The Pete Quiñones Show - Episode 1117: Post-Nuremberg Russian-Syrian Relations w/ Thomas777 - Part 3 - The Finale

Episode Date: October 8, 2024

58 MinutesPG -13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.Thomas concludes his talk on the close relations between Soviet-Union/Russia and Syria post-WW2. Thomas' SubstackRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

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because I know that a lot of our guys are on Gumroad, and they are against censorship. So if you head over to Gumroad and you subscribe through there, you'll get the episodes early and ad-free, and you'll get an invite into the telegram group. So I really appreciate all the support everyone's giving me, and I hope to expand the show even more than it already has. Thank you so much. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekanianas show. Thomas, how have you been? I'm right.

Let's finish us up talking about Russia and Syria, and I think I know where you're going to go with this one. So just let loose. Yeah, that's your thing. Obviously, we're coming up to in the anniversary of the Ramadan War, or the Yom Kippur War, which interestingly doesn't get, it doesn't appear a lot in media these days. some of the fellows have made the point in our discussions that

historical events don't really occur anymore I mean that like Zizek makes that point a lot and so does some of these other guys who are kind of trying to salvage what remains a continental philosophy I mean there's something that's a deeply psychological mechanism you know and there's like sociological

locations to it too but in more kind of prosaic terms that's an important point because I'm always emphasizing to the fellas who don't remember because they weren't born yet that media narratives like however corrupt they were corrupted they were by ideology and by conceptual biases they did in fact build on a continuing foundation of historical time you know I make the point even really up until 2000

kind of like the last instance of this in this in the spring or no it was like summer or fall of 2000. I remember this vividly because I made my dad really upset and he went on this local radio show to talk about it, this show beyond the beltway that used to be like based here in Chicago. And me and like my cut my then girlfriend, um, we went down to the studio to meet him like in the loop and, um, the subject of the day, and my dad was on this pan with this like former Navy seal guy and this kind of crusty older dude who was a civilian, but he'd been on William Odom's staff in some capacity.

But Peter Arnett, and this is one of the things that kind of crushed his career. I mean, he was getting old up there in years anyway, but he broke this story where this guy claimed that, first of all the guy claimed that he was a deserterer in the Vietnam War, and he claimed he ended up in Laos, okay? And he said there was this village, like, full of, like, you know, like young white men who were, like, married to indigenous women. and he's like, what's happening here? And they're like, oh, we're all deserters.

This is like our commune. We're like escaping the war. And anybody who knows the history of the conflict, that's preposterous on its own terms, okay? There's no way that happened. But he was, Arnaud was saying what this guy said is fact. So our net's like, well, like, what happened? I don't come there's no record of this place. So this guy's like, well, you know, he's like, Army Special Forces arrived one day

after they bombarded us with nerve gas and everybody died. But I was out in the field. that day are the rice paddies. So I escaped. And he's like, it was called Operation Tailwind. You know, and my dad's like, this is outrageous. This is outrageous as being reported as news. And how dare this guy, like, defame these special forces operators. My dad takes that real seriously. You know, he was a civilian, but he got to know a lot of these guys very well.

You know, and he takes the honor of such people seriously, you know. And I mean, for me, I mean, it was just, I mean, aside from that, it was like, I mean, Arnett was just like lying. Like, if you're a serious journalist, this guy's story was preposterous. You know, like I said, I was, I was like 24, 25 years old. And I was just kind of like a student of the Vietnam War. And I'm like, there's no way that happened. And of course, it broke that this guy was some crazy liars. And Arnette kind of disappeared.

But it was a big deal, man, because, you know, even 24. years after Saigon went kaput, you know, Vietnam was still on people's minds, man. You know, in conceptual terms, it was one of their main kind of like whole stars of historical events. So that

it doesn't really, that's just like not the case anymore. And part of it's deliberate. It's like a deliberate sort of like whitewashing of the collective memory. They're not so much, it's just kind of like erasing the collective memory of historical time. But it's also these narratives increasingly,

are just kind of generated out of nothing you know they're they'll they draw upon these kinds like endure it this kind of like enduring praiseology that regime um information or propaganda oh let's disseminate you know so they there's a certain structure to it there's a certain conceptual structure but it's very much like it kind of like every every aspect of it's kind of like autonomously situated in a psychological term that's really weird but um in any event Even through the late 90s, when there was, when any kind of crisis was emergent between Israel and its enemies, there'd be contextual references to the Ramadan War, which they called the Yom Kippur War and the 1967 Six-Day War, which was Israel's greatest victory. That's not just cap, that Israel had, they were unusually.

