The Pete Quiñones Show - The Populist Delusion by Neema Parvini - Complete 2 of 2

Episode Date: November 4, 2024

5 Hours and 29 MinutesPG-13This is the second part of Pete's reading of "The Populist Delusion" by Neema Parvini, with commentary from a variety of guests.The Populist DelusionPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

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Financial Services Ireland Limited. Trading as Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Ready for huge savings? We'll mark your calendars from November 28 to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse Sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favourite Liddle items all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Liddle New Bridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Little more to value. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekinjana show. I am here with Curtis Yarmine.

How are you doing, Chris? Hello, pretty good. We are here to read a chapter that our mutual friend, academic agent, wrote in his populist delusion book about James Burnham. It's just under his real name. Yeah, he wrote it under his real name is Nima Parvini. On the cover, it says Nima Parvini. Got it.

Yeah, it sounds like it sounds like a gay Italian. porn star, but you know, it does. It does. It may be Indian, Italian, something like that. But it's aptly titled managerial elites. And I'm just going to start reading and stop me whenever and comment when you think you can add when you can add to it because obviously I wanted to talk to you about Burnham because it's Burnham. All right, I'm going to get this up on the screen. All right. Chapter 7, managerial elites. In the 1930s, James Burnham had one of, James Burnham had been one of the leading American exponents of Trotskyism. He's Trotskism to the fourth, I believe.

However, in the 1940s, he broke decisively with Marxism and accepted the basic validity of the Italian elite theorists, Moscow, Micello, and Michelle's, to whom he had been introduced by Sidney Hook. In 1941, he published his most famous book, The Managerial Revolution. Not his, yes, not his best book, but what's going? I know you're trying to make one even the most popular. So in 1941, he published his most famous book, The Managerial Revolution, which argued that Marxism had misconstrued the true nature of the revolution that had taken place. It was not the proletariat who overthrew Bushwaq capitalism, but a new class, the managerial class.

So what always bugs me about Burnham is that he doesn't understand the difference between a manager and a bureaucrat. I would say that essentially an extremist, a manager is a commander and a bureaucrat is essentially a judge. And so there's sort of all throughout the managerial revolution and it'll be like complaining about this as you go along, there's basically this confusion between these two very, very different roles.

Now, as a social class, we can sort of definitely say that they have something in common, but that's a separate point. So let's go on. Okay. This book created an intellectual storm at the time of its publication and was reviewed very widely, not only by academic journals, but also by mainstream newspapers. Two years later, he followed it up with the Machiavellians,

in which he explored the ideas of the elite theorists together with George Sorrell, and from which I have already drawn. Burnham was read by and profoundly influenced George Orwell, who was chilled by his amoral scientific view of, power. Burtum's outline of the managerial state inspired both Animal Farm and 1984. His coldly realist view was said to be the model for both the character O'Brien and the book, the theory in practice of oligarchal collectivism by Emmanuel Goldstein in the latter. In the 1950s and beyond, he became part of the conservative establishment in the USA,

helping William F. Buckley found National Review and becoming a leading advocate of a tough line against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, to the extent that now Burnham is sometimes called the first neo-conservative. Later in 1964, he published the suicide of the West in which he severe, he would, in which he is severely critical of liberal attitudes and assumptions, which he argued are naive to the point of being suicidal. Anything there? You want me to keep going?

No, keep going. All right. Here we will focus on the core ideas of the members. I mean, hang on, let me, let me step back for a second. And I'm not sure naive is a rather simple word for the suicidal nature of these suicidal ideas. Let me just flag that. And I'm not really sure that's the way it's described in suicide of the West either. But let's go on.

Okay. Here we will focus on the core ideas in the managerial revolution rather than the entire body of his thought. It is obvious to anyone familiar with the elite theorists that Burnham had fully internalized the teachings of Moscow Paredo and Michelle's. So as not to repeat ourselves, we will take their conclusions as granted and suffice only to show what is original in Burnham. In 1960, Burnham wrote a short article called Managing the Managers, which condensed his core thesis to just five pages. This very useful summary will serve as guideline throughout. Before starting, it is important to emphasize Burnham's explicitly Machiavellian frame. There is little optimism in Burnham's view of human nature.

of all the thinkers we are considering, he was the one who most emphatically and avowedly wore the mantle of Machiavellian, seeking to write only about what is, not what ought to be. He embodied what Thomas Sol might call the constrained or tragic vision of man. Niccolo Machiavelli once said that human appetites are insatiable, but the thing that they desire most is not wealth but power. I mean, let me let me let me let me just step in for there for a second. I mean, you could almost say wealth is a form of power and that money is the ability to tell other people what to do. I think that you might actually perhaps a better comp for power here is sex because it's sort of like both power and sex give you this feeling that you're literally, your genes are likely to be passed on. I mean, the powerful, you know, the chief chimp is like much more likely to reproduce than some like in cell omega chimp, right?

You know? And so there's a sort of sense of like power feeling really, really good in a way. And because it feels really, really good, it is frequently mistaken for something good. And, yeah, just a note on that. Okay. Burnham's fundamental view of human nature was a Hobbesian struggle driven by an almost Nietzschean will to power. Perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in suicide of the West when he argues that

the liberal assumption that mass education would solve the problems of yesterday year is wrongheaded. The 19th century liberals overlooked and the 20th century liberals declined to face the fact that teaching everyone to read opens minds to propaganda and indoctrination at least as much as to truths. Step ahead to the next one. No one truly strives for the public good, but rather to seek to increase power and prestige for himself and his clique. Okay.

That's a sort of vaguely correct model, but I think that it's sort of, it's not really necessarily psychologically, or. true in a way. It's like when I think of, you know, the immortal question that we can never know the answer to, you know, what are progressives thinking? It's like asking, you know, Wittgenstein had this thing where he was like, you know, if a lion could speak, would we understand it? You know, and sometimes, you know, there's a sort of gap there that kind of sunders, you know, the sort of two kinds of thinking. And I see it, it's a sort of very, like, it's, of course, narrower than the gap between

sort of the person and the lion, but there's basically a way, you can sort of, everyone has a bit of that inside them. And the sort of the best way I can find to understand it is to sort of think about sort of liberal thoughts that kind of activate you that still make you, that still make you like warm in a way. Like there must be some, just find one, find one, find a liberal thought where you're just like, oh, maybe it's something that's actually good. Sometimes these things are actually good. There's plenty of lip stuff that's actually good.

And, you know, just find one that feels like really good and just like kind of, you know, feel that thought in your body, man. You know, and the, and that's sort of the feeling of being a little. lib and it's sort of like the feeling of, you know, changing the world, making an impact on the world, doing a good thing for the world, doing a good thing for people like you, thus power and prestige for himself and his clique is sort of relevant. It's like you're not really, when you're striving for your click, you know, even sort of in an unconscious way, you're just like, we are good, the things that make us feel good are good.

And so you're basically, you know, you're, I mean, prestige is just status. It's the thing that gets chimpanzees laid. Power is a little more, you know, prestige is one of the benefits of power, but one of the, you know, the definition of power is sort of a little more obscure. I think that one way to say, to rewrite this sentence to sort of make it ring a bell with everyone out there, trying to write their college application essay and decide what they mean, you could say, you know, no one truly strives for the public good, but rather seeks to matter. You know, like, and it's sort of that sense of mattering that is what the chief chimp matters.

The omega chimp, you know, one day they went on a raid and somebody lost track of them and they never saw them again. And it was like three days before the rest of the chimps noticed, right? but the chief chimp, right, matters, right? You know, and that's a chimp who matters. And so that sort of sense of kind of translating what... You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive, by design.

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is back We're talking thousands of your favorite Lidl items all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Liddle Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Liddle, more to value. You know, these two sentences kind of mean and how they produce what we know in love as progressivism. Today is sort of, you know,

it's not the sort of Burnham is kind of wrong about any of this stuff. It's that he's sort of, he doesn't go quite deeply enough into like what is actually going on here. How are these people thinking? How are, you know, what is sort of in the minds of these people. And what's in the minds of these people is that, you know, the sense that if you matter in some way, then there is an idea that mattering in this way is sort of connected to good. let's say for example that the way in which you wanted to matter was to um you know deface uh all um you know statues of martin luther king that's one way of mattering and then another way of mattering is to deface

all the statues of robbery lee and you know you can feel that the person who it's it's even you and i are as conservatives are much emotionally closer to the person who would deface the statue of Robert Lee. It's easier to see in a way. It's easier to understand that person. And that person obviously is much more important because those statues get to face than other ones don't get to face. So, you know, the sense that basically, you know, if you look at what teaching everyone to read opens the minds to, what teaching everyone to read basically creates a marketplace of information for the information that these minds want to see and hear. And these minds want to see and hear things in general that make them feel like they, the audience, matter.

You know, Slava, Ukraine, right? You know, basically, you know, suddenly it's not a baseball game anymore. It's not the World Cup. It's a war. But, you know, the sort of somewhere in today's, like, understanding of politics, like, you know, the war in the Ukraine and, you know, the World Cup and Eurovision kind of all blend together in a way. They're all sort of this kind of fan spectacle thing. And so the sense that basically the ideas that blossom in these minds, like the bacteria that turn into big blobby things on your plate of agar,

the ideas that blossom in this, you know, basically fertile science experiment that you've created by, you know, letting and telling everyone they can read anything, and teaching them, in fact, to do so is, you know, what blossoms in that is basically ideas that feel like believing in this idea helps you matter. And of course, this is the same thing as like Moscow's political formula because then you can basically say, okay, you know, it matters that I'm like rejecting Robert E. Lee. It matters that I'm defacing this statute because it will help my African-American countrymen lead a more dignified life, you know, by remembering that these

statues of their oppressors are not among them or something. You have that some connection to something that's good, that's done. And, you know, at the end of this, basically everyone in New Haven is going to Yale, you know, and the, or something like that, right? You know, and so this connection, the thing about psychologically feeling the need to matter is that this connection can be a little diffuse. Nobody really reality checks it. Nobody wants to know if, hey, maybe spray painting a statue of Robertedly won't do anything for Black Lives at all, right? You know, but that's sort of that possibility, you know, it's like when he says there's a little optimism in Burnham's view of human nature. He's talking about basically the lack of the sort of rosy glow that kind of leads

from these things that are conventionally said to matter in a good way to like what you can do and what you can believe. And like, you know, and sort of the reason that I go kind of deeply into this is that I think it underscores sort of how hard the problem is and how, you know, sort of intrinsic, not just to quote liberalism in this kind of Stalinist progressive sense than we have, but really essential to classical liberalism to liberalism in the 19th century of the, you know, view of the word. This is a disease that afflicts the free and open marketplace of ideas. And so, yeah, that's my little interjection there. And when I was reading Suicide of the West, I made sure every time that I read the word liberal to make sure to put a classic in front of it.

because he was there's something to be said for the coined shit lib I mean it's really rude and disrespectful and unpleasant but there's sort of a reason it's kind of caught on it's this like sort of directly fecal binding like I will not let this word twist loose from my grasp you know I will accompany it

with the most disgusting substance on earth I don't know it's you know it's for those who like that sort of thing It's the sort of thing they like. But I'm going, please. Lib's hard worked for a while. Shitlib works a lot better now. It will be around a lot longer.

Yeah. All right. Sorry, gone. No problem. Burnham thus harbored no illusion that a particular form of society, agrarian, theocratic, or feudal, much less socialist, liberal, or Democrat, could adequately restrain the appetite for power.

Like Mosca, he recognized the need and utility of a political formula, which can apparently motivate men by a, appealing to their sentiments, but like Pareto, he essentially viewed all ideologies as thinly veiled justifications for the interests of power. However, unlike Pareto, he saw psychology as the decisive factor. Burnham retained perhaps from his Marxist origins, an economic emphasis as we shall see. Obviously, I also see psychology as the decisive factor. Yeah. Where the analysis of power in the ruling class has conveniently rested in the government itself, Burnham saw the managerial class operating across the so-called public-private divide

and in every large organization. In effect, the bureaucrats who emerged in Mosca and Michels through the Iron Law of Oligarchy come to control every institution and then come to recognize each other as an identifiable class with common skills, interests, beliefs, and goals. All right. I think that basically if you're looking for a parallel, and admittedly this is falling down in the present sort of military. If you're looking for a parallel between just like Burnham was an intellectual, he did not know anything about the like business world or how business works or any of that stuff. It was basically as far from him as like the Empire of Japan.

And so, you know, understanding basically that, you know, it's true that you can get sort of so-called bureaucracy, you can get outposts of very bureaucratic bureaucracy and like HR departments and so forth in the private sector. You can also have things in the public sector, which are run basically by command. But the main difference is basically organizations that run on a command, a true top-down basis versus organizations that run on the basis of procedure. And so if you basically look at essentially the essential principle of capitalism when it's functioning normally is on the command basis and the essential principle of bureaucracy is the procedural basis. Now, the procedures can be manipulated and bent in various ways to actually sort of exert kind

of personal power or like little mafias do things. But basically, at least the way it's supposed to operate in a procedural basically organization, everyone who works there has some procedure that they're supposed to be doing. If they encounter an exception that they don't understand that doesn't fit in their procedure, they kick it up to their, quote, manager. But their manager is not a commander. Their manager is an exception handler. And so when weirder and weirder things happen, it goes all the way up to the, you know,

whoever the decider is. And in the federal government, that ball can go all the way up to the president. The president is making a decision. you might as well be a magic eight ball. And those can make decisions too. In the private sector, when you're a commander or the military, in an effective military, at least, when you're a commander, you have what's called mission orders, which says basically you're a captain, you want to take, you know, you want your lieutenant to take a hill.

You say, lieutenant, take that hill. You don't say how he takes the hill. He, she, or they, or are they, reserve, takes the hill. you just say take the hill. And that basically, that top-down command structure allows sort of every, every commander to have essentially absolute authority within their specific domain, which creates much, much more flexibility. And it creates a different mindset.

So basically, if you go to Pareto, I guess we're not going to deeply into Pareto here, but he has this theory of residues of basically sort of the lion personality and the Fox personality. And, you know, the lion, the lion is commander and the fox is a bureaucrat. And so basically, when he uses this word manager in the managerial revolution, he's kind of confusing kind of lion roles with Fox roles. Now, as for being an identifiable class, there's clearly this sort of college-educated upper class thing, which is like a thing, right? And the, like, and it certainly is trained by the

institutions and it sort of gets the same kind of recycled ideology. But really, like, you know, to say the active heads of the bureaus are the managers in government the same and nearly the same in training function skills and habits of thought as the managers in industry is basically his central thesis in this book, and unfortunately, his central thesis is just plain wrong. Okay. All right. Let's keep going. Yeah.

I'm fine with that. I mean, you're here to talk about Burnham because I don't think anyone I know or knows more about him than you. So yeah, yeah. In the new form of society, this is quoting now, in the new form of society, sovereignty is localized in administrative bureaus. They proclaim the rules, make the rules, issue the decree. The shift from Parliament to bureaus occurs on a world scale. You catch them in the corner of your eye.

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the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Lidl Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Lidl, more to value. The actual directing and administrative work of the bureaus is carried on by a new man, a new type of man.

It is specifically the managerial type. The active heads of the bureaus are the managers in government the same or nearly the same in training, function, skills, habit of thought as the managers in industry. See, if he pulls, like, every time he's sort of constantly spicing up his discourse by drawing this kind of broad connection, which really fails. You know, I think in its time to be fair, the corporate middle manager and the career of civil servant were probably a little more similar to each other, perhaps. It was an age of big, you know, big stagnant companies and like very dynamic young bureaucracies may look a little more.

like each other. But, you know, if you drew lines from the civil servants to the professors who educate them, he'd be drawing, I think, much more defensible lines. But please go on. Okay. Thus, power seems as if it is decentralizing, but in fact is concentrating and consolidating itself in a more diffuse way across every possible institution note in society. If we use Juvenile's idea of power center as being like castles,

which center power needs to capture, central power needs to capture, the managerial class quietly takes over government while capturing every castle to create an extremely broad central power base, which has the appearance of being made up of disparate and separate spheres of influence. When Burnham talks about managers in industry and managers in government, it brings to mind the corporate middle manager and the career civil servant, but he actually has in mind a much wider range of people than that. Senior executives at board level in corporations, for example, the CEO, are very often managers, paid employees.

Beyond the mid-ranking civil servants, top-level advisors of every stripe, senior diplomats, communications directors, and so on are all managers. Even the politicians themselves who sit in parliamentary democracies, we might picture someone like Tony Blair or Angela Merkel, take on a distinctly managerial air. However, the scope of the man, go. Yeah, yeah, get, say the, say the next one. Okay. However, the scope of the managerial class is wider still than this. It is not simply those who work in and around corporations in government, but in all major institutions across society. Let me keep going.

Yeah, I mean, no, let me, you know, so what we're really identifying here in a way is sort of what forms a class. class is kind of two things and or three things it's it's or four things well there's race let's not get into that um but then there's um basically parental inculcation of traditions and there's institutional inculcation of traditions and there's work so you know what's common basically across this class is, and what's to a great extent managed to homogenize this class, is simply the modern American educational program where basically in order, it is true that to get, you know, whether it's a private sector, you know, job or a government job, you have to basically go to the same institutions and basically excel at the same institutions. And so basically, you know,

the ideology or sort of the, you know, even just sort of the idea of like how to do things that is prevalent in those institutions becomes a thing. I mean, you know, what people will find often, this may have changed since my younger days, but, you know, the, the, the, the, like, usual experience in a top quality company of like a new high level CS grad is that they, sort of usually had to be taught which way which end is up. And if they were a PhD, they had to basically be taught which end is down. And like the PhDs required much more retraining. So, you know, it's like there is still this commonality in this sort of, you know, these institutions create social groups. There's the group of people who graduated from this school, that school, whatever

school. So, you know, to sort of overlook that as a class, I mean, that is a kind of class forming thing. It's just that sort of the kind of tasks of being, I mean, the reason why being a bureaucrat is like being a professor is that they're sort of both kind of fox positions. They're both positions which work by exercising influence rather than sort of command and decision. And sort of all of the lion prince, you know, basically one of the things that's often cited is kind of the downfall of the late Roman Empire was that it had this rigid separation between being the career of being a general and the career of being a bureaucrat. And a lot of bureaucrats, and they were all quite unmanly. And, you know, there's no one like Caesar, who is a general, a writer, and

an administrator. And so when you have this, separation between basically lion careers and fox careers and bureaucrats are all sort of very, very bored foxes, basically. You know, you have a problem. But yeah, I think that's the, the lion fox separation is just what Burnham is. So I'm sorry, I'll stop. I'm chapter. No, that's good. You're good. Chapter three on this, I already recorded with Warren McIntyre, who you met when we did a stream together. Yeah, and we went. He goes deep into foxes and lines there. So what you're talking about is not going over anyone's head if they listen to that episode on chapter three.

So all right. Excellent. I'll skip going. It is worth quoting Burnham at length here. Within the huge trade unions, a similar managerial officialdom, the labor bureaucracy, consolidates its position as an elite. The elite is sharply distinguished in training, income, income habits, and outlook from the ordinary union member. What's great.

But what's great is that these people still exist, but I don't think they actually do anything at all. So maybe it's a third one of career. The trend extends to the military world, the academic world, the nonprofit foundations, and even auxiliary organizations of the UN of the UN armies of the UN. Armies are no longer run by fighting captains, but by Pentagon style managerial bureaucracy. That's a bit more true than it was. I'm guessing very much. 80 years ago, but within the universities,

proliferating administrators have risen above students. Proliferating administrators in the 40s. Yeah, yeah, exactly. Proliferating administrators have risen above students, teaching faculty, alumni, and parents, their power position expressions. This isn't, this isn't from the minute. This is much later. This is because you wouldn't be talking.

with the United Nations and the manager. Right, right, right. Okay, yeah, this is probably written in the 60s, I think. But, well, this is from managing the managers. He mentioned that the one that he wrote in 1960 to update to consolidate and do a consolidation. Yeah, yeah. All right. And yeah, I noticed that too.

I'm like, there's still, there's still. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. There's still been some proliferation of administrators since 1961. Um, it's, I believe statistics will show. I'm sorry, going. The great nonprofit foundations have been transformed from expressions of individual benevolence into strategic basis of managerial administrative power. Everyone should read Renee Wormser's Foundations, Their Power and Influence.

He was the chief counsel of the only congressional committee that ever actually investigated the Great Foundations. Please keep going. I'm writing that down. Wormser Worm S-E-R. United Nations. has an international echelon of managers entrenched in the Secretariat.

When was the last time you heard about the United Nations? It's been a while. Isn't that amazing? It's still there. It's just like ticking along. It's sitting there in Turtle Bay. But like basically, it used to be so relevant. You had these fiery speeches at the United Nations. I believe the Chief Justice of the U.S. actually stepped down Arthur Goldberg

to become the ambassador to the UN. It felt to be a very high-profile position. And it's just like a void. It's incredible. But as far as I know, they're still spending money and parking their cars illegally. And it's taking up a really expensive frigging riverfront property right there. I know. I know.

It could be given to the underprivileged. That's exactly what I was thinking. Exactly. Turn Turtle Bay into a kind of a Caloon walled city of homelessness. Just see. Like, what is the record? for how many you can pack into, you know, I'm sorry, go on. There are fairly obvious parallels in the managerial structures of the diverse

institutional fields. For example, managers and business are to stockholders as labor managers are to union members. As government managers are to voters, as public school administrators are to taxpayers, as university and private school administrators are to tuition payers and fund contributors. Yeah, it's just very loose. It's very loose. Go on. When Burnham was writing, the managerial class had not fully consolidated its power,

so the truth of what he is saying was not readily visible to all but the most astute observers. Detractors would often focus on irrelevant details and incorrect predictions while missing the bigger picture. You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive. By design. They move you. Even before you drive. The new Cooper plugin hybrid range.

For Mentor, Leon and Terramar. Now with flexible PCP finance and trade-in boosters of up to 2,000 euro. Search Coopera and discover our latest offers. Coopera. Design that moves. Finance provided by way of higher purchase agreement from Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited. Subject to lending criteria.

Terms and conditions apply. Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited. Trading as Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Ready for huge savings? We'll mark your calendars from November 28 to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse Sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favourite Liddle items, all reduced to clear.

From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Liddle New Bridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Liddle, more to value. At the time of writing in the 2020s, when all these organizations appear to speak with one voice, when none dare to disagree, the truth of Burnham's analysis appears so obvious as to seem trite. In fact, the scope now extends beyond what even he envisioned to encompass practically every major church denomination too.

Do they still have the denominations, or is it just all like the church of like pride flag? Well, I mean, yeah. technically legally there was from my research back in way back in 2001. In 2001 there was 50,000 Protestant denominations registered in the United States. Wow. That had to have doubled or tripled by now. So yeah, yeah. Well, and they're all.

And they're all wet. And well, you know, three quarters of them are pride flag. And the other quarters is Q&ON. But I'm sorry, go on. Pretty much. These are true religions. but I exaggerate. I exaggerate.

This is exaggerations. It's only 2022. It's only 2022. Even the Holy Roman Empire has been paused. All right. Where Marxists believe that the decisive factor in history and society is ownership of the means of production, Burnham argued that the relationship between ownership and control has been severed due to the rise of limited liability corporations.

which as CA bond shows were always a legal creation rather than a facet of the free market. I mean, I don't know what rat hole were going down here, but like I feel like basically Burnham knows about as much about living at liability corporations

as he does about like, you know, the liver of the lobster. I mean, but like, I mean, I think it's green the liver. But yeah, I just, yeah. Anyway, Yeah, let's let's let them say more about public corporations and then have my opinion there. Okay.

So quoting, the divorce of control or power from ownership has been due in large parts of the growth of public corporations. So long as a single person, family, or comparatively small group held a substantial portion of the common shares of a corporation, the legal owners could control its affairs. Even if they no longer actually conducted the business, the operating managers were functioning as their. accountable agents. But when the enterprise became more vast in scope and at the and at the same time, the stock certificates became spread in small bundles among thousands of persons, the managers were gradually released from subordination to the nominal owners. De facto control passed for the most part to non-owning management. All right. All right. All right. Hold up. Hold up. So, you know, basically, I feel like there's something that,

this motherfucker does not know about business. And I've worked in a number of businesses. I've done business. I've started businesses of own businesses. And like there's something really basic of the nature of business. And I think not just James Burnham, but like most people, like fundamentally at a certain level,

just don't understand, which is they don't understand the, purpose of a business. Like the purpose of a business, and really it's like any business, the purpose of a business, I know this will come as a shot, is to make money. Like, you know, so, so, so, and what's important about this relative to this question of ownership is that the whole concept of if you imagine businesses having like other like nefarious purposes, like, let's say you pretended that your purpose was to make money, but your real purpose was to conquer an ex-Mexico.

You know, then you'd be like sort of pretend, or turn the world in paperclips. Another fine internet example. You know, you'd be like pretending to make money, but you'd actually be engaged in this other thing. And presumably this other thing would be the direction of the owners. So the owners, you'd have a little cabal of people of this company that pretended to be mining gold but was actually plotting the invasion of Baja,

let's just say Baja, you know, and they would be doing gold mining things, but also like Baja invading things, right? You know, whereas the thing is that every company does something different. Every company has a different sort of purpose and companies in the olden days used to be defined by corporate charters that limited them to a specific purpose. Anything else was held ultra-virus or out of bounds. that concept is something of a dead letter, your gold mining company can start selling dental floss. But even if it starts selling dental floss, its purpose is selling the floss will be to make money. So what makes a company work really well is the reason it doesn't matter who the owners are or how many bundles amongst thousands of persons the, you know, the ownership is spread among.

The interest of all of the owners is completely aligned. they're not here to change the world or like create environmental sustainability or whatever. They're here to make money. And because they're all here for exactly the same purpose, it's like a laser. It's like coherent light. Their purpose is completely aligned. You ever see it like a European company in like Spain or something? And instead of, you know, Co or Inc after it has the letters S.A. Do you know what SAA stand for? No, what is it stand for? It stands for anonymous society. And it's an anonymous, what a corporation is is an anonymous society. So first of all, it doesn't matter who the fucking owners are.

Okay. They're just the people who get checks. You know, and the only way it matters is basically, if they look at the company and they're like, something is not going on right here. We're not invading bah. Well, forget the Baja. No, this is, we're not mining enough gold. Like maybe the CEO is stealing half the gold.

And then they can step in and do something. So the second thing to understand a bit, corporate governance is that it has two layers. It has a board and it has the shareholders. The shareholders elect the board. This election is almost always completely meaningless. Actually, if even the board is involved in managing the company, something is probably fucked. And if the shareholders are involved, there's like war in heaven or like a proxy battle or like something is just fucked. And, you know, but in a smaller company and a little bitty company like the kind of I've been involved, it means if the shareholders are involved,

It means something is fucked. Okay, so in the normal, and even if the board is involved, something is fucked. The role of the board really should be like, what does Mark Zuckerberg's board do? Like actually, Mark Zuckerberg is an absolute ruler. His board has no power over him at all. So basically, they just meet and say, hi, Mark, you know, nice job. Maybe they have some thoughts and views, but it doesn't matter. You know, Google's board.

