The Pete Quiñones Show - Pre-1945 German/Islam Relations w/ Thomas777 - Complete

Episode Date: February 4, 2026

3 HoursPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.This is the complete series on pre-1945 Germany's relationship with the Moslem world.Radio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Buy Me a CoffeeThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas' WebsiteThomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

I want to welcome everyone back to the Piquaneda show. I'm here with Thomas and building off of the episode that we, the deviation episode from the 30 years war, in the same, in the same subject matter, Thomas is going to jump in. So take it away, Thomas. I wanted to talk about the relationship of the third right. to the Islamic world, specifically Palestine, and Palestine was absolutely affiliated with the access powers in direct capacities. And there was very good offices between the Fuhr and the grand Mufti al-Husini, who despite what propaganda and mainstream history suggests, he was a, he came from

from a lineage that very much had a claim to the mantle of leadership in Palestine and from a very proud lineage that was and remains very respected among Palestinians across the sectarian divide, Christian and Muslim. In order to understand that relationship though, it's important to deal with the relations between the German Reich and in the Islamic world generally. And early, on the Third Reich viewed the Islamic world not in reductionist terms

but as very much a political force that had momentum in the historical process but that also was an important ally to be cultivated in the war against Bolshevism

and Jewry as they viewed it. And this wasn't just pragmatic there was a basic affinity there with some qualifications. And this is important. And it's impossible to talk about this with people in a rational manner because they just go berserk, if you mention Islam. They've been that brainwashed.

Some of these people are just incredibly stupid. But, you know, the majority continues to take their cues from legacy music. media and from regime ideologies. The only thing comparable to it is people go utterly berserk if I attack the president. I don't know what they think the president is doing for them lately or why they think he's some incredible personage. But, you know, I'm not here to make friends or to try and convert stupid people to make them intelligent or reasonable.

It's just, you know, one of the reasons I disdain social media. because it's impossible to have serious conversations there because aside from the paid agitators and disruptors, there's just this whole peanut gallery of idiots. You think it's like a video game or something. And they've decided they've convinced themselves they have some take on everything. And even though they spend their days exclusively in their own house or Walmart, they decided they have some take on Islam when they have no understanding of it whatsoever. whatever. So not just, I mean, don't get me wrong. I'm very blessed. There's anybody who spends time

with capital T. traditionalist authors, you know, Marcia Eliotti, René Ginnon, particularly, because I mean, obviously he was a Sufi Muslim. Julius Evela, they all wrote extensively on, on Dar al-Islam and Muhammad and his role in the historical process and things like. that and obviously I've got a fair amount of Muslim comrades on the ground Wachia and Sunni you know her both good friends and and reliable partisans but who I can seek out to discuss comparative theology with them things so I'm not suggesting I'm isolated in that regard it just it reaffirms why I am a vanguardist because most people aren't built for this in all kinds of ways and

they don't even have their own prejudices. Their prejudices are Jewish prejudices. Or they're ones that, you know, they glean from legacy media apparatus or about fucking around on the Internet with people who are probably paid agitators or like random guys in India or something, just saying things. It's like a staggering degree of ignorance. But anyway, I'll stop ranting at the subs. The general disposition of the Reich towards Islam, the Islamic world, like I said, they viewed it as a global force that was playing an essential role in the unfolding historical process.

They also predicted that although there wasn't going to be the imminent emergence of a new caliphate, to replace the seat of Darryl Islam that obviously was vacated by the collapse of the Ottomans. And to be clear, the Kaiser Reich and the Ottoman Empire were very close allies. So the Germans had a particularly the German academic, which had a very strong Orientalist bent and the Foreign Service, many of whom remained into the Third Reich. They had a

fairly highly developed understanding of Islam and of the several cultures that constituted. And obviously as the war went on, the non-European territories that were directly occupied by the Vermat

were largely Islamic. countries and syria yvall which is the seed of european islam was occupied by by the rike so uh

that's that's important all these um all these variables been intertwined and as i've written about in my manuscript and i believe i've discussed here with pete previously the mass occurs or the annihilation

therapy that was perpetuated against minority elements in the nascent Turkish state. The world came to know about that owing to a Max von Schuzener Richter, who was deployed there, and he alerted both the Red Cross and the... and the Berlin foreign office. And he was told in on certain terms to stop agitating for some sort of localized intervention or relief for these people, because relations with Ankara are very important,

especially in these times of uncertainty. And I make the point that, well, and von Schuvener-Richter, he fell at the, at the Munich Pooch in November 1923 and Hitler went on record is saying that he was the one he said the party never recovered from the death of Schubertr. He was an essential

personage to the National Socialist Party and the revolution. And so I make the point in my manuscript, so if if from inception the NSDAP was this hyper-racialized, you know, murderous, conspiratorial cadre that simply hated all non-Aryan races, why was Richter the only man who was raising alarm about what was happening in Asia Minor? Nobody seems to be able to answer that question for me. They simply ignore it or say I'm lying or move on without addressing it.

but be as it may. The Third Reich, although arguably there's the deepest sort of diplomatic rapport and cultural rapport enjoyed with Darl Islam, the other major access nations made similar efforts to curate and mobilize Islamic support. Mussolini, he famously, I mean, this was very performative and very stage managed, but in 1937, he arranged for this ceremony where he was presented with a quote, sort of Islam at a public ceremony in Tripoli, symbolically holding himself in the kingdom of Italy out as a protector of the Muslim world against communism. and he went on to declare that the quote laws of the prophet would be honored. Gerbils actually made note of this in his diaries,

prolific as he was as a diary, which was one of the reasons that's such a valuable artifact. He had kind of a cynical take on this. He said, you know, the Deuchy never never, passes up an opportunity to glorify himself as the protector of other peoples, you know, which was, which was true. And I don't think Duce had some deep affinity for Islam or spent much time learning about its theological precepts. But it was imperative, particularly considering the primary battle space that Italy was committed to with that juncture to try and curate the support of these people,

or at least mitigate any hostility that might be emergent otherwise. Similarly, the Shinto is Japan they established the greater Japan Islamic League. And

simultaneously, the Tokyo Mosque was established at 1938. And they very much dedicated a lot of effort and resources, both military and capital, to encouraging an Islamic uprising against the Dutch, and radicalizing people in the Dutch Indies

against both the British and the Midlanders. And like I said, in the case of the Reich, this long predated the National Socialist Revolution, the central powers, you know, particularly the Kaiser Reich, the Ottoman Empire was an essential ally theirs. And until they got knocked out of the war, they played an essential role in allowing Germany to sustain. a two-front conflict. There's so much emphasis on the Western Front and the maelstrom and slaughter that represented if not enough ink dedicated to the the Ust Front of World War I,

where it wasn't the stalemate that came to pass in the West because the open step precluded it and facilitated maneuver poison gas was used to greater effect in the east as well

and obviously you know until the when the after the Russian Revolution the the Reichs failure was victorious I mean that was one of the big sore points of the

of the military in the wake of Versa. as they were forced to give up these territories that they won on the battlefield. But, you know, before an entire army deployed to the east was freed up, you know, by the Red Revolution and the Treaty of Brestotosk, the Ottomans were playing an essential. role in the prize rights Jewish strategic flank and Wilhelm who was not any kind of

great diplomat nor strategic thinker he went out of his way to sustain good offices with the Ottomans you know Holveg was very much the political mind behind

the Kaiser Reich, but the Kaiser himself, particularly in dealing with you know, fellow monarchs and we make no mistake, you know, even in its waiting days, an

Ottoman Sultan at great authority, it was essential for dictates and declarations as well as insinuations both subtle and flagrant come from the Kaiser himself.

But, you know, so German Ottoman authorities, they collaborated and tried to cultivate Pan-Islamic consciousness in North Africa, in the Near East, in Russia, and India. I mean, this was a long-standing effort. It's not just a question that emerged in 1939. And in World War II, as the Vermont and the VARMAC and the Vof on SS, even early on as they found themselves deployed to Islamic lands, German authorities were explicit that Islam was of political importance and sold out and were instructed to respect religious customs

and show respect for Islam when dealing with Muslims and to treat them as friendlies unless they exhibited disrespect for the Reich. its heraldry or for you know the the personal honor of soldiers and officers um on the aust front the uh the rike went as far as they ordered the reestablishment of mosques and madrasas and they set aside pious endowments for their reestablishment of of islamic religious life i mean they did they did the same thing with with orthodox churches but i mean that goes up saying if you know the history of the conflict and the political side of things uh you know they this went a long way to undermining the soviet rule because moslems were

targeted with as much hostility as as the orthodox were you know um and gerbils himself made the point that the early Soviet cadres in kvv and the czecha they they hated the moslems retnosticarian reasons as much as they did the christians and and he viewed them as their oppressors and did incredibly brutal things and tried to try to extricate related sensibility from islamic communities um very much cultivated very much cultivated you know, the Ulama in eastern territories. And the Balkans especially, that's how headway was made.

And as the Balkan theater became this counterinsurgency quagmire, that became very important. And Ante Pavlovich Poglovnik of the independent state of Croatia, he was raised in a town early in his life that had a very large

Muslim population and Pavlov himself, he knew a lot about Islam and their rituals. There's photographs of him wearing a fez when he's

meeting with Bosniaks. It's very interesting. And he famous he viewed Bosnia X as quote racial Croatians and Sunni Islam

was viewed as a state religion alongside Roman Catholicism albeit secondary to it but that that that sort of expedited

these efforts in the Balgan Theater, which would have been a lot more difficult if the Eustachia was openly hostile to Bosniak populations. And the Vermat and the Varnak and the Bafn-NSS, they granted a lot of religious freedom to Muslim recruits. in Muslim formations the religious calendar

was taken into a account dietary laws with respect to the mess hall and things both the Vermeck and the Vafan SS

had imams served as chaplains and they launched ideological education programs to explicate how, you know, a Muslim should live as a national socialist, you know, and what the meaning was of national socialism to non-Germanic yet allied races.

