The Pete Quiñones Show - The Significance of Oswald Spengler and Francis Parker Yockey w/ Thomas777

Episode Date: February 19, 2026

61 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.From March 23, 2023, this is Episode 872 in which Thomas joins Pete to talk about two 20th-century political figures who had a great influence on him: Oswald Spengler and Francis Parker Yockey.Thomas' SubstackRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekina show. Let's talk a little bit about something different today, Thomas. How are you doing? I'm doing well. Thank you for hosting me. Yeah, we can talk about, we can change up the, we can change up the subject, definitely. Yeah, we'll get back to the Cold War on the next one. But I've read Yaki.

I started reading Spangler, one of the essays that you recommended. And it just speaks to me, really speaks to my heart. And I know that Spangler and especially Yaki are a big part of your thought and where you've taken a lot of inspiration from. So I thought we'd do a little episode. And I think they go together because Yaki uses so many Spanglerisms and seems to have really dug deep into his work and integrated into his work. So I guess let's start with the original. What is it about Spangler? that attracted you first.

Well, frankly, especially if the Cold War resolved, Spangler was one of these, was one of the only, what we consider esoteric kind of thinkers that he came to before the internet. There was a two-value, it was a bridge, but it was the two-value abridged version of the decline of the west that I think Harvard University Press had put out in the 50s, but have to double check. It's part of this whole series on political theory, like Hans Morgenthau, who's actually worth reading, and yes, he was part of that, he was part of that, Morgan'sel family.

And he was for a time, New York, state attorney general, and then, and then he was some kind of state department, Hancho. But in any event, I think it was Harvard University Press. There's this whole series on, like, footable theory, okay? And they had those at, like, my local, like, Cook County Branch Library, like, around, like, North of Glenfield. you. And I'd come across Spangler and stuff like In Storation Magazine and in like National Alliance Lit and stuff like that. And someone was over my head because I wasn't, I mean,

I was like a teenager and I hadn't really dived into Hagel yet and like Aristotle and things. But what really did not have me was again, you know, this was like literally as the Cold War was ending and there was discourse was really weird then because it was still semi-serious and you had serious guys who were kind of weighing in what the implications were, you know, of Soviet collapse and what kind of globalism would look like and, you know, what the implications were just kind of like across the board, you know, because everybody realized this was a profound event. This was like an apoccal event to see what we can still. Okay.

And I was kind of seeing out sources to try and put this in better perspective. And there was not much. I mean, there was this, I mean, admittedly, like I just said, you know, the tenor of discourse was it was elevated compared to the day. but there was not a lot of other than kind of like into history kind of midwit stuff there you know there wasn't a lot to put this in kind of especially for a young person when i started reading spangler what such that i could understand it and again it took me probably about like a decade to really get like a complete understanding of spangler but what jumps out of me is the symbolic psychological quality to cultural forms and what he called prime symbols of those forms and I've always been somebody who puts a strong emphasis on symbolic psychology, okay? And if you believe in true racial differences, I don't just mean, you know, like, at the biological level. I'm not talking about, you know, I'm not talking about, you know, the relative bone density of insular breeding populations. I'm not talking about, you know, people's ratio of fast-twitch, a slow-switch muscle fibers.

I'm not talking about their IQ. Like I'm talking about deep metacultural phenomenon that somehow some way insinuates itself into people's minds and conceptual horizons across generations. Okay. It's not clear exactly how that happens. Okay. It's a combination of biology. It's a combination of cultural learning. I mean, it's a combination of biology and cultural learning as well as other, I think, what I think of epigenetic very,

variables that aren't well understood. But Spangler really put this in perspective, okay? There are these prime symbols, these things that quite literally, you know, characterize, you know, kind of the core essence, the cultural forms. And these prime symbols resonate pretty much through everything that culture does, you know, especially in power political terms, because that's kind of the zenith of cultural activity in all kinds of ways. and it's the most critical because there's existential considerations there relating to racial survival.

But even everything from like the food, kind of foods they cook, you know, the kind of colors that they favor and like, you know, the clothing they wear and, and the kind of, you know, artwork they create. You know, this is basically how people understand themselves, but not just how they understand themselves. It's how they understand themselves in the world relative relative, but also kind of like what they view their sort of existential imperative as like, as a self-aware culture. I mean, that itself is kind of, not kind of, that itself is very much, you know, like a modernist, arguably postmodern sensibility, you know, people actually being like aware of things like cultural horizons, you know, cultural and conceptual horizons and prime symbols they're in, you know, and how these things are impactful in terms of, in terms of how, you know, people create or sustain, you know, all the phenomena that we consider separately to be like cultural activity. but the fact that you know like like

like awareness of that and awareness of it is like a discrete phenomenon that doesn't somehow like put people like outside of it okay um so and Spangler

accounted for that too but that's the reason why I mean initially that's like what really kind of like got me into um you know deep diving into spanglerian thought but also

you know Spangler was a one of the they really put them on the map, you get a renaissance in the 60s and 70s as people were kind of looking outside of, you know, the kind of international relations quantitative model for understanding, you know, cultural behavior.

