The Pete Quiñones Show - Episode 1319: Pre-1945 German/Islam Relations w/ Thomas777 - Pt. 1

Episode Date: January 20, 2026

60 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.We continue our break from the 30 Years War series. Thomas starts a short series on pre-1945 Germany's relationship with the Moslem world.Radio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Buy Me a CoffeeThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas' WebsiteThomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

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Subscribe Star. And if you do that, you will get access to the audio file. So head on over to the Pekignano Show.com. You'll see all the ways that you can support me there. And I just want to thank everyone. It's because of you that I can put out the amount of material that I do. I can do what I'm doing with Dr. Johnson on 200 years together and everything else. the things that Thomas and I are doing together on continental philosophy.

It's all because of you. And yeah, I mean, I'll never be able to thank you enough. So thank you. The Pekingona Show.com. Everything's there. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekignano show. I'm here with Thomas. And building off of the episode that we,

the deviation episode from the 30 years war, in the same in the same subject matter Thomas is going to jump in so take it away Thomas I wanted to talk about the relationship of the Third Reich to the Islamic world specifically Palestine and Palestine was absolutely affiliated with the access powers in direct capacities and there was very good offices between the furor and the grand mufti al-Husini

who despite what propaganda and mainstream history suggests he came from a lineage that very much had a claim to the mantle of leadership in Palestine and from a very proud lineage that was and remains very respected

among Palestinians across the sectarian divide, Christian and Muslim. In order to understand that relationship, though, it's important to deal with the relations between the German Reich and the Islamic world generally. And early on, the Third Reich viewed the Islamic world not in reductionist terms, but as very much a political force that had to be a political force that had momentum in the historical process, but that also was an important ally to be cultivated in the war

against Bolshevism and Jewry, as they viewed it. And this wasn't just pragmatic. There was a basic affinity there with some qualifications, and this is important. And it's impossible to talk about this with people in a rational manner because they just go berserk if you mention Islam. They've been that brainwashed. Some of these people are just incredibly stupid. But you know, the majority

continues to take their cues from legacy media and from regime ideologies. The only thing comparable to it is people go utterly berserk if I attack the president. I don't know what they think the president is doing for them lately or why they think he's

and some incredible personage. But, you know, I'm not here to make friends or to try and convert stupid people to make them intelligent or reasonable. It's just, you know, one of the reasons I disdain social media is because it's impossible to have serious conversations there because aside from the paid agitators and disruptors,

there's just this whole pin a gallery of idiots. You think it's like a video game or something. and they've decided they've convinced themselves they have some take on everything and um even though they spend their days like exclusively in their own house or walmart they decided they have some take on islam when they have no understanding of it whatsoever so not just i mean don't get me wrong i'm very blessed there's anybody who spends time with capital t traditionalist authors you know

Marcia Eliyadi René Gannon particularly because I mean obviously he was a Sufi Muslim Julius Evela they all wrote extensively

on on a Dar al Islam and Muhammad and his role in the historical process and things like that and obviously I've got a fair

amount of Muslim comrades on the ground Washia and Sunni you know who are both good friends and and reliable partisans, but who I can seek out to discuss comparative theology with them things. So I'm not suggesting I'm isolated in that regard. It just reaffirms why I am a vanguardist, because most people aren't built for this in all kinds of ways.

And they don't even have their own prejudices. Their prejudices are Jewish prejudices. Or they're ones that, you know, they glean from legacy media. apparatus or by fucking around on the internet with people who are probably paid agitators or like random guys in India or something just saying things. It's like a staggering degree of ignorance, but anyway, I'll stop ranting at the subs. The general disposition of the Reich towards Islam, the Islamic world, like I said, they They viewed it as a global force that was playing an essential role in the unfolding historical process.

They also predicted that although there wasn't going to be the imminent emergence of a new caliphate to replace the seat of Daryl Islam that obviously was vacated by the collapse of the Ottomans. and to be clear the Kaiser Reich and the Ottoman Empire were very close allies so the Germans had a particularly the German academic which had a very strong Orientalist bent and the foreign service many of whom remained into the Third Reich they had a fairly highly developed understanding of Islam and of the several cultures that constituted. And obviously as the war went on, the non-European territories that were directly occupied by the Vermaqt, were largely Islamic countries. and

