The Pete Quiñones Show - The World War Two Series: Episode 1-5 w/ Thomas777 - 1/4

Episode Date: October 18, 2025

5 Hours and 22 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.Here are the first 5 episodes of the World War 2 series with Thomas777 in one audio file.Episode 1: The Rise of the National Socialists in the Weimar Republic/Germany w/ Thomas777Episode 2: The Invasion of Poland and the U.S. Enters the War w/ Thomas777Episode 3: FDR and The New Dealers Push For War w/ Thomas777Episode 4: The Origins and Rise of Winston Churchill Pt. 1 w/ Thomas777Episode 5: The Origin and Rise of Winston Churchill Pt. 2 - The 1930s w/ Thomas777Thomas' SubstackThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

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Because this is not just for us. for us. It's for future us. To find out more, contact our smart energy services team at ESB.a.e. forward slash smart energy. Welcome back to the show. How are you doing? I'm doing very well. Thank you for having me back. It's always a pleasure, particularly so soon back to back. I really appreciate it. Well, I want to have you on a few times, especially for this one subject, because I know it's your specialty. It's of great interest to you. And World War II is absolutely fascinating. I don't even think, well, we can even bother getting into the Pacific at this point. Let's stay in Europe.

But in your, where do you start? Most people, when they, a lot of good historians start with the Treaty of Versailles and say the Treaty of Versailles, basically, basically was the foundation for what led up to World War II. So what's your take on that? That certainly is what created the political culture of Weimar. So, I mean, that was an essential catalyst, but it wasn't the sole proximate cause. I really, it was the Bolshevik revolution, which was an international phenomenon. on like I know I don't want to I don't want to jump the gun or go too far afield into a kind of theoretical topic that's not totally material to what we're what's right in front of us but um you know I say Ernst Nolte a lot because he he gets into the the psychological as well as kind of the metahistorical context to the war and a lot of people don't like him for other reasons I'm not going to flesh at all those reasons right here not because it's controversy, but because again, I don't want to...

I've read two of his books. I think I understand why. Yeah, yeah. But the people who, uh, people who, people who attack him, one of the things that they emphasize is they say like, well, you know, the Russian Revolution, that was happening in, you know, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, you know, to a lesser degree. And, you know, in these kind of frontier territories, the Baltic, it's like that, I mean, it's not really true. I mean, yeah, obviously. I mean, those were primary theaters, but, you know, in Bavaria, there was an actual communist revolution. And in Berlin, I mean, the communists were fighting the Stahlhelm and the Free Corps in the street, quite literally.

It's a really, really stupid movie. It was this TV movie from about 20 years ago. It's got Peter Sturmier as Captain Rahm, which is kind of cool, but it's called Hitler Rise of Evil. I mean, that's that's an overwrought title, if there ever was a way. and rise of evil. But there's a scene in Munich where the communists are literally shooting it out with Peter Stormera's Rahm

and these Stahlholm type guys. And that's not the Hollywood stuff. I mean, that really happened. You know, it was a civil war situation. So the, you know, the national socialist, I mean, yeah, like that was, the only reason there were, like the Treaty of Versailles and the fact,

fact that it being clear, you know, that the allies weren't really interested in creating some kind of workable political order that the, you know, combatant states, or the former combatant states could live with. They were, they were basically interested in looting Germany. I mean, yeah, that was essential. But national socialism, to understand national socialism and understand the 20th century generally you've got to understand communism and you got understand the fact that there's a revolutionary paradigm underway and like noldi said it was like a european civil war was underway and and that and that's so i mean yeah but i but again the the treaty conditions were such that i mean that that should not be this that should be indisputable

to people i mean wherever they fall in the issue or whatever however even if they read a a very reputative view of Germany. You know, and I mean, incidentally, too, that's, I've gone to, I've gone to bad for Wilson before, not because I think Wilson was a good man, or because I think he, he was this great president or something, but you can't really hang responsibility for Versailles and, and the, the kind of disaster of the, of the, of the punitive piece on Wilson. You know, Wilson's 14 points, I mean, that might seem kind of highfalutin and silly from a real a political perspective, but Wilson didn't want to punish Berlin.

He was disgusted by the Treaty of Versailles and he threw his hands up and said, you know, he, he, he, he, because he realized that, you know, he basically, he basically bailed out quite literally, you know, the, like London and Paris and then they paid him back by saying, like, okay, you know, now's our chance to loot Germany and not remedy the, the conditions that gave rise to the war. in the first place. So yeah, I mean, that's correct. I don't really I don't really, but at the same time, it's important not to reduce things just to that. Like I've heard, I know people like Ian Kirschaw, they act like Adolf Hitler was, what's some kind

of con man who just capitalized on these kinds of grievances that were kind of middling. I mean, first of all, Vimeo really was tailored to wreck the German economy. Like, that was a point. It wasn't just this misunderstanding or, you know, this kind of this kind of somewhat

objectionable peace that you know these crazy german chauvinists just decided to fix it on i you know the you're gonna you're gonna you're gonna provoke some kind of you're gonna provoke some kind of hostile reaction if you impose something like that on a people i mean and i and plus i mean why would you do that the uh you're not even if you're even if you hate the germans you don't care or you just don't care about their fortunes as a people i mean why you're if you're going to subject people to a starvation regime. I mean, you're, you're not, you're not looking forward to a workable piece. You're going to just generate structural instability. So yeah, I agree. Yeah. It seems that Yimar, one of the easiest ways to destroy it was the way they always do it

through the banks. Well, it's also, the thing with World War I is this. I, I object strongly. People, are always uh people think they're being smart you know when they they say smedley butler and i'm like yeah you know war is just about you know wall street like it's really not true i mean wars are bad for business generally the fact that the fact that the fact that there's firms and individual men who find ways to profit from war or the fact that there's guys like dick cheney and like haliburton who where that's basically their mo i mean that you know there's guys there's guys who have some kind of who run the make in in all kind of sectors of political life that But on its face, you know, Wall Street is never shit hot to go to war because there's some way to make money. But at the same time, like crazy as it might sound to us, I mean, because we take kind of informational awareness for granted.

There was a strong financial aspect to the Great War as regards to America. And JP Morgan, they extended a huge amount of unsecured credit to the British crown. And the British had essentially said this diplomatic delegation that also had these kind of high-flying banker types with them. And they'd approached Wall Street in 1915 when it being clear that kind of a quagmire was sitting in. You know, and they secured all this unsecured, they secured this deal with a huge unsecured line of credits. Basically saying like, look, you know, that we, you know, in just a few months, you know, will have broken the back of the German war machine and then we're all going to get paid. And then it began clear that wasn't going to happen.

And JP Morgan essentially got on the phone quite literally for the telegram, telegraph, as it were, probably the Colonel House and Wilson and said, you fix this right now. You know, you cannot, you are not going to let London lose this war and you're not going to let us eat this loss. I mean, that wasn't the sole reason why Wilson went to war, but, I mean, that was a big point. part of it. You know, so I mean, it was, there was a whole lot of, there's a lot of very, very corrupt stuff going on and that was, and it was a little more opaque than what happened in the Second World War. Like, people lie about the Second World War a lot and say crazy

things about it. And, you know, there's ethno-sectarian narratives about it that are negatively political, but it's, it's more, it's more kind of clear cut. Like, the Great War doesn't really make a lot of sense. It was a strange example of, uh, of, of, of security paradigms, kind of not really matching up with the technology that they, like the killing technology I mean of the battlefield. And it was like a basic failure of deterrence. I mean, that's why it's really interesting, frankly. You know, and I genuinely think, you know, the last, we take for granted because, you know,

the war between the States, like really, really, really screwed things up in America for decades. You know, it did. like America didn't really normalize until the turn of the century. But Europe, Europe after Waterloo didn't really fight any major wars. I mean, there's a Crimean War, but, I mean, that was kind of localized in theater, like, in literally the Crimea. You know, and there was the Franco-Prussian War, which, you know, was a, like, this kind of incredible, you know, German victory. I mean, I realized Prussia wasn't Germany yet, but, you know, the modern German state is the Prussian state until

1945 in my opinion but point being it's not like Europe had fought some like heavy heavy conflicts in the in the 19th century and we're developing a sense of you catch them in the corner of your eye distinctive by design they move you even before you drive the new Cooper plug-in hybrid range for mentor Leon and Terramar now with flexible PCP finance and trade-in boosters of up to 2000 euro search cooper and discover our latest offers cupra design that moves finance provided by way of higher purchase agreement from vogue

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and future-proof their operations because this is not just for us it's for future us to find out more contact our smart energy services team at ESB.aE forward slash smart energy of what that modern battlefield is going to look like and how it's going to impact, you know, national economies and things and how it was going to create shortages and how it was basically just going to slaughter people.

I mean, so that was part of it. I even, I think the German I command, I think the Kaiser Reich, and this isn't just because I've got a warmer view of Germany than I do the other. their combatant states. I think he's a disputable. They had a better idea of how things were going to develop, and that's one of the reasons why Holvig, the chancellor was beside himself when it became clear that France was going to go to war.

Because I think he, despite he wasn't any kind of military man, but he knew that some kind of slaughter was going to happen. But I think, you know, if you read the kind of internal memorandums, I mean, what amounts of internal memorandums and kind of internal, debate and discussion in London and in Paris.

And to a lesser degree, like, within the, within the Tsar's kind of inner circle, but that's a bit more complicated. These guys really didn't get it. They thought this was kind of, they thought it was going to be kind of a brushfire affair and that, or they thought that, you know, they, they thought that, you know, the Germans just basically wanted to, like, force, for some kind of concessions on their, on their key, on their key demands. And, but, you know, okay, well,

you know, we'll just fight for a little while and then, you know, we can come to the table and position of strength. That's not, it's not at all the way the Kaiser Wright saw it. And they certainly didn't think that they were going to lose, you know, a million people. But they, they didn't think it was, you know, it's going to be this, you know, four year long, just, you know, kind of like endless destructive affair. So, yeah, that's a good point. So what most people know about Wimar is there's two things. One, that it became really degenerate and morally. And two, the money supply got inflated to the point where people were, you know, need a wheelbarrels full of money in order to buy a loaf of bread, which is probably, you know, just lore.

But I hope it's lore. But the, what do you see as, what's your understanding of what was going on there? I mean, like I said, the The, the, uh, like we're talking about, um, you know, uh, but was it like, I mean, it almost seems like, you know how now we have these people, it's like, oh, we have to teach kindergartners about queer theory. Yeah. Things like, I mean, it's like, it, it almost seems when you think about it, when you look back

and you, if you know anything about the history of Prussia, and then you go forward. to Weimar, it's like that looks planned. That looks like somebody injected that into there on purpose. Even the degeneracy, even the whole idea of siphoning and looting the country, which I think in the modern day, we can talk about Ukraine. It seems like it's the same exact thing. But it seems like that was all planned, you know, that it was, sure, a lot of people are going to loot a lot of countries. But, I mean, they made sure that it was, that it was going to be catastrophic because they not only defeated them, you know, destroyed their money supply, but they destroyed their morality. Yeah. And it's also too, the starvation blockade endured for one step of the cessation of hostilities.

With regard to the kind of moral deviancy, yeah, I mean, it wasn't as centrally orchestrated as, uh, it wasn't as centrally orchestrated as, uh, as was the case post-1945 in the Bundes Republic, the Bundes Republic, and particularly West Berlin, was flooded with pornography after the Second World War. And that, if you read Wilhelm Reich, he was this German-Jewish psychologist. He wrote about that, about breaking the moral foundation of people, in order to essentially make them malleable.