You know, there's a lot. And like, I mean, that's the one time like Youngian theory, like came back into vogue too. I'm not comparing the two. I think there's some value to be found in Yon, but I think Spangler is quite a bit more of a rigorous thinker. But my point is, this kind of stuff came back into

vogue like decades later but you know spangler he really was like an inner war theorist okay and that's one the reasons why you know hitler wanted an audience with him you know kind of anybody is anybody in germany um you know people you know like like people on the far left you know like reactionary modernist types you know hitler himself you know spangler was a man about town because he was up on something people viewed as profound but beyond that i mean aside from you know kind of the the merit on its own terms of his of his sort of conceptual vision or its kind of theoretical model. You know, he was very much observing these things, you know, kind of like in their epoch, you know,

and he was very much, you know, if you want to talk about punctuated decline in crisis, and, you know, what, and kind of like, you know, a culture's self-conscious efforts to survive lead bare, not just amidst modernity, but amidsternity, but amidst, you know, like an existential crisis relating to, you know, a power political event of truly kind of like world, Sheeking proportions. I mean, that was the Great War, and that was a situation of the German Empire, and a lesser degree, you know, they're also Hungarian allies. But, you know, that, and there was not a lot of real scholarship about that

that could be viewed as kind of the era parent of people like FICPA, in my opinion. But beyond that, I mean, beyond Spangler's cultural resonance, like in his epoch, he was trying to answer the question like what was happening in Germany like what you know what there was there was some kind of coalition going on between you know the way people understood themselves you know racially and Berkeley and you know their ability to live in the world and uh you know this was both this this was both obviously like intrinsically bound up with the great war and that's why the great war happened but also just like internally it's not something it's not an accident that you know the bolsterisk revolution you know happened you know you know, just on the immediate heels of World War I. And it wasn't just because, like, well, this was, you know, a crisis modality, kind of attempted remedy, you know, as the Russian state kind of collapsed on itself, like, due to the fact they were losing the war. I mean, yeah, that was like an immediate catalyst,

but that was not why it was, that was not why it was, like, approximately emerging in absolute terms, okay? It was, these things came, these things emerged from the same, like, nucleus of causal variables or operative variables. and you know the inability of culture is to kind of like not just live historically but survive as the street you know like kind of modalities of human life and organization that really is kind of like the crisis of modernity for European men

like non-whites and non-Europeans that impacts them too in a huge way the Japanese were impacted just as much as Europeans were but what we think of now is the global south like they weren't really but like their kind of apocalyptic event was you know the fact that European culture kind of collided with their culture like while the Europeans

were enduring this process as well and that really really caused havoc that's a little more complicated but the fact is that you know now people are going to say like well smangler this wasn't anything new you know Hagle dealt with this

Nietzsche dealt with this and everybody like on the nose kind of way. And yeah, that's true, but Nietzsche was really talking about something different. Like, Nietzsche wasn't writing about, like, power political behavior and activity in, like, very concrete terms. I mean, Spangler appears, like, abstract, you know, to somebody who's, like, inundated with either analytic philosophy or somebody who's kind of like, you know, or somebody who's kind of like, habituated, like, you know, the kind of Anglo, like, rationalist tradition. But, I mean, Spangler is very much, it's like, okay, like, you know, kind of like abstract and,

and like erie and continental oriented as he was in philosophical terms he was dealing very much with like emergent again like existential crises like Europeans were were dealing with in the epon okay and that's not something that's not something

that philosophers generally did I don't I think a Spangler is it's kind of a pure like it's kind of a pure like pliable theorist who's who's who's who's kind of life's work was to identify you know the historical process

And his relationship to culture and race, okay, really large. I, I, I, I, I think the term philosopher is kind of a dumb term in the modern age, but I, I, I, I, I, whatever, I mean, even we accept it as totally valid. I think a Spangler is kind of in the terms that I just described, but bring it back a little bit, you know, so, free internet, you know, is like a 15, 16 year old kid, you know, um, you're, you're, you, you really, really, the tools you have. to kind of put things in perspective conceptually, you know, was what you could find at, like, you know, the public library or, like, what you could find, you know, by, like, like, cruising university libraries to grab what they had. So I realized, like, reading Spangler, like, I was, I'm like, okay, like, this is putting things in a perspective in a way that makes sense, you know, and this especially is understanding kind of like the tragedy of, you know,

the kind of the German situation in the 20th century. And from there, I'd run across, uh, name Francis Parker Yaki a whole lot owing in part to I was always reading Willis Cardo's stuff you know American Free Press which I still like periodically pick up today but um Cardo is kind of a he was kind of peculiar because uh in a lot of ways he was kind of just like a conventional like America firster like right wing type guy like anti-communist but he's the guy really put Yaki on the map um for uh you know for like American audiences of just like regular people. I mean, Yocki was doing some very strange

things with his life. I don't mean, I don't mean in punitive terms. I mean, he was probably a Warsaw Pact intelligence agent. He was like kind of the costume and vanguardist. Like Yonaki was trying to convince the man in the street of like the merit of his ideas. You know, he was distributed, I mean, I think the first

front run of Imperium was like 500 copies. And that, I mean, that wasn't just because like he wasn't flushed with money. He had no intention of like distributing this. you know, to millions of people. But at any event, Cardo, even though Cardo's personal kind of ideological

bearing didn't have anything to do with Yaki, he was one of the last people to see Yaki alive because when Yaki was arrested, Carter went to visit him because he knew who he was. It's not even very clear, like, how that is, but Cardo was a rich guy and he was pretty connected and he seemed to just like know things until the end of his life.

Like, he, I mean, that doesn't sound as well another episode that we could cover. like not a mystery of Willis Cardo. But if you read Cardo publication in the early 90s, whether it was like Noontide Press books or whether it was, you know, American Free Press, like for Andyaki, he was always popping up.

