The Paikin Podcast - World on Edge: Will Trump’s Israel-Hamas Peace Deal Work?

Episode Date: October 30, 2025

Trump’s 20-point peace plan includes disarming Hamas, an international stabilization force, and an apolitical Palestinian transitional government. Could it work? Hussein Ibish, contributor to The Atlantic, joins Janice Stein to discuss the state of the deal, why Hamas accepted it, how Netanyahu was forced into it, why Hamas never actually wanted to govern Gaza, if the plan offers a viable long term plan for Gaza’s future, and if one of the legacies of this war is to turn Israel into a permanent pariah state. Follow The Paikin Podcast: YOUTUBE: https://www.youtube.com/@ThePaikinPodcastX: x.com/ThePaikinPodINSTAGRAM: instagram.com/thepaikinpodcastBLUESKY: bsky.app/profile/thepaikinpodcast.bsky.socialEmail us at: [e-mail]

Hi again, everyone. We call this segment of the Pagan podcast World on Edge because it just seems to be that way, regardless of where on this globe you live. No more so is that the case than in the Middle East, which for decades has been on edge, and particularly so since the Hamas attacks of two plus years ago and Israel's reaction. But almost three weeks ago, the Trump administration managed to get both sides to agree to something. Where are things right now? Well, let's find out. On the weekend podcast coming up next. Happy to welcome back, Janice Stein, from the Monk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, and this week our special guest, Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute. He's a columnist with the national news and a regular contributor to the Atlantic, some guy we've got to know very well over the years on. TVO and Hussein. It's great to see you again. How you managing these? Thank you, Steve. I'm missing the agenda. But otherwise, I'm okay. Thank you. Well, we're happy to be able to chat with you here.

Yeah, it's great. I want to start putting you to work right away by just having you tell us what your sense is of where things are at right now with this agreement. Yeah, that's a very tough one. All right. So Trump said, we have eternal peace. We don't. He also said we have, we're already in phase two of this multi-phase process that he got everybody to agree to some version of. And he's wrong about that as well. This is very much in phase one. And really the ceasefire aspect of this has never fully taken hold in terms of fighting every day Israel has attacked somewhere in Gaza and every day, either Hamas and or Islam jihad or others have been harassing Israeli troops with attacks and, you know, not obeying the ceasefire themselves. The one thing that

was fulfilled is Hamas released all the living hostages. The other thing that's happened is Israeli forces have withdrawn from about almost less than half of Gaza. And that means that aid ought to be pouring back in. It's coming through at a higher rate than before, but not usually. What we don't know is what's going to make phase two possible, the establishment of an international stabilization. Hold off on that if I can. Hussein, we're going to get to that in our, as our discussion continues. But Janice, let me again get you just to sort of give your introductory comments as to where you think things are at right now.

now. Look, I agree with Hussein. I would just take it one step further, just a little step before we get to phase two and say that what we have, and I think this is not nothing, as we say, for Palestinians who live through these god-awful two years is the only way to describe it. Israeli forces have pulled back from the populated areas of Gaza. So Gaza is divided. There's a so-called yellow line, which is for phase one. But so I think there's two things. What's going on behind the yellow line and what's going on in front of the yellow line before we get to phase two. And I see who's saying that has had, look, from everything we understand.

understand and it's really difficult to know. It's really, really hard. It looks like Hamas is able to reassert control of the streets. That there is a, whatever word you want to use here. I don't get lost in the terminology, but there is a police force that seems to be imposing order. That the only exceptions to that, Now, there were exceptions at the beginning. There were some executions of people that Hamas treated as enemies who had opposed Hamas rule during this period. And in the Palestinian areas, which are very few that are behind the yellow line, there there's a different story. you see some old established families of Palestine that have been there ever since 1949, beginning to reassert control in some of the neighborhoods. Now, what does all this matter? Because we can't get to face two.

