The Paul Wells Show - Gen. Wayne Eyre on a new era for Canada's military

Episode Date: August 20, 2025

The year since Wayne Eyre retired as Chief of Defence Staff has seen unprecedented change in Canada's national-security environment. Prime Minister Mark Carney has announced plans to boost Canada's defence-related spending from less than 2% of GDP to 5%. The United States has become an unsteady ally. What do those big changes mean for the future of Canada's military? An in-depth conversation.

Careful what you ask for, what will life be like in a Canada that's tripling its defense spending. This week, Wayne Eyre, the former chief of Canada's defense staff. I'm Paul Wells. Welcome to the Paul Wells Show. You're about to hear my first long conversation with Wayne Eyre. I was shy about approaching him until this summer, but I'm glad I got over it. From 2021 to 2024, Err was the chief of defense staff of the Canadian Armed Forces, the country's top soldier. He's a career army man commissioned into the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's in 1988,

which means he saw service in Croatia, Afghanistan, South Korea, and elsewhere. He served in the U.S. Army, as Canadian officers often do. He commanded multinational forces, as Canadian officers often do. And when he got the big job as CDS, on very short notice, after two of his predecessors were removed from the post in quick succession, he had to deal with the Trudeau government's conflicted and contradictory attitudes towards the Canadian military. He talks about it all in this rich conversation. It's all here.

Making sure your money is well and effectively spent during what promises to be a historic increase in defense spending? The challenges of recruiting into the CAF and keeping the best and brightest in a competitive economy. The risk of political extremism in the ranks, which is far from hypothetical. The perception of Canada's military among our allies, and the increasingly difficult relationship with the country that has been our most important ally for most of a century, the United States. and the call from some politicians for a warrior culture to replace the woke culture of the CAF. I had mentioned to Air that I wanted to talk about that one. It's pretty clear that he came prepared for that question.

As Canada's military approaches a historic inflection point, it's a great honor to be joined by this experienced guide. Wayne Eyre, thank you for joining me. Well, thanks for having me, Paul. You've been out of the military for about a year after having been in for more than 30. Do you miss it? Well, actually more than 40. Yeah, and just over a year.

And so do I miss it? I miss parts of it. I miss the people. I miss the camaraderie. The thrill of operations is something that is, you know, some have said is addictive. I don't miss the politics, especially from my last job. But, yeah, getting used to transition is a process in itself. It seems to me, I mean, I've never come close to a military career,

but I spent a lot of time around soldiers in the last 15 years. And it seems to me there's just almost complete unpredictability about what you're going to be doing. But there's a lot of certainty about your relationship with the people around you. and that losing that can be disorienting a little bit. Well, unpredictability is right. You know, I think about my own career and how it spanned, how it started in the Cold War, coming down to the Berlin Wall,

our focus on the former Yugoslavia, 9-11, the focus on Afghanistan, and now almost full circle to a return to great power confrontation. Yeah, so change is, is one of those constants in a military career, one that spans decades. But you're right, being surrounded by a team who are, whose members are bigger than themselves,

part of something bigger than themselves with a sense of purpose that is transcendent. That will always be part of my identity and part of every veteran's identity. And I've certainly experienced, experiencing it. And what I've heard from others is that sense of camaraderie is the biggest thing they miss. How did you get into it in the first place? You grew up in Wadena, Saskatchewan, and you were in Army. Yeah. Were you from a military family?

No, I was the first one to serve in my family since the Second World War. And I had the opportunity to go through the history of family members that fought and served in the First and Second World Wars. and those that didn't come home, which seemed to be a trend in my family. But no, it was something that interested me from my very early age, running around with my brothers, my cousins, with sought off hockey sticks patrolling against each other in the woods on the farm in Saskatchewan, through to Army cadets.

It was really a calling, something that very much appealed to me. What did cadets entail? I mean, I knew people around my school who were in cadets. It seems to be there's a lot of drilling, marching information, but I mean, obviously, some skills, and I don't know, we can worry. So, my view, it's the best youth program we have in this country. It focuses on leadership, on practical living skills in the field craft, working with others. it gives you a real sense of teamwork.

You know, I had the opportunity to spend, I think I was 16 at the time, you know, summer in at Banff National Army Cadet Camp, climbing mountains, climbing glaciers, whitewater canoeing, you know, learning those schools, all right, those skills. My daughter went through the program herself and the same thing, very developmental. Now, the focus has changed over the years. It was originally formed to give military skills to our youth. Child soldier regulations and the like changed a little bit of that. But the focus on citizenship, the focus on leadership, it is still there and still a great program.

