The Pete Quiñones Show - Reading 'The Nuremberg System' w/ Thomas777 - Part 1

Episode Date: August 25, 2026

56 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.Pete reads while Thomas comments on his new book, "The Nuremberg System: Conceptual Bases of World Order from 1933 to Present."The Nuremberg System: Conceptual Bases of World Order from 1933 to PresentRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Buy Me a CoffeeThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas' WebsiteThomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

With election time approaching, political ads will be inserted into the episode, along with other ads that, frankly, I'm not going to like and you aren't going to like. So please ignore them, skip by them, whatever you have to do. I don't endorse any of the ads that are inserted, but it is another way for me to generate income. So I appreciate you guys putting up with them. If you don't want to deal with them, go to the Picanuena Show.com. can subscribe through Patreon. You can subscribe through Substack, which is my preferred one. Because with both of those, you get an RSS feed, only Patreon and only Substack give you an RSS feed. There's also a link to my website, Gumroad, and SubscribeStar, where you will get

the audio files that you can download and listen to, or you can stream in most cases through those locations as well. So if you want to avoid the ads, consider supporting the show if not, just know none of these ads get any endorsement from me, skip by them, do what you need to do. I appreciate all of you. Head on over to Pekignona Show.com. You can get the show early and ad free over there. If not, here's a show. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekignano Show. And here we are on another journey. But before we talk about the journey at all, obviously this is about time. Thomas's new book, and this is about really just a week after it dropped, and the thing blew up. So what are your thoughts on what's going on with the book, Thomas?

It succeeded all expectations in terms of the sales as well as the hype around it. And that's extraordinary. You know, I really appreciate the efforts, you and Burden, you know, and Carl Dahl and Andy Edwards, and of course Daryl Cooper, who was kind enough to write the Ford. But even with that kind of talent and pushed behind it, you know, political theory books that don't exactly have mass appeal. So that's really extraordinary. And it suggests that there's an interest in the subject matter

that owes the historical situation at present. You know, I don't think 10 years ago this, I think it would have done okay for an academic. text, but I don't think it would have popped in the same way. You know, so that has implications, I think, for the wider political situation, you know, beyond sort of the narrow confines of academic culture and things, as it were. I mean, those are my thoughts, just spitballing. Cool.

Well, as you said, this is an academic text, and the way I look at it is academic text need lectures with it. And, you know, if this was to be a college course, that's the way I'm looking at this. So we're going to just start on a journey or reading through it. Have you commenting on it? I don't think we're going to say to any set schedule. We'll just do this over time. And yeah, I think when this, by the time this ends, people will not only have an audio book of it, but they'll also have your thoughts on sections that I'm sure people are reading that they may have questions about what they mean and you can shed some light on that. Yeah, that sounds great.

Awesome. All right, man. I'm just going to start reading the text and you stop me whenever, you know, you think you want to comment on something. So here we go. I'm not going to read the foreword. Darrell put that publicly up on his substack. Right. So please go read.

that and if you haven't bought the book go buy the book so you can follow along all right you you weigh in too and ask me to clarify things or you know or what have you also because I I I it's difficult for me to sometimes predict what people are going to require clarification on or are going to feel that they want you know a wider discussion of on any particular point of interest you know oh don't worry I've already I've read this three times and I'm and there are there are definitely parts I'm going to be asking you questions about. Okay, yeah, yeah, for sure. Yeah, go ahead. All right, here we go.

Introduction to discuss international law, quite literally the set of normative moral assumptions, intergovernmental conventions that touch and concern war and peace between sovereigns and ontologically speaking, even politics itself as a conceptual category, is to discuss Europe and specifically the European cultural mind. The political map in concrete and telluric terms as well as any conceptual paradigms relating to the nature of sovereign authority and potentialities therein, the essential aspects, at least superficially, of procedural and substantive due process, and of course, most profoundly, the theological basis of the modern state and the ordering principles therein

is the axiomatic denouement of a dialectical paradigm that began in the Athenian city state in the 5th century BC and concluded in the ashes of Berlin in May of 1945. as the Soviet juggernaut halted and its commanders met their American counterparts at the arbitrary line of demarcation. At that moment, Europe was no more. The modern state system enshrined by the Westphalian peace three centuries prior perished with it. What followed was a total collapse of the Washington-Moscow Concord, itself an anti-fascist alliance intended to bring about an autocratic world government, charged with enforcing a prohibition upon warfare itself. So basically you're setting it up that the modern state was created in Europe after the Westphalian peace.