You know, and so I'm like, what is this all about? And in inspiration, they made the point that like, well, you know, Imperium is the sequel to, you know, Spangler's decline of the West and the hour decision and, you know, man in techniques and all these things are going to severally

has you like Spangler's you know like a diagnosis of you know the the 20th century um the inner warriors um if you will so i sought it out i found imperium at a use a bookstore they special ordered it for me because that's what we had to do in those days um and it started like diving into it and the case of yaki um yaki's polemic some people think it's overwrought to understand it Yaki was a you know he was he was this upper class uh he was basically like this upper class like kind of like Norashore dude you know he was born in Chicago although he lived a lot of his life in Michigan um you know educated in Catholic schools which at that time were kind of elite like at least where he went you know people then like wrote in a kind of like florid

language it wasn't a kind of like obnoxious like moronic soaring language like people attempt today but you know they had told the fact that Yaqui was a trial lawyer you know that that's kind of a way to understand his style which i understand like put some people off but i found it highly resonant because he was one of the few i mean he academically thought more like a european than he did you know an american and a lot of that always was cultural catholicism and not saying that punitively quite the contrary but so i mean he he conceptualized things a bit differently than somebody like i would in terms of you know what he initially found himself attracted to or instinctively rather than initially but uh

You know, Yaqui put, he kind of put the European experience in like an American context. He, you know, and tied this into like Hitler's significance, you know, to people in Anglophone societies, you know, who, who found themselves, you know, sympathetic to the access cause in very absolute terms, which at that time, you know, was like very much like a hot issue. When there was more people who felt that way than is often acknowledged, I mean, the, you know, the America First Committee was not. not something that, I mean, they had Broadway support. So, I mean, that was, I mean, Yaki's book, it was, I mean, reading Imperium part of it is, you know, Apologia for, you know, kind of America first in, like, deep philosophical terms. But also, you know, it puts in convex the then, you know, emergent Cold War and what, in Yaqui's view, was truly at stake.

And that was pretty revolutionary. and Yaki made the point again and again and one of his essays, which is hard to find now, it was called in the year 2000, Yaki predicted the Soviet Union would break apart just like tenanted.

He's like, this isn't sustainable. You know, the USSR, as we know it, is not going to exist in 50 years. But he's like, Russia will still exist and at some point we're going to have to deal with these people, number one. You know, like us as like, you know, Occidental white Westerners or whatever your preferred kind of descriptor is.

But also, you know, you said, you know, his point was that like Russia, you know, when it's, when the kind of artificial like modernist guys, you know, of communism, like sloths off of it, it's going to be truly emergent as, you know, a kind of antithesis element, you know, to the basically Judaic American, you know, um, um, you know,

uh, ethos. And, uh, that's very true. I mean, Yaki was not like a Rousseophile. In fact, in a lot of ways,

like, he kind of looked down on fobs. And I mean, that's clear. I mean, the guy was very much like a natural socialist. So, like, everybody, people, people like to be stupid on purpose about Yaki. And for any of the say that, like, he was sympathetic to quote Bolshevism,

which is, and recorded or that he was like some kind of like Rusophile who just like love was like sitting around like I don't know like reading the brother's Karamazov or something like that's not at all what he's saying you know like he was saying is that you know a truly unipolar world

where you've got you know basically kind of you know you truly got this you know you've got a single loci of a global power you know in America

and its kind of client regimes, all the which are basically, you know, kind of reduced to appendages of this, of this is literally like, you know, Jewish and kind of deteriorated, you know, kind of like post-cultural anglophone mode of, of, of, of, of, of, of,

you know, of, like, not as a cultural organization, but of, like, ethical disposition. You know, and that's, that's basically the worst possible outcome you can, imagine for culture. Okay. And really the only way to mitigate that

is to I mean Europe's got to stand with Russia for pragmatic reasons. But also again, like it doesn't matter if you like Russia or hate Russia. It's totally irrelevant. I mean that Russia is the natural counterweight to that tendency in all kinds of ways. Because Russia is basically anti-American and Russia

is basically like rabidly anti-Jewish. Okay. Is Russia anti-European? Yeah, they are. And I understand the Bolstrek Revolution is kind of like, you know, the kind of primitive indigenous, like, peasant Slavic element, you know, finding common cause and alliance with, you know, the cosmopolitan Jewish mercantile element to literally exterminate, you know, the European overcast that, you know, had reigned in Russia since the days of the Varangian roots. okay um but that doesn't matter again it's not there's not a risk of russia becoming this there is not it has not been a risk of russia becoming this you know truly global power since 1989 it's this idea that like well you know russia is just as bad as you know what we're dealing with now

that's not true at all that doesn't make any sense and not just because there's like power projection capability and potentiality but you know the reason why it's a reason why it's sounds like a trivial thing, but one of the short companies of Warsaw Pact command and control in terms of integrated forces, there was a short, like, Russian officers wouldn't bother to learn German

a lot of the time. You know, there was like literally like a language barrier between like them and like, you know, like, you know, like National Vox Army forces under their command. You know, I think there was like a distance there. You know, the, like if you want to understand how why the American kind of

cultural genocide, social engineering of Germany was possible. It's because like an Anglophone society, you know, a basic cosmopolitan European society, like America still was, like America was definitely in 1949 and still somewhat as today. That was Anglophone in character that's able to insinuate itself into, into German culture, almost like at the cellular level. I mean, people think of it being silly, but I think of it almost like the thing, you know, like the little horror movie. like that was just not possible for Russians

you know like the Soviet Union even if they said about even if you know even if that had been kind of like a dedicated effort there is like look we're gonna we're gonna truly kind of like russify you know the DDR it wouldn't have worked you know like it just wouldn't have you know you're talking about truly yeah in like border areas especially you know like you would yeah there were them people who were basically

like you know like like Slavonic Germans but generally like you wouldn't you wouldn't have had like every like you know every like east german school kid like just like casually learning russian by osmosis and like you wouldn't have had like you know german ladies decided if y'all wanted to look like the russian women in the magazines like you wouldn't i mean like that just would not happen okay and that stuff you better believe that happened in the boondish republic okay and it wasn't just because like oh america's got good propaganda and Coca-Cola you know i mean that's these are real things okay um so all of that taking it back to kind of your original query. I mean, that, that, that kind of is what being to, like, put the world in perspective to me. And I always knew there was something wrong. Post-Ragan, I think Bush 41 was a pretty, within the bound of rationality of, you know, kind of, of what American government is in Edvin since 1933.