I mean, so this is more about boring than people think, but that there definitely was intentional subversion in that regard, but it's like I generally agree with E. Michael Jones what he wrote about this, and I'm not going too far afield because it's material to what we're talking about in a very direct way. You know, E. Michael Jones always coming back to the idea that, you know, look, like, Marquis Assad was actually, he considered himself to be a political thinker. You know, he wasn't just this, he wasn't just this kind of sick individual, sort of degenerate aristocrat,

like writing pornography and writing about sex, because that's what kind of decadent aristocrats do. I mean, yeah, that is what they do. But he was widely publishing this stuff because his notion was that, you know, well, you know, the foundation of what I don't like in France and in Europe generally is, this kind of thrown and alter sensibility where, you know, you've got this, you've got this kind of, you know, you've got this, you've got Roman Catholicism propping up the seat of sovereignty and the monarchy. And it derives its authority, it derives its legitimacy from a claim that it reflects providential design. And the basis of that is the, the preeminence of reason over passion and irrational things. So it wasn't just that, you know, Desaude. didn't like females and he didn't or that he was a statist and homosexual or that he you know he wanted he wanted to kind of screw with people's morals and horrify them like he wanted to do all of those things but his idea was also that well if i can get people to say you know why why do i want to

privilege reason over over my passions i just want to you know i just want to do things that feel good or i want to pursue you know sexually deviant stuff or why why should i be a family man when i can you know, visit prostitutes or, you know, why, why would I want to be involved with women anyway when I can, you know, go go with men and just kind of do whatever I want. You know, I mean, that, this idea that sexuality and, like, social morals, like, aren't political, like, that's nonsense. So, yeah, I mean, that was part of it. And it also, you know, I mean, people in Germany were, it wasn't just, like, far right guys and stuff. I mean, people were very cognizant these things in those days, you know, like not because they were a bunch of prudes or they weren't,

you know, worldly or something. You know, if I think people then were like a lot more worldly than now. It was like life and death was kind of like in their everyday life. And particularly then, you had, you know, you had millions of guys knowing about in Germany who kind of come, you know, they'd spent their formative years, you know, in the military. You know, it's not this idea that Germany was this provincial kind of place and they freaked out about sex. Like, that's ridiculous, obviously but they you know

so not only German they saw what was going on in terms of that kind of subversion but it's also you know the the national socialists are better or worse they

they were not conservatives and they didn't pretend to be and you know the reason why speaking of Rom the reason why guys like Rom were in the ranks particularly in the revolutionary phase you know it's like Hitler said you know

when people objected to some of these characters being in his milu he's like you know yeah Ron might be a degenerate guy but he's great under fire and I think Hitler said you know the SAA is a tough fighting force

it's not a finishing school for young ladies so I don't give a shit what these guys do on the raw time as long as they're loyal and they're willing to fight and so my point is that it's not like Hitler and it's not you know or even Strasser or any of these guys

It's not, the national socialism become popular because these guys are a bunch of, you know, kind of moralizing conservatives. And it's not like they, it's not like they, you know, just fixated on pornography and socially deviant things because they, they were these uptight conservatives. Like, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with conservatism or objecting those things. Obviously, those things are bad. My point is that this stuff is kind of so extreme and so nakedly political. I mean, that's why the national socialist were, we're reacting. acting to it so strongly because, you know, it was, you know, I mean, to, to Jones's point, I mean, that kind of stuff is always political. It's never, it's never truly just secular,

never truly just, you know, incidental to political occurrences, but it was, it was so, it was so nakedly tailored to attack the kind of prevailing social order and, and things that it became a priority to remedy it to the kind of the kind of radical right the radical you know national socialist right so yeah I mean that's that's very true you had already mentioned that you talk about rom fighting in the streets basically have civil war in the streets in uh in Germany in the 20s so how does the why mar how do how do the national socialists um come out of this and what's the direction in the 20s. I mean, my opinion is that

Germany was a, Germany was doing a little bit better. Gustav Stressman, he found a way of kind of mere compliance with the reparations, payments. And he was also able to draw it. Germany, even at its worst,

you know, people have confidence in its ability to produce and get a return on their investment. So Stressman was a, you know, chancellor. He gets kind of a bad rap. I'm not saying he was a good man or that he was like on the side of his own people like the way he should have been but ready for huge savings will mark your calendars from november 28 to 30th because the leadle newbridge warehouse sale is back we're talking thousands of your favorite leadle items all reduced to clear from home essentials to seasonal must habs when the doors open the deals go fast come see for yourself

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You can't just like dismiss him as this like race trader or a bad guy. And he understood economics very well. And Schumpeter actually praised him. I'm a big Schumpeter guy. I mean, not that I am some kind of authority on economics, but point being, um, stress was able to garner a fair amount of direct foreign investment. for an investment such that it i mean there wasn't the kind of conflict interdependence in those days that we did granted today but the the national economy was bouncing back to a degree uh germany

was kind of beginning to come to terms a bit with uh with london not so much with paris um but then but then the but then the 1929 financial crisis happened collapse happened rather it wasn't a crisis and that threw that through that through germany into a tailspin in a lot of ways and all the kind of ground need games seemed to have evaporated overnight. And that really put the National Socialists back on the map. And plus the international situation was getting more critical to. You know, it became, I think it was around any 29, 1930 that it started to become clear. I mean, even though the Soviet Union was nothing like it was 10 years subsequent.

but it became clear that the Soviet Union was becoming a superpower, that those concepts, those kind of geo-tradictic concepts weren't really in people's mind yet, but people understood the power potential of America and they understand, I mean, especially the Germans because they fought the Americans. You know, they'd taken the full brunt of the U.S. Army, which is not any fun thing, especially in those days. But, you know, so the power potential, the Soviet Union would be, becoming apparent. I mean, aside on the fact that Bolshevism was, it had become something of a

psychological contagion. I'm not saying that. It's not melodramatic. It's the best way you can describe it. You know, there was like the apocal, the conditions of the epoch seemed to be favoring communism. And people really freaked out. So, yeah, it was all of those things. And like I said, it wasn't, It wasn't just that the 1929 collapse. It didn't just kick people's asses. Like it, I mean, it did people all across the planet. But, I mean, every major developed economy. But it was especially brutal to the Germans because they'd actually,

they'd been making ground, you know, after, after, in the wake of, you know, the catastrophe in 1918. And then they suddenly just, you know, all those games just evaporate overnight. and you know it was it was kind of like the final nailing a cough and a people's willingness to accept you know that there was some sort of like parliamentary democratic solution to their problems and that that's my view of a perfect storm of stuff so around the time of the crash in 29 um what's where's hitler at what's he doing that was a national socialist big break that was their first big breakthrough you know um and it was uh

you know, I mean, people, Adolf Hitler and a lot of the pioneer kind of what we can see, what became kind of, you know, modern campaigning techniques of the 20th century. That's why in the, you know, in triumph of the will, you know, how there's this, it opens up with this, you know, aerial shot, um, of, uh, of Hitler's aircraft descending out of the airfield, you know, like breaches the clouds.

I mean, that's just like a really cool shot, you know, and it was kind of like the camera work was pretty radical. Like not radical like it was cool. Like I mean, it would do that too. It was like radical like it hadn't really been done before. But the reason that's a big deal, it wasn't just Hitler, you know, trying to flex about like how cool like his PR staff was, although it was part of it. Like Hitler was the first national political figure to, you know,

like shoot all over the place and the planes that, you know, so, you know, it's a campaign face to face, you know. And that was a big deal because people didn't do that before. You know, I mean, Hitler was basically campaigning his ass off. And that's what Mind Conf is, too. I'm always telling people to read Hitler's second book. That was unpublished. This is called the second book, even though it never actually was a book.

It was just a manuscript. Because it was discovered after the day of defeat. But that's basically Hitler's geopolitical book. Like, Mind Cop is like, it's basically a, it's Hitler, like, meaning his cave. to the German voter as to why you should vote to the national socialist. That's only that's goofy when you get these losers, whether it was, you know, old Chrissy Hitchens or whether it's, uh, Ian Kershaw. It's like, oh, my cop is a terrible book. It's like, well, bro, it's not, it's not supposed to be Shakespeare. It's like, it's, it's, it's a man who's, you know, running for political office saying why you should vote for his party.

I mean, that it's, that's not going to be, you know, a compelling reading, you know, a century after the fact. Because, I mean, that can't, that point can't be overstated. Like, people act like, people act like the national socialist put like pulled the wool over everybody's eyes by like pretending to be this aboveboard party it's like they they were they were a political party that wanted people to vote for them and people did they accomplished a parliamentary majority they were left an angle the chancellorship out of it um their primary up their primary opposition was engaged in a war against uh the legitimate against the seat of government And it was entirely legitimate to ban the KPD. It's like you don't have to like Hitler or you don't have to like national socialism. But unlike the, I mean, unlike the Bolsheviks and, you know, in Russia who just kind of killed people because they'd get what they wanted. The national socialist were the legitimate government in Germany. I mean, that, I don't want to get too far out of ourselves.

I mean, that's one of the interesting things about other Nuremberg narratives tailored. I mean, this idea that, you know, the government in Germany was illegitimate. I mean, you could say that it was an evil government, I guess, if that turns you on, but it wasn't this illegal or really, you know, illegitimate government. The election returns that the national socialists got were, I mean, above board. That's not super important anyway. Like, the point I made, you know, the plebiscite that made Hitler to fear the furor, uh, Hitler had something totally insane, like 89.3% of German voters, I thought he was great.

Like, people loved to eat off Hitler. They didn't like love the National Socialist Party. I mean, they, they had a, the National Socialist plurality, but the key takeaway is that the Germans love Adolf Hitler, not that they love the party he represented. But that's, you know, that's, uh, that's basically what Adolf Hitler was doing. I mean, really, when he got cut loose from Landsberg prison, I mean, that's just what he said about doing.

He said, well, we're going to, he, uh, I mean, it was an interesting given tag between him and the Weimar government. On the one hand, on the one hand, he'd literally, you know, he and, he and Schutner Richter and Lundorf, who in those days, it was still an ally of Hitler.

You know, they literally merged into the, against the guns of Weimar, but when Hitler found himself in court, they actually treated them pretty, I mean, they treated them really, really, not just at the chaosfully i mean they really showed him a lot of slack so i mean i mean i think hiller realized the writing was on the wall and that there wasn't some kind of he wasn't

going to be able to duplicate what musilini had done in robe in 1920 so part of that was pragmatic it wasn't hitler being a nice guy or something but part of it was also that uh you know he he he wasn't going to be marginalized uh by you know being locked away for 20 years or you know being banned from public life or something so it's like well, you know, the, it would have been, among other things, it would have been seemingly from to continue on a revolutionary course after that. And it probably would have been counterproductive, absent some kind of, absent some kind of a situation like happened in the Baltic states where, you know,

the, you really did have, you know, a kind of bloody civil war under conditions of parity. Germany was dealing with a revolutionary paradigm on the ground, but it was localized. You know, that's why, that's why the, that's why the Munich Soviet was the big, was the communist big coup? Because I mean, that's where they, that's where they could pull it off. They, they didn't have the,

they didn't have the political capital, the forces of the being to pull it off nationwide. That does not mean it was any less of an existential threat. And owing to the international situation, it didn't matter if most Germans weren't communist. It's like, okay, I mean,

if the communists can, if they could, if they could carve out these fiefdoms in places like Bavaria, if they could control the Berlin Street, you know, it didn't, you know, and, and, in, and in in germany was a fracturing mess anyway owing the vimar and you know the occupation of uh

the occupation of the rur and things and you know they they wouldn't have been able to resist soviet designs i mean it's a complicated situation but yeah that that's essentially what hitler was doing um you know he was campaigning like a modern politician which hiller was many things and i i agree with russell stofly like i cited on my podcast the other week that you know i think Hillary was a messianic sort of figure, historically speaking, not in religious terms, obviously. He wasn't a, he wasn't just a typical politician, but he was, well, the mayor, as he wore, he was a modern politician, and then he did that very well. I mean, so that's, that's what it was doing during the 20s. Let's jump into the 30s a little bit, and I wanted to talk a little bit more about Europe.

Yeah. You had talked about how you constantly bring up the Bolsheviks. I mean, they... Ready for huge savings? We'll mark your calendars from November 28th to 30th because the Lidl Newbridge Warehouse Sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favorite Liddle items all reduced to clear.

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it's right there. And what I think a lot of people don't realize is, and maybe you can talk to this, is just how much sway and just how much they were infiltrating European countries. I mean, there were, I mean, obvious one Spanish Civil War, but pretty much every country had a communist kind of movement in it. I mean, just anyone who's read anything about 1920s, Italy can can see who the anti-fascists were. Yeah, they had a remarkable momentum. I mean, both in terms, they're kind of forces in being might not be the right way to characterize it, but they had tremendous. reached particularly particularly for that that time you know a century ago wasn't like today i mean

there was there was more interdependence than people might think and especially in europe i mean people cross national frontiers um pretty much as a matter of course you know it's not like there wasn't there wasn't this kind of monadic insularity to things but the communists were very very good at political warfare and they were very good at um at uh at at a waging political war with this kind of cadre structure very effectively even when they didn't have majorities on the ground or even pluralities um i think part of that was through the radical commitment to the people he did have acting as a force multiplier but it's also one of the things ilegerns nolte it's not just because i think that he he describes the phenomenon what happened during the war and with some of these really brutal kind of categorically homicidal events. But he also, it can't really be overstated the degree to which communism seemed to have the force of apoccal history behind it.

That's why, like last time, you were kind enough to invite me on the podcast, I made the point that, or you made the point that people like to rate James Burnham over the and a lot of these other political fingers of the era and economists, because they talk about communism, like it was just this perennial thing and that its victory was imminent. People weren't saying that because they loved Joseph Stalin or because they thought communism was great for something. I mean, yeah, some people thought that way, but the 1929 collapse,

it wasn't just an economic crisis of the sort that, you know, you deal with when they, the world situation is in is deteriorating or when there's some kind of punctuated shock going to you know um going to like uh you know shortages or famine or something like happened before you know food insecurity got remedied globally in the 50s and stuff it was like basically essentially like the banking structure as it existed to that point failed you know so people like well all right you know, capitalism and private industry can't deliver at scale. You know, it can't provide people what they need and there's too much uncertainty.

