The Pete Quiñones Show - Episode 1428: Reading 'The Nuremberg System' w/ Thomas777 - Part 4
Episode Date: September 29, 202660 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.Pete reads while Thomas comments on his new book, "The Nuremberg System: Conceptual Bases of World Order from 1933 to Present."...The Nuremberg System: Conceptual Bases of World Order from 1933 to PresentRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Buy Me a CoffeeThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas' WebsiteThomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.
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I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanuano show.
Thomas, how are you doing today?
I'm doing well.
Thanks for hosting me.
Of course, of course.
We are going to continue the reading
of your book, the Nuremberg system.
And let's just jump right in unless you had any announcements or anything you wanted to say.
No, that's fine.
Okay, cool.
All right, picking up where we left off last time.
This is in the chapter titled Europe Nomoosin civilization.
And here we go.
to understand how such perverse circumstances came to pass, and more importantly, why, and to develop a meaningful
understanding of the political architecture of the globe since American victory over the Warsaw Pact on November 9,
1989, and why this represents an unmitigated disaster not only for the white race and Western civilization,
but all peoples of the world availed to American and Zionist tyranny. We must thoroughly examine the
establishing event whereby the sovereign jurisdiction over not merely politics among nations,
but over all the affairs of mankind, secular and theological, was unilaterally invoked by
Concord of American and Soviet radicals in the ruined city of Nuremberg, Germany in the year
1946.
Nuremberg is an ancient city, its first mention arriving in 1050 AD, wherein it is described
as a Rijksburg built on the Order of the Holy Roman Empire.
Situated initially owing to potential strategic significance resting between the Franks and the Bavarian
Nordga. Nordgo.
Nuremberg grew exponentially over the following five centuries due to its location along
central east-west trade routes, a notable interdependence developing between it, and the
German-speaking Austrian commercial centers to the east.
In centuries subsequent, the city of Nuremberg endured all the traumatic upheavals wrought by the Protestant Reformation,
the 30 years war in the conflict's long aftermath, ultimately becoming a late-blooming hub of Baroque aesthetic tendencies and high culture.
The peculiar irony of Nuremberg, having been the cultural symbolic, if not truly sovereign seat of the Holy Roman Empire,
subsequently becoming synonymous with Protestant resistance to the Catholic League,
and ultimately attempting to enter into the formal union with the kingdom of Prussia,
progenitor of Culture Kampf, was not lost on Adolf Hitler.
We've discussed this before.
Like, this was the fight to be,
the fight was to become a world power.
And that's what we seem to be,
that's what it basically the Nuremberg proceedings is to make it illegal for anybody
except the accepted um the accepted peoples to push for world power is that correct
yeah that's why it declared that warfare as a policy instrument was criminal and was the
and originated from criminal conspiracies that's why it's goofy i mean i mean Hegseth is a
fucking idiots. But it was very deliberate to recast the Department of War as the Department
of Defense. And it's not because we're all liberal pussies. It's because the notion is that
warfare is quite literally illegal and unless it's the United States or Israel perpetuating it
for defensive and police purposes. You know, that's very, that's not accidental. And it
doesn't derive from some peaconic notion of war being bad or something. And like anybody who
thinks that is a moron.
You know, it would make no sense for the architects of the Nuremberg regime and for America
according to who, you know, the control group of which is the only legitimate arbiter
of hard power.
It would make no sense for America to declare, oh, no, that war is a legitimate policy
instrument.
So now this is the Department of War.
Like, somebody seems like I'm being pedantic, but it's uniquely moronic that that's,
that, like, guys like Hegsteth have this great.
gross misunderstanding of that nuance.
But yeah, that's always been
something that's sort of
been a fixation of
these progressive global.
It's this idea that
warfare doesn't arrive like the seasons, life doesn't
struggle against life, that there's not intrinsic
conflict to
within power political affairs,
this idea that you can simply abolish warfare
as some sort of criminal enterprise
and through a combination of social engineering
and the threat of punitive violence.
When you mentioned American and Soviet radicals,
who particularly are you pointing to in that?
Well, there's a bunch of the Soviet judges
who were impaneled were a bunch of these guys
with the vanguard who presided over Shochers.
trials and condemned mass numbers of people to death for what amount of the ideological crimes.
You know, these weren't, these people weren't selected for no reason.
You know, I mean, Justice Jackson was something of a mediocrity.
You know, and again, he, he had reservations, I think going more to a sort of naive provincialism than any deeply thought out ethical understanding of the world's situation.
but I mean anybody who would deign to devise, we're going to declare ourselves the arbiter of some absolute planetary morality,
and we're going to put on trial or enemies as if we're as if we're God.