largely larded with military talent at operational level for various reasons. And I mean, so that was a big deal. And that's kind of what the myth of Israeli military supremacy like was emergent. Because in 67, it wasn't a myth. I mean, on the one hand, like modern combat resolves rapidly. That's how I was trying to upside the people. You know, they, people get a corrupted view of this because pretty much like the only, like, the only wars in living memory involve these kinds of nonsensical paradigms

where like, you know, some Pentagon guy or some State Department spokesman or woman is suggesting, well, we're making incremental progress. You know, like these kind of like endless deployments that don't resolve anything, like people think that that's normal. Like, they don't understand that even under conditions or relative parity, you know, like modern combined arms war, battles are usually massively

one-sided. It's usually a route. It usually resolves like within days. You know, but just the same, the IDS performance in 67 was unusually strong. But all of that, all that basic came to an end in the 73 war.

And it's significant to us. I mean, even people who weren't particularly invested in Israel, Palestine, I don't think that's a correct. disposition because if you know, within the current paradigm, you can't just kind of like select

that we choose what you quote care about. It's not a question of caring about it either. Like, everything is impactful. You know, anywhere that anywhere that U.S. forces are deployed under as a NATO where like IDF has deployed you know, with the full

faith and blessing and operational integration within of the United States, you know, this has this has implications for everything that occurs in a political nature. But in 73, I believe that that was a more dangerous crisis modality than the Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban missile crisis, the way it was unfolding in real time, and the way these Soviet naval vessels were approaching Cuba. up and there was a question like will they run the blockade or not or like how will this resolve like

and as like the days and hours were ticking away in kennedy's um war room you know people got the perception that this was especially critical and it was don't get me wrong however um there was nothing approaching strategic parity then in 1973 there absolutely was like the soius didn't officially accomplish so strategic parity in terms of forces in being, you know, that were, in fact, deployed until 76 and 77. By 73, they, they have the capability to absolutely devastate Western Europe and the continent of the United States, you know. And, uh, under command and control nuances and the shrinking of the window were human to see. decision makers are capable of reacting, you know, that window of opportunity to render decision had shrunk dramatically from a decade previous, you know, and so I maintain that in 1973 when America went to DefCon 3, that's the only time that's ever happened, you know, and for context, it's not like during the early years that war on terror with those

like goofy, like color-coded alerts. Like today, like, the terror threat is purple. So, like, shove a dribble up your ass or whatever like you're supposed to do. It wasn't like that. Like, um, it was quite serious. And at DefCon 3, um, you know, basically

that means America shifted to a war footing. And missileers in their silos, they strapped into their seats to prepare for deep impact and awaited launch orders. And like the little doors, like atop the silo, went like, you know, which is kind of horrifying. But, and Brezhnev, he mobilized the Soviet Union. Operationally, in some ways, they mirrored the NATO order of battle,

but in other ways they were totally different. But they had, you know, America's kind of rapid reaction forced during the Cold War was the 80-second Airborne Division. the Soviets mirrored that. Like the Soviet airborne troops at that point were like an air assault element they went on high alert

and they were preparing to deploy to the Middle East to relieve the Egyptian army. So this was really, really bad. But that it's interesting that that's been conspicuously absent. I mean, unless to somebody my age, the absence is conspicuous. I haven't read one reference to it.

And since the IDF assaulted that Russian target, which don't get me wrong, it's happened many times before, okay, but it does constitute, if only in the court of public opinion and public opinion

in wartime takes on an outside significance, it does represent a kind of escalation, that you know, the IDF is flagrantly assaults, Russian targets. And it was one thing to do that during the Syrian Civil War. It's nothing to do that now. But I would think that any newsman or lady

would kind of like invoke the 73 war as the direct precedent to contextualize what's happening. You know, and they're not doing that at all. So that's just something that sort of jumped out of me. But like moving on to, you know, the topic of the day. You know, once again, as I indicated, I don't want to sound like some crazy old person, but if I'm repeating myself, let me know because I do forget sometimes where we left

off and I try to refresh my recollection from the last episode, but I don't always have time to like totally go through it. So I'm not going to be offended if you stop me and say like, we already covered that. Employers, did you know, you can now reward you and your staff with up to 1500 euro in gift cards annually completely tax-free. And even better, you can spread it over five different occasions. Now's the perfect time to try OptionsCard. OptionsCard is Ireland's brand new multi-choice employee gift card packed with unique features that your staff will love. It's simple to buy, easy to manage, and best of all, there are no extra fees or hidden catches. Visit OptionsCard.I.E. today. Airgrid, operator of Ireland's electricity grid, is powering up the Northwest. We're planning to

upgrade the electricity grid in your area and your input and local knowledge are vital in shaping these plans. Our consultation closes on the 25th of November. Have your say, online or in person. So together, we can create a more reliable, sustainable electricity supply for your community. Find out more at Airgrid.I.4 slash Northwest. Employers, rewarding your staff? Why choose between a shop voucher or a spend anywhere card when with options card you can have both. With options card, your team gets the best of both worlds.