You know, you can't just leave it in the hands of, in the proverbial hands of all these, you know, discrete decision makers that aren't coordinated. So this just doesn't work anymore. So some kind of central planning is going to have to take the place of the free market. Like everybody thought that way. Like even right wing guys thought that way, you know, because what was the alternative? that they didn't understand. Okay, I mean, it wasn't, a lot of these guys

wasn't a bad faith thing. They just didn't really get it. Because in the moment, you can't understand what's happening in historical terms, particularly with something as complex as, as 20th century economics. So that was underway.

And so it says he appeared to everybody, like the man in the European street, like this is, you know, there's basically communists have the force of history behind us. you know it's almost it's almost like a crusade or some sort of like fervor that's you know sweeping millions of people off in it so how do we stop this and that was um that was a no i mean that was a big part of the strength of adolf edler too and that's still we's point about it being a messanic figure you know that now's a big that's fascinating too because like people are i'm always taking the issue with people who say like well you know hit hit hitler snipe who just you know exploited anti-semitism and Hitler almost never, even as early as, he almost never mentioned Jews. I can think of two speeches where he referred to international Jewry.

I can think of another one where he talked about Jewish bullshitism. But that's it. He just didn't bring it up. Not because he was afraid of being politically incorrect or upsetting people, but that's not, that just wasn't really his orientation. You know, I mean, yeah, Hitler took for granted that if you were a national socialist, you view Jews as your mortal enemy. But this idea that, you know, Hitler was getting.

people clued into his program and excited by talking about Jews like that's not true um i mean i guess you could turn around to say this because it would have been redundant because everybody understood he was talking about okay but you know the um the uh the kind of uh the kind of shared premises that people were responding to with with with what he was presenting to them had to do with he he made them believe that they weren't inevitably going to be swept up in this kind of mass homicidal like workers revolt that then was just going to kind of transform everything into this sort of, you know, this sort of giant like labor camp that were, you know, the trappings of national life and and social capital would have been kind of stripped away and, you know, things have been kind of just

reduced to bear survival. And if you weren't privileged within the administration of that new regime, you know, you just were kind of going to live a pointless life of relative deprivation. The only consolation being that, you know, you'd be assured that if you were politically reliable, you wouldn't starve or not at housing or something. I mean, that's really what was underway. And people don't believe me on that. Read Orwell's 1984. Like, that's basically, that's in all but name, that's a Stalinist dystopia,

that a guy who came of age in the epoch, like, that was the big fear of every European, including, you know, even middle class Tory types like Mr. Orwell, okay? So, I mean, that's, this wasn't this like weird thing that paranoid artist, you know, self-styled shaman,

Mr. Hitler just kind of came up with. So that, I can't really emphasize that enough. You mentioned Orwell, and I mentioned the Spanish Civil War, so. Yeah, how much of Catalonia? The, um, okay, so.

1932 and 1933, we have the election of two people who will fundamentally dictate what the next, even what we're dealing with today. So Hitler comes to power and the king for life FDR comes to power. And from what I understand, Mr. FDR was not exactly, he wasn't averse to, what Mussolini or what Hitler were talking about in the in their respective countries, was he? Well, I mean, Roosevelt, so no way. Like I've, you know, like I said before, last time we were discussing the 20th century. One of the reasons I like Thomas Fleming, not the Rockford Institute guy for clarity. People aren't familiar with the other Thomas Fleming.

he was this East Coast Irish guy and we're not going to hold it against him that he's Irish because he was a really good author but he uh he was this independent scholar story and then he he wrote kind of the seminal critical biography of uh of Roosevelt as well as up the

of the uh of the Roosevelt administration called the New Dealers war and it like half Arnold helped him write it like all these personages uh some of whom were Roosevelt's allies some whom were his enemies you know guys in the the diplomat, guys in the state department, guys in the military apparatus, you know,

the then war department, you know, he had access to all this direct testimony and all these documents. But his core, I mean, obviously he's got nothing nice to say about Roosevelt, but his core thesis on the brass tax of it is what I said last time, that the New Deal regime was as much a revolutionary paradigm as, uh, was implemented in Berlin. and what Stalin did in the Soviet Union. And it's foreign policy. You better believe that Roosevelt basically is raison d'etra was to,

what, you know, was that implemented a progressive socialist and anti-fascist political order, you know, and kind of ground up, you know, restructuring socially and politically. And ultimately, I mean, it's great foreign policy coup was the, you know, the destruction of Germany and the destruction of fascism. that was its whole raise on detra

just as much as Hitler's raised on detra was to smash Bolshevism and that's, you know, make the point again and again if you want to understand not just not just Hitler but the but like his orientation

towards history the last the last real speech before the Reichstag that Hitler made was the December 11th, 1941 speech which incidentally was also the formal declaration of war against the stage.

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lending criteria. Terms and conditions apply. Volkswagen Financial Services are limited. Trading as Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. And Hitler didn't talk about Stalin in it at all. Like he mentioned communism. He didn't mention Stalin. He mentioned Churchill very fleetingly and kind of a condescending way. He talked about Roosevelt. He did two things.

He identified, he talked about the situation in the East where the assault on Moscow was, was being halted and which in my opinion was what decided the war but he said Hitler said two things he said well you know

this is this isn't he's like we've been through this before in 1813 now when he said we okay in 1813 Prussia was fighting along with Napoleon in the Russian Empire and Prussia was the only German state

that went to war on Napoleon's side so Hitler the the Habsburg Catholic was basically saying, we the German people are the Prussian legacy state. And that's fascinating. And it's key to understanding Hitler and why everybody was okay with him, you know, from his own kind of tribe, you know, the Bavarian Munich types as well as, you know, the Prussian officer types and everybody else. That's key. And I wasn't, heller actually believed that. That wasn't an affectation or something. But secondly, what Hitler said was he said, you know, this was a European war and it did not have to be a global war. And basically, Mr. Roosevelt, we tried to come to terms with America over and over again.

You know, and there was no reason. We have no interest in common with America. We have also no conflicts with them in common. You know, basically like, why is, you know, Roosevelt basically is forcing us to fight America. and that's actually true you can claim that you know well Germans are evil and Hitler's an evil man

so I think it's good that America went to war with Germany and I mean that you can okay I mean that if that's your position that's fine but align with the Soviet Union and assaulting Germany and make no mistake September 11th

1941 that was the other September 11th that's when Roosevelt declared unrestricted naval war against all German flagged military vessels. I mean, like, America went to war with Germany long before there was ever a German war declaration,

long before there was ever Pearl Harbor. You know, and that didn't make any sense strategically. You know, it was an ideological political decision. You know, so it's, that's the key takeaway. But I wrote some long

form on this, too. I mean, if you want to understand, And if you want to understand, Hitler versus Stalin, yeah, there's a manichaean aspect to that. And it's almost, it's, you know, it's almost kind of mythical. And the enmity between Germany and the Russian people is really horrible and tragic. I'm not like making light of that. But, you know, the Germans in the eastern sloths are just going to fight. Like, even absent bullshitism, like, that's just something that's going to happen.

Hitler's real kind of ideological nemesis was Roosevelt. because again, like, there wasn't any reason for America to fight Germany other than the fact that Roosevelt and his patrons slated Germany for annihilation. And, I mean, in political terms, I mean, that's the definition of enmity. You know, a man you don't have any objective strategic conflict with that's forcing you with, you know, into confrontation. It's quite literally, you know, he slated you for destruction for some ideological commitment for reason. So yeah, that's an important point. And everybody, you know, when in talking about Hitler and his intentions, you know, it's kind of like people are constantly talking about what's in the Constitution or what's in the Bible, but they never ever read either, so they don't actually know. Like people always talking about like things Hitler said and didn't thought, but they never actually bothered to read things he said.

You know, and it's David Irving made the point that, you know, Hitler was a very rare political thing. figure of the 20th century because he basically did everything you said you know he didn't really have a filter for better or worse so it's the there's you know it was pretty it's pretty above board if you want to like trace Hitler's strategic decisions as well as his political sensibilities because he said these things in public you know with without his exceptions of things that you know required secrecy in order to succeed but you know there wasn't this wasn't some like secret program or something or there's not there's not some complexity to i mean yeah there's a lot of complexities dead off hitler but there's not there's not some there's not some great mystery to

or ledger me you know what what what what what what is political commitments for and what he wanted to accomplish so yeah i think that's important to well what i was saying about fDR is it's not a secret that a lot of people who are around him have said after that that through the 30s when when the German economy was seemingly doing very well, that he looked upon it. And, you know, as he's doing the New Deal, which as he's putting together the New Deal and just passing all these laws, all these, what do they call those things, the president's just right, executive orders. Yeah, like 3,000 of them or 4,000, I think.

Yeah. That he was looking and he was like, well, if they have a manager, economy over there we can have a managed economy here oh yeah that was definitely part of it and adam twos he's a really interesting guy he's an economic historian and that's uh

that those guys tend to be really brainy i mean like economics is uh if you can write an economic history you have any modern state i mean that that's just like a kind of a leviathan task but he i don't know what twos is politics are i mean i'm sure i'm sure they probably

i probably would not see to i to i him he's like a typical kind of british university type guy but you wrote a book that's a history of the third-rug economy called the wages of destruction that's a really exhaustive book and it's got a huge amount of data um and uh yeah the uh if you want to understand uh if you want to understand national social economics i mean it's basically it's basically traditional you know hamilton frederick list kind of stuff i mean with you know with a with a with a with a with a with a with a with a highest for heavy industry and mass subsidies that privileges heavy terrestrial manufacturing over other sectors.

But I mean, that's, the German economy today is not really radically different. I mean, we'd, it's a stupid term, but what economists in the 80s used to call, quote, picking winners and losers like that, you know, the German economy is a lot more like that of Japan than it is like America or the UK. That's why there's a fantasy one of these like Goldman Sachs losers after a, after a wake, he, he, he dropped, it was in that, he was in that Rolling Stone piece by Matt Tybee or the fuck he pronounces his name.

And it was like Goldman Sachs rap. He shows up in Berlin in like 2005 or something. And he started, like, making his pitch, you know, and about, you know, basically trying to turn these German firms on. to, onto, you know, binding up their pension system with, you know, Goldman Sachs, 401Ks or something. And, like, I guess these, these Germans, let me laugh at them. And we're like, get out of it.

You know, we don't, we don't invest in derivatives. You know what I mean? So that, that sensibility remains, but it, uh, yeah, that's what, that's what, um, that, that's exactly what, uh, what Roosevelt did. And that, um, I mean, but it's also, too. I mean, people, you know, the New Deal didn't actually accomplish anything. I mean,

in terms, I mean, politically, it got Roosevelt everything you wanted and it had earth-shaking consequences, but basically it's, you know, Roosevelt didn't do, Roosevelt didn't stimulate you as economy, you're like breathe new blood into it or, and he's not, it's not, you know, Roosevelt's administration before

941 isn't some, isn't some testament to how, you know, isn't some testament to, you know, to how demand side paradigms work, or are true. all he did he literally put people to work digging holes for no reason and essentially paying them in government's in food stamps you know so that you didn't have you didn't have unemployed guys milling about you know every in the middle of the street you know begging for food or something like and you didn't you didn't have riots because people you know people couldn't uh buy a loaf of bread because there was no work to be had you know it was it that that's what it was i lived down the street from skoky lagoons which is this big nature preserve.

And, like, don't have me wrong, it's pretty dope. But, like, you know, Skoky Lagoon's is, it's these giant man-made lakes just, like, down the street. And from me that Roosevelt had a bunch of guys dig for no reason and said he could, like, you know, basically give him food stamps. I mean, that's why it's there. Wow. Yeah.

But that's what the Skokie Conference at the CCC was. Like in other states, you'll come across stuff like that. I mean, Skoggy Lagoon's is a, it's, It's more, it's more scaled than a lot of these things. But you're causing them across stuff like that, you know, these kinds of nature preserve things or these kinds of, these kinds of, you know, like man-made lakes or whatever. And there'll be some plaque or something saying, like, yeah, built by like the civilian conservation corps, you know, of Oklahoma in like 935. Ready for huge savings?