This was very, very detailed, whatever, if any, whether anybody agrees with this or not. you know and these education programs were almost unfailingly delivered by military imams the only times they weren't is when an imam wasn't available and Bosniac imams in particular played an outsized role again Sarajevo, only about two million Muslims lived in Sarajevo, but that's the European seat of Islam. And the way Muslims viewed it throughout the Muslim diaspora was, you know, being sort of the seat of Islamic culture in Europe. and also being very directly threatened by by communism there was a peculiar interest in the fortunes of the bosniaks of syriyevo and reciprocally pious sunis you know pious uh the bosniac sunnis they had a strong

interest in the fortunes their co-religionists you know behind the they were still behind the verbal wire in the Soviet Union and in Palestine you know the military formal military policy towards Islamic peoples and broad strategic terms really that policy paradigm first originated on July 25th, 1940, just after the fall of France, you know, and as the Battle of Britain was getting underway, a man named Max von Oppenheim, he was a retired diplomat and an Orientalist scholar. He spontaneously sent a memorandum, a seven-page memorandum, to the foreign in office, suggesting that it was both imperative to cultivate the populations and the enemies, Islamic territories, and do everything possible to incite a rebellion against the British

authorities there, and moving forward to give whatever military material aid and and diplomatic encouragement as was reasonable and feasible. You know, and he said if, he said that time is nigh for a comprehensive strategy to mobilize the Islamic world against the British Empire. But he said also if the British have time to consolidate forces and suppress an nascent rebellion and while, meanwhile, holding, you know, German forces at bay in theater, the opportunity will not repeat. He's also Oppenheim, who spent most of his adult life traveling and living in the Islamic world. He'd reached out directly as a private person since his retirement.

He was in his early 80s, I believe. to pan-Islamic religious figures like Shakib Arslan, and more significantly to the grand Mufti Amin al-Husini. And they became very close. And largely at Oppenheim's behest, Hitler, who had a somewhat tempestuous relationship with the foreign office, he took this seriously and German officers were

deployed to the entire Muslim corridor where there was a British imperial presence from Egypt to India and of course subsequently

the grand move to Yel Usani was able to gain a personal audience with the Hitler and we'll get to that but this was the this was the origin of what became a strategic imperative in political and military terms

I mean that's important for its own sake but also Ribbentrop is other cast of some sort of fool or an incompetent or the foreign office is cast as in the same sort of terms as the Abvera as this sort of a posth of a fifth column is and Hitler's cast as this provincial

nationalist who didn't understand the felt politic. I mean, all that is ridiculous. And this, the relationship of the Reich to the Islamic world

in particular stands in a rebuttal to that inference. And, so I mean, this is an important subject matter for that reason.

And Oppenheim, he 'd served in the Kaiser Reich for decades and few there's few people then living who knew as much about Islam

and Islamic societies as he did. And more than any one man he was responsible for shaping the Kaiser's disposition towards Islam generally. He was trained as a lawyer by education. He'd become fluent in several Middle Eastern languages,

including various Arab dialects as well as Turkish. He'd traveled for years through Africa and the Middle East. And in 1896, when he was a fisherman, recruited by the foreign office, he himself's only posted for 12 years in Cairo, where he directly monitored political developments and cultivated enduring relationships with Arab and Islamic leadership.

In Sudan, during the Madi Rebellion, he'd been on the ground there, and what he attested to, in subsequent years was that's when he first encountered Islam as a political force. He always understood the deeply integral structure of Islam in conceptual terms, but this had all been abstract or academic until this point. In Sudan, he came to realize that Islam had a strong role to play in the burning political process, that it had an ability to animate pious elements

towards direct military action and therein it was a force multiplier and that there is a peculiar interplay of deep theology and political and military imperatives in the Islamic world and the Western power that could integrate that into its own political soldiery

would carry the day in theater. And he'd been able to gain Oppenheim had, he'd been able to gain audiences with the Ottoman Sultan with a number of other luminaries both reactionaries and reformers. What they were hold in common was

a belief in advocacy of the pan-Islamic cause in lieu of this sort of narrow ethno-nationalism that was still characteristic in the colonized world and substantial measure. And

Oppenheim's dispatches were delivered personally to the Kaiser who basically viewed them as gospel in terms of how to proceed in the Near East and

North Africa. And the Kaiser, Wilhelm for all of his shortcomings, which were myriad, and he was in many respects, the Reich was unfortunately saddled with him. He did delegate to experts. I think of the reason it's Holveig

subsequently had the sort of power he did and on matters relating to a Veltpolitik the Kaiser tended to defer to people he viewed as the experts and that's very Prussian

and that's why despite Germany not having a global profile in terms of directly administered colonies in the way that the United Kingdom or France or the Spanish or the Portuguese did, they tend to do

very well at at cultivating allies in the developing world. And this went, some of this was, and we'll get into this in our 30 Years War series, as on this side, I want to cover this, what I'm about to discuss, as well as the sort of proxy war that was going on in Japan during the 30 years war between the Catholics and specifically Dutch reformed elements.

But the Ottomans had granted asylum. to Protestants, both Lutheran and Reformed, who were either refugees of hostilities in the 30-year-s war or were wanted by the Inquisition. And a sort of cultural rapport developed between Protestant Germany and Sunni Islam. And I think that that's something that's understated in a lot of these otherwise very complete. accounts of the subject matter. But even limited as the Kaiser X colonial profile

was, the Kaiserite did, in the colonies that did have rule over um, did rule over Islamic populations in in Togo and Cameroon and Germany's Africa and now in Namibia, you know, and, uh, obviously,

it was far easier. I mean, I mean, Africans are a, subterian Africans are, there's challenges to managing those populations just because of profound alienage. It's obviously, but the colonial authorities obviously found it easier to deal with Islamic elements than

pagan ones who described to some sort of folk animism or something and from the outset curated good offices with Islamic elements in these territories and local Islamic structures weren't disturbed so long as

Muslim leaders accepted the colonial presence in German Africa Sharia courts recognized Islamic endowments weren't touched or taxed Madrasas were left open religious holidays were acknowledged

and the Germans wisely they ruled through Muslim intermediaries and Islamic dignitaries. You weren't generally going to be visited in your township by some by a white man or a German colonial administrator and it would be an African Muslim intermediary or

a respected man in the local mosque who you deal with and he in turn to deal with the Germans and on the one hand this left colonial governor somewhat isolated but in the other hand it also meant that these intermediaries they had the might of the

Kaiser Reich behind them in the event of an uprising So indirect rule was highly effective and that it's not discussed enough that again in comparative terms limited as the German colonial profile and experience was it very much was a school of a political rule and high political intrigue and they were very good at it. And I think that's, I think it's not often enough acknowledged, other than in very perfunctory terms. And this also led to as these kinds of colonial, as more and more business was done in the colonies, and as a geostrategic imperative developed around the German presence, there was more and there was more and more of the, these sort of colonial congresses, formal and informal, between military and political and business authorities within the Kaiser Reich.

This led to the development of a cadre of experts in Islamic studies in German academic studies. And there was always a streak of Orientalism in modern German academic academic anyway but these guys who previously

really only were focused on classical Islam and you know the their relations with the the Greeks and things

they shifted their conceptual focus very much under the contemporary Maslow world and what a proper imperial policy should be towards Islam qua Islam

and there really wasn't something comparable in the UK or France there was philology type stuff and you know obviously a very advanced cultural anthropology but a kind of political science

of how European Christiandom should index with Islam and power political capacities that was pretty much exclusive to the Reich. There was a

German colonial institute formally established. One of their big luminaries was a guy named Carl Heinrich Becker and a couple of his colleagues, Martin Hartman and Dietrich Vesterman. Becker was centered in Hamburg, Hartman and Vesterman in Berlin.

They placed themselves and their faculty at the full disposal of the German Empire. And the entirety of their labors and their endowment was put in the service of investigating and studying Islam and the colonies, accumulating knowledge on its spread, historical and contemporary, its impact on power political affairs. There was these massive surveys undertaken by Becker Hartman and Vesterman in 1906, 1911, and 1913, respectively, which were then submitted to the Kaiser through the Colonial Institute, to the foreign office, onward to the Kaiser. And this became a, you know, viewed as power political dogma in terms of how to proceed in policy terms,

both formally and, you know, below board. the German society for the study of Islam. It published a periodical, the Veltz de Islam's, the world of Islam. And that became regarded as the seminal European academic journal on contemporary Islamic faith and practice and politics. And you know, most people,

too, even in the UK, which supposedly is full of these, you know, progressives and people who have a... I don't think progressives know what they're talking about, obviously, don't. But it's characterized supposedly by this sort of progressive sensibility in academia.