What's the name of the president of Google, Sandeep or something? Yeah, yeah. And he, Google's board actually has control over him. But, you know, obviously he's doing a fine job. Stock keeps going up, revenue keeps going in, web keeps getting shittier.

So it's fine. But, I mean, the web keeps getting shittier is an effect, I'm convinced of Google, but it's not Google's intent. It's not like invading. It's an externality. It's not an intentional externality like invading Baja. So the thing is basically in a normal company, there are no acts of intentional

externality that flow from the owners, whether it's one owner or, you know, although everyone on the NASDAQ, there's sort of no intentionality that goes into the management of the company. The only reason why you have anything but the top down hierarchy from the CEO or president or whatever down is basically to act as an accountability layer in case the CEO loses his touch or gets a brain tumor needs to be replaced for some other reason. And so, you know, from the CEO down, it's simply an army. And just as an army's, I mean, an army has much more complicated tasks than a company because the company's job is just to make money.

An army is like, well, do I conquer this? Do I conquer that? Do I build, you know, peace? Do I make a desert and call it peace? So, like, none of those questions of purpose are relevant for the company. Its goal is just to make money. And so this is something very fundamentally different from sort of anything that exists in these kind of procedural bureaucracy systems.

And of rent. All right. Onward. In effect, Burnham's key insight was to apply Michelle's iron law of oligarchy to shareholders and corporate managers and then to apply the same logic to every other organization. Murray Rothbard, the great Murray Rothbard, I think he had a number of laws, but one of Rothbard's laws, which ironically may have affected Rothbard to some extent, was that everyone puts the most attention into the thing that they're the most wrong about. Because Burnham is literally right about everything else except for this, but like, but that's his key insight. I'm sorry, go on. Okay.

Burnham's conception of the behavior and methods of managerial elites owes a lot to Michelle's. They look after their own interests at the expense of those whom they are supposed to represent and serve. Yeah. See, if you're working, you know, that's true in a bureaucratic elite. In a corporate elite, basically, no, anyone who's a middle manager at a business is well aware that the purpose of business is business is to make money.

And so basically, like looking after your own interest in that sense. is like with taking kickbacks from like your purchasing manager or something like that's something that's sort of basically non-existent. I would go further and say that what Burnham is doing is he's basically taking all of the bad press that has already by this time been aimed at evil corporations and he has this aha moment and he's like what if we could redirect that at these fucking bureaucracies by calling them the same thing. It's just a typical rightest like three cushioned pool shot that like just lands date ball in the corner pocket. You catch them in the corner of your eye.

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When the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Liddle New Bridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Lidl, more to value. Quoting. Coup ball. Sorry, going. Cube ball.

Okay. So scratch. Okay. Yeah. Quoting. Once the managers consolidate their position within an institution, their objective interests no longer fully correspond to the interests, interests of the other groups involved, voters, owners, members, teachers, students, or consumers.

A decision on dividends, mergers, labor contracts, prices, curriculum, class-sized, scope of government operations, armament, strikes, etc., may serve the best interests of the managers without necessarily contributing to the well-being of the other groups. See, the reason why this is true in every group, except the sort of corporate structure. The corporate structure, it's not true in because basically corporate, you know, like the military discipline of actually having to win your wars,

corporate discipline of actually having to make money sort of keeps organizations tight. So they actually, unless they're, you know, this breaks down a little bit in like really gross monopolies. I think really gross monopolies are gross. But in like a normal capitalist environment, everything is basically has, you know, is sort of, there's no slack in that because that slack should be sort of instantly sucked out into profit. And so you have these organizations where basically people are just used to like executing shit without slack and then you go over to the post office and you're like why is this different right you know and it's different because the whole theory of the post office is managers too the post office is a corporation okay it loses a little bit of money you know who else loses money uber right you know um but uber isn't run like the post office and you know um and but maybe if you made uber a government department and gave it 100 years to mature it would be run like the post office and and And in fact, I'm pretty sure it would be. And so like that, that difference of, you know, basically for the managers to be pursuing their own self-interest, it is a kind of slack, which a basically tense, you know, organization that's running efficiently is not going to do any more than a car that's running efficiently is not going to like belch like gasoline fumes at the tailpipe.

All right. Onward. their ends are almost entirely self-serving and self-justifying, focusing on problems that expand their control and power. Again, this is the case of the problems are like successful memes that make people feel important. Going back to earlier, like, you know, I'll let you keep going. Talk about the progressives, yeah. All right. Quoting, managerial activity tends to become inbred and self-justifying.

The enterprise comes to be thought of as existing for the sake of its managers, not the managers for the enterprise. A high percentage of the time, a high percentage of the managers and their staff is spent on housekeeping and other internal problems. Self-justifying managerial control tends to keep alive operations which have little social purpose other than to nourish an enclave of managers. This is conspicuously true of governments. Many acute, expensive problems which are society faces, for example, in agriculture, radio TV, railroads, finance, etc. are largely manufactured by the managerial agencies founded to solve them. Go on.

Okay. Here one might think of the issue of climate change or the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In both cases, every solution to the problem entails expanding the remit of the managers, creating new jobs for managers, and instituting new power centers from which managers can control the masses. Stop there. So basically, when you say every solution to the problem, again, if you just kind of flip your lens slightly and say an idea will be seen as a solution by bureaucrats in a network like this. An idea will be seen as promising if it offers that capacity for expansion.

So if you can basically pose it as a solution to a problem which is within the remit of some small oligarchy. And it also... sort of is an idea that has impact on within that oligarchy. If it lets you expand your remit and create new jobs and institute new power centers, it will be seen as a very sweet idea. Whoever discovered, and the best ideas are like America, like someone discovers this idea and then just like a whole flock of professors can like descend on it. Right.

You know, and, you know, there's sort of space enough for everyone. This is like the dream idea. normally it's pretty cramped. And so that sort of way of thinking about it is like you're like, where do the ideas of these solutions come from? Where does the idea in COVID-19 or the idea that really created COVID-19 that we have to go around and collect all the back coronaviruses? Where does that idea come from?

Why is that a popular idea? And why once we collect them, do we have to genetically engineer them to be more dangerous? And, you know, and so the idea, you know, it would seem that among virologists whose purpose in life is to control viruses, that gain of function experiments would be the opposite direction from, you might be more interested in, like, lost of function. Like, this is literally how you create a traditional vaccine is by, you know, partly lost a function, right? And so the fact that you're studying like gain of function is like, why is that so exciting and interesting? And you catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive by design.

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Terms and conditions apply. Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited. Trading as Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Ready for huge savings? Well mark your calendars from November 28 to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse sale is back. We're talking thousands of your... favorite Liddle items all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs,

when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Lidl Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Liddle, more to value. And, you know, eventually it creates, like, it's not that the people who are doing these experiments were like, we're going to create a pandemic.

And then we're going to get more money because we're the virologists and it's a virus pandemic. but that's in fact sort of the feedback loop that happens and that literally happened. I mean, we're spending more money than ever on finding the back and all the back coronavirus. It's like fucking Pokemon out there, you know, and we're training them too. You know, and so, you know, so, you know, the, like, the fact that these ideas of solutions basically prosper in a liberal.

marketplace of ideas or within the expert marketplace of ideas, especially because, you know, nobody in virology cares what like, you know, Linda Lee and Topeka thinks of virology. It's the expert network that matters. But within the expert network, basically the idea that here's this kind of research that everyone is funded to do and that looks very, very impactful is like actually bad is not going to be a popular idea. And the idea that like, you know, who the heck prospers in an academic career by like killing the guy in the next office is funding. Like it doesn't work that way. And you may not be allies.

You may not be working on the same grant, but at least you better be a team player. And so just the very nature of these oligarchies tends to promote these kinds of basically oligarchical political formulas. Onward. In addition, the managerial class is anti-democratic in practice. though not in rhetoric. Managerial predominance tends towards regimentation and the suppression of active democracy. The rising power of a managerial group is in a given institution is, in fact, usually equivalent to a lessening in whatever form of democracy is relevant.

In other words, the power of the stockholder, voter, member, consumer, faculty, taxpayer, etc. decreases as the power of the manager increases. The combination of managerial groups, as when they're, is a collusion between labor and business management means the decline of democracy in the conjoined fields. In this connection, we must remember that totalitarianism is nothing more than an integrated front of managerial groups achieved either by mutual agreement or unilateral coercion. Well, I mean, there's a silver lining in every cloud. I mean, you know, but the, yeah, I mean,

you know, it's like, I mean, if you can imagine democracy on the scale of even a small institution, I mean, like imagine a restaurant in which the diners vote on the food. Imagine a restaurant in which the staff votes on the food. And that's just a restaurant. You know, imagine a movie which is made by the votes of the cast and the crew, right? you know, this would be like some ridiculous 60s experiment and it would be like unwatchable, just improv the fucking thing, you know. And so the sense of basically like, again, he's sort of, I think what Burnham adopts in later life is something that happens to some pundits who become

important. They basically are like, wow, people are actually responding to my words and making decisions because of them. And I'm going to, instead of writing sort of, or like looking as coldly as I can to see what is true, I will be like, what will be the useful, powerful, effective thing to say? And so the reason why Burnham doesn't look too closely into his like bogus manager, bureaucrat sort of analogy or like why he's like, oh, this is anti-democracy. Well, democracy is the cult of the age. So I'm going to rate that it's anti-democracy and that's like, you know, bad.

It's like, you know, it's beneath them in a way. It's like beneath the author of the Machiavellians. Okay. They are also practically impossible to dispense with owing to the interchangeable nature of managers. Even today, though individual managers in business can lose their jobs, a Napoleonic campaign is needed to get rid of corporate management group. As for government or educational administrators and trade union officials, a nuclear explosion would hardly be enough to dislodge them. Yeah.

The latter is certainly true. It would have to be a big explosion. Firing one manager will simply result in another one taking his place. He will have the same managerial taste, interest, ideas, goals, and so on as the last one. You can read, you can just read bureaucratic there. And that should be a specific warning to the people in the, proposed NICS administration who are working on the Schedule F problem. Go on.

Why did this change come about? For Burnham, it is no great secret. Quoting, there is no mystery in this shift. It can be correlated easily enough with the change in character of the state's activities. Parliament was the sovereign body of the limited state of capitalism. The bureaus are the sovereign bodies of the unlimited state of managerial society. Indeed, much of the managerial revolution is devoted to contrasting capitalism, by which Burnham means the small state laissez-faire bourgeois capitalism of 19th century with managerialism.

The differences between capitalism and managerialism manifest themselves in their respective ideologies. Capitalist societies promote individualism, opportunity, natural rights, especially the rights of property, freedom, especially freedom of contract, private enterprise, private initiative, and so on. these ideas justified profit and interest they showed why the owner of the instruments of production was entitled to the full product of these instruments and why the worker has no claim on the owner except for the contracted wages yeah i mean sorry going going going i mean so so one of the you know the trends of the time is the sense of like big and bureaucratic is good it's sort of like the like, like, remember, like the Japan is taking over everything, business craze in the, in the 80s, like, Black Rain, you know, like, and so basically there's a sort of thing that is like looks back at, um, kind of 19th century capitalism and also sees it as kind of more of an abstraction, whereas in fact, it's just like large bodies of men being commanded in a military style just to make money, not to conquer.

And so the extent to which that is that, that rather than the sort of classical liberal ideology things that he talks about are kind of the essence of 19th century business. And though he doesn't realize it, you know, because of this kind of fad for 20th century business as well. Go on. Burnham notes that where these were once progressive slogans in 1941, they are recognized as revolutionary and as the cries of the Tories.

Yeah, that's an important, that's an important point. So basically, one of the things, you know, classical liberalism in, say, you know, the old Manchester day is going back at like the, really the first half of the 19th century, that is always basically a left-wing standpoint. That is basically striking down sort of thrown altar and monopoly. And so there's just this, you know, because it's sort of a destructive force of these old powers that be, and it's a, and it's a destructive force of these old powers that be, and it's a, its nature, it's inherently destructive. Of course, once the older powers are gone, you know, and new powers arise, that force is also an acid to those new powers, and so it becomes a right-wing force. That's why we perceive capitalism as right-wing now and 150 years ago as left one. I'm sorry, gone. In contrast, managerialism is oriented away from the private individual and towards the public collective, away from free enterprise and towards planning.

away from providing opportunities and towards providing jobs, less about rights and more about duties. One must remember, you got, you got something? Yeah, no, no, no, no, keep going. That's just, what? I was just a phantom. It's wrong. Okay.

One must remember here that Burnham did not only have the United States in mind, but also the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as managerial states. The Soviets and Germans were more blatant in their messaging than the Americans who felt the need to pay lip service to the older ideology. in a passage that seems shocking to read today, perhaps owing to 80 years of propaganda between 1941 and now, Burnham notes that the masses in Britain, France, and America simply did not want to fight World War II for the elites, that their messaging was tired and outmoded and simply failed to animate the young men despite mass unemployment at the time. He contrasts

that with the picture in Germany where the masses enthusiastically supported Hitler. He argues that if it that it is shallow and absurd to imagine that mass support for the German war effort was down to terrorism and skilled propaganda alone. Rather, the cause was genuinely popular. I think this is, I mean, maybe slight exaggeration. I think it is correct that World War II is more popular in Germany than at first than with the Allies, especially as the Germans started up by winning. I would say important to remember that in World War I, the war is much more popular than World War II. Just worth them.

Okay. In France, meanwhile, the masses were passive and did not have the will to fight because democracy and capitalism were not causes that animated them whatsoever. He points out the awkward and undeniable fact that both Britain and the USA had to resort to the draft rather than relying on millions of enthusiastic and willing volunteers at a time of mass unemployment. You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive, by design. They move you, even before you drive.

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the Central Bank of Ireland. Ready for huge savings? Well mark your calendars from November 28th to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge warehouse sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favourite Liddle items all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs. When the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Liddle Newbridge warehouse sale, 28th to 30th of November. Lidl. More to value. However, managerialism ultimately had a globalizing tendency and totalitarian character. As Burned in 1960, the directing managers of each nation should preserve a healthy remnant

of national individuality from becoming dissolved into the global managerial state that looms under a variety of labels as the ideal goal of a total managerial society. However, it seems that Burnham's thinking retains a residually Marxist Economism, whereby material conditions ultimately create the need for ideologies. Or in Marxist jargon, the basis creates the superstructure. The process by which capitalistic firms become managerial is driven initially by economic and practical concerns and only latterly by ideological ones. Burnham argues that managerialism comes about initially because of the economic need for startup capital, especially in times of contraction in which the interest rates are high and investors are risk averse, such as during the Great Depression.

Yeah, I mean, I'll just leave that one. Like, like, yeah, I wouldn't, I wouldn't even know where to start to try and refute that argument. It's just, it's a piece of the 1940s that just hasn't really worked out. intellectually. I'm sorry, going. All right. So, quoting, the internal crisis of entrepreneurial capitalism compels the expansion of the state. Massive amounts of new capital cannot be mobilized from private sources and must come directly or indirectly from the government. The manager is indispensable to the technical processes of modern production, find cooperation with the state and the use of its coercive monopoly valuable for the continuation of production and

for their own interests. Here, the defender of entrepreneurial capitalism might object and argue that a firm might raise funds by floating themselves in the stock market as an IPO. In other words, issuing shares in exchange for liquid capital. But the publicly traded company relies on the state for its legal status and automatically comes under increased regulation and managerial oversight. Furthermore, in practical terms, control over such companies is often handed over to managers. Okay. I mean, this is like sort of there's a like broad rightness here maybe, but really what's controlling the publicly traded company is that it relies on the press, which really, you know, for its PR status and we live in a press run state. And so basically where, you know, the two forms of governance that really drive things are the press and basically, you know, the, what Christopher call,

well calls the second American constitution, but it's actually like the fifth, by which I mean like the law of protected classes. And so the, you know, right in a way, I'm not sure the like, yeah, I mean, like regulation does matter. I don't know. But like, yeah, it's sort of a little doubling down here. Let's let's keep going. Okay. For example, one of the great Americans I Coons, Henry Ford died in 1947. Although his son Edsel had technically been the president of the Ford Motor Company from 1919 until his death at 1943, Henry had always assumed de facto control over the company. The board and the management had never seriously defied him. The Roosevelt's administration had developed a plan to nationalize the Ford Motor Company should Henry becoming incapacitated. Thus, he

resumed direct control of the firm. Before his death, owing to his old age and declining mental health, and somewhat cold. What's going on, Curtis? I'm just freezing my memory. Before his death, owing to his old age and declining mental health and somewhat cajoled by his wife and daughter-in-law who owned controlling stakes in the firm, he agreed to hand over the day-to-day affairs of running the Ford Motor Company to his grandson, Henry Ford II.

It was soon losing $9 million a month, and the corporate manager Ernest R. Ernest R. Breach, that's ironic, was hired to become executive vice president and then board chairman. The Ford Motor Company became publicly traded in 1956. Thus, even though the Ford family, the Ford family retained a 40% ownership of this company, it can be said to have fully transitioned into being a note of managerialism after the death of its founder, Henry Ford, who once commanded it as a visionary entrepreneur and leader. Yeah. So the separation between basically, You know, when you separate kind of family or concentrated ownership, you know, companies like, you know, Facebook today from, say, a company like Google whose ownership is distributed, you see that there's not a whole lot of difference in behavior between Facebook and Google. There's a little bit of difference with basically someone like Elon Musk, who sometimes does maybe kind of have some ulterior motives, except he doesn't seem to want to buy Twitter, unfortunately.

but the you know maybe there's some motives there I don't know but sort of the you know again the sort of the obsession with this kind of robber baron muck raker storyline where which is just this really tired storyline even by the 40s where basically you're like oh the evil robber baron you know like is plotting to invade Baja you know um to find a hey anyone out there have some Baja Baja vehicles uh uh uh It'll be like storm area 51 except storm Baja. But you're hard to hear first. But the on the peak, you know on the show. But storm Baja.

But yeah, I mean, you know, that there's a difference between those things is sort of not particularly great in a way. And so, yeah, he's just barking up the wrong tree. and the difference between sort of managerialism. And I mean, Ford is still a perfectly efficient company that efficiently makes cars and really hasn't done anything else besides make cars.

Its cars may be a little less exciting than they were after the death of the Elon Musk of cars. But they're still perfectly good cars. It's not like Ford has transitioned entirely into making like experimental theater or something. It couldn't because basically those strings are tight, right? you know, whereas the Ford Foundation, I guess we're about to get to the Ford Foundation. By the way, you mentioned, I think Ernest R. Breach is a really cool name, but I recently met someone

living in Austin who has the coolest name of all the time. He's actually an academic. He writes, I think he's written for like City Journal or Manhattan Institute or something like that. He works on homelessness and as well, he should because his name is Judge Glock. Oh, my God. That's amazing. Exactly. Isn't that a matter? amazing. That's so awesome. You didn't even make it up. Judge, yeah, yeah. Judge Glock.

Oh, wow. Yeah, yeah. It's an old Swiss name apparently. Anyway, I'm fucking brilliant. You know, not even artificial or so I'm told. Anyway, the same can be said for the going. The same can be said and doubly so for the Ford Foundation. Shortly after

Henry Ford's death, Henry Ford the second signed a document stating that the Ford family would exercise no more influence over the foundation than any other board member. He regretted the decision for the rest of his life. Since then, the Ford Foundation has supported almost exclusively left-wing progressive causes that would make Henry Ford a well-known social conservative. That's mildly, mildly putting it to turn in his grave.

For example, between 1970 and 2010, the Ford Foundation gave $46,123,135 to LGBT causes alone. This is typical of how managerialism captures institutions and turns them against their original purposes for managerial ones. See, when you get all the way over on the other side of the aisle, managerialism is just another euphemism for a communist, right? And basically, well, he says that shortly afterward, I guess. But like if you hear, if when you're talking in this sense, you hear the word managerial, just substitute communist and it will make perfect sense. In fact, you could do it as you read. Okay. Here, left-wing progressivism and communism are synonymous since the solutions of the former always involved the expansion of the latter.

Hey. To stay with the example of LGBT causes, these may seem remote from something as technical as communism. But consider the armies of HR officers, diversity czars, equality ministers, and so on that are supported today under the banner of LGBT and used to police and control enterprises. The philanthropic endeavors of the Ford Foundation in this regard laid the infrastructure and groundwork to set up new power centers for communism under the guide of this ostensibly unrelated cause. Jesus, it does work. Oh, my God. Similar case studies can be found in the issues as diverse as racial equality, gender equality,

Islamist terrorism, climate change, mental health, and the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. The logic of communism is to create invisible problems, which can in effect never truly be solved, but rather can permanently support communist jobs that force some arbitrary compliance standard, such as unconscious bias training, net zero carbon, the ratio of men and women on executive boards, or whatever else. In the communist state of the Soviet Union, well, no, hold on. Although we do that. In the managerial state of the Soviet Union, such managers would simply be called commissars of the CPSU.

In the communist state of the United States, they will simply be called things like equality, diversity, and inclusion officer for Ford Motor Company, but their function is identical. In both cases, their post and its duties are backed by the full force of the law and the state. The latter is an example of fused political, economic apparatus,

Burnham describes. In the end, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not have to nationalize Ford, even if the U.S. government and the Ford Motor Company have the ostensible appearance of being separate entities. In actuality, they move as one,

expouse the same values, enforce the same compliance policies, and so on, as if they were two sub-departments of the Politburo. Well, they don't make the same kind of tough trucks, you know? I mean, you know like imagine imagine if the department of transportation had to make the f-150 right you know i mean right right right and so you know the thing is that where you see these little communist colonies

in these basically capitalistic enterprises are hr pr sort of stuff like that that basically kind of take over the brain of the corporation and kind of team it a little bit to you know provide jobs to protected classes, you know, to make it say and do, you know, there's this huge list of corporations that have filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court asking the court to be more rare. I don't mean more rare. I mean, I mean, to take race into account when deciding its admissions. You know, the, I mean, yeah, right. So these are clearly these kind of little colonies where most of the cells are,

still, you know, the host, but like the cells from the alien thing that goes in here, you know, are kind of... You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive. By design. They move you. Even before you drive. The new Cooper plugin hybrid range for Mentor, Leon, and Teramar.

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Terms and conditions apply. Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited Trading as Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Ready for huge savings? Well mark your calendars from November 28th to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favourite Liddle items

all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Liddle Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Lidl, more to value. Doing most of the work of having, creating two sub-departments of the Politburo, but they're very different departments. Go on. Thus we can see that although to retain, thus we can see that although to retain the Marxist's

lexicon, the economic base determines the ideological superstructure in Burnham. Communism also uses the ideological ideological superstructure, which is to say the slogans of social justice or climate change, etc. to expand its economic base and therefore it's control. God damn it, it works too well. If you go to Google and grams, which lets you graph the use of words and phrases across time, and graph the use of the phrase social justice, which means by themselves, these words mean almost nothing. If you grasp the use of the word social justice from, say, 1880 till 2020, you'll be impressed. Okay, wrote it down.

The role of public relations in general is somewhat taken for granted in Burnham and reduced to propaganda, even though, as we saw earlier, he was acutely aware of the power of the press to brainwash the public. He was also aware that the United States had come to be dominated by Pretto's foxes who rely almost exclusively on persuasion to get their way. This aspect of communism takes a subordinate role in Burnham's work, but is massively expanded upon in the work of Samuel T. Francis, which we will explore shortly. While Burnham worked chiefly in the diagnostic mode, he makes some suggestions as to how Western societies might escape communist totalitarianism?

In fact, this is the central thesis of his new, of his next book, the Machiavellian. Byrneum had a belief in a pluralistic society in which power restrains power. I think he's also wrong about this, although he doesn't spend actually most of his time in the Machiavellians talking about the solution. He just wants you to think that there's one out there and that it's not grim. You know, saying power restrains power is like in the classical political science, the political science of Greece and Rome, the phrase for basically competing powers would be Imperium in Imperio, that is sort of power within power, and it's generally held to be, you know, a design fallacy. And usually power doesn't restrain power. One power conquers the other power, and then since that sets it up as a front man, or a yes man, rather.

But sorry, go on. Thus, his solution to, it was, to communist totalitarian and was essentially to set managers from different spheres against the set. Commissars, commissars, bureaucrats. Yeah, yeah. Yeah.

Or we could just go back. We can go back to managerial. I think we've made the point. Let's go back to managerial. All right. Thus, his solution to managerial totalitarianism was essentially to set managers

from different spheres against each other as to prevent them from uniting. The only way to manage the managers, in short, is to keep them busy enough managing or countervailing each other to guarantee that they won't unite and spend all their time managing the rest of us.

This is substantial, the same solution as Moscow's juridical defense and separation of powers. However, as Juvenel's work shows historically and as history since Burnham was writing has shown, this is easier said than done because power's logic always tends towards centralization and it seems to me that the managers have a vested interest in convergence. At the time, what do you? Yeah. I mean, yeah, they don't like, they sort of, they converge.

because their thoughts naturally converge because they have the same ideas, really. It's like if you expect the house, you know, if you expect one, you know, Harvard to be left wing and Yale to be right wing, what you will find is that the managers in Harvard and Yale cannot be said against each other because they all believe the same thing

despite the fact that they don't work for each other. And so really you're just, your pluralism is not getting you anything. And I think that's what the author, this this parvini chap is getting it yeah so like what is the what would be the main difference in ideology between like tony blair and facebook is there one i'm sorry did you see yeah no yeah no i mean hear anything oh you're not hearing it no it's because there isn't one there's it's nothing yeah okay okay i got you yeah exactly oh no that's okay great podcasting here guys

very deep very we go very deep on this podcast man sometimes we say nothing um i know where i know where i am want me to keep going yeah keep going keep going i found it i'll say nothing at the time of writing they have achieved total global dominance across all institutions it strikes me that of the possible rival nodes of power only to have the potential to resist this total dominance the first of the the Kulak class or if you prefer the independent middle class or Petit Bourgeoisie. Wait, wait, wait. Or, or. It said, petite with any bourgeois, which means a little bourgeois woman.

Oh, yeah, a little boy. Yeah, yeah. I know. I'm just, I'm doing. Okay. Sorry. Actually, this, this isn't the finished copy. This is one that he sent me.

Well, you should have that. Then because petite bourgeois is funny. But the first of the Koolock class. I do prefer the petite bourgeoisers. Sorry, go ahead. Yes. The first of the Kulac class, or if you prefer the independent middle class or Petit Bourgeoisie, who are non-managerial, disparate, and are not as yet organized as a minority interest group. The second are managers at the level of national government whose power represents a threat to global managerialism and therefore must, in the long run, be conquered and dissolved as so many feudal castles. So long as armies are loyal to nations rather than to global governance structure,

or supernatural, supranational organizations, there remains at least the foreseeable chance that a power struggle may emerge between the traditional apparatuses of nation states and the power centers of globalism. At present, they are united, but if history tells us anything at all, it is that they can change quickly. Yeah, that doesn't seem very likely. I mean, you know, like, imagine the Pentagon pulling like a military coup. I mean, the Pentagon can't even invade Barbados, you know, I mean.