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I mean, that was just like a side point, but I come back with it. I think they teach, like, I've had people who have kids, like teenagers and like when they ask me stuff, like their, you know, their teenage son or door, I'll be like, but yeah, you know, like in like 10th grade public school, whatever, they told me that like, you know, because Roosevelt, you know, put people to work and then, you know, that saved US economy. It's like, no, that doesn't happen. If I pay you to dig a hole and give you food stamps, I'm paying you to dig a hole and giving you food stamps. I'm not, I'm not, I'm not breathing new life in the internet. into a I'm not I'm not creating you know I'm not I'm not stimulating I'm not stimulating I'm not stimulating the national economy through incentives like I mean I don't know thank God I haven't set foot in the public school in decades but I I believe in that that is what is underway

I don't have kids in my own but I I mean I like young people anyway but I also kind of use I also kind of use them as like human intelligence so I like what what's happening in the you know, in, in public schools and stuff. I mean, I'm only kidding. Like, I actually do. But yeah, that, um, to your point, if, uh, if Roosevelt had been anything all other than this kind of crazy

Zionist guy who, you know, looked, who, who, who wanted to, you know, destroy Europe and alliance with Moscow, if he was some, like, you know, if it was something like America first guy, he'd been, like, undertaking these, these kind of steps ruled by ruling by executive order and kind of, you know,

situating himself as like a law and to himself. Yeah, people would have gone crazy then and they'd, even today, they'd be, they'd be acting like he was, uh, they'd be acting like he was Darth Vader or something.

So yeah, I mean, absolutely. Look at the way they treat the census in Florida. Well, yeah, exactly. Like the Santa,

and unlike Mr. Roosevelt, the Santa doesn't have people arrested who disagree with him. But yeah. Yeah. So in the 30s, who were, who were,

Germany's biggest allies? I would say, I mean, it's a complicated situation because prior to, I mean, obviously, you've got to look at Germany and Austria as one as one political culture. I'm not saying that like, I'm not saying that like Austria just can't think with themselves that there's not things unique to, you know, I mean, Austria's very different than Germany proper, okay? but the reason why the ash loose was able to go off out of hitch

was because of what I just said. An incident of that really, after after the after after, after Dolphus was murdered and after Hitler kind of smoothed over that potential in-house crisis that that could have caused Mussolini, and the big concedure you get to move, Solini was he offered him the Tyrol region which was a huge that that was unprecedented especially for I mean he'll was supposed his huge German nationalists he basically you know he handed

he handed German-speaking lands over to Italy and that quite literally outright as a concession so from like 36 37 onward it would it would it would be Italy and room I'm of the belief that Romania was the first and foremost Germany's best out They committed a huge contingent of men in scaled terms to the Eastern Front. And Antonescu, you know, he was the marshal of Romania, Ion Antonescu. He was a holder of the Knights Cross and just a real badass. But also he really had Hitler's back and vice versa. And people, you know, Romania was essential too because Barbarossa was staged and

essentially from Romania in key ways. If you understand how things broke down in terms of deployment and things, you understand that. So, I mean, Romania is not, Romania is not just like insignificant, dumb little country or whatever people think. It's situated in a way that's key. And I mean, that's also why it has such a strange regime during the Cold War and stuff. I mean, that's like outside the scope of what we're talking about fear. Yeah, I lived there for a little while.

Oh, wow. That's awesome. Yeah, it's a strange. Yeah, it's a strange. Yeah, I've never been there. But I find Romania kind of fascinating. Oh, no, you would. You'd love it.

You'd love Bucharest, man. You'd have a good time. No, I'm sure. They got really, really pretty ladies. And it's a weird collision of, like, crazy Slavic shit and crazy Latin stuff. And that's, I just think that's really cool. Maybe it's kind of like a square Protestant guy or something. Yeah, I, that's freaking awesome.

I genuinely want to hear about that sometime. But, yeah, so, I mean, forgive the tangent. But, yeah. I mean, Italy, because it goes out saying, and yeah, I'd say Romania. For, not just because the Romanians were like, were like very, very committed to the program. But Antonesco himself was, I mean, he was just an honorable guy, and like I said, a real badass.

But he just really had Hitler's back. And Mussolini did too. I mean, Mussolini is a guy, Mussolini had a lot of flaws. and I think Mussolini like Lenin was I think he was kind of a master intriguer and kind of a political genius in terms of as a political soldier I mean

I don't think he was really I don't think he was cut out for you know gross wrong politic if we can look at it that way he just wasn't but I think you know I know Mussolini has some degenerate habits

I know he was a big womanizer and kind of a sex fiend. He whacked his own son-in-law, you know, Count Chiano. I don't think that's a great thing to do. I mean, that's a crazy Latin stuff, I guess. But I'm not saying that to be mean or prejudiced. But it's also like you said in a recent episode of yours, Mussolini had this swagger about him. Yeah, he had a machismo about him.

He had a, you could, the average man in the street probably believed that Mussolini he could kick his ass. Yeah, that's true. But Hitler didn't have that. No. No, Hitler was, that's why Hitler and Mussolini are kind of, it's odd that they became like personally really tight because they weren't similar kinds of men.

You know, like Hitler was this, Hitler was actually, I mean, Hitler was like a tense guy, but he was very subdued, you know, when he, Hitler, when he, he'd never, Hitler made the point he didn't like wearing a uniform. Sometimes he felt it was necessary, but I can't really during, you know like the revolutionary phase immediately after but Hitler always wore just you know a well tailored but modest suit you know and he'd wear uh he'd wear his iron cross first class but in his

party lapel like his party badge you know and he didn't uh you know Hitler you know he had Ava Braun was very beautiful and a lot younger than him but you know she was his only girl like it didn't you know yeah he was uh he was very very different than Mussolini there was But, I mean, it's straight. Like, man, if become friends, it's kind of strange. I mean, like, there's guys that you wouldn't think would become such close allies, and they do. But I think that's the case with Hitler and Mussolini.

But Hitler took great risks, including, you know, deploying Scorsani to bail Mussolini out, like literally to spring him from the Alpine Redox where he was being in prison. I mean, like, Hitler, the other, because, you know, owing to either is his kind of a sensibility as a combat, veteran NCO or or just as a political soldier you know Hitler a lot of his decisions were informed by his personal loyalties but Antonescu Hiller and Antonescu like they were personally tight but it's also they Antonescu was a great ally and and yeah that's a point that should be fleshed out more and the Romanians actually fought they fought really hard I mean and they got they got decimated you know they they uh it's not you know the romanian

army is not like some like storied force but they they had a until we got chewed to pieces um they in 1941 early nineteen forty two the the romanians did really well i mean for that i mean as well as going to be expected you know they didn't they were they had certain disadvantages but they you know it's uh it's not um that's no small thing croatia was a great ally of germany too and the croats uh you know the croats uh man for man were probably the best uh like minor access nation soldiers the croat uh the croats were incorporated into the very into the here like officially they weren't they weren't they weren't like they weren't bobbin s s or some kind of auxiliary formation and uh they uh they uh they're they uh they

were the only non-German element that breached the gates at stalin grid you know like uh and they they they were they were super tough but uh and um yeah uh pavillich was uh was a was a he was a rare example too of uh like the independent state of croatia and like the ustasha they really were like like a client regime of the third rike and that was rare you know like if people notice that you know the like Berlin and and the SD and

they particularly Himmler he was always trying to kind of insinuate these like proxy sort of parties even ones that didn't really have any on the ground support and Hitler was like no we're not going to

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Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited. Trading is Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Speaking of Romania, you know, the Antonescu, himself. He's the one who put down, you know, the Iron Guard revolt and probably personally ordered Codriano to be murdered. And like the SS, though, was, uh, they were providing aid in comfort to these Iron Guard guys. Meanwhile, Berlin's policy was, you know, that these guys are like enemies of the state. So you had like, you had like Berlin and the German army saying you doing one thing. Then at the SS saying like, no, these guys, you're like arresting and

haven't shot or our guys and helping them. So that, which is really crazy. But at, uh, but the point being, independent state of Croatia is a rare example of that owes the intrigues of what happened in the kingdom of Yugoslavia and what amounted to do what kind of chitnik coup and all but name

on the eve of barbarosa but yeah so Croatia was a rare kind of like true like client regime of a national sort of a fascist or fascist type country so yeah forgive me if that was like too tangential

No, no problem. I want to wait until the next time we talk to actually get into the war. But one thing, one thing I wanted to ask was, was it because of American influence or was it because of Soviet influence that he didn't have more European countries that he could consider to be allies? Because I mean, Spain seems like it could be a natural ally, especially at that point. Yeah, both Salazar and Franco were intriguing for their own purposes. I mean, I think Franco was kind of an idiot. Unlike Salazar, I think, was a great man in a lot of ways. And Salazar, there's nothing else Salazar could do, whether than kind of like trying to strike this tense, like, middle path between, you know, the British Empire, the third-right elite. But Franco, I think, was just a fucking moron.

And he, you know, Franco, but Franco was a great survival. and obtuse men often are good at surviving, even if they're, you know, kind of not good at much else. But the way I understand Franco is that the real, like the phalanists who were real like hard-in-vassed national socialists or fascists, you know, he sent them off to fight the Soviet unions that they were out of Spain and hopefully wouldn't come back. And that's kind of what happened.

But it, you know, people, you know, France actually was a fascist state. like and it would like they were you know organically like they that's why people conveniently forget that you know an operation torch when American troops landed in North Africa it was they were opposed by French who were who fought them okay like and a commandant Darlane who I think Roosevelt probably had murdered you know that was basically Roosevelt was faced with having to try and bribe Darlane into like quitting the war I mean like the fact that France fought Germany they fought the they fought Germany because they didn't want to be under Berlin's dominion.

Like they were, they were fascists, basically. You know, like a third, like, about a third of France were rats and they, like, refused to fight, but it, you know, the idea that, the, the, quote, Bichy regime was like this total, total contrivance is not true.

It's complicated by the fact they were under occupation, but, you know, I think, I mean, I thought a lot about that, too. I mean, your point about but why but I mean Hitler specifically said you know there was there was a meeting of

of what was supposed to be a fascist international of sorts I think in 1936 but I'd have to double check it and I cannot remember what the host venue was but it didn't really go anywhere because

again that you know there was no national socialist delegation and without a Berlin delegation representing Hitler it was kind of like a big whatever but it uh i um it uh hit uh hit uh hitler himself always made the point that you know i mean that's why i made the point about the independent state of croasia because hiller himself said that you know the national socialist program and paradigm it's it's not this ideology that is is intended to be exported as some sort of you know as some sort of answer to to bolshevism

or something and that's important um i mean i think hitler did pretty i think hiller did pretty i think it pretty well. I mean, I, uh, in terms of wooing allies, it, uh, he, uh, people, uh, in some these smaller states, uh, you know, you know, like, Father Tiso in Slovakia, you know, Tiso was this kind of, I guess, what most people would consider to be like a clerical fascist type. You know, that was like the big, that was, that was, that was, that was the big coup against Venice is that, you know, Czechoslovakia wasn't, it wasn't just, it wasn't dismantled somehow by the, by the, by the machinations and evil hair Hitler. You know, as soon as the

Slovakians, like, saw their opportunity, they declared an independence. They're like, we've got no truck with this enterprise. Shigal Slovakia is a contrivance. And Tiso is very much on board with the third right. And simply because, I mean, Hitler made his case effectively and, and managing convinced him

of victory odds. So, I mean, I think it's, but it's also you got to the Europe Europe kind of orbits around, I mean the whole Europe orbits around Berlin. I mean kind of geo-strategically as well as conceptually. I mean, I think that's

I think that's part of it. I mean, I think Hitler understood you know, I mean, basically basically people, even people who didn't particularly fancy taking standing orders from Berlin. I mean, it was understood that like, well, I mean, and

you know, what happens in Berlin has got ramifications throughout the continent and you know the kind of that that's that's kind of the heart of political life so i think that's part of it too i was just under you know let's say it you know let's say in this in autumn or december 9041 you know let's say moscow did fall and you know nc was realized it's like okay i wherever people were at you know whether they were in prog or whether they were in Paris or whether they were in Madrid or in, you know, wherever they were, I think I would say like, well, okay, you know, this is, this is kind of the new political culture, so that's, you know, we'll abide that. I think that's why. It, uh, it, uh, it, uh, also, I mean,

I, I really like, I really like Newt Hampson, you know, he was the, uh, Norwegian author. He was like this agrarian romantic type guy. He wrote about growth of the soil, which is a really great book, as well as his book about The Hunger, which is kind of a autobiographical

take of his early life as, you know, like when he was literally kind of like a starving author. But Hamson made the point, he wrote the eulogy to Hitler when, after the, in May 9845. And you know, there was a million, there was a

million, quite literally a million, like a 1.1 million foreign volunteers in the Bafn SS, you know, from, from all nations, from Ukraine to the Netherlands, to Belgium, to Spain, to, you know, it's, it really was like this pan-European army. And these guys weren't conscripted at gunpoint or something. I mean, you know, I, so I think there was, I think, I think there was more of a pan-European allegiance to Berlin. Was that because of anti-American sentiment or anti-Soviet sentiment?