When did you decide that you were serious about this and that it might be a way to spend your life? Well, from pretty early age. And so I joined cadets. I tried at 11. Wouldn't let me in. So let me in at 12. You're supposed to be 13, but I was with a birthday in November. They let me in.

And I applied to the Canadian Armed Forces while in high school. And in fact, I found myself at basic training three days after high school graduation. And so, you know, joined up as a 17-year-old and went straight in. Was there ever a point after that when you thought it might have been a, a poor choice of career path and that you might want to bounce out and do something else? Or did you, were you happy to stick with it all the way through? Well, I was pretty happy. I kept going from adventure to adventure.

Now, everybody has these thoughts of, okay, what's next? And when do you make that decision as to when next comes? Everybody makes that decision, either themselves or somebody makes it for you as to when you have to leave the Canadian Armed Forces. And there was numerous junctures through my career where, you know, I could have easily retired. And my time out in Edmonton, I spent a lot of time in Edmonton and my last job commanding the Army in Western Canada. I saw myself easily staying out there after that position finished. But no, the challenges and opportunities just kept coming.

Another thing that stuck out to me reading your bio is that you have, as a lot of Canadian military officers have done, You've worked very closely with other countries' forces. You served a command function in the U.S. Army or over U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and you commanded in South Korea, working with a multinational force, including South Koreans. Are there elements of a culture clash of that kind of assignment? Do you have to sort of get used to the crew that you suddenly find yourself working with? Yeah, that's a constant opportunity in front of you, and you go into these positions, is having to work across the various cultures. You know, for example, my last tour in Afghanistan, I was in charge of NATO training

mission Afghanistan. I had 14 different countries or members from 14 different countries under command. And so you can imagine the culture clash, not just, or not clash, but cross-cultural barriers, not just with the Afghans themselves, but within the command from so many different countries and different services within those countries, Army Navy, Air Force, regular reserve, contractor. Everyone comes with a different perspective, a different understanding of the situation, but also it gives you cognitive and experiential diversity if you can harness that. So different takes on the problem, different perspectives.

And when you're dealing with very complex issues, it's always good to have those various viewpoints. Is that something that Canadian forces have gotten more used to over time? I mean, one of your early assignments was in former Yugoslavia, which was, it strikes me, I mean, a difficult assignment for peacekeepers because the rules of engagement were so limited. And also, at that time in Canada's history, an unusual assignment for Canadian forces. And it, it, it, you must have felt a bit, a little bit like a fish out of water at times there. So, not really.

And the reason, the reason I say that is our training was so good. You know, those who kept the light alive over the course of the Cold War, when many would have us focus solely on interpositional peacekeeping. No, there was a focus on combat, a focus on. a focus on those battlefield skills that were so necessary. And so when I found myself in the former Yugoslavia in Croatia in 1993, at the Battle of Madak Pocket, the largest Canadian engagement between the Korean War and Afghanistan, those skills came back.

That training kicked in. You know, some have said that period was the death of traditional peacekeeping, and I believe it. But it was also a reaffirmation of what we as a military needed to invest in, and that was ensuring that we were combat capable, because you never know when a situation is going to go downhill, when it's going to deteriorate into conflict. And so just being ready for that.

You know, as the nation's ultimate insurance policy, that's what we have to do writ large. Now, you became Chief of Defense Staff kind of quick, because two of your predecessors got told that they were done being Chief of Defense Staff, Jonathan Vance and Art McDonald, under unfortunate circumstances in each case. Do you feel like you were adequately prepared? Did you feel kind of thrust into the role? Oh, hell yeah.

Yeah, and kind of quick is a bit of an understatement. It's a funny story. I was sitting at home at dinner on the 24th of February, 2021, you know, telling my wife I was so happy. I was not the CDS at that point. And an hour later, the phone rang. And it was the minister asked me to come downtown in the middle of a snowstorm to speak with him. I had no idea what it was about. And two hours later, I found myself as the acting chief of defense staff thinking it would only be for several weeks.

And three and a half years later, I turned it over. So, yeah, it was pretty fast. You know, was I ready for it? I've been thinking a lot about that and what experiences prepared me for that. So from an experiential perspective, yes, I think I was about as ready as I could have been. From a detailed handover perspective, no. Because when we take over these positions, any position in the military, you'd like to have a week, several weeks with your predecessor to ensure that seamless transition, to do that knowledge transfer. You know, this was instantaneous.