I could probably invade Barbados, but, you know, the Bahamas might be hard. It would probably take a few days. It would probably take a few days, right? They'd have to clear everything through Jags, you know. But, yeah, I keep going. On this score in the Machiavellians, one thing Burnham does add to the elite theorists is his own idea of how revolutions take place. There is revolutionary change. One, when the elite cannot or will not adjust to the new technological and social forces.

forces. Two, when a significant proportion of the elite rejects ruling for cultural and aesthetic activities. Three, when the elite fails to assimilate promising new elements. Four, when a sizable percentage of the elite questions legitimacy of its own rule. Good luck with that. Five, when elite and non-elite reject the mythological basis of order in the society. And finally, six, when the ruling class lacks courage to employ force effectively. So I really mostly work on the basis of, I would guess, one, four, and five. Maybe there's some like three involved, but really four, you know, you laugh at four. Four is a sweet spot.

Four is where it's at, man. It's, you know, it's just one of the four is what brought down the Soviet Union. Yeah. You know, it's just one of those things that like when you read it, it seems so absurd. But then when you look at history, you're like, they actually do that. four and five is the is the core man it's like it's central it's also good for the non-elite to reject the mythological basis of order in the society like you know it's like our society is supposedly run run according to this like piece of paper you know from like 250 years ago

like none of the actual parts of the government are like basically mentioned a piece of paper but like we keep on keeping on but you know the um like yeah it's just it's it's it's like when you you know, when you're like, oh my God, they're violating the Constitution. That's like this basically fundamentally deferential non-revolutionary form of dissent. You know, I think Lenin said somewhere that, you know, when he realized that the goal was not to seize the leverage of the machine, but to smash the machine. He really had a thing going. And so, you know, questioning the legitimacy and rejection.

and rejecting the mythological basis of order are not grasping the levers of the machine. They're smashing the machine. So in a way, Lenin really emerges as the foremost theory of revolution here with no surprise. Go to the next point, which is really, really good. Okay.

It is notable that of these six criteria, only one considers the disconsent of the masses, and even then it is only half of the point, or in other words, five and a half out of six, criteria concern the elites. The discontent of the masses is BS. It almost never has an effect. If you actually starve people, they'll become

quiet as mice. It's like, you know, actually the more, you know, there's this whole system of, you know, bullshit in the American political tradition that are like the more oppressed people are, the more, you know, likely they are to rise up and seize power. It's the opposite.

The more oppressed they are, the less likely they are to rise up and seize power. And the worst they're conditions are, the less they'll be interested in contending for power. You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive. By design. They move you. Even before you drive.

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All reduced to clear From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Lidl Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Liddle, more to value. The last two and a half years of should make a lot of things clear to a lot of people,

especially that a lot of the political ideology that most people are holding on to just isn't in reality. It's just like for like kindergartners. Yeah, yeah. So it's embarrassing. It's like you're a grown man, you're a grown woman. Like, why do you care about this stuff? Yeah.

All right. When considering our current situation under managerial dominance, we might say that the current elite do adjust to new technologies, still have an insatiable appetite to rule. Do not question their own legitimacy and believe their own myths. We're working on it. We're working on it. It's been a, like, yeah, cut us a break out of you.

Sorry, going on. So far, so good. However, to go through the six points again, they are at risk of mismanaging new technologies if they are too forceful in their climate change agenda. People accustomed to driving their own cars and enjoying other methods of travel and who are used to eating meat at affordable prices are likely to revolt should these luxuries be suddenly removed. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, nobody. They're back to discontent of the masses shit. It's like, yeah, yeah, yeah. No, I mean, yeah, yeah, they had no problem to be unlocked.

And no one would have ever be in locked down. You know, shit. No, sure. There were some people complained a little bit. I think in Australia there was a little pushing and shoving at some point. You know. Yeah, the penal colony was, the penal colony just showed itself to be, you know, they like being prisoners.

Yeah. Somewhat. Yeah. And they may find some elite backing by vested interests who still want to make money from the massive industries associated with them. They have also not yet found a way to manage the new social forces unleashed by widespread resentment against mass immigration and other facets of globalism that led to the Brexit vote in the UK, Donald Trump in the United States and so-called populism in Europe, most recently

embodied by the meteoric rise of Eric Zamor in France, who has flanked Marine Le Pen by being more radical in his rhetoric to challenges. What I like is that all of these things are politically dead. actually they have thrown away. It's easy. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, what I saw as Amorra, I was like, when I heard him, I was like, okay, that's not, he's not going anywhere.

So the current tactic of simply branding such people as beyond the pale, insurrectionist, fascist, ad nauseum has not worked in any respects since 2015. You know, Peter, since 2015. You know, Peter, when you're a dissident, I just got to say one thing. It's really important. to keep your hand off your dick since 2015. All right, keep going. In fact,

four years of such relentless rhetoric from the corporate media resulted in the hated... You can quote me on that. You can quote me on that. But sorry, go on. Oh, man. In fact, four years of such relentless rhetoric from the corporate media resulted in the hated...

Okay, corporate media. Corporate media. This is an example of exactly the same thing that Burnham is doing. He's like taking this like stupid equation from this like illiterate like, you know, propaganda narrative that corporate means bad. Therefore, if we call the media corporate, it will mean they are bad. Actually like, you know, there's nothing that's corporate about them in a sense. They're disguised government departments and they're actually, you know, bureaucracies. You could say the official media, even that's dendentious. I like just saying

the prestige media, but corporate media is actually leading people down the long rat hole because just they've, you know, they've spent 15 years going to movies, you know, corporation bad, you know, it's just like in the Third Reich, you'd be like, Jew bad, Jew on screen, Jew bad, right? You know, it's like this like, you know, and so this thing of like leveraging these stupid two minutes hates, you know, crap is just intellectual laziness and it should be stricken from the earth with a red pen. in fact four years of such relentless rhetoric from the corporate media resulted in the hated Donald Trump increasing his total votes by over 14 million people, which would have been a

resounding victory had he not been against the most popular, the most popular presidential candidate of all time. Is he trying to say something here? Is this like some subtext? What's gone? It's so good. I'm reading this in AA's voice when he's being like that sarcastic. Do you want me to do some reading?

I could do some reading. Do you want me to do some reading? If you want to, go ahead. The populist phenomena are perhaps a symptom of the fact that communist dominance and convergence will increasingly seek to dissolve the nation state as an obsolete unit. Indeed, globalists use separatist groups such as the S&P and Scotland or the Catalan Independence Movement in Spain as battering rams against the national governments. It's very interesting to notice when so nationalist parties are either, basically, communist or fascist, but not like in between.

And there appeared to actually just simply be two meanings of the word nationalist, because the meaning that refers to the Catalan independence movement is not the same that refers to Hitler. I'm just saying, or Trump. In juvenile in terms of globalists

constitute the center and separate as the peripheries, the national governments are the subsidiaries whose feudal castles must in the long run be destroyed. Okay, this is just like too fertile a metaphor, I think. So long as national governments maintain standing armies, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which they may turn on the globalists. For example, the populations will not brook the punitive carbon taxes that globalists wish them to enact.

Here we are in, you know, social dissent, you know, again, the political incentives to side with dissidents against globalists may be too strong for leaders to resist. You know, I don't think the, I don't know how long the Orban regime in Hungary will exist, but I don't think, the cause of them is carbon taxes. I don't think that's the main issue down there in Hungary. I could be wrong. But in any case, basically, there's plenty of Hungarian globalists.

The globalists are going to win. They always win. Like, this isn't even, it's just a question how long. Do you want to read some? Yeah, this is actually the last paragraph.

Awesome. The elite are also actively turning away promising new elements, which is simply to say, talented people with the wrong political view. skin color or gender. Either these people are not hired in the first place because of the affirmative action programs and increasingly absurd diversity quotas or they are hired but later sacked for transgressing the regime in some way.

What color would this? Never mind. Go on. I wonder. In the long run, this will create an entire class of disaffected, well would be elites who will put their skills and talents towards their eventual overthrow, especially if they feel locked out of what would have been their career path in a normal and well-run society. I think everybody's locked out of a career path in this abnormal and poorly run society,

but go on. But this is good. This is good. Furthermore, around 30% of people have turned decisively against the elites in the past few years, taken together with disaffected would-be elites. These dissidents form a non-elite who increasingly reject the mythological basis of order in the society, where the basis is, is some empty managerial slogan of social justice that becomes a precondition to enter the workplace. So these are your infamous dark elves, right? Yeah. Notice how well the communist slogan of social justice works there.

I was just going to say that. Which brings us finally to the question of force and whether the managerial foxes are prepared to use it. But whether the... Oh. Which brings us finally to the question of force. whether the communist foxes are prepared to use it against the dissident population. Time will surely tell, but according to Burnham's criteria, while the communist elite may look secure and united now, they are faced with a threat that cannot be managed using their usual tricks of persuasion,

since the people who constitute that threat have become actively hostile to their increasingly patronizing message. force will become necessary and then as Oswald Spengler once put it will come to will come the hour of decision here I gotta read that last sentence for you man go ahead I gotta I got to write force

will become necessary and then as odd word as Oswald Spengler once put it will come the hour of decision I was down in Austin recently and I was taking an Uber ride and the driver was some Mexican guy he looked really Mexican

and I have a little bit of Spanish and one of Austin's local disabled population. You're doing a really weird thing with your background like you're doing the internet. It's unnerving. You know, this is actually my house back here. But you know, the, what does it say on your shirt? It's a gas station shirt.

It's from Sun. It's from Sun Studios where Elvis recorded and Memphis and everything. It used to be, that building used to be an electric. Anyway, anyway, I'm in Austin. and I'm talking to my, to my, um, um, um, uh, Uber driver, um, in Spanish and one of Austin's local, mentally disabled populations kind of drifts through the intersection in this mildly lethal way. And, you know, I just say to this guy, I'm like, in la vida, I have gone those basis.

when the sole possibility for that situation is the force

I don't I don't I don't think you need my bad Spanish to understand that I'm like

it's the force and he looks at me and he's like is the force and

he's the gentle force beautiful happy force you know the force of the surgeon and not the butcher the force that cleans and heals and you know doesn't leave ugly piles of bodies lying in the street but forced you know i think that's the um in a way it's like when you try to imagine a way out of the solution of the armies of bureaucrats um it's not violence that you need to imagine and its force, and these are very, very different things. It wasn't violence that brought down East Germany. It had simply lost the force to cohere.

It was kind of just sucked, almost like, you know, a planet being sucked into a black hole by West Germany. We don't really have a West Germany. But the... You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive, by design. They move you. Even before you drive.

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The sense of basically this, you know, you can see how prophetic he is in a sort of sense that basically the kind of the core challenge is this loss of faith and this loss of like respect for the mythological order. And it sort of goes along with something that I often say is kind of the correct definition of rightism, which is really, it's not a positive belief system at all. It's just an absence of leftism. leftism is a phenomenon which you can study, you know, but the absence of anything is not a phenomenon that can be studied. I always compare to the word gentile, which doesn't refer to a class of, could be a Hindu, could be a Christian, all we know is it's not a Jew.

And you can't say what are the qualities of Gentiles, whereas, you know, one can say that. I mean, one shouldn't, you know, about the Jews, right? you know and so the like the you know the sense of basically abjuring the sort of state religion is a much, much clearer and much, much more important sense of dissent than like, you know, remember when we were kids, people are like you say, you know, I'm a capitalist. I'm a libertarian. I believe in this. I'm a Christian, right? No, it's like, okay, you can't believe in those things. Those are fine things to believe in, but what really brings all of you dissidents together is that basically you don't believe the shit that's on TV. And like actually reducing and moreover, there aren't really very, very good filters for like unofficial information.

So actually just like reducing your consumption of non-official information is not a bad thing as well. Just like keep your brain like empty and ready for service basically. And so there's a sense in which basically, you know, there's some apocalypse of something different that sweeps these bureaucracies away. They can't be gradually reformed. And there's also a sense that kind of the like the state capacity that will come and do this is in the private sector in a way, which is sort of why the kind of unification of bureaucrats and managers. is so misleading. It's like when you look at, for example, the Obamacare health care sign-up site, which I harp on,

at first they tried doing it with bureaucrats, and many of those bureaucrats were in the private sector because that's the way D.C.'s Beltway Bandit Contracting System works. They basically were like, we just spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to do this thing with bureaucrats. Let's give up. Let's do it with managers instead.

And they did it with managers, and it cost a few million dollars in a few weeks. And so like there's a really radical difference in competence there that maybe wasn't necessarily there in Burnham's Day. And like the difference has only grown greater and like more important. And you're just really, really lucky to be living in a country that does have this. I mean, capitalism, especially well, startup, you know, any kind of highlight dynamic area of capitalism is kind of a school for kings in a way. It's a school that basically teaches, you know, a non-trivial number. of like very capable human beings to basically organize a large number of other people up to tens

or even hundreds of thousands on a single task. And if you compare, you know, let's imagine, imagine that, you know, people are like Afghanistan, the graveyard of empires. You're like, okay, sure. Imagine that if you basically took the management structure of Apple and you gave Afghanistan to Apple and you were like, Tim Cook, your new name shall be Khan Tim Cook. And you're like, and Tim Khan, maybe, and you shall do with Afghanistan as you will. And you got to conquer the place first because we fucked it up so badly that the Afghans are back in church. But, you know, the do with Afghanistan as you will. Let's see where you are in 20 years.

And then you said to the people who are to try to, I guess not conquer, but of course, liberate Afghanistan, you will be like, you're now in charge of liberating Apple. You're the new management of Apple. Let's see how far you get with that. And then we'll take a look at our like iPhones in 20 years and our Afghanistan 20 years. And I'm betting that basically probably the iPhone would be outsold by something made in Afghanistan and designed in Afghanistan. And the, and like, and so this is this huge disparity in competence is one of the things that Burnham wrote about when he wrote about revolutions. It's like there's sort of no obvious way for this competence to.

switch over and instead of, you know, affecting just one tiny new website of a government to be like, no, we're actually going to do the whole thing, the Silicon Valley way. But once you do that, just like, you know, it'll be like the end of inception, like buildings will be sliding into the sea everywhere, you know, and nobody will get hurt. And you don't need to hurt these bureaucrats. These are not violent people, right? Think about it. You fire, you know, one of my favorite, you know, policies, which I point to it, you know, anytime I can, is just dissolve. the American Empire by basically laying off the State Department and bring all the embassies home, close the Truman building, shut the whole thing down.

Okay, you've got 50,000 people who work for this organization. You know, 50,000 people, you know, how many divisions is that in an army terms? Is that five divisions? Like, you think about this and you're like, holy shit, this is a menace. These like laid off, you know, FS4s or whatever could like, you know, seize Georgetown. And having seized Georgetown, they'd set up picket lines. and then you're just like, nah,

I know these people, they'll go home, right? They'll tend their gardens, right? There's 50,000 people, probably 700 of them own a gun, and, you know, 200 of them have ever been in a fist fight, and, you know,

three of them have ever killed someone, you know, and like, you know, I mean, actually, that's the great thing about this sort of late-stage bureaucracy is that actually, it could just be pushed

it's humpty dumpty it can just be pushed off the wall and it'll just fall and people don't understand that at all but yeah that's my rant was that enough ranting at James Burnham it was beautiful bro Neva Neva the gay Italian dude

Neema The gay Italian corn star The gay Italian porn star Yeah that's right That's right that's right that's right He's hung like he's hung like a cassowary but give your

all right give your give your plugs I'm Curtis Jarvin I write a gray mirror I'm usually not this vulgar and that's gray mirror at subsdack.com

that's gray with an A the American way and thank you so much for having me on and let's do the skin some time thank you Curtis take care all right cut

I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekina show returning Evelyn, how are you doing? I'm good. Thanks for having me on. No problem. We are here to do Chapter 8 in the Populist Delusion. It's called Elites and Ideology. And it concentrates on the teachings of Samuel T. Francis.

You're pretty familiar with Sam, right? Yes, but my experience with Sam Francis, I think, is about, I did it backwards. So I wasn't really familiar with him as the writer for first. I think it was National Review and the other outlet that I think it was Buchanan run for a while that he wrote for and I knew he wrote for some more

kind of radical fringe stuff as well right from the 80s through the 90s and I've latterly kind of found that stuff but for me it was I think I was listening to some I think it was Edward Welsh I think the guy there

that's one of the editors for the Chronicles magazine and he was on somebody's stream I think it might have even be on academic agents or something and he was like oh what's the one book you've got to read there. The question was something like, Sam Francis's Leviathan and its enemies. And I thought, that's interesting. I'll give that a read. And bought

this big paperback, hardback, 840 page tome, having only just been slightly familiar with Burnham before it. So I really dip myself in the deep end, but it's been one of those books about some of the really good Austrian works where I'm always coming back to it. Anything I'm looking at tangentially, I'm always like, well, did Sam Francis mention something about this? And more often him not, he normally does. He has the same sort of ability as Rothbard to sort of see-through time, as it were. It'd be really good to get a PDF and be able to search it for things, because I've looked online for a PDF of it and I can't find it. I think I have one I can send to you. All right, that's cool. You send as your telegram. All right, so the way I'm doing this with

everyone. I'm going to read it. Stop me any time to comment. And we'll just go from there. All right. You can interrupt me. Even AA was interrupting me mid-sentence and it was fine. As his book after all, I suppose. It was only really interrupting himself on a sort of roundabout way. I'm sure that's how he rationalized it. All right. Let's get this up on the screen for people. All right. I'm going to start reading. Chapter 8, elites and ideology. Samuel T. Francis appears to have written Leviathan and its enemies in 1991 because this is when he dated its preface. He did not publish it during his lifetime. He died in 2005 and it was found by Jerry Woodruff who was given a box of three and a half inch computer floppy disks, one of which was labeled in Sam's handwriting Leviathan and its enemies complete, dated 327, 1995, and containing word perfect 5.1.10.

text files. It was published in 2016. You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive, by design. They move you, even before you drive. The new Cooper plugin hybrid range for Mentor, Leon, and Terramar. Now with flexible PCP finance and trade-in boosters of up to 2000 euro. Search Coopera and discover our latest offers. Cooper. Design. that moves. Finance provided by way of higher purchase agreement from Volkswagen Financial Services, Ireland Limited. Subject to lending criteria.

Terms and conditions apply. Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited, trading as Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Ready for huge savings? We'll mark your calendars from November 28th to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favourite Liddle items

all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, When the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. The Lidl Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Lidl, more to value. Francis had been a firebrand paleo-conservative journalist who wrote regular syndicated columns as well as speeches for Happy Cannon.

It's one of the things I really took on from being at the Meases Institute the other week. Thank God there are people who win these sort of writers that we venerate pass. that someone make sure to go through the stuff. Because from what I've seen and heard, and I've obviously read the big preface and stuff myself to the book, no way, you never told anyone about it or anything really. It would just, it would have died with him. And we'd never have that book had it not been for, you know,

Jerry Woodruff here going through Sam Francis's old stuff just to see what you had lying around. Yeah. Yeah. And talking about the Mises Institute, Patrick Newell. in figuring out Murray Rothbard's handwriting for Conceived in Liberty Chapter, Volume 5, for the progressive era. Yeah, I mean, these are things that were just, I guess he didn't tell anybody he was

writing them, and then they're just found years later. So thankfully, thankfully, someone found him. So, all right. It was first published in 2016. Francis had been a firebrand paleo-conservative journalist who wrote regular syndicated columns as well as speeches for Pat Buchanan. He was an early victim of canceled culture for his politically incorrect statements about race and was fired by the Washington Times after an attack by the neo-conservative, Dinesh D'Souza.

He was known for his sharp analytical insights, ballistering rhetorical style, and a barbed wit. Posthumously, he was blamed or praised, depending on who was writing, as the intellectual basis for the rise of Donald Trump. Whatever controversy surrounded him in life, intellectual history will record Francis as a much more important and influential thinker than DeSouza or any neo-conservative writer at the National Review.

However, Leviathan and its enemies features none of Francis's signature polemics and it is written in a more coolly analytical mode. Again, I really like the constantly bashing DeSouza and just never letting people forget that that happened. But I always find it strange when the left picks, you know, these sort of almost somewhat obscure and kind of dead thinkers on the right sometimes is the key influence for X thing happening, you know, in the case here, Donald Trump,

how many of us would maybe not have got round to reading Sam Francis if it wasn't for the fact that this was claimed? Yeah, for as much as they love power and they are they aren't conniving, sometimes it really does come back to bite them in the ass. So, all right. It's like they've never heard of the Streisond effect. Yeah, exactly. Francis had long been a protege of James Burnham having written a monograph on him in 1984 that was republished in 1999. Leviathan and its enemies can largely be read as a 1990s update of the managerial revolution.

Francis had fully internalized the thought of the elite eras and of his men's, tour, and much of the book covers terrain that we have already traversed. Thus, what is of interest us here is what Francis adds to Burnham or else where he disagrees with him. One important dimension of Leviathan and its enemies is that it has the benefit of 50 years of hindsight since Burnham wrote the managerial revolution, during which time many objections were raised against the managerial thesis. After restating Burnham's central arguments at some length, Francis devotes considerable space to dealing with the chief counter arguments that were raised since 1941. The foremost of these came from C. Wright Mills, whose book the power elite published in

1956, constituted the main left-wing rebuttal to Burnham. The chief contention was that although the managerial function undoubtedly exists, property elites maintain a controlling ownership over firms. For example, you got anything to say? Well, dear, this is, I'm a it gets slightly further into a different point, but it is something I'd always considered. And I think it's also something Burnham touches on at one point where there is almost a sort of democratizing effect that happens in major industries as they become legislated to a point whereby for either because of getting round legislations or trying to have a bigger market cap or whatever excuse they give for it, they basically have to sell elements of the company off to

the public and in the public elects a board to run the company. So there isn't, you know, as he's going to go on here and describe Ford as a sort of owner or owner-entrepreneur sort of character where he, and I think it even relates to a point in the next quote really well. When he built a factory, he had to homestead. He had to think logistically about how it was going to integrate into a local economy and a way where someone who's just, you know, on the managerial board afford nowadays doesn't have to give to hoots about that because the as what we're going to get into and describe a little by the revolution of mass and scales already happened. So they enjoy democratized industry as opposed to the sort of homesteading entrepreneurial and entrepreneurial

industry would have had even in the turn of the century. But even so, in Burnham, in manager in manager or in revolution, some of the things that he says about corporations really hadn't come true yet. you know, Yarbin talked about how it's, it almost seemed like he was projecting some of his Trotskyite passed onto corporations at the time where corporations really hadn't at that point fall into managerialism. It was more like a, it was more like a foreshadowing when you look at it. I mean, they still, most corporations at that time were still pretty top down in 1941. So, all right.

For example, when I discussed Burnham, I used the example of the Ford Motor Company of a firm transitioning from the entrepreneurial to the managerial. However, as I noted, the Ford family maintains to this day a 40% stake in the company. In addition, William Clay Ford Jr., the great grandson of the founder, currently serves as executive chairman having previously acted as president, CEO, and C-O-O. Mills argues, therefore, that there is no distinct break with the old regime of entrepreneurial ill. elites, and thus Burnham's managerial revolution is a mirage. Burnham would argue that in the case of William Clayford Jr., he trained as a managerial elite having attended Princeton and MIT, and is thus a professional manager whose roles have been literally interchangeable with executives from Boeing and elsewhere who do not

carry the Ford name. Francis, however, argues, it is largely irrelevant, this is quoting Francis, it is largely irrelevant whether the property elite acquires managerial skills, takes an active part in managing corporate enterprise, or has assimilated non-propertyed elite managers into its own class and interests. What Mills and his disciple William G. Dumoff and their school do not sufficiently perceive or appreciate thoroughly is that the interests of the property elite have changed substantially with the revolution of mass and scale. The property elite or grand bourgeois of the bourgeois order of the bourgeois order may not have changed significantly in family composition, and certainly it

retains wealth and status. Its economic interest, however, have changed from being vested in the hard property of privately owned and operated entrepreneurial firms, usually comparatively small and scale, to being intertwined with and dependent upon the dematerialized property of publicly owned, state-integrated, managerially operated mass corporations. it's a word salad but it's brilliant I know I very much like the the point that both Francis and Burnham heavily focus on

and sort of almost as them channeling a bit of Kaczynski or a lull when they really heavily narrow in on the the revolution of mass and scale and that not one is of course a fundamental prerequisite for you to have the managerial class otherwise there'd be no role for them in society

but furthermore that fundamentally changes the incentives of human behavior, not just in a universal sense, but up and down the chain when it comes to people who are elites or people who are not. Their incentive structures are not as they were when, say, for example, the principles of classical liberalism were knocked out in the 1700s or the 1800s. It's much different then to look at, especially as Francis looks on, you know, not just the start of post-war, sort of consensus liberalism, but towards its end and the turning of the millennium. In other words, whether or not a man of the property elite such as William Clayford Jr. takes an active or passive role,

his interests are now synonymous with the managerial regime, while those of his great-grandfather were in many respects antagonistic to it. Francis argues that a family such as the Fords are now entirely dependent on managerial capitalism for their, continued existence as property elites and are thus, in the final analysis, subordinated to the system. The propertyed elite, the grand bourgeoisie, thus do not retain an economic interest in acting as the leader of the bourgeois order

and defending its ideologies, values, and institutions. Its material interest push it towards defending the complex of managerial interests. So I think this is sort of where you can almost see the influence that Rothbard had on Francis, where he's almost sort of discussing here that, you know, in that very basic economic sense, if you...

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Whereas if business is just fueled by entrepreneurial elites, then they will want to spread and recruit other entrepreneurial elites. and creates, you know, if you pay for more of it, you're going to get more of it. If you pay for less of it, you're going to get less of it. And that continues and compounds. That, of course, though, is if you're, those managerial elites are not people who run companies. So you're going to have to hire people to run your company.

And that's when the managerial elites come in. But that is, of course, a consequence of the revolution of mass and scale. Yes. All right. Yeah, it's great when you, when you, when you, read Francis because he did know his economics. So, all right. This perfectly explains why virtually none of the so-called grand bourgeoisie have taken a firm stance against what is today called woke capitalism. Whether they are

property to elites or not, executives who dare take a stance against the office managerial ideology are quickly removed, as was the case with Tripwire Interactive CEO and co-founder John Gibson, who was forced to step down just 53 hours after tweeting his, support for a ban on abortion in Texas. Similarly, John Shatner, the founder of the Papa John's pizza chain and a billionaire, was forced out of his own company by the board after making racially insensitive comments on a conference call in 2018. And let's just remember that he was just repeating, like he was quoting. He wasn't like giving his opinion. He was quoting something. And that was just a new version of that.

high, middle, low dynamic. You offend the great saints of progressive ideology, and for that, you as the middling CEO, co-founder, your business is rejected and disempowered so that the low progressive causes of whatever charity or group or Bank of America, or whoever is, it's pushing HR policy and your work can feel good about themselves.