I mean, that's insane.
Anybody would unironically insinuate themselves into that role is either entirely delusional or they're,
or they're drunk on hubris owing the, you know, a commitment to an ideological schema that would seem preposterous
where its proponents not in a position to impose it upon everybody else at planetary scale
by virtue of their willingness to resort to limitless violence in the service of those principles.
That's what I meant.
The praxis speaks for itself.
So you mentioned Nuremberg and you mentioned the history of Nuremberg.
And we know that Nagasaki in Japan was the center of Catholicism.
And a lot of people think that that's one of the reasons why it may have been targeted.
Do you think there was deliberately they went to Nuremberg in order to do this?
Well, yeah, but it wasn't for a sectarian reason.
and it's because it had the particular significance to the national socialist struggle.
Other than Nuremberg was a national socialist heartland,
other than outside of Munich.
You know, that's why.
Okay.
Moving on.
The fewer embodied the European conceptual horizon vis-à-vis the power political affairs
and in particular the new era of Gross-Trump politic more than,
any other man. It is impossible to truly unpack and decipher the intentions, ambitions,
and ultimate contextual meaning of the Nuremberg world system without a deep understanding of
Adolf Hitler. In particular, his status is a fundamentally historical figure who embodied the
zeitgeist of his epoch in a way that is rare in all times, but virtually unheard of in the modern
era. Concommonately, the total destruction, occupation, and social engineering regime,
which continues in earnest to the present day of the German Reich and its European and Asian allies
was the catalyst for an effort to criminalize warfare. Thus so, the reasoning was to deprive
ambitious, bad actors of the means to utilize warfare as an instrument of national policy
to facilitate power political objectives. Such a prosaic and frankly conspiratorial view of
warfare and its ultimate causes is, of course, ontologically flawed in the most basic capacities,
but that did not preclude a victorious United States and Soviet Union from devising the foundational basis of a new order.
And that is precisely what was accomplished by the respective delegations at Nuremberg,
who presided over the trials of major war criminals.
What is remarkable is that the aforementioned imperative,
most significantly the scope and scale of the constituent aspects and conditions precedent required to implement,
meant the ideological program in a sufficiently thorough capacity was realized so completely in the
brief period after the death of President Roosevelt and prior to the final collapse of the U.S.
Soviet Concord.
The same Concord that had facilitated the anti-fascist crusade against the German Reich,
and consequently the total destruction and subjugation of the European continent, barely endured
beyond the final adjournment of the trial of major war criminals that was rapidly convened
amidst the literal rubble of the ancient city of Nuremberg, Germany.
A diligent historian might suggest, and many have, albeit obliquely, that the entire
Rézondetra of the Allies' war effort as conceptualized by the New Dealers, who were just
as radical, ambitious, and hubristic as that of their communist allies in Moscow, and motivated
by an absolute desire to subjugate and manipulate historical processes directly, could not be
said to have endured beyond the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the subsequent end of the
the American Soviet Concord as a primary causal variable, nor is an adequately robust ethical
rationale for the creation and implementation of the proposed compulsory juristic paradigm,
global in scope in declaring a substantive law of planetary humanity derived from the practical
reason and historical experience of humanity in common, and thus binding on all human beings
availed to its boundless penumbra. So this will be a
recurring subject, but can you explain how Adolf Hitler is an historical figure who embodied
the zeitgeist of his epoch in a way that is rare in all times were virtually unheard of in the
modern era?
Well, yeah, because he had more in common with 17-11 Mohammed or Oliver Cromwell than he did
with a politician.
That's why Russell Stoffley said he was a messianic person.
It's not in the religious sense in this, in the historiographical.
sense. Hitler wasn't a politician. He was somebody who had a world historical mission and circumstances
selected him to lead those imperatives. And the stakes were the continued existence of
European civilization or its annihilation and subjugation before historical forces that
aimed to annihilate human beings' ability to exist as historically situated organisms individually and at collective scale.
I mean, that's why that's why Zionists and their American allies and lackeys.
that's why Adolf Hitler is this
Erzot Satan figure to them. I mean, part of it's just
you know, a kind of primitive
political theology.
That's essentially reactive and not well thought out,
but also they perceive the significance of somebody like
Adolf Hitler, contra
you know, a mediocrity like
Winston Churchill or a mere politician
of the sort that populate, you know, common history is all in sundry of, you know, every nation and empire of the last 2,000 years.
That's what I mean.
I'm going to ask a question, and forgive me if any of these questions seem basic, but I think they're, yeah, I'm doing this for the people listening in the subs.
When you mentioned criminalizing warfare, so who's been a,
is that for?