It ended in 1945. And how are you setting up the modern state? Is it the preferable way that Europe would operate? or are you just giving a history here? No, I'm just proffering a history. There's two major, there's two major concepts. First of all, epistemologically, in every conceivable capacity that people talk about politics or ethics or morality or any of the epistemic priors that I'm, that. informed discussion of these things are Western in nature.

That's why there's something absurd about this sort of infantile and ongoing struggle session of over, you know, colonialism and the legacy of racism. Even those concepts perverses, they may be, derived from the Western ethical mind. So there's something, there's something perverse about people who, everything from the language would they speak, to the clothes they wear, to their habits, moors, customs, patterns of living, every conceivable aspect of their existence as human beings derives from the Western cultural mind.

Yet they're turning around and saying, you know, the West is evil. I mean, like, that's, it's, you know, it's like a child who, there's the heir to a billion dollar fortune who declares that he hates his parents. You know, so there's that. I don't mean to make that in turn to, you know, resort to a polemical rant, but there's the fact that when we're talking about high politics,

we're talking about exclusively categorical products of the Western cultural mind. Secondly, obviously I don't accept the kind of linear view of history, the linear progressive view of history, but there is, in fact,

a conceptual line. It's not perfectly linear or anything between the origin of politics and high culture as we know it on the Peloponesis. You know,

and the modern state system as it existed from the 17th century until the 20th. you know, and Europe was the, like Russell Kirk, he's one of the few conservative thinkers actually holding high esteem. You know, what informed, we're talking about the Western mind and the Western way of life and the Western concept of politics. You know, we're talking about, we're talking about a pastiche of Athens, Rome, and biblical.

scholarship and understanding through the lens of Thomas Scholasticism, which in turn, you know, is Aristotelian logic through the lens of Christian morality, which is practical reason. Okay. Nobody would deny that wherever they fall on the political spectrum, presuming that they're actually educated. So what the purposeful eradication of those culture and political forms represents a total and complete breach with the Occidental Tradition and the annihilation of the Western way of being in favor of something else. and that's the way to understand what court historians and people generally view as the Second World War. All of their assumptions and episodic priors generally are incorrect about the subject matter.

And it's especially perverse when people talk about, you know, the West, because World War II was the war against the West, to annihilate the West and to create something in its that was axiomatically opposed to the West. So that's really the purpose of this volume and the volumes that will follow, is to explicate that in terms that are cognizable and relevant to the current situation. The essence of this fundamentally radical schema was creative destruction at unprecedented, i.e. planetary scale. History most assuredly does not repeat itself, nor is a dialectical problem. it generates conceptual horizons in zeitgeist, and attendant and concomitant catalyzing phenomena

that facilitate and render historiographical events psychologically intelligible, a redundant and algorithmic feature of the historical existence, ontologically speaking. Precedent, however, is most assuredly not just material to understanding the process of historical phenomena and the uniquely dualistic anthropic principle that is brought to bear by the human mind at scale. specifically man's role as both observer and uniquely situated subject of the historical process, and in turn, man's variable function, phenomenologically speaking, as participant in historical time, the experience of which is a catalyzing occurrence with respect to the individual mind

and its ability to contextualize and interpret systemic phenomena, and ultimately a causal variables unto itself owing to the fact that the subjective situation, situatedness in turn facilitates the development of men's conceptual horizons and so continues the tautological paradox in perpetuity. Okay, can you give a fifth grade explanation of what you're saying there? Because that was probably the paragraph that jumped out at people most like right off the bat and people had questions about. The way in which people structure the world, it's a combination of categories of concrete reality and data derived from sensory perception and categories of mind.