And then the other hand, these sort of Machiavellian types have a deep understanding of alien cultures and how to establishes establish and maintain power therein most of the most of these german experts their counterparts they they just looked at uh you know indigenous religions whether they actually were savage

you know forms of animism or paganism and islam is just so much you know so much nonsense or something you know primitive it was uh it was these german philologists and cultural studies types and orientalists who you know emphasized the Kaiser and demonstrated

within and without of their own closer to academe you know look this Islam is a a formative civilizing element the

higher races within Darul Islam, if you'll allow the descriptor, produce extraordinarily high culture. And Islam has brought millions by millions of people out of ignorance and savagery. And even if one doesn't accept that, it's a singular power of political force that is playing an essential role in the political process underway into then nascent 20th century. And to be clear, this is when Christianity was under full assault by the communists. And it was when this, however contrived to me have been, this enforced secularism reigned throughout the Western world. That's one of the things that set the stage.

for the Bolshevik revolution. You know, so Islam is this catalyzing element really stood alone among world religions. I mean, don't get me wrong. I, there was pious Christians who were quite literally waging a holy war against the communists. And I, yes, I, I,

I believe in symbolic psychological terms and anthropological terms that all politics is essentially theological. But I'm talking in terms of conscious religious practice and the ability of religious imperatives to animate political affairs. In the early 20th century, Islam really stood alone in that capacity at global social. scale. That's what I'm talking about for clarity. And that this was not lost obviously on these

people that were talking about. Probably the best known political theorist who devised a praxis of imperial rule vis-a-vis Islam was Carl Heinrich Becker. he emphasized again and again

he said Islam wasn't as the British claim a threat the colonial government he said not only is it not a threat but that it should and can be used to bolster imperial rule and to guarantee

peace stability in public order he said that the main reason why the white Western power hours were coming into hostile contact with Islamic cultures was because they were either treating Muslim populations like they were animus or pagan savages or they were viewing observance of Islamic practice as somehow inherently subversive, you know, and that integral

aspect of Islam not only did it render it an essentially political confession in a way that other faiths are not but it also meant that

to attack any aspect of its observance was to attack every aspect of the reigning way of life and theater. And this wasn't a minority opinion among the German colonial authorities, both political, diplomatic, and military. German colonial officers didn't have a hostile disposition towards Islam. And they correctly viewed... The anti-imperialist elements and the pro-communist elements in theater that claimed to be pan-Islamic, they weren't, really.

Because the two, it was an irreconcilable velcern. There was superficially Islamist language in Moscow's propaganda, as well as within some of the, anti-colonial ideological subcultures but there was no depth to it. Johann von Lear's and we'll get into him next episode, he's a lesser-known personage within the Third Reich who, and it was an essential personage to the National Socialist resistance or the day of defeat. I hold him in great esteem, but he correctly recognized. Islam's not reactionary. In fact, it tends towards a revolutionary paradigm, but it is socially conservative in terms of its view of authority. And a, a sultan or a, a, a

king or a colonial governor or a procurator or an occupying general even if he himself is not of the faith and not of your people if he protects Islam from its enemies

and allows the free observance of Islam you are obligated as a good Muslim to not revolt against him for example Wilhelm when his far as he in the autumn 1898 he uh the Kaiser uh went on a tour of uh the german colonies and

and of the holy land in the middle east generally and he visited damascus specifically to visit the tomb of Salhadin. And he gave a speech to all these, you know, assembled masses of people where he declared himself to be a friend of Islam and the German Empire to be a friend of Islam and of, quote, the world's 300 million Mohammedians, you know, to give you an idea of the priority that Berlin put on the cultivation of this relationship.

It wasn't just a minor consideration emergent in the foreign office or something that colonial officers posted in theater were trying to force the Kaiser and the government to take notice of you know and uh this paid uh this this this paid dividends i mean not you know again not only uh did it maintain good offices with the ottomans who were in real trouble then but who were

an essential ally you know within the bound irrationality of the power political paradigm that you know um reached critical zenith in 1914 but there there was an enduring affinity between the rike the german people and darrell islam that endured through the cold war in my opinion you know it was uh this is a bit of a tangent but you know the only the only marxist leninist Arab state was South Yemen and it was a cadre of East Germans who really were the intermediary between the Warsaw Pact, the East Block and the indigenous Arabs there. The book John Kohler is this Cold War II. department guy.

He wrote a really interesting book on the Stasi. I mean, he's very much a pro-regime kind of guy, Cold Warrior type. And I believe he was probably like a lot of State Department people. I think he was probably an intelligence guy under diplomatic cover.

But he wrote about the Stasi and the National Folks Army's presence in Yemen. You know, he tried to cast as pejoratively as possible, you know, suggesting that, you know, all these East Germans swaggering around, like, colonial overlord. It's like, well, I mean, they, they're doing something right. The Yemenis didn't open fire on them and send them packing. I mean, I, and the Yemenis aren't exactly a people who take a knee for others just because, you know, if anything, there is, impossible to govern as the Pashtuns. And they,

it was, it was the DDR that really sold him on the idea of, of Stalinism. I mean, there's, South Yemen, there's a confusing pastiche of, of,

political intrigues in Yemen. But, I mean, obviously, and not suggesting that the soul, or even the primary proximate cause of them, align with the East block was, East German persuasiveness or intrigues. But interestingly, one of the Yemeni militias today in the south of country, they ride under the flag of South Yemen, you know, and they claim a drag lineage to that holiday.

You know, so it's, there's something there. but yeah that I think that should be adequate foundation man there's a couple other authors I want to get into relating to the orientalist academic culture in the Kaiser Reich and then later

in the Third Reich and the impact that had on conceptual matters but I want to get into the Grand Mufti al-Husini and Palestine and its status as an axis element and things.

And then I promise after that we'll get back to the 30 years war. But this is important, and it's particularly timely, in my opinion. Okay. Do you think you're going to be able to talk about the Grand Mufti and Van Leeuars in one episode, or is this possibly going to be three? Yeah, they might go three, but I'll see what I can do. I'll try and expedite it. Well, don't, yeah.

I don't leave anything out just to, you know, we can do three episodes. That would be perfectly fun. Okay. Yeah. Thanks for hosting me. Of course, always. Head on over to Thomas's Substack, realthomas-777.com. And his website is Thomas-T-777.com.

The T is a 7. And you can connect to everything from either one of those places. And if you want to try and find him on X where, um, where, you know, his account could be gone one day and, um, back the next. Yeah, they can be banned constantly. I mean, X is a, X is a total pile of shit. Like it, like it really is. I, I'm not trying to play murder, but I only, I only maintain an account there because people of some reason can't move on from it. And it's, it's kind of a one-stop place to index of people and stuff.

as a kids say as a kid say um or used to say this this phrase is probably uh played out by now it's really fake and gay yeah it's garbage it's it's really fucking garbage and yeah it's fake and gay as well all right thomas talks you in a couple days thank you want to welcome everyone back to the peeking yono show thomas is back for part two talking about um the relationship between Islam and not only the Third Reich, but you know, you talked about the Kaiser years in the first part. So jump right in. Thanks. Yeah, and subsequently, I at least want to dedicate a brief addendum to discussing the post-war resistance and exile. and how that dovetailed with the cause of Palestinian liberation and Pan Islamic consciousness generally.

I think we got into some of that when we were talking about the post-war diaspora of national socialist in exile. We were talking about how Der Vague, which Johann von Weirs as well as Otto Riemer and Hans Rudell was a major contributor to, both in terms of his work product and capital investment. And when Argentina was no longer a friendly environment for that sort of partisan activity, going to Peron being forced out of office,

von Lear's made his way to the court of Nassar, and Egypt and Syria in particular were very much the loci of that kind of partisan activity. And that's significant because that plays into the not just the military culture of the region on the Arab side, many of whom were trained by former National Socialists and Vermach's veterans, but also it impacted the culture of resistance in profound ways. And that's something that's overlooked. And we talked a bit about the odd dialectics of the DDR and the Roth Army fraction and Horstimau.

Obviously, the element he was representing when he was on the ground and the Levant was that of the DDR and the Roeth Army fraction. But he did a lot to facilitate deep contact and operational interdependence with the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine. and the nascent PLO and things. And this all ties together, not just conceptually, but in terms of a common nucleus of operative fact, if that makes sense. I let me see, I try to,

I always try to indicate in my outlines where I leave off. So if I'm repeating myself, please let me know. I raised Von Lears because if memory serves we left off talking about Von Lears and some of his work

early on and after the National Socialist Revolution as early as 1994-35 he was attempting to create good offices with you know European Muslims in the Balkans

as well as with elements in Palestine and behind the proverbial wire in the Soviet Union. And Van Leer has very much had the ear of Gerbil's as time went on. Goebbels actually, through the propaganda ministry, he instructed the press to paint a positive image of Islam, or at least not a negative one. This long proceeded to war. And he urged journalists

under the penumbra of the propaganda ministry to give credit to the Islamic world as a cultural factor that plays a historically significant role in the historical process. And that alliance between the national socialist cause and pan-Islamism and the liberation of the Holy Land is, you know, completely commensurate with a component of a national socialist Veltepolitik. You know, and this is important for a few reasons. It sheds light not just on the deep ideological culture and philosophical disposition and national socialism.

It's standard bears, but also it's yet another rebuttal of the claim that the Third Reich was this provincial state that didn't understand the cultural and strategic situation outside of immediate battle theaters. And that's preposterous for a lot of reasons. many of which are obvious. Germany was a very cosmopolitan country, not in the modern pejorative sense. I mean in the 19th and early 20th century European sense. Von Leer is, of course, too,

he was a linguist. He was fluent in something like 13 different dialects. He was a cultural anthropologist. I mean, what we consider a cultural anthropologist. He was a philologist. He was an expert on Islam and Oriental societies. And he was very much a Wright Higalian. And he wrote an essay, probably his most famous essay,

and it's fairly accessible online. I don't know if you can find a translation that's not corrupted by AI Slop. But it was titled Judaism and Islam as opposites. And in Hegelian terms, Van Leer is viewed Islam as the dialectical antithesis of Judaism and a splendid repudiation of it.