Sarajevo which is the seed of European Islam was occupied by the Reich so that's important all these all these variables

been intertwined and as I've written about in my manuscript and I believe I've discussed here with Pete previously the mass occurs or the annihilation therapy that was

perpetuated against minority elements in the nascent Turkish state. The world came to know about that owing to a Max von Schuzener Richter who was deployed there and he alerted both the Red Cross

and the and you know the Berlin foreign office and he was told in on certain terms to stop agitating for some sort of localized intervention or relief for these people because relations with Ankara are very important especially in these times of uncertainty and I make the point that well you know and not chubner richter he felt at the Munich Pooch in November 1923 and Hitler went on record is saying that he was the one, he said the party never recovered from the death of Schuvenor Richter. He was an essential personage

to the National Socialist Party and the revolution. And so I make the point in my manuscript, So if from inception the NSDAP was this hyper-racialized, you know, murderous, conspiratorial cadre that simply hated all non-Aryan races, why was Richter the only man who was raising alarm about what was happening in Asia Minor? Nobody seems to be able to answer that question for me. They simply ignore it or say I'm lying or move on without addressing it. but be as it may.

The Third Reich, although arguably there's the deepest sort of diplomatic rapport and cultural rapport enjoyed with Darl Islam, the other major access nations made similar efforts to curate and mobilize Islamic support. Mussolini, he famously, I mean, this was very performative and very stage managed, but in 1937, he arranged for this ceremony where he was presented with a quote, sort of Islam at a public ceremony in Tripoli, symbolically holding himself in the kingdom of Italy out as a protector of the Muslim world against communism. and he went on to declare that the quote laws of the prophet would be honored Gerbils actually made note of this in his diaries prolific as he was as a diary which is one of the reasons they're such a valuable artifact he had kind of a cynical take on this he said

you know, the, Deuchy never, never passes up an opportunity to glorify himself as the protector of other peoples,

you know, which was, which was true. And I don't, I don't think Duce had some deep affinity for Islam or spent much time

learning about its theological precepts, but it was imperative, particularly considering the primary battle space that Italy was committed to do it at juncture

to try and curate the support of these people, or at least mitigate any hostility that might be emergent otherwise. Similarly, the Shinto is Japan. They established the Greater Japan Islamic League. And simultaneously, the Tokyo Mosque was established at 1938. and they've very much dedicated a lot of effort and resources, both military and capital, to encouraging an Islamic uprising against the Dutch,

you know, and radicalizing people in the Dutch Indies against both the British and, and the Nibylanders. And like I said, in the case of the Reich, this long predated the National Socialist Revolution, the central powers, particularly the Kaiser Reich, the Ottoman Empire was an essential ally theirs.

And until they got knocked out of the war, they played an essential role in, allowing a Germany to sustain a two-front conflict there's so much emphasis on the Western Front and the the maelstrom and slaughter that represented there's not enough ink dedicated to the the us front of World War I where it wasn't the stalemate that

came to pass in the West because the open step precluded it and facilitated maneuver um poison gas was used to greater effect in in the east as well and obviously um you know until the when when the after the russian revolution the the rites fail was victorious i mean that was one of the big sore points of the the of the military in the wake of Versailles is they were forced to give up these territories that they won on the battlefield. But, you know, before an entire army deployed to the east was freed up, you know, by the Red Revolution and the Treaty, of Brest the Tusk, the Ottomans were playing an essential role in the Kaiser-Rex Jewish strategic

flank. And Wilhelm, who was not any kind of great diplomat nor strategic thinker, he went out of his way to sustain good offices with the Ottomans. You know, Holveig was very much the political mind behind the Kaiser Reich. But the Kaiser himself, particularly in dealing with fellow monarchs and we make no mistake.

You know, even in its waiting days, an Ottoman Sultan at great authority, it was essential for dictates and declarations and as well as insinuations, both subtle and flagrant, come from the Kaiser himself. But, you know, so German-Ottoman authorities,

they collaborated and tried to cultivate Pan-Islamic consciousness in North Africa, in the Near East, in Russia, and India. I mean, this was a long-standing effort. It's not just a question that emerged in 1939. And in World War II, as the Vermeck and the Vafn-N-SS, even early on, as they found themselves deployed to Islamic lands, German authorities were explicit that Islam was of political importance and sold out and were instructed to respect religious customs and show respect for Islam when dealing with Muslims and to treat them as friends. unless they, you know, exhibited disrespect for the Reich,