Brendan Ike was forced to resign after only 11 days as CEO of Mozilla, when it was found he had donated to a political campaign against gay marriage and employees launched a social media campaign to oust him. I might continue listing examples such as these almost indefinitely, but there can be no doubt that Burnham and Francis are correct, while Mills and Domoff are wrong about whether power finally rests in the hands of the managers or the owners. The managers have primacy. If an owner does not adhere to managerial ideology, if the company in any way depends on managerial capitalism. They will find themselves removed in short order.

The second objection to Burnham with which Francis deals is the idea that the managerial elites are not unified, but rather a plurality. In fact, such objections were also applied to the work of Mills and his followers. Francis had in mind the work of Robert Dahl, David Truman, John Kenneth Galbraith, David Reisman, and Arnold M. Rose. As we have seen, Francis largely deals with this by acknowledging that while While entry into the elite is possible, its narrow and exclusively managerial character, which emphasizes special qualifications and skills, in practice gives it a uniformity that is rare in history. He points out, citing Mosca, that the old capitalist entrepreneurial regime and even the old feudal system,

were much more diverse in terms of the makeup of the ruling class. He seems to almost be more heavily drawing on Allul here. It's quite funny, actually, if you read the preface to Allul's technological society, which was written in 54, and I believe the managerial revolution was 41. Yes, correct. So, but in that, he sort of briefly mentions in the foreword that Burnham's basic idea of managerialism gets very close to his idea of technological sort of society and the sort of, I think you would say the autocratic nature of technique, as it were. and he says that this is one of the closest approximations. But you can see that in this sort of description here, Francis is then sort of pulling on the same kind of thread.

He's recognizing that once you have a sort of, this replacement of the qualitative or the quantitative, you then have formulas and techniques that are more uniform for performing different tasks in society, that this continues on, continues on, to what Alulu calls like the one best way, which is this striving for the perfect technique to achieve whatever goal.

In the same sense that the Austrians would think of economising, but it's saying there's another side to that coin whereby constantly striving for the one best way means that you create this strange class of alien people who have pursued the one best way in, say, in this case, business management, and they have no relation to the people that they actually have working under them or living in the society around them because they're sort of just these bizarre, technically inclined freaks

with no other skills really outside of that, the laptop classes, people might call them. Yeah. The third objection came from libertarians of the Reagan era, who argued that the managerial regime is being eclipsed by the rise of newly minted entrepreneurs. Today, minds may instinctively turn to a man like Bill Gates or perhaps the Silicon Valley types,

such as Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Elon Musk, and Peter Thiel. But virtually none of these billionaires are entrepreneurs in a manner that, say, Henry Ford was. They each made their fortunes by playing the system of the managerial regime and exploiting the fusion of the state and the economy in one way or another. But even if there should spring forth a genuinely innovative and entrepreneurial firm, sooner or later, it becomes co-opted and is transformed into being part of the regime apparatus. Francis cites the example of McDonald's. A more recent example might be Google. Yeah, but it's a private company, bro.

they can do what they want and they do I mean how much really how much is Musk I would really like to know his net worth what percentage of that is just from government contracts

because it's basically how he built his wealth and Bezos too I mean yeah it's all leverage and share wealth and none of it's really none of it's real

none of it's tangible it's all written in debt for the most part. Yeah, correct. Francis's major contribution to the general corpus of elite theory is in his emphasis on the role of ideology. Where Burnham emphasized a fusion of the state and corporations, as he put it, managers in government and managers in industry, Francis immediately recognized the importance of a

third category of managers involved in opinion formation, which he called mass public relations or mass organizations of culture and communication. These include, quoting, not only the media of mass communication, one of the most important instruments by which to manage your elite disciplines and controls the mass population, but also all other mass organizations

that disseminate, restrict, or invent information, ideas and values advertising, publishing, journalism, film, and broadcasting, and broadcasting entertainment, religion, education, and institutions for research and development. Indeed, the mass organizations of culture and communication, which generally lack the coercive disciplines of the mass corporation and the mass state, are able to provide disciplines and control for the mass population primarily through their use of the devices and techniques of mass communication. All the mass

cultural organizations then function as part of the media, the media of mass communication, and they constitute a necessary element in the power base of the managerial elite. Lennon levels of propaganda awareness. Yeah, yeah. And I mean, could you imagine what he would be saying now? Well, I don't think he'd be saying anything different because he's so, he's so on the money nearly 30 years ago from where we are now. It's just that he must have had a much more discerning eye than your.

average person nowadays that it took the whole nonsense of COVID for them to even think about how there is both explicit and implicit propaganda messaging. Right. I mean, I would love to see his articles during COVID, especially during like 2020, especially during the summer of riots and murders. Sam would have had a lot to say about that. Probably lost his head. Francis was keenly aware of the ideological component of the managerial regime and his insights owe much to his deep understanding of the cultural turn in Marxist literature after Antonio Gramsci whom he cites. However, you got something? No, I'll just let it carry on.

Okay. However, like both Burnham and Pareto, Francis saw ideology as mere justification for power, usually coming after the fact as a means of consolidation. and control. This is to say that he saw the use of ideology as almost entirely cynical. In his afterward to Leviathan and its enemies, Paul Gottfried shares this revealing passage about his own fundamental disagreement with Francis, quoting. Sam and I would argue about his skepticism concerning whether elites accept their hegemonic ideas, in other words, whether elites really believe their own ideology.

In his understanding of circulating elites, values and ideal, in his, I'm going to do that again, in his understanding of circulating elites, values and ideals were mere instruments for achieving practical goals. They advanced the interests of those seeking positions of authority. Sam would quote, with pleasure the Italian economist and sociologist Wilfredo Peretto that those involved in the power game would exploit whatever ideas and visions were most attractive to the masses in a particular culture. You catch them in the corner of your eye. Distinctive. By design. They move you. Even before you drive.

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all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-haves. When the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself. Lidl Newbridge Warehouse Sale, 28th to 30th of November. Lidl, more to value. But according to Sam, these elites would approach the myths as nothing more than ladders for their own assent. I mean, I have to ask it of curiosity.

What side do you see yourself on in that sort of distinction? Because I know I'm ever the cynic, but it seems to pay well-being so. I'm probably on Sam's side. I think a lot of these elites have the only ideology they have is power and you know more than money power I think it's power so ideology is just a it's just a technology to them it's a technique and they'll change ideologies they don't care um there was some of them will some of them will if if it means that they stay they don't get circulated out they will change their ideology. Well, that's, I think, part of the reason why we have so much issue, especially when

people start to really dip their toes into this kind of stuff. And are the neoliberals, are the liberals, are the socialists, or are the neo-conservatives? We have all these sort of bizarre terms that really, when you try and identify each one separately, you end up with crossover between them all to the point whereby you're not really identifying the fact that these people have a subset of ideas, but that there is a subset of ideas. But that there is a subset of ideas that they're willing to interchange at any moment in time, really. Yeah, agreed. 100%.

All right. This is, in fact, the old disagreement between Moscow and Pareto about whether ideas affect history restated. Godfreyed occupies the Moscow position while Francis takes the Pareto position. However, all four thinkers would ultimately agree that the ideological function cannot be ignored in any analysis of power. The culture, even down to the every. beliefs of the masses must at some level reflect and buy into the political formula of the

ruling class. Vital. Francis, however, recognized perhaps more than any other thinker that under the managerial regime, the ideological vision must be totalizing. That's a word, totalizing, which is to say... It's not spout warzad that's confusing you. Exactly, yeah. Which is to say, no vestige of... the previous regime can be allowed.

He illustrates the point in a much livelier way than in Leviathan and its enemies in two pieces that were republished in the collection Beautiful Losers. The cults of Dr. King, an equality as a political weapon. In the former,

good, good. When I was going to say, as I mentioned earlier on, this are two essays I'm quite familiar with as I've done a stream on them already, but the beautiful losers, I think, is probably, if you're not one for, reading giant books of people you've never really heard of before, which is an understandable position.

If you can find a copy, there are some still floating out there of new, old stock copies of beautiful losers. We managed to get one for a relatively fair price. And it's a great, it's a better way to get familiar with Francis, probably. He's a bit more sort of polemic and the motive as compared to the sort of more Burnham-esque, you know, he's so clinical and, Leviathan and its enemies that he might be confused for supporting the managerial regime, as Burnham did as well.

In the former, the cult of Dr. King, he spots in what has now become almost a commonplace insight that the ideology of the managerial regime takes on an almost religious air with its own sacred heroes and symbols as embodied in the figure of Martin Luther King. While the symbolic significance of Christmas is fair game to debate politically every year, no such freedom is afforded to the annual celebration of Martin Luther King Day, which must be observed with solemn reverence and can only ever be about one thing, the righteous struggle of the civil rights movement. No, I think if I remember correctly towards the start when he's talking about, you know,

just like Christmas as well, Dr. Kate or Martin Luther King Day or whatever he refers to it as, comes with all the unloading of us, sorry, the unloading of assorted junk. which instantly makes me think of, you know, the way that like BLM and LGBT and all these different movements becomes so quickly commodified and a way that these legacy brands with these sort of reputations that wouldn't be respected normally can, you know, like Nike can jump onto making shoes wherever that guy was that took the knee and whatever else. Yeah. You know, and all of a sudden they've got all the clout.

It's the same crap and they've been doing it since the 80s. In a blistering conclusion, he writes, Martin Luther King's legacy, as its keepers know, is profoundly at odds with the historic American order, and that is why they can have no rest until the symbols of that order are pulled up root and branch. To say that Dr. King and the cause he really represented are now part of the official American creed,

indeed the defining and dominant symbol of that creed, which is what both houses of the United States Congress said in 1983, and what President Ronald Reagan signed into law shortly afterward is the inauguration of a new order of the ages in which the symbols of the old order and the things they symbolize can retain neither meaning nor respect in which they are as mute and dark as the gods of Babylon and tire and from whose cold ashes will rise a new god leveling their rough places, straightening their crookedness, and exulting every valley until the whole earth is flattened beneath his feet and perceives the glory of the new Lord.

That is such amazing writing. Yeah. I mean, there's some interesting stuff as well. We can look at, again, the way that progressives and, or people we would think of as progressives can jump onto any subset of ideas and throw away any other subset of ideas instantly. You know, Martin Luther King now would be cancelled because he was a heterosexual black man.

and he was a misogynist and what you know he was we've probably toxic and all these other phrases it would be giving him a big yikes as it were because he was a Christian however in 1980s he was the pinnacle you know he was the symbol of progressivism and now they would you know it's it's only been 50 years and they basically turned around and spit on him it shows you how as you see how purely focused on power these people are that you know that there are people alive nowadays who probably played a part and get you this whole campaign going in the 80s and would turn around in either lie to you straight in the face then or now or probably both situations about what their causes are and what their goals are

because at the end of the day it's just all about power yeah I mean look at Joe Biden Joe Biden is the author of you know the crime bill that famous crime bill I mean the things he's said in the past no way big shot lawyers of a certain variety yeah about the bit yeah also you know about the black community stuff that he said and now he, you know, it says, if you don't vote for me, you ain't black. It's just, I love politics. It's so, oh, God, it's so great. All right, moving on.

What may have seemed like hyperbole in 1988 is an observed daily reality in the 2020s, when statues of everyone from Confederates to Founding Fathers are physically torn down by state-backed feral mobs with a full approval of every major corporation, university, and media outlet. In 2020, after the Black Lives Matter protest, riots, murders, following the death of George Floyd, massive statues of Floyd were erected in many public places across the USA, while Edinburgh University renamed David Hume Tower to 40 George Square, citing 18th century enlightened philosopher's racist views.

Oh, how do you feel about that as a Scott? Well, see, I'm not the biggest fan of David Hume either, but... Right, but still. you'd rather have David Hume. No, that's true. I suppose, but the lesser of two evils. I think it's very much, I mean, the examples AAs you're using here are the same sort of thing

that Francis and even Rothbard then want to talk about, you know, when things like the L.E. riots happened. They just had sort of big enough gonads at the time to point at that and talk about it in the way we do with BLM nowadays. Even back that, what's that, 30 years ago, 32 years? Yeah, different time. for Francis such displays do not signal anything more than the victory lap of the new order over the old order which must be emptied of all significance I'm claiming that victory lap line because I can I can remember me and scrump were going over the

that MLK essay in the video and he was in the chat replying to something we specifically used the line the victory lap of the new order or something that I would say the fact that since World War II, progressivism has just been, it's just been doing sort of ritual humiliation sort of ceremonies and engaging in sort of celebrations because the world died anyway. Yeah. In equality is a political weapon. We see Francis's essential cynicism as regards actual belief in the doctrine of equality. He seizes on a passage in Pareto.

The sentiment that is very inappropriately named equality is fresh, strong, strong, alert precisely, is fresh, strong alert precisely because it is not, in fact, a sentiment of equality and is not related to any abstraction as a few naive intellectuals still believe. But because it is related to the direct interests of individuals who are bent on escaping certain inequalities, not in their favor and setting up new inequalities that will be in their favor, this latter being their chief concern. I think that's such an amazing passage from Pareto there it's hilarious to think that in your economics degree

you'll normally learn about Pareto but you'll never learn about that stuff that you wrote where his political economy writing we just we just get the boring stuff and production possibilities frontiers and Pareto maximality and stuff like that you catch them in the corner of your eye distinctive by design they move you even before you drive

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quoting, in the 20th century, egalitarianism has been used principally as a political formula or ideological rationalization by which one emerging elite has sought to displace from political, economic, and cultural power another elite, and in not only rationalizing, but also disguising the dominance of the new elite. That is brutal. I mean, that's the thing that separates both Francis and Burnham from so many other American thinkers is they drew so heavily on the elite school or the elite theorists as they're called nowadays. And you know, you can read as much stuff on theocracy or the old world as do you want. But there is something about the contents of elite theory, the basic sort of statements it makes about human nature are. eternal, it seems, and that once you've really tapped into those, you can sort of skip a lot of things politically that other people would maybe focus time and energy on reading or engaging with because you've actually, you've got the cheat codes, you understand how the game works, you're not just...

Or wasting their time writing books on things that don't matter. What else are books for? All right, next one. Francis points to the behaviorism of B.F. Skinner and others, the belief in human beings as equal blank slates differentiated only by their upbringing as one of the chief strains of egalitarianism in the 20th century. Quoting, egalitarianism played a central role in the progressivist ideological challenge and the main form it assumed in the early 20th century was that of environmentalism, not in the contemporary sense of concern for ecology, but in the sense that human beings are perceived. as the products of their social and historical environment rather than of their innate mental and physical natures. Indeed, the ideological function of progressivism in delegitimizing bourgeois society was accomplished by its identification of the society itself as the environment to be altered through social management. Well, yeah, this is the great sort of build-up and thing you need to hold in your head as you come to some of the other parts from Francis and, Gottfried as well on the therapeutic state because you first need this sort of

environmental view which then allows you to sort of slubishly transition into a medical or socioc psychological view where there is more and more quantitative data there replaces the qualitative data that people used to use for decision-making processes at the lowest level right up to the top and as one of the themes that sort of is is drawn out more throughout this chapter is that sort of the illusion of democracy basically allows the elites to build a wall of expertise around themselves with techniques and sort of specializations that people the average person couldn't grasp and as it was saying before it it creates this alien class with people who just cannot integrate into the society that they are actually orchestrate

it's no wonder that the products we get the mass media we consume seems so misplaced because it's made by people who have never lived in the real world as ourselves. I mean, I think this is something even Eric Ritter von Kuhn-Outladen goes on at great length when he talks about, again, the same notion of quantitative sort of data and dealing specifically with utilitarianism. And you would just have these sort of dictatorial men of science who are roaming around, rearranging and socially managing the world as they saw a fit because it was for the good of science. The logic of environmentalism or behavioral behavioralism, thus always points in the direction of ever

increasing managerial control, since it is society that must be changed, and such change can take, can only take place through management. I really hope people are understanding what this is, because this, to me, this is one of the, this may be the most important part of the book. I mean, because, I mean, this is what really speaks to me, because this is what you're seeing now. I mean, this is so clear now that you can just, if you cannot understand this and not see it in today's society,

you're just completely blind and I don't know where. The only thing I think this little bit of the chapters are missing is just a little twist of a lull on the end. Or Uncle Ted. Why not both? Francis Locates, Edward Bernays, is one of the chief culprits for Inculcate. this view among the elites in the 1920s and 1930s, quoting,

Edward Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, also helped develop behaviorist psychological techniques for the managed economy and the science of public relations, which he helped found. Treating all people as mechanically identical, writes historian Stuart Ewan, Bernays, called for the implementation of a mass psychology by which public opinion might be controlled.

That's the most important element to any form of mass propaganda is first getting the mass to recognize itself as such. Yeah. That's good. Good quote. That's just for me. That's just for me. I said, good quote. What is striking if one turns to Bernays is his naked and unapologetic elitism.

In public relations, he speaks openly about the engineering of consent and warns leaders against following. public attitude polls explicitly because they might hinder the progressive agenda. Quoting, society suffers when polls to inhibit leaders from independent thinking, from anticipating change, or from preparing the public for change. Polls exert pressure that may play society under what Jefferson called the tyranny of the majority and throttle progressive minority ideas. What did Bernice see this? What does he mean by that?

Bernays does not see public opinion as something to be followed, but something to be managed and, if necessary, transformed, preferably by using his services and expertise. Brené's fellow elitist, Walter Lipman, was it Harvard class of 1913, I think. I'm pretty sure that's it. I think he was there with John, what's his name, the communist that went to, Russia. They did the movie, Reds about. Yeah, I think. John Reed. John Reed. Yeah, he would, yeah, they were, they, they graduated together. Funny that. Shocking. Bernay's fellow, Bernay's fellow elitist, Walter Lipman, was skeptical about the extent to which public opinion even exists other than as a fabrication of the media as a pseudo environment and wrote a book on the topic called the phantom public. Look at the name of that.

It's just so. The whole thing. with Bernays is sort of interesting as well. He's someone I think I should probably know more about than I do, but I sort of have a brief understanding of what he's about and some of the stuff he was up to. But you basically worked for withdrawal Wilson directly to engage your propaganda campaigns

in South America so that they would adopt and allow the building of American factories and go work in them so that the American war effort could be fueled by cheap South American labor. And then after the war is basically tasked with, well, take that stuff and then just push it on the American people. War propaganda at peacetime.

Yeah, yeah. His book, His book propaganda is very short. It's an easy, rather. I read it in less than two days. So, yeah, read it over two days. It begins with a portrait of the disenchanted man, which is a neat summation of the passive masses.

Quoting, The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back row who ought to keep his mind on the mystery, on the mystery off there, but cannot quite manage to keep awake. He knows he is somehow affected by what is going on. Rules and regulations continually, taxes annually, and wars occasionally remind him that he is being swept along by great drifts of circumstance. Yet these public affairs are in no way convincing ways, in no way convincing way his affairs.

They are for the most part invisible. They are managed. if they are managed at all at distant censors from behind the scenes by unnamed powers. As a private person, he does not know for certain what is going on or who is doing it or where he is being carried. In the cold light of experience, he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction. He reigns in theory, but in fact is not governed. Then another passage dripping in Kaczynski. Oh, where do you find?

your surrogate activities people well this is one of the things I actually had I think we're getting towards the end here anyway if I remember correct but it was one of the things I had sort of note was and I think it's something Francis kind of draws on towards the end of Leviathan and its enemies he's sort of basically pausing the question of you know are the surrogate activities no longer good enough as is the post bourgeois proletariat not willing to accept you know faulty orders from sham captains as Carlisle would say see. But Lipman does not, as one might imagine, lament this fact, but rather uses it as a call for a reign of experts. One might say, in a managerial elite. He says, I think it is a false ideal. I do not mean as an undesirable ideal.

I mean an unattainable ideal, bad only in the sense that it is bad for a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer. An ideal should express the true possibilities of its subject. When it does not, it perverts the true possibilities. The idea of the omnipotent sovereign citizen is, in my opinion, such a false ideal. It is unattainable. The pursuit of it is misleading. The failure to achieve it has produced the current disenchantment. I mean, it's sort of very hard to disagree with him there, especially when he's tapping

into this idea. the passive actor in the mass or as Alul would say that the individual alone in the mass. You know, it's such a bizarre and novel position to where man used to be before that there really is, you know, it must have been at the time felt like unlimited opportunities to mold and shape and organize men as you saw fit as someone who was part of this class of experts. Lipman's solution is simply to do away with democratic fictions and let the elites go on with task of managing their affairs. Quoting.

Yeah. As long as they're good men, as long as they're good elites. And I realize. As long as they're my friends. The thesis of the phantom public does not assume that men in action have universal purposes. They are denied the fraudulent support of the fiction that they are agents of a common purpose. They are regarded as the agents of special purposes without pretense and without embarrassment. They must live in a world with men.

men who have other special purposes. I have no legislative program to offer, no new institutions to propose. There are, I believe, immense confusions in the current theory of democracy which frustrate and pervert its action. I mean, there's a surprising amount of writing from the kind of left-wind position

when you really start reading, you know, people's like doctoral thesis for politics, philosophy, economics, degrees, or whatever. And they'll talk very much in a similar tone. about, well, the people think democracy should work properly, and we know it can't work like that because society would basically fall to the ground. So how do we just keep the illusion going? Onward. The role of the public is simply to rubber stamp which party of the elites gets to govern,

even if there is little difference between the choices on offer. Quoting, Although it is the custom of partisans to speak as if there were radical differences between the ins and outs, it could be demonstrated, I believe, that in stable and mature societies, the differences are not profound. If they were profound, the defeated minority would be constantly on the verge of rebellion. An election would be catastrophic, whereas the assumption in every election is that the victors will do nothing to make life intolerable to the vanquished, and the vanquish will endure with good humor policies which they do not approve. That's pretty much got out the window now. All right.

Keep going. In the 2020s, it is perfectly clear that, according to Lippman's criteria, the USA is no longer a stable and mature society. Lipman viewed the masses as a bewildered herd, whose opinions needed to be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality, in other words, by men like Edward Bernays. However, it strikes me that this narrow vision of democracy as a mere rubber stamp of rule by experts who engage in perception management

is running towards its death rows. This is primarily because the internet, a modern Gutenberg press, has destroyed the ability of elites to control narratives, which is causing them to become more desperate, coercive, and brittle. I'm not sure if I in turn. by that theory. Fair enough you can use the internet to attack the elites political formula of we are truth, but you can't use the internet to do is to demonstrate the

falsity in the political formula that we the elites are still in power, no matter what you put in the internet, which in a certain sort of way in terms of propaganda, fair enough you might feel that you've engaged in the psychological component of rebellion, but you're not physically rebelling against the elites, so the organisation component, arguably the more important component to any propaganda campaign. It still works. It's still there. It's still got you in its midst.

Basically, what you would hope is that rising elites, elites that were on your side, at least that your friends were doing this, were using the internet as Gutenberg press to realize. Oh, no. I'm not saying we shouldn't. I'm just saying I don't think in and of its own is enough. and that a lot of the time and energy spent trying to fight the regime on the internet actually just confirms the regime's position of power

because you spend all this time and energy trying to fight them and they've not gone anywhere. Right. At least not yet. Yeah, which is, I guess we'll repeat it for the millionth time during these readings is we need to raise up our own elites. Many elites that are our friends. as more people come to see them as unmistakably totalitarian in nature, and as the gap between elite and popular values widens, it is only a matter of time until we see a circulation of elites because the managerial regime is failing precisely at the moment of its apparent victory lap.

I actually believe that at this point. I see it. I mean, it might not be in my lifetime, but these things don't happen overnight. They may take a generation or two. and I think I see movement. I think the most important part and something is it is pointed out a number of times and I'm quite happy to see him putting out the same messages

that you need to watch for containment as he would refer to it. Don't allow the people who are of the distant right now to be co-opted when the regime puts on a conservative mask for a year or two to sort of release a bit pressure and angst out people after they've been agitated for decades towards leftists. Yeah. I mean, it's leftists take power and they don't really care about anything, doing anything else, except getting more power while they're in there.

They're just building and building upon power. And real conservatives and real right-wingers don't do that. And even the fake, even the regime Republicans, they don't do that because they're just controlled opposition for the regime. So well I think earlier in the equality is a political weapon article he actually makes the point that you know that one of the main reasons conservatives were useless at fighting communism during Cold War period and if you ignore the fact that maybe the conservatives were in cahoots with them for a number of

different reasons is to notice that they they took their egalitarianism on face value and they argued with them as if they believed in egalitarianism which if you've read your Lenin and your angles, you know they don't believe in egalitarianism. They just see it as a goal with a way, in the way that Francis even describes it earlier, so cutting the heads off all the stems of grass so there's nothing left and flattening every hill.

A near perfect illustration of this failure of narrative control took place in early January 2022. On December 31, 2001, Joe Rogan interviewed Dr. Robert Malone, the inventor of the nine original, mRNA vaccine patents, the author of nearly 100 peer-reviewed papers with over 12,000 citations for three hours during which he highlighted many unanswered questions about the COVID-19 vaccine. In addition to the interview, Dr. Malone leads a coalition of over 16,000 doctors and scientists dedicating to speaking truth to power.

Mada Vsetti, MD, who also holds a degree in electrical engineering from MIT, then asked whether this was the most important interview of our time. The interview was promptly banned by YouTube and Twitter, who suspended any attempts to upload it, and Dr. Malone was personally banned from Twitter. Defenders of the regime, such as Dr. Dan Wilson, whose video was pushed to the front of the algorithm by Google managers in perception, quickly denounced Dr. Malone as having gone full anti-science. See, I'm not too sure what to think of the whole Robert Malone escapade, because if I remember correctly when he was on Rogan's podcast, he had quite a lot of what may be referred to as the boomer truth regime about him and that he constantly used sort of analogies or similes that referred to the mid-century Germans because those people, of course, are the height of evil for what they did in the 1940s and that you can't question that.

So as much as he is against the current elites on the vaccine, he's willing to be. to still go with the sort of false notion that you can speak truth to power, which I don't think has ever happened in history. Power speaks to truth and truth goes away and you have new truth. And the fact that he's only willing to question such a small portion of it, it's the same when you look at anyone who's sort of part of the anti-woke grift. Fair enough, they might be against ridiculous trans policy or they'll be against the grooming stuff or they they think BLM's taking it too far. But they always fall back on, you know,

consensus liberalism. I mean, that was one of the points I found interesting about the MLK sort of pieces that, as I said earlier on, the left has already dispensed with MLK because it's not useful to them anymore. And the only people that cling to MLK nowadays are right wingers that for some reason are making civil rights arguments. Well, they have to prove that they're good people,

that they're not racist. Well, yeah, the Democrats are the real racist guys. It's such a great argument. It's a great. Imagine if the roles were reversed. Imagine if the shoe was on the other foot. Yeah. God.