I mean, primarily the latter. I think people, outside of, the Germans understood that they were in big trouble with regards to Roosevelt because he was tiring them for destruction. I speculate and I think it's pretty well substantiated by the kind of statements of other

of other chief executives at the time in Europe. I think America wasn't really on people, people's radar in the same way. Prior to the Cold War and prior to the kind of destruction of Europe and it's divvying up between the superpowers, if you were, unless you were situated in the UK or in Germany, if you were a European, if you were a European head of state or if you were in the executive kind of branch of a European state in the early 20th century, like a America wasn't really at the forefront of your thoughts. I mean, yeah, you had a sense of its great power capability, and, you know, you had an

understanding that its intervention or not intervention could make or break outcomes, particularly in geopolitical terms, but it, it was just kind of this remote thing, you know? So, yeah, I mean, most, um, most, uh, I, I guarantee you that most guys, like foreign fighters who joined the Vof and SS did so if they wanted to kill Ivan and they hated, kind of communists, not because, you know, they're like, we love national socialism. All of them did. But at the same time, I mean, it doesn't matter because it owes to what I said. I mean, it, it, you know, European political life orbits around Berlin. So it's like, well, you know, we're, we're going to, you know, we're going to, we're going to, we're going to, we're going to, we're going to,

we're going to, you know, so, you know, Berlin's going to lead us, you know, and if, if, if the access had won, it's like, okay, well, you know, it, uh, you know, you know, you know, you know, whether people like it or not it's like basically the tenor of political life would have originated in Berlin. I mean, where else is it going to come from? It's a fancying issue.

I mean, I can understand why the Spanish would hate the communists, but if they have... Ready for huge savings? Well, mark your calendars from November 28th to 30th because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse Sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favorite LIDLEL items all reduced to clear.

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Subject to lending criteria. Terms and conditions apply. Volkswagen Financial Services Ireland Limited. Trading is Cooper Financial Services is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Why do you think people were coming from all those other countries? I mean, what was the, because we aren't taught this. I mean, you talked about it last time you were on here. Nuremberg just basically put a nail in the coffin for being right wing.

And if you're right wing nowadays, you have to be middle of the road right wing and you just have to bow down to whatever the left says. But what was it about certain people in Europe who would be willing to go and fight for a foreign army? they hated communism so much. I mean, it was obvious in some countries, but... Well, I mean, generally, it's like, I mean, back to the point about what Malti was saying, these German guys, I mean, Hitler himself, but also, you know, this idea Germans had that Bolshevism is this, you know, homicidal paradigm that, you know, is the, is being foisted upon us and implemented

by radicals and Jews who want to kill us. I mean, you can say that's crazy or that's a bad way to think about things. That's basically the way people thought about it. You know, nobody's really neutral on communism. Either you were with the program or you viewed it like I just said. And in the case of people,

I talked about Father Tiso, or in the case of people like these Slovak guys who joined the Bob and SS, they would have done it because they're like, well, you know, this was basically a peasant population of pious Catholics and they're like, you know, the communists are they're going to do to us and they do the cool ox and they're also going to just you know it's going to

burn our churches down and kill our priests you know fuck that you know we're we're going to we're going to burn them to the ground first in the case of a a more developed country like France you know and I mean the last defenders of the guys who

the bail of Berlin the guys who literally defending a Reichstag with a French chuf and SS okay you got a situation like that it's you know you'll have guys who basically would have viewed it the same way that the Germans did. You know, guys from like a developed kind of, you know, cosmopolitan, we can call it that European state.

They would view communism as like, you know, so much, so much, you know, kind of Jewish radicalism aimed at, you know, kind of annihilating our national existence in favor of this, in favor of this, you know, paradigm of enslavement, quite literally. But, I mean, there's not, you know, it's, you know, it's, I, uh, I, I've got an idea, I mean, I, I don't want to go too far afield and bring it into the, uh, bring it into the, um, realm of polemic, but it's the, uh, you know, it doesn't really, at the end of the, I mean, I think the point a lot that, I mean, it, you know, anti-fascar, people, this idea that, like,

I mean, I'm not saying you, but like, people have this idea, because, I mean, from, like, like Hollywood or whatever from public school that people were just like revolted by like Nazism or something like they were you know I mean even if you weren't like a big national socialist even like Hitler was great even if you didn't even if you didn't

love nor fascist movements in every country yeah and I mean even the people who didn't particularly Mosley was in the Mosley was an MP yeah yeah exactly I mean even if you weren't particularly keen to that it's not like you looked at it as something revolting or horribly evil

you know it's like you if you were like a middle of the road like conservative type or just kind of like a working man who you know was a was a believing catholic you'd probably look at fascists like well these guys have some strange ideas and i think their pageantries a bit silly but they want to kill the communists and you know they want to get jewish finance capital off our back so yeah i'm with that you know that's a good thing i mean that's the way they would have looked at it and i think basically the way most guys looked at it. I mean, that's what the, you know, like I said, the way to understand, say, for example, in a state like France, the way that people looked at

the Germans is they're like, we don't like being under occupation by Berlin, but they didn't disdain the fact that these guys were fascists. They're like, they didn't care about that. I mean, the minority did of, you know, partisans, but I mean, that's a different thing. You know, the average man in the street fighting German occupation, it wasn't a Connie. He was just what I said. He was a guy who didn't, he didn't want, you know, some, he didn't want some German capo, you know, telling him his business. It's not that he had some kind of principled objection to the fascism. He probably was a fascist himself. Yeah, a lot of the, it's funny that some of the people even that I know will today talk about how,

you know, Israel involved. and how much of our foreign policy is based off of Israel involvement. We need to get out of it. And we need to cut them off, cut off funds, cut everything, just cut them loose. And a lot of these same people can't even look back to the 30s and see that people had the same arguments. They were just coming from a different direction. They were talking about banking, you know? Well, it's also a two.

I mean, the fact, I mean, the point, it's, you know, the, the, the, There's real, there's real sectarian enmity between, um, between, uh, between people who identify with, with Judaism and everybody else. Now, I mean, does that mean that everybody else in the planet is like this big racist and just like hates people for no reason? Or, or does this mean that, you know, there's, there's, there's a real problem with, with the, with the kind of, with the kind of intrinsic politics of, of Jewish identity. I mean, I, you know, uh, I, I, that's why I object, you know, yeah, I mean, you can't, you can't have an honest conversation. Even Marks, even Marks wrote at length about it.

Well, yeah, exactly. Like, you're conscious, the kinds of this stuff. No, people can't have, people can't have grown up conversations about such things. So, yeah, I mean, it's, it's, and it's amazing with people, even otherwise an intelligent people, they, they can't, yeah, they can't, like, draw these connections between things. It's like, it's, it's really, really extraordinary. Um, but yeah, let's, um, let's, um, let's, um, let's, um, Let's end it there so that we can get into the war the next time we talk. No, no, that's fine. Yeah, yeah.

I didn't mean to go out and do many tangents. Oh, no. Okay. Yeah. That's what I love tangents. Okay. I appreciate you, man. And yeah, I mean, it's a complicated issue.

I want to make sure I don't want to just gloss over things that are material to understanding the issues presented. But yeah, no, well, whatever you want. Talk about, promote your substableness. Promote your substack because I've gotten to the point, yeah, I've gotten to the point where I basically survive on what people, people give me for my substack, what people just send to me because they love the show. They love what the people that I have on,

the conversations I have. No, that's awesome. Some of my own crazy thoughts. I want you, I want you to get, you know, you deserve, I mean,

you only have, I think it's five episodes of your podcast that are exclusive on substack and everyone, Yeah, I've been trying to drop it biweekly. And I'm going to, I've been like the second, the second installing my science fiction brand. I haven't to double down on that because I got to get it to Imperium Press. But I'm getting is I got to start putting more law and form written content on my substacks. I haven't in about a month.

And I promise I'm going to, I'm going to bear down on that in earnest. But yeah, my substack is real Thomas 777, real, R-E-A-L-T-H-O-M-A-S-777. Substack.com. And it's about half free content, about half subcontent, like the podcast, the subscription, and there's, like, premium long-form stuff, that subscription, but there's also, like, I said, about half of the long-form stuff on there is free. And, like, my print stuff, like, for my sci-fi brand. There's always like previews there that are free of like sample chapters and things like that.

So if you like what I do, go there and yeah, it's only five bucks a month too. So it shouldn't break your bank and you can read everything. If you can't afford five bucks a month, you shouldn't be sitting around reading my substack. You should be trying to survive. But no, in all seriousness, I really, really, really appreciate the fact that people take an interest. But yeah, no, again, man, this was great. And yeah, we'll get into the war years whenever you want. Just let me know.

And we'll get back to it. It'll be real soon. Thank you. I want to welcome everyone back to the Pete Cignon-S show, returning for the third time in less than a month, Thomas 777. What's going on, man? Hi, Pete.

Thanks for hosting me yet again. It's always a pleasure, and I'm very grateful. last time tried to explain what was happening in Germany that was leading up to we went from Treaty of Versailles, even backed a little bit to the Bolshek-Gar revolution and came forward to what would lead up to World War II. But before we started that, I wanted to ask you a question because this is a question that I've heard arguments on and debate on and watch lectures on. for five, six years now, the national socialists in Germany, would they be considered left

wing or right wing? I mean, the problem is that in America, and part of this owes to, part of this, part of this owes the two things. Part of it owes the Keynes and the kind of ideological baggage of Keynes, and part of it owes to the subsequent Cold War. Ready for huge savings? We'll mark your calendars from November 28 to 30th. Because the Liddle Newbridge Warehouse Sale is back. We're talking thousands of your favourite Liddle items, all reduced to clear. From home essentials to seasonal must-habs, when the doors open, the deals go fast. Come see for yourself.

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Give the gift of a unique experience this Christmas with vouchers from Trump-Dunbeg. Search Trump-Ireland gift vouchers. Trump on Dunbiog, Kush Farage. Americans, into a lesser degree, you find this in the UK, as well as the rest of the kind of anglophone, cultural. sphere. You have this idea that the right left-wing divide is something to do with economics

or it is something to do with people's view of how the government interfaces with the free market or what purportedly is the free market. I mean, everybody knows there's not there's no such thing as it kind of purely like free market, you know, like that

just exists like in stasis like Newtonian physics just exists or something. But I mean that that's a bit too abstract. for what we're talking about here. But the, you know, the way the Europeans, if you want to understand what the right-left divide originally meant, like, conceptually, you've got to look at the French Revolution

and what gave rise to those clefts. It has to do with political values. It has to do with what you consider, like, how you view authority, how you view the legitimacy of authority, and what you view as the proper, you know, domain of, of of a of a of state and of culture and where where the dominion of one begins and the other ends

and what the content of those things is okay it's not when you find these libertarian types who claim like oh adolf hitler was a left winger because he believed in high taxes or something i mean that's that's either deliberately obtuse and kind of a an effort to sabotage the conversation on purpose or it or it's just really really provincial and ignorant you know the the only one I understand national socialism is as I mean there's something to the the AJB Taylor's view of it as Sonderveg is you know owing to the

kind of peculiar like dialectical course of Germany that gave rise to it like it would it wouldn't really have emerged in another state I believe that and that's also why it's important to distinguish it from fascism and other kinds of autocratic movements that that developed kind of culminantly with it but it, you know, the

fact of the matter is, it, it was, it was, it was an effort to salvage what, uh, culture from what Heider called practical transcendence. And what He said transcendence, he didn't mean, you know, like we, we, we think about in a Christian sense or like in a plate in a sense. He meant that modern life and the challenges of it, and particularly the emergence of technology and other things and the kind of tensions

and tensions inherent therein, you know, one of which was, class warfare or one of which culminated in class warfare rather it's not a spontaneously occurring thing despite what mr. marks said this leads to the destruction of certain practices values a prolegibility to phrase it or characterize it orientation points for the way people live their lives individually and and severally or severally and in common with others you know in communitarian ways. So the national socialism had,

if we were going to like boil it down to a, like say like three principles, it was, you know, to restore German sovereignty, you know, and to liberate it from the, from, you know, being yoked by its enemies. You know, to preserve the German culture and guarantee the

posterity of its people and then, you know, the German race, if you want to characterize it that way, as people in the 20th century tended to think about things in biological material terms and to eradicate communism, you know, for all time and basically all iterations of left-wing thought and praxis that, you know, we're facilitating those first two things that I mentioned. So it's an existential proposition. You know, the idea that, you know, there's a check.