I think Bush 41 was basically a serious guy and a good commander-in-chief, even if I've got nothing nice to say about him otherwise. even by 1991-92, there was this kind of like bizarre, triumphalist language creeping into American discourse that just made me wince. And, you know, I could tell that the culture has been coarsened. I don't just mean, like, you know, things becoming kind of like

more like lord and pornographic as part of it. But I mean, like, things that be becoming like less and less serious and just kind of like, just more and more like idiotic. You know, and it, um, uh, you know, I realize like a little kind of like, yawning chasm here where there should be like a culture and it's a couple of the fact that

I realize it's, I'm sure everybody's sick of hearing this and it, you know, some, I just sound like some cantangorous old guy telling people to counter blessings, but the early 90s in America really were like really fucked up. I mean, you remember that and, you know, like, rage waves is in the toilet, you know, like, I don't have to like think about like

where I couldn't, couldn't go. Like I'm talking about it was like Chicago hoods. Like, you'd like fucking get killed and like, you know, from getting white. And like, that's not that way. Remember the freaking, Special Forces was literally in Los Angeles. Oh, yeah.

In 1992. 2,000 Korean businesses were burnt to the ground. Oh, yeah, it's war in the streets. And the Marines, the fact of my rack who were fucking shooting it out with like the Grave Street crips and stuff. But, you know, like, it's not, like, bad people think things are today.

And then, like, I'm married in a bad place. You don't get me wrong. I'm not going to, like, if I, like, disembarking Garveyo Park over the bus, like, I'm not going to, like, get my ass like, fucking stopped into the cement. for being white. That's not going to happen. Okay. In

1992, that absolutely would happen. Okay, so it's like all these things, like my teenage mind, like, Yaki really put this in perspective. You know, I mean, there's not, I'm always telling people, especially youngsters, like, you can't, you can't find answers to the world, especially

like politics, like in books. And you can't. It's like the wrong way. It's not like a twist-nosed version to like, you know, political occurrences or something. But in theoretical terms, in a place like America where there's there's like bizarre signaling in terms of the propaganda

narrative that doesn't really make sense and is like extracted from any kind of concrete experience it is essential to have you know kind of like the pole stars as it were like the parameters rather like provided by you know like theoretical scholarship and yaki yeah I realize yaki's a polemicist I realize he's like a big national

socialist he's not and he doesn't like for it to be like oh I'm this objective kind of like diagnostician of historical processes. But, um, Yaqui really put everything in perspective to me like, okay, this is why the, this is why the problem in the ground with the races of the way it is in America.

You know, this is why the culture seems so coarse and just like moronic. This is like what it's trying to accomplish. You know, this is why like the leadership chaos seems so like flavoringly, like either just corrupt or disengaged. Because this is why at that time of Europe too, like, you know, Tudjman's Croatia.

Like Helmut Kov. Cole in a kind of one of the most singularly patriotic acts post war by a German chancellor. He immediately recognized the independent state of Croatia. You know, and then and Bush and Baker like hit the roof when he did that. But that, that's what prevented like, you know, some kind of, you know, some kind of contrivance of, you know, democratic Yugoslavia from enduring. And, you know, for a way, the two-termist Croatia was a national social state, literally. okay um so i mean that that came into perspective too and like why you know um like that where like that was that was that was literally unfinished business you know from 1945 um so i mean

that's kind of how i mean that's pretty much like how i came to yaki and then i um from there i've uh i've kind of moved beyond like based just about everything i've read i was reading around with a teenager, except for stuff like, obviously, like, Aristotle and, like, Hegel, but, you know, I continue to defend Yaki, particularly, and I found, I don't believe these, like, internet guys, especially in university types. I mean, a lot of these guys, they, they never read what I write. I think they, like, see the way I look or something, and they, they, they act, like, haughty and, like, act like I'm stupid or something. Then they realize, like, I'm not stupid, so they just kind of, like, attack, like, what I cite is, like, authoritative.

And it was, like, oh, Yawki's ridiculous. That's just, like, you know, you might as well read, like skinhead magazines. It's like, I don't believe you've read France as Yaqui if that's what your take. I mean, it's not, it's intellectually highly rigorous. Like I said, you can say his language is like overwrought in the way that frankly, you know, people who's kind of

introduction to, you know, like adult intellectual life of the practice of law, and that's unfortunate, but, like, you can't say it's like not serious or that it's like some stupid, like, racialist, like, rant or something. Like, it's not you know so I don't I believe a lot of like what's levied against yaki particularly by these like

kind of self-appointed like academic gatekeeper types I don't believe they've like even write imperium you know plus imperium like 700 pages you know it's like it's and it's it's pretty heavy stuff um you know like it's not just something you can like flip through like in a couple hours on a Saturday so I think a lot of like what people say you know to the kind of make fun of people who say, yuck, you don't think they really read it. But they pretend it's like reading like George Lincoln Rockwell or something. Like it's not, it's not at all. You know, like it's totally.

And I mean, the point of people, too, and this is a bit of a tangent, but, you know, the Falcon, the Snowman, which is a fascinating story in like a great film. And Chris Boyce, you know, the guy, I mean, he was a real guy. I mean, that movie really happened. And basically it happened in the terms presented. But he had a blog. in the 2000s when he got out of prison. He didn't get out of prison until like 2003 or something, you know.