But then again, this is a profession where we have to be prepared to step up. You know, it's a profession that has been forged in centuries of combat, and we've seen where chains of command have been wiped out, and others had to step up and carry on. And that I saw as one of the strengths of the Canadian Armed Forces is that depth of people. No one's indispensable, and there was always that bench where somebody could have stepped up. So you had a strange kind of battlefield promotion and that was the precedent that you were able to look to, I guess. Yeah. And the timing is also interesting to me. It was November of 2021.

If I had to pick a moment in Canada's recent history where our politics, our electoral politics, was at its most polarized and most confrontational, it would have been about the time that you were chief of defense staff. So right after the 2021 election, it was. only a few months before the Freedom Convoy took over Ottawa for a month. Did you feel the, you'd have mentioned earlier that you weren't fond of the politics of the role. Did you feel that it was especially heavy because of everything else that was going on in Canada at the time? So, you know, just to correct your statement there, I came in in February of 21. Okay, sorry. As the acting CDS and then became substantive in November.

of 21. But yes, it was an intensely political time, especially with the misconduct crises swirling around the Canadian Armed Forces. And I was told by some very senior public servants that you are the topic, but not the target of much of the political discourse that was happening at that time. And so, you know, things were sporty, to say the least, in Canada. But at the same time, this was the start of what I would call a poly crisis that we faced over the next three, three and a half years with the invasion of Ukraine, multiple crises around the world, whether it was Sudan, Haiti, things heating up in the Asia-Pacific region, and then Ukraine, and just the fallout of that. So it was not only just an incredibly interesting time from a domestic perspective, but internationally as well, all coming together at the same time. How did that test the Canadian forces? I mean, suddenly you were running off in all directions, basically, as a military. So I was very concerned with our level of readiness to address.

this increased what I would call demand signal. Because we were all things to all people in some cases. We were still responding to the pandemic. And there was calls, incessant calls for us to get involved, whether it was intervening in provincial healthcare systems, helping with the vaccine delivery. Natural disasters continued unabated, the intensity and frequent of those just really drew on the Canadian Armed Forces.

And then internationally, as we saw the return of great power, the specter of great power conflict, our readiness was going down. Our ability to respond at speed, at scale, and for sufficient duration, what wasn't there. And so it was something that I was very much seized with. How do we rebuild that readiness in the context of continuing to be called out over and over and over again.

Did you feel like you had to constantly remind the Trudeau government that any G7 country is going to have, any NATO member is going to have military responsibilities? Yes. That advice, that conversation was what was continual every time, pretty much every time that I sat down with either the minister or the prime minister. that was a, if not the subject, a subtext to what we were discussing. Every option that I would put on the table for military response was underpinned by what we could realistically do, what our levels of readiness were at the time, what was the opportunity cost for not being able to do other things.

And it was very much a dialogue, but in the words of Elliot Cohen, in his book, Supreme Command, it was an unequal dialogue because the fundamental of military professionalism and a democracy is your military subservient to duly elected civilian officials. And they may or may not take your advice. And they are elected. We are not. This is a democracy. As elected officials, they have the right to get it wrong. And so if your advice is not taking, well, you can't take it personally. You just got to persevere and continue to. to work on it. Did the Prime Minister ever lose patience with you?

Stop bugging me about that stuff? Never directly. I always got the sense that he appreciated the input. But I did have to push. And I felt it was my duty to raise the flag when our readiness was at such a point. and the international security situation seemed to be spiraling, which it still is, by the way.

We have entered a much more dangerous phase in world history, and so being ready for that is crucial from my perspective. I remember at the end of 2023, I got interviews with two senior leaders in your command structure, Admiral Topshee of the Navy, Admiral Octolone from the Canadian Joint Operations Command.

And a substantial element of both of those interviews was it would be sure be nice if we had more horses. If we had more material, more equipment, and a broader ambit. And Scuttle, but at the time was that you were worried that everybody in the Canadian forces were pushing a bit too hard and that you were in danger of poison. the well. Did you have to sort of dose out how much talk there was about these limitations and how much you had to just make a show of going about your business and following orders? Was that a hard balance to strike? Well, you have to be truthful, but at the same time, you have to motivate those underneath you,

to continue to press forward. And we have a history in the Canadian military of never having enough, but making it work regardless. And that's one of the great things about the people in this organization is they get things done. But yeah, those two in particular

were quite articulate in laying out the challenges. And we had many discussions behind closed doors about what those challenges were. and I supported everything that they said at that time. But at the end of the day, we follow government direction and get on with it. Boy, a lot has changed since then. You must be fascinated to watch now from outside the forces as government of Mark Carney announces they're going to hit the 2% target this year.

and that on the way to 3.5% of GDP plus 1.5% in military-related spending in fairly short order by 2035, are you surprised and do you buy it? So I am pleasantly surprised. This is exactly what we need to do. You know, I was never a fan of assigning a percentage of GDP for defense spending. That's what I would call an input metric. Rather, we need to do a threat-based approach and determine what the output needs to be in terms of capabilities and readiness. So an output metric based against the threats that we face.