And he said that that's one of the reasons why the caliphate wasn't subverted by a hostile Jewish element within because these recalcitrant people were locked behind ghetto walls. And every aspect of the Islamic cultural, social, and legal code precluded them mobilizing in a hostile capacity to wage war from within. by subterfuge or any other way. And whether anybody accepts that perspective or not, or think that it is merit within the Higalian paradigm or without, it's a fascinating theory.

And I highly recommend any of Von Lear's essays that you can run down. I mean, admittedly, I've got a discrete interest in the subject matter and it's relevant to my own research but i aside from that i i believe it's essential to having a complete understanding in conceptual terms of the third rike and the national socialist ideological culture um and von leers wasn't alone in his overall perspectives um he was a he was a well regarded racial theorist

and he was an associate of Hans Gunter Hans F. K. Goenter who was another well-known racialist both these guys that are profile comparable to

Houston's Stuart Chamberlain or Lothrop Stodd for comparison plus his book Ross Ross Unseil, race and soul, was, for all practical

purpose, as a bestseller, if memory serves. And for different reasons, the data that he cited, because, again,

he, Klaus and Gunter both had very much a, a materialist view of race but they were in substantial agreement with Julius Evela and Renee Gienan

in suggesting a basic affinity between the master castratum of the Nordic race and that of you know the caliphate in other words Islam was a emergent and curated by the natural racial overcast within Darl Islam.

And that's one of the reasons it's so splendidly tailored to this integral concept of sovereignty, where every man is in his place and the caste system remains undisturbed because it emerges from the natural hierarchy within, you know, the Oriental paradigm from where it was emergent. Klaus wrote reports for the SS head office

on political affairs and strategic matters relating to anthropological considerations. And he wrote a paper that was submitted titled Preparation of an Operation for Winning Over the Islamic Peoples. And within it, he reflected on the good offices between the Kaiser Reich and the Ottoman Empire. empire. He talked about the warrior heritage of many of the step people who were, you know, very, very much culturally Muslim. And he said it's important to emphasize similarities in Velt and Schum between national socialist doctrine and ethics and the Koran. you know and um that's very interesting and to be clear klaus wasn't suggesting that national socialism was intended as some sort of irisot's religion i know that that's something a lot of anti-fascists like to claim and bandy he was acknowledging that the islamic faith structure is very very different

than religion in the Occident it's the integral aspects of it that are significance because Islam is a political doctrine and an ethical disposition as well as the theological

system and that's what's key and if you're a Hegelian which essentially ever everybody associated what the Third Reich was, to some degree or another, you view the development of religiosity

as being very much bound up with the dialectical process within the relevant culture. And the variables that, the historical variables that created Islam were very

congress with those that gave rise to national socialism particularly the perennial existential ross and creg

against the Jew so it's not really a stretch you know and again you've you've got to understand the conceptual parameters of of the time and place that these ideas were being postulated. There was a unique receptivity, actual potential.

You know, and a lot of people who otherwise know the subject matter are overly dismissive of that. Interestingly, Klaus, After the war, he abandoned biological racialism. He remained an Orientalist academic, and he ultimately converted to Islam. That was the case with Carl Wolf, the SS adjutant to the permanent SS adjutant to the fur. Later, he commanded troops. in the field and he was highly decorated he wasn't just a parade ground soldier but he's

a fascinating guy and in David Irving's true Himmler which is a great book I I understand some people's lament that it you can tell that it was intended to be two volumes and Irvin you know the infirmity of old age that strikes us all down, struck Irving before you complete it. But what there is of it is just fantastic. But anyway, Carl Wolf's testimony is cited extensively. Anyway, Carl Wolf's daughter, Fatima Grimm, she married that Czech Bosniak Muslim guy,

that she converted to Islam. And she became an Islamic theologian, and she wrote extensively on jihad as a concept. And I realized Klaus and Fatima Grimm and people like Ahmed Huber, who was a fascinating personage. I believe Huber would have been indicted after 9-11 had he not died. but that's a subject or a discussion for another day. I realize these people are outliers.

I'm not suggesting that it's normative or some sort of natural progression within German cultural dialectics to convert to Islam. I've got tremendous respect for Islam, but I could never imagine converting to Islam, with the exception of somebody, like Renee Dynon, who truly went native. I mean, living among Muslims and living in the Orient

for essentially his whole life. That's a different phenomenon. However, with those qualifiers, there is some sort of internal logic, especially consider the catastrophe of the day of defeat and the subsequent occupation. There is some sort of internal logic. logic to the peculiar spiritual journey of von Leer's of Fatima Graham of

Klous, I believe, but I'm sure the rebuttal of that is that that's speculation. And there was others too. There was other academic writers. Schmitz Lindemann, Reichhardt, who posited not just an alliance at geostrategic convenience, but an ideological affinity between Islam and the national socialist state on Higalian grounds. Lindemann went as far as to say that in some of the propaganda that he drafted intended for Islamic societies so the

pure principle is the Occidental variant of you know the principle that animates the caliphate.

You know and Reichard knew the Koran very well so he was able to cite passages that conveyed the notion that

Muhammad was the fear of the believers and subsequently the caliph represented that role you know and but he made clear

that the fear is comparable to the Mahdi you know he's not suggesting the fear as a prophet you know it was very intelligently tailored for its purpose um you know and of course

Muslims were under tremendous pressure by the by the communists you know they were they were targeted as severely as Orthodox Christians were um you know and that also um provided an

avenue of ingress for uh this kind of discursive affinity and um after uh as early as 1936, the major transmitter of German propaganda to the Mediterranean and

North Africa and the Middle East was in Zesson, which was a small town south of Berlin. And it housed at the time one of the most powerful shortwave transmitters in the world. It had been built for the transmit for the 1936 Olympics. and after 19th as of 1939

the broadcast station is Zesson it brought it had an Arabic broadcast every day you know intended for Turks, Iranians, Muslims who were then

within the British Raj there was a journalist Gustav Boffinger who headed up what was called the

Orient Office of the radio station they had they had 70 or 80 permanent staff members that type as translators announcers and as the war went on

it broadcasts not only in standard Arabic but in Berber and in some of these Caucasus languages too there was an Egyptian emigray named a Eunice Bari who was a big national socialist and he was a permanent fixture at the Zesson radio station. He's a shadowy guy. He disappeared at some point and it's pretty clear.

If he wasn't murder, he disappeared into the into the Middle East and probably took it a new identity and ended up similarly in the court of Nasser or in Syria. But, you know, this in the Zesson,

the Oriental broadcast from Zestan, they continued until just a month before the day of defeat you know, in April, 9045. So it was a major thing. We've got to get into the life and times of Mohammed Amin al-Husini for this to be anything approaching complete discussion.

So forgive me for changing gears to, you know, like a biographical discussion. You know, of course, Hussein was the grand Mufti of Jerusalem. I mean, he's a man who's very much lied about, which comes as no surprise. Not only was he a Palestinian and a significant man in Sunni Islam, but, you know, he also was allied to the ex's cause. So that's sort of a perfect stormic characteristics that, you know, make on a target for slander. of the most hostile sort.

He was pretty indisputably the most powerful leader of the Palestinian national movement during British rule over what before had been an Ottoman fiefdom. For those that don't know,

from approximately 1917 until 1948, that was the period of British rule over Palestine. And the Mufti was, he reminds me very much a Saeed Kutab in his disposition. You know, people suggest he talked at both sides of his mouth and the issue of violent partisan activity. You've got to understand the role of the Mufti.

Like a Mufti is a learned man. man in Islamic jurisprudence. And Sunni's put a premium on interpretation and application of the law. So a Mufti he's not a governor

as we think of it and he's not a priest either. He's one part sort of a learned, wise man within the tribe. And one part, one part

intermediary between the congregation of the faithful and the outsider or secular authority. You know, and a lot of both Zionists and a lot of court historians, either out of ignorance or because they're

touting the prejudice of the former, they claim, oh, the British invented the office of the grand Mufti to have, have some sort of figurehead on the ground is, you know, to mitigate the difficulties of directly ruling over a Muslim population. That's not true.

That's ridiculous. They British recognized him as the grand movie of Jerusalem and ceded authority over Islamic holy sites to him. but you're talking about a role in a title and a function of Mufti that spans a thousand years, okay? But to bring it back to some of the similarities in Himad Khutab and other Islamic jurist types, you know, there's a complex interplay between how a good Muslim relates to second, authority and how he manages a situation and is such as that, that, you know, the Palestinians were in vis-a-vis the occupation. They knew that some sort of race war was coming and that

the Zionists wanted to ethnically cleanse them. They knew the British would be leaving at some point. And they knew that if a national state was going to be realized, they would have to make that divorce from British rule amicable. And finally, a Mufti's not a general, and he's not a guerrilla fighter or a soldier. I mean, if he's called late on his life for jihad, that's what he must do, and he will do, if he's worthy of the title.

But, you know, he's, it's not, his role to devise military solutions under conditions of occupation. It's his job to keep the people safe, you know, and to interpret the laws laid down by the governing structure in a way that allows from Islamic life to be realized. You know, and beyond that, too, I'm not a Koran scholar, but so, you know, I just want to get that out there. But when armed revolt is permissible under the Quran, there's very discreet conditions for that.