Right. Unless there's whatever this terminology means disarmament of Hamas. That could take us an hour to, frankly, parts. But we are not, we've moved since that original. ceasefire that was declared two weeks ago. Lines are hardening. Let me get a sense from both of you as to why you think the respective parties accepted this agreement. And to that end, I'll ask you about something that you wrote in the Atlantic on October 1st, which was that, quote, Trump's 20-point plan for ending the war in Gaza reads

more like a joint U.S.-Israeli dictat to Hamas. Now, if that's the case, why did Hamas accept it? Yeah, it's a really good question, right? I think they desperately needed the war to end. I mean, this is an instrument of surrender. It's like that line from the godfather. Pop, it'll look like weakness. It is a sign of weakness. I mean, yeah, they are in a very difficult situation. They are greatly reduced in power such that their assertion of force in the areas Israel is withdrawn from that Janus was just referring to. their reemergence as the governing power in areas of Gaza without Israeli control is not as thorough going as it would have been a year ago, let alone two years ago, etc. I mean, yeah, they still outnumber anybody else and there's still no real competition for it. But it's greatly diminished. The leadership is destroyed, command and control, barely exists. And a lot of the key people have been assassinated. And those who are not assassinated who are important are living in Turkey, which is not even in the Arab world. It's very

far away from Gaza. So you have a greatly diminished Hamas. And there's no support for an ongoing war with Israel surrounding them. The Iranian network cannot get to Hamas anymore because of the downfall of the Assad dictatorship in Syria, right? The literal road going from Iran through to Lebanon and south is closed at the Iraq-Syria border. And it's not going to be reopening anytime soon, given the attitudes of the new regime in Syria that closer to al-Qaeda than to Iran. I don't think they are al-Qaeda, but I'm just saying, you know, that their hostility to Iran is pretty total. And that change in the Middle East that was engineered by Turkey is just a humongous game changer.

And in addition to which, Turkey and Qatar, the last remaining friends of Hamas, were pressuring them to take the deal. The Palestinians in Gaza were desperate for an end to this war and just they desperately needed it to end. So there was nothing really for Hamas to work with. I mean, I think they might be looking in the longer term or medium term to rebuild more in the West Bank than in Gaza. But for now, that's where they are. That's where they have their guns. And I just want to add one more thing. It's been clear since the war began that Israel's, that the most important thing about the long-term future or medium-term future of Gaza was Israel's refusal to discuss a day-after scenario.

Netanyahu's, I should say, because lots of. Israelis wanted to discuss it, the military, and lots of the government did, but he didn't want it. And the reason is that this re-emergence of Hamat is, I mean, I think we have to be honest about it. It's a strategic decision by Israel. The Netanyahu government has left no alternative. It created an alternative. It allowed no space for the building of an alternative by those who wanted to build an alternative. Because I do think in the end, the Israelis who are bound and determined

to annex the West Bank prefer ultimately dealing with Hamas, at least in Gaza, than they do Fatah and the PLO. It is very good to have an adversary with a ridiculous goal, like an Islamic state between the river and the sea. It is very dangerous to have an adversary with a plausible goal, the creation of a small Palestinian state alongside Israel,

just recognized as the UN by Canada, France, Britain, Australia, Portugal, and other. So I think there's this re-emergence of Hamas is not just a function of their own situation, but a careful decision by this Israeli government that reflects their broader extremism. Well, let me ask about that for a second, because, again, Janice, I'm going to Can I put a quote from Hussein's piece to you and get you to explain why the Israelis accepted this deal? Because he wrote, for now, implementing the Trump ceasefire seems to be Netanyahu's best bet going into 2026. However, if the ceasefire holds and the war truly ends, Netanyahu loses his primary reason for remaining in power. In which case, Janice, why did Bibi Netanyahu

accept this agreement? So, look, I think it was a huge strategic. miscalculation. It's impossible. You know, I'm looking for the most hyperbolic work of the Buddhist government to refuse to discuss the day after. Aaron Miller likes the word galactic. Galactic is perfect. Galactic miscalculation. I agree with Aaron. It is a galactic mistake on their part. And to show you how bad it was if the people, and it's Nathanielho and some members of his own party, but not all, as Susan just said, and these extreme right parties that will have a much harder time in the next election. If their goal was to annex the West Bank, Trump has put his finger on the scale now, and the game has changed.

He has told them, totally. He has told them, no way, no-how brother. This is not happening. Now, too bad he didn't say that a year ago. Yeah. I would have changed the underlying calculation. Yeah. And people could, even Netanyo, you know, who's so late to the party that the party's over, could have in fact thought through what kind of government would make sense in Gaza

because that old divide and rule strategy, which he's been using for years and years, is frankly, cabot, because annexing the West Bank is off the table. So why did they accept? Okay. I think there are two reasons they accept it. First of all, the pressure from the hostage families was just unremitting, unrelenting, and you have to give credit to the three quarters of a million Israelis who took over the streets and went at it and went at it and went at it no matter how stubborn.