Like it's the same thing not like Americans talk about democracy. Like there's a checklist and, you know, if you identify certain factors like, oh, that's democracy or this is not democracy. You know, it's like let's look at Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist, German Workers Party. You know, if I check off and off in the socialist box, that means it's left wing. Or if I check off on it here, it's right wing. That's not really the way political theory develops. And that's not the way, that's certainly not the way people conceptualize it in Europe. So, you know, the only way to look at national socialism is that is as a,

radical right-wing tendency, kind of like the ultimate radical right-wing tendency in Hegelian terms. And whether you accept Hegel's view of things or not and his idea about the cunning of reason and history, all that aside, even if you reject his metaphysics outright, you know, the Germans themselves, I'm talking about, you know, people like ordinary men involved in political life, not just high-flangin academics. They basically accepted Hegelian paradigms. and they thought of politics itself as a dialectical process. So there weren't even national socialists on the Strasser side who had a conciliatory view of the Soviet Union in relative terms

and who incorporated a lot more of kind of class antagonism sorts of paradigms into their program. They viewed themselves as radically right-wing and as the radical right-wing response to subvers of elements from the other side and the other side being the left. So in that sense, you're talking about people who, in existential terms, look at themselves as the right-wing vanguard. So it can't be anything other than right-wing.

Like, if that's what you view yourself as, in political terms, that's what everybody else views you as, you know, the enemy is who is willing to kill you and who you're willing to kill in kind. Like, views you as that. That's what you are. So, I mean, that's the best way in character. it. There's no argument there in my opinion, but like I said, it's it's

it becomes convoluted because part of this is, you know, people view their left, right, divide in America and part, I mean, like I said, I mean, Keynes is really toxic in all kinds of ways, and I think he was a fraud and a pseudo-intellectual at base, as much as Marx was, but there's a, there's ideological

baggage to Keynes and they kind of, and, you You know, and the kind of demand side paradigm, it's basically, it's got what we would consider to be today, you know, like a social justice ethos baked into it that is essentially hostile, everything that came before it. And that suggests that, you know, the role of government is to, you know, resolve, like, certain inequalities that are just inherently unjust and need to be remedied. But that's not what, that's not what socialism at base is, okay? I mean, you want to, Spangler himself made the point that, you know, Prussia, particularly, you know, and particularly like Bismarck's model of good government was highly socialistic. I mean, if you think that, if you think that, you know, Bismarck had something in common with, you know, like the 1970s labor party in the UK, you have something wrong with you or you're an idiot. You know, I mean, it's not, or if you think that, you know, the, or if you think that, you know, the, the, the, the.

the Prussian ethos was, held something in common with, with, with Eurocommunism that came later. I mean, that's absurd too. You know, I mean, it's, it's nonsense.

I don't see how anybody could think otherwise, but, you know, that's, that's the way to understand it. Werner Sombard is kind of the key. If you don't understand right-wing socialism, such that it is, that's probably the wrong way to characterize it, but if you don't understand socialism,

not of the Marxist left, you should read Vernor Sombard, he should probably read Oswald Spangler, but I don't even I don't even think you need to get that esoteric. I mean, all socialisms are kind of European

axiomatically because the origins of Europe as a kind of cultural, sociopolitical form develops out of the medieval mind, okay? And there was an interdependence between cats there

that was shattered by the modern age. Part of this was deliberate, but part of it just was inevitable, owing the emergent modalities of labor of production, but also of, you know, just patterns of living and what people, and the authority, what people recognize as authority and what authority they appeal do for justice and things like that. You know, when there's no more Lord of the Manor, and there's no more

there's no more subsistence agriculture that changes everything and the whole kind of the whole theory of socialism wherever you peg it on the political spectrum and whatever iteration you're talking about it's basically

it's basically an effort to to restore the social capital that was shattered by the emergence of of a modern life it's more complicated than that, but that's kind of the basic brass tax of it.

That's the best answer I can give. We'll let people chew on that. All right, so Germany invades Poland. What leads up to that? Why does that happen? Well, Poland was essentially ruled by a military junta that was somewhat unstable, not just in the way that, I mean,

conditions that lead to any military junta, kind of taking power unstable, but it uh there was a kind of great power intrigues destabilize that situation you know like I raised before and on um on Bronze Age Perverts podcast we deep dive into this um air grid operator of Ireland's electricity grid is powering up the northwest we're planning to upgrade the Electricity grid in your area and your input and local knowledge are vital in shaping these plans. Our consultation closes on the 25th of November. Have your say online or in person.

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Essentially what Germany demanded of Poland was they demanded dedicated access to Danzig. They demanded that their people be guaranteed certain rights of self-determination. what was called the Polish corridor. And they wanted some kind of guarantee that they could deploy, they could deploy to accomplish defense in depth, like on Polish soil in common with Poland,

like an event that, you know, the Soviet Union mobilized with hostility. But they were willing to let the polls, you know, retain sovereign control over Danzig so long as the Germans had dedicated access and so long as the so long as the ethnic Germans there had

you know had a formal political rights and uh I believe Poland would have come would have accepted those terms because they were entirely reasonable and they were precedented at that point the Germans weren't even demanding that you know the territories that have been ceded to Poland

every great war be decoupled from Poland and given back to them I mean this was a very moderate set of demands frankly and these demands owed the basic national security exigencies that I whatever whatever regime was in Berlin would have basically demanded the same thing. A couple of things happened to frame this in context as to why war kind of became in outable, in my opinion. Like I said, the Polish documents, a, after the invasion of Poland by the Vermacht, an SS battalion seized these documents from a from a I can't remember it was the foreign ministry or if it was uh or if it was somewhere else but uh in any event the the crux of these documents was that there have been diplomatic uh overtures to Poland wherein uh Roosevelt through William Bullitt had given Poland to foreign guarantee that if they held out against Germany, like they would support them an event of war.

And that, I believe, probably stiffened their resolve even more than Chamberlain's guarantee did. I mean, obviously, Chamberlain's guarantee was above board. And the Roosevelt, the new dealer's guarantee was not. But you've got to consider in context what have been going on between the new dealers in Poland, leading over that point. Ambassador Potoski, Potowski, I always butcher the pronunciation of these Slavic names, but when he'd been in Washington

several months before, the outbreak of hostilities, you know, late 1938, early in 1939, I think it was around holiday season, 1938. He ran across William Bullitt. William Bullitt was ambassador to France,

but he was something of a minister without portfolio in Roosevelt's administration. He was kind of the defect of Secretary of State. like cordell hall it was always kind of sideline but it it was understood even at the time that bullet he wielded disbortioned power

he was considered not a ridiculously serious guy he was kind of this foppish guy like a man about town uh you know he was one of Roosevelt's kind of a aristocratic conceits came out and some of these associations he maintained and nowhere was that more evident than with William Bullitt but uh when Patooski ran across a bullet um he voices he said that he relayed back to warsaw apatowski did that

you know bullet was characterizing uh you know the soviet union in completely benign terms uh rosevelt was uh was speaking in germany in in in such jingoistic language that you know it was having the effect of of of of kind of a kind of a facilitated a crisis where there didn't necessarily have to be one. Basically what Potoski said was that the new dealers were facilitating a kind of war fever by their vilification of Germany. And on top of that, they were kind of, you know, they were placing Poland in a very precarious position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union because they were essentially demanding that Poland

start looking at the Soviet Union as a strategic ally when, according to Potoski, like these people, meaning the Soviets were a greater threat essentially to Poland than the Germans were. and it indicated a real contempt for Roosevelt and the entire foreign policy apparatus in Washington. In Potoski's view, he said that Jews and their financiers, these are his words, not mine, were trying to orchestrate a crisis, and at the same time, you know, build a war coalition against Germany just, you know, for the sake of smashing Germany, without regard to, you know, what that would do to the geostrategic landscape in Europe. And the fact that there would be no, there would be no bulwark against Soviet power, which was increasingly, you know, being asserted by Stalin, both directly and implicitly at the same time.

I mean, so in other words, you had these, you had natural conditions. attention extent between Germany and Poland. I mean, they'd go back probably a millennia. And the Polish government was doing basically nothing to stop, what amounted to a burgeoning

kind of race war in the ground. The Polish majority was ethnically cleansing Jews, Russians, Germans, other people that they didn't like. You know, the you had you had some

moderates in Warsaw, within the military government. You had others who were incredibly jingoistic and were looking for any opportunity to essentially sue for war in order to grab even more land from Germany on top of that, which they were even ceded to them. Even in some elements who believe that Germany's back and been broken so much by the defeat in 1918 and by the subsequent. by the subsequent sanction of Versailles and everything else

that if it came to war there were even those who believed that the Polish army would be able to march on Berlin within weeks which seems totally insane but this is history in the rearview mirror and it's amazing what people can convince themselves of when they're convinced the rightness of their cause

as it were so basically all of those reasons and it's uh i believe too the uh what was always within the contemplation and both john tolin and david irving make this point um neither of whom are military historians but they're both were incredibly i mean irving's still alive but you know irving's kind of the seminal historian of the third rike who everybody feels about him and tolund uh tolland as unique had unique insight into the worsening of Hitler, I believe. And he had a good understanding.

I think he's probably the best documentarian of Hitler's relationship with the OKW and, you know, the general staff, rather. It, uh, the, uh, very much within the contemplation of, of, of, of, of, of, was, uh, the Soviet Union and its power projection potential. And the, uh, one of, uh, one of, other reasons Hitler was so eager until it began clear that this was just totally off the table to sue for peace with the Western allies is because, you know, like AJB Taylor to, you know, bring up him again, as I did about the Sunderberg point a moment ago. Hitler didn't really have any interest in the West. I mean, yeah, like any kind of any kind of German superpower, you know, was going to dominate Europe as a little pivot politically and militarily of the continent.

but this idea that, you know, this idea like the German that some sort of designs on France or something, I mean, in naked geostrategic terms, you know, what exactly would that accomplish? You know, nothing really is of 1939, 1990. So if you want to understand the Polish situation, too, like aside from all these intrigues and just intrinsic tensions, you've also got to understand what the Soviet Union was doing. The Soviet Union was amassing the largest military force, the world, the place. man it had ever seen it uh it was a burgeoning superpower as much as the united states was in military terms obviously not in not in productive terms um and in uh in terms of uh you know in terms of

economic wealth and the ability to translate its natural bounty into value added you know manufacturers obviously that wasn't there but its capacity to make war and project power was was absolutely on a part with the United States, potentially. But anything Germany wanted to do, if Germany could not reach something to get sort of concord with Poland in the form of mutual defense pact or at least, you know,

some kind of right of parley in terms of deploying in depth. This Black Friday, game stream and go full speed with one gig, Sky Broadband, and watch unmissable shows like all her fault on Sky. These nice people killing each other. And Ballad of a Small Player starring Colin Farrell on Netflix.

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Find out more at airgrid.com. Across the Polish frontier in common with the Polish army, if that couldn't be achieved, Jeremy would not be able to come to terms of Polish. because that would mean that they were just constantly essentially at risk of assault by the Soviet Union with no natural no naturally defensible

boundaries between them and the Soviet army and Poland would have been in a position too where they could essentially indefinitely indefinitely play off the Soviet Union against Germany and vice versa in order to get what they wanted. I mean it would not be a tenable situation. That's why. But

moving forward as late as as as late as October 1939 you know like several weeks into the several weeks into the

invasion William Rhodes Davis who was this kind of industrialist type he was not a new dealer but nor was in America firster he he made overtures to Berlin at the behest of

Department of State to see what as a civilian, which is, and you know, not as not in any official capacity. This is very unofficial diplomacy, but Dave's approach Hitler through Weisker at the

foreign ministry in Berlin and asked what Germany was willing to offer, you know, if America was willing to step in and try and, you know, negotiate some sort of peace. And Germany said that they'd allow Poland to remain sovereign so long as it became a, so long as it adopted a formal neutrality vis-a-vis Germany and the Soviet Union, so long as the territories that have been lost during the Great War. were decoupled and incorporated back into the German Reich. You know, so long as the Germans got Danzig. And, you know, so long as, you know, so long as, you know, so long as those conditions were met, basically, like, they, they would draw, you know, they would draw beyond, you know, what would be the new German borders, which were basically what they'd been in 1914, okay, which is not a great deal for the polls.

but it's better than what became the polls, and frankly, the Germans didn't have to offer anything. And then when, apparently when Davis returned to Washington, Roosevelt refused to meet him. Cordell Hull refused to meet him, and he was basically stonewalled, and everybody in Roosevelt's regime

pretended as if these conversations never happened. Now the cynic and me wants to believe that Roosevelt was trying to hedge his bets looking forward to do his... reelection. But, I mean, who the hell knows? Davis had no reason to lie about this. What he said was, it was pretty well documented by Tom Fleming in the New Dealers War, and as well as by Mark Weber at IHR. He's, I mean, when I'm dropping this force that people can look at it of if they want to, they don't need to just take my word for it. But, I mean, this

was, the political situation was very, very murky, in other words, okay, that's what, but it was, uh, you know, it would, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the power political paradigm between Germany and the Soviet Union, which is why, I mean, that's what it, what, what did, what did Berlin do? What did Berlin slash, you know, Hitler do before, uh, before giving the assault order? I mean, they sat down with uh ribandrop and uh you know Stalin's uh delegates who had authority to negotiate in uh such capacities and you know divvied up like what you know the what what the map would look like after the cessation of hostilities of poland because that and that wasn't an accident i mean that wasn't just you know germany being a good neighbor and in power political

terms. I mean, that was, this was the catalyst for the war. I mean, it, you know, it was, it was a geostrategic contest between the Reich and the Soviet Union and the Poles thought that they could

gamble and somehow profit, and that was incredibly foolish, but, like I said, it was an unstable regime. People made the point that one of the more bizarre things is, I mean, yeah, okay, I realize that there's always, there's always fictions that are confabulated in order to rationalize, you know,

intervention and things in these, in these power political affairs. And, you know, there's always, there's, there's never honesty that a foot when America decides to go to war. But holding out the Polish regime of 1939 as some sort of deacon of democracy or some kind of, you know, or some sort of, or some sort of victim of the intrigues of authoritarian states. I mean, that's particularly absurd.