You know, even an apostate occupier or caliph, if he protects Islam and allows Muslims to freely worship, it's not just a righteous to overthrow him or to disobey him. You know, and so there's that, obviously, you know, he's a hate target of mainstream historians, the Anglosphere. But even a lot of Muslims, some people try and paint him as some sort of extremist, quasi-national socialist. On the other hand, you, you know, a lot of passionate people behind the Palestinian cause, you know, they view them as some sort of Machiavelli. intriguer who didn't do enough to protect Palestine that's misguided in my opinion you know he was as partisan as he as was appropriate to the circumstances and the fact that he the fact that he got a personal audience of that off Hitler is pretty remarkable and the way that came about is fascinating too and I'll get into that.

But, you know, the, on the one hand, Hitler was cunning in who he would curate good offices with, but it's, it wasn't some foregone conclusion Hitler would meet whoever the grand Mufti of Palestine was. Why would he? I mean, basically, the, like force of personality

and the persuasiveness of his polemic and his own sort of cunning and intriguing because he wants something of an intriguer that's not a slander is what brought him into a face-to-face meeting with the furor and that's pretty extraordinary you know whatever's flaws

that have to be acknowledged you know and it's also too the circumstances on the ground at Palestine I mean to say nothing of the war years but from the conclusion from the fall of the Ottoman Empire until, you know, the declaration of the Zionist state and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.

There was an incredibly unstable and not just fluid, but actively chaotic situation on the ground and the Levant. You know, the Mofti's views changed in accordance with the security situation and the historical situation. you know, there was basically at least two distinct phases. You know, from 1917, when the British arrived until about 1936, where he was like Sayy Kutab, a kind of cautious, pragmatic, traditional leader in the Mufti role, you know, cooperating with British officials while uncompromisingly opposing Zionism. And then there was the exile phase.

The Mufti was exiled after the Arab Revolt, which was catastrophic. Not his exile. I mean, the outcome of the Arab Revolt. But rightly or wrongly, he was swept up in the reaction of the crown to the revolutionary situation on the ground and you know he was identified as a partisan actor if not an architect of the rebellion but after he was understandably bitter being exiled from his home you know and again the husseini family has a powerful and distinct heritage to this day they they remain important people in theater um but he became

he became increasingly radical and he gravitated ultimately to the axis and he did become a partisan you know he ultimately he became essentially gotlocked burgers right-hand man in recruiting and mobilizing Muslim populations to the Vafn-SS. Now, again, too, you know, Hussein had been, he'd come up through the Ottoman system. You know, the Hussein family, they were the most prominent political Palestinian family who were the direct intermediary for generations between the Palestinians and the Ottoman overlords. You know, so, I mean, exiling him was no small thing. And he wasn't some upstart careerist or some random imam, you know,

who insinuated himself into... a clerical and partisan role going to a nascent and then fully realized crisis situation. You know, so that's all these things are, all these things are important to consider. What, uh, oh, I want to give me one second just to find my citation here. I'm sorry. I wanted to, I wanted to get into how, um, how the Grand Moofy got an audience with Hitler. Another personage who was essential to the development of the Third Reich's relationship with the Grand Mofti, but Islamic populations generally,

was a German officer named Wilhelm Hintersatz, also known as Harun al-Rashid Bay. He was an SS Stendartan Fuhrer. He was born in Brandenburg, and during World War II, he commanded the Eastern Moslem Division, Ushutur-Tur-Waffen-Weband Division, which was this sort of cosmopolitan pastiche of Kazakhs, Turkmen, Azeris, you name it. But El Rashid, during the First World War, he served on the general staff of the Ottoman Empire with Inver Pasha, who was one of the young Turks, for those in the middle of history. And during his time there, two things happened. He developed a strong admiration for Otto Lehman von Sanders, who he met. was this Prussian aristocrat who was a non-observant racial Jew, who became this hero of the Ottoman Empire after spending his life there and training their people and waging war when the Ottoman Empire went to war and commanded Turkish troops.

El Rashid wrote a biography of Sanders later that got published in Berlin in the 30s. that got a lot of fanfare. Anyway, during the Great War, he converted to Islam, and then that's when he became Haru and al-Rashid B. After his conversion, he met up with, as the Great War was ending, there was a whole glut of POWs from the Russian Empire. at Woonstorf camp.

And he met he met a bunch of Muslim POWs who had been drafted into the Tsarist army and they further schooled him in Islam

and he developed an interest also in the Russian way of war because looking forward it was clear that you know the Soviet Union was going to be the prime geostrategic actor, not just in Europe and not just contra-Germany, but, you know, across this entire planet.

Because he was an Aryan Muslim and an experienced combat officer, and he was multilingual, and he had the implicit trust of other mob. Muslims. He was recruited by Italian intelligence when they went to war in Ethiopia. So he served Il-Ducce and further sort of augmented his credentials. And guys who served under him, like Italians and Germans, you know, who said it was uncanny that they said he, quote, prayed without timidity in a mosque. and quote, he had the implicit trust of the native Mohammedians who saw him as a fellow believer.

He also viewed the United Kingdom as potentially Germany's Achilles heel. And he said, and this was even long before the ascendancy of the war party, but he said that the British Empire is going to have to be neutralized because they're going to make war the Reich and he said the key instrumentality of the Reich prevailing in that conflict is an alliance with with with Muslims on you know currently under um hostile occupation by by the United Kingdom

he uh during up when our operation Barbara Rosa kicked off. Al Rashid, he was a liaison officer with the Reich main security office and the eastern populations,

you know, the Muslim nations within, Muslim nationalities within the Soviet Union. And in that role with the Reich security main office of the SS, he made contact with the Grand Mufti,

Hajamimin al-Husini. And this became a close friendship between the two men and it developed into a deep alliance. And El Rashid and the Grand Mufti, they began drawing of a plan. They believed that there was

two things happening here. This is one of the Quagmire and the Balkans was emerging in earnest, you know, which was remained unmanageable for a substantial portion of the war. So Rashid and the Grand Mufti, they believe that the ideal place to deploy a Muslim division would be in the Balkans, you know, and thus hand-jarm. came about 13th SS but additionally the Bosnia was the Muslim heartland within Europe and again like we talked about in the first episode there was a prestige that attended that and plus the ecumenical clout of the grand muftia jerusalem who's a very respected man going to Syriyvo

and addressing not just Bosniaks but all Muslims and particularly those behind the wire fighting communism this this this was

very politically savvy a relative of the king of Egypt, King Farouk, a prince Mansur Doud El Rashid met him to the Mufi. and Mansour then began aiding in these recruitment efforts

and that bolstered these propaganda efforts and the resulting formation ultimately Hanjar was the first and it was also Skanderberg which was Albanian Muslims and Kama but the true Pan-Islam division size element was the Ozturk Wafen-Webander SS, Ost Turkish Wafen-Webanda-S-S-Kor-S-Kor.

Eastern Turkic SS Corps. And again, it was a, it was Turkmen, it was Kazakhs, it was a Zeres, it was, you know, all the nationalities of the Soviet Union who were of the Muslim faith were represented. I'm going to time we got. Okay. Now, what's really interesting here is that the other sort of key personage in the Vafin SS

was Gottlob Burger. He was a Vaf and SS general as well as a higher SS and police leader and he was responsible for the recruitment of non-German nationalities into the Wafn-SS and he was impressed with what he saw from El Rashid and the Mufti and Berger decided that there had to be an effort to insinuate with a national socialist ideological education into Islamic formations. So the position of military imam was first introduced in 1942.

And this, again, is that the behest of Gottlob Berger. The command headquarters of the SS Eastern Turkish Division, they set up what amounted to do an imam training school and it oversaw religious practices in the four

Muslim legions as they were designated they assigned a mullah at division level imams and clerics down to platoon level the overall

Legion Mullah was a For the Azerbaijani Legion for example It was Imam Pashaev The Turkestan Legion It was Mullah Inoietiv And so on down the line

And Legion and Division Mullahs They were the equivalent company commander And these were fighting men one of the most famous of the imams who's a Bosniak named Halim Malich he held the Iron Cross

and a slew of other awards you know so these these guys weren't just actors or stand-in propaganda elements and it also this is a level of religious formalized

religious hierarchy and institutionalization, which basically, there's something brilliant about it. That's not how Muslim armies were organized. It was really assimilating Islamic cultural coding into a Vermacht model. And a lot of the recruits really took to that. There were some Muslim legions that were terrible, and there were some that were absolutely savage.