It's the benefit of whoever is the architect of the system that isn't deigning to
impose penal liability on any power political challenges.
That's it.
It's a power play.
It's not anything else.
I mean, there might be some monastic intellectuals who are naive in their sincerity or
whatever.
I don't know.
You can argue that either way.
But it's not, there's not some, there's not some collective.
benefit to stripping people of their ability to live historically, that you're robbing people of
basic aspects of their humanity and their ability to come to terms with their own mortality,
among other things, by imposing that kind of regime on people. Obviously, the reason for it is for
reasons of power and the ability to perpetuate one's own ideological schema on others.
and you know from a perspective of subjugation
when you mention here humanity in common
and then the in the same sentence you mentioned planetary humanity
this seems like you're the basic kind of
are you talking about just
this being the true birth of globalism
where um everything is done under one
under one law, one
overarching umbrella?
Well, I mean, there's some
modality of globalism was inevitable,
but this idea of homogenizing
people by stripping
away human characteristics
that allow them to perceive
and participate in historical processes,
that's an ideological enterprise. That's what we're talking about.
There is no humanity in political terms.
That's meaningless.
That doesn't exist.
There's not some community of humanity
that identifies a common
interest and historical imperative and
community
based on the fact that we are all human beings
that that's idiotic.
That doesn't exist.
And any international law
is by definition permissive, not compulsory
because it's not possible
if there to be a global sovereign that commands
the
loyalty and
you know
recognition of its legitimate.
intimacy by every human being on this planet.
You know, that that's not, by definition, that's an absurdist fallacy.
So anybody would suggest that is either an ignoramus or they have in mind a social engineering enterprise
that would be able to render this possible by stripping people, again, of essential characteristics.
characteristics that make them human.
There's not some, that doesn't mean that there's not objective standards of good and
evil and right and wrong derived from practical reason, but that's not a political question.
And politics isn't the business of, of, of, of, of, of, of a morally improving man.
And even, even if it were, the, you know, randomly selected judges from the Soviet Union and
apparatchiks in the New Deal regime, don't get to just declare the,
and so ultimately the arbiters of universal morality.
That's ridiculous.
Not too big a tangent, I hope.
But it does seem like what has happened to the United States and what has happened to Europe,
but more so the United States that anyone can be an American.
There's no such thing as like an American heritage.
That's part of the stupid on purpose sort of ideological cope also, because when it becomes clear,
these poxosos can't stand up to any.
of rational scrutiny.
So it's sort of this dummy version of, of, of, over, over, over, welly and contrarian
contrarianism, you know, declaring pretending you don't know what is meant by national
citizenship or by ethnos or by some sort of historically situated identity and declaring
that, that legalism has some stand-in for, you know, organic patterns of living or something.
you know i mean if you're going to if you're going to declare that everybody with the right
credential belongs to this national group i mean like i said that's it's um it's it's it's
dummy contrarianism in service of an ideological
postulate that that has no precedent and and isn't rationally situated
but yeah i mean it all it all runs together it's just got it's just gotten less and less
intellectually rigorous not that it was particularly rigorous to begin with but
yeah, that's part of it.
All right. Continuing.
There endures a reliably critical perspective among American legal academics as well as practicing
jurists that built-in restraints preclude merely judicial overreach tending towards tyranny.
This is a traditional basis of the American claims of the mantle of moral leadership.
Marlborough v. Madison, the decision which established for all time the extra-constitutional
authority of the federal judiciary to avail itself of any,
and all acts of state or legislative acts rendered by the body politic through their formal
representatives to the scrutiny of a sovereign judicial apparatus is both a preemptive remedy,
as was alleged by its architects and their ideological errors, contra the imperial presidency
and the tyranny of the common majority, but it is also the basis of the power of scientific
veto over those imperatives that privilege historical attachments and cultural learning
over substantial justice.
The autological paradox on display vis-Aviz of the American claim to exclusive and absolute
political sovereignty over the earth, as well as the claim that the practice of the
American regime's ideological schema tends to preclude both moral corruption and unsound
decision-making among the putative control element does not represent a propaganda narrative of
recent vintage, nor is it a mere rationale for American exceptionalism and its claim
to an exclusive and absolute monopoly on military force.
What is, in fact, on display is a claim to rarefied competence in the juristic science of
substantial justice, whereby all outcomes derivative of judicial process and presumably any
and all policy imperatives related to war and peace decision-making are non-rebuttable
and essentially infallible.
Okay, so can you give a explanation of what exactly Marbury v. Madison did when it comes
to governance in the United States.
Yeah, there was an availed access state
and
executive decisionism therein,
as well as expressly delegated
legislative authority,
both of which
derived from
you know, the consent of the body
politic.