But he, you know, and he didn't want to talk a lot about his espionage charges. But what he did say, and we did reiterate, was that, you know, he had no affinity for the Soviet Union or for communism at all. You know, and he's like, I never started identifying as a practicing cat was. You know, he's like, but America couldn't be allowed to just win the cold war in absolute terms. any more than the Soviet Union could be allowed to do that. And he was right. You know, boys had the energy

and kind of fervor of a young man and thinking he could change these things. Like, you can't. Okay, like, none of any one man, no matter what kind of, no matter what kind of secrets or intelligence he had access to, their military knowledge,

you know, could have, like, change the course of the Soviet Union. But his impulse was correct. Okay, even if it was like, even if it was like youthful romanticism, and it was ridiculous him to think, like, he could change the course structurally the way the wars up that was going. Like, he was right that something terrible would happen if America simply just, like, outright won the Cold War.

You know, there needs to be that kind of, I mean, I think the American government is 933 is literally evil, but even if somebody's got a softer or more charitable perspective on it than that, you know, agonistic pluralism as well, like keeps like, politics like productive and I and you know um it is what prevents uh you know the establishment of these uh of these um of these kinds of deteriorated uh like monocultural uh you know um mechanisms that that basically suppress culture where it's emergent in any in any form that's you know threatening this is quo i realize it was a lot there but that's the best way explain it all right i wanted to go back to spengler because in reading Prussian socialism, there was something he said in there that I think a lot of Americans and Westerners would have a problem with, especially since, you know, I think he wrote that in 1920. So he said that the Englishman judges himself upon his riches, and the Prussian judges himself upon his rank.

I mean, there's some truth to that. Yeah, I don't, Werner Sombard made a lot of the same points. And the way to understand, I mean, that's why to be a bit more charitable to the English, you know, the UK and England itself, it's at inception with a divided society, there wasn't some like single ethnos that became the English people. I mean, you know all of this, but you're an educated guy, but like, that's got to be this idea, this idea of like this homogenous kind of England and that's one of the ones is why I said it went especially

bizarre when you know this kind of cargo cult multiculturalism in England it's like England's always been like catastrophically multicultural they didn't even get a handle on this arguably until the 20th century you know like the experience of Prussia was totally different I mean Russia was this garrison

state um you know with uh like with that with barely any arable land no no natural really defensible, you know, border features, you know, it basically makes sense, and I don't disagree. And this, that's one of the reason why, like, you know, class antagonism has

conceptualized. And that's why the reason why it was off base for, for Mars to look at Germany is, like, this is where, like, you know, Marx's Leninism is going to be, you know, this is where, you know, communist is going to be emergent, and later, like, Lennon, like, attempting the same. the same enterprise, or attempting to implement that enterprise as theorized by Marx. Like, yeah, okay, Germany, like, obviously was going to be first over the line in terms of the productive forces that could facilitate, you know, like true socialism in a sense. In addition, my people like Marx, but the class antagonist catalyst is not really present in Germany. I mean, it's not to say, like, the KPD wasn't very strong, but again, like the KPD got defeated

and of, you know, what amounts to, like, a fair fight by the right in Germany. I mean, that didn't happen in Russia. Obviously, the opposite happened. Because, you know, in spite of the lack of techniques and infrastructure, the class antagonism was vicious. You know, and in the U.K., the reason the British was paranoid, absolutely paranoid about Bolshevism, they were for good reason.

You know, I mean, there was a, there was a, there was a, there was this basic class antagonism. I mean, to the point that it's, it's, like, you could argue that, like, in some ways, like, the what people kind of politely and you basically approve is like the English class

system. I mean, you're talking about people are basically, like, well, practical purposes, like, different ethnic groups, man, like, they, and genetically, I think they would dare out too in some sense, okay? Like, it's not, it's, that's quite a different thing than, you know, a place like Prussia where, uh,

like you really do have like a common culture and yeah i mean there's people you know there's people like higher rank and lower rank you know and there's obviously you know people of vastly disparate abilities but you don't have like one class of people concentrated you know in like one function like looking across these other people who are like literally totally different from them like they look different they talk different they act different you know like they their customs are different like it's just not that's not the case so i think that's basically true and it's also So it, you know, Stombarts and Spangler's old point, too, was that there's something, I mean, there, there is something, you know, cultures are kind of, some of a drift in history.

I mean, the way, I mean, the way they manage these, like emergent challenges, I mean, obviously, that's, like, volitional, but, you know, there's also this, this idea that, this idea like if we ignore like this kind of impulse towards socialism, it'll go away or if we like outlawed or if we, you know, or if we just, you know, or if we make it clear to everybody that, you know,

there's not a limited amount of wealth in the world and, you know, if they just develop the gumption and industriousness, like they two can become rich. There's not, this is not the way things work. You know, not even saying in like ethical terms. I mean, it's just like not, like, like man individually or

or, um, man, severally or collectively, you know, at, at the, at the cultural level and as regards

historical, um, enterprises is not, it's a very limited participant in, you know, and there's something, continental Europeans always understood that, or rather accepted that in a way that the English didn't.

Um, and it's not my purpose is here. I don't just like trash England is, you know, as, I know, it's a hobby for some people. particularly in our circles.