They can spend with Ireland's favourite retailers or choose a spend anywhere card. It's simple to buy and easy to manage. There are no hidden fees, it's easy to use and totally flexible. They can even re-gift or donate to a good cause. Make your awards, more rewarding visit options card.i today but i think where we ended we were talking about you know the russian federation in syria and how one of the major one of the major foreign policy

moves even even in the yeltsin era was to absolutely you know guarantee that you know the the the soviet mediterranean fleet could still base in syria and the syrians were still obviously very much amenable to that. But, you know, despite even, even Yeltsin's either, you know, apathy or gross incompetence or combination of both on power of political matters, you know, it wasn't just him, obviously, either. It was, you know, the equivalent of the general staff

of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and, and the foreign ministry and other things. But they, even when they were not at all in a position to, you know, be pursuing a, a true kind of world politic, um, strategy. You know, they made sure they locked in a continuation of, um, of good offices with Syria, you know, and, um, this is the 1971, uh, naval treaty that was signed with Hafez al-Assad.

They granted the Soviet Union, um, you basically are going to restrict the access to the, the naval base. it's hardest that it had built. And it can say that continues this date. You know, and the treaty runs for 20 years and there's automatic fire or extensions, and it's one of the parties opt to terminate the agreement. But it, but it's a rubber stamp sort of thing. You know, in the Syrian state, Hafez Assad, who passed away in 2000,

he was one of the first heads of state to recognize the Russian Federation. you know basically immediately as a soviet union became the russian federation he recognized it and made clear that the syrian government was going to abide any um in any military agreements and specifically the the naval treaty regarding tartis but um you know when the uh i can't remember we got into this or not we were talking about the the continuity war between 67 and 73 and how the the the Israeli air force you know they fought this pitched air battle between the Israeli Air Force and

Soviet Migs. But during the Ramadan War, the Yon Gapur War itself, there was thousands of Soviet advisors on the ground as well as direct action military elements, technicians, a veritable battalion

and technicians to assist the Syrian Arab army and to maintain their equipment and their armored platforms, their aircraft, all of that. And at least 20 of them died. The Russian so at least 20

KIA, and probably more. I mean, that's just what the Kremlin acknowledged, but there was, during the war, there was over 3,700 tons of aid airlifted to the battle space. By the end

of October, 1973, by sea, the Soviet Union transported 63,000 tons to steer you to replace its military and infrastructural losses. That's a massive commitment in relative and absolute terms. I'm not sure people recognize that

because America throws money around, like, water and is constantly just like dumping these like aid packages and secondary fees. that this was a big deal okay um I think I got into the fact that there was some tension in 76 77 between Damascus and Moscow the Syrian Arab army deployed to the Lebanese battle space which put them directly opposite the PLO and you know the

PLO the popular front and the popular front of the liberation of Palestine they they were very Warsaw packed adjacent there's big concern in the Soviet camp that this would upset the kind of delicate balance that was in place in the Arab Cold War, as it's called. This was remedied basically 110% when the Soviets went to war in Afghanistan. Because I can't remember if I mentioned this or not either. Like Assad immediately declared like solidarity with the Soviet Union in the war in Afghanistan. in. And obviously, I put him at odds with basically every other Arab government, you know,

and that's huge. And it's significant to, I mean, because the, there's obvious inherent tensions between the Soviet, between there were between the Soviet Union and Iran, and there are a day between the Russian Federation and Iran. Some of these are sectarian and religious, theological, some of these are ethnic. You know, that the Persons and the Russians aren't particularly cozy, but there's a very large Azeri minority in Iran. You know, Ahmadinejad's in ethnic Azeri. There's, there's some bad blood there.

You know, aside from the intrinsic value with Syria in absolute geo-strategic terms to the Russian Federation, it's also very much like a con, it represents kind of like, it facilitates concord between the Russians and Tehran in a real way. You know? The,

I'm sorry, one second. Oh, and it's, um, in, uh, in April of 77, like as this kind of Lebanon situation was developing, um, Hefez al-Assad, he traveled to Moscow. And there's some interesting sort of like, cool footage. that the Russians shot and there was also some

there's also some British media guy in the ground the British were very well indexed with the Soviet Union in terms of media for whatever reason so a lot of this but there's this footage of Hafez Assad arriving in

Moscow and receiving you know like great honors you know it's really it's really interesting and especially for a small country you know it's Syria has a very outsized relevance for this reason.