It availed all of those
decisions and imperatives.
The
this judicial review
oversight, which is not constitutionally mandated, only to this sort of progressive conceit that
there's this constant danger of executive overreach or an imperial presidency or some sort of
quorum of, you know, the body politic, being able to impose tyranny upon the remainder
owing to, you know, the fact of the quorum they're able to accomplish.
And within the progressive mindset, something that features very prominently is this idea that the law is some sort of science of morality that's basically infallible with the jurist presiding over this analytical process that ultimately leads to,
Dick Tots
from the judicial bench
you know
is somehow infallible
if the correct metrics and
factors are included
and the proper methodology is
implemented. That's why there's this
absurd sense in this
country where people like the Supreme Court
is some like learned rabbinic council
and it's immoral
to question whether or not
judicial review is appropriate.
You know and you get these
You got these fake populists like Trump who throw up their hands
and acts as if they're utterly powerless to push back against some sort of a high court decision.
That doesn't make any sense.
And that's not how we do things in the Western, in the Occident traditionally at all.
You know, we don't, we don't, we don't have some counsel of rabbis or jurists who we consider to be that, you know,
the learned men of the tribe who
interpret
reality for us and declare what
ethics are. That's nonsense.
And it's also
a culturally alien tendency.
And it's
not an accident that
that is
sort of the
that's the basis on which
that's the basis on which Zionists and
their allies and as well as
myriad other progressives and radicals.
It's not accidental or arbitration.
that that's the basis upon which they
play their claim to
an elevated
understanding or ability to
interpret political affairs
and ethics they're in and develop
a scheme that assures
substantial justice.
This is important. It's not
just a trivial point.
This is what underlies the entire system.
Is this the way they get around
somebody who would act like an Article 2 president, like how we can never have another Andrew
Jackson who basically operates as the Constitution would allow, not as a king, but as an executive
that can hand down decisions and decide the exception.
Well, yeah, I mean, that's why the Watergate, the confabulated Watergate narrative makes
no sense. It's the scandal about nothing because it's, the whole narrative of this
pretend scandal is this window dressing for this sort of conceptual prejudice and in favor of this
idea that there's this constant threat of the imperial executive. And it actually proceeds in Nixon.
Like it people would, a lot of, I'm not, I, I'm, I'm, Johnson did some pretty fucked up
things, President Johnson, but I, but a lot of his critics, they, they, they weren't attacking his
decision making from a well thought out perspective.
It was, there was this idea that Johnson is becoming a tyrant and he's engaged in this
kind of overreach that is dangerous to democracy.
I mean, which itself is another floating signifier because it makes no, invoking democracy
as this kind of, as this kind of approval.
word. I mean, arguably is a contextual meaning, you know, within the course of the Cold War
hostilities. Because, okay, you can say like, well, you know, there's a, there's a comparatively open
system in the first world, contra the second world, because behind the Berlin Wall, there's this
party apparatus that has an absolute monopoly on power, and this is mandated structurally.
So, contra that party monopoly is democracy in some procedural sense.
but even that is kind of dubious.
But obviously today, that makes no sense whatsoever.
There's not some competitor system to globalism that is mounting this challenge.
So that's a bit upset the scope.
But yeah.
All right.
This last sentence that I read here,
what is in fact on display is a claim to rarefied competence in the juristic sense of substantial justice,
whereby all outcomes derivative of judicial process and presumably any and all policies
imperative related to war and peace decision making are non-reabutable and essentially infallible.
Can you explain that a little more?
It's what I just said.
It's saying that the judiciary is the guardian of this elevated morality going to their
competence in this kind of judicial science of ethics.
That's what I just said.
Okay.
All right.
Can you continue.
The International Military Tribunal, which sat between the 20th of November,
1945 and the 1st of October 1946 was a singularly ideological enterprise couched in the appearance,
though not the substance, of due process of law. It did not aspire to anything other than to condemn
the German Reich as a criminal actor to declare, according to its own novel interpretations
of rules of evidence, discovery protocol, and due process, the government and armed forces
of the German right to constitute an ongoing inco-hate criminal
conspiracy. The objective of the proceedings was to characterize by way of various offers of proof
buttressed by a heavily reliance on pre-existing conceptual prejudices held by the judges so impaneled
as trier of both fact and law and facilitated by a prevailing spirit of vengeance. The raison d'etre,
the entire rationale for the existence of the National Socialist Party state, as a conspiracy to
carry out the mass homicide of the Jewish people on a planetary scale and to capture, dominate,
and exploit by way of ruthless conquest of Leibnizram, and the acquisition of military means adequate
to neutralize any actual or potential strategic rival or competitor by development and permanent
mobilization of military resources sufficient to project power across the entirety of the planet.