Now, that's difficult to do. So, you know, 2% as a measuring tool is a proxy for that. We've got to remember why this is important. It's because of the deteriorating security situation. It's because of the erosion of the guardrails of the rules-based international order put into place. It's because of the intense instability in the world right now and the very real threats to Canada. It can't just be because we're being berated by allies that we're doing this. And so it's important that that will to do this is sustained. And the Canadian population is brought along

to really understand that threat. You know, for far too long, we have been very secure behind three oceans and a benign superpower to the south. Well, now we're facing a globally integrated security environment. And our own vital national security interests are under threat. And if we take a look writ large in terms of international relations, the currency of international relations is now hard power. And we're quite behind the curve. And so is it possible? Absolutely. It takes will. And we've had that will before in Canadian history. You take a look at World War I. our percentage of defense spending was around 10%. World War II, I think it peaked at 37%.

Over the course of the Cold War, especially in the early years, it was between 4 and 6%. And so what we've seen over the course of the last, some have called it the unipolar moment, that period from 1990 to 2020 when it seemed like peace was breaking out writ large and the world was on a positive trajectory,

that could be considered a blip in history. And we've returned now to what has been the norm for human history, the long arc of human history, which is power matters, great powers trying to balance power. And as the world tries to find a new order, a new equilibrium, it's time of instability and significant, opportunity for miscalculation. And that's why this is so important.

Have you met Mark Carney? Have you ever, like, he's been around. Have you ever discussed these issues with Mark Carney? No, no, I have never met him. Okay. And do you get a sense talking to your former colleagues that there's a sort of momentum and towards a follow-through? Or like so many other people around Ottawa,

are you waiting to see what this government is made of? So I get a sense. sense that there is momentum, but it has to be maintained. And if you try using all of the old established excessively bureaucratic processes to execute defense banning, you're going to fail because it's just too cumbersome. It takes a lot of staff to to go through all that process, and if you don't have sufficient staff, you're going to fail.

And so a new mindset is required. You know, something akin to what we had, I talked about World War I and World War II, that wartime mindset to get things done. That is what's going to be necessary because a real sense of urgency is required here as well to get the capabilities and readiness in place

to deal with that increasingly dangerous world. It feels like there was a, time not too distant when Canada was able to rapidly increase its capability, which was when the Afghanistan conflict suddenly got a lot nastier after 2006. It seems to me like procurement increased rapidly and with great effect. Am I misremembering that? I was just a magazine writer in those days. Yeah, but it's not just capability or not just equipment. And I lived through that period as both a battalion and a brigade commander. And I can tell you that we had to scrape together units to deploy.

We overextended in Afghanistan like a number of countries did. And it was indicative of the hollowing out that we had experienced in the decades prior to that, that we had to mix and match units, scrape them together, scraped together vehicle fleets to be able to operate in that environment. Yeah, many hangar had on a few successful procurements, which were really good. You know, C-17s, M-Triple-7 howitzers, Chinook helicopters, for example. We didn't get enough at the time. And after the fact, after those very successful procurements, what is not talked about

is the additional oversight that came in because of the backlash. and I'm talking about the 2011, 2012, 2013 time frame. And so we just need to put everything into perspective. What does that entail the additional oversight because of the backlash? Yeah, additional process to ensure that defense isn't running wild in terms of buying equipment. We need to make. we need to make sure that accountability is maintained. Yes, I agree with that.