But this idea that, you know, oh, we can just author, you know, like, we just kind of, we can just kind of like author like a well-functioning society by, you know, resort to, you know, kind of like sound principles of economics or something like this. Or by resort, you know, like social science. Like that's actually a very, it's actually a very, it's actually like a very anglophone thing. I think that's part of it, all those things. But I don't fundamentally disagree. ego. You have it sometimes overstated. When you read a lot of the writings from the early 20s,

I just read Schmidt's political theology on the show, you see that they're struggling with this new world. You know, World War I changed so much. And now, you know, if you have a monarchy left, it's a parliamentary monarchy. It's a monarchy in name only. When Spangler's looking at Europe and he's seeing those changes. How is he how is he interpreting what he sees? I mean, the, well, I mean, he, it's, again, there's a common strain in Spangler and Schumpeter and in, um, and in Sombard. Um, the reason why socialism was on their mind, you know, Schumpeter was,

Shumpeter was probably the most like anti-socialist figure you can imagine. Like, they didn't say, they weren't saying. think socialism's an inevitability because oh this is the march of history and this is progress they're saying that once like X level of development is accomplished and when you have universal suffrage you know

people are going to like vote themselves more uh they're they're going to they're going to slay the golden goose by voting themselves in in the punery okay like as a culture how do you manage that you know it's like well if you have

what you know the Germans used to call the mention material to kind of mitigate that because you have industrious people, you know, you do whatever you can to, you know, kind of marshal those energies, you know, towards, towards things that facilitate, you know, competitiveness on the world market, you know, and that, you know, frankly, facilitate, you know, the ability to, to, to constitute a fearsome army that can appropriate what you can't produce at home. But this is an ongoing problem. And with the absence of a mitigating, you know, the kind of a fatalist, you know, the kind of a fatalistic, the understanding of the kind of like

fatalism of God's dominion, I mean, it's the way I look at it, I'm a Bible prod. Or, you know, if you're just some kind of agnostic, who nonetheless accepts, you know, that, you know, the process of history is something that man is not truly the power to shape or control.

You know, you've got you've got to become comfortable with like a certain amount of, like, you know, surrender to these processes. They're like greater than man is. Okay. The deterioration of government and this kind of, you know, from, you know, kind of the, kind of, you know, from kind of like, you know, the on the nose, like theological kind of symbolism of monarchy. And it's just kind of like a parliament that's like a glorified public works administration that, that has a very corrupting effect. And that's why Spangler, you know, he held out the Prussian state. Um, it's not like Spangler or some like military man or some, like, Prussian Martinette himself.

You know, he was, he was, he was kind of like the consummate, like, you know, burger type, uh, and he was, you know, like a bookish, kind of like timid guy. Like, what he was saying was that, you know, really the only state that can survive this process, you know, with an intact culture that is prone to, you know, things like, you know, um, sustaining its, it's, it's human quality with, you know, with appropriately hygienic craft practices, figuratively and literally. And that, you know, is, is capable of, you know, generating the wealth that's going to be, you know, rapidly kind of cycled through and consumed, you know, by the voracious monster

that is, you know, the, you know, the, the parliament, the Europe, the modern parliamentary, parliamentary democracy, you know, a state, a state with the Prussian ethersion, those extrapolated, you know, to potentially a continent-sized great space, great sovereign space would be what's required. And I fancically agree with that. I mean, that's why that is obviously, in my opinion, like what got Hitler's interest in Spangler's stuff. You know, Hitler looked at maps all the time for the time he was a little child.

like literally until he died until like literally like the week he died he always had his maps and his card pencils and you know he was fixated on

geography and you know implications therein both tactical and strategic as well as you know culturally and informative capacities

but heller didn't sit around reading like like geopolitics all day you know he was in stuff like show up an hour um he was into like I mean, it was his favorite, like, philosopher, you know, and he was into, he was into, like, art theory, he got to stop, like, I've never heard of before.

You know, and he was into, like, you know, he was into, like, you know, hero epics and German histories. But it's not like Spangler was the kind of thing you ordinarily would have just, like, been, like, oh, this is great. You know, it got his attention, not just because Spangler, again, was a guy who had a lot of clout in the inner war years. It's because, like, that what I just described, like, that is what spoke to Hitler. and my basis for that is not just a table talk but it's the December 11, 1941 speech to the Reichstag

and that's an important speech for all kinds of reasons but Hitler Hitler's talking about the Prussian experience in in 1813 but he's not he's not saying the Prussian kingdom he's saying we he's talking about the German Vogue is synonymous

with the Prussian state okay and this was in Hitler was the Habsburg, Austria saying this. I mean, that to me, that it's about outside the scope, but that's what convinces me, that's what convinced me of what I just said. But

that's basically Spangler's notion. I mean, there's a lot more there, like in his body of work, but in terms of what he, in terms of this prescription for how the state should be configured and what

it's, uh, and what it's sort of like guiding, uh, ideas should be, you know, that's, that's what he's getting at, and that's what he's concerned with. And that's what everybody was concerned with. And, you know, yeah, I mean, that's Chumpeter and Sambart. Because, like I said, I mean, they, they were fundamentally concerned the same, fundamentally concerned with the same thing is because these are questions of existential imperative

significance. Let's, um, let's do Yaqui now. and you already mentioned this, and this is probably the thing that anyone who finds out something about Yaki wants to question or wants to use to dismiss him. It's his embracing of the Soviet Union and his reasoning behind that. and I think a lot of people look at it, would look now and look at the world and be like, if somebody's honest, they'll be like, well, I think he was ahead of his time and his thinking in this, but it's still really hard because, you know, we've gone through this whole, we've had 75 years of the Soviet Union was our enemy. I mean, we grew up in that way.