and it's heraldry or for, you know, the personal honor of soldiers and officers. On the Ost front, the Reich went as far as, they ordered the reestablishment of mosques and madrasas, and they set aside pious endowments for their reestablishment of Islamic religious life. I mean, they did the same thing with Orthodox churches, but I mean, that goes up saying, you know, the history of the conflict and the political side of things. But, you know, this went a long way to undermining Soviet rule because Muslims were targeted with as much hostility as the Orthodox were, you know, and Gerbils himself made the point that the early Soviet cadres, the NKVV and the Czechha, they hated the Muslims for ethno-sectarian

reasons as much as they did the Christians and he viewed them as their oppressors and did incredibly brutal things and tried to extricate related sensibility from Islamic communities. Varamag authorities also, they very much cultivated, you know, the Ulamas, in eastern territories. And the Balkans especially, that's how headway was made.

And as the Balkan theater became this counterinsurgency quagmire, that became very important. And Ante Pavlovich Poglovnik of the independent state of Croatia, he was raised in a town early in his love.

that had a very large Muslim population. And Pavlovich himself, he knew a lot about Islam and their rituals. There's photographs of him wearing a fez when he's meeting with Bosniaks. It's very interesting. And he famously. he viewed Bosnia X as quote racial Croatians and Sunni Islam was viewed as a state religion alongside Roman Catholicism, albeit secondary to it. But that sort of expedited these efforts in the Balkan theater, which would have been a lot more difficult if the eustachia was openly hostile to a Bosniak populations and the

the the Vermak and the Bauffin SS they they granted a lot of religious freedom to Muslim recruits and a Muslim formations, the religious calendar was taken into account, dietary laws with respect to, you know, the mess hall and things. Both the Vermak and the Vof and SS had imams, served as chaplains, and they launched ideological education programs to explicate how, you know, a Muslim should live as a national socialist, you know, and what the meaning was of national socialism to non-Germanic, yet allied races. This was very, very detailed, whatever, if any, whether anybody agrees with this or not. You know, and these education programs were almost unfailingly

delivered by military imams the only times they weren't is when an imam wasn't available and Bosniic imams in particular played an outsized role

again Sarajevo only about 2 million Muslims lived in Sarajevo but that's the European seat of Islam and the way Muslims viewed it throughout the Muslim diaspora

was you know being being sort of the the seat of Islamic culture in Europe and also being very directly threatened by communism they're

was a peculiar interest in the fortunes of the bosniaks of syrivo and reciprocally pious sunnis uh you know pious uh the bosniac sunnis they had a strong interest in the fortunes their core religion is you know behind the they were still behind the verbal wire in in the soviet union um and in uh in palestine you know i the formal military policy towards Islamic peoples in broad strategic terms. Really that policy paradigm first originated on July 25th, 1940, just after the fall of France, you know and as the Battle of Britain was getting

underway a man named Max von Oppenheim he was a retired diplomat and an Orientalist scholar he spontaneously sent a memorandum a seven page memorandum

to the foreign office suggesting that it was was both imperative to cultivate the populations and the enemies, Islamic territories, and do everything possible to incite a rebellion against the British authorities there, and moving forward to give whatever military, material, aid, and diplomatic encouragement was reasonable and, feasible. You know, and he said if, he said that time is nigh for a comprehensive strategy to mobilize

the Islamic world against the British Empire. But he said also if the British have time to consolidate forces and suppress a nascent rebellion, and while, meanwhile, holding, you know, German forces at bay, in theater, the opportunity will not repeat. He's also Oppenheim, who'd spent most of his adult life traveling and living in the Islamic world. He'd reached out directly as a private person since his retirement. He was in his early 80s, I believe,

to pan-Islamic religious figures like Shikib Arslan. And more significantly to the grand Mufti Amin al-Husini. And they became very close. And largely at Oppenheim's behest, Hitler, who had a somewhat tempestuous relationship with the foreign office. He took this seriously. And German officers were deployed. to the entire Muslim corridor

where there was a British Imperial presence from Egypt to India. And of course subsequently the grand move to Yel Usenia

was able to gain a personal audience with the Hitler, and we'll get to that. But this was the origin of what became a a strategic imperative

in political and military terms. I mean, that's important for its own sake, but also Ribbentrop's other cast of some sort of fool or an incompetent or the foreign office is cast as in the same sort of terms as the abvara as this sort of a posth of a fifth columnist