Legacy mainstream media outlets quickly set to work to debunk Dr. Malone, who, despite his obvious credentials, was said to have no academic credibility by experts and reported breathlessly by 20-something journalists and well-known and well-known, once respected newspapers. I'd argue with that, whether they were once respected. Then CNN ran a piece hosted by Brian Stelter entitled, Is the Media Out of Touch with with the Country over COVID? Stelter's colleague Oliver Darcy said, a lot of the media does seem, as I look at it,

and travel the country, to be very out of touch with people. I mean, if you travel the country, people are not really living in the same bubble. it seems that the media is messaging, it seems that the media is messaging toward. And so I think this is an issue because if people are tuning out what's going on in cable news, if we're not messaging towards the general population,

then they're just ignoring everything and living their lives, and we're not really not really getting the information that they need to them. See, this is me really tapping into my inner cynic here. This is not people from CNN having a moment of clarity. This is people from CNN, engaging in a limited hangout as they try and make you ignore the idea of it's not it's not

the fact that they're they're messaging towards a different bubble as they're messaging people to try and move into that bubble it doesn't exist already that's why the media messaging is there for it because they're trying to create it right they seem to have the causality of their own work backwards i'm sure i'm sure they wouldn't make such a silly mistake like that again all right from the standpoint of what we have been discussing as regards managerial elites, this episode is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it is obvious that Dr. Malone and his band of 16,000 doctors and sciences are managerial elites by the classic Burnham definition, technical experts, and they have broken decisively

with the regime over its management of the pandemic. Second, Joe Rogan's podcast has become more watched and listened to than CNN or any other legacy media outlet, to the extent that one might question whether the label's alternative and mainstream are still appropriate. Third, the managerial masters of persuasion openly complained that their messaging is not working and that, in effect, no one is listening to them. If only the White House or CNN could hire Edward Bernays, maybe things might be different. But one suspects that even if Berners himself was managing this, he could do nothing

about the loss of monopoly control over information flow that has been caused by the internet. Do you, I mean, the problem I have what that is, that it almost seems, and you know, it almost seems like he's writing to the bubble because most people are not going on the internet to debunk what they're seeing, you know, what they're seeing on Twitter. And that's you and me doing that. You know, it's AA doing it. It's, you know, it's our crowd. But the average person who, you know, quote unquote, just wants to grill.

is not going, I don't think they're going home in searching the internet and looking to debunk what they're seeing on the news. Maybe they don't believe it. Maybe they think it's fake news, except, of course, if it has to do with Ukraine. But the, don't get me started. But I question how many people are actually doing this, considering the regime just is going on. Well, you can tell straight away. I mean, how many people actually sit down and spend the time to read political works and go straight to the source and, you know, what did what did Karl Schmidt actually have to say instead of just reading academic papers where they call him a Nazi?

You know, what did he actually have to say? It's such a small number of people. And I think it's, I think it's, if anything, it's nice that AA is writing to that in-group. He's talking to, you know, the vanguard, as it were. As you say, people like ourselves, if we could do ourselves as a hubris to adopt such a label, because, you know, we are pushing the forefront of specifically these set of ideas that he's discussing here. I mean, I think this chapter in and of itself, even though it's not the final one of the book, does a fantastic job or wrapping up a lot of the themes that people will have picked up on at the start, I hope.

Sure, because when you're reading the early chapters, there's a lot of theory, there's a lot of things people aren't going to get. they're going to read it, read a page and maybe say, I don't really know what I just read. I'm just going to push on. And I think AA does a great job of when he, you know, presenting the theory at the beginning of the chapters. And then as the chapter goes on, it becomes more practical. Well, I don't know if it becomes more practical.

It just becomes he's writing it easier saying, okay, that everything I said back there that kind of, you know, maybe doesn't make sense to you. I'm breaking it down for you here. And I think that's what Francis, this friend, what the Francis chapter. and that Paul Godfrey chapter does is it takes the whole book and it goes, this is what's happening now. And just so we can show you that elite theory is real, look at what's happening now. It's impossible to argue with. I mean, people still want to argue with it, but that's because they're holding on to their ideologies like a religion.

So, yeah. All right. Let us return to Francis, who longed for a revolution from the middle and saw its scope in what he called the post-bordial. Vujois resistance made up of the middle class, including Koolocks or Petit Bourgeois, the lower middle class, and the working class. This is straightforward, this is a straightforward foxes versus lions or class one residues versus class two residues. Analysis derived from Pareto's strong influence on Francis's thinking.

Quoting. Quote, quite before you get into the quote there, this is also something that Lenin and his friends spent many hours arguing over was the fact that the the self-employed, the handy man, the man that was self-taught in some kind of practical skill, was the most reactionary force that existed, even more so than massive, sort of conglomerate, international organizations of capital and whatever else, because they were slow, they were lethargic, and they ultimately weren't connected to the soil and the way that a, as some sort of self-employed tradesman is. Yeah, I've had conversations with people who call themselves Marxist Leninus.

And it's very rare that you actually have a conversation with a real Marxist Leninist. They always try not to be woke, boogie progs. But when you do talk to them and you let them know, hey, I'm self-employed, I work for myself. And they immediately think, you know, this is someone that we can talk to. This is someone that we can recruit. This is our natural, you know, someone. naturally who would be drawn to us. If you're not, they're mad. They get mad. If you are self-employed, if you were just a normal cool lock, just the guy who works, owns a company that he works for

by himself and drives a pickup truck every day. If you are not down with them, you become their enemy very quickly. But those people own their own capital. Why would they want to do that to them? All right, go back a little bit. This is straightforward foxes versus lions or class one residues versus class two residues. Analysis derived from Pareto's strong influence on Francis's thinking. Quoting, post-Bourgeois groups manifest hostility not only to the ideology of the soft managerial regime and to the psychic and behavioral patterns of its elite, but also to the manipulative style of dominance that characterizes the elite and the tendency to acceleration on which the elite. relies for the preservation and enhancement of its power. The managerial use of manipulation and acceleration

not only alienates post-Bergeois groups culturally and morally, but also threatens their economic position and social status. When commentators say that Francis predicted the rise of Donald Trump, it was for passages like this in which he perfectly encapsulates the essential problem. It does not appear that Francis was aware of Juvenile's work, work, but he spots the alliance between elites and the underclass, particularly its non-white components. Although Francis could not have foreseen the rise of the internet, he recognizes several vulnerabilities in the managerial regime. Drawing from Moscow, he views the fact that the elite are monolithic and

uniform as being a weakness, which is ironic giving their famous slogan, diversity is our strength. Quoting, the formal mechanisms of mass liberal democracy, regular elections, competing political parties, universal suffrage, and legal and political rights do not significantly mitigate the monolithic and uniform concentration of managerial power. The despotism of the regime, its tendency towards a monopolization of political, economic, and cultural power by a single social and political force of managerial and technical skills and the expansive uniformed, and centralized nature of its power is a direct consequence of the contracted composition of the elite and the restriction of its membership to elements proficient to managerial and technical skills. The narrowness of the elite that results from this restriction insulates it from the influence of non-managerial, social, and political forces and reduces their ability to gain positions within the elite from which they can moderate, balance or restrain its commands.

Their exclusion from the elite contributes to the frustration of their aspirations and interests and encourages their alienation from and conflict with the elite and the destabilization and weakening of the regime. What a paragraph. I mean, how more quickly and concisely could you sum up a sort of analytical view

of the power dynamics and, as he says, mass liberal democracy? And, I mean, it just goes to show that, you know, you read that and then you look at something like, okay, a bunch of ideologues are going to take over a bureaucratic organization. Well, how did, if a bunch of ideologues take over a bureaucratic organization, what's the easiest way to fight back against, you know, to neutralize the influence of those ideologues? the organization has to be run by bureaucrats. Ideologs aren't managerial. You need managerial people. The managerial people come in,

eventually they're going to end up being in charge and dictating with the direction. See, I think they move one and the same, though, that one tends to follow the other either in both directions, that managerialism and an organization, allows for science and social science specifically to then inform more and more of its policies and then from that you have a natural tendency to woke crap anyway because that's what dominates and has dominated the intellectual social sciences for decades yeah so it's almost kind of like the point

earlier about you know do they believe in the ideas or not are somewhat irrelevant because it's it's just the fact that the act and the way that they do anyway that is the the important part. Last paragraph. This destabilization takes the form of decomposition and fragmentation in the social order, which we have undoubtedly witnessed in three decades since Francis was writing. Since the managerial regime is soft and frequently does not actually solve problems, but opts rather simply to manage perception or engineer consent, it seems likely that the de facto balthanization will begin to occur in both the USA and Europe. so-called no-go zones in which the authorities have essentially given up policing have already

emerged in major cities. While these have, to date, occurred in non-white areas populated by the underclass, as post-Bourgeois white populations become more disaffected by managerial elite rule, and even if they come to distrust the authorities themselves, it is perfectly possible that de facto autonomous no-go zones could occur in white areas too. In the U.S. USA, both the Trump and Biden presidencies, have been characterized by widespread state-level noncompliance with federal and executive edicts. If half the country declared that the president is not my president, no matter who wins the election, the regime has a serious problem on its hands. As I have mentioned previously, the current strategy of simply writing off 30% or

more of the population as undesirables simply cannot serve. In Moscow's terms, there is a lack of moral unity between the rulers and the ruled. And historically, this situation has not and will not persist for long. We can but only hope. Well, you know, I'm wondering, I wonder just how many people have checked out. Like, they just don't care. You know, what percentage is that? I remember a couple of years ago, what was it?

Like 45 to 48% of the population here didn't vote. in i think 2016 or 2012 election so you know if the guy goes to see but we as if we learn the the important lesson from the previous chapter for mackles that the total number of what you have in your group really doesn't make much of a difference and the the mass will always be there when i put it in why i think my speech on vanguard isn't for a anomos event a while back that the mass is a sort of an an indistinguishable quantity in society, but it reflects the centrality of our cultural products. And it doesn't mean that it's always 75% of people that consume it or 25%, but there is some number, and it's enough to make it look like there is a consensus.

And that's, you know, in the passage we were looking at where Lippman sort of tries to suggest that public opinion doesn't even really exist. It's just constructed. Yeah. And, well, I think the point of bringing up the amount of people who aren't voting is, I mean, these are, in worst terms, these are people who are either apathetic or they could be angry. And that doesn't bode well for the regime. So I'm looking for hope. I'm looking for the white pills. I'm looking for the white pills and all of this because, you know, it's very easy to get blackpilled over all this until you understand it.

And once you understand it, once you grasp it, and once you know how power works, maybe there is that denial phase where you're just like, well, you know, there's the denial phase. No, no, we can't work. And then there is the, you're like, well, I mean, how, we can't raise up people like this. And then you realize we're just going to have to raise up people.

Yeah, we're going to have to raise up our own elites. Well, that's the thing I've always found sort of very, comforting actually is that when people you know they they work out what's going wrong and they realize that a lot of things are actually arguably possibly a bit hopeless but what it means is that your choices of what you can do to affect action are actually quite slim and once you understand the core goal which is developing and raising a new class of elites then that's all you need to do and you just need to headlong stick into that with whatever resources and time you have and that becomes a lot more

more, as I say, moving out of the best, where it would confidence inspiring maybe, because then you know the path that you're supposed to go on. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, it's the problem I think that, you know, I've had some people, but contacted by some people and say, not say that they were blackpilled,

but they said that people had listened to like the first chapter one and chapter two with, with Stephen, and then they looked more into elite theory, and that it blackpilled them. And, you know, it's like, this isn't blackpill. If you figure out, once you figure out how it works, that's not blackpilling.

Then you just have to come up. And especially like libertarians, they're so good at diagnosing. Well, this also gives you how you fix it too, because libertarians have that, you know, that whole South Park thing. It's like collect underpants, you know, question mark profit. It gives you that middle. It gives you what's in the middle. Well see, I don't know, I've kind of, I find the elite theory stuff very easy because, you know,

again, without stepping into the depths of hubris, it's kind of how I've just always seen and understood humans anyway. On a fundamental level, we are not all the same. We are not equal. And that means that we are not equal in capacities to organise, which is possibly the most differing fundamental capacity in people as a whole. as your ability to organize that allows you to be an entrepreneur,

be a political actor, be an elite as it were. Yeah, if you can organize. The problem is, as this book is laid out, is the masses are unorganized and underfunded, or not funded at all. So there's your,

that's what you have to do. And you know, you're not, the masses aren't going to organize. It's going to be what you call, you know, what you'd reference is a vanguard. And the vanguard will organize. The vanguard will find the elites.

Maybe the elites are among the vanguard. And you raise up those elites and then you go to work. And, you know, it may not, you know, and I'll talk to libertarians again. It may not happen in this lifetime, but you're not going to get Ancapistan in this lifetime. You're not going to, you know, hope. One thing you can hope for is you get like close to something approximating like a Hopian covenant community or private city or private law city or something like that. Yeah, that's something I said to a lot of people over the course of the week at me's as

you when there would sort of the issues of culture and other sort of things would come up and then they would want to crawl into the sort of libertarian safe space of not having put out, oh, well, I'm indifferent on these things. I just think you shouldn't be able to enforce your values, blah, blah, blah. And I always said to them, well, I love the picture Austrian economics paints, but without radical political action, you're never going to have the canvas for it. That's a good way of putting it. That's, we should probably end on that.

I don't know. I suppose I will see. You're going to do any better than that one? I don't think so. I've hit my peak already. No, I will say though, if people haven't already, do pick up a copy of A.A.'s book, and then if you want to become part of the real vanguard, go grab a copy of Sam Franz as Leviathan and its enemies before it becomes impossible to buy.

Or hit me up for the archive PDF link. I will hit you up for that because I'll probably end up doing that. Probably use it more as a reference so that I can control F on it. Anything else to plug? Just that you can find me on the YouTube channel, Scrumm Monkey, and I'm sure if possible you could throw the link for the telegram channel where people can find me in the description or wherever else. I can absolutely do both of those.

Right. Well, thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Evelyn. Take care. You too. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekinez show. Returning, Pedro Gonzalez.

How are you doing, Pedro? I'm well. How are you? Doing very well. All right, we are here to read and comment on chapter nine of Nima Parvini's The Populist Delusion. And this one is called the therapeutic state. And it goes over the writings of Paul Gottfried.

and you are an editor at Chronicles. I believe that Paul is the senior editor at Chronicles. Why is Paul special to you? I think he's like the most underrated living scholar of our time who really understands the issues in a way that other people don't. Paul's level of learning is unusual. You certainly don't see it on the mainstream right, someone who's actually an intellectual in a true sense.

and I think his ability to entertain an actually diverse array of ideas and thinkers, even those that are considered controversial, like Carl Schmidt, and then apply what he learns in a way that's relevant, you know, even 10 years after the fact, in this case, we're talking about after liberalism and managerialism and the politics of guilt. These are not new books. These are books written, you know, a decade or so ago. And the insights from them are still as relevant or more relevant than ever actually.

So Paul is an unusual luminary, I think, in a good way. Well spoken. Well spoken. I've had him on to talk about fascism and anti-fascism, and I've had him on to talk about stress and the neocons. So, yeah, it's amazing, amazing what he knows. All right. So just like all the rest of the chapters, I'm going to read.

I'm going to share a screen, put this up there, and you stop anytime you feel like you need to comment, and I'll do the same. Okay, sounds good. All righty. Chapter 9, the therapeutic state. In theory, the role of government is not for the sake of its own power, but for the benefit of the people it is supposed to serve. If a government does not serve the people, then it must be transformed until it does so or be overthrown and replaced with one which does. However, in multiculturalism and the politics of guilt published in 2002, Paul Gottfried argued that the modern managerial regime had completely inverted this theoretical relationship. Rather than transforming itself to serve the people, the managerial regime seeks to transform people in the service of its system of atomized corporate consumerism.

I think you already see here a kind of radical break between Paul and mainstream conservative commentary on this, right? In the sense that Paul understands that we no longer live in a constitutional republic. And if you get your takes from your typical conservative pundant, they're arguing that either we still do, but it's endangered, or that we, you know, Mark Levin or something like that, right? Like, you know, this is, this is against our constitution or something like that. Like you already see that Paul already begins from like, you know, 10 steps down the road where he's saying our regime is fundamentally different from, from what it was initially conceived as.

It no longer actually serves anything that's like a social good. And instead, it exists to transform people to, to engineer. a specific type of subject. So you, like just in the first, you know, a few lines, you already see why Paul is, why his insights are so radically different, again, from your average conservative who either thinks that we do live in a constitutional republic. And therefore, you know, it's not okay for the FBI to raid Mar-a-Lago because that's somehow that's a violation of constitutional rights, which is in theory true, but in reality irrelevant besides the fact, right or the people that think that you know uh we we need to vote in the next election

in order to save the constitutional republic that's endangered paul is saying it's dead and gone yeah and also he's crushing anybody's hopes of oh we still have a free market things like that it's that's right that's that's again uh you don't hear this from the uh the typical conservative the idea that basically um that that there's something that there's something bad about capitalism, but there's something bad about our culture of consumerism. So, all right. It drives ever more closely towards what Juvenel saw as the final destination. It ends in the disappearance of every constraint, which does not emanate from the state, and in the denial of every preeminence, which is not approved by the state. In a word, it ends in the

atomization of society and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man, whose only bond is now the common bondage to the state. The extremes of individualism and socialism meet. That was their predestined course. Yeah, go ahead. I actually just wrote a piece about neoconservatism, and this is something, this is something that I kind of touch on, but from a different direction. And basically like the new neocons, like Barri Weiss and Douglas Murray, who conceive of themselves as kind of breaking with the left, they kind of see themselves as good liberals, right?

And in many cases, that's what a lot of conservatives see themselves as, that the true conservative, is actually trying to preserve the liberal order, the proper liberal order, right? And like the average Bari Weiss reader, like Bari Weiss herself, there was an article recently to give you a concrete example about like the problems with Hollywood. And in this article it talks about how like in the past, there was this kind of noble crusade to root out white racism in Hollywood to break what the author called the white wall. But then Trump gets elected and a mass history. hysteria descends upon Hollywood and then everything is bad. And basically, there's no sense of maybe

these things are connected. Maybe are crusading for social justice and individualism at the same time was a kind of contradiction. And the comments are like that too. The comments are like, I was always, you know, like as someone who's worked in the entertainment industry, I was always opposed to racism. but, you know, this stuff just goes too far. And I talk about this in my piece because it's something that James Burnham mentioned, too, that basically this tension between individual freedom, the ability to kind of, you know, live whatever life you want, and social justice are at odds because social justice requires uniformity.

Like, we have to get people to act a certain way on the, on the basis that certain behaviors are discriminatory and they exclude others, right, or they stigmatize others. And so that means that there's not really a whole lot of room for individualism if you believe in social justice, because individual thinking, individual types of behavior can threaten, let's call them, certain sacred groups, right? Whether they're minorities or people that are transgender or whatever. And the point that everyone from Paul to Burnham to juvenile has made is that ultimately this kind of like what we're seeing now, it's not like, oh, it's liberalism abandoned and betrayed. It's like, no, this is the logical

conclusion of these two tensions resolving themselves. And I mean, other people go back further to Rousseau. What we're living in right now is a kind of Rousseauian totalitarianism, or where any kind of dissidents is unacceptable and it has to be crushed. So in the words, And liberalism and leftism, it's not like they're different. Like, you know, Dennis Prager would argue or something like that. Like, no, these things are actually related. You very much see this in the Barry Weiss, Douglas Murray, the IDW types. Yeah.

Yeah, I just see them as infiltrators to keep basically conserve liberalism, conserve progressivism. Yeah. 100%. All right. However, Gottfried identifies the root of this, not in managerialism. per se, which is simply the vehicle through which its ends are achieved, but in two proximate causes, multiculturalism, which is to say the prevalence of minority groups whose political efforts go towards neutralizing the culture and institutional particularities

associated with a majority outgroup and a religious and cultural phenomenon owing itself chiefly to a progressive perversion of mainline Protestant churches that manifest itself as white guilt. David French. Concrete example of this. This is actually what got San Francis in trouble in the 90s. He wrote a column in the Washington Times, and he was basically mocking this Southern Baptist church for apologizing for slavery.

Basically, this idea that Christians today in the 90s have any kind of responsibility for something like slavery, right? And also the idea of kind of like permanent group guilt. It seems to completely contradict the idea of forgiveness, of forgiveness in this Christian sense that we can be absolved of our sins. Instead, what we're saying is that actually entire races of people have this kind of permanent original sin that will not only taint them, but also like every subsequent generation of white people carries this sin. And San Francis just argued like this is absurd. It also seems to violate like Christian ethics in history.

And that column actually got him in trouble. He was right, of course, like everything he said in that column is correct. But it was just seen as, of course, it was construed as an apology for slavery, which obviously that's not what it was. But the funny thing is that that was considered a hot take at the time, so hot that, like I said, it got him in trouble. And it contributed to his firing for the Washington Times. But today, there's like a unanimous agreement on the right, even like the mainstream right, that, yeah, this actually seems to be a kind of bizarre Christian defamation, the politics of white guilt. Like, that is a totally mainstream view now, whereas it got a prominent intellectual who was talking about this in the 90s, it got him in trouble and ultimately contributed to him getting fired.

Yeah. Yeah. Dinesh to Susan. All right. This results in an atmosphere to which white people must submit in self-abasement and atonement for past sins. It necessitates the grafting on to administrative states of therapeutic and punitive agencies for, forming social consciousness and chastising those with defective sensibility. That is a quote and a half right there.

By now, political correctness and its causes are well-worn themes. It has also become a common, it has also become common, it has also become commonplace to identify modern social justice and its dominant theme of white guilt as a kind of religion. Gophrie derived at such conclusions at least 20 years before most commentators, as did Sam Francis, whose work we have already explored. The specific causes are incidental to our purposes here, but it is worth listing them. Godfrey sees the issue as predominantly American arising from the so-called melting pot,

and then exported to the rest of the Anglosphere from the mid-1960s onwards, who came to imitate the crusade against discrimination then being waged across the Atlantic. In the American milieu, the key groups are the so-called wastes, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, who have allowed their mainline churches to stray very far from biblical teachings to general sermonizing about the dangers of bigotry and an alliance of minority groups, which include Jews, Irish, and Italian Catholics, and blacks. Godfrey locates at the heart of the issue the feminization of Christianity, the fusion of a victim-centered feminism with the Protestant framework of sin and redemption.

It is not difficult to see a perverted form of the Calvinist doctrine of absolute depravity in contemporary social justice rhetoric. I think that that thesis that basically radical social justice, whatever you want to call it, that it was not a European import to the United States. that this is actually something that we, by we, I mean, the United States kind of conceived and then ultimately exported, that also is, that's a controversial opinion, right? Like, a lot of, a lot of conservative, punitary revolves around this idea that basically everything was fine, but then some, you know, like some German idealism or whatever, or Marxism got imported. and that ultimately brought us to where we are now. That basically was the import of foreign ideas.

But Paul seems to believe that actually this tendency was already present in the United States. Or there's something here that made the ideas particularly virulent and destructive. And I mean, this goes against like even institutions like the Claremont Institute. right. They take the view that actually our problems are mostly imported from German thinking and German views of like the social sciences and stuff like that. Paul is saying no, like this is actually a homegrown problem. And it's funny because you recently had the French government talk about this, that basically the like woke ideology is coming from the United States to France. and that they view it as a kind of threat to the stability of the French regime,

because essentially it threatens to delegitimize the French government, the French state, by doing what it's doing in the United States, which is saying that the entire French society is built on racism, on the exploitation of minority groups and stuff like that. for the United States, it's more about slavery. In France, it's more about colonialism. But the French government has said, like, this is, on the one hand, a threat, an existential threat to French society, and on the other hand, an American import. I think that point doesn't get enough attention because it's worth chewing on, right? Like, why is that? Like, what is this? My mind goes to, I think his name was William Lloyd Garrison, the abominable. The Abil,

abolitionists who burn the Constitution and I think you referred to it as like a deal with a devil or something like that. And I think that you always had this kind of radical tendency that was, it seemed like it was, there's always this kind of millinarian tendency in the United States. Not in the average American, but there was always this kind of faction in the U.S. that had this kind of millenarian radical social justice camp. And I think Paul is really the only person that's, I think, tried to explore this. All right. Going back to reading the author in the first, the author's writing in the first person here. I recall being at an international conference in 2017 at which a world famous feminist Renaissance scholar at Columbia, undoubtedly a wasp, spoke for almost half an hour in unmistakably religious terms about her shame at being white.

In truth, I could not bear witness to this act of public penance and left the conference hall after 10 minutes. Godfrey does not solely lay blame on Protestantism gone awry. He also points to the political games played by minority groups. Godfried, who is Jewish, notes the double standard, for example, of Jews who combines strong nationalist feelings for their own group and for Israel with the advocacy of open borders, alternative lifestyles, and extreme pluralism for their host countries. That's quoting Gottfried right there. Elsewhere, around the time he was writing multiculturalism and the politics of guilt, he noted the weaponization of social justice rhetoric by Jewish groups against their chief political rivals,

the white Christian right. Quoting Gottfried. but seeking out block alliances with blacks and other marginalized groups is thought to help American Jews in another more significant way. Like gays and feminists, blacks are valuable for those who perceive the white Christian right as their major enemy and as the prime source of American anti-Semitism. I would urge Professor Foreman to look at the Anti-Defamation League's 1994 publication, the religious right, the assault on tolerance and pluralism in America,

as an illustration of how leading American Jewish organizations perceive their self-interest. It is by declaring solidarity with blacks and others thought to be on the left against the predominantly southern-based religious right. Racist, theocracy, Holocaust denier, and anti-abortion are becoming interchangeable terms in American Jewish tirades against the Christian right. Remaining firmly tied to blacks is therefore seen as necessary to, preserve Jews against the real enemy, the one they fear and detest most whether or not it poses a real threat to their individual or communal existence. Paul has said elsewhere, I think,

that he thinks of this strategy backfires, that it actually increases, I mean, we're so past like Balkanization, but basically that's exactly what it does. It actually increases conflict between groups in the United States more than it resolves anything. I mean, but I mean, I think Paul is like one of the few people that has written about this subject and is willing to kind of, you know, make these points. But anyways, yeah, I mean, this is like probably Paul's, one of the most controversial things that he writes about as only probably he could or would be willing to. I mean, yeah, it's, this is, it's a difficult subject.

So he still gets called an anti-semite anyway. Yeah. Yeah, I think he had family that was killed by the Nazis too, I think. But it's just, yeah, I mean, to his credit, he's even willing to discuss these things. Yeah, it's part of the therapeutic state when you're getting accused of things that are absurd. However, Gottfried notes, Godfrey notes that other minority groups have played these political games, too, including Irish and Italian Catholics.

Of course, good students of elite theory would not be surprised in the slightest that in a multicultural liberal democracy, tightly organized special interest groups should come to dominate the disorganized majority. This is Moscow's law. What troubles Gottfried most is the manufacturing of consent that we have seen discussed, that we have already discussed, has been pathologized and even medicalized. this is where I'm going to say, just stop and say that when some of us say, especially Orrin McIntyre really says this a lot and has almost become famous for saying that, these people are just not going to leave us alone. The people who want to be left alone are always going to be defeated by the people who aren't going to leave us alone, have no intention of leaving us alone.