You know, like I said, this was literally a military junta that was ethnically cleansing people that it, that it didn't think belonged in its national state. So that's the best summary I can proper. Can you talk a little bit about the fact that we are taught nowhere when we're growing up, when we're in school, that the Soviet Union and communos, at that point was a great threat to Europe. I mean, you saw, you already had the, we talked about the last time the Spanish Civil War, all the stuff that was happening in Spain and all these fascist movements rising up in certain countries

because they felt the heat of this. Germany, Germany being right there. What did they really did Germany really feel like the Soviet Union was going to push forward and basically take Europe if they wanted? Oh yeah, definitely. And I mean, Germany's problem going back, I mean, Germany's problem going back centuries was always Russia, okay? I mean, just if you take communism out of it, that would have changed everything, okay, in terms of the world situation. and the ideological persuasion of the state actors involved and everything else. But Germany always had a geostrategic existential problem vis-à-vis Russia.

That's just inevitable, okay? Because that's the tragedy of great power paradigms and particularly Europe where, I mean, one of the problems of Europe is that, you know, Europe is basically a peninsula. If you look at it, I mean, in geographic terms, I mean, you know this. You've looked at maps and you're a learned guy. It's essentially, it's an underside. Yeah, and there's no natural way to defend it. You know, and then you have this, there's nothing standing between,

there's nothing standing between Europe and, you know, the barbaric east. If you want to look, I don't look at it that way, but I mean, that's the view and that's kind of the mythology of Europe and its existential concerns and fears. So, I mean, there's that. And I, you know, the, the communists had gone on the march immediately after the Great War, and they basically got stopped in their tracks, you know, by the polls. And that's one of the reasons why, you know, the Polish army had this kind of misplaced confidence as people might view it. You know, intrinsically, communism, as I made the point last time we spoke, communism is not just intrinsically homicidal, it's intrinsically internationalist, and it's kind of like the practice.

access of it is to tear down national borders and frontiers and expand almost like almost almost like a plant germinates its surroundings or something i mean i'm not trying to sound shrill or resort to lurid hyperbole but um i mean there's there's all these considerations you know there's like the apoccal uh uh reality that you know bolshevism truly had this this kind of this this this momentum this this dialectical momentum

that's difficult for people to kind of identify with these days because there's nothing comparable but it but on top of all those things too Stalin was mobilizing a massive military force that

you know as I said was the largest that up to that point had ever existed I mean well and they were situated in offensive deployment by the time of Barbarossa two years subsequent just shy of two years subsequent to the assault of Poland.

I mean, what exactly was the Soviet Union planning on doing with this? I mean, they you know, I, it's never benign. I mean, you never, you never estate never, I mean, even aside of all these other variables we just mentioned,

you, estate never mobilizes particularly a state with, you know, super power potential like the Soviet Union was, a state ever mobilizes for benign purposes. You know, it's the equivalent of drawing down on somebody and saying, well, don't worry, I'm only pointing this weapon at you for

defensive purposes. I mean, that's great. Employers, rewarding your staff? Why choose between a shop voucher or a spend anywhere card when with options card, you can have both. With options card, your team gets the best of both worlds. They can spend with Ireland's favorite retailers or choose a spend anywhere

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Find out more at airgrid.i.4 slash northwest. You know, it doesn't change the fact that's an existential menace. And it's also, too, I mean, I believe that was part of the problem with, there was a, there was a, I don't want to, we can deep dive into this at some other time. you want, but like the Hitler-Straser cleft, which in some ways is the radical rights equivalent to the Trotsky-Stalin cleft. It's an imperfect metaphor, but I'm kind of intrigued by it.

The parallel. I mean, there was an international aspect to that because, I mean, Strasser was certainly no friend of the Russians or of communism or the Soviet Union, but he realized you know, we've got to somehow come to terms with these people.

And the response to that, like the Hitler faction's view, was basically the Prussian view, which was like, okay, I mean, even if you come to some kind of concord with Stalin and with the Russians, just by a kind of osmosis, you know, Germany is going to become a fiefdom of Russia slash Soviet Union. You know, you can't, you're going to be junior partner. just in existential terms in any kind of uh in any in any uh sort of diplomatic political concord of that nature you know so it's not going to matter because you know whatever

whatever whatever germany does in terms of power projection or in terms of existential political decisions you know of a of a military nature is is going to be dictated by moscow and if not dictated you know moscow is going to have the ultimate veto over it and you know in an existential realist terms. So, I mean, there's that. And finally, I write a lot of my long forum as people who read me. I'm sure I've gleaned

about the fact that I believe that, you know, Roosevelt and the United States was Germany's primary existential enemy. In, I mean, yeah, I realize there was a maniacian kind of ideological collision between the German rights,

in the Soviet Union and the Bolshevism and national socialism emerged out of a common dialectical process and they can't be overstated the significance of that but

in terms of the true kind of in terms of the true kind of enemy of the German Reich I'd say that was America and looking forward that definitely was in Hitler's contemplation, like I said, just read the text of the December 11th speech.

And if you're going to, if you're looking forward, you know, and the Germans did think in millennial increments, okay? I mean, you can say that it's grandiose and crazy, but it's really not. That's the way ancient people view the world. And it's a historical time in the 20th century, people began to think in these kinds of gargantuan terms, okay? I mean, that's all the major, all the major powers did. Okay, it wasn't just the Europeans.

It wasn't just Hitler's kind of, you know, artist romanticism, taking hold of his, taking hold of his fascinations. But if you're going to, if you're going to steal yourself for some ongoing kind of cold war with the United States or some kind of great power competition with America, I mean, you've got to become a superpower yourself. And, you know, we're back to the, the Hitler's strength. or problem like we just mentioned. Okay, I mean, you can either become a fiefdom of the Soviet Union

or you can smash it and you can create a European superpower that, you know, that stretches from the Atlantic coast to the Earls and is basically the United States of Europe, like replete with, you know, comparable population and

a power productive capacity and, and, uh, and bounty of natural wealth and, you know, in petroleum and energy and farmland and everything else. I mean, that's the way to look at it. So it, either way, Germany doesn't survive unless it becomes a superpower. And it becomes a superpower by smashing Ivan. So there's that. Even taking, like I said, even taking the ideological,

aspect out of it and the dialectical process that gave rise of the kind of intractable murderous tension between Berlin and Moscow out of it and taking the race war aspect out of it. That's what's important to consider. So Germany goes in in 1939

into Poland and what do they start setting up to as a cudgel against the Soviets. Well, I mean, there was the non-aggression. There was a non-aggression pact. There's, I think, they're a non-aggression pact, which, uh, and people, you know, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

And I mean, people who like to put shade in the Third Reich, you know, they like to say like, oh, you know, Hitler was this horrible man for, you know, breaching the non-aggression pact, you know, less than two years later. But you don't sign non-aggression pact with your friends. You sign non-aggression packs for your enemies. I mean, it should be obvious to anybody. And, I mean, like I said, they'd, they'd, um, you know, the, the, the, the Reich had approached, uh, had approached Stalin and, uh, in, uh, in Ribentrop's ministry, and, um, and established

that the demarcation lines would be in, uh, and the very much really met the Red Army and, you know, Poland Central. I mean, that's what that's what the hedge was. And it was less than perfect. I mean, you still have the Red Army on your frontier. And Poland's not a small country, but in the terms we're talking

about, and with the mobilization potential of the Soviet Union, and with the way modern combat resolves with combined arms, I mean, that you know, that still doesn't constitute a hell of a lot of defense in depth. You know, if, if

uh, if you're facing off against the if you're facing off against the Soviet Union and the center of Poland rather than, I mean, certainly better than having them, it's certainly better than having them on the North German plane or something, but it's, it's certainly less than ideal, but that's,

but I mean, that's why Barbarossa happened when it did. I don't want us to get ahead of ourselves, but it's, uh, looking, um, looking, uh, looking, looking eastward, um, that's exactly what the German saw. And that's what, uh, I mean, I believe, Victor Suvorov wrote a book.

He's a controversial guy, not just court historians dislike him because they don't like the fact that he's basically a revisionist. A lot of revisionists don't like him because they disagree with some of his takes because they think he's an eccentric kind of Russian.

Then there's yet other people don't like him because he was a GRU defector, and there's always people who, I mean, defectors really don't, people don't look favorably upon them. at okay I mean regardless of all they feel about the regime from whence the person in question came but I was I was questioned defectors because the first thing that they do is they get debriefed by the state department of whatever country they're defecting to yeah yeah they always they always end up having um housing and transportation out of nowhere yeah how did this happen no and it's just not I'm not saying people should And yeah, it's not an admirable thing to do, I mean, regardless of, I mean, every circumstance is different, but yeah, I understand the suspicion people have for Mr. Suvorov and others.

I get it. But what, in very, in very particular terms, what, what Suvorov said about, what was in Stalin's contemplation in the weeks and months leading up to Operation Barbarossa, I think is, I think is inarguable. The people today, they, we take for granted the way that combined arms, modern combat resolves, you know, rapidly. And we take for granted that, you know, the France's back was kind of broken in political terms by the Great War, and they, they, they, they weren't weren't really situated and they you know politically they were fractured you know they weren't really in a position to wage a general war against the german rike and plus it didn't it didn't

really make a lot of sense you know the whole the whole issue of the war guarantee like was to prevent what happened which was you know germany's assault on poland and you know the alteration of strategic conditions in europe's like once that happened it's like okay well the the you know it's already failed in its purpose you know the mechanism in place you know that threat of war so it's like why why bother to even go through with it at this point so there's a lot of issues presented by prance's decision to declare war in berlin but uh people did think with the exception of a handful of uh mostly uh armored commanders who were very forward thinking i mean rommel's kind of first among him because he was a real stud in this regard but there were others too but

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we can create a more reliable, sustainable electricity supply for your community. Find out more at Airgrid. Dot A.E. Fort slash Northwest. They're the minority. My point is that even people who put German victory odds is all but inevitable,

they thought it would be a pretty long slog from, from, you know, the Franco-German frontier to the Paris as it were, including Stalin. So, you know, the idea is that, you know, as Germany's like,

as Germany's hemorrhaging men and material on the Western Front, you know, this is when the Soviets will strike from the East. And, you know, Germany was not particularly in 1940, you know, at the end of the onset of hostilities with France and the UK. I mean, it, the onset of actual hostilities. I mean, obviously, the war declaration had come, you know, months and months earlier, but war declarations, rather. but um

the uh Germany was not really in a position of Germany just was not in a position to wage some sort of like you know protracted two front attrition war just wasn't I mean that's this is the ongoing existential nightmare that Germany always had

in terms of its military quagmires or potential military quagmires and uh when uh when Germany smashed uh France within several weeks weeks, you know, and not in lieu of, you know, several months.