But that means understanding who is accountable for what. One of the challenges we have right now is there's no single department that you can pin accountability on for successful defense procurement. Accountability is diffuse. And so if something goes wrong, who do you? who do you hold accountable? It's not clear. And so when we talk about speeding things up, when we talk about making sure we have good procurements, that's part of it. That's part of what needs to change. There is a constant worry that when there's more money to spend,

suddenly everything will just get more expensive, that anyone can spot a big spender and they adjust their prices accordingly. How do you avoid that? Yeah, so I'm not sure that there's always a cause and effect with that. There is at times, but it comes down to that strong case for reform as to how we do things. Who has accountability for what in the process, reduce that process. There's a perverse risk of or perverse impact of risk aversion here that if you delay because of defense, inflation, things become more expensive. And so the faster that you can, you can acquire capabilities, the better. We're also seeing an acceleration in technological change. And so what

that means is, and I heard an interesting term, it was called compliant obsolescence. Yeah, you've gone through all the process of purchasing something, but it's obsolete by the time you get it. And so we've got to have a much more rapid pathway to getting capabilities into the hands of our troops. Now, this is, I think, fundamental going forward because the way that wars are fought are rapidly changing, the character of war, if you will. Ukraine is a case in point. And it's all related to something called the adaptation cycle. And in warfare, a truism is the side that can adapt the fastest has the advantage. In peacetime, that adaptation cycle can take decades.

But we're saying in Ukraine, that adaptation cycle taking weeks, especially in terms of drone warfare. You know, one side changes something with regards to its capability. Another side observes, adapts. And within weeks, those changes are in its domestic production line. We've got to get more of that. And what that means is an increased investment, in research and development,

latent capacity in production lines, and a much shortened pathway from innovation to acquisition. And so we're not preparing for the last war. We're preparing for changes that are going to happen in the next war. Okay. You talk about the difference between a spending target

and a capability target. If all of your drugs, others were accommodated. If the military were able to do the sort of stuff that you think the Canadian Armed Forces need to be able to do, does that look like a rough tripling of our annual spending? Because that is the spending target. I mean, is there enough on the to-do list that it starts to look like that? So you've got to remember that we've been hollowed out for decades. And there's a huge debt in terms of maintenance, in terms of ammunition stockpiles. And, you've got to remember that we've

and the rusting out of capabilities. And so if you take a look at what needs to be brought up, there's many things. Now, to sustain it and continue to improve it, is that going to require a tripling of the defense budget? I don't know. The threat is important. And so this is a target that needs to be continually reassessed in light of what the threat is. Yes, we need to defend, but a defense.

defend against what? Prepare for what? And so it's that constant assessment. But there's some baseline shortfalls with the crumbling infrastructure. If you take a look at our ammunition stockpiles, if we were to go to war and consume munitions at the same rate that are being consumed in Ukraine, we would be out of what's called battle decisive munitions in a case, for some natures, within days. And they would take years to replace. And so having a certain level of stockpiles is very important. And moreover, having the production capability, the production line capacity is equally important. For more than a decade, I have heard every once in a while, when I talk about this sort

of thing with people on the political side, I've heard these concerns dismissed as toys for the boys. That, of course, Army wants more stuff. And of course, Navy and Air Force want more stuff. and that the rest of us have to live in the real world. That's got to be a maddening thing for you to hear, but how do you counter it? Yeah, well, it's also grossly negligent from a responsibility perspective. If you take a look at human history, why human communities were formed, it was for collective defense. And the first role of any government is ensuring the defense and security of its country and its people. Now, for a long time, we could ignore that first role and allow the welfare state

to thrive because security and defense were not concerned. Well, history is returned. And that requires reprioritization of what is truly important. And so understanding that the true threats to this country is an education that needs to continue. And it can't just be led by those in uniform. It's really a case of our elected officials needing to bring the Canadian population along. These are the threats we face. This is why it is so important. And if you truly believe in Canada, and I, for one, do, we need to be strong. And that means hard power. It means equipment and it also means people. And there's been a lot of talk about recruitment shortcoming in the Canadian forces.

But you scratch those numbers a bit and it becomes less clear whether it's a recruitment problem or an applicant processing problem. There's just a gigantic backlog in turning applicants into real effective recruitment. What this do you think is the bigger problem and how would you like to see it addressed? So the other side of that coin is retention as well. I think it's important we look at some short-term history. Let's go back about eight years or so. The 2017 defense policy, strong, secure engaged, allowed for an additional 3,500 into the regular force. And so as we approach the pandemic, the approved ceiling of the

the Canadian Armed Forces, regular force was 68,000. And we were just within a couple hundred of breaching that. Pandemic hits at the same time, our growth is approved to go to 71,500. So all of a sudden, our authorized strength is increasing, and our real strength, our actual strength, is decreasing because of reduced ability to recruit with the pandemic restrictions that were brought in, of our recruiting stations, our centers were closed. We didn't have the same face-to-face engagement. And coupled with that, the phenomena of the great resignation at the time where our attrition went up. Now, our attrition has normally been about seven, just over seven