Okay. And that's never going to be truly value neutral, nor if we're talking about interpretations of historical processes, does it need to be? because the soft sciences, as it were, the social sciences are obviously bound up with the human condition in ways that can't be extracted. And there'd be no reason to aim to factor that out unless somebody was trying to assert some sort of superior claim to truth under auspices of some sort of superior claim to truth under auspices of some. splendid objectivity. That's what that's what liberals like Carl Popper tried to do or John Rawls.

But there aren't actual proofs unless what you're talking about mathematics. Okay. So the structuring of a historical perspective

is always going to factor in the political modes of thought. And it's always going to reflect the imperatives of whatever

actor or agent or constellation of intelligences was responsible for bringing about the extent of political order at least so much as such things can be devised and deliberately constituted you know

so that's what I'm getting at in sort of brass tax Cliff's notes terms. You know, and the fact that owing to a complex interplay of historical and technological

factors, there was a situation where the victors in 1945 had the benefit of an absolute bully pulpit that was uniquely situated to manipulate the psychological environment. in a way that it's just, I don't think that those conditions can be duplicated at the present juncture. I mean, I can't, I'm not an auger, I can't say what's going to come about in a thousand years, but that, that was an unusual condition, okay, historically speaking.

But it allowed the psychological environment to be splendidly manipulated in ways that before or substance. I don't believe would be remotely possible. So that created these entrenched and permanent conceptual biases within the public mind that people simply take for granted. And that's very difficult to overcome, although that's changing. That's one of the reasons why this book has been successful, because people are now receptive to critical perspectives on the subject matter. You know, unfortunately, when we're discussing abstract phenomena, particularly highly subjective phenomena relating to almost purely psychological categories,

it's difficult to express those things. And, of course, I mean, that's one of the reasons why, in the Anglos, fear there's this long-running criticism of continental philosophy that is gobbledy gock or needlessly wordy. I try to avoid that kind of like academic jargon as much as I can, but there's not better ways to, or more concrete or more complete ways to describe these things with respect to the subject matter. All righty. I think that's a good setup for where you go here. Thus, what was the Urgent in the aftermath of hostilities and what came to be known as the Second World War was far from rarefied, as regards to suppositions, epistemic prior assumptions, ideological prejudices, and consensual pole stars.

A localized historical parallel microcosm of the events of 1939 to 1945 can be identified in the 30-year's war, the War of Three Kingdoms, and, most significantly, for purposes of this analysis, Oliver Cromwell's near-mythical ascendancy, active regicide, and establishment of what was arguably the first modern European state. And these are just the most obviously relevant examples. Equally relevant as regards comparative precedent are the events of this century subsequent

to the aforementioned conflict paradigms when the Jacobin Revolution of 1789 shook the continent and unleashed devastating potentialities, the essential character of which, if not the numerical scale was liable to inspire disbelief in the minds of men who were situated distant from the carnage when witnesses recounted what they had seen as the crescendo of political terror peaked. The categorical annihilation of human beings, regardless of age, sex, overall health, or capacity to bear arms based on the subjective criteria of a nakedly political character,

did not emerge for the first time at Treblinka or Jacenovich, 1942. Nor was the Soviet death camp system, which was the first such instance of annihilation therapy in the course of events that led to the Second World War, as well as by far the most highly scaled and doctrinally reflective of the intrinsically homicidal characters of the guiding ideology and philosophical commitments of its architects, the original historical instance of categorically political mass murder at scale. Anyone who heard me read Camp of the Saints out loud knows how great I am on French pronunciations. The nois de non, wherein the jocquemines rounded up and detained person suspected of inadequate sympathy for revolutionary ambitions,

in addition to any clergymen and women and pious laity, who could be identified, as well as royalists, a category that included any persons of aristocratic pedigree. or worldview or manners inhabit in addition to actual monarchists. Subsequently, these hapless and by then wretched prisoners were loaded by their captors onto adapted barges specifically purposed for the task at hand, which were then pulled out into the river and scuttled so as to drown the human cargo as a struggle, frenatic, frat, fronatically, frantically struggled against their bindings. Entire extended families were slaughtered in this way. The orgy of political bloodletting, the callousness of which shocked the conscience of even hardened