Nathania Ho, and how little he cared about the hostages. Let's be honest, because he never came to visit any of the families. It was so rare when he did. American envoy spent more time with hostage families than the prime minister did, which tells you something. So that was one big one. The second big one, which we probably don't talk enough about Hussein is very aware, is a relentless pressure from the Israeli military. Exactly.

From the beginning, we're totally opposed to this offensive in gas, this is the closest to insurrection I've ever seen by a military in a still-functioning democracy. They may clear their objection at every level. There was no strategic goal to this. There were no targets that they slow walked in every conceivable way. The prime minister said he wanted total victory over Hamas. Did he get that? No, of course not.

I mean, there is no total victory or total victory over Hamas, Steve, would be establishing a government of Palestinians in Gaza, free or unin intimidated by Hamas militias. That's what total victory is not the disappearance of Hamas. it's a reduction in their capacity to intimidate Palestinians who live in Gaza. And because there was no discussion of the day after, for two years, frankly, despite the best advice of anybody, he did not get. Well, that was another thing that Israeli military was literally up in arms about was the fact that he wouldn't discuss the day after, which meant, you know, Yeah, not just, it meant that, as Janice was saying, they didn't know what they were bleeding men for.

Here, they are commanding reservists who are not even career officers, who are not even career people. And they're losing them at the rate of a few a week, at the at least. You know, that's on a good week. And they're asking why, and they don't have, they don't get an answer. And so we had Trump and the Israeli public together. with the military, you get the agreement from the Israeli point of Yucan. Trump went over the head of Netanyahu

directly to the Israeli public. We've seen that occasionally in history. It's pretty rare. Well, Hussein, if Hamas has not been obliterated, which was the original goal of the Netanyahu government, what would you say the current state of it is? It's in really

bad shape, but I mean, saying we're going to obliterate Hamas, just unqualified, is meaningless. thing because Hamas is not a list of individuals or installations and equipment that can be searched and destroyed, found and destroyed. It's a brand name. It's a political brand name. It's like trying to destroy Coca-Cola, when people will run around selling bootlegged Coke at night. So it's an idea. It's a concept. Yeah, as long as you've got a bunch of Palestinians in Gaza saying

we're Hamas. It exists. You know, what I think Janice was saying, at least between the lines, clearly was referring to, is that a plausible, achievable goal that the military would have understood, for example, the Israeli public would have understood, and that would have provided a metric for Trump and everybody else inside and outside of Israel to judge the war would have been to say, we're going to break the political stranglehold of Hamas. on Gaza. We're going to ensure that Hamas is weakened, not just in Gaza, but in the West Bank too, in the Palestinian National Movement in its entirety.

And has that happened? To the point of irrelevancy, not at all. Not at all. They are still the main force in Gaza, and it's totally unclear how it would go for them if, and I would argue likely when they try to shift their attention onto the West Bank. If they focus on rebuilding their organization in Gaza, the best they can get to in the long run is October 6th of 2023. Is that scenario? That would be the best they could do. And that, meaning, meaning that their rule would be uncontested, but they would be surrounded by Israel, blockaded by Israel, frustrated from making further gains in the policy and national movement, cut off from the West Bank,

basically stuck in Gaza in a very frustrating way. That's where they were on the eve of October 7. And that's one of the reasons they were willing to overturn the apple cart and just kind of walk away from what they built in Gaza. The only reason to rebuild in Gaza is immediate gratification for the gunmen in Gaza and the fact that the organization, is based there so you do it in lieu of anything else but from a strategic point of view they might really want to shift their attention if they can to the west bank and then we'll see we'll see how how they are i do and then i want to ask hussein a question sure not percy but with your permission you know it's really interesting because um we know a lot more about yeah yeah

scene more now than we did because there's so many captured documents that are translated and Yaya Sinewar it becomes clear had no interest in governing gas and recesses, you know, which he thought was a distraction. He was looking to hand it off, frankly. That was what, you know, Israeli intelligence completely missed. And he was looking to hand it off for the reason that was saying that his strategic goal, is an Islamic state in all of Palestine. And there are maps and all the documents now that make that really clear. So this, not only would be stuck in Gaza, Hussein is who just suggested.