percent, which is amongst the best of our allies. And it went up a couple of percentage points into the nine percent range. We were still doing much better than our allies. I was talking to, you know, my Australian counterpart, for example, at the time was telling me they were up 12 percent, New Zealand up over 15 percent. The Brits were not much better. But it was hitting us at the mid-rank level and some really stressed technical trades. 2022, we had what was called the applicant crisis. We weren't getting the applicants coming in. And we made a concerted effort with as the restrictions were lifted to get out through the face-to-face engagements and get the the marketing campaign going to the point that by 23, 24, 24, 25, we had

levels of applicants we hadn't seen in probably a decade. It was fantastic news. Processing was a challenge. The recruiting process was too onerous. And you had to balance the screening. with the need for speed. The medical screening, the security screening, if you don't do the proper screening, you get those that perhaps do not have the aptitude for military service in

or are joining for the wrong reasons, as we've seen with some recent news. There was an interesting U.S. study done a number of years ago, and this was looking at the U.S. population, but which can be a proxy for ours. and they looked at the cohort of those turning 18 years of age, and I think this was, oh, in the 2017-2018 time frame. 71% were not suitable for military service because medical reasons, because criminal background, et cetera. Of the remaining 29%, only 4% were interested in military service, and that 4% everybody was competing for. because they were the ones who were willing to serve. Now, anecdotally, our numbers are about the same.

And that plays into what we call a conversion rate. How many people apply versus how many are actually enrolled? And traditionally, we've sat about eight applicants to one, and that decreased over the course of the last number of years. Industry standard is about 25 to 1. You'll think of whatever you've been involved. with how many job openings have come up versus how many applicants are there. And the nature of many military trades are such that you need those technical aptitudes.

This isn't the mass industrial age military of the Second World War. You know, some have asked, and I myself have asked, you know, why can't we do what we did in the First and Second World Wars and do mass mobilization? Well, we could do the recruiting from that perspective, but the training, because of the technical occupations require much longer training pipeline. All that being said in this last year, and I saw it as I was retiring, they've had the best recruiting year in over a decade. They beat the strategic intake plan, which is the plan of how many you want to bring in based on that training pipeline. They exceeded that. So that's unconsciously optimistic.

There's still work to do. Still got to keep the foot on the gas in terms of recruiting. Retention piece, like I said, is the other part of it. And we've got to continue to make military service attractive. It comes down to what I call quality of service. You know, having that, there's a couple of elements to it. Having that transcendent purpose. And there's, it's really hard to find a higher purpose in serving your country and serving the people of your country. But having the meaningful employment that goes along with it, the day-to-day meaningful deployments where you can see results from what you do, having that respectful workplace, having that financial and family security, and so that when you're deployed overseas, you're not looking over your shoulders, make sure that your family is well taken care of, and then having modern equipment and infrastructure. You know, one of the biggest complaints that I heard from our troops who really wanted to do the job, really wanted to get it done, was so much of their equipment didn't work. And that's because of the constant slashing of our operations and maintenance budgets, which resulted in serviceability rates hovering around 50% for ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, couldn't get the spare parts, couldn't get the contracted maintenance that was so important for manufacturing.

matchers because of that lack of investment into operations and maintenance. So it's all tied together. It's a, it's a system of systems and the people's system is so tied to the equipment system that a change in one, positive change in one has a positive change in the other. Is part of the attrition thing that being in the Canadian Armed Forces now gives you marketable skills that there's private sector competition for? Absolutely. Hey, the economy matters.

And we've seen throughout Canadian history over the last hundred years when the economy is bad, recruiting is up. And when the economy is good, attrition is a real challenge. I commended the Army of the West in the period from 2014 to 2016 when the oil was booming. And we had a heck of a time up in Edmonton, keeping in our heavy-duty mechanics. You know, many of these specialties, they could walk out the door and almost double their take-home pay. And so that is a real challenge. We look at many of our technical trades, aviation technicians, cyber operators, those are all in high demand across the economy.

So keeping them in is a challenge. And it can't just be money. We will have a heck of a time competing with industry, dollar for dollar. It's got to be paid well enough, yeah. But what else can we offer them? Well, cyber, for example, we can give them some authorities, stuff that they can legally do in cyberspace that would get them trouble as civilians. But what else?