military men who had served in peripheral colonial theaters and been witnessed, a savagery born of the Stygian darkness, where the light of reason and the habits of Christian civilization cast no illumination emerged after a century and a half of the Westphalian peace. It's self, a structural and ethical paradigm that was tailored specifically to preclude sectarian bloodleting within the European cultural consensus. So when you look at what happened in France, 1789 onwards, did you would, in past history, in far history, we had seen slaughter as such being done by barbarian tribes, what have you, is what makes that stand out

and why we should concentrate on it, because it's happening within the, within basically what it has become the modern, what had become the modern state at that point. That, but also, you've got to look at what's alleged by court historians. What the Jay Gellman did was in a planned and deliberate capacity that was bureaucratically organized, they subjectively categorized people according to purely political criteria and then exterminated them regardless of age or sex or political status,

you know, owing to the assignation of that, of that categorical schema. and then later, you know, a century and a half later, the Soviet Union did the same thing at utterly massive scale. That's qualitatively different than some spontaneous race war on the frontier between settlers and Apaches or the Mongols putting everybody to the sword. It's not the same thing. and aside from that, the claim of the architects of the Nuremberg system was that the German Reich was a criminal conspiracy that existed primarily to murder Jewish people en masse, that this had never happened before. This was totally unprecedented, and it represents an outlier that wasn't related dialectically to any other political conditions.

extant or anticipated. That's why it's relevant. All right. Moving on. The spectacle of an European war emerged locally within the heartland of Gaul and born of putative resentments of a typing character commonly, if not axiomatically associated with slave revolts in the most savage instances of race war and animated by a distinctly modernist fervor conferred by a hubristic and fanatical belief that a Tulloric heaven was at hand, a heroic redeemer emerged to reconcile the dialectical furies responsible for the maelstrom into the establishment of a new order, was beyond the capacity of belief by a great number of

European elites and commoners alike. As had Cromwell a century prior in the British Isles, and as would Adolf Hitler a century and a half subsequent, Napoleon abided the messianic function as demanded by the epoch in which he lived. What is discernible in the most sanguinary record of the human condition is not repetition, but an arguably prosaic iteration of eternal recurrence. The primary agent in the dialectical process is the anthropic principle. History is thus an essentially psychological phenomena as experienced by man, which leads to the presence of predictable variables derived from the bounded rationality of human conceptual parameters and intellectual convention, formal and symbolologically psychological.

To confuse or to conflate this process with a structural derivative duplication of conditions across and between temporal distances great and small is a monumental era. Following the conclusion of the European Civil War and the concomitant consolidation of the New Deal Revolution of the United States, four and a half decades ensued of war by proxy between the Stalinist socialist community of nations and the American Zionist block, the spearpoint of which was a constellation of collective security arrangements, buttressed by massive military budgeting and the Truman and later Reagan doctrines, a systematically stable, if structurally fragile, owing to susceptibility to escalation

amidst crisis across myriad conflict dyads. Irregular peace was facilitated and curated by the balance of terror, and the nuanced mutations of strategic nuclear war planning and perceived and actual capabilities therein, as every aspect of political life from the prosaic to the most profound touched and concerned the grand ideological struggle to determine for all time how the new and global state would be configured. So these, I guess I have two questions. So these outlier, these sort of proxy proxy fights being fought in Vietnam, being fought in Korea, being fought in other places, are to replace head-on war and then the nuclear proliferation, which I think many people

erroneously consider was not a real threat, was an actual real threat against any who would go against this new world order? Or am I just completely wrong? No, but these proxy conflicts weren't, they weren't replacement or airsofts conflicts. There was a stalemate in Europe, not just because

I mean, the primary variable was military. And it, there was no way to eject the Stalinists from, you know, from the Soviet bloc without laying to waste, without annihilating Europe and killing 80 million Soviets,

which would have been Pyrrhic, despite the musings of some of these strategic air command types in the 60s. So the prize became, you know, or the victory metric became who was going to sway the world, the global balance in favor of one system or the other, and isolate the adversary such that, you know, he was forced essentially into garrison circumstances amidst a hostile world. So the battlefield became the global south, what was called the third world then. You know, like I said, I'm not trying to be a pet ant, but I try and discourage me of using the term third world because it no longer has a meaning.