It's likely stuck in a smaller Gaza because it's going to be very difficult to get the Israeli army to pull back all the way as long. And the more Hamas we organize is the harder that conversation is going to be. And reaching the West Bank is now harder for Hamas than it was before the war because, as Hussein rightly said, that road through Iran is closed. And that's where a lot of the money and the equipment came in. It's going to be harder to access. And it's not clear that the president of Syria that this is the top of his agenda right now. There would be real cost. So they don't recover to October 6th.

They're far worse, frankly. which is again, yeah, and you know, neither of these two had what any of us would call a strategy that was reasonable under the circumstances. And that's why this is such a catastrophe. Here's my question for Hussein. There are rumors flying around that the head of the technocratic government in Palestine, Turkey has signed off on Qatar and others, and Hamas has not objected to. is somebody called Ashmer al-Shawa, who's well known in Gaza. I think it would be interesting, Steve, because we have to stand up this transitional government. Yeah.

It would be interesting to hear from Hussein, how do you evaluate him? Yeah. It's just just one degree of separation. What are Palestinians in Gaza who want to get? Not one degree of separation from Hamas, many degrees of separation from Hamas. in terms of orientation. So basically, the Palestinian political scene is binary and zero sum. It's divided into two camps that only agree on one thing.

They're all Palestinians. That they agree on. You're a Palestinian, I'm a Palestinian. But after that, nothing. One is Islamist and wants to, you know, carry on an honor. struggle with Israel until victory and, you know, dominating the entire area between the river and the sea. The other is secular nationalist and wants an independent state in small part of the area alongside Israel. You can't really, they tried cohabitation in 2006 after parliament, after presidential elections that were won by a fatac.

candidate Mahmoud Abbas who got 63% of the vote and then a year later there were parliamentary elections which Hamas back candidates got 44% of the parliamentary seat so you had this division and they tried what the French call cohabitation you know between an executive from one side and a legislature dominated by the other side complete failure right yeah but at the same time Hamas is in a bind because the main advantage the Palestinian National Movement has competitive tool that they have vis-à-vis Israel and any long-term future is the international standing of the PLO. It's the fact that the PLO has 130 embassies and missions around the world and represents

this state of Palestine at the General Assembly. And, for example, the reason that the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice has claims jurisdiction plausibly over not just Hamas, but Israel and Israelis, with regard to Gaza, is that Gaza is a presumptive part of this independent Palestinian state. And so they and the state of Palestine signed the treaties governing the work of the ICC and the ICJ. So they claim the right to, they claim standing to a certain jurisdiction over those territories, even though Israel hasn't signed those treaties. So it's an example. I throw that out just as one example of how this purely symbolic thing can suddenly turn out to be a quite potent weapon in the hands of a Palestinian leadership that's serious about using diplomacy rather than an armed struggle to achieve their goals. Now, Hamas can never claim to speak on behalf of the Palestinian national movement as long as it's locked out of the PLO. So their goal has to be to either stage a successful hostile takeover or join it on the existing terms,

which would mean basically recognizing Israel or acquiescing to that and other things they hate and biding their time to try to take it over in the long run. And this is the kind of thing you would have to get into the West Bank to try to do. And so that's why I think they're going to be very interested in that part of the Palestinian territory. If they can, if they can. Let me jump in here and circle back to a comment that Hussein made right at the very beginning and get both of you to follow up on that, which is part of the Trump plan involves a so-called international stabilization force and the disarmament of Hamas. And I want to just sort of probe the two of you right now on both of those things. Janice, start us off on this international stabilization force.

Who are they? What do you think they can accomplish? Yeah, look, there's a lively ongoing, almost frantic discussion about this international stabilization force because, frankly, until that force goes in, everything is on hold, right? And just to show you the yin and the yang of this, the more Hamas visibly demonstrates that it is on the streets, the harder it is to get this international stabilization force organized. And if I can vent for just a minute, any seasoned group of diplomats would note this and the ceasefire would not have gone forward unless there was at least a rudimentary force in place that could. have gone in literally at the moment that the ceasefire went into effect. And if that happened, I think we'd be having a different discussion about the political

future of Palestine right now. So this is a galactic mistake, okay, where the professionals weren't able to influence the trio of people who were running the show. Now, who's going to lead? We know that. Non-Arab Muslims. So Azerbaijan and Indonesia, Indonesia said that it's willing to contribute up to 18,000 people. That's not small.