It comes down to that purpose and that meaningful employment that is so important. You mentioned people who joined for the wrong reasons. Let's put a name on that. There are extraordinary stories about an extremist militia around Quebec City that includes members of the Canadian forces. And I've heard officers in the armed forces say for some time that this extremism is a real and potentially an existential problem for the forces. That if, you know, if too many people join up,

because they have fundamentally anti-government motivation, then that's a huge problem. How did you see that playing out while you were Chief of the Defense Staff? Yeah, and so I had to address this when I was the Army Commander back in 2019 as we had a few high-profile cases as well. And the way to address it is through constant vigilance. It needs to be part of that recruiting process, and that's why the screening is so important.

And finding that balance between screening and urgency and getting people in is critical. But it's also constant vigilance for once somebody gets through the doors and to make sure that they're not being radicalized through either online or through other contacts. And it's a challenge because the signs, the symbols, those rapidly change and evolve and morph as well.

Tattoos are an example, that the symbology is very difficult to keep abreast up. And that's why, you know, curiosity, knowing your people, knowing what they're involved with is a leadership responsibility. Staying abreast as to who is on your team and what makes them tick is incredibly important. And so giving our commanders at all levels

the tools to identify what some of these non-aligned beliefs and behaviors might be is important. Another aspect of the fact that Canadian Armed Forces has tens of thousands of members of the broader Canadian society is concern about what Pierre Pauly of the conservative leader has called a woke culture in the military. I've seen a lot of criticism of dress and deportment rules that were relaxed under your command, the sense that being in the Canadian forces now could sort of mean just about

anything and that this was a problem for morale. What do you have to say about that? So you could argue that Canadian society has gone through more social change in the last 10 years than it has in the last 50 combined. And as we wrestle with changing demographics, changing norms and expectations, there is no template for this and so what what is important well it's important to create a military that is disciplined that follows orders that has a sense of camaraderie and that can fight and win you know many have called well some have called for a return to a or for the

adaptation of a warrior culture and you've probably heard that as uh as well sure have And, you know, that sounds good. And I want to think that what they believe they want to do is good. But a lot of that comes from Hollywood. And the historical truth of a warrior culture is it's based in personal glory, a glorification of violence. You know, individual honor is more important than team discipline. And what triumphed over these warrior cultures in history?

Well, it was, indeed, someone called it the Western Way of War. It was that disciplined, well-trained troops, and doed with that teamwork and that will to win, who use violence only reluctantly. You know, that's what's important. You know, I'll call out an article in the Atlantic several months ago by Elliot Cohen, talking about this so-called warrior culture.

and he cites the Iliot in the case of Achilles and the war crimes and, you know, dragging Hector before the gates of Troy and stopping and touting when he didn't get his way. That's not what we need. You take a look at our own history. You know, our World War I, World War II vets, I didn't see them calling themselves warriors. You know, that's a very land-centric term. And as we talked about it, you know, with Armed Forces Council, the Air Force and certainly the Navy didn't see themselves in that light. The analogy I like to use, have you seen the movie Gladiator, the original Gladiator?

Yeah. And you remember the first scene where the armies of the army of the legions of Marcus Aurelius were facing off against the Germanic tribes, the disciplines, legionnaires against the warriors from these tribes. And it was that discipline fighting spirit that overcame those individual warriors. And so what we need is that sense of quiet professionalism, that fighting spirit, which we called our professional of arms document, that willingness to get the job done regardless of circumstances. You're cold, wet, hungry, afraid. Now, you're still willing to drive on, follow orders.

You're in the middle of combat, and things are quite brutal, but still you follow the law of war. You know, some have argued that war crimes, in some cases, individual war crimes have been an extension of those who pursue that personal glory ahead of brute discipline. going going back to some of your earlier comments what we need to do and continue to do is create an environment of respect we're all feel that they all who have the right qualifications and aptitude feel they're part of the team and can contribute and some have said that this affects our operational effectiveness well that's a false dichotomy operational effectiveness or respect within the team. Well, really, the ladder is based on the former.

You're not going to create that combat capability unless you have those respectful teams. And so as we go into these uncharted waters with society rapidly changing, hey, we try a few things out. Some of it works, some of it doesn't. But we have to have the courage to try, do some people. pilot projects to experiment. And what works, we scale up, what doesn't work, we go back. But what I do know is we need a military that's ready and willing to fight and win. But at the same time, looking after itself, looking after its own members. Does that make sense?

I think broadly. One question that I have is, what is the perception of the Canadian Armed Forces among militaries of allied countries. You've served with Americans, you've served with in South Korea, and you've done a hell of a lot of work with NATO allies. What do they say about the Canadian Armed Forces? So the impression I've got everywhere that I have served, or the Canadian soldier, the Canadian military, the Canadian sailor, the Canadian aviation,

Aviator, Canadian operator, highly respected. They want us. They want us in various roles. I remember my own time as a deputy commander of Deputy Commander for Operations, 18th Airborne Corps. A very seasoned colonel came up to me and said, sir, you may wear a different uniform, but you're our general. That respect is profound. What they want, though, is more of us. Yeah, we bring operational excellence to the fight, but just not enough, and certainly not what the size of our country would suggest that we could provide.