But this almost ecclesiastical structure that one would have found in a company in the 30 years war, for example, transposed to an Islamic cultural paradigm. like when it worked when the mentioned material constituting the company platoon or division in question when it was game fighters and when it was mentioned material suitable for soldiery it was a it was a fantastic um formula and it also it that's did wonders for discipline and morale It wasn't just a question of spiritual counsel. It was a way of conveying to these recruits that, you know, this is a jihad against Bolshevism and Jewry and being a good national socialist and being a good Muslim are synonymous. And where those tendencies converge is in the person of the Islamic National Socialist political soldier, exemplify.

by the imam, you know, who was both a cleric and a warrior, you know, and who, you know, and, and, and, not just a commander in, in, um, the path of jihad that we are on, but, you know, also a, a spiritual guide. The, uh, Ralph on Higendorf, who was a career, uh, Vermeck officer and an expert in military, jurisprudence. In May of 1943, he issued a formal recommendation that in Muslim formations

before a course marshal assigns punishment to a defendant, there should be a consultation with the divisional mullah on the scope

severity of punishment to legitimize the military justice system. And this was huge too. Hagendorf recalled also that he said often these imams, what they'd recommend was usually substantially more severe than what the secular coded German military justice and the Vermak and the Woffensass otherwise demanded. You know, so in practice, these imams acted as intermediaries with a European and Christian military justice system that nevertheless, you know, abided Islamic principles in its punitive aspect. and this

this insinuated legitimacy into it that otherwise would be lacking and around the same time May 1983 Gottlob Berger he issued a formal decree from the main office it was

on the quote ideological spiritual education of the Muslim SS divisions and it formally identified e-mobs as the most important transmitters of political and religious education within Muslim formations

it made clear that the emphasis was to be on the common enemies of Germans and Muslims Judaism quote Anglo-Americanism communism, communism, Freemasonry, secularism,

you know and that these shared ideals including militancy and the martial ethos the role immorality of tradition of upright manliness and you know like all this is what brought together national socialists

of different faiths you know whether they be the Protestant Catholic or Muslim And, you know, again, Berger, the more I dive into, I was researching his battle record and his career in the SS, going to like a different, a related but distinguishable subject matter. And I, he was just an amazing guy. You really only find footnotes about him as, oh, he was this big war criminal and this brute.

Or he's described, you know, kind of similar terms to Martin Borman. It's just, oh, he was just a sort of cretanist function here. He's not, not at all. And for a military man, he had a lot of deep, esoteric interests. And I think that Vavanaughes has attracted those types, frankly. you know, not just romantics and dreamers, but there was, Orientalism was literally coated into it. You know, I mean, that's why the Proudon book on Genghis Khan

was required reading at SS Younger School. And, of course, Yacan Piper wrote his senior thesis on the Proudin book in Genghis Khan. But, I mean, I think, I, Schopenhauer was an Orientalist and I, you know, Schopenhauer more than Nietzsche was the patron philosopher of the German right, I think. But yeah, we're coming up on the hour, man. I hope people are finding this educational and interesting.

And we'll wrap it up the next episode, I promise. Awesome. Awesome. That's what I was going to ask if we, if you have another episode in this. And is, is that the, are you going to be getting into post-war? I'd like to. Post-war. Okay.

Yeah, I mean, it's your show, literally. Like, I mean, if you're a matter of that and if the subs, the main thing is that you're happy and the subs are finding this interesting. And then I promise we'll get back to the 30 years war. No problem at all. Remind everybody, go over to real Thomas, 7. 77.substack.com. It's probably the best way to connect to Thomas.

You can go to his website, Thomas 777.com. The T and Thomas is a 7. And basically you can connect to them everywhere from there, from those places. That's affirmative. Thank you, Thomas. Appreciate you.

Thank you, buddy. I want to welcome everyone back to the Peking Yenna show. Thomas is here. just little mini series doing on Islam and the Third Reich and Germany in general. We're going to close that out today. So, you know, what we've heard from the subs is they're really enjoying this. So thank you for the recommendation on this. Great subject.

I've learned a lot. And, you know, take it away. Thank you. That makes me very happy. And I appreciate the subs and their kind words. and feedback that's essential this is an important subject matter for a lot of reasons i generally agree with irmsonlety islamic dialectics are very important to the post-cold war historical process in conceptual terms i don't think that needs to be said additionally

and i'm including this as sort of an addendum to my manuscript that's one of the reasons that's one of the I haven't submitted it for formal editing to a publisher yet. There's this myth, some of which derives from the testimony of Albert Speer, which I consider to be not remotely credible, obviously. He described the final months of the German Reich as Hitler developing this sort of nihilistic apathy, punctuated by fits of rage and an impulse to sort of burn everything down, Hitler's actions don't indicate that. And I've emphasized, I'm bringing this back to the subject matter,

I'm not on a senile tangent, I promise. I emphasize the fact of Donets being designated as successor, not just because Hitler thought that he was a man the allies would find acceptable and they did other than yodel he was really the only Nuremberg defendant that people in the united kingdom not just the admiralty but a lot of the aristocracy and even people in the war cabinet came to the defense of but also there was an understanding that the post-war world would need some sort of resistance legacy if Europe was going to survive and if the national socialist cause was going to survive albeit in a historically contingent configuration and that's a

subject for a whole we could do a whole series on that and like i said i'm dedicating the final third approximately of my manuscript to the subject matter. One of the only authors who I think truly understands that and who really understands that there was a fascist international of a sort during the Cold War and beyond is Kevin Coogan. He was an unusual guy. He wrote a biography of Francis Yaki, he called Dreamer of the Day, Francis Parker Yaki,

and the Post were Fascist International. This was released in 1999. It's actually a fantastic book. H. Keith Thompson contributed to it and allowed his testimony to be included. Elsa DeVitt, who was a longtime mistress of Francis Yaqui, she participated in it and proffered a lot of her testimony, as well as personal effects and papers that had belonged to Yaki. things. You know, Coogan is definitely a left winger, but of a more serious type. And, I mean,

the fact that some of these personages are willing to participate in the book project speaks for itself. It's not a purely punitive treatment, but the real value of it, especially if you're reading it as a researcher, there's a couple of hundred pages. pages of footnotes and end notes that are really incredible, including a substantial amount of material about Johann von Leer's, about Der Weig and the National Socialist Resistance in Argentina and then in the Near East. And I highly recommend that book to students of the subject matter, as well, as people who are just curious students of history you want to get a better understanding of the subject matter.

But I raised Coogan, not just because I like that book, but, you know, again, he's one of the only authors I know of who has a deep understanding of this phenomenon. and the efforts particularly of the SS and the SD to curate a national socialist sensibility among Muslim populations this ramped up in earnest in the final year and a half of the war when it became clear that NSEG was no longer possible and it's not because everybody was delusional it's not owing to some desperation

born of manpower shortages or any of those confabulations it was because at base and particularly in the Vof and SS the truly diehard national socialists ideologically committed

they had a profoundly Hegelian view of the war and of the historical process generally. And of course, Germany was not a stranger to these sorts of apocalyptic conditions. We're talking about our 30-year-s war series, I think in the first episode. We were talking about Hitler himself and Speer, speaking of Speer, as well as many personages within the traditional military establishment, as well as the National Socialist cadre that took over the government.

The historical poll star of these people was the 30-year's war and the destruction of Germany, the destruction of the First Reich, and the scattering of the German racial organism to the proverbial four winds. And in their mind, it had taken centuries to reconstitute the German nation and to bring Europe into a organizational modality whereby it could fulfill its historical mission. And in their estimation, this had taken close to three centuries. So there was an understanding that a similar process was emergent in 1994-45. And there was the added challenge of a world dominated by the communists and by the American Zionist occupation that was looming. Both of these challenges were related.

that's why these ideological schema were quite literally allied but they were also very distinguishable in terms of what they represented and what they were trying to accomplish and in terms of creating a global political regime and the tactics required to counteract those efforts to break people of their identity and characteristics and historical memory were somewhat different depending on whether the population of the question were those situated in the east or in the west.

And Muslim populations were under unique pressure from the communists. And this endured throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. The Islamic revolt was one of many proximate causes that ultimately brought the Soviet Union down. I think that's irrebuttable. So that's something that is important to understand here.

And that's one of the reasons why this remains a relevant subject matter. It's not just some sort of trivial curiosity. related to aspects of the war that are sort of not commonly emphasized. But the role of the grand

mofdi to change focus just a little bit. The way that he's cast in the historical record is somewhat incorrect. There's people with a superficial understanding of national socialism and there's some Palestinian liberationist who mean well but they they're there's somewhat conceptually impoverished in their understanding of the historical record

they cast the mufti as almost like a Palestinian Nassar that's not really accurate I made the point that I believe if he can be analogized to any contemporary it'd be Said Kutu. And if you know anything about Islam, particularly pious Sunni Islam, the role of a Mufti is not that of a political soldier. It's different. There's definitely a partisan aspect that goes up saying. But the Mufti also, he didn't have a sense of pan-Arabism. What became sort of the rallying, cry of the resistance in the Near East, which is a combination of pan-Arabism and an east block aligned, but discernibly non-communist sort of militant socialism.

That was not what he viewed as the way forward for Palestinians. And he was absolutely a pan-Islamist, but he didn't view pan-Arabism as a meaningful concept and frankly it's not. On the other side, Zionists then and now have tried to cast the mootty as sort of a Palestinian Kodriyanu or some sort of

or some sort of ethno sectarian nationalists who's a mirror of themselves who wanted to annihilate jewelry owing to some sort of highly binary zero-sum concept of racial and sectarian struggle in the region. That's naked propaganda.

And interestingly, when people in the Churchill government, who are particularly sympathetic to Zionist perspective, tried to convince the home office of these things, and when as far as trying to push the British authorities to try and capture the El Hussein, this was quickly quashed. And British intelligence simply refused to pursue it. And there was an internal memo that indicated that this was a propaganda effort devised by Zionists on the ground who were concerned about a leadership cadre reconstituting among their enemies,

which they'd pretty successfully decapitated by this juncture. And to be clear, the Murphy was in exile from 1936 onward, or into the Arab Revolt. The Arab Revolt is complicated. I don't want to deep dive into that right now. Briefly, it was a general strike. It was an uprising. as more and more European Jews streamed into Palestine, it became clear that the Palestinians were going to be ethnically cleansed.