Who's doing the police training we know? Is Jordan with a very quiet assist from Egypt all along the way here? What's holding up the international stabilization force? The biggest obstacle is, in fact, these pictures coming out of gas with Hamas on the street with guns. but there was a discussion which I have to say I'm out of patience with okay, it is all, it is

what's, who is there going to be a UN mandate for this force? Like honestly who cares? Right? And why would, I mean, I know that's, it doesn't matter. No, you sit, no, you sit down, you draft a mandate, there's

rules of engagement and there's money to support this force and the fact You can get that force on the ground. First of all, the better for the lives of Palestinians. Living Gaza, let's be honest. And secondly, the better the prospect that there will be a political prospect. A political process for the power. Do you want Canadian forces as part of the stabilization for us?

You know, that's another politically correct question. Pardon me, Steve. And I don't have a lot of tolerance for. We don't have relationships. on the ground there. We don't have, uh, we don't have extra forces right now. We're committed in Lafia. So it's a non-starter. It's frankly a non-starter. Let's do something that's practical, that's real, that's grounded. And there's several options and that can help Palestinians living in case. Okay. Hussein, what are your hopes for this international stabilization force?

Um, no, I'm skeptical. Um, let me just say, uh, You know, the thing is about a stabilization force. It's the same as the technocratic government that we were talking about before. As long as it's not Hamas and not Hamas in described or in drag or in, you know, Hamas puppets or something, as long as it's really not Hamas, anything Palestinian that emerges or in defense of the Palestinians, like the International Stabilization Force will ultimately strengthen the hands of Fatah and the PLO in Ramallah. I mean, that's the fact. So you've got a situation where Netanyahu is very hesitant to allow that under any circumstances.

So for reasons I sketched out and reasons that Janice talked about, there are different categories of reasons, but they're all operative. And I think, you know, as long as you've got, yes, images of Hamas reemerging in Gaza where you know that if you commit your troop to policing the area and disarming Hamas or even just traffic control, you're going to be dealing with those guys and there's going be shooting involved potentially and you know you why would you risk that it's it's an open question well i'm actually was persuaded hussein yeah that given what we're talking about before that hummus has an interest in disrupting the stabilized yeah no i agree with you it may not want to shoot at them because it doesn't want to govern gas so i i think you're right and i think actually if the leadership

in Turkey decides the Hamas leadership in Turkey and Qatar. If they decide they want to focus their rebuilding energies in the next 10 years on the West Bank, and there are parts of the West Bank they could begin in. The old city of Nablus and the refugee camp outside of Janine are places where they already have a tiny toe hole in the West Bank, and they could focus on rebuilding or building up there, even though it's really a Gaza-based organization. It's always been a Gaza-based organization, and it's going to be hard to do that, if that's what they decide to do. And I think if they're smart, it is what they'll try it, at least try it, see if they can do it.

That would be a reason to allow a technocratic government to come in, to allow stabilization force to come in, and even to disarm or partly disarm. And especially if they can get the agreement to allow their forces to relocate temporarily outside of Gaza if they won't disarm. There's this part of the deal that we've seen that sometimes it's in and sometimes it's out. I don't know what people have signed. But there are provisions that are, like I said, sometimes there are not, depending on which version you read, that members of Hamas who don't want to disarm could leave, would get safe passage to, I don't know, Algeria or Turkey or whoever would have them. I don't know who wants them. Can I follow up on that angle in this, Janice, which is to say, you know, allegedly, one of the 20 points in this peace plan is the disarming of Hamas. I'm not sure it's clear

about who's responsible for doing that. Do you know? Yeah. So I know what the plan says. The plan says it's this international stabilization force to which Hamas will hand over its arms. my English here is really careful. It's not fighting them. The assumption is that Hamas will hand over. Now, let's talk for just a second what it means

to disarm Hamas, okay? Everybody has personal weapons. So it's not personal weapons. It's assault rifles. It's missile projectors. You know, let's just understand first. Most of the missiles that Hamas

had are made in Gaza. in factories that are located in the tunnels. They didn't come from around, and you can start that up at any time. It's not a huge sacrifice to hand over what's visible. You know, the long-range assault missiles, what you really need to do is get them off the streets. And turn in a certain number of them. So you meet this formal category of demolition. We've seen this in other conferences around the world.