It doesn't mean it doesn't mean poor countries or non-white people. It literally is a strategic designation. The first world was the United States, Japan, NATO. The second world was the socialist community and nations. The third world was everybody else. So, you know, if the Soviets were able to effectively kick off, you know, what Spangler called in less delicate era, you know, a true colored revolt against the West. You know, the Soviet Union already had one-sixth of this planet. You know, they could have very potentially swayed, you know,

it amounted to the majority of the earth, you know, exempting Japan, Western Europe, the United States into this kind of, you know, alternative globalism, where true power emanated from the Soviet Union. And it wouldn't matter if, you know, that model of, that globalism was totally dysfunctional because there would have been nothing to contest it. You know, and dysfunctional regimes shamble on indefinitely. There's no reason they couldn't, it couldn't at planetary scale.

You know, so, I mean, that was the issue. and that's why it didn't matter it didn't matter where the communist push was because the question was political I mean I don't believe in resource wars anyway that's reductionist and it's it's a misunderstanding of

the ultimate sources of war and peace questions but um it didn't it didn't matter where the conflict went hot what matters was that America after it had

staked a willingness to the Truman doctrine to defend the American sphere of influence in planetary terms to see the entire spheres of influence to the communists would have been to forfeit to Soviet demands, which essentially would have handed them the planet. You know, that's the way to contemplate it. Okay. we live now not merely in the aftermath of the short 20th century. Rather, the 21st century exists, conceptually speaking,

as captive to what eminent historian and political theorist Ernst Nolte referred to as a historical past that shall not pass. The historical process and its subject matter are most ominous to those who are capable of apprehending and interpreting the essential aspects of it and derivative phenomena therein, thus facilitating a complete, however, contingent, conceptual picture of the immediate extant global political paradigm, as well as the causal nexus of factors, information, and variables that render it intelligible.

Thus statesmen, such as Mr. Lavrov of the Russian Federation in the present day, Secretary of State James Baker, a generation prior to the present, the cloistered philosopher, such as Oswald Spangler in the aftermath of the Great War, the con of the medieval, step were and are prone to an upright severity of effect, precisely because they are perennial outsiders vis-à-vis the body politic. While at the same time, such men are charged with shepherding the same body politic from the most catastrophic fortunes, if only by rendering and publicizing diagnostic conclusions born of innate properties and discrete cognitive perception.

What is particularly ominous and axiomatically deleterious to the social role in vocation of the public intellectual, the court advisor on matters of high politics, the self-consciously historical personage is the fact that in the present epoch, all previously occurring events, occurrences, and sociological configurations and modalities are contemplated in purely punitive terms, and even the minority within academe and public administration and media roles, who are more charitably inclined toward matters of cultural heritage and historical phenomena, only consider the subject matter as catalyzing variables, actual and potential or future, for continued implementation of the post-1933 ongoing social engineering regime,

a regime that designs to irreplicably and permanently eradicate man's ability to live historically in the capacity to partake of historical identities, habits, beliefs, and modalities of life. So this is pretty much when, I think the very first time that I ever spoke to you, the first episode we ever did, was basically a brief overview of how this was how purposely looking at history with a critical eye cannot be allowed because in doing so, it prevents people from, looking back and essentially having a future of living historically as they as man did for a millennia before the pre the post 1933 regime yeah that's affirmative the purpose of this volume is to informant and hopefully stir meaningful discussion on the subject of political realities of the 21st century and to bring to light the complex series of events to shape the ex the extant world order Intrinsic to any such discussion, of course, is an analysis of how national states, the preeminent

actors in Velt Politique for most of the modern period wielded such great power within the world's system only to suffer a precipitous decline in conceptual significance and ability to captivate fortune and spoils in contests of high politics when at apparent zenith. A particular significance to this author, as well as any serious student of political theory, who thereby does not purposefully understate, if not outright as true, anthropological criteria in the study of historical phenomena, is an adequately thorough investigation, analysis and discussion of the emergence, longevity,