The capacities in which the new regime so established as cited by the International Court of Justice
in the aftermath of the most devastating conflict in world history constituted a fundamental breach
with precedent by virtually every relevant authority and criteria formal and substantive cannot
be overstated. Furthermore, the claims asserted by the tribunal were born of an almost preposterous
hubris, driving not merely from a tortured and opaque naked ideological tautology, but additionally
and perhaps more significantly from epistemic and ontological assumptions that could neither be falsified nor rebutted,
let alone even availed the cursory challenge by the paltry defense afforded the men under indictment,
owing to both the all-encompassing yet deliberately vague essence of the declarations of the tribunal
and its concomitant consumption of absolute moral authority.
The next paragraph you start talking about Western legal tradition.
I know we covered this in the World War II series,
but I mean, I think it should be revisited.
I mean, was there any precedent for an international military tribunal up until this point?
Not in the, no, not according to the parameters that were established by International Military Tribunal, no.
And again, the senator, the, the, the, the, the,
declaring that your representatives are the vanguard of this sort of universal morality.
I mean, again, that's ridiculous.
The fact that anybody would suggest that is preposterous.
You know, and I mean, you see this today.
I mean, the Hague is something of a sick joke.
But these abject mediocrities, these nobodies in Holland declaring that they're the arbiters of this absolute morality.
either like the supreme rabbinic council of the planet.
Like that's that's laughable.
That's delusional, you know, among other things.
And it's always been understood that it's absurd to talk about such things
and outside of a basic moral consensus.
And, you know, again, all internet,
if international law can be said to exist, I mean, we're talking about,
permissive agreements within consensus.
And beyond that, no proceeding is worth a thing where the defendants once availed to
jeopardy, they don't have discovery rights, they don't have meaningful rights to confront
their accuser.
They're incarcerated and being availed to things like sensory deprivation.
You can't defend a criminal case under those conditions.
you know um and um that there being no affirmative duty of the prosecution to avail the defense
to evidence that there's a tendency to exculpate i mean all these things you know and um
so no not in the sense we're talking about well i mean even um i guess yaki was at uh was he at
Dock? Was he at the Dockow trials?
No, it was at some of the lesser
work arms trials. The dog out trail specifically was the trial of
Leipstandardt.
For the
accusations deriving from the Malmody massacre
and some other things. That was essentially its only purpose.
And it was odd that it was
the venue was
dockout, but that was somewhat incidental.
Burton C. Ellis, who was the lead
prosecutor, he was something of
a literal buffoon.
During court
recesses and things, Ellis's staff
was literally breaking into defense counsel's
quarters and stealing things.
Like, it was ridiculous.
It was, it was
this sort of preposterous
comedy of
errors. And like during one
One of the presiding judges, his cleric looked out the window.
Because again, this was held literally in the dockout barracks.
And some kind of dumpy, overweight assistant to Ellis's main prosecutorial team.
He's literally, like, climbing over this fence.
And they see him, like, they see his badass, like, half hanging out the window of defense counsel's quarters as he's, like, breaking in.
You know, and so one of the.
clerks is like, what exactly is he doing?
You know, like, you can't, you can't make this up.
I mean, there was nothing that flagrant on display at Nurember, at least, you know,
not in the kind of slapstick way, but I mean, there's the kind of garbage that,
that it would, that had become normal in these proceedings.
Right.
But in, in most, the most simple form, and again, we covered this in the World War II series
when talking about Nuremberg, I mean, they, it was, it was,
basically Stalinist in that you see what the man did and then create a crime.
Because there was no prohibition, for what they were tried for,
there was no prohibition in international, quote unquote, international law.
Well, yeah, you can't charge people with crimes that didn't exist at the time of
the incidents under review.
But also, like I said, I don't even need to think we, I mean, yeah, that, that was the big
objection of Taft and others.
and that it's a well-placed objection, and it's a global objection,
um,
colloquially speaking.
But I, you know, again, if I don't, if I don't have discovery rights, if I can't confront my accuser,
if I can't, if I can't mount a defense, I mean, it's, any, any such trial, quote-unquote trial is a joke,
you know, um, that, that, that just means I, I, I is the defendants.
I'm, I'm there to be, you know, kind of,
burned an effigy or, you know, flogged and executed as some evil totem, where by some sort of, you know, some sort of morality play designed to beef up, you know, fervor for the regime presiding over the, over the, the affairs at Barr, you know, can,
can pretend as if there's some sort of, you know,
for them proceeding underway when in reality it's just propaganda theater and a way to
ritually condemn the designated victim before formally condemning him.