We grew up that way. The Soviet Union was our enemy, you know, well, if bombs start dropping hide into your, desk kind of crap. So by Yaki saying that the Soviet Union was, that he was supporting the Soviet Union at that point, you know, can you call it a little more into detail his reasoning behind that? Well, yeah. I mean, first and foremost, in kind of most, in the most basic terms,

and the most basic structural terms, it's what I said when I referenced Chris Boyce, with nothing in common with Yaki, but I but in in in in in Jewish in geopolitical terms that that was that that was that that was that structural issue okay um an American an American a hegemon would lead to what you see today you know it would lead to the social engineering of of race out of existence other than the Jewish race um as a matter of course like literally at a debate that's not something conspiracy theory that's literally baked into the American ideology okay

And even with that not the case, you don't want, in a 21st century, you do not want a Pax Romana in a 21st century world, okay? You just don't. That's not, you do not want great power monopolization of global resources, like singular great power monopolization of global resources. That's going to be a tyranny no matter what. So just an absolute, like, apolitical terms, structural terms is that. secondly Yaqui always Yaqui's all big point

was that he said that like and then again part of this is kind of like his cultural Catholicism but I'm not saying that punitively at all Yaki's point was like

look you've got to look at yourself white Americans need to look at themselves as basically like Europeans who live in the new world okay because if you don't you're going to make compromises

that ultimately like write you out of history okay and that's what happened in 1933 um New Deal America and beyond, it's singularly anti, it's anti-Western, it's anti-white, it's anti-European, and like, why wouldn't it be? It views all these things as an alien to itself, okay?

It's basically Jewish, such that it has, like, a cultural orientation at all. Like, the people who constantly do it who aren't Jewish, like, they might as well be because they don't care. And, like, what they don't view is hostile. They simply have no interest in preserving, okay? The only way Europe can survive is Europe has, to join with Russia. Now, Yacht would have preferred, you know, that to have occurred with, you know, um, you know, the capture of Moscow in December 1941 because that didn't happen. Well, we have, you know, we have the world that we have, not the world that we want. So the only way that

Europe is going to throw off the American yoke is by some kind of con for it with Soviet Union. and after 1953 he said that wouldn't be particularly in city it's like yeah Soviet occupation is a tyranny but you know it's like Elin de Benoit it's a tyranny of the body you know whether Stalin intended to do this

for sectarian and ethnic reasons or whether he just did it for practical reasons because these people constantly with a threat you know to not just his own mandate but the enduring power of the party Stalin literally purged Jews from leadership in the communist party of Soviet Union. Okay. And he did so in a way that was fairly above board.

That was, that was Yagi's point about the Prague trials, okay? Every, I mean, out of the Prague trials were, I mean, of a satellite regime, you know, the satellite regime that was the subject of it, but it was not actual either, because that was kind of like a test case. every one of the doctors plot defendants was Jewish but one. Okay? It's like, so we weren't even trying to hide was underway here.

You know, just like, we don't care. Like, these people are, these people are, their fifth columnists, like,

they're going to die, you know. So, okay, yeah, like in Germany, um, a Germany in 1950 or 1960, you know,

uh, in Concord with the Soviet Union. Yeah, the people there were, we're going to, they'd have the heel of Stalinism on their neck. But, you know,

they wouldn't be being genocited out of existence. you know, like churches were going to be replaced with Holocaust museums, you know, like black immigrants were going to be flooded into the cities. You know, like pornography wasn't going to be flooded made available basically for free. I mean, like this was a lot, lot less insidious, okay?

Like being poor and having, like, to deal with a political police force, that's not a small thing that's fucked up. Nobody would say that's good. That's better than what I just described, okay? And not only is it better in day-to-day terms in civilizational terms, you can survive that.

You cannot survive the other. Okay? That was Yaqui's reasoning. Finally, again, Yaki was like Kennan. He's like, look,

the Soviet Union is not going to exist in 50 years. It's definitely not going to exist in 100 years from his then present in 1950. He's like, you know, when the Soviet Union's gone, there's still going to be a Russia, they're still going to be in Germany,

you know, there's still going to be a Europe. You know, it's, you know, So this idea that, you know, this idea that like, you know, if we capitulate, if we capitulate the Soviet Union now, you know, that the world's going to become this, you know, is going to become this kind of like,

this kind of like giant glug hell, you know, is, you know, that's facile. I think some exception to, I mean, I don't want to get into my own view on this because it's, it's outside the scope. But, you know, his point was that, you know there's nothing

less cosmopolitan than the truly like kind of like Russian cultural soul okay so even if you have like a Europe and particularly in Germany like dominated by Russia in perpetuity you know gradually like they're going to slop off you know either the appearance of communism

and even appeal to it as some kind of you know ration like purported rationale you know for what for what the regime does you're going to be left with days this kind of like this kind of like nationalist

Russian regime that you know might be brutish towards the Germans but it's not going to be it's not going to be trying to racially exterminate them out of history and it's not going to be able to insinuate itself into the culture like no like in Russia not do that they can't do that

you know again like you were not going to see like Russian kids all just kind of spontaneously speaking Russian because they view the Russians as the higher culture you weren't going to see like you know German women like decided you want to dress like you know like Russian women. You're not going to find, you know, German saying, like, you know what, like, you know, our own intellectual canon is just inferior to that

would be produced by the Russians. Like, I'm not trashing Russia, but this is, this is a fact, okay? Like, that would not happen. And also, again, I mean, I use the example, which seems like a kind of narrow, narrowly focused example of, you know, Warsaw Pact commanding control and having certain challenges, you know, because there was like language barriers. I mean, that's, that part of it was just like a Russian, thing. I'm not going to learn German. You know, like, I'm the Occupyer. I'm the boss. You know, I don't care about these people. Fuck them.

I mean, it really is kind of like a crude show. It isn't what a Russian do. I don't even think that's pretty bad. I'm kind of the same way in my own like fucking Yankee pecker would sort of way, okay? I'm not some fucking, I'm not so many things like being cosmopolitan is this great thing, okay, at all.