But he got an Assad got not just an audience with Bresnan, but with Alexei Kisigan, who was, uh, he, the way

to think of him is he was kind of in the role that Lavrov is today. You know, it's an imperfect analogy, but for foreign policy purposes and war and peace terms, especially like if he used to be the Arab world, it tracks. And, you know, that's not, that's no small thing.

And it's not, you know, that's why when people, when people talk about the Assad family, like they're, like, you know, like, they're like Saddam and his clan. They're not at all. You know, they're,

the, the, half of the Sao was anything but just some, like, tin pot dictator. You know, I mean, I, I, I think there are, I think the Syrians are a noble people generally. And I find the Assad is particularly impressive, but that's not, that's not just, um, that's not just cap. I'm going to conceptual bias or something, you know. Afez Assad visited Moscow again in early spring 87, April, 1987.

And, um, he traveled there with. with then serving defense minister Mustafa Klaus. And he has to require this advance service air missile system. And Gorbachev denied him, which is really interesting. And this was during a time when, it's a critical period when avionics were becoming hyper-advanced. you know, obviously the stealth like the B2 stealth bomber

it was a really kind of played for them than those that these missile systems that the the Syrians wanted to acquire were tailored to as a countermeasure for but that that entire sort of like skunk works series of projects that was emerging from this kind of culture of high-tech adionics

okay so um you know the syrians were asking were requesting this for a reason you know they they need they desperately needed countermeasures because Israel uh Israel and and West Germany were in the Cold War they were getting America's best equipment I mean the Germans in their own right I think the I think the leopard tank is the best like modern battle tank like hands down but the but um the West Germans in Israel I mean in the in the former case that you know what obviously Cold War Icedency is the latter was ideological

and the latter obviously still this is the case in terms of what they received but they weren't getting like they weren't getting um like knockoff versions of of American aircraft they were getting the real thing you know and this obviously decides to give the Syrians pause because even before even before uh

stealth technology became the norm, you know, long before. It advanced avionics were making it increasingly difficult, really to develop any counter, any countermeasures at all. And the Soviets, one of the things the Warsaw Pact did very, very well was aircraft countermeasures, particularly serviced air missiles. But you know the old, the old book and film, Flight of the Intruder, it's a dumb movie, but it's a pretty good book.

If you're in a Sydney air. I read the book and saw the movie. Yeah, the book is a lot better. Yeah, but it's, and Stephen Coons is kind of a, he's kind of a strange guy, but he, he flew A-6s over Vietnam. And the part where the, the, the kind of John Wayne type aviator, Jake, Rafton, you know, his new, his new radar intercept officer, his new RIO, he always, is this kind of like wild guy.

But even he, like, falling so he's over downtown Hanoi is like a terrifying prospect for American aviators. Because other than Moscow, like, it was like the most hardened, like, target on this planet. Like that, that's not, that wasn't creative license that was included in the book or something.

And that owed the fact that, I mean, the Soviets built it up to make it that way. You know, it wasn't, um, it, it, obviously it was, you know, the Vietnamese are an industrial, people, but they had nothing approaching that kind of technology

and, you know, they the Soviets knew that I mean, that was before the Senate Soviet split but, you know, the like the Chinese had nothing remotely powerful, you know, like the the Chicago equivalent was junk.

But in any event, so this was a, that was kind of a turning point, obviously, in 87 when Gorbachev refused basically to kind of honor the good offices that had been sustained with Syria really since day one,

at least, you know, as regards military necessities and exigencies. But, you know, that was, the, what Garber Chauoff was attempting to accomplish. I was writing some about this the other day, but that's kind of a subject for another episode. If we go off on that tangent, like we'll be here all night.

But, um, it is, that was definitely like a anomalous though you know like I said it even even even under Yolson's tenure the you know the Moscow never made any indication that they had any intention of abandoning Syria but moving forward

with some I mean obviously what's most relevant to the present is the Syrian civil war you know and I it's it's hard to divinate really what's what people are thinking in in Washington because you don't have a serious foreign policy establishment and you haven't since you know 1992 but when Obama's people when they were saying that

Damascus is imminently going to fall that that was that was in fact accurate um at the outset of the intervention the Russian intervention and I there's another case of Putin waited far too want to intervene. I mean, it's a credit to the Syrian people, you know, those loyal to Assad and to Hezboa and those Russian forces were deployed that they won. But it was becoming critical. You know, the Syrian government, they officially only controlled about a quarter of the country. You know, this statistics I've read is like 26% of overall like territory. And how how much that territory you can deploy in depth or defend it. I mean, they had the,

they, they had the, the built up areas by and large, but, um, you know, they were, they were essentially, there was this,

there was this, there was this, there was this, like, becoming a frontline city, you know, and, um,

Assad, uh, Assad sends his wife away, and he sent his sister, Hushra, Assad, away. And,

you know, he, I developed huge respect for, Bashar, the son, because he said, I'm not leaving Damascus, if I have to die here.