Steve, this is non-new. So, for me, disarming is less significant military and very significant in reading what Hamas's intentions are for the next stage. Where is it going to make its bet? And that's why I'm watching. No, that's right. Well, I think that's right. And I think the thing about disarmament is less about the number as just the,

Exactly, as Janice was saying, it's less about the number of guns you confiscate or missile launchers or parts of machines that make rocket launchers and rockets or whatever. It's less that. And more a question of, you know, assuming that the governance of Gaza post-Hamas goes forward, right? Then the question will become, what happened to former Hamas cadres who don't leave and who, who, are no longer fighting. Do you make what the Egyptians and Jordanian in Arab meetings behind closed doors have been calling the Iraq mistake? This is the phrase they've been using since February since the big meeting in Saudi. What does that refer to? It means sending the Iraq, it refers to the decision of the W Bush administration to send the Iraqi military home with their weapons and no

jobs, right? So the Egyptians and Jordanians have basically been using this experience as a reason to push for including former Hamas members and cadres in the Palestinian police that were being trained by the Egyptians, Jordanians, CIA, and others to eventually take over, to join the stabilization force or to take over from them. Or do you regard them all as toxic, which is the UAE's position and to some extent the Saudi one. You know, I say, and actually just think about how much more strategic it would be to allow any Hamas militant who says, okay, I am now going to enter a disciplined police force and follow the rules.

And this police force is, after all, a Palestinian police force. It is not a Hamas-led police force. Right. It wouldn't be. You hope, you hope. But you hope that people have the wisdom not to do what they didn't. Let me ask you two, one more question about, again, another provision in the peace plan, which is to say, you know, correct me if I'm wrong on this, but I don't think this peace plan of Donald Trump's administration specifically creates a path to a Palestinian state. And I wonder, okay, Janice, you're shaking your head, but tell me if that strings the prospects for this plan. No, no, no, because any pathway created by this agreement, it's not going to have legitimacy anyway.

What really matters is if we can stand up some Palestinian-led institutions. And, you know, that's why I asked to Hussein about Al-Sahua, who is the, and it is interesting to know, is this technocrat, he's a Palestinian from Gaza. Is he acceptable to Amas? Do they, allegedly, you know, we're getting in the climate, so you get in the Middle East all the time, which you do is a right. If they decide to allow anyone to go forward, they would have no problem with him. Yeah, but you see, that's the real issue. If they say, yeah, if they say yes, then all of a sudden you have a technocratic Palestinian government. It will be made up exclusively of Palestinians.

If you can get a police force in that is Palestinian and led by, you have then, for the first time, what I call nascent institutions, where Hamas certainly does not have a veto. It may have a role, but it doesn't have. It wouldn't be, the thing is it wouldn't be for the first time, because it would be for the second time or third, depending on how you count. And it would be very close.

ultimately to what you have in area A of the West Bank, in the Palestinian South world area. But in Gaza, it would be the first time. It would be the first in Gaza and, but it would ultimately link up. I mean, I don't see how this process could create a third gravitational pole in Palestinian policy. It's not going to be that strong. So ultimately, it's going to connect up with the PA.

And for that reason, I think you see people both in Hamas and, among the Israeli right who would like to sabotage that because they don't want to see that. Yeah, but you know what? But here's where Donald Trump put his finger on scale. Yeah, totally. And I could use it for a letter word, but I won't and said,

guys, this is not happening. Right. That changes the political equation. That's the most significant thing to come out of these two years, right? Okay. So I agree with you. It is. In the long run, it is. We focused a great deal. on the Palestinian side of the equation on this program.

And I'd like to spend our remaining moments here just talking a little bit about where Israel's at today. Yeah. And I think I saw a recent public opinion survey in Israel, which says 73% of the Israeli public thinks that Israel's standing in the world, in the international arena, is worse today. It is. It was before October 7th of two years ago. There's no question about that, Steve.

So let's discuss this, Jeddice. I mean, you've said it here before. Do you believe Israel is still a pariah state among nations in the world today? Well, look, there's no question, again, I'm trying to stay away from every label because I just find them really unhelpful as we think about the political process. But there's no question here that Israel standing in the world is worse. But there's also a reality check. You can't end this war without working with the government of Israel.