But whether it's good or bad is incidental, like, that's not what the Russians are like. That's not how they do things. Okay, so that was Yaqui's point. And, you know, at the end of the day, I mean, he was, he was right because it's like, even if you, you can look at the big rebuttal of that would be like people, you know, the kinds of people who would say, like, well, look at what the, look at what the soy did in the colored world.

You know, they were radicalizing all these people against the West. But like, what was the West, what was the West then? Like, the West was, they, they were open borders. They were, you know, we've got to, we've got to eliminate. you know, this leg of equity between the sexes. We've got to destroy these parish communities where people are insisting on retaining their own kind of purity of ethnos and cultural practice.

You know, we got to, you know, we got to create this kind of like global model culture where it's, you know, like, we're beyond race. Like the Soviets were doing all of this. Yeah, okay, I don't think it's good that the Soviets who were deployed, you know, in the Cubans were deploying and forced of, you know, it's a

Africa to annihilate, you know, the Boer Republic. But, I mean, okay, in the grand scheme, what I say is there's out, okay? There was Washington wasn't his far, far, far, far more radical, far more actually communistic, far more insidious, far more destructive

than Moscow ever was. Okay, and that was the case in 1950, okay, as it is today. That was Yaki's case. Let's, uh, let's finish up with us. so Yaki gets caught, he gets thrown in jail, and he ends up killing himself. Indeed.

Why do you think he did? I think Yaki never, and H. Keith Thompson, who was his good friend, and even like decades after the fact, I mean, Thompson, the Thompson realized that he was a witness to history in some sense. So, I mean, he, he, he was relatively open with interviewers about his own life and his own kind of experience. I think he always played kind of coy about Yaqui. Like, Yaqui had no visible source of income, but you know, according to his friend, he was always dressed well, and he never had a lot of money, but he was never, like, starving. You know, and he, uh, it's pretty clear to me that, you know, he was,

uh, that he was in the East Block intelligence asset. I believe that he made contact with Otto Reamer, um, and the socialist Reich Party. when he was briefly a war crimes prosecutor and he deliberately lost his cases or tried to for like lesser war criminals but he wanted to, he was held by trying to get to Germany and he did

that's why he wanted to go there in my opinion I believe he made kind of the guys like Reamer you know Reamer was Reamer had the view that I mean I mean you know the Socialist Right Party was they favored alliance with the Soviet Union.

I mean, that was their whole that was their whole Raisin de Metro. We've got to skew the what remained of the German nationalist right towards, you know, away from NATO. But it's, uh, I believe that through Reamer, he got introduced

probably to the probably to elements of of East German intelligence and definitely to KGB types. And I think that that was Yaki's, I think that was Yaki's role. And I think part of what Yaki was doing was he was working on neutralized, like him and like everybody's so deployed as he was, it was basically their job like neutralized with the allies are trying to accomplish with their like kind of operation gladio notions. You know, like the Warsaw Pact was basically swinging like the European like patriotic right and like the fan. Ash it's right, like, toward their camp for the reasons I just said.

And Washington and people like Dulles especially, they were very upset about that. Because obviously, like, this was a key part of kind of like their strategy for if there was a general communist assault on Europe. You know, their stay behind element was these guys. Like, Yaki was flipping to the Soviet side, you know, stuff like that. And he also, we have, Yaki had like four or five. different passports in different names he was arrested like and this wasn't like today where you know if you know the right people you can get that done like you know could print a passport in 1950 you know like a you couldn't do that on your typewriter i mean i i believe that very is very clear

do you think from reading bolton do you think there's a chance he was originally intelligence for the united states he goes awall in the beginning of world war in the beginning of war in the of World War II, disappears into South America and then comes back and he doesn't do any time or it doesn't seem that he's even reprimanded, or if he is reprimanded, it's a slap on the, it's a slap on the wrist. I mean, it's possible, yeah. And he also, he wrote a, he wrote a speech or two for Senator Joe McCarthy, which, you know, the subject of the speech was like, why, you know, we need to rearm Germany and, like,

embrace Germany as, like, allies. It's really interesting, I think. But, like, why would Joe McCarthy, like, know who Yaki was? I mean, McCarthy was, like, a big deal then. I mean, like, his fall from grace proverbially was dramatic and profound. But, you know, McCarthy was, one of the right-in-the-left still, like, burns him an effigy today. It's because he was, like, a big deal. So it's like, why does this big shot senator or all this kind of, like, random, like, right-wing lawyer?

Like, that doesn't really make a lot of sense, you know? So, like, yeah. So, I mean, there's a very good chance. Yeah, definitely. All right. Let's leave it there. And we'll come back to the Cold War on the next episode. And I think this had Cold War implication.

So that's good. Oh, yeah, absolutely. And we can come back to this on another date. Drop some plugs and we'll end this. Yeah, for sure, man. Thanks. For the time being, I'm still on Twitter. I think that's probably going to come to an end soon.

So I behoo people to follow me on Substack. You know, my substack is, real Thomas 777.7.7.com. You know, there's like a whole like, there's a whole like chat feature there. You know, people are pretty active on. I'm on Tgram. You know, I still am at the time being on Twitter

for the time being on Twitter at Real underscore number seven HMAS 7777. I'm working on the channel still in earnest. I'm going to start shooting dedicated content for it. by the first week in April. So I mean, be looking for that. It's Thomas TV on YouTube.

Once I start uploading like real original content, I'm going to start saturating like Odyssey and other stuff. But right now I'm on YouTube so people can find us and realize that that's not long because of the earth

once they figure out what I'm doing. But I will hip everybody to that like on my substack because I have been doing and stuff. And that's all I got for note. Well, thank you very much. Thanks for this. No, thank you, man.

Take care. Yeah.