Okay. And we talked about how the British were inconsistent and how they responded to ethnocectarian violence and, you know, categorical attacks upon Palestinians to realize annihilation. oriented goals by the Zionists. So this represented an existential fear. It wasn't just a question of resistance to Palestine being dominated by a hostile Jewish majority on the ground. There was an element among Palestinians underarms, too,

that had always favored an armed struggle. And their reasoning was we've got to pull the trigger now before the situation deteriorates the point that it's no longer possible. There was a pious Islamist organization that was also highly militant, led by Eise al-Din al-Kasam. He was a Sheikh

and something of a lesser aristocrat, but it was also a dedicated revolutionary. And as early as the mid-1920s, he was demanding that money that was coming into mosques, the equivalent of alms, be spent on arms and military needs, rather than on, you know, proselytizing and, and traditional ecclesiastical activities and things of that nature, you know, the equivalent they're in. This caused tension between him and El Hussein. He'd approached El Hussein and tried to cultivate his friendship and asked to be brought on to the Supreme Moslem Council as an itinerant preacher of sorts. And Hussein turned him away

but did help him find a permanent place and a mosque that would be more receptive to his revolutionary concepts. This is viewed as some people, too, including, again, some Palestinian liberations who mean well today, as being perfidious and El Sini being political. I don't think that's fair. And Alessini also knew that his people weren't in a position to win at that moment. He was continuing to try and curate a relationship with the British, too. out of necessity

owing to again the the hopelessness of the military situation at that juncture but as it happened in 1936 a general strike did kick off

and once the uprising began the move he stood with Palestine he was very much accused though of fermenting this and being a leader of it the British commanders on the ground who he'd curated a relationship with, I believe they talked to the foreign office

and British intelligence, and that's why the move he wasn't harmed. He was allowed to live in exile relatively undisturbed at that juncture because, you know, it was, it was clear that he wasn't devising a revolutionary resistance movement. He wasn't trying to force a kinetic outcome to then extend conditions. But this was when O'Sini began approaching representatives of the Third Reich.

And they began approaching him. We talked about Gottlieb Berger and elements within both the Algemi and S.S. and in various party offices who viewed this as imperative. And Al-Hassian, he only met with Hitler face-to-face once in November 1941, but the fact that he met him at all is remarkable because it was not easy. to gain access to Hitler. What he was able to procure, Hitler guaranteed and he convinced Il Duce to co-sign this guarantee

that after the defeat of the British Empire, Palestine would become an Arab state and would be ethnically cleansed of Jews. Whether the Mufti would become the ruler of that state, I find that unlikely.

Again, it's complicated how traditional Islamic authority is organized. You know, and to be clear, people have this misconception, because first of all, they'll look at a place like Iran. And, of course, there's a sectarian divide there because Shia and Sunni are very different. And even within those broad sects, there's differences within Sunni Islam and Shia Islam that are profound. The Iranian government called itself the revolutionary government, precisely because it's not this reactionary regime.

The Foucault, one of the few essays he wrote that's oriented towards ideological praxis that's in a direct capacity. He went to Tehran as the revolution was underway, and he made the point that this was something. something people hadn't seen before. It wasn't some reactionary regime of clerics. It was very much an Islamic movement, but it was a hybrid ideology that was a truly third positionist tenancy in the true sense.

Okay. Al Husseini didn't represent some Sunni variant of that. And also, once what became the Palestinian Liberation Movement, its proverbial DNAs in the Arab Revolt, and in the men who they took inspiration from. And the Mouthi wasn't really part of that. You know, he definitely was a partisan, and he took on the function of a political soldier

as he became insinuated into the SS organization, but military command and political credibility became inextricably bound up in theater. And that, some of that addures to this day, but, you know, it's not this idea that the Mofdi simply approached Hitler because he had ambition to become emperor of Palestine or the boss of the Arab committee or something and wanted to

parlay that into authority over a Palestinian ethno state that was going to emerge at NC. I don't think that's credible. What was important was that he got a guarantee from Hitler. He had the patronage of the Axis. And it guaranteed. he that forces would be brought to bear. And Hitler made clear to him, Hitler said he believed in the Arab people and he believed in the Sunni's cause, which I think was true.

But he also said that the German Reich had essential interests in the region and they expected the Palestinians to help those things be realized. So obviously it was a real politic aspect of this too. But both, men came to realize also that this had become a planetary struggle. You know, and by November 1941, America wasn't, as if, I mean, America de facto was at war with Germany from September, 1941 onwards.

The Reich was, the Vermeck was closing in on Moscow, and it became clear that the struggle. that the struggle was global in character and even after final victory was realized which appeared to be eminent as a November 1941

no Germany needed allies in newly liberated formerly colonial spaces but there was also a a basic

affinity and that's coded into national socialism through influences like Schopenhauer and things and the German character generally Hitler wasn't some Orientalist like von Lears but I think it's clear to

all but the most literal and binary minds when I'm getting it and towards that I mentioned before about over group and fear and geniehahed devaphanesz gotlaw burger who i think was a fascinating individual and he was a key personage in forcing the uh through uh policies within the SS relating to

the alliance with not just the Palestinians and al husini but but with the Islamic nationalities in the East. He clarified, Burr said, and I'm paraphrasing, the relationship between Islam and national socialism, there's a vocish imperative, but what is not intended as a synthesis. He said, quote,

it is not intended to find a synthesis of Islam and national socialism or to impose national socialism on the Muslims. Rather, national socialism is to be seen as the genuine focus German worldview, while Islam is to be seen as the genuine focus Arabic worldview. He was using Arabic as a stand-in for, I mean, obviously the land of the prophet and the Arabic language, and Muhammad himself means that Arab-C, cultural forms have an outsized significance in Islam. He was using Arabic in the Arabic rule of you in a Spanglarian sense to include, you know,

and most of the Islamic elements under the Reich authority were not Arab. And again, there was this emphasis on Sarajevo in specifically in Bosnia. as the as the heartland of European Islam and thus there to be given priority and Berger emphasized that and mind you Berger was he was second only to the Reichs Fierre SS Himmler in his rank he'll rank equivalent to Paul Hauser and Sep Dietrich so he his word was a law within the organization. And he clarified that the Muslims, the Balkans,

were racially part of the Germanic world. Well, ideologically and spiritually, part of the Arab world. So he said, among other things, these Balkan Muslim peoples, they represent, you know, what the complementary aspects are of this alliance. and this unity of

Velt and Scheng against communism and Jewry. And he continued by saying through the deployment of a Muslim SS division, speaking of the Bosniaks here, they may hereby for the first time the established a connection between Islam and national socialism, or rather between the Arab and the Germanic world

on an open, honest basis. As this division in terms of, of blood and race is influenced by the North in terms of geology in contrast by the Orient. I think I got into in the last episode I tried to clarify by reference to my outlines what I covered so stop me if I'm being redundant but in 1944 the SS head office at behest of Berger they established two Islamic Centers for Religious Education The first one, which I think I got into a bit, was open in April 1944. It was in a small town called Gubin in Brandenburg.

This was the Emom Institute, and we talked about emoms in the Bof and SS and the important role they played at not just divisional level, but at company and even platoon level. and this Al Husseini himself attended a ceremony with Gottlobberger and an imam named Hussein de Zozozo who was a Bosniak more significant particularly to the subject matter that I started this discussion with was what was colloquially called the SS Mullah School. It was a it didn't formally it wasn't formally established until November 44 and once again there was an inauguration ceremony tailored to celebrate and emphasize a Germanic Muslim alliance. The opening speech was proffered by Walter Schellenberg and the emphasis of it was interesting because they

again, it seemed very much coded towards a post-war world and proceeding under hostile occupation without resorting the language that suggested what in the national socialist ideological culture would be looked upon pejoratively as defeatism. But the crux of Schillensberg's speech which was the historical associations, the traditional bonds between the Kaiser Reich and Darl Islam, the longstanding support for Muslim peoples who were besieged by Jewish tyranny. And it emphasized, too, that the Soviet Union,

by its very existence, it represented assault, not just on fulish ways of life, but on all confessional practices and cultural expressions, first among them, Islam. And Schellenberg specifically said

that the fulish core of Russia had been destroyed for all practical purposes and totally deracinated. and that the non-Russian people under occupation and on the periphery of the Soviet Empire were similarly being targeted for destruction and their fate would be the same as that of the Russians if an effective resistance

wasn't cultivated, and the only way that that could be realized is by the dual commitment to racial hygiene and confessional piousness. And in this respect, Schellenberg said Islam was the, quote, custodian of the Eastern people and their biological substance as well as their confessional heritage. in linear terms back to the time of the prophet. And he concluded by saying that because the Bolsheviks lack traditions of the past, they're not long for this earth, but that Muslims are able to cope with the future, no matter what hardships emerge,

because not just to the racial purity of the several populations who are very tribally randed, who constituted the Eastern Muslims, but that basically their faith would carry them through the historical destruction of Bolshevism and the racially impure interment who are the standard bearers of the Bolshevik ideology, who are really just the vestigial remnants of the Russian racial corps that died in the Soviet death. camps very very heady stuff not not not typical just sort of grab bag propaganda you know and this is important um and uh the the the mullah school it was it was far larger than the emom school it was based at this villa in uh this affluent neighborhood outside of dresden

There was this Victor Klemper. He was this Jewish writer who curiously, you know, didn't get, like, shot into space or something by the Nazi Holocaust. But he was, a lot of people, I think, including Shire, William Shire, who wrote a very silly book that a lot of court historians hold out as some great treatment of the Third Reich. Of course, Sharpe called it. There was the rising fall of the third way. And there was the nightmare years. That's an objective and not at all hysterical title for a history book. But Victor Clemfer, he kept diaries and he documented his observations on various things.