Right, go a little further here.
For context, the Western legal tradition, pastitious, it may be of London, Athens,
Jerusalem, and Rome, derives from the
the classical Greek idea and ideal of justice.
This can no more be redacted from the conceptual paradigm of justice-quad-justice
than Euclidean and Aristotelian foundational mathematics
can be disavowed in favor of any purported yet heretofore unknown,
more perfect ERISAT's replacement.
The cycle of warfare that commenced in August of 1914
and concluded on Shikselstog, the German Day of Destiny, November 9th, 19th,
can only be considered as an almost purely ideological phenomenon.
The dialectical process that was the progenitor of the three dominant revolutionary ideologies
within the aforementioned conflict was not emergent owing to spontaneous catastrophes
within the delicate ecology of Bismarck's diplomatic and military infrastructure that had
sustained the European peace since Waterloo and facilitated a mastery of technology and
concomitant prosperity. Rather, this process was emergent owing to awareness of power potentialities
a man-quam-man as a foundational slate of sorts, metaphorically speaking, upon which political order
a truly planetary scale could be rendered by a combination of will and deliberate structuring
of statecraft simultaneous to an equally massive psychological conditioning, homogenous across
distances great and small to homogenize the inner sympathies of a categorically political nature
within populations of hundreds of millions to billions of human beings.
Back here, when you mentioned three dominant revolutionary ideologies in the aforementioned conflict,
what are you speaking of?
Capitalism, socialism, and fascism.
That's what.
For centuries and almost certainly for millennia,
the relatively paltry surviving artifacts and purposeful documentation of human political existence
precludes a truly complete and verifiable conceptual record, man held a mythical perspective of the
world in which he was situated. As the 20th century German jurist and political philosopher,
Carl Schmidt elucidated in his magnum opus no most of the earth, quoting here,
in great antiquity there is no concept of a planet of human compass and orientation common to all peoples
in this sense there was no global consciousness and thus no political goal oriented to a common hope
thus a just gentium international law capable of encompassing the whole earth and all humanity was
impossible if one speaks of a just gentium in this age it is only in terms of differing spatial
structures, but not in terms of what later, after the emergence of planetary and global concepts,
was called the law of nations, just gentium, or international law. In this context, we can
regard the philosophical generalizations of the Hellenistic period, which made a cosmopolis
world state out of a polis city state because they lacked a topos orientation and thus had no
concrete order. So basically what we're looking at here and I mean this Schmidt
the Schmidt quote the Schmidt section always hits me hard because if you
realize it's only technology technology and intercontinental travel at mass scale is
really the only is why they're able to they were able to institute this system.
considering that, you know, just basically, you know, a thousand years ago, no one cared about what, you know, that a, no one wanted to impose their, um, their morality on a Russian, unless they were some, like, you know, weird monk, you know, weird, um, monk that was going out and trying to, um, evangelize or something like that.
Essentially, yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, like I said, the whole thing is alien to the human experience as well as was
precedented within, you know, both precedent and potentiality.
If you're going to, I mean, if you're going to, if you're going to, if you're going to,
if you're going to make the claim that the laws, whatever, can be imposed at planetary scale
by naked force to, you know,
know, guarantee compliance. I mean, okay, fine. I mean, you can make that argument.
But this idea that in conceptual terms, there's this kind of universal morality. And again,
the, the arbiters of it are these kinds of self-appointed jurists who derive from, you know,
a handful of structures.
created by the dominant regime.
I mean, and then you're going to literally going to die on that hill
and insist that this is some sort of ontological reality
that borders on delusional,
assuming it's not just a, you know,
a rhetorical device of convenience or something,
made it presented in the course of, you know, policy arguments.
It always bothered me as somebody who doesn't really bear down into the minutia of things,
but looks at things from like large, looks at the grand scale of things, how it bothered me even
before I had any understanding of, you know, any kind of political theory or even broke down,
got down into like theological study that how much just the last 200 years of our existence
is just seems like this insane anomaly almost like a mistake when you look at the rest of
human of humankind of history it just seems like they're like a virus was thrown into
humanity at some point and now we've spawned into something that it
is just unrecognizable to the grand history of humanity.
Yeah, it's substantially anomalous.
I mean, in comparative terms, that's why it's a fool's errand.
And pretty much every mainstream academic does this,
even people who are arguably somewhat more critical of what's become academic convention than others.
They act as if there's some meaningful precedent in absolute terms we derive from the 20th century, and there's not.
You know, that's what's bizarre.
You know, like I said, in policy terms, when I realize that people who fill out the officer court, the U.S. military or idiots.