So I think that this section right here, this is starting to talk. talk about that where anyone who thinks that this leftist ideology is they're somehow going to overcome it politically. No, that's why these people don't care about politics. That's why these people will raid the compounds of former presidents. That's why these people will push the mutilation of children. Yeah. I think this is actually the most interesting part of the chapter.

basically the clinicalization of disagreement. Yeah. He suggests that since the 1960s, the behavior modification and social engineering programs of the managerial state have relentlessly fought against discrimination and promoted diversity using the looming image of the Nazis or the ghosts of slavery and the segregationist South as cudgels in a permanent slippery slope argument. He identifies three tactics that are routinely.

employed. First, the tendency of media and other opinion makers to stress that consensus has already been reached, for example, over immigration or multicultural programs. In the UK, the BBC would routinely engage in this form of gaslighting on its flagship debate show Question Time. They would routinely present a panel with four pro-immigration voices against a lone anti-immigration voice. The studio crowd would cheer the pro-immigration voices and boo the anti-immigration voice. This serves to isolate the viewer at home watching the show who may be against immigration by creating the perception that their stance is held by a despised minority. In fact, from 1964 to 2017, over 65% of the British public opposed immigration, according to the

British election study. The media nakedly employs a persuasion tool known as social proof in a bid to make the public more accepting of mass immigration. I mean, you've wrote on, you've wrote on this on immigration. I mean, yeah, I think the point about social proof reminds me of something else that I've written about, which is called, well, it's this idea of like socially constructed phenomenon. It's like mass shootings, right? there's this idea that is constructed by the media that basically like they're there are

that all mass shooters are white right that they're all this this implicitly right wing white person but obviously that's not true like the high profile things that we see on TV like you know they happen to be these these like white schizophrenics or whatever but they make up a minority of the total population that is responsible for mass shootings. And the study that I was citing to make this case actually argues that, on the one hand, you have this thing, these socially constructed perceptions of social problems. And on the other hand, it actually results in a kind of like misdirection of resources. That because our attention is focused on, you know, what seems to be this, this boogeyman of, like, you know, the white mass shooter, our attention and efforts are directed toward essentially, like, you know, increasing our, like, anti-discrimination regime.

Like, the social engineering to stamp out, like, supposed, you know, white extremism, white rage, as General Mark Millie. calls it, right? But it's a complete waste in the sense that it doesn't actually solve anything. It basically creates a problem that doesn't really exist and then pours resources and energy into addressing that. Then ultimately all it really does is kind of expand the size and scope of the manager regime. You have a more invasive state that needs to root out, you know, the causes that that supposedly contribute to this problem of the white mass shooter, right? And there, I mean, you could argue, like, I actually believe in this, that there's actually something that's driving people insane about modernity

and making them commit these kinds of shootings. But it's not like white racial resentment or something like that. Like, I think it's actually much worse than that. It's something about the way that you, the way that we live period today makes people, I think, nihilistic. But that's much harder to solve than, you know, the supposed boogeyman of like, of white extremism. That's much more serious. You're talking about something that is like baked into the cake of the modern West. And you can't really, you can't really solve that. Like there's no

think tank that can address that problem, right? But these socially constructed narratives, like, This social proof, I think, is an example of that, completely divert our attention and resources to things that ultimately serve no one except for the managers, if that makes sense. Yeah. I thought you were going to start talking about industrial society in its future right there for a second. All right, let's move on. The second tactic Godfrey identifies is employing the past as a club. By harping on the real or imagined evils of the past, proponents of

state-controlled socialization appeal to the guilty conscience of their listeners and furnish occasions for exhibitions of public righteousness. Such exhibitions have become by now so routine and widespread that they have gained the label virtue signaling. Who hasn't seen somebody post on social media that they're opposed to slavery? Right. Yeah. In 2022.

Thank you for, yeah. Just, thank you for, you know, letting us know that you're against slavery. That's great. It's very brave. Very much and stunning. However, the third and most insidious method is to treat the unwanted behavior as a form of sickness. To depict unfashionable thinkers and retrograde views as pathological. Gottfried is rightly perturbed at the implications of treating dissent as a form of mental illness,

which requires psychiatric remedy. that pathologizing tendency has its overt post-war roots in the work of the Frankfurt School, and specifically Theodore W. Adronos, the authoritarian personality type. Gottfried gives a full treatment to this text in his early book after liberalism, to which multiculturalism in the politics of guilt was a sequel. Elsewhere, he is at pains to point out that contrary to certain right-wing conspiracy theories, which suggests the injection of Frankfurt School Thinking into Western Institutions as a Marxist plot hatched from Moscow, that Adorno was sponsored by an emphatically liberal but also anti-Soviet sponsor, the American Jewish Committee.

In other words, this is not subversion of liberalism by communist agitators. This is the logic of managerial liberalism played out to its natural limits. got anything to say about that no i think that's i think um again it gets at this this idea that um that these are imported um ideas right uh that no actually this this actually seems to be something that is is homegrown uh and i mean like managerialism managerial liberalism is a good term to sum this stuff up um but i think the the next part is what i was like i said said this is the part that I think is really, really fascinating and I wanted to talk about. Let's do it.

In after liberalism, drawing on Thomas Zaz, it's Thomas Zaz, right? I think so. Okay. And Christopher Lash, he charts how the fields of psychiatry and psychology gave rise to a new expert class whose role was to regulate, alter, and normalize behavior to conform to their requirements of managerialism. Quoting, The invasion of government. and the courts by behavioral scientists has produced what Thomas Zaz calls the therapeutic state.

Psychiatrists and social psychologists have been given social status, according to Zaz, and their moral and political judgments, though not always founded on hard empirical science, are taken to be expert. These experts today can affect decisions about the responsibility of criminals, the right to control property, and the custody of children. psychiatric theologians have been able to impose their private political opinions as scientific truth, and Zaz cites the fact that the American Psychiatric Association now defines the involuntary treatment and incarceration of mental patients as health rights. Zaz also observes if people believe the health values justify coercion, but that moral and political do not. Those who wish to coerce others will tend to enlarge the category of health values at the expense of moral values.

Health values have also become socialized through a global managerial culture. Since 1976, the United Nations, through its international covenant on economic, cultural and social rights, has elevated the enjoyment of the highest standard of mental health to a sacred entitlement. henceforth, governments must ensure a sound state of mind as a human right. I think this whole thing

is so important and I think the most obvious example of this idea of psychiatric theologians today is transgenitalism. And I don't think we really appreciate this point enough There was a case recently in Arkansas where a judge ruled that Arkansas cannot enforce a ban on gender transition therapy for kids. And obviously the justification for that is that basically these medical interventions, the so-called medical interventions are life-saving.

And we're going to get into Foucault here in a sec. I actually think you're better off reading like Foucault at this point than John Locke in order to understand like the modern manager regime that basically these claims that like gender transition therapy are are life saving and therefore necessary and you can't stop you can't you can't even like through the legislative process it's it's not okay to prevent kids from getting access to this stuff it's delivered in the like the neutral language of science which gives this facade of exactly that. This is just objective truth. This is what the, what the, the, uh, the, the, the academic institutions of medicine have decided is simply true. It's not political at all, but obviously it is. Every institution is political. It's a, it's absurd to think anything else. But that is precisely why this stuff is so pernicious that you have courts and social workers and all of these people that have the power to deprive you, of your children, of your property, or even your freedom, who are grounding their arguments

in what are supposedly kind of objective ethical concepts, like best practices for care and things like that. It's extremely pernicious. And again, Paul is one of the few people that talks about this. It's so dangerous and it's so scary. I mean, these people, They can pick you up and there's nothing you can do. They can do anything to you that they want to. Force Medicaid. I mean, there was,

there was a time I was reading about somebody, somebody I've talked about in this podcast before, who actually committed suicide because he was in fear that they were going to lobotomize them. Oh, wow. Yeah. So, all right. It is interesting that this analysis of relationship between the field of mental health

and power has a parallel on the left in the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault pointed out how the medical or clinical gaze obscures the functioning of power because of the morally neutral language of science. However, as much as Foucault was added to university reading lists and read by undergraduates, it seems that no one at universities, least of all those on the left, ever stops to question the relationship between power and public and mental health. in the current paradigm. One might suggest that this is because they now see themselves in power. Instead of using Foucault to criticize the current paradigm,

they seem to remain frozen forever analyzing the culture of the 1950s and deconstructing the last one. Yeah, that's right. That's the irony of, I guess, modern political scientists who are kind of bathed in Foucaultian concepts, but don't really seem to apply them to. to the existing paradigm and existing power structures, right? They continue applying them to the past. And the past always provides a justification for kind of reshaping the future.

Like I said, I actually think at this point you would get more understanding. It's probably more constructive to read people at Foucault at this point in order to understand like the problems and how power works in the world that, you know, people like Foucault made, then, you know, reading like Locke, and kind of pretending that we still live in this like, you know, 19th century liberal constitutional republic or something like that. I think Foucault was himself like a sexual deviant and a terrible human being, but his insights on power are actually, are really useful. And I think that for Foucault, he was writing as someone who viewed.

himself as kind of out of power, right? And so when you're someone who views themselves as part of a marginalized community, because Foucault was, he was gay, but not just that, like he was part of this French group of intellectuals that signed a petition for abolishing age of consent laws in France. Like, the guy was messed up. But as an outsider who kind of sees all of the, you know, of these taboos and taboos exist for a reason, but all of these kind of these things that make people behave and think and act a certain way as basically kind of constraints on your own individualism, then you're going to want to figure out how these power structures work and how to dismantle them. And for someone who is on the outside, that makes sense, right?

But I think the reason Foucault is useful to the right now is that we're the ones that are on the, it's kind of, it's a, it's a paradox, right? The right, which is for so long identified with like institutions like the military and law enforcement and stuff like that, we're on the outside. We have no control over institutions anymore. The institutions are not conservative. They're not right wing. You are in the, you are basically in the shoes that people like Foucault were in. And that's why it actually behooves you to understand how the regime actually works, rather than. than how we've been told it does or how we would wish it did work.

So I mean, that's my, that's my position on, you know, why actually you should read Foucault. Yeah. And Foucault wrote books on prisons, wrote books on medicine, what, where, how medicine was being handled in the modern time. I mean, we know he was a deviant. A lot of that work though is his spot on, especially for, especially for, especially in light of today. Okay, so, all right.

We are quoting Gottfried here. Christopher Lash explains the process by which the therapeutic segment of the managerial elite won moral acceptance. Despite that it claims to be providing mental health, we're always, mental health, we're always self-serving and highly subjective. The therapeutic class offered ethical leadership in the absence of shared principles. By defining emotional well-being as both a social good and the overcoming of what is individually and collectively dangerous, the behavioral scientists have been able to impose their absolutes upon a culturally fluid society.

In the true and only heaven, Lash explores the implications for post-war politics of the authoritarian personality. A chief contributor to this anthology, Deodor Adorno, abandoned his earlier work as a cultural critic to become a proponent of governmentally imposed social therapy. According to Lash, Adorno condemns undesirable political attitudes as prejudice, and by defining prejudice as a social disease, substituted a medical for a political idiom. In the end, Adorno and his colleagues relegated. a broad range of controversial issues to the clinic to scientific study as opposed to philosophical and political debate. Yeah, I think this is another aspect of this particular section of the chapter that I think is really important, really fascinating. That dissent disagreement is no longer merely a difference in opinions. It's pathologized. It's indicative actually of a social

disease. I think that's, that's, you really saw this play out with like the arms, armchair psychology that people performed on Trump while he was in office, right? Like, and these like popular psychology magazines, people writing about, you know, what, what makes Trump tick? And it's always something like fascism, right? Or what makes his, his base tick, which is always something like fascism. It always seems to come back to that. But the point. is, is that these people literally don't accept viewpoints that are, that they don't hold. It just can't be that way. It has to be indicative of some kind of pathology, right? If you don't like,

like transgender activism or like LGBT activism, it's probably because you're closeted, right? If you don't like feminism, it's it's because you hate women. It's like there's, if you don't like, if you think that we should have borders and immigration restriction, it's because you hate immigrants and brown people. Like, it's always, it always actually has to be just a kind of surface level, a symptom of some deep-seated path, some sickness that needs to be cured by therapy and social engineering. And what's important about that is that it means that they're never just going to accept differing views.

And I think that somehow this is connected also to our foreign policy, this idea that there's only, if there's only one set of acceptable political views and social views, then it follows that there's probably only going to be one acceptable form of government, right? In all other governments that are not that are existential threats to you, and they have to be reconstructed. And you see this in the rhetoric of like neoconservatives and foreign policy. Every every, every geopolitical thing today is always like a contest between autocracy and liberal democracy, right? We literally can't leave countries alone that our foreign policy establishment does not see as liberal democracies. Why? Because it's unacceptable. It's unacceptable that there could be another form of government, another, another consensus.

in other words on governing. It's just not acceptable. And the same thing obviously applies to domestic politics. If you want to support the show, head on over to freeman beyond the wall.com forward slash support. You can see all the ways you can do it, including right there on the website, which is the best way. Also, Patreon and Subscribe Star, and I even have some cryptocurrency addresses listed there. So head on over to freeman beyond the wall.com forward slash support. and thank you. One of the reasons why when the troops are leaving Afghanistan, you see pictures coming out and reports of George Floyd murals in Afghanistan

and that schools were teaching gender studies in Afghanistan. They have to export that to, they have to export that there. And it's a religion. It's very evangelical. in nature. Moving on. As per Carl Schmidt, there are no neutral institutions, including medical and psychiatric institutions. If the managerial state makes anti-discrimination the moral center of its political formula, then discriminatory views are diagnosed as mentally abnormal. In such a regime, unconscious bias training is mandated at most workplaces and for employees of the

state despite empirical proof that it does not even achieve the behavior modification at which it aims by admission of the British government. The UK Cabinet Office's written statement on unconscious bias training, ostensibly written in the neutral language of science, concludes by reaffirming its commitment to the political formula of the therapeutic state, equality, diversity, and inclusion. The Civil Service will therefore integrate principles for inclusion and diversity into mainstream core training and leadership modules in a manner which facilitates positive behavior change. Here is an open declaration that the state is engaged in positive behavior change as a central

mission. At the time of writing, the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking in an interview at CNN, said, it's an indicator of how broken politics has been that the issue of vaccination should become political. I mean, it's just a question of science. One might ask Mr. Blair how the issue of having one's body penetrated by a foreign object by order of the government could ever not be political. Paul talks about this in after liberalism that basically like the clinicalization of everything that in the early and mid-20th century, you have,

I'm not actually not even going to give a timeline for this stuff because I haven't absorbed it enough. But basically what Paul argues in general is that psychiatry arose initially in the United States as something that was used to address things like alcoholism and domestic violence, right? So in other words, Paul suggests that, okay, in the beginning of this stuff, you know, probably did have some merit in kind of correcting deviant behavior. But then something happened, and progressives,

the progressive movement in the United States and its adherents, basically started to view things like psychiatry, not as correctives, not as a kind of something that we use to treat, people who are behaving in a way that's bad, you know, like an alcoholic or something. Instead, we can actually use it to socially engineer society a certain way. In other words, to foster a certain kind of populace or citizenry that actually, I mean, we say citizenry, but really you're talking more about, like, subjects, right? And I think it reminds me of this idea that Michel Foucault had, that basically

in the 17th century, you had this kind of, this emerging new type of power that he called biopower. That basically the moment that rulers, the moment that sovereigns took it upon themselves to kind of concern themselves with the welfare of the population through, through things like not just, you know, obvious things like, like medical services and things like that in public services, but also even through, I mean, like, I think Foucault even includes, like, census keeping, kind of like the moment that we started to put people on Excel spreadsheets, whatever the 17th century equivalent of that is, right? And then obviously onward from that, the moment that we started to do that, something happened where regimes began to concern themselves

with fostering a kind of way of life, that power before. that was what co-called subtractive. So power before that, the way that you experienced it was the regime would take things away from you. It would take your life away from you. It would take your freedom away from you. It would take your property way. It still does those things obviously, right? But then this new type of power, biopower, starts to, it's a kind of prescriptive power, that regimes going forward started to cultivate ways of living. And I think this is a really fascinating concept. And I think it's something that the right doesn't think about enough.

This whole idea of social engineering, I think we do and we don't. But I mean, I think Paul's treatment, I'm kind of, I'm but Paul's treatment in after liberalism is, it's really incredible because, I mean, even, I think you even, you, you, you see the effects of these things and the way that conservatives have conversations where they make distinctions between like sex and gender without realizing that all of this stuff, even the words that we use, it all arrives from these institutions that have been totally captured and turned against us to the extent that we don't even realize that we're still kind of operating within the language that these people have created in their paradigms when we're trying to refute like leftists or something like that about how like, you know, sex is real.

biologically grounded or something like that, we still will use words and concepts that are developed by these people. I don't know if that made sense, but just conservatives are conserving liberalism and progressivism. It's worse than that, I think, actually, but yeah, correct. But simply for somebody who, you know, doesn't really follow and read a lot of what we, you know, a lot of what we do is basically there, it makes its way. It makes its way. way in. It makes its way into everything. It insinuates its way even into your thinking. Yeah. And I think even this idea of like, like it's just science, right? It's a question of science. I mean, even not a great, it's funny. I was thinking about this the other day.

Ask someone, what is recidivism? So ask someone who's like pro criminal justice reform, you know, pro defund the police or whatever and ask them what's, because obviously they'll tell you that like, you know, resettivism programs work. These programs where, like, dangerous criminals can rehabilitate themselves by, like, washing dogs in prison and stuff like that, that it works. And so you just ask them a simple question, because they're so certain that recetivism has been reduced, right? So you ask them, like, what is recidivism?

And they'll tell me, well, the likelihood of someone to reoffend once they get to prison. But that's not true. In Ohio, recidivism is not that straightforward. Like, if you get out of a prison in, you know, in a particular county, and you grow across the state, state line to like Michigan, and you commit a crime there, and you go back to prison, as far as the Ohio Corrections Department is concerned, you're not a resettivist because you committed that crime in Michigan. And I think that gets at this problem of like, well, it's science.

It's empirical objective data. How could you argue with that? It's neutral, in other words, but obviously nothing is neutral. Like your truth claims that you think are founded on objective empirical fact are not because they are laundered through institutions that are politicized. Like every institution is. And so you actually, I mean, if you really think about this, you might even go crazy because basically what we're saying is is that like the foundation for truth does not really stand on anything in Western liberal societies today except for basically just, you know, the opinions of people who are insane and unfortunately also in power. We will move on.

It is important for us to grasp here the salient features, the salient feature of Gottfried's analysis, which is not merely to say that the managerial state has developed and adopted this ideology and those tools of mass manipulation to justify its own power, but also that has developed them as a political weapon, quoting Gottfried. The political class has adopted in clear, inclusiveness and diversity as a political instrument, as a means of controlling a society it has said about reshaping.

The diversity machine is a mechanism of state power that operates without anyone being permitted to notice its coercive nature. Therapeutic regimes are packaged in a way that disguises their resort to force, both the left and establishment right in the United States, which misrepresent political life, have helped to make this concealment possible. Thus, insidious efforts at social engineering are shrouded in a cloak of benevolence. In managerial doublespeak, flatly coercive programs are cast as vehicles for empowerment. One is reminded of when Bob Dylan sings, good intentions can be evil, both hands can be full of Greece, you know that sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace. Every moral revolution expands the realm of managerial control. The government now in place searches out radical forces in order to break down non-inclusive

behavioral patterns and to subjugate citizens. Those who favor such a course for individual or collective reasons will empower the state to pursue it. The most blatant example of this in recent years has been the borderline insane push to recognize transgender men and women as being indistinguishable from what so, from so-called. called cis men and women. Go ahead. No, that's it.

You can keep reading. I'll comment after the JK rolling thing. Okay. The public maintenance of obvious fictions and falsehoods signals allegiance and obedience to the regime and serves no other function whatsoever than to punish dissidents. The most famous example of this has been the attempted unpersoning of the otherwise pristinely political, politically correct liberal JK. Rowling for her alleged transphobia.

Controversies surround, you want to do it now? Yeah, sure. No, I think this is, I mean, this gets it kind of the point that we were discussing earlier where, I mean, and I've been guilty of this too, just kind of out of laziness, but it's kind of like the marriage thing, right? Like the moment that you start referring to marriage is traditional marriage, to make a distinction between traditional marriage and, you know, non-traditional marriage or. or gay marriage or whatever, you've already kind of lost because you've already had to make

that distinction and you've created a second category. Patrick Deneen is actually very good at pointing this out when it comes to marriage, but it obviously applies to much more. So the moment that you start saying cis women or cis men or even biological men and biological women, the moment that you do that, you've kind of created, you've implied that there's a second category of woman. and that these other people that occupy this category are not really women, but maybe they are in one sense. You know what I'm saying?

And I think that conservatives, in a much more absurd level, this applies to the idea that, you know, you have some of these so-called good liberals and some conservatives too who oppose, you know, militantly, transgenderism and kids, but are actually fine with the idea of transgenderism as a common. concept for consenting adults who understand the implications of what they're getting into. So they actually accept the most important premises. And I think rolling kind of falls, I mean, she does and she doesn't. Like she's rejected the idea that men who medilate themselves can become women and all that. But rolling accepts a lot of other premises that kind of made this whole thing inevitable.

And in my view, a lot of this stuff derives from feminism. The idea that we should essentially destroy distinctions between men and women, it's kind of coming back to bite people like rolling. But anyways, yeah, I think the language thing is important. And that's the part that caught my eye about this section, the whole cis men or biological men, stuff like that. controversy surrounding her failure to abide by the new managerial edict to recognize biological men who take hormone supplements and wear skirts as women and biological women who take testosterone supplements and wear masculine clothing as men has led to, among other things, a school dropping her name from a building and her virtual erasure from a 20-year Harry Potter reunion. In 2002, Gottfried predicted, correctly as it turned out, that the ever-widening chasm between the equality, diversity, and inclusion doctrine of the therapeutic state and the lived reality and beliefs of most ordinary people would result in a populist backlash against managerial overreach. He claimed that the regime faces a paradigm crisis in which the gap between its democratic and liberal self-descriptions and its imposed social policies would be. become too obvious to escape notice, and therefore the efforts to justify these policies with

archaic terminology or human rights rhetoric no longer elicit widespread belief. At the time of writing, a recent study by the University of Chicago has found that 47 million Americans are said to believe that the 2020 election was stolen. 21 million believe that Joe Biden is not a legitimate president. 63% of people agree with the statement that. that African-American people or Hispanic people in our country will eventually have more rights than whites. A belief sometimes called the Great Replacement and 54% agree that a secret group of Satan worshiping pedophiles is ruling the U.S. government, which is the key belief in the QAnon movement. A more recent poll has found that one in three Americans believe that violence against the government is justified.

Moscow's warning that no ruling class can remain a ruling class for as long as for long if the masses do not buy into its political formula seems to ring ever louder. Yeah, I think I mean, you see this playing out in all these warnings that there are two articles that stand out that recently were published and I think one was in the Associated Press, but it's like, you know, more people that have before living in their own reality. or basically that faith or, yeah, I guess faith in American institutions is plummeting, institutions that are responsible for like creating consensus, right? And I don't know.

I think I generally want to agree with Moscow that basically ruling classes historically have required people to buy into their political formula in order for them to say. in power but it's something about the our contemporary problems seem difficult um it might have just something to do with like the level of comfort the average person enjoys you know like as angry as your um like your boomer republican gets about what biden is doing um not not just boomers this is not just like a boomer problem but like it takes someone who's like super super angry about what biden is doing and they still will participate in things that contribute to all these problems that they think are ruining society. And I think the most obvious example of this is probably like sports, right?

Like watching professional sports. Like there are so many conservatives who are addicted to watching professional sports obsessively, knowing that their money and their attention and their emotions are being invested in something that is totally opposed to the things they claim to hold dear. You know, like pretty much every sports institution is like that, supporting BLM, supporting transgenderism, stuff like that. Like every time that you like buy a jersey or watch a game or something like that, you're supporting those things. even though you don't agree with the political formula, right? You reject the political formula when it's presented to you, but then you continue doing things that actually support the system

to which the political formula is part. And I think that that is, I mean, we've always had bread and circuses, right? That's nothing new, but something seems uniquely bad about contemporary bread and circuses in our ability, to or in its ability to to make this whole thing possible, that people can be simultaneously, you know, angrier than they've ever been since a civil war, but still seemingly incapable to really do anything constructive with that anger.

Yeah. So I think it's a unique problem. I think like I said, I agree with Moscow, but I also think that there's like something new has been added to the mix that makes all of this worse. There is an article came out today from our friends over at National Review, showing that 20 teams in the MLB, Major League Baseball, are donating up to six figures and some into six figures for youth gender transitioning. Yes. It's weird to me that people are like, wow, this is outrageous.

It's like, yeah, this, why are you surprised? It's outrageous that you're surprised by this. Yeah. All right, moving on. Where Francis took his cues chiefly from Burnham and Pareto, Godfrey's chief influence was Carl Schmidt, and in particular the primacy of the political. The idea that we could ever reach the end of history has been shown to be nonsense. But Godfried stresses that a peculiar feature of therapeutic managerialism is its need to maintain the fiction of consensus. previous ruling classes had no such requirement and had more actual diversity of opinion within their ranks.

However, to function properly, the therapeutic state requires the downplaying of genuine political differences. The sorts of characters who attend the Davos agenda hosted by the World Economic Forum, the most elite managers of today, speak in the language of consensus. One such character, Larry Fink, the CEO of Black Rock, who manages over $7.5. trillion in assets and who can name the U.S. Federal Reserve as a client, uses phrases such as public-private partnership, and stresses that it is important for CEOs across all business to be unified. It has never been more essential for CEOs to have a consistent voice. Although he speaks in gushing terms about the power of capitalism, it is quickly clear that

Fink's message is managerial and at his vision for a quasi-commanded, and economy in which the controllers of capital dictate the investment agenda for the future. Quoting, every company and every industry will be transformed by the transition to a net zero world. The question is, will you lead or will you be led? We focus on sustainability and not because we're environmentalists, but because we are capitalists and fiduciaries to our clients. divesting from entire sectors or simply passing carbon-intensive assets from public markets to private markets will not get the world to net zero. When we harness the power of both the public and private sectors, we can achieve truly incredible things. This is what we must do to get to net zero.

Yeah, I like, probably one of the best things about this book is the fact that, that it really drives home this point that this idea that you're still living in the world of like 19th century laissez-faire capitalism is absurd. You know, and it's funny because like you still hear this on the like on the so-called dissident right, but like you'll still hear people kind of be critical of the, I guess you could say the anti-capitalist rhetoric from people like myself, right? Like basically there's this concern that maybe we're going too far with, you know, going after corporations and things like that, but it's like, no, we're actually not going far enough.

And when people like Larry Fink are telling you that we need to kind of have this increased partnership between public and private sector, or this not, the partnership is there. He's just saying that we need to mobilize together. The so-called capitalists are telling you that they're not really capitalists, you know, like I don't know why we're arguing about this. And I think, obviously the more correct term is managerialism. That's the kind of a connery that we live under. So I don't know. I think liberals complain that we live under capitalist society.