and ultimate decline in inevitable disappearance, conceptual as well as concrete and temporal, of the Westphalian state from the global stage. Specifically, the ontological relationship of the aforementioned process to and upon discrete political communities based on identitarian criteria of race, ethos, sectarian affinity, or myriad regional and geographic imperatives. It goes without saying that power activity in the modern era came to be categorized in elaborate and often tautological terms that were, albeit often superficially,

premised on firm appeals to precedent, while the most ardent proponents of this perspective simultaneously broke almost entirely with the historical past in matters of war and peace, sovereign legitimacy, and concepts of natural law, and further prioritizing this demolition of history above virtually all other ethical imperatives. Incongruous as these tendencies may superficially appear, and as happenstance as the development configuration and implementation of the post-Westphalian globalist regime might seem, the current system, the extant law of the earth, is anything but accidental.

I think some could read this and come away with the idea of not a hard, but a soft kind of year zero. Yeah, that's, yeah. It, it, um, the assumptions that underlie it differ, but yeah, they're not, they're not radically different partial.

It's relating to, the human condition as well as what is perceived and considered as, you know, an ideal outcome. But, I mean, that's why that's the whole point. I mean, that's why the New Dealers didn't ally with the communists out of some Machiavellian impulse. They, there was basic agreement there. You know, what really drew the, what really drove the wedge was, I mean, there's intrinsic realities to, power political affairs, particularly when the prize is quite literally planetary and scope, that would preclude a true consensus between competitive, you know, competing systems.

But also there was, you know, the atmospheric aspect, which I think was paramount, as did Francis Yaki and as does Kerry Bolden today. You know, I mean, that's not something I came up with, obviously. I mean, I think it should be obvious. But, you know, but those things notwithstanding, yeah, there's this basic agreement between the Enlightenment liberal tradition and the view held. by the Marxist-Leninist, when Marxist-Leninism was a was a real

ideological schema that was informing high politics. And, you know, but I mean, Jacobinism has long appealed to these types. One of the reasons why it, I mean, going back in the struggle record, I mean, one of the reasons why I, I, I've always maintained that it's perverse

for some of these lost cause historian types. some of these Confederate Romantics, the whole lot, Jefferson is some great man. I mean, the guy was a Jacobin. You know, I mean, I, why, what's so wonderful about his perspective? He was some,

in the most charitable perspective, he was, he was some naive agnostic who had someone brought up faith in the efficacy of social engineering by, by, you know, by something like enlightened the,

cadre of a lease. You know, considered the most punitive terms, he was basically an American Jacoban who thought that what was going on in France was just wonderful.

You know, I mean, what's, what's, what's, what's, what's, what's,

what's, what's, what's, what's, what's, you're, your, your, your,

your, your, your, your, your, you know, a neo-confederate, but I, I think, a lot of these literary types,

then is now, they, they view people, they, they, Hugh Jackson himself as an example of, you know, an uncouth Presbyterian who was, you know, a little more than a literate snake handler. But they, I mean, that continues into the present day. I mean, I got huge love for the South, and I don't want to spin this off on some tangential rant or anecdotal musings.

but I run into some of these snobby high church southern guys, and they act like it's like they look around real quick to make sure nobody sees them talking to me before we sit down and engage, you know, like I'm not talking to OGC guys. I'm talking about, you know, I'm talking about others we encountering our travels and things. That's what I've said to skull, forgive me. Oh, no, it's all good. We're going to, look like we're going to finish the introduction here, and then next time we can go on to chapter one. To understand the essential aspects of the global regime, it's guiding philosophies, its founding myths, its theological strictures.

It's, it's teleological aspects. One must understand the 20th century conflict cycle that facilitated the grand project of creative destruction. specifically the motives and epistemic assumptions of the United States and the Soviet Union, which then came to constitute the basis of the new paradigm of world power, devised by the International Military Tribunal, acting as a sovereign representative agent of the victors, and enshrined by the Nuremberg show trial of major war criminals. To accomplish these objectives, this author and the reader must contemplate Europe.