and Hitler's cast as this provincial nationalist who didn't understand the felt politic. I mean, all that is, is ridiculous. And this, the relationship of the Reich to the Islamic world in particular is, uh, stands in rebuttal to that inference. And um, so this is an important subject matter for that reason. Um, and Oppenheim, he, he'd served in the Kaiser Reich for decades and few there's few people then living who knew as much about Islam and Islamic

societies as he did and more than any one man he was responsible for shaping the Kaiser's disposition towards Islam generally he was trained as a lawyer and by education. He'd become fluent in several Middle Eastern languages, including, you know, various Arab dialects as well as Turkish. He traveled for years through Africa and the Middle East. And in 1896, when he was officially recruited by the foreign office, he himself was only posted for 12 years in Cairo,

where he directly monitored political developments and cultivated enduring relationships with Arab and Islamic leadership. In Sudan, during the Madi Rebellion, he'd been on the ground there. And what he attested to in subsequent years was that's when he first encountered Islam as a political force.

he always understood the deeply integral structure of Islam in conceptual terms, but this had all been abstract or academic until this point. In Sudan, he came to realize that Islam had a strong role to play in the burgeoning political process, that it had an ability to animate pious elements towards, direct military action and therein it was a force multiplier and that there is a peculiar interplay of deep theology and political and military imperatives in the Islamic world and the uh the western power that could integrate that into its own political soldiery would carry the day in theater.

And he, he'd been able to gain, Oppenheim had, he'd been able to gain audiences with the Ottoman Sultan, with a number of other luminaries, both reactionaries and reformers. What they were held in common was

a belief in advocacy of the Pan-Islamic cause in lieu of this sort of narrow ethno-nationalism that was still characteristic in the colonized world and substantial measure. And Oppenheim's dispatches were delivered personally to the Kaiser who basically viewed them as gospel in terms of how to proceed

in the Near East and North Africa and the Kaiser Wilhelm for all of his shortcomings which were myriad and he was in many respects

the Reich was unfortunately saddled with him he did delegate to experts and the reason it's Holbeg subsequently had the sort of power he did and on matters relating to

a veldt politic the Kaiser tended to defer to people he viewed as the experts. And that's very Prussian.

And that's why despite Germany not having a global profile in terms of directly administered colonies in the way

that the United Kingdom or France or the Spanish or the Portuguese did, they tend to do very well at at cultivating

allies in the developing world. And this went some of this was, and we'll get into this in our 30 years war series, as an aside, I want to cover this, but I'm about to discuss,

as well as the sort of proxy war that was going on in Japan during the 30-year's war between Catholics and specifically Dutch reformed elements. But the Ottomans had granted asylum to Protestants, both Lutheran and Reformed, who were either refugees of hostilities in the 30-year's war or were wanted by the Inquisition. and a sort of cultural rapport developed between Protestant Germany and Sunni Islam. And I think that that's something that's understated in a lot of these otherwise very complete accounts of the subject matter. but even limited as the Kaiser X Colonial profile was

the Kaiser like did in the colonies that did have rule over um did rule over Islamic populations in Togo and Cameroon in Germany's Africa and now in Namibia you know and

obviously it was far easier I mean, I mean, Africans are, sub-suran Africans are, there's challenges to managing those populations just because of profound alienage. It's obviously, but the colonial authorities obviously found it easier to deal with Islamic elements than pagan ones who described to some sort of folk animism or something. and from the outset, curated good offices with Islamic elements in these territories. And local Islamic structures weren't disturbed so long as Muslim leaders accepted the colonial presence in German Africa. Sharia courts recognized Islamic endowments weren't touched or taxed. Madrasas were left open.

religious holidays were acknowledged and the Germans wisely they ruled through Muslim intermediaries and Islamic dignitaries you weren't generally going to be visited in your township by some by by by a white man or a German colonial administrator and it'd be an African Muslim intermediary or a a or a a respected man in the local mosque who you deal with and he in turn to deal with the Germans. And on the one hand, this left colonial governor somewhat isolated, but in the other hand, it also meant that these intermediaries, they had the might of, you know, the Kaiser Reich behind them in the event of an uprising.