And that's, you know, I'm like, okay, this guy's a real man and he's a real president. You know, he's a real leader of, uh,

he's a real warlord now, you know, um, because that's the way it has to be. But, um, you know, when the Russians did arrive, you know,

they rapidly integrated with, um, you know, a lot of the Syrian Arab army, um, defected. You know, I think a lot of that, the degree to which that Sunni bath elements, and the Iraqi bath and the Syrian bath party are very different animals, but there is a common ideological core, and there's a common sociological rationale to like the men who

were in our heavily indexed with the party. And, you know, a bunch of Saddam's officers who were, you know, part of the Sunni minority in Iraq, like they clicked up with ISIS basically immediately. Not all of them, but a lot of them did. And they were accepted by these guys, which is really interesting. And some of the same thing happened in Syria, you know. And the Syrian bath party, even, like, at the top

is more ecumenical than they're credited, but it still is, I mean, it's basically, you know, like an al-a-white, like, minority rural situation. But, um, and it's, it's interesting, and in May 2010,

like, before the formal onset of hostilities, Medvedev had visited Syria. And that, Medvedev's like brief tenure as the president is interesting,

man. And it's interesting how we, became, it was like out bad with Putin subsequently. But it's pretty obvious that um, NATO, Israel and um, I'm sure they're

proxies in these ISIS types as well, because those guys weren't stupid. They realize, you know, look, the time to move, you know, the time to truly escalate is when the Russians are having some kind of crisis of leadership. You know,

or if not, if not so much crisis and a literal like, you know, war in the Kremlin like happened after a drop off died, you know, you, when the civilian executives kind of headless, that causes problems. You know, it causes problems in terms of like grand schemes, strategic decision making all the way down to the operational level. That's one of the reasons why Netanyahu was secure, unfortunately, because even people who despise them, you know, they're playing musical chairs with the civilian executive is not what you want to do at war.

But, um, as it may, um, when the Russians did deploy, they immediately integrated, you know, with Hezbo and the Syrian Arab army and command of control capacities, you know,

like, like deeply. And this, how this, you know, there were, the Russians, no, like, wartime diplomacy, man. I mean, that, during the Cold War, I'd say the key ways,

I mean, NATO had them beat in all kinds of capacities like material, political, and otherwise, but you know, what the Russians had was, I mean, they had firepower, obviously. They had a very tough in game population

in the Russian people. But they were very, they were and are very adept at like war and peace politics. And that that's how they were able to accomplish that. You know, because like I, I mean,

I mean, obviously, especially considering the tactical situation on the ground in Syria, I mean, Hezbollah wasn't about to say, like, we won't index with the Russian, our force, the Russian Federation, but there's always tensions in trying to integrate a command and control structure. You know, and this was accomplished seamlessly, essentially. But the, well, you know, the Russians, the Russians brought in, like, real firepower to bear. You know, the Russians can't do high-tech like America can, but their war tech, as during the Cold War is now, was good enough. And the Syrian intervention and the way they, you know, they pursued a truly scorched earth policy in the, in the battle space, like, against their, against the op-for. And it paid off, you know.

and Putin declared in no uncertain terms that, you know, the like the Assad government is not going to be allowed to fall. There is some momentum behind Syria too in the court of world opinion. Like we talked about, I'm not susceptible to propaganda. I mean, I'm not some young, naive person.

I was legitimately horrified by those scenes from, you know, like the suburbs of Aleppo were these ISIS barbarians, we're beheading people and putting heads on stakes. You know, like I said, I saw this video with them. You know, they were doing their afternoon prayers on their prayer mats. And there's like a forest of hits. You know, it's like a horror movie. But, you know, people were seeing that kind of thing.