And the people who, you know, stick out careers in the Pentagon after 19.
89 are like shockingly stupid.
You know, it's not like purplily, they really are.
They're unbelievably stupid.
But, I mean, even accounting for the cretanist nature of these people,
hearing them speak as if massive warfare at planetary scale is this kind of like normal thing that happens
and you've got to prepare for in the absence of conditions,
the totally anomalous conditions that facilitated, it's totally bizarre.
you know, this idea that for no reason whatsoever,
China is going to insist that we must fight the Battle of Midway in 2026 for no reason.
So we, I mean, it's a level of libertines of America has the ability to, you know, mobilize for war at scale anyway.
But even not accounting for that delusion, the idea that, well, we, we've got to constantly be on guard of
Beijing building a surface navy, I guess, in secret,
and then deciding they're going to assault Taiwan for no reason,
and we're going to have to fight the Battle of Midway and the Taiwan Strait.
Again, for no reason at all,
just because this is, you know, something that happens.
And it's some sort of normative schema that characterizes power political affairs.
You know, like I said, it's literally done.
illusional. But also, I mean,
it's as if the people
never got the memo that globalism
happened and after November
9, 1989, the
thing was decided.
You know, like don't get me wrong. I mean,
conflict is
intranity of the human condition
and
power political affairs will always be
characterized by violence because that's
a, you know, that's the currency of power activity.
But
that doesn't
equate to combined arms warring at national scale.
That basically never, ever happens, you know.
But it's, you know, it's all the reason why it's, it's, it's beyond a fool's errand to, to argue with the regime-adjacent academics.
You know, it's like trying to, it's like yelling at somebody who only speak.
Mandarin in English and expecting them to understand things.
All right, we're almost done with this chapter. I'm going to continue reading.
Yeah.
In the pre-modern era, the idea of a teleological unifying theory of politics,
independent of sovereign imperatives axiomatically derived from physical space and territorial
parameters, wherein an identifiable person within whom sovereign authority axiomatically
vested was a conceptual impossibility. There existed no distinction between myth and
historical fact, collective memory and symbolic psychological phenomena. The origins of sovereign
power, both its lineage and its intrinsic authority, were inextricably tethered to occulted mysteries
and theological concepts, however comparatively primitive. The ultimate source of the sovereign mandate,
in common with the territory availed to it, and the founding acts or acts of dominion leading
to its capture, capture use and exclusive appropriation, represented as much as much
of an unknown quantity as the origin of the language spoken by the ethnos in question.
A sacred act or succession of acts by a liminal figure or figures, the shedding of blood in the
course of conquest, and the realization of these processes as the fulfillment of fortune, the
winning of a bargain to the victor, and, among those ancient populations whose cultural psychology
tended towards the cultivation of religious belief structures, what Spengler designated Magian
culture forms, the completion of a discreet covenant with the creator.
European political order and ultimately the normative paradigm on international relations in the
modern era in formal conceptual terms began and ended with the devastation of Germany.
Between the de-fenestration of Prague on May 13, 1618, and the conclusion of the treaties of
Osnabrück and Munster on October 24, 1648, a seemingly end.
Sectorian War, grindingly brutal and simultaneously tactically complex and technologically primitive,
left virtually no Central European territory unscathed. The material destruction, moral desolation,
and bloodshed of combatants and civilians alike span the interior of Bohemia to the Baltic coasts,
from Italian riverbanks to the Scandinavian fjords. The general crisis, as the war was sometimes
called, touched and concerned every aspect of European life and death for the entirety of its
duration. Still, German lands constituted the primary battle space, and it was Germany that was truly
broken as a new epoch of power politics at scale arrived the birth cry of which was a sectarian
called to arms. There is no true academic consensus on the causes ultimate or proximate of the
30 years' war. A diligent student of the conflict will discover, and instead is a set of variables
and documented occurrences that are afforded greater or lesser evidentiary weight that correlates
with influential aspects of zeitgeist at the time of publication, and perhaps more significantly
an alternatively charitable or punitive description of the Habsburg dynasty and the character
of Ferdinand II.
As a deep political crisis developed in Bohemia, which was populated by a Protestant majority,
Ferdinand II, a Jesuit trained and educated Habsburg Zion, inherited the Bohemian crown
and two years subsequent in 1619 became Holy Roman Emperor as well.
A pious Roman Catholic, Ferdinand aimed to remedy the damage wrought by the perceived inadequacies of his immediate predecessors
by reinstituting Catholicism as the sole confessional tendency within the empire
and simultaneously crushing any and all religious dissent.