Conservatives claim that we live under socialism or something or communism. No, it's actually a fusion of both of those things. It's called managerialism. Yep. Simply put, this is not capitalism. This is agenda setting. whereby one of the most powerful executives in the world announces five-year and ten-year plans for what the future will look like in an almost entirely top-down managed economy.

The language of consensus conceals a truly political character of what Fink is saying. In fact, he has a temerity to start his letter by saying that COVID, quoting Fink now, COVID-19 has also deepened the erosion of trust in traditional institutions and exacerbate, polarization in many Western societies. This polarization presents a host of new challenges for CEOs. Political activists or the media may politicize things your company does. They may hijack your brand to advance their own agendas. In this environment, facts themselves are frequently in dispute, but businesses have an opportunity to lead. Thus, when he sets his net zero carbon an agenda later, it is cast in the politically neutral language of inevitability. But in actuality,

his letter contains an explicit threat. If CEOs do not get on board with this agenda, they will be left behind. They will be identified as the enemies of progress and someone, perhaps someone whose company owns half the exchange traded funds in the world, might see to it that these enemies no longer have a seat at the table. In theory, the market decides, but in practice, as men like Larry think decide. A company can now be sunk regardless of its actual success with consumers simply through investor activism. Likewise, products that have little to no market demands such as Beyond Meat can be thrust onto the shelves despite continually failing to sell. Appalling sales figures have not stopped massive corporations such as McDonald's and KFC

pushing Beyond Meat plant burgers to the front and center of their menus using the the full might of their advertising budgets. Yeah. Yeah, I think this gets another important point, which is the idea that go woke, go broke is a thing. It's not, it's a myth. It's a cope, again, that conservatives, I keep hammering conservatives because that's, that's like my audience, right?

I'm trying to tell these people that you mean well, but it's wrong. Yeah, that if places go woke, you know, no one's going to want to buy your stuff, correct. No one is going to want to buy, you know, or actually in time they will. I mean, that's just how this stuff works. Like you've got celebrities on the left and right in the middle that are promoting this kind of stuff, like beyond meat. I don't know where you would put Vitalik, the Ethereum guy on the spectrum, but you know, he tweeted a picture of himself eating their protein bites made out of crickets. And so like, like, unfortunately at some point in the future, I'd like this stuff is going to be pushed on more and more people, regardless of the cost, because they believe in it. I think you can't discount that.

The power of belief. And I always try to make it a point to say like, there are two people in the world, cynics and ideologues. Cynics do it for the money. Idiologs do it because they really believe it. And oftentimes they work together because what they want to do is. in the direction and want to go overlaps. And I think the ideology part helps to explain why go woke, go broke, just doesn't work. Like, they are willing to lose this money.

There's this quote, I think it was, I read it in Breitbart. I don't know where it's originally from, but it was some marketing big way from Nike who was talking about the losses that Nike had posted after Nike went woke and, you know, make Colin Kaepernick's poster boy. And this marketing guy just said, well, we're not worried about it because we don't think that the future of Nike is old white guys, old angry white guys. And so basically they're willing to lose millions of dollars because they think in the long run they're going to win because they believe in this stuff.

And I mean, yeah, so I think it's important to basically get that out of your head. Like the cavalry is not going to come. Like no one's the market is not going to save you. The invisible hand is not going to come down and crush beyond meat. Like it's just not going to happen. You have to do things that you have to figure out how to do these things yourself. And there is the chance that if people start abandoning Nike left and right and go to New Balance, maybe a Larry Finkin or some of his friends decide to wage war on New Balance.

Yeah, that's right. New ballot. Yeah. So, yeah, capitalism. Yeah, that's what we have. Yeah. Wonderful. All right.

Most of this attempted engineering of consent by the therapeutic regime serves the purpose of identifying Schmidian friends and enemies. The list of enemy terms which serve to expel you from employment and society at large continues to expand. Sexist, racist, homophobe, transphobe, client-deny or unvaccinated. and so on. These are all markers of ideological impurity which serve to dehumanize. Ideologically conscripted armies tended more and more to demonize their targets. Those who resisted the ideal embodied by one's nation were no longer viewed as human in thinking or in fact. In the 20th century, this resulted in catastrophic total wars between managerial states.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA, under the neo-conservatives, continued a crusade to spread liberal democracy to all parts of the world and to dissolve any vestiges of outmoded tradition with a missionary zeal. As these efforts were frustrated, and as populations evermore started to turn against such warmongering, the missionary zeal turned inwards, where in the 1990s and 2000s, so many Erzatz Hitler's resided in, Serbia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and so on. In the 2020s, they are at home. Not simply the despised Donald Trump, but also his supporters, and now people who refuse to submit to the prescribed remedies of the COVID-19 pandemic. In time, it will no doubt encompass meat eaters, people who wish to drive petrol-fueled cars, and so on. The question remains whether society can function while around 30% of the productive population are demonized and dehumanized in this way. This has never been achieved in history by any ruling class.

Stalin and other such dictators simply opted to eliminate their enemies through brute force. They were willing to do so to consolidate power and control. Managerial elites seem unwilling to use such force, and instead must rely on increasingly transparent games of perception management. at least by the estimation of Garr Woods, speaker at the World Economic Forum in November 2021, our current ruling elites seem to be aware of their own unpopularity. At an event called the Great Narrative, she said,

at Davos a few years ago, the Edelman survey showed us that the good news is the elite across the world trust each other more and more So we can come together and design and do beautiful things together. The bad news is that in every single country, they were polling the majority of people trusted the elite less. Of course they have to come together. They see the writing on the wall. Yeah.

Yeah. But, I mean, again, it's importantly, they're not deterred by it. They're confident that ultimately they're going to win. They've got the resources. They've got brains. and they're not really experiencing any push. I mean, the only, this is like the thing that's difficult to discuss, especially in the United States today,

is like the only people that are really kind of pushing back on these Western liberal, eat the bug elites are countries like Russia and maybe even China, right? And I think it is a very strange position to be in. And maybe I think this also contributes to the establishment's fear of figures like Donald Trump and obviously Victor Orban. Because they represent, I mean, setting aside like Russian China, guys like Orban and Trump represent the possibility of an alternative. So yeah, yeah, I mean, this is something that's been on my mind a lot because I had a conversation with my friend who's, who's German. and he grew up his whole life hating Russia and his family hates Russia to this day

and he just told me like I he's like he's not a Russophile and neither am I but he basically just said like I can't help but think that that somehow like the West is on the wrong side of history here unironically and that's not to say that Russia's in the right side but basically like it was like he was trying to understand why he felt like he had a stake in Russia not losing this war in Ukraine. And he was like tortured trying to explain this to me, right?

Because it goes against everything he believes. But he's just saying like I feel like the same people that want to crush Russia are the ones that want to crush me. And it was really interesting, this talk that we had. And it's been on my mind a lot because, again, this is someone who hates Russia. He would never live there. He doesn't like Putin. Like I said, he was raised hating Russia. But here he is saying, like, I feel like if they lose somehow I do too.

But he's also not rooting for Russia, obviously. I mean, I think this is actually on a lot of people's minds. But obviously, it's just not something that you can openly discuss with most people because they just wouldn't understand it. But I think there's a non-insificant part of the population it kind of feels this way. So even myself, I'm of the age where I grew up during the Cold War and that was our enemy. And now I'm looking and I'm like, you know, I hear Putin give speeches, you know, decrying Stalinism, decrying Marxism and decrying the West.

And I'm like, all right, I'm not supposed to like this guy. but basically the way he talks about this regime, he would be one of the people that Paul talks about who is targeted if he lived here and he was American. Yeah, and I think you have to remember that at least initially Trump had talked about normalizing relations with Russia. Yes. And that was a huge, I think that was a huge factor in the establishment hate for him. Because again, it represents the possibility of a different world order, right? A different political consensus. And, yeah, I mean, again, this is something that you simply don't really hear discussed in the West,

or at least in the United States because of the consensus that's emerged on this. I mean, maybe in other places like Hungary, you'll hear it more often. But, I mean, yeah, I think the consensus is like it's overpowering, at least from the institutions of elite opinion making, right? But yeah, it's an interesting point. We got one paragraph left here. The World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report for 2022 lists social cohesion as a major concern and notes that a recent poll in the United States, United States, for example, found division in the country to be voters' top concern. They expected it to worsen in 2022. While Gottfried in 2002 was unwilling to predict their ultimate demise,

it seems to me that unless the current ruling class is prepared to become openly coercive and use force, it will be overthrown once counter-elites become organized enough to do so in every region and locality. You want to, what's your opinion on that? Because I mean, that's probably probably the most controversial is we're

soon these people are going to be overthrown and so many people just can't see it well he doesn't say soon well yeah I know he doesn't say soon it's

it's also an if it seems to me which is another way of saying if if these if the current ruling class, you know, doesn't change its approach, it will be overthrown. So I think there's, it's obviously contingent on certain things happening, right,

and falling into alignment. I don't know. I'm not really black-pilled, so to speak. I don't think that it's, I don't think that their victory is inevitable. I think that this is, I made a threat about this. recently and I it was well received but I also got a lot of hate for it and basically what I was saying is that the the the people who I think are are actually radical who are on the dissident right and for me the dissident right was like I you know probably

starting in 2016 started to kind of get introduced to you know like the radical right and like reading guys like Buchanan and Gottfried in San Francis and so that was a dissident right for me, basically like the paleo-conservative authors, because they are, which is separate from like the online right. This gets confusing really fast. But the point that I was making was that like basically the dissident right, the radical right, has attained a kind of purchase in the mainstream. What I mean by that is that you have some people and institutions in the mainstream that are,

that have kind of like have buy-in to the, ideas of the dissident right. Like you've got people who are totally mainstream basically saying the same things that only the dissident right was saying a few years ago, like immigration moratorium, dismantle the FBI, you know, basically like decapitate government leadership. I don't mean literally, I mean like mass firings and things like that, which, you know, is something that like that you're hearing about now, like Axios did that story about how the Trump administration is going to like fire a bunch of people and staff and with loyalists and stuff like that. Like the fact that, these ideas are becoming mainstream means that like like I said the deep the DR has a kind of buy-in

on some level and what the dissident right has done for a long time is is basically just kind of point out problems and basically notice patterns and things like that um things that like no one else is willing to notice and my thread was basically saying like we can still continue doing those things and noting these problems you know like like the proud boys were crushed by the feds but antifo which is far more violent, you know, can openly do armed patrols in like red Texas. Like that that's a problem that no one is really talking about. So then, but the next thing that we have to do is actually figure out how to come up with actionable solutions to these things. You know, how could states actually repress Antifa and make it so these people cannot publicly organize?

You know, how could you, how could you prevent institutions from forcing or not? normalizing transgenderism in society. And I've been accused of being like a Ron DeSantis show. I'm just, but what I, the reason I talk about him and write about him so much is because I see a governor that's actually using power effectively. So like threatening to revoke the beverage license of a place that serves alcohol where you have transgender like strippers, you know, prancing around in front of little kids.

It's like, okay, you want to do that? Okay, then we'll take away your beverage license. and effectively destroy the business. I think that's the kind of stuff that we should be thinking about and actually implementing, not just like writing based, basically kind of statement legislation, which Republicans do this whole time.

Like, here's my draft of this piece of legislation that's never going to go anywhere for like term limits. Like, we don't actually have to play that game. Like we have governors. You know, we have people,

we already have people in positions of power. And as we get more of them in positions of power, how can we actually do these things in a way that is consistent with what Parvini is describing. And that's kind of what I'm really interested and focused in now is actually organizing and going beyond the pattern recognition, problem recognition part, and then actually starting to implement solutions.

The other example that I use for DeSantis is his whole thing with Disney, just basically stripping them of their special tax privileges in Florida for taking the side of transgenderism against the, against the, not only what the governor wanted to do, but also what like normal people in Florida want, which is, you know, getting transgenderism out of schools.

Yeah. One thing, though, that the right needs is they need to change your minds. They really have to start embracing the fact that there's power out there and they need to use it. Yeah, yeah, no, I agree. Historically, it's just get in there, we'll tweak a little bit, and all they end up doing is basically continuing the regime.

There's a great example of this last thing I say, because we're both bringing out of time, but there's a guy named Mark Elias, and he's like a Democrat election lawyer, and he's really a kind of legal field marshal. This guy oversaw an army of lawyers that was responsible for something like 200 pre-election lawsuits that basically made it easier for Democrats to win in key states

by removing restrictions on things like mail-in voting and absentee ballots. And so that was before the election, right? And this is the other thing, too, for conservatives who understandably because they don't have power, they kind of look towards, like, you know, kind of incredible explanations for why things didn't go their way, like Dominion or something like that, right? Like servers in Germany and like shootouts in Spain and stuff like that. Actually, it's guys like Mark Elias who are secretly like waging lawfare and like changing

election laws in your states without you ever knowing about it. Right. And so that was before the election. And then after the election, Elias led an army of lawyers that successfully thwarted. like 64 attempts by Trump's legal team to investigate election irregularities. Where is our Mark Elias on the right? Why don't we have someone like? And like, it's funny, I've made this point to people who are conservatives.

I'm like, well, Mark Elias is a sleaze bag. He's ruthless. And I'm like, yeah, so where's my sleaze bag, ruthless right winger, you know, who's extremely competent. And I think that's, it's funny because no one, although the initial reaction people was always kind of like, oh, that guy's a dirtbag. Once I explain, like, yeah, but he's effective. No one has disagreed with me.

Like, yeah, actually, we do need people like Mark Elias, these people who are just totally ruthless, you know, stone cold killers. Just being content with having a seat at the table that just has to go out the window. I mean, it's, I mean, I can't even know anymore. Plug what you want to plug, and we'll end this. I know we got to go. Yeah, well, you can read my column, Theoretic a Partisan at Chronicles Magazine.org, and then I've got my substack at contra.substack.com and my Twitter. Actually, I'm on Twitter,

getter, gab, and other places under the same handle in Meridicus, E.M.E.R.I.C.U.S. I think earlier I said psychiatry in the 19th century. If I did, that was a mistake. Paul. And the point about psychiatry is in the 20th century with the progressives. So I just wanted to. I was thinking about that and I was like, no, psychiatry wasn't a thing. Like, at the time. Freud, early 20th century. Yeah, that's right.

I appreciate it. Talks about it. Yeah. How are good. All right. Pager, thanks. Bye. Take care. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekinoa show for chapter 10, the very last chapter. I'm here with Charlemagne. How you doing, Charlie? Very well. Thank you. And Ryan Turnipseed.

time on the show, even though we've hung out in real life a couple times. So how's it going? It's going very well. How are you, sir? Doing good. Doing good. Why don't I just throw this chapter 10 up since this is basically a summary and it's going to take less than five minutes and then we're going to have a discussion of an overview of the book after that. So let me share this real quick. All right. I'm going to start reading like I've been doing it through this whole thing. Anybody, either of you wants to stop, stop me and comment. I don't care if it's mid-sentence. Just do it. Feel free. All right. Start reading now. Chapter 10, conclusion. The thesis of this book has been that democracy is and always has been an illusion

in which the true functioning of power were an organized minority elite rule of a a disorganized mass is obscured through a lie that the people is sovereign. I have called this the populist delusion because of the power of other lies that this central lie conceals, chiefly the myth of bottom-up power or people power, and the entirely inaccurate view of history this lie creates. There is never a substitute for the tightly organized minority. This fact, Mosca's law, is the key lesson of the Italian elite theorists. Gaitano Mosca, Wilfredo Peretto, and Robert Michels. I believe that the outbreak of populism in Europe and America that started in 2015 was significantly stymied due to a view of power and the functioning

of Western systems that was wholly wrong, which is to say that the people who made up those populist movements believed re-articulations of a false political formula. that they were taught in their civics or history classes at school. I think I'd go a step further than that. I would say that the leadership, the people who presented themselves as the populist leaders, the Trumps, the Orbanes of the world, they actually believe in democracy.

So they're not going to be able to get anything done within the system the way it has been structured. Right, and quite expressly so. And they also believed in this sort of like meritocratic view that the system worked, which is why Trump hired people that were absolutely disloyal to him, but appeared to have the expert qualifications. You know, it's why he staffed his foreign policy side of things with warhawks and complete backstabbing neocons, because they looked on paper the most qualified.

But they were not the most loyal, and that's not how this stuff works fundamentally. Right. It was clear that, you know, as Mr. Parvini wrote in the book, very few presidents have actually achieved sovereignty, one of the few being FDR. And it was clear that President Trump believed that he would in fact have sovereignty merely by winning the election, which was definitely not true. And that fundamental misunderstanding is really what destroyed his presidency more than. and the fact that his supporters believed that. Because even if his supporters had believed that myth, as is made clear in the book, if the president understood that he was not sovereign merely by winning an election, things would have been different.

Yeah. All right. Moving on. The myth of social change being a bottom-up phenomenon pervades our culture and thinking. It is the essential fiction of the 1960s counterculture and the worldview of the base. be boomers, or as

AA would put it, it's just boomer truth regime. And as soon as we can destroy that, the better. Sooner we can destroy that the better. It is worth returning to the four myths of liberalism that helped to perpetuate this worldview.

Myth of the stateless society, that state and society were or could ever be separate. Do you have any problem with that, Charlie? No, and this actually sort of leads into, well, I was planning on offering some criticisms of anarchism. I know we still have a few libertarian for anarchists in our midst, including Mr. Carson,

you know, who I respect greatly. But to me, the ideal of trying to separate the state from society or any of these other factors, like the economy, as you're about to read, it just doesn't make sense as a goal or ideal. I mean, I understand the anarchist or libertarian impulse towards freedom, and of course that's a totally reasonable concept

for an American to pursue, but I think strictly speaking, the idea of anarchy is a bad idea to hold in your head simply because it's completely impossible politically. Like, having ideals that aren't

achievable by man in a religious sense is fine. Like the idea of Christianity. No one can be perfect like Christ, right? But in terms of our political or economic or social ideals, they should, I believe, be rooted in something that's actually achievable. I don't want to jump the gun here too terribly.

Well, let me, then let me finish reading the four and then I'll let you, I'll let you jump in. Yeah. So I'll read one again. Myth of the stateless society, that state and society were or could ever be separate. Myth of the neutral state that state and politics were or could ever be separate. Myth of the free market that state and economy were or could ever be separate. Myth of the separation of powers that competing power centers can realistically endure

without converging. So, do you want to jump in there or do you want me to keep reading? Yeah, I actually, just very quickly, I actually was going to challenge myself this time and try to defend the whole, or not the whole thing, but at least parts of the anarchistic worldview. Even though I myself don't fully subscribe to it, I don't believe by any measure of the belief system. But the initial things, I remember whenever this first came out and he talked about the four myths of liberalism before anyone had really even read the book to find out what exactly he meant. and he said that you can't separate the state from the market, you can't separate the state from society and all this other stuff. And the first thing that my mind initially jumped to was sort of like the enlightened absolutism.

You know, the ruler cannot be separated from any of the outgrowths of society, the sort of Prussian system. And that's not really what's being articulated here. And I was very happy because Mr. Parvini has done an absolutely splendid job at a, you know, throwing clear, definitions out, this whole book. And I think it's like, right at the very start of one of the chapters, he defines state is, you know, a minority that rules over

a majority, where the majority has to be ruled. So it's not exactly the typical definition you would get for state from an anarchist or someone like that. So while it is still infeasible, because you're not going to get rid of a class

that rules over anyone else, it's not exactly going fully in the other direction either. You can still have great amounts of autonomy, as you do see in history, while still repudiating these four myths here at the end. I figured I would throw that in there just sort of as a... These things are much more strict in definition than they might immediately seem if you haven't read the full book. Well, one thing I would like to say here,

because we are basically talking about anarchism, And I'm on Facebook, but I'm on one of those famous vacations that I always get for 30 days. So I can't respond to things that I see that are absolutely annoying. But one of the common refrains when it comes to statism, you know, the, you know, something that they like, libertarians and anarchists like to use as a pejorative other than as a descriptor of somebody's beliefs. they one of the common things they'll say is, oh, you need a, you want a state because why do you have to use violence against peaceful people? And it's a good bumper sticker. I like bumper stickers. But, you know, I would ask, are these people peaceful? Are, is the general public peaceful? And I think a lot of them would say, well, they would be peaceful if it wasn't for the state. So the state is, basically the boogeyman for everything. It is, it's to be blamed for everything. It's to be blamed for human nature. And, you know, what I would say about, you know, and then they'll say,

well, you know, if we had, if there was no state and, you know, the market controlled everything and everything was based on economics, you know, if somebody got violent, we could just put to get, you know, a bunch of people could get together and they could just nip it in the bud right there. And it's like, I don't know about that. You know, I mean, people have a tendency to tribe up. And one tribe is going to, and this just what history tells us, is stronger than another, is going to be more powerful than another, is going to be more violent than another, is going to be willing to commit total war against another. And I'm not saying the state is here to stop that. I'm just saying that making the broad claim that without a state, things would be better than they are right now.

Well, first of all, you have no evidence of that. It's a complete theory. And second of all, making that claim is really childish. If either you want to push back on that at all, I'm willing to listen. I can, I guess in some ways, defend anarchism. I mean, anarchism, anarcho-capitalism, these are fine to have as political myths. You know, there's no real problem with using those in order to help organize people. But in terms of the organizers, the elite, if you will, actually attempting to organize your minority at the elite level around the concept of anarchism doesn't actually make any sense.

And the book actually makes an interesting comment earlier in regards to how capitalism worked. you know, in this era when we had free markets, we basically had free markets by force because the capitalist ruling class came into being and made the society capitalist, right? It was made to be that way. It wasn't just sort of that way in some natural sense. So, you know, this is something I've mentioned before.

I mean, you can basically have your sort of Anargo-capital in a very approximate sense if you simply have a elite class ruling somewhat paradoxically implementing that system, right? But you still have to actually have the state, if you will, implement anarcho-capitalism, which is somewhat of a contradiction. But according to the theory of this book, which I think is very well demonstrated, that's simply how it must be. and people who style themselves as some sort of anarcho-capitalist elite in the sense that they have some intent to organize for political power, say like a Ron Paul or something.

They have to operate with that recognition. Right. And that might even start looking very similar to what a lot of people who claim be Hopian. I'm not going to speak for Hoppe himself just because he puts out such a. wide volume of works that I'm not going to try to summarize it, but the people that claim to be Hothians tend to advocate for a system that sounds very similar to what a state is being described as in this book. Because you have to remember whenever in the page 20 or whenever it is in the first chapter, whenever you introduce the concept of a state, it's not presumed to be

some modern system that you can go look around today. There's no like DMV that. that is necessary in the definition of the state. You know, there's no sort of underclass of lump and proletariat needed to staff it that's necessary in the concept of the state. It is literally just the organized minority that has to rule over the majority, and that is a fact in day-to-day life. And then that definition is then extrapolated to apply to these four spheres of society that people try to separate out of that state.

But, you know, speaking from earlier on in the book, and that's just most books typically will have the basic axioms or the basic ideas early on in the book that you can then always refer back to to try to apply that out of things not explicitly stated in the book. So a lot of Hoppians probably would look at the description of how the state, the minority that rules over the majority, how this book says it comes about, and look on it very favor. that it is both, you know, it is voluntary just because the nature of man necessitates that you can't literally just force someone to do absolutely everything you want them to. There has to be some element of voluntary action in there. But then also because of the nature of man, it requires people to organize socially. It's coercive in that way. You know, you are tied to that sort of a natural need. So people that argue for Covenant, communities that argue for contractual communities and all this other stuff, those types of anarchists that I tend to see is much more real. Probably wouldn't find that much to object to in this,

which is, you know, it repudiates sort of the pie in the sky anarchistic thought that Pete definitely goes off against quite often from what I can tell. And it also sort of affirms the more realist tendencies within these people whenever they see how things actually function, which is why these four myths are being stated here, even though on the surface, if you have not read the book and you just kind of plunge into it right here, they might look very sort of statist in the pejorative term if you are to use it. But in reality, when you read through this book, it is just affirming very real facts that actual realist libertarians or anarchists have come to grapple with for the past few decades. You know, this is a

if anything, it's sort of a codifying of those lessons that have been learned, is what I would say. Just as a point of interest, Hans Herman Hoppa does cite the juvenile extensively in democracy, the god that failed. Yeah, and Rothbard cites,

I think all three of the Italians used in this book quite extensively in all of his essays. And Hapa would definitely say that you're looking for in building these communities, you're looking for pillars of the community or what he calls natural elites. So, yeah, I was, yeah, I also wanted to say, I've said this a few times that, you know,

we could have Ancapistan tomorrow if the elites wanted it. But then if you're looking at the elites that are there now, you have to question why they would want it. You know, you're, these people, we want our friends in charge. I mean, that's pretty much, to me, the message of this book is there's always going to be a state and we need our friends in charge of it. We need people who think like us and desire the things that we want or else we have what we have now. So, all right, I'm going to keep going. So talking about the four myths, let us do these, with each of these in turn, the myth of the stateless society permeates the two computes.

leading ideologies at the 20th century. Liberalism and socialism, at their extreme ends in anarcho-libertarianism, whether left or right, and communism. Mosca and Michelle's demonstrate that this is fundamentally wrongheaded because minority organization always prevails from the level of a tribe to the level of global government. Humans are, simply put, the political animal and what is called the state is simply the fact that there must be the political function, that there must be the political function in any society. We go on, because I think we've, we probably beat that one to death. The second myth that the state is separate from its laws and institutions is shown to be false by Carl Schmidt, who demonstrates that, despite liberal pipe dreams, there is no escape from the political.