And I remember a bath party spokeswoman in on certain terms telling some European media. type like look we're not we do not negotiate with people who we do not negotiate with we're not going to change our government because terrorists are are bombing us and killing people and beheading people like what that's you you can't ever allow that you know this is and you know this is also too when the war on terror was still on it's like so you America's telling us and telling the world like you know we're waging the war on terror yet you're you're trying to bring down a secularist eye doctor who has got like a pretty wife who looks kind of like any white woman in

the United States and you're saying that like ISIS are the good guys like that's that's really when America lost all credibility you know like even more so I think than the Iraq fiasco because that was just like laid bear you know it's like we will burn down civilization and handed two barbarians you know that basically accounts what we want and that's the opposite of civilization, you know, um,

to say nothing of the fact that, that's, I mean, 9-11 should never happen, but it did happen. And it's like, okay, it's like a decade,

you know, a mere decade subsequent, like now, now, now you're willing to, like, accept that as, you know,

just kind of like the, the verbal cost of doing business. It's like, that's, that's unconscionable. It's grotesque. But, um,

you know, and then, Putin clarified in 2015, it's really interesting, too. Speaking of the Medvedo situation, for three, four years when Putin, you know, his kind of like second permanent tenure as President of Russian Federation, there's this kind of window where he was speaking very candidly. I think Putin acquits himself pretty well generally, but he plays so close to the chess and kind of issues these like non-answerers, the policy questions.

It was like this brief period of a few years where he was kind of trying to humanize his image, I think. And remember in October 2015, yeah, it was like October, November 2015. He gives us an interview. And he's like, look, he's like this. He's like, you know, the Syrian intervention was prepared well in advance. Despite what he may have appeared, we weren't just responding an emergency situation on the ground. We knew that America and Israel wanted to bring down the bath regime. We consider this unacceptable.

We still do. it was really interesting. He just doesn't talk that way anymore. And one of the things people criticize him for is, is this kind of like ambiguous language about Ukraine? Oh, no, this is a special military operation. And, you know, not being clear about objectives and things, it's very different. But I think it's relevant. You know, I know it is.

but the in Putin's terms and Russian speakers I'm sure will suggest and suggest correctly this is an imprecise translation but it's the

most coherent when I found like in the same interview he said quote that the objective wasn't remains quote stabilizing the legitimate power in Syria and creating conditions for political compromise. And that's very much a Putinism.

Putin's always resorting to, you know, the rules-based international order that purportedly exists. And like I understand why he does that, but I think the time has passed for that, those sorts of appeals. But it's just interesting. And I can't remember we dropped the brass tax, like the literal numbers of what this operation constituted in Syria.

In some ways, especially considering a lot of the discussion about the deterioration of Russian capabilities, in some ways this was as much a coup in world opinion terms as the UK's effort in the Falklands. You know, because people were, I mean, Washington's always suggesting the Russians can't do anything right in military terms. but even relatively serious people were prone to talking that way. But the Russian Air Force, it carried out over 19,000 sorties, 71,000 direct strikes on what they called the quote infrastructure of terrorists. You know, I interpret that in like real human language, not military language, as a combination of, you know, ground support, attack missions, you know, as well as, you know, as well as bonding of enemy positions and things.

But I close air support and direct support of ground element forces is what really carried the day. and again the Russians they've always viewed warfare as kind of the advance of fire you know they're very Klaus of Witsian and they're like literally Klaus of Witsian in their perspectives you know that's who trained them to fight

modern war you know it was Klaus Wits himself and approaching officers and there are in the Russian Federation on parade they still you know performed the goose step that's no

not a coincidence are because they think it looks really sharp, which it does, but it's because that's how they learn real. You know, and this, this solidified Russia as a real military power on the world's stage once again. You know, and that's why it's, it's not as like a conceptual bias or like a categorical ignorance. I mean, it's both of those things too, but, you know,

like at the onset of Australia's in Ukraine, like, however, mismanaged that war has been, and it's been like grossly mismanaged on the Russian side, okay? But this idea that, like, Russia lacks the capability to deploy its scale. It's like, what are you talking about? I mean, that's at odds

with reality, you know? And if you're going to if you're going to fight the, you're going to fight the Armed Forces of Russian Federation, like literally on their own frontier, you know, the direct precedent that comes to bear

is, well, what happened in Syria. You know, I, not, I make no mistake. There is no, like, military objective on, you know, that Ukraine is pursuing, because there's no, there's no path in victory in military terms. And it's, but if you accept that, you know, US, NATO, Israel, their only interest is, you know, is, is, is an, um, creating attrition. You know, it, uh, it makes perfect sense. but this idea that

these, these, it's not as these fools like blinking either, like, there's, um, you know, there's these people, I don't think there's any serious people in the foreign policy establishment, but even people less kind of, you know, out of it than he is. You know, they were talking like, well, yeah, you know, the Russian mainland resistance is just going to collapse,

you know, the, the moment, basically, we, we start popping off combined arms and, you know, from a bar of munitions or whatever. And then like the, you know, the United Russia is just going to collapse. It's like, what, say, are you smoking cracked? Like, that's, you know, the one thing, the one thing the Russians have going for them, again, is the fact that, um, they can bring firepower to bear.