You go to Latvia and see how we are leading that multinational brigade right now, and our European partners who are part of that are just so happy. I was told by my Polish counterpart that the reason they continue to provide an element to that battle group and not focus or that brigade and not focus solely on their own defense because they are a frontline state is because they just enjoy working under Canadian leadership so much and their troops come back at a much higher level of readiness because they've had the opportunity to train with us. There's something special about what we provide. And I can't quite put my finger on it, but you mentioned the Balkans in our time in the former Yugoslavia. You know, I saw it there with the Canadian military member's ability to deal with the local population, to be compassionate when necessary, to fight when required. I sought in Afghanistan, the same thing. And I certainly see it now as we do missions around the world.

Our young soldiers training Ukrainians are inspirational. Number of our training, elements of our training mission over in Europe, these young troops would come to me and tell me, sir, this is the most meaningful thing we have ever done. It's really inspiring. And so I've got faith that this next generation of our Canadian Armed Forces members they've got it and they'll they'll serve this country just just well one last thing i want to touch on in this rapidly changing international environment is a lot of questions about

canada's relationship to the united states and prime minister carney early in the campaign said that uh basically a lifetime's ever deepening economic and security integration with the united states is over he has since poured a hell of a lot of water in that wine But that's got to be really hard for a Canadian military that has, you know, throughout all of your career, worked very closely with the United States. And it's clear that American equipment, starting with the F-35 jet, is highly prized by Canadian commanders. Is it going to be practically possible to turn the page from that integration towards something that looks a little more European? Yeah, so a few thoughts on this. So geography, history, language, you know, they all matter. And we are we are prisoners of it in this, in this continent. And so we've got to be realistic

about a relationship with the United States. And we still have many, many friends in the U.S. And we have to keep the faith with them and not burn bridge. But at the same time, I believe that we need a hedging strategy, one that's based on forming a robust mesh of friends, partners, allies, around the world so that all of our eggs are not in one basket. Hey, there's real resentment out there about our perceived and very real free writing in defense and security matters over the course of the last number of decades. And, you know, as I mentioned earlier, hard power is now the currency of international affairs. And if we want an ability to influence and help shape what the next world order is going to be, well, we need to ante up to be seen to be real players. Like I mentioned, our skills are coveted, our people are coveted, our allies just want more of them.

Are we still going to have some relationship with some defensive? and security relationship with the US? Yeah, absolutely. Most importantly in the Arctic. Every meeting that I would have with the US counterpart, as you would look at a speaking notes, the first at the top of the list would be the Arctic. Okay, what are you doing?

Because they view that as a critical vulnerability to their own security. Well, how can we become the indispensable partner for the Arctic in terms of that exposed northern flying? And that's why investment there is just so important. Yeah, we can diverse some of our capabilities and go to other suppliers, not just in New York. I think we need to look to Indo-Pacific as well. Both Japan and South Korea are evolving allies that are important in that region.

And our focus can't be continually as traditionally we've done eastward. We've got to look westward as well, especially as our – as our trade becomes increasingly important with that part of the world. You mentioned specifically the F-35. I for one think we need to continue and not just to be interoperable with the US, but we take a look at all of our other allies

that are getting this platform. The UK, Finland, Norway, Japan, South Korea, maintaining interoperability with them is important. But I believe there's much we can do domestically as well. And, you know, it's easy to come from an army officer saying that this should be our last manned fighter. And after that, we should go to autonomous systems. But as a stepping stone, we can look at the collaborative combat aircraft concept, where you've got drones that are tethered to an F-35 that greatly extend its reach and capabilities.

And we can develop that here in Canada and use that as a stepping stone to, to non-piloted fighter aircraft. And so there's lots of opportunity here. Well, we sure have covered a lot of topics, and I'm really grateful that you took all the time that you did to share your thoughts with us. Wayne Air, former Chief of the Defense staff, thank you so much for talking to me today.

Well, it was a pleasure, Paul. Great talking to you. That's the Paul Wells Show for this week. week. Thanks to Wayne Eyre for joining me. Remember to hit like or subscribe if you liked what you heard. You can read more of my writing at paulwells.substack.com.