Even though the cloak of neutral or scientific language can be used to mask the ideological content, every institution will bear the mark of the dominant political formula, which acts as a kind of theological holy writ. If the political formula is equality, diversity, and inclusion, there can be no other official bodies or laws that do not conform to it. Samuel T. Francis shows that the managerial elites will not stop their social transformations until all, all relics and vestiges of the old and despised bourgeois regime are replaced by the new religion at every level of culture down to your local museum. Paul Gottfried shows that this is even taken to the domain of science and medicine to the extent those who resist a political formula are diagnosed with mental disorders. Comments? Well, I guess it just, this really hits hard because...

we were all brought up with the myth that we you know we live in a free country we have free press and all of our ideas are free but of course that's just not true at all everything that people you know we have democratic opinions right we don't have like free speech um we have democratic speech you're not allowed anywhere because of the law to you know promote fascism for example if you try to do that. You're going to get in serious trouble almost immediately. And this book just eviscerates the idea that the press and the ideas we have are sort of these free ideas that weren't instituted by some sort of political formula by the state. All of the institutions we have are not free institutions. They're democratic institutions, at least in terms of the formula. And this is really important to

to hit home for people who read this book who aren't actually, you know, familiar with these ideas, sort of disabusing yourself of the myth that all of the ideas that you've been taught are sort of free and not tied to some sort of political formula. That's a really important aspect of this book that sort of runs alongside the main concepts of elite theory. Right. And like even a minor point to add on to that because a lot of right-wingers have, especially in the last few years, well understood the idea that it's not just what is legally desure the government, but it's also things like the media, things like the press, the public schools, and all this other stuff, that is what forms, you know, the idea of

the government, this monolithic entity that will just control every facet of your life, whether or not they legally have to answer to the president or the leader of the deep state, or depending on who you talk to, you know, whatever bogeyman is hiding under the under the rug. The contribution here that I don't see many people on the right talking about is, you know, Paul Gottfried's point about the doctors that will diagnose you with mental illness if you dare to go against this political formula, this or the political reality that just sits in front of you. They'll give you, they'll call you mentally deranged. They will have all these medicines or magnetic treatments for your brain, perhaps if you remember that story to make you

less xenophobic. They will have all these different pills prescribed to you if you somehow become so disaffected that you look depressed or any of these other clinical diagnoses. It's not just things that you would naturally associate as being political or legal in nature. It is literally science itself that has to fall under the formula as well. It is a total, much more total than most people talk about. Charlie mentioned the, mentioned fascism that you can't even talk about fascism. And we saw this Georgia Maloney who got elected in Italy. And we were on the live stream last night. I was doing with Thomas. Someone asked him, you know, how close she is to Mr. Big Chinman from the 1920s. And Thomas said, her message is no different than Tony Blair's. in 1997 coming to, coming to power. She's, no, Tony Blair had the same message.

So to try to compare him to, to call it fascism is really a, is exposing that therapeutic state that Paul Godfrey talks about is that there is something wrong with this woman. And, you know, I'm, I'm at the point where I think that, you know, they may, you know, they may, just reinstate lobotomies to try and help people, you know, get past us. I mean, that's, what was the, uh, the certain, uh, scientists from a middle eastern country of origin were developing magnetic treatments, uh, you know, that famous story that everyone freaked out about, I mean, that might, you might as well just lobotomize people at that point. Um, but, like, even just to hammer the point home, you're told from a young age, you know,

trust your doctor on these medical ideas and all of the, other stuff is no different than trust the government to carry out the will of the people. At this point, it's such a political organ that it's no different. All right. The third myth that the state and the economy could ever be separated, the myth of the free market, is the central tenet of classical liberalism. Bertrand de Juvenel shows that since the political comes prior to any economy, the economy itself can never and will never escape politics.

James Burnham shows that Le Seferre was simply the political formula of the capitalists who gained power in the 19th century, but this, because of the practicalities of mass and scale, gave way to managerialism and the fusion of corporate interests and the state. We have seen how even the economy in the managerial state is a top-down process. The consumer is not sovereign, despite the slogans. The managerial class used the roles of executives at large. corporations and financial institutions to set directives and mission statements for the foreseeable time horizon. The reason organizations such as the UN and the World Economic Forum can announce their visions for Agenda 2030 is because the economy itself is managed. Now, as Charlie and I come from libertarianism and Ryan, I believe you are a economics major right now, right?

Yes, and entrepreneurship. I am studying under. pair by then you know this is all uh I was never a libertarian for the record were you not no never definitely close

close around maybe 2015 or something but never quite there where were you on Austrian economics I mean I think as Mr. Parvini would say I agree with the

Austrian economics is 100% correct in terms of how human action functions but it's not a political formula. It's the objective description of human economic action, much like elite theory is the objective description of human power. What do you think about the statement here that either you can take this? Because since the political comes prior to any economy,

the economy itself can never and will never escape politics, Do you believe that's true that the political will always, because there are a lot of people out there, they call themselves an anarcho-capitalist who believe that you can actually build a society off of economics? Well, come before is sort of a strange turn of phrase in a way. I mean, these things always exist simultaneously. If there's human beings, they're going to be making economic decisions, and they're going to be making decisions regarding, power. So these things always exist simultaneously, and economics is a description of how humans trade with each other, but power is always going to be able to supersede that. You can, of course, have power sort of, as the earlier chapter alluded to or stated directly, when you have a

capitalist ruling class, you can allow the economy to operate freely, but that's always at the a hess of power and you know power is always going to come to being as soon as you even have a small tribe of people so you know if you have only one person even he again pervini even mentions the robinson crusoe situation somewhere earlier in the book you know if you just have one person or maybe two people on a deserted island then there's no real power relationship you're not going to have a tribe having a tribe of two people i guess you could technically call it a tribe but only in these weird edge cases, do power relationships not emerge to subsume economic activity? So, yeah, I fundamentally agree with his debunking of the third myth.

You got anything right? Sorry, I couldn't. Yeah, sorry. So the only thing that I disagree with is the idea that the political becomes political organization, the political sphere of life precedes economic. economic sphere, just because it's both of them are fundamentally social. And it seems strange to me to say that in every single case, power relations will precede exchange. But this could ultimately just be seen as hair splitting, because it's ultimately going to end up the answers at the same

time they will come about, which doesn't absolve any of these ideas from the criticism here. It's It's more just the certainty that this political life precedes the economic. Now, with all of that, the jab at consumer sovereignty at the end, I can understand why he would take it just because most people have so distorted it to mean that the consumer just directs and controls everything. When in reality, it is simply just can the consumer choose to purchase or not purchase or withhold money, or not even do they have different options, just can they choose to purchase at its very base meaning, this is still true. But then you do end up with the question, does that mean they're actually sovereign? Well, depends on what you mean by

sovereign. I understand why he takes the jab there. I don't think he's necessarily attacking the properly understood concept there. But for all intents and purposes, the sort of pop definition of it, you would get at like a business class or a marketing class, by all means that has still been debunked. But at least here, I'm not exactly forced to purchase Pepsi or Coca-Cola. I can just not purchase either, which under the traditional definition does mean that I still have sovereignty. Now, you know, in the coming future where there might be a, you know, a political commasar standing on the grocery aisle enforcing a diversity quota in my purchases, then I might need to start purchase, in which case now you can you can debunk it. But this is a economics,

autism, and hair splitting. But I might as well be thorough if we're going to, if we're going to treat this seriously. Sure. And if you look at the, so trying to separate, in the early colony, their early colonies they had there was a great degree of freedom that they had from the crown and being 3,000 miles away helped a lot but then you read Patrick Newman's book cronyism and he starts in 1607 and what you what you're seeing is you're seeing that whenever it doesn't matter if you're just here if you just showed up on a boat you're with a bunch the cronyism always exists. And to try to, and I hear people, and I probably used to say this all the time, so you can probably find audio of me saying it that, you know, a free market would solve that

problem. A free market could actually make it worse. I mean, there could be just much more collusion in laissez-faire of companies coming together. I think the idea that monopolies won't happen because people could just, people would be able to start a company that morning because there are no regulations against starting a company. If I had a big company, I would just buy that person out. I mean, I would offer them so much money that they would be like, okay, well, it would take me years to make this amount of money, so this is what I'm going to do. Yeah. So the idea that the, that competition is going to solve every problem. And, Lace Fair is going to solve every problem.

I think we've said this. I've said this numerous times. Really, the freest market that you see now is basically the black market. And even the black market, their prices are going to be dictated by the prices in white markets. Right. And then, of course, just to hammer the point home, you will come back to sort of the other autistically economic talking point of, well, if there is a monopoly that naturally comes about, does that mean it's bad?

It could be. It could be our friends run it, so it's good. It could be that it's someone we are ultimately indifferent about that runs it, and they just do it well, then okay, fine. Really, realistically and politically, this is only a bad thing if it's our enemies running it, and if they do actually have a genuine monopoly just because they are good at what they are doing, that's when it becomes a bad thing. But in other, keeping with the realistic analysis, you don't just have to economically, challenge them. There are other ways to challenge those sorts of people. Right. And I think... And I think...

And I think a government that actually did protect the rights of the people, only the most autistic of anarchists would be against it. You know, that protected our rights, that where the military was just there to make sure that we were safe, that the police were there to make sure we're safe. I, you know, I don't know. I don't know. It's a, it's hard the world, especially after the last two and a half years and really try to nail down why there are some people who are still talking about statelessness and talk about it on a, I mean, that's their main talking of point instead of it just being like the North Star or something like that. All right. I'm going to go to the fourth myth. The fourth myth is that there is a separation of powers in a liberal democracy, which is to say that there are checks and balances between the various branches of government.

This is largely collapsed by the incisive analysis of Schmidt and the process of powers tendency to seek to conquer feudal castles identified by Juvenel. It is worth noting that at least three of the thinkers covered, Mosca, Burnham, and Juvenile himself, favor a system by which centralization or the convergence of power centers is held in a kind of equilibrium through a constant struggle, even if in practice they recognize the extreme difficulty of achieving this. I'll go on if no one has anything to say. While it appears that populism largely failed, not because it was not supported by the masses, but because of political naivete, that that does not mean a circulation of the elites is not due. As the lies and manipulations of the managerial regime become more and more visible to a public that has become widely skeptical of our current globalist elites and the system that supports them,

agitation for significant change will continue apace. Attempts to maintain official narratives and maintain free and fair elections will become more difficult. Please, I want this. I wanted them to build a wall around the capital after January 6th. It strikes me that the system that then faces many possible points of failure, which include de facto balkanization, the need for more explicit coercion and the use of force, a high-low-middle mechanism whereby national governments become the middle,

while supernational globalist governance structures become the high, and local regions become the middle. Bio-Leninism, or in other words, degradation of the elites and exclusion of people of superior skills and talents causes the ruling class to become complacent and or inept, eclips by foreign powers. There is one more that he leaves out, and this just could be because I didn't read clearly enough,

or it could be because it was infeasible at the time of writing this. And it is the fact that the sort of managerial method of organization that we're operating under, we accept that thesis by Burnham because he operates under the assumption that it works more profitably for the people in power than any other organization method does. And what you're currently seeing, especially in the last couple of months, is that that might not actually be the case, because you have to wonder how, much money do they need to print? How many foreign governments do they need to coerce to keep the dollars as the global reserve currency? How big can this bureaucracy get with their autistic specializations of management where you'll have a manager for like specific emotions and like a

in a team and then you have a manager for you know interrelations between groups? How bloated can this get? And then you know, how much sort of financial black magic and wrangling can they do before you've had one bubble that popped way too big, and it just brings everyone down. That is, to summarize all of this, it could also be as well that the sort of managerial method of organization is collapsing in on itself. You got something, Charlie? What I will say is the, yeah, and he says in the next paragraph, at the time of writing,

we were seeing all five of these in their nascent state. De facto Balkanization, we saw that. pretty clearly with the COVID regime in a couple states, most notably Florida. The need for more explicit coercion and the use of force, no more so than the way the January 6th tourists were handled. And FBI raiding Marilago, the home of a former president, real kind of banana reprimed. public kind of things. Bio-Leninism, I mean, look at some of the people that are in charge right now. I mean, you can even say, you can even look at the vice president of the United States.

I mean, it's just got... Right, and look at the universities where they turn out their elites. Just by the methods that most state universities organize, and with a lot of these sort of backlash that private universities are getting, it is unfeasible. to hold high standards anymore. At public universities, they have this sort of quasi-s sort of Vimar-esque democratic system where the students kind of rate their professors,

and if the professors get too low a rating, their pay gets cut, they get barred from teaching these things, and you need to teach in order to keep employment. You get barred from tenure and all this other stuff. And then in private schools, where they have much more control over their classrooms, well, you know, students just write petitions. You get enough protected classes to sign on to the petition to where it makes the media headline,

then the professor just gets fired wholesale. Their, their centers for turning out new elites are actively lowering their standards by design and opening themselves up to just being completely outclassed. And it doesn't necessarily have to be everything, though I don't know if there is a field that is resisting this sort of slide and standards. But it just takes a couple things for the current elites to just be completely outclass and humiliated in for them to just lose their mandate,

you know, to be unfeasibly seen as rulers. I want to add to what you said earlier about the managerial method possibly becoming less profitable. The way I gauge what's happening right now is that the managerial method is becoming more and more profitable for the governing elite, which are the managers, but it's becoming more profitable for a smaller and smaller segment of them. So I think we are getting to the point where the managers are benefiting,

but only the very, very upper echelons of the managers are really seeing the benefits of all of the monetary inflation and other things. things we see going on right well do you think that there is a war because of that there's a war going on between the elites right now you know you point you can point to roe v way being overturned a number of gun decisions things like that it seems like there are some people working in the background who are working against the the wishes and the goals of the ruling elites right now right because most of the managers are now effectively just being treated like the Kulax.

So once we're at the point where, you know, I think it's in arguable that the inflation and other regulations we've seen have been of insanely high benefit to a tiny amount of people. But when you're only actually benefiting a small part of the ruling class like that, you're actually going to get your counter-elite forming. So the counter-elite may very well form out of the disaffected managers, which is exactly what you would expect based. on the theses of this book.

So that's where we ought to look to for being saved from this horrible system is the disaffected managers. Right, and just to bolster that point, just around here, sort of in, you know, the periphery of the Empire, if you will, Oklahoma,

you know, plainsland with not a lot of development, no real structure or centers of anything except for maybe Tulsa. all the people that literally do manage in these large corporations, especially the oil stuff around here, something very key to your current system of elites, whether they realize it or not. Basically, all of the managers absolutely hate what's happening,

but they just don't have an alternative. So, you know, there is a sort of group in a potential minority coalition there to latch onto, and basically all you have to do is say, We aren't even necessarily going to change much. We just aren't going to make you do the retarded craft. And you've already got a segment for a sort of organized one of the groups in a minority coalition that's ready to just go on. And a very key one at that, the managers in the managerial system.

All right. I'm pretty sure I'm finishing this up with this last paragraph. Yep. All right. Last paragraph. At the time of writing, we are seeing all five of these things in their nascent state. The political pressure from the public on elected leaders, due to the sheer unpopularity of the policies enacted, may eventually cause them to break decisively with globalist elites. This remains likely so long as nations maintain standing armies.

Strong indications in France and elsewhere seem to make it almost inevitable that there will be at least, there will at least be, a nominal struggle for national sovereignty against globalist overreach. The political capital spent on the COVID-19 pandemic will exacerbate this, especially given the economic hardship it seems to be bringing. European populations may have a stated preference to achieve net zero carbon by 2030, but in practice it is extremely unlikely that elites will be able to push ahead with their utopian visions without violent protests. as a situation worsens, people will become more serious and organized, having learned from the populist experiences between 2016 and 2020.

Elites, of course, always have an option to reverse course and a bid to reverse these trends, but one suspects that they believe their own visions with a missionary zeal. I don't know that I agree with that. If they do not, the will to power is such that they're less forever greater, control will not let up until power is taken from them by a better organized elite with a political formula better suited to the populations they are supposed to serve. I strongly doubt that this new elite, when they emerge, whether by democratic means or otherwise, will be able to break decisively enough from liberal and democratic myths to do what is necessary to keep Western nations from experiencing certain disaster in the future. However, after decades of

chronic mismanagement from the current managers, perhaps all we hope for is a vaguely sensible replacement for a few years whose interests will be closer to those of quote unquote the people. I wonder to what extent he still believes everything in that paragraph because I've seen an academic agent put forward his belief that they're sort of rolling back some of the worst aspects of green and woke and everything and some of the studies of Tony's Blair. So I wonder if he would, I wonder if he would disagree now with some of the things he wrote there. Just an interesting question to ask.

Have you, have either of you seen that the World Economic Forum, one of the books that they recommend is Dr. Robert, Dr. Robert Murphy's modern money mechanics? Yeah. Yeah. But that is a good point. And I think that almost everyone was sort of overestimating the extent that they were just fully and plasticly committed to going along with everything that they've been pushing, the elites. Because all it took was, you know, one threat, like winter isn't even here yet for most of Europe, but it took one threat of a winter of extreme discontent. and suddenly you get various supposedly hardline green governments going back and redefining saying,

well, I guess natural gas and nuclear power could be back on the menu again. They're, I mean, mostly green. And then you get all of a bunch of other, I believe it's sort of like the smaller countries, especially Denmark comes to mind where their left-wing party, fitting with sort of like the Danish left-wing traditions, is taking this chaotic wave as an opportunity and starting to close down their border again, trying to preserve Danish demographics. Even though I believe in the past, you would have a lot of these Danish left-wing parties

going out in support of immigration because it's the popular thing to say. I think that a lot of people might have overestimated, including potentially me, I don't quite remember what I said on this topic for the last, few months. I think everyone might have overestimated the extent to which they are committed, the sort of missionary zeal that is written in the book here. I want to add too because he mentioned something again that's really important, which is understanding what the middle actually is in the juvenileian model of high-low versus middle. Notice how he again frames the national governments as the middle here.

and it's really important to understand in that frame that middle doesn't just mean middle class. In the American system, it to some extent does map to that, but it's a much concept than just the idea of middle class. And that's just interesting too because it highlights the importance of having national governments that are opposed to globalism, as globalism is the final convergence of all the power centers to the point where they're, will be no, there'll be nothing left to converge on. So that's a really important point to consider is that we need to make sure our national governments are in fact not acting as, not acting complicitly in the global system and are actually attempting to act in the interest of the middle.

Well, one of the interesting things about that last paragraph is he talks about people basically growing weary of the government and questioning the government. And Ukraine, North Stream 2, all of this, it's, you know, Germany is looking like they're going to have a very rough winter. Although I've heard that their reserves are only down like 3%. So it looks like they can get through the winter, thankfully. but there is hope. It's just one thing that you know you get from reading this book is, okay, so who sweeps in as the hero of the day?

Who sweeps into what elites are going to solve this problem? You know, I've said recently, I don't know publicly or privately, but it seems like really the one elite that I look at who seems to be, the closest to being on our side and I don't trust him at all is Peter Thiel. He's the only one who's giving money to people that we agree with and pushing certain ideas that I think a Blake Masters is saying the right things. He's been associated with Teal for a very, very long time. So, yeah, I think the one thing that this book really helps you to understand, and you can even

mix us in with Hapa is you're looking for elites. You're looking for elites who are who share your values. And I think that's the white pill from this book. The white pill is it you don't you don't have to start a revolution. You don't have to pick up arms that may happen by default in certain areas. But the white pill is you raise up the right people and you can have what you want in these people can be overthrown. And in terms of the national governments, again, one of the interesting things that happened recently is, you know, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was destroyed. And it seems like basically everybody just assumed the Americans did it, which would be

inconceivable lifetime, right? Like, that would be the last thing you would think is that the Americans did it. And now we have other American allies, so to speak, basically just assuming, even if they don't state it out right that America was behind an act of terrorism, essentially, on European countries. Ryan, I have, unless you guys have anything else to add on that topic, because I was going to switch ever so slightly. Go ahead.

All righty. So, he does mention in here sort of like a black pill that he just slips in right at the end of the conclusion. He says he strongly doubts that a new elite, when they emerge for whatever means, will be able to break decisively enough from these myths in order to save the West, basically. This is strange to me because I know he is very well read on the Bolshebaic movement in Russia. And if you look at every single thing that they were telling the populace, that they were telling the elites that they got on side, that they were telling foreign governments, it was absolutely

nothing like what they actually had planned and executed. There were some moments where they would go out to the crowd and basically tell them directly what they would do if they were in government and they actually came to pass. But there were just a, quite frankly, a lot of lies that they would throw out to people. You know, it would be much more Democrat. They promised much more popular sovereign rule through Russia, which, in reality, they did absolutely everything they can because they could, because they understood the system here, that this popularly sovereign system they implemented was absolutely under their control.

they knew how the game worked. But nonetheless, they would still promise to people it would be a golden democratic age that would descend across Russia. So, you can have elites that can preach these myths in order to get people on side and all of that,

and you can even paint the actions that they will take to look like they are still following these popularly held myths that you cannot break from with the population, but you can still just completely contradict them through very, I want to say subversive means, but sort of very hidden means, if you will. Because everything that the Bolsheviks promised, for instance, to keep with that that example, they did carry it out. They did bring democracy to Russia and all of this.

It's just that they so knew the system they were going to work with, that there was no choice, quite obviously, quite famously. So you can do the same. I don't think this is the black pill that he is making it out to be at the end here. I also think that people are starting to read things that they haven't read in the past. You know, I've heard Blake Masters talk about Ted Kaczynski. And yeah, I mean, for somebody who's running for Senate to do that is, you know, And I've actually seen a couple right wing voices talking about Yaqui.

So, sure, maybe these people aren't elites. I mean, I think, to me, a Blake Masters is an elite. I look at him as for better or for worse. I mean, we don't know who's, you don't really know it's in somebody's heart. But at least these are people who are quoting, you know, they're not quoting Jonah Goldberg. You know, they're quoting people who have, who think differently and also who are able to diagnose the problems of the day at a very deep level. Yeah, I entirely agree there. So, and not only do we have that what you just mentioned, and not only do we have

what I just mentioned there, but our side seems to be the only one actively courting competent people. I think, I never actually read or listened through this just because every single time the subject has come up, I've been in exams or midterms. I think that's the concept of the base draft. You know, get the highly competent people that agree with you to just either when they get kicked out of the industry or coerce them to leave the, or, sorry, convince them to leave the industry.

You know, you will have the only competent people left. And it doesn't matter how technically you're on-present. paper how well positioned your elites currently are if they're your enemy. If they're incompetent, they are just going to fall apart. If they can't play the game, if they cannot secure their position, if they can't use their position, they can't stay there, especially if you're better. Someone always is. So that's the sort of three things I would use to repudiate this hidden black pill that he just throws in at this very last paragraph of the book. Yeah, well, I guess in order to back up the black pill,

one thing I don't see happening in terms of this based draft is the Coulogs or the middle are really just not organized, not organizing at all. That's really the mission right now, I think, for people like us, is to actually get that organization kick started because it's really not happening. And sort of all agreeing on ideas and meeting and having streams like this isn't organization, right? I mean, it's sort of leading in that direction, but actual real organization

is when you have a group of elites actually leading some sort of minority and aggregating their ability to exercise influence, be that through money or some sort of social position they have, you actually have to have an elite utilizing that, collective people power and we really don't have that happening at all. We have a sort of intellectual elite who do streams like this, right? But that's a far cry from actually organizing any of the

people who might be listening right now. Right. At least not officially. We don't have people actively taking stock of what talents do we have, what resources do we have, what money do we have available, and also again, at least not officially, we don't have people saying on this date we are going to do this at this location. We don't have actual plans being organized and carried out and execute. If you took it so broadly,

you can say that's happening on these streams, but then the definition is so broad, it doesn't mean anything, because these streams aren't actually, we aren't showing up to these streams with the intention and talking about how we're going to win feasible power at this location at this time for this purpose.

That would be absolutely brilliant to do, but it's not quite what we're geared towards. It's not what audiences want and all that, and it's not our purpose here, quite frankly. So whenever we talk about we need people to actively organize, it means on that level, be at sort of at the project head, sort of like the grand planning, or at sort of like the, to use corporate language, the team level. You know, your five people, how do you keep this plan in motion? You know, what can the six of you do? So it's hard when you when the pagans and the Christians are fighting against each other and then the Protestants and the Catholics are fighting against each other.

We have a pretty good example of people who put their religious differences aside to come together and defeat a force in their country, well, except one religion that they that had to go. But they came together and they just said, well, we have a foe here. And it's more important than it's more important than our religious differences than we need to come together. And the more I see that, the fighting just over, oh, well, the pagans are like, well, look what Christians have done in the past. And Christians like, oh, look what pagans are done in the past. Look at the children that are being sacrificed now. On this note, I would put forward that it might be the case that certain enterprising Americans are actually working to tackle this problem more directly in the near future. So maybe pay attention to this fear if you're interested in that.

Very much so, yes. All right, I'll give each of you a chance to say a last word if you want and promote anything you want. So, Ryan, go ahead first. Well, just to summarize my thoughts about the book, and I probably could do a much deeper reading that doesn't have to be done in the course of a couple days or so, but I was genuinely very impressed, and I had a feeling I would be coming out and saying that, but it reads very clearly. There's very precise, very direct, the definitions aren't vague, and it's genuinely, I want to say entertain. painting, but it's fulfilling to read. So, great book, go read it. Easy to find, easy to pay for and contribute to a

person that most definitely is acting in your interest at least 95% of the time. That is a safe, a friend. And with that being said, though, with a lot of the things that are being articulated in this book,

you might go into it thinking that it is just a one giant black pill. You have to use shadowy means to fight these shadowy elites that are in these official positions that can't be assaulted. It's not that. There's a lot of a... He does a good job at making this just cold practicality. You can go home and use this, this book that we just read, to your advantage.

Not like in some sort of psychopathic Machiavellian sense, like go get a promotion at work. But, you know, you can use this to actually see what's going on in politics and do something. something yourself because a lot of the people that we have in our sphere would be absolutely perfect to do these political organizations that we keep talking about. We just don't get, probably because we don't know how to, we're scared to move first, something like that. It's not that difficult. This book makes that abundantly clear that you just need to be competent. We have competent people. You need to be tightly organized. That is definitely very possible. You need to have a political formula, that's not beyond us to come up with if we don't just choose one that's out there already.

So our situation is, it could be infinitely worse. We have everything we need. We have everything that we can organize with. All we just need to do now is act, really, act and plan and execute. So that's my final thoughts, really, especially since we're doing the conclusion. house. I must say that there was a moment about a third of the way through the book where I just thought, wow, this is an absolutely stellar book, which is actually pretty rare. This is an excellent scholarly work. It's well-sourced. The bibliography, the all-important bibliography is stuff full of references. Don't want the size of the book to see-view. It's small, but actually compressing the core ideas of all of these intellectuals into a short, readable form that really

delivers the core concepts from all these works these tens of thousands of pages of works is a huge achievement this is absolutely a book that you should read and buy I'm actually thinking about buying 10 copies and handing them out at my local city council because the book is really that good I mean it's only a little more than 100 pages you can read it in one setting if you want and it is actually amazing that Nima Parvini was able to do what he did in this book and compress all of these enormous texts into something very concise that has a very clear narrative from beginning to the end. So, yeah, I'm not just saying that because he's a friend.

It really is an excellent work. it might be in a technical level, the best book that Imperium Press actually has on their site. So, yeah, I found it remarkable. And thank Mike from Imperium Press for not only publishing this book, but for publishing a host of amazing books and being able to put works together into, you know, like De Maestros, Volume 1, to be able to put all the most important writings into one. He's doing amazing work over there.

Do you have anything to plug, Charlie? Oh, just check out my substack. I'm doing my booknote series and just publishing them on there regularly. I have uploaded a couple short videos to my YouTube channel lately. But, yeah, if you want to support me, financially, the substack is the place to go for that. And I do try to put out worthwhile content for the readers there. and I'm just finishing up my CIA theme, which I is basically all composed of books that Thomas 7-7 recommended,

which were all very good. So if you're interested in learning about the history of the CIA, I'm about to publish the fourth article, the fourth paid article on my substack in a week or two. So charlemagne. substack.com. Awesome. All right, gentlemen.

Thank you very much. joining me and this this was great love not as an insults at all this was way beyond my expectations this was friggin' amazing thank you