They've got a very game population. And I, as long as, as, as long as Putin is alive and relatively healthy, like, United Russia has, like, never been stronger. Like, their, their problem is that, apparently they can't achieve consensus on who, on a man to take his place. But this idea that, plus men of Russians literally took 25 million dead.

You know, if you lose one in seven of your population to the Vermacht in four years, and not only do you not fall apart, you can reconstitute into a superpower, albeit a crippled one, immediately subsequent, That's like nothing short of incredible. And I think it's basically unprecedented. You know, like some sort of comparable scenario where a state endorsed that level of devastation

and is able to, you know, if not profit from it to, you know, immediately reconstitute and project power in a way theretofore unthinkable. um even prior to the onset of us stories but um you know the uh that's one of the reasons why i mean you you've got to understand the ukraine war as as literally like another a secondary front a secondary theater of the same conflict as was underway in syria and um one of the things facilitated by russian victory there was not just clout on the international stage, but it basically guaranteed them access to the eastern Mediterranean. You know, and from there you can stage climate operations like theater-wide, basically, you know, including in places like Libya that for

reasons, some of which are within the bound of rationality of a, you know, native decision-making. And there's some reasons they call it Libya that make sense or some that don't. But, like, point being, Russia absolutely can deploy their in-depth if they're not tied down on their own frontier vis-a-vis the Ukraine. And that's really the key

to understanding what is underway there in in, in, like, hard material terms, I mean. But the Assad himself, apparently, on the

eve of Russian intervention. He, I assume this came from his general staff and I, the Syrian Arab army, I know people claim that their shit like the Egyptian army or something. I don't accept that. I don't accept that because of the 19703 war. And like I said, the issue with the Syrian Arab army, it wasn't that like they were getting mauled in the field.

It's that basically like the Sunnis said like we're not going to fight this war, you know. but Assad again I'm certain through like his general staff which equivalent they issued this series of reports

to Moscow saying like this is the this is the tactical situation this is what we absolutely need this is what needs to be brought to bear you know they basically like identified and characterized opt for and like how it was hurting them

and in a very concise and clear-headed way said, like, this is why we're going to lose this war unless you're able to deploy and guarantee A, B, and C. You know, and that events is like a remarkable level

of trust. Because, like, among other things, if you invite a great power and in very reduced terms, Russia still is a great power in relative terms, although, like, nothing you know, like a superpower. You know, you invite the Russians to deploy in depth and hand your commanding

control mechanism over to them, they may well just decide that like now Syria is part of Russia for all practical purposes. Like that, that's not just cap. Like when people like, you know, Putin's going to attack Poland. Like it's, it's no small measure inviting like five or eight thousand like armed Russians and their combat aircraft and guys in their general staff like into your country and saying like, okay, fellas, like, you know, do what you do best. Then apply, implement like death at scale among like those people, but then like kind of politely bow out. when it's done. I mean, it's a rare case of like real kind of like respect and reciprocity at like cultural level as well as practical levels. But yeah, and that's why, you know, like I said, if I could

if I could meet the, when I go ahead of the state, like I find it all interesting is Bashar al-Assad. Like, you know, he's a, he's a fascinating dude. And I find, highly relatable. But yeah, the, I think that's, yeah, I was going to get, at some point, and we covered some of this earlier, I mean, in like a different series, I mean, we were talking about, you know, the Jackson-Vannock Amendment and what prompted it, which was in large measure, you know, the public borough and the Supreme Soviet moving to literally outlaw Zionism.

It became a political crime against the state to, you know, like, advocate from Zionism. You know, and there was a party official in April 83. This full page ad titled

quote from the Soviet leadership laying out the case against Zionism as as viewed from Moscow, which is fascinating, you know, and this and then

subsequently, you know, that's when you started hearing in media, this narrative like, like a Soviet Jews are at risk of of annihilation. You know, the Soviet Union is this, you know, anti-Semitic country. I mean, they'd been at war for decades already, but it, um,

it, uh, it took on like an overt you know an above board like character you know

and um this uh the you know the purported plight of Soviet Jewry it it was something that was endlessly bandied about

by um not just NGOs and sympathetic media people but by the Reagan administration like it's really it's really wild and um

you know speaking of Cold War movies or Cold War theme movies. The movie Firefox is a really good movie. If you can, I mean, you've got a little bit like the propaganda, but when I was like a little kid, my mom and dad, I wanted to see it with them, and it blew my mind.

But, you know, one of the subtext of it is that you know, that Clint Eastwood is like the Russo-American, like, Nam era combat pilot, you know, he, uh, he, his mission is like steel, uh, what the then fictional Meg 31. Like there is an actual

Meg 31. It's call signs is Foxbat. But it didn't exist when Firebox came out. But the the Meg 31 Firefox is like this super plane. And it directly interfaces with the pilot's brain waves.