You can't stand up. We have to stand up Palestinian. institutions inside Gaza. You can't do that unless you negotiate with the government. So whatever language you want to use, you can't avoid it. Number one. Number two, and I think this really matters as we think about this next year, there is an election happening in 20, no later than October. And unlike others that are backsliding into authoritarianism, there is no question this election will be held. I think it will be held early. here than October. Thirdly, you looked at that survey, but look at public opinion polls inside

Israel. Consistently, Netanyahu and his coalition loose. Likud may be the single largest party by two or three seats, depending on what day. And you would have thought he would have gone a tremendous bump after the hostages came back. No, there is he. There's no poll that predicts that Netanyahu's coalition forms the next government, we're going to have a different prime minister. Oh, you don't know that. You don't know that. He's managed to buck the odds so many times in the past

to the point where he's now the longest serving PM ever in it. I know, but I think this is there. You know, as Ken Rokoff says, this time is different, given what's happened in the last two years. You hear a lot of us who will believe it when we see it, just because he's so skilled. at making himself not the number one choice of huge numbers of Israelis, but the acceptable number two or number three choice of enough of them to give him the prime ministership,

give him a majority that can survive enough confidence in the Knesset, not by being beloved, but by being kind of okay or reliable or something like that. And I don't know that that going to happen but I know that I don't know that it's not going to happen either and I guess we'll all find out I was told repeatedly that he you know after October 7 that that he had weeks months left you know he's still there still there so I don't know I mean I'm going to disagree with you yeah go ahead go ahead of the following reasons yeah I think most of us understand it's really to have to change prime ministers when you're at war. Oh, sure.

It's tough to change prime ministers. The hostages were an overwhelmingly emotional issue. Yeah. That's done now. And the next step, there is already a fight, which is a serious fight over a state commission of inquiry. And Nathaniel and are going all out to prevent an independent state commission of inquiry. You know, that will be.

And that's when he has. He doesn't have a majority government right now, frankly. That's the kind of issue where he loses majority. It's a second big issue, which is an internal domestic issue, which is hard for people from outside to understand. But it's drafting the Orthodox into the army. People, this is the hottest issue because of the length of service that reservists had to give over the last two years. And that's part of the reason why the IDF did not want this war to go on. Yeah.

Right there, and they were exhausted. They need time for people of rest. If there, and Nathaniel cannot go there, if he goes there, his coalition's history. It's history. Okay. Let's do one more thing here if we can. And I want to put, hmm, this is a question. I'm not sure I ever thought I'd be asking, but let's try it anyway.

You know, I suspect the three of us agree that Donald Trump is on his best days, mercurial, and on his worst days, authoritarian, narcissistic, psychopathic, fill in the blank, use whatever word you like. Are you two prepared, Janice, you first. Are you prepared to give him whatever kudos he may be entitled to for getting things to this point? I don't even have a problem. That's a nanosecond for me to answer yet. Yes. You know, if you send a nice guy, like Tony Blinken, this is the Secretary of State to previous president.

He's the fine, one of the finest people you could hope to meet, you know, in advance, right? Even Joe Biden, they could not get it done. Donald Trump plays by the roughest rules. And when he finally put his finger on the scale. and stopped it, but not only stopped the fighting, said, forget it because my buddies in the Emirates, they made a deal. I care about the Emirates because I've got big crypto investments there.

And the deal is, and yeah, two trillions of dollars that we're talking about here. And no annexation of the West Bank. That's the way it is. This is a completely. different order for good and for bad than we've seen. And yes, he gets credit for this. And if you want to give him the Nobel Prize,

I'm good with that. Yeah. I don't know about Nobel Prizes, but I agree. I wouldn't hesitate to give him a huge amount of credit for it. Sometimes you need a bully, right? Sometimes you need a bully. And Trump is a good bully.

He knows how to bully people. And, you know, then he got the Turks and the Qataris to sit on Hamas and he got you know the Iranians are no longer a factor and he bullied Netanyahu really effectively and Netanyahu left himself with no alternative there was nowhere left for him to turn right he was all in on Trump again and again and again and again and so when Trump put his foot down Netanyahu was stuck he absolutely in a corner of his own making political corner, where he put all his chips on Trump, and Trump decided that it was his reality, it was going to dictate things, not Netanyahu's reality. And I do think that that

is a very useful thing, generally. So, yeah, he deserves a lot of credit. Let me take this opportunity to thank the two of you for joining us on the Pagan podcast this week. Hussain Abish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, columnist of the national news regular contributor you can see his stuff in the atlantic janestine from the monk school of global affairs and public policy a reminder to everyone if you want to comment on our programs the pagan podcast at gmail dot com that's the pagan podcast at gmail dot com and what are people in this medium always say please like and subscribe yeah that's it for us this week i don't rag the puck right that's you taught me that phrase so thank you got it to see you guys great

to see you guys great to see you Thank you.