They really like to keep diaries, don't they? Well, to be fair, that was something people did in those days. I mean, I'm talking actual people, not fictitious diaries of, you know, girls who wrote like Judy Bloom books that were marketed for like 1970s junior high students. You know, most, I mean, Gurbos was especially prolific, but Yodel kept a diary, so did Kytle, so did Rosenberg, Alfred Rosenberg, so did Earhart Milch. But no, I take your point. But Clempers' diary, I believe, was real.

and he noted he was observing obviously from without what was going on in this old but rather stately property which I believe was a repurposed hotel in Blasfitz, this neighborhood of Dresden and he said there was a quote, mysterious Muslim study group there. I

This A few might not Relate But I What I read that I had this I had this funny image of this Like little nevish dude

Like peeking out at Uh At these like SS posse Hicks Going out of this Gothic building And saying

It was like What is going at? I don't know Maybe I I'm prone to silly, silly kind of shit like that. But moving on, it can't, it's something that's something that's something you can't, you can't, you can't chug this up to some sort of, you know, effort to corral hapless POWs

in the frontline service or something to flesh out the ranks of, of devastated divisions and battalions, you know, the people who suggest that sort of thing don't know the subject matter. And there was a guy named Rainer Oshachja, Ossacha. He was assigned to set things up in the Mullah School and make it culturally compliant with the students would be attending it. So, Oshaca, Oshacha,

he decked out the interior of the building in ways that reflected Islamic architectural styles. The main entrance hall was decorated with a mosaic, pattern specifically after mosques in Central Asia.

There was a lot of Islamic artifacts unloan from museums in the Greater German Reich. There was a Quranic verses and calligraphy painted into the walls. There was a prayer niche in one of the main assembly areas. There was an ornate prayer hall, which was sort of the center of activity on the ground floor. You know, and so, I mean, the SS went out of their way to create an authentically Islamic environment.

And they went as far as to hire Kurt Erdman. He was the foremost expert on Islamic culture. and art history in the Oriental Department of the Pergamon Museum in Berlin. And he consulted with architects from Berlin in Dresden to mock this up. And it took half a year. You know, there was a great library. It had authentic Islamic texts from France, from Bosnia, from the Netherlands. Netherlands, including rare ancient texts that have been purchased in Sarajevo.

Around this time, anybody, no matter there, any folks Deutsch or any non-Jewish outlander could obtain a free Koran from the propaganda ministry just by asking for one, there weren't a lot of Qurans that have been properly translated into German, so an effort was made to remedy that by the propaganda ministry. And one of the reasons for these efforts was the SS wanted to attract top religious scholars and imams to teach at the school, but also to attend it for political education. and military education within the SS model. And reading between the lines,

you know, again, this is the last year of the war under desperate conditions. They were looking to build cadres. They were looking to build dedicated national socialist cadres within these populations for a post-war world. you know i that should be clear to anybody who understands what they're looking at metaphorically speaking i think um alam john idris or idris he was uh coveted as director of the mullah school but he was still in the service of the propaganda ministry as well as the foreign office

and he was the top man in charge of propaganda in the Islamic world and neither the foreign office nor the nor gerbils would let him go you know and again this they were emphasizing the propaganda aspect in theater in Palestine as well as in among the nationalities in the Soviet Union. And, of course, in Bosnia, but the Bosni, again,

they were racial Europeans, and most of them were multilingual just because of where they lived. And they had a privileged position within the Reich. So it would have been redundant to make them the focus group of these efforts, if you follow me. But nevertheless, ultimately the propaganda ministry, they let Idris preside over the Mullah school three days a week. He was young comparatively charismatic. he was very modern and had Western habits he had a great

admiration for the European culture and he had assimilated very well into Germany culturally but he was also a very very dedicated Muslim he was kind of viewed as the model Muslim national socialist he had a son who

worked as an interpreter and then ultimately joined the Eastern Muslim SS Corps in the final year of the war and that obviously was I mean I anybody who joined that late in the game

knew there's a good chance they weren't coming home I mean he was a dedicated he was coming to the jihad but he this also was something of a propaganda coup you know look this wealthy Mullahs offering up his son to fight for the Reich. It's no small thing, obviously. And the SS insisted on only employing Muslims as teachers in the Mullah school,

in contrast to the Vermat. And in contrast to other party institutions that dealt with the education and political indoctrination of Muslim peoples. The SS took this very seriously, you know, and that tracks with its overall orientation. You know, it's a fascinating sort of aspect to the Reich's relationship to Romania.

you know Hitler Antonescu and Hitler were very close and Antonescu was probably the furor's best ally and I mean Romania sacrificed tremendously for the Axis cause and also

the fact that they when Stalin began World War II with his war of conquest obviously Romania was very much in the crosshairs of Moscow. So there was an existential imperative as to why they'd welcome the Vermaq deploying its scale there, but also obviously Antonescu not only to commit close to a quarter million men

to Barbarossa, but he availed Romania as a staging ground for a huge component of Reich forces in being in operational terms. But later, you know, Antonescu, he presided over the brief national legionary state and then he banned the Iron Guard owing to what he viewed as their revolutionary subversion.

This was in the aftermath of, this is when Sima had succeeded Kodriano who'd been murdered. But the SS famously they backed the Iron Guard against Kodriano who the fear of himself unconditionally backed Kodriano

there was an SS ideology into itself which was very pan-European, very revolutionary, very different. not just from the vermark and traditional german society and even traditional german military culture but distinguishable from the mainstream of the nsdap as well and i find that fascinating but to bring it back to the subject of hand one thing that the mullough school emphasized and this is another reason why they insisted on

on Muslim teachers exclusively. The theological program, it was very oriented towards overcoming sectarian hostilities. And the SS tried to prioritize bridging the divide between Sunnis and Shiites. There's a constant emphasis against

religious sectarianism among Muslims and traditionally in in Vermont units where

traditionally Shia and Sunnis were segregated and the SS were not only refused to do that but they pursued an anti-sectarian line and

the emphasis again was that the schism was contrived by men who coveted worldly power after the center of the prophet to heaven and that the current struggle where the dual threat in existential terms to the Islamic faith and to the race of the nationalities and populations that constituted Darl Islam, that calls for a healing of the schism, even were it not a contrivance promised unworldly and thus axiomically corrupt,

the ambitions, you know, and again, the implication, in my opinion, is obvious. It's, you know, we, a political soldier looking ahead, circa 1944, 45, needs to adopt as its primary concern, the racial survival of his people and the continuity of his faith on this plan. And the continuity of his faith on this plan. planet, you know, in the face of the dual assault of Zionism and communism. And we'll stop it there. I hope this wasn't, I hope people got something out of this. I mean, I presume they did because people have been very nice in their feedback.

No, I mean, if anything, I would like to hear more people. not talk about Islam like they're a boomer right after 9-11? Well, yeah, I mean, they're idiots. That's one of the reasons. I mean, we've got Islamic comrades who are great, but beyond that, you know, I don't, well, just the same when people whip off at me about World War II or about the law. It's like, oh, you're the expert, you know, how like, you watch a lot of, you watch a lot of TV, You're also like cable legacy media, so you're an Islam expert.

I mean, that's why, that's the reason I emphasize these topics, because even in supposedly disencoded spaces, these people are conceptual illiterates by and large. But you can't, the fun of the reason I'm trying to get more, more guys who have a theological, their background is you know in in um bible christianity or or catholicism or orthodoxy or islam because that's i mean at the end of the day i mean i like what we've talked about it's i'm more a capital t radical tradition with us than i'm anything probably i mean you're talking about like

my political philosophy, you know, I mean, I identify as a yakiist national socialist, but what the, it's Renee Ginoon, it's Marcia Eliotty, Julius Evela, that's a substantial part of my canon, if you're on a way to like that, okay? And there's this kind of dummy anti-intellectualism that's just hostile to theology and religion you know I mean that's common to any epoch really

you know even people I've argued that point with some of our Orthodox friends some of our Catholic friends who view the medieval era as a period of high culture that's unduly maligned which is absolutely true casting the Middle Ages

as a sort of hellish time of cultural poverty. I mean, that's ridiculous. I mean, I don't know how any Anglophone person can think that way anyway. I mean, our Thurian lore and the Ulster cycle, if you're somebody like me, the second only of the King James Bible. You know, I mean, like I, and that, that comes out of the horrifying medieval era, you know. But beyond that, I think some people, they kind of view with the rose-colored glasses,

They have this idea, oh, well, then there was this integrated concept, you know, that they mean in terms of the trifunctional hypothesis, but they mean that religious life informed everyday sensibilities. And that's somewhat true, but I think it was, I think most people, and not talking about class, this doesn't know class, in terms of where these sensibilities are kind of, concentrated. But I think most people, even then, it was a very kind of superficial thing. You know, people are going to look at scantz at you if you take religion seriously.

And you want to emphasize it as the subject matter that is your sort of topical focus, you know. But yeah, I, people like that are, I don't know, I mean, I, I've had to get habituated to tuning out ignorant people because they're all around me and they're all really noisy. They're, I don't know, you know. I'm not here to educate morons and I'm not here to like listen to assholes, lip off on things they don't know about. So I just, the minority of people who want to talk about serious stuff, I'm acting like little fucking kids.

I mean, you know, those are the people I want to interact with. All right. Everybody go over to Thomas's substack, real Thomas 777.substack.com and check out his website, Thomas 777.com. The T is a 7. And you can hook up with him from there. Thank you, Thomas. Appreciate it. Thank you, ma'am.