up its own sophistication
and production of nuclear warheads as well. And so that is the path that I think that we are
currently on, embarking on, which is a dangerous path, as Janice observes. All the more so when you
add North Korea in its nuclear program as well as others. And so I guess one of the questions
then becomes what is trying to try and to do? What are they trying to achieve with this nuclear
program? And it's they haven't really, I mean, they've published a white paper recently, but it
doesn't offer a lot of new insight. My own, you know, reading of this is that part of it is prestige. This
is what major global powers do as they have major nuclear programs. Part of it is ensuring the
survivability of their nuclear program in the event that the United States and China find themselves
in conflict, heaven forbid, in the future. But part of it is developing new capabilities
that will make it more difficult, that will raise the threshold of decision-making for the United
States to intervene militarily in a conflict along their periphery.
All right, let's do one more go-round here.
And if we haven't scared the, you-know-what, out of people enough already,
let's finish up by talking about Taiwan.
And we have been hearing, obviously, considerable intelligence slash rumors for months,
if not longer, which have suggested that, you know, there's a breaking point coming between China and Taiwan.
Janice, what are you seeing?
How close are they to some kind of military intervention?
I don't know the answer to that.
that.
And it's not clear.
You have
Shenzh, Bing,
knows the answer to that.
I would say that the
purges of the senior military,
which Ryan knows a great
deal about in a very
granular way,
can work in one of two ways.
And who knows, it can
actually postpone any
military action because you have to let
new leadership get
comfortable and learn and develop confidence both in their own portfolios that they're managing
see, but also among each other and with the and with Xi Jinping. That's the more pessimistic one.
The more optimistic one is that the level of corruption, which has been in Chi Chi Chi Ping's line
of sight from day one, was so bad that removal of the last of the original generals, the one
who is closest to him, opens the door to a new younger generation.
That will take the handcuffs off J.C.C.P.
Let me just add that to clear, because I think Ryan made a really important comment
when you talk about one of the reasons for nuclear weapons.
If Xi Jinping were to move against Taiwan in any way, blockade anyway,
a big goal would be to deter the United States from getting.
involved and from trying to break back walking and come to the right and provide assistance to
Taiwan. For that, you need a survivable nuclear deterrent and you have to broadcast it and the other
side has to know you have it and you have to persuade the other side that if they were
intervened in what Xi Jinping concerns the domestic issue, you would use it. That's why these two
issues are so closely connected as far as behind this.
Brian, what would you add to that?
Well, it's hard to argue with the logic of anything that Janus has just said, but I'm going to
try to not leave on a dark note. So I'm going to try to provide a dose of optimism, Steve,
which is that it's absolutely clear that the Chinese are determined to try to assert control over
Taiwan. I don't think that there's any doubt or debate on that point. The question is how
and win. And for the past 77 years, the People's Republic of China has survived and thrived
with the status quo that we face today. And so I offer that at the outside, just to observe that
I'm not sure that there is this intense urgency that many people in Washington feel towards the
situation. The question is, is it, is the pro progression going to be a light switch or a continuum?
In other words, is China going to try to use force and some type of flash event or suffocating blockade to squeeze Taiwan into submission?
Or is it going to proceed along a continuum toward its goal of asserting control over Taiwan?
And this is really where a lot of the debate rests.
You know, my own view is that the Chinese want to achieve their goals at the lowest possible cost and risk.
And as a result of that, the military option is not the option.
of first resort, but it is certainly an option, as Janus has observed, that the Chinese are
investing considerably in to make credible. And so I think that the Chinese are strengthening their
hand, their ability to credibly demonstrate their willingness to use force, but their preference,
I believe, based upon, you know, conversations over decades, would be for the people of Taiwan
to conclude that resistance is futile, that there is no path to their own peace and prosperity
that does not run through Beijing, and that the sooner that this gets resolved at the negotiating
table in a way that allows for both sides of the strait to live in peace, the better it will be.