To speak of modernity itself is to speak the architecture of the European mind and the fruit of its processes. In discussing the nature of rights and substantial justice, the declarant, no matter his ethnic or confessional heritage, is drawing upon liberal totems that have been elevated to the status of prime symbols in the civic globalist culture. There is a stark irony of the sort commonly emergent in the modern era, and the fact this near-unversal acquiescence to Western liberalism, it's its ontological postulates, moral assumptions, and political theology, however superficially, was brought about by direct force of arms in the aftermath of the categorical destruction of

Europe, the systematic annihilation of the racial consciousness of the survivors, and the permanent subjugation of European men incidents of the deliberate extermination of the European form of life from the face of the earth. To acknowledge the starkness, sometimes seemingly unconstitutional, unbearable of history's verdicts upon the races of the earth, the diminishing of things truly human and edifying that served to mitigate the long, cold shadow, cast over every man's individual existence by mortality, requires the historian to develop a peculiar psychic and emotional fortitude. This is especially true in the case of the revisionist historian, owing to the fact that we find ourselves not merely charged with the sober and humbling and existentially perilous task of

speaking for the dead, as individuals situated in their epoch as well as standard bearers of races, nations, sex, and peoples, but also as partisans who must guard historical memory itself from those who would not merely replace the record of events with lies and Ersat's Theologies of False Gods, but whose ultimate ambition is to deprive man of his ability to live historically. The subject of this volume is to describe and analyze not only what is a critical power political question, the critical power political question of the 21st century, that being what will become of the white race and the remnants of the modern world that are the conceptual progeny of the white Western cultural mind, but also to identify and meaningfully

interpret what were the grand historical ambitions of the Western world since 1648, and how and why did this enterprise in total become not merely compromised but insidiously reconstituted as to be fairly described by the late James Burnham as an ideology of cultural and racial suicide. This is a query that rather profoundly supersedes the merely political and basic capacities, while paradoxically representing perhaps the purest political phenomena and intellectual tendency of the modern era. It seems, I know that Burnham talked about the suicide of the West. Pat Buchanan wrote suicide of a nation. But is it, can you really call it suicide?

Because it's being done to, it's being done to a people by a largely foreign ideology. Yeah, but that came about owing to people like, Roosevelt. You know, and nobody was, and, you know, these are very powerful people. And I, there's this great, um, Peter Hitchens of making the rounds. I'm not, I'm not some huge fan of Peter Hitchens. Uh, unlike his, uh, unlike his scumbag brother, like he actually produces some worthwhile stuff, but, you know, at the end of the day, he's just kind of an old school

Tori. But he, he was plugging this book that. colleague of his wrote about the degree to which, you know, the UK, the crown bankrupted itself to wage World War I, you know, and, I mean, I've dealt with this in our content before that we've collaborated on. You know, one of the, one of the rare instances of Wall Street actually demanding a sitting president go to war was what was World War one. You know, it's usually sort of like a lazy canard of simpletons and half-educated, the conservatives to claim, you know, bankers cause wars.

Generally, that's nonsense. But anyway, this colleague of, but World War I is the exception that rather demonstrates the rule. But this book by Hitchens colleague, it deals with the fact that one of the reasons why the new dealers had the power to lean on the UK to the degree that they did was because the UK being permanently in a hawk to America because it literally bankrupted itself to wage war on the German Empire. I mean, that was a nakedly irrational thing to do. You know, and this isn't exclusive to America is my point. And nobody was, nobody was holding these people down and torturing them.

forcing them to make poor decisions. You know, there's a there's a there's a basic acceptability to a suicidal ideology within a certain

faction of the Occidental race. You know, if you want to look at the West as an anthropological whole, which for limited purposes I think is is appropriate. And, you know,

obviously there was a... But I mean, that's one of the reasons why, you know, in part, you know, the Second World War was a civil war within Western civilization. I mean, that's why not the... refer to the Europashe Berger Krieg. You know, the European Civil War.