So indirect rule was highly effective and that it's not discussed enough that, again, in comparative terms, limited as the German colonial profile and experience was, it very much was a school of political rule, you know, and high political intrigue. and they were very good at it. And I think that's, I think that's not often enough acknowledged other than in very perfunctory terms. And this also led to, as these kinds of colonial, as more and more business was done in the colonies,

and as a geostrategic imperative developed around the German, presence there was more and more of these sort of colonial congresses formal and informal between military and political and business authorities within the Kaiser Reich this led to the development of a a a a a um a cadre of experts in Islamic studies in German academic studies and there was always a street of Orientalism in modern German academic academia anyway. But these guys who previously really only were focused on classical Islam and, you know,

their relations with the Greeks and things, they shifted their conceptual focus very much the contemporary Muslim world and what a proper imperial policy should be towards Islam quah Islam and there really wasn't something comparable in the UK or France there was philology type stuff and you know obviously a very advanced cultural anthropology but a kind of political science of how European Christiandom should index with Islam and

power political capacities that was pretty much exclusive to the Reich. There was a German Colonial Institute formerly established. One of their big luminaries was a guy named Carl Heinrich

Becker and a couple of his colleagues, Martin Hartman and Dietrich Vesterman. Becker was centered in Hamburg, Hartman and Vesterman in Berlin. They placed themselves and their faculty at the full disposal of the German Empire. And the entirety of their labors and their endowment was putting the service of investigating and studying Islam and the colonies, accumulating knowledge on its spread, historical and contemporary, its impact on power political affairs. There was these massive surveys undertaken by Becker Hartman and Vesterman in 1906, 1911, and 1913, respectively, which were then submitted to the Kaiser.

through the Colonial Institute to the foreign office, onward to the Kaiser. And this became viewed as power political dogma

in terms of how to proceed in policy terms, both formally and you know, below board. The German Society for the study of Islam.

It published a periodical, the Veltz de Islam's, the world of Islam. And that became regarded as the seminal European academic journal on

on contemporary Islamic faith and practice and politics. And you know, most people, too, even in the UK, which supposedly is full of these, you know, progressives and people who have a, I don't have saying progressives and know what they're talking about, obviously don't. But it's characterized supposedly by this sort of progressive sensibility in academia. And then on the other hand, these sort of Machiavellian types have a deep understanding of alien cultures

and how to establish and maintain power they're in most of the most of these German experts their counterparts they just looked at you know indigenous religions

whether they actually were savage you know forms of animism or paganism and Islam is just so much you know so much nonsense or something you know primitive it was

it was these German philology and cultural studies types and orientalists who, you know, emphasized the Kaiser and demonstrated within and without of their own closer to academia, you know, look, Islam is a formative civilizing element. the higher races within Darul Islam, if you'll allow the descriptor, produce extraordinarily high culture. And Islam has brought millions by millions of people out of ignorance and savagery. And even if one doesn't accept that, it's a singular power of political force that is playing in a

essential role in the political process underway into then nascent 20th century. And to be clear, this is when Christianity was under full assault by the communists. And it was when this, however contrived it may have been, this enforced secularism reigned throughout the Western world. That's one of the things that set the stage for the Bolshevik revolution. You know, so Islam is this catalyzing element really stood alone among world religions. I mean, don't get me wrong. There was pious Christians who were quite literally waging a holy war against the communists.

And I, yes, I believe in symbolic psychological terms and anthropological terms that all politics is essentially theological. But I'm talking in terms of conscious religious practice and the ability of religious imperatives to animate political affairs in the early 20th century. century Islam really stood alone in that capacity at global scale. That's what I'm talking about for clarity. And that this was not lost obviously on these people that were talking about. Probably the best known political theorist who devised a praxis of imperial rule, vis-a-vis Islam was Carl Heinrich Becker. He emphasized again and again, he said, Islam wasn't as the British claim, a threat,

the colonial government. He said not only is it not a threat, but that it should and can be used to bolster imperial rule and to guarantee peace, stability, and public order. He said that the main reason why the white western powers were coming into hostile contact with Islamic cultures was because they were either treating Muslim populations

like they were animus or pagan savages or they were viewing observance of Islamic practice as somehow inherently subversive you know and that integral aspect of Islam not only did it render it an essential essentially political confession in a way that other faiths are not but it also meant that to attack any aspect of its observance was to

attack every aspect of the reigning way of life and theater and this wasn't a minority opinion among the German colonial authorities both political diplomatic and military German colonial officers didn't have a hostile disposition towards Islam and

they correctly viewed the anti-imperialist elements and the pro-communist elements in theater that claimed to be pan-Islamic they weren't really because the two it was an irreconcilable