That's, I think, what Beijing would prefer, whether or not that is available to them or to
the situation, I think time would tell.
Understood. I've got a little housekeeping to do here, and then one more mission for you,
too, so get comfortable for a second, but don't go anywhere.
I want to remind our viewers and listeners here that we've set up a Patreon page for the
Paken podcast.
It offers, if you choose to go that route, a bunch of things that we think are attractive.
You get our programs earlier than everybody else, and you get them ad free.
We also have some web-exclusive videos there, including a new one we've just put up with a
political consultant.
Janice, I'm not sure if you know him or not.
His name's John McEttician.
He was sort of an original common-sense revolutionary 30 years ago when my
Mike Harris was Premier of Ontario. He spent his life working for conservative causes.
He spent a month in a coma after a heart bypass surgery, which had significant complications.
Shockingly, he came out of it. He has spent probably almost 200 days in hospital, and he just got out.
He is alive and trying to get well, but he has some very different views about our health care system in Canada now,
having spent nearly half a year engaging with it. So that is an interview you will want to check.
out if you become part of our Patreon community, and you can do that at patreon.com forward slash
the Paken podcast. You can also pitch show ideas and ask our guests' questions. And to that end,
I'm going to ask a question of Janice and of Ryan right now, which came in from a guy named Liam
Mitchell, who's part of our Patreon community. And Liam asks, is there a point at which it
becomes pointless for Canada trying to negotiate with the Trump administration? There is a low
likelihood the current U.S. administration will adhere to any agreement that gets reached.
New reasons will be offered by Trump to feign outrage and seek further concessions.
Is Canada ultimately bound to stay at the table, or is there a line that could be crossed
that would justify Canada flipping over the table and walking away?
Okay, Janice, you first on that.
Let's go to Ryan first on that one.
Okay, Ryan's gone from Washington State to Washington, D.C., so what are your spidey senses telling you
about what Canada ought to do under these circumstances?
Well, Steve, as we were talking about a moment ago,
I'm pretty modest in my, you know,
suggestions of how Canada should navigate anything.
But I would just say that for the sake of the views of the public in the United States,
there is a virtue to getting caught trying,
even if there is not immediate results,
showing the depth of investment and steadfastness of investment
in preserving and advancing U.S. Canada relations,
I think we'll have dividends that may not be realized in the near term, but that will occur over time.
Janice.
So I think it's a really important state that we distinguish between Americans and this administration.
The relationships and the ties of friendship between Americans and Canadians run very deep.
as you know very well across the 49 parallel families live on both sides.
There are historic patterns of investment.
Yes, it's very challenging right now.
And some of the investment patterns and the political patterns, there's no question, are being disrupted.
But it's important to have a longer view here.
And to recognize that no one administration is forever.
And this administration is, you know, the character of the president himself is shaping the administration.
Even though I think the social forces that MAGA represents are not going away in the United States,
I think it's very important to have a long review here.
To be, as Warren Buffett would say, Steve, a value investor, a patient investor over time.
care and recognize that there is your future.
Gotcha.
Thank you for those answers.
And Liam, I hope that helps answer the question.
Again, I want to remind people they can go to patreon.com forward slash the Paken podcast
if they too would like to put questions to them.
And let us also thank to that end some people who joined us over the past week.
Danny and Interlaken, Gavin Kennedy, Jane Patey.
In the last week, I said there was a former liberal cabinet minister named Charles Beer who joined us.
This week, I'm happy to say there is a former progressive conservative election candidate named
Jillian Smith who has joined us. So we're very ecumenical here. We'll take them from wherever.
Chris Stout, you found us on Village Media through the Oakville News. We're glad you joined as well.
Reminder, all of our shows are archived at stevepepeakin.com. That's s T-E-V-E-P-A-I-K-I-N.com.
Ryan Hass and Janice. It's so great having both of you on the Paken podcast this week.
Do everybody else? Peace and love.
See you next time.