And in the United States, you know, you had people who, you had people who weren't crazy Zionists or weren't, you know, Trotsky-I-Hs who sort of reinvented themselves, at least in their public role as Democrats or something. You know, you had these were Anglophone, white Christian Americans who were plotting ways to literally exterminate Europe. that's insane. Nobody does that. You know, that's the distilled essence of suicide ideology. So, yeah, there's an indigenous element to it. Those people wouldn't have been strong enough on their own to get their way. But neither were the Jews. The Jews couldn't have done this alone.

No, exactly. They couldn't have done this alone. That's why when people want to spur out about the Jews, who are like, oh, we need to check Stalin's early life and Lenin's early life. And like everybody, literally everybody who does something wrong has done something wrong in history, we need to check and see if they have like 0.5% Jewish blood to explain. No, these are traitors. Well, they don't, they don't understand the issue with, they don't understand that's a political issue. Like, it's not to them in their mind, like the word Jew is.

stand in for bad guys or something. They have no understanding of it. I mean, but that's why I included multiple chapters in my book on the perspective of the Third Reich towards the subject matter. You know, the, yeah, there was something

uniquely dangerous about the Bolshevist ideology. and it absolutely emerged from the Jewish world of social existence. But, I mean, that's a political and historical phenomenon.

And the transformation of warfare into a purely ideological enterprise led to very, very inhumane and tragic circumstances, you know, just in categorical terms. you know and that's one of the reasons why it's so misguided who try and hold out the German Reich is a singular example of evil I mean aside from that I mean even if even if he was the most evil man wherever lived you don't you don't vilify your own civilization I mean that that's absurd but yeah I one of the reasons I mean it's two things on the one hand yeah people are ignorant about such questions that I'm not writing this book for them But, you know, for people who require a clear understanding of the factors and parameters in which these factors are operative, I'm hoping that this book set some light on these things. But I realize it is very dense material.

That's why, you know, I didn't write a 500-page book. I decided to, you know, write a two or 300-page book, see how it's received. and then, you know, follow up with other volumes. That's why the book I'm working on now, it has to do specifically with the American situation from 1915 until basically now. And it deals very much with praxis and the sort of shared white American experience, you know, because I think it's a good follow-up to something that was very, very dense and theoretical and, you know, kind of a difficult read, just to,

to the subject matter or not because I'm so smart because obviously that's not the case. All right. Well, I'm glad we got the introduction done today. We'll come back and start getting into chapter one. But I have to encourage people right now to go to Amazon and buy the book. You can get the Kindle. You can get the paperback. Now I will tell you that as soon as the book started blowing up, fake copies started coming out on Amazon.

and if you have the IQ of a white person, you should probably be able to figure out which ones are the fakes and which one is the real one. So, you know, please, please. But yeah, we're going to read this. We're going to go through it. I'm going to post it. It's going to be public everywhere. Everywhere I post.

And the, you're going to want to read along. I know that most people are going to be listening to this. So you're going to want to read along. So get the book. As I say about Dr. I'll say the same about Thomas. I say about Dr. Johnson, go show him some love.

He put a lot of work into this. And by buying the book, you will help to support what Thomas is doing and the books that are forthcoming. And the one that he's reading right now, I read the first 40 pages and it's a page turner. It's not like this. It's not theory.

He's talking about history and how people in this country and elsewhere, I believe, too, right? I mean, you got something reacted to this regime, reacted to what's been taking place for over 100 years now. So go do that. Go to the substack. Real Thomas 777 at substack.com. That's where you're going to find Thomas since. X pretty much, um, nuked him again.

And, um, and what else? Um, Thomas 777.com. The T is a seven. That should be it, right, Thomas? Yeah. No, and I, you know, yeah, I mean, social media, I think is increasingly a negative experience and just,

it's just kind of run its course. So it, I, I mean, I'm happy being on substack and being on my website and, you know, I've I've friends shifted my workflow to this long form stuff and I

that seems to be what I belong doing because obviously the people have spoken and this book's been popping and it's exceeded expectations so I'm very

thankful for that you know to say the least I'm not surprised I'll tell you that much well thank you I appreciate the endorsement all right

we'll be back thank you talk to you talk to you