velcichung there was superficially Islamist language in Moscow's propaganda, as well as within some of these anti-colonial ideological subcultures. But there was no depth to it. Johann von Lears, and we'll get into him next episode, he's a lesser-known personage within the Third Reich, who and it was an essential

personage to the national soldiers' resistance of the defeat. I hold him in great esteem, but he correctly recognized. Islam's not reactionary. In fact, it tends towards a revolutionary paradigm, but it is socially conservative

in terms of its view of authority. And a a sultan or a king or a colonial governor or a procurator or an occupying general even if he himself is not of the faith

and not of your people if he protects Islam from its enemies and allows the free observance of Islam, you are obligated as a good Muslim to not revolt against him, for example. Wilhelm went as far as, in the autumn 1898, the Kaiser went on a tour of the German colonies and of the Holy Land in the Middle East generally. He visited Damascus, specifically to visit the tomb of Salhadin. And he gave a speech to all these, you know, assembled masses of people,

where he declared himself to be a friend of Islam and the German Empire to be a friend of Islam and of, quote, the world's 300 million Muhammadians, you know, to give you an idea of the priority that Berlin put on the cultivation of this relationship, it wasn't just a minor consideration emergent in the foreign office or something that colonial officers posted in theater, you know we're we're we're we're trying to force the Kaiser and the government to take notice of um you know and uh this this this paid dividends i mean not you know again not only uh did it maintained good offices with the ottomans who were in real trouble then but who were an essential ally for you know, within the bounderationality of the power political paradigm that, you know,

um, reached critical zenith in 2014. But there, there was an enduring affinity between the Reich, the German people, and Darl Islam. That endured through the Cold War, in my opinion. You know, it was, uh, This is a bit of a tangent, but, you know, the only Marxist-Leninist Arab state was South Yemen. And it was a cadre of East Germans who really were the intermediary between the Warsaw Pact, the East Block, and the indigenous Arabs there. that

the book John Culler is this Cold War State Department guy he wrote a really interesting book on the Stasi I mean he's very much

a a pro-regime kind of guy Cold Warrior type but he and I believe he was probably like a lot of State Department people I think he was probably an intelligence guy

under diplomatic cover but he uh he wrote about the the stasi and the national folks armeese presence in yemen you know he he tried to cast as pejoratively as possible you know suggesting that you know all these these these germans swaggering around like colonial overlord it's like well i mean they they're doing something right the yemen the yemenes didn't they didn't open fire on them and send them packing i mean i and the Yemenis aren't exactly a people who take a knee for others just because, you know, and if anything, there is impossible to govern as the Pashtuns. And they, it was the DDR that really sold them on the idea of Stalinism.

I mean, there's South Yemen, there's a confusing pastiche of, of political intrigues in Yemen. But, I mean, obviously, and not suggesting that the sole or even the primary proximate cause of them, align with the East Block, was East German persuasiveness or intrigues. But interestingly, one of the Yemeni militias today in the southern country, they ride under the flag of South Yemen,

you know and they claim a drag lineage to that polity you know so it's that there's something there but yeah that i think that should be adequate foundation man there's still look there's a couple other authors i want to get into relating to the orientalist academic culture in the kaiser rake and then later in the Third Reich and the impact that had on conceptual matters. But I want to get into the Grand Movede El Hussini and Palestine and its status as an axis element and things. And then I promise after that we'll get back to the 30 years war. But this is important and it's particularly timely in my opinion. Okay.

Do you think you're going to be able to talk about the Grand Mufti and Van Von Leer's in one episode, or is this possibly going to be three? Yeah, they might go three, but I'll see what I can do. I'll try and expedite it. Well, don't, yeah, don't leave anything out just to, you know, we can do three episodes. That would be perfectly fun. Okay. Yeah, thanks for hosting me. Of course, always.

Head on over to Thomas's substack, Real Thomas, 7. 77.substack.com and his website is thomas777.com. The t is a seven and you can connect to everything from either one of those places. And if you want to try and find him on X where, um, where you know, his account could be gone one day and, um, back the next. You can try. Yeah, they're being, they're constantly. I mean, X is a total pile of shit. Like it like it really is. I'm not trying to play murder, but I only maintain an account there because people of some reason can't move on from it. And it's kind of the one-stop place to index of people and stuff. As a kid say, as a kid say, or used to say this phrase is probably played out by now.

It's really fake and gay. Yeah, it's garbage. It's just fucking garbage. And yeah, it's fake and gay as well. All right, Thomas. Talk to you in a couple days. Thank you.