Ferdin's designs created a situation where vicious sectarian violence engulfed not just the provinces within the ambivalrous.
ambitious emperor's domain, but ultimately the entire region of Central Europe,
dramatic lands, and the entirety of the continent itself. It is imperative, however,
not to merely assign the discrete ambitions of Ferdinand or any other sovereign, nor the persecution
of Protestantism actual and perceived as the exclusive or even primary proximate cause of the
conflict cycle. The origins lie in this author's opinion in the preceding century.
That ends the chapter. I want to go back to this section in the beginning.
The first couple paragraphs here talking about how a sovereign became a sovereign, as opposed to, which is,
it's mysterious, but there's a mystery to it. There's a theological, there's a theological, there's,
a theological angle to it, but there's also a warfare angle to it. And that, it seems like that is
something that is basically what our history is, no matter what, no matter what civilization you're
talking about. Some were more barbarian than others, some were outright savage. But taking this
away from us and turning it into a, you know, voting machines and, you know, the sovereign as the
ideological, you know, the ideological, creating an ideology over the face of the earth that everyone
has to follow no matter how much it butts up against their historical, their historical passions
and how they would live historically. That seems to be something that has devastated,
especially the European soul. Am I just misinterpreting? No, that's part of it. And I,
yeah, it's ridiculous to declare that political authority derives from some bureaucracy or from,
or from proceduralism or from the ability to declare that, you know, you legitimately hold an office.
I mean, that's, that's obviously nonsense.
You know, that's not, that's not to say that I've got any particular passion for royalty or something.
I mean, that's not, that's not the American way, and that's certainly not the dissent.
their Protestant way.
But, you know, this idea that government derives from procedures and procedural norms.
I mean, it really misses the point.
There's an illiteracy there.
You know, I mean, some people are well aware of this.
And I mean, and that's their notion is to create this sort of overlay a slave morality and mediocrity to everything.
as a very deliberate design,
but in a lot of,
in a lot of cases,
it's,
it derives from a kind of monumental ignorance.
Right.
But also,
but also,
there's a perverse suggestion
about what government is
that characterizes the late modern era.
The idea that
government is a social engineering bureaucracy
that is just entitled
to,
you know,
to take your,
money and appropriate your property and wait if we didn't if if if we weren't being
policed by these by by the by these mediocrities who populate these offices like
we'd immediately resort to like rapine and looting I mean that that's ridiculous and
any anybody who thinks that way is serious problems but yeah go ahead oh no no I was
just gonna say um and wrapping up that um there was a lot there in the last couple
paragraphs, but they will be explicated further in the next chapter. So I'll leave that for the
next time. Yeah, sure. All righty. Well, everybody, go buy the book. It's on Amazon. It's selling well.
It's amazing. This is something that our people should be celebrating. And when we were at Thomas's
birthday and in Milwaukee two weekends ago people were celebrating it and every I think
everyone is genuinely happy for Thomas but also that these ideas are are getting out there
and people that you would not expect to be I mean I saw a and it was it was a criticism
but some historian had done a review of the book on Substack.
I forget who linked it to, but I'm just like,
he picked up on a lot of what you had to say and agreed with so much what you had to say.
But then when he disagreed, it wasn't, it was all basically feelings.
It just turned, it just turned into, oh, this buddy.
it up against my feel so um yeah i'm not going to uh i'm not going to mention the guy's name
because i don't want to give him any uh well no i mean that's not that's not a good look i mean people
don't have to like the book or agree with it you know it's not but uh i i don't i don't just say things
and i certainly don't commit things to publication that i i don't think can stand on their own terms
you know um and yeah like declaring that you you that this like offends you because only a bad man
would say that or that's not a good look for a rational adult yeah yeah they'll um he also
had to do the uh the thing that so many do um he had to include a picture of you thomas because
you know you're um you know your your rock and roll look just isn't
good for a historian.
But I didn't realize I was like trying to win a beauty contest.
And I was like, but I mean also beyond that,
should I dress like Orville Redenbacher or something?
Like I don't, I, I don't know, man.
Like I, it's not a, you know,
yeah, I find that I find that incredibly odd.
Like I don't, I didn't, I didn't realize that,
I didn't realize we were all like seventh grade girls or something.
I just wanted to say that,
yeah,
we were all happy for you and proud of you and yeah that was it that was a good time and um no no
the reception of the book has been tremendous and yeah i these past couple weeks were just fantastic man
i'm very very honored and very humbled yeah all right go by the book it'll be linked in the show
notes and in the description in the video and also um real uh real thomas seven seven seven seven
7.substack.com and Thomas 777.com. The T is a 7. And that's where you can find Thomas.
Thank you, buddy. Appreciate it. Yeah. Thank you.