So like if you so you think commands to the central processing unit and then it responds. And um, because Eastwood in the film, his character is this Russian guy, Russian, he, he speaks Russian, you know, so it's, so he can think in Russian to manipulate the avionics. But in any event, like a subplot is, um, there's this Jewish avionics engineer.

And the Soviets are basically, they're like threatening to like waste his family if he doesn't build the Firefox. And like, uh, at one point, like, Pliny's whose character makes contact with him. And he's like, yeah, you know, like the, the, the, the Soviets are, you know, they're as bad as like the German Reich and it's kind of like obvious propaganda insinuated, you know, but that, like, even, that wasn't just like Hollywood stuff. Like, that's, that was the narrative being presented. But that, um, that's kind of a tangential when it, it's a long, um, topic. But yeah, I think, uh, I think we're coming up in the hour. Yeah. No, that's, uh, that's about all I got for this series. I don't want to break off another, like, sub-topic, man. And forgive me if I repeated myself.

But, yeah, I think unless, unless I'm, I got a real gap in my recollection, I think we covered quite a bit of the, of what's relevant, you know, over these past few sessions. Can I hit you with one question from current events? Yeah. What was your take on the Iranian missile offensive? The Iranians had to do something.

I mean, yes, like Hezbollah is for all practical purposes, you know, like the foreign, the Iranian foreign legion, but there's a plausible deniability that the Iranians like very sort of jealously guard there. but also just in in terms of in power political terms as well as for domestic consumption as well as

in the court of world opinion like I ran hand to respond some of and this is basically an identical it is basically a redux of when when Soleimani was murdered you know it was the same thing it was just like it was just like very very controlled response

you know the target the area is targeted were like exclusively counter value you know it was a now that this was going to happen. So that's the way I read it. And it's more for the benefit of,

like, Iranian regime, despite, the private media says, it's not like the Taliban or something. And it's also, like, it's really, they actually hold elections in Iran all the time. And, like, the regime does have, like, certain credibility problem. So, like, Ahmadinejad, you know, he was not only in a ziri,

but the reason he always wore that, like, members-only jacket. I remember, like, media people would make fun of him, but it's like the dude worked, he was like an oil rig worker, or like a pipeline, like a, like a foreman. And like, that's why he was trying to look the part of like, you know, Mr. like Aziri working man. He was like this big, like socialist, kind of like labor leader,

like rabble rouser. And like the religious authorities didn't like him at all. Like they basically allowed him, they come into the top job because they had to. You know, and so talking about like some Islamist. It's like this. It's like smoking crack if you think that. But point being, Iran's, it's a complicated situation domestically. And the regime there, they do have to cater to public opinion more than people acknowledge in the West.

And especially if it looks like, I mean, even if these like retaliatory strikes like don't mean anything, it doesn't matter. It's for domestic consumption anyway. you know, like Iran's, Iran's ground element in real terms is Hezbollah. That's my interpretation. Yeah, and it seems like with some of the incursions that have been monitoring over the past 24 to 36 hours, Hezbo is doing a pretty damn good job on the ground there. Yeah, there seems like, it seems like Israel, they're only, they can only do anything from the air right now. Yeah, they don't want, well, it's also two.

What are they going to do? Are they going to assault Lebanon like it's the 80s, early 90s? We're in 2006, when they tried that. You're not going to, they don't have the forces, they don't have the force structure or the political will to assault Beirut and try and like route Hezbollah from the Shia urban heartland. You're going to fight house to house against Hezbollah for the next five years and, you know, and take like 20,000 dead in a few months.

Like, no, you're not going to do that. No, Hezbollah is, they're no joke. man they're they're definitely the most capable ground element other than IDF in the region 100% cool well um do your plugs we'll get out of here and I guess the next next time we get together we'll finish up the gladio and then move on to something after that that's great yeah yeah um yeah man you can find me on substack it's real Thomas 777 that's substack.com that's where the pod is at and as well as like longer form stuff and just like various things. I, uh, I'm a social media at capital R-E-A-L underscore number seven, H-O-M-A-S-777.

I'm on Instagram. I'm on T-Gram. I got my own website. It's Thomas-777.com, number seven, H-O-M-E-S-77-com. And, um, I got I got like Merce that I sell because owing to popular demand I'm not trying to be corny

like that's literally why like I started doing it with my friend and partner in crime hair creed but if you would include a link to that

in the description that would be a great help so people can find it yep it last time it'll be there this time yeah thank you man I appreciate it Thomas

It's all the next time. Thank you.