This really, this really gave the Soviet Union pause. And this is when it became, that's when Stalin realized he had to strike immediately, essentially, by autumn of, of 1941. And that's Superov's point, and I accept that. and that's that's also why the Germans struck when they did i mean it i i believe with these and i'm not any gun of military expert but i know something about politics and uh and the way governments behave at war and uh i know something of the historical record in this regard and uh during this unfortunate ukraine situation i made the point of people a few times that historically uh historically the Russians wait too long to act and then they only deploy when they're sure they can win

and traditionally the Germans were you know in the Prussians before them but the modern German state was the Prussian state traditionally they kind of jumped the gun arguably I think that really played out in 9 and 41 but that's that's basically what I understand it um I mean the Soviet Union was an existential threat in military, if not political terms to Germany and to the entire continent

that's an arguable. It doesn't matter how anyone feels about Aoff Hitler, it doesn't matter how anyone feels about the German Reich. I don't see how that I don't see how that's arguable. I mean, there's certain variables that when present make not just war inevitable, but they render certain political

conditions inevitable and they they establish parameters of how states are going to interact and a the uh a a um had uh one or two things was going to happen either you would you know like we just talked about at the onset of our conversation you know there would have been a Soviet dominated Europe either by default just existentially you know it was the only proximate superpower of the continent or you know because Stalin just simply went all in and, you know, absorbed Europe, you know, by force of arms, you know, because the historical moment was his, as it were,

like, only to the momentum of Marces Leninism and the kind of revolutionary fervor they were in, you know, only to the fact that, you know, America still needed a few years to mobilize. And, uh, thus, you know, the opportunity would never present itself again. Because, you know, Stalin saw the writing on the wall, too, in terms of,

in terms of, um, you know, what military preparateness, You know, and what the implications for that were, you know, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the in the, in the, in the, in the, in a in the, I'm called gross wrong politics. I mean, all these things, all, oh, it was, it was a convergence of circumstances, you know, circumstances, you know, circumstances really do conspire sometimes, and that's, that's, that's, that's the way to understand it, I believe. Um, even if we take the, uh, ideological, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, phenomena as well. You know, they don't emerge out of nothing or just, you know, they don't just manifest in people's minds, you know, out of the ether, you know, independent of historical conditions and things like that. I realize that seems very abstract, but yeah. What, how is America being drawn into the war? Well, I mean, like I said, I, Roosevelt had a problem

and I mean the new this is we can do a dedicated show about the new dealers if you want and I think we should but Roosevelt was trying to insinuate America into a war with with the German Reich

really from the moment he took office okay but he had a problem public opinion was solidly against that to the as of 1939, it was something like

80%. It was in the high 70s, low 80s, people opposed a general war with Germany, absent some sort of direct assault upon America. Okay, this was not the case for Japan, which is very interesting, but for our purposes,

let's not get into that right now. And you had you know, Senator Nye, the Nye committee had had closed-up shop in 36 or 37, having concluded that, you know, one of the proximate cause of the First World War was J.T. Morgan bankrolling the crown and demanding that they get, you know, a return on their investment, as it were or not before to eat the loss. And, you know, Nye had gone on national television and said, you know, we've concluded, you know, that banking interests as well as the armaments industry quite literally conspired, you know, to, you know, to, to, to, to, to, to, the greatest circumstance for which they could profit, you know,

at the cost of, you know, 50,000 dead American boys in combat and another, and equal that number, you know, dead from disease, you know, shipboard and, and filthy trenches and things. You know, people were not going to get behind

Roosevelt going to war with, you know, white Christian Germany just because, you know, we don't like those Germans, but, you know, the communists are our friends. This wasn't going to work. So what happened was, so I think very, interesting happened on a I mean there's two key takeaways here the first

key takeaway obviously that Pearl Harbor was a godsend for uh for the new dealers on but they still are a problem because uh they couldn't fully insinuate that uh as uh across its belly against uh Germany much as they would have liked to um what happened on December 4th um December 4th, 941. Robert R. McCormick, he was the Archamerica First or

owner of the Chicago Tribune. Somebody leaked to him what was called the Rainbow Five War Plan. It was splashed all over the Tribune and then, you know, every other news service picked it up rapidly. The Rainbow Five War Plan was commissioned by Roosevelt in 1940.

And it was a real war plan. It was the war plan. And it was a war plan that had only one purpose. And that was the wage war on Germany. It called for the mobilization of 10 million men. It called for an invasion of Europe. It called for the mass production of four engine bombers to devastate the German Reich from the air.

and it was very clear that it would take it until 1943 for this mobilization table to be affected at which point the Rainbow Five War Plan would be implemented and General Weidemeyer who then, I believe, was a captain

he was responsible for the Rainbow Five War Plan kind of the brass tax of it. He was something of a logisticist, it's genius and sort of like an Omar Bradley type, but with a lot more integrity and character. And Weedemeyer had a connections to America first. And Weidemeyer, as he relayed to,

um, to not just his biographer, but to, uh, um, a couple different historians who chronicled, uh, these events, including Tom Fleming. He was visited by the FBI, as well as the Department of the Army, and they were accusing him of the leak.

And, uh, he didn't leak it. And he approached Hap Arnold in later years, and half Arnold apparently told him, and this became somewhat of the consents of the army, that it was Roosevelt's people themselves who leaked it. Crazies as that might seem, but that is really what convinced Germany

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And if you read the December 11th speech by Hitler to the Reichstag, the concrete incidents that he references, I mean, like I made the point before, like Hitler really does not mention Stalin in there, and he mentions Churchill only in the most dismissive terms. He talks about Roosevelt as a moral enemy of the German Reich. He talks about there was no reason for this war to happen, and he talks about America as having been captured

by a conspiratorial cadre whose ambition was and is to wage total war on Germany. And this is what he was talking about. Okay. And I don't see, you know, honestly, too, I mean, the rebuttal to what people, the rebuttal of Weidemeyer and Hap Arnold and Fleming himself is that, you know, well, nobody would do that because of the national security implications. It's like, well, you know, there really was only one way for America to wage war on the German Reich. And that was just, you know, to mobilize completely and then assault Europe.

You know, it's not like this is some big secret. Either America was going to do that. The political war, the political will was there and the material and the men were there or they were not. So, I mean, it's not as if we're not talking about the leaking of nuclear secrets or something. So there's that. I mean, number two, there wasn't really any. other way to get America into the war, you know, other than telling Germany in a roundabout plausibly deniable way, we're going to assault you, and then, you know, making sure that Germany

returns the stir as it were by, you know, declaring war in kind, but then doing it officially, you know, then the president can go before Congress and say, like, you know, a war has been to, you know, war has been brought to our shores, you know, we, we haven't done anything to provoke this. I mean, my idea, America was that war with Germany for years before that, you know, and most recently before the leak September 11th, that this was the first September 11th, 9041. Roosevelt

declared unrestricted. I can think of a September 11th before that. They tried to kill Mussolini on September 11th. And September 11, 973 was Penne She's seizure of power. So it's one of those

haunted days on November 9th. Yeah, that's a good, I didn't even think of that. Yeah, you're absolutely right. But it, uh, but December of, but yeah, no, September 11th, um, of 41, Roosevelt declared a unrestricted a naval war affair against Germany. He said all German military vessels when encountered the Atlantic Ocean will be fired upon. I mean, that's not a declaration of war. Like, I don't know what it is. You know, it's like, you know, committing acts of war is a constructive declaration of war. I mean, so there's, um, all of, uh, all of, um, all of these things. Um,

I mean, that was what, because I mean, people, this is what's fascinating about, like, kind of pop history. Like, because that's what people say, you know, you can bring up the people. If you sell the Rainbow Five case to people, they were like, well, but Pearl Harbor happened. That's what brought America into the war. It's like, yeah, but nobody knew Pearl Harbor was going to happen. I think it appeared inevitable. That's a whole other issue. But the point is, too, that doesn't get into war with Germany.

I mean, despite what Roseville's people were trying to sell for years, like, oh, anything that happens in two. Tokyo is coming from Berlin. Those little yellow Japanese, there are inferior, just the Germans anyway, telling them what to do. Nobody believed that. And nobody particularly wanted to wage war on Germany just because, you know, I mean,

no matter what Japan did, it wasn't going to somehow, you know, that wasn't going to somehow allow the New Deal regime to, you know, get war declaration against Germany. Particularly with the House of Congress. And like I said, we've got to look at the political climate. You know, look at the Nye committee. like what people were thinking about.

Like we talked about last time we held one of these discussions, you know, like World War I was viewed as, it was viewed as basically the Iraq war of the time. Like, people did not trust the government anymore. You know, they viewed World War I as a con. You know, they viewed, when any time,

some war department type or some state department type, you know, came on the radio in those days. I started to say, you know, trying to bang the war drums. You know, people said, like, you know, we're not, you know, according to who, we won't be fooled again, you know, I mean, that people, they've got this idea that, uh, they got this idea of, you know, because they see like these, this kind of ticker tape parade footage of, uh, and things, uh, you know, like the sailor kissing

the pretty nurse and stuff that like, oh, World War II is when everybody will, you know, you got war fever and jumped on the bandwagon, like that's not the case, you know, um, at all. And it was not easy for the new dealers to get a general war declaration against the German Reich out of this. Like, it really wasn't. And it's not as if, you know, the Germans were really cunning, too. Hitler made sure that there was not going to be some kind of lucetania event. Like, one of the things that, one of the early clefts between him and Raider, you know, was the gross admiral later replaced by Donnitz.

I mean, there's a lot of things that led to that dismissal, but Raider was saying, like, you know, look, like, if my if my men encounter American vessels, we're going to, we're going to fire on them. And Hitler's like, you absolutely are not. You're not going to do anything unless you're defending yourself. You know, we're not going to give, we're not going to give the Americans, you know, some pretext to, you know, to declare war on us. I mean, the Germans were very content of this. You know, like, it wasn't, it wasn't, it wasn't something that was, was beyond their comprehension. And

And despite what, how Hitler himself and the OKW are presented, these were not like provincial guys who didn't understand, you know, the way that America did business in terms of war and peace questions. I mean, they fought America and not, you know, just, you know, over 20 years before. And an historical time that's a drop in the bucket, you know, this isn't, this isn't something, this isn't something that, that was not on their mind. Yeah. I mean, I remember 20 years ago like it was yesterday.

Yeah, exactly. 9-11. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, so people act like, among other things, they act like the Germans were ignorant or provincial, number one. But also, yeah, they act like, you know, the Great War was 100 years previous or something. You know, the, uh,

and plus two, I mean, the German, the German general staff was full of guys who'd literally fought the U.S. army. You know, I mean, it's, this wasn't, uh, this wasn't something remote to them. You know, they knew what America could do. They'd fought it. You know what I mean?

It was not theoretical. They had no illusions about this. So Hitler declares war on the United States. And then how does the United States enter into the battle officially? I mean, really, for all practical purposes, I mean, America, there was no, this is interesting, too, because, I mean, you had like the, as everybody knows, there were the do little raids over, uh, over Japan. wherein, you know, the pilots of these, of these bomber craft literally had to bail out because they couldn't refuel

and then be, you know, retrieved later. America did that because it was viewed as imperative, you know, kind of like return to serve after Pearl Harbor. You know, America didn't actually engage at Vermeck until 43, like in North Africa. You know, and that was, that's fascinating, too, because you had Darlane, who was, I'm trying to remember what his formal title was.

I mean, he was basically the, he was the equivalent of like the military, curator or like what would have been in the German Reich the galighter of a it was the military district commander of you know French Algeria basically okay and it um it was French Operation Torch uh when America landed in North Africa um it was uh they traded Oswald fire with uh with fascist French forces you know not with the Merrmoct and uh the uh Casserine was the first, uh,

was the first engagement, uh, with the aggregate core. And America got, uh, America was handily defeated. It wasn't until El Guitar, um,

months, uh, months subsequent that, uh, that America was able to attack, like a victory over German forces on the board, as it were. And that was,

uh, that's what put Patton on the map, interestingly. Like, I don't, I don't know if people still watch the movie Patton. Like when I was a kid and, and I'm sure when you were a kid,

you know, was always on TV. like we Padden with George C. Scott. Yeah. Yeah. Which is actually really good movie. One of the first Blu-rays I ever bought. Oh, wow. Okay, yeah. I mean, it's a dope movie. It's my dad's favorite movie, so I've seen it a bunch. But, you know, they get, they get into that. You know, that was Patton's big coup, was that, you know, he defeated the Avrogate Chordial guitar. And the, I mean, the writing was on the wall already, you know, like Rama was in terrible trouble.

but uh but just the same i mean the average or even on their worst day were i mean they were they were incredibly freaking squared away that's not any uh that's not any uh that's not any uh that's not any small thing but i'll uh if you want to get into uh if you want to get into the uh if you want to get into the u.s war in africa and the u.s war like in in in the west i would love to do that but i'd like to do another dedicated hour to that we'd even do it tomorrow if you want but frankly i want to brush up on my notes if that's that you'd be that you'd be able to do it That's okay. Yeah, that's fine. Yeah, yeah. That's fine. Do you want to hit anything else before we go? Not unless you've got any more questions, man. No, I think that's enough for people to,

people to deal with. Okay, yeah. Let's hit up the next time, though. It doesn't have to be tomorrow, but I'm willing to go tomorrow if you want. But yeah, whenever you want to, let's hit up the, the onset of actual hostilities in terms of America engaging with the Vermock and go from there. Okay, that sounds good. Remind everybody about your substack and we'll get out of here. Yes, sir, indeed. My substack is Real Thomas 777.substack.com. I put long form up there. I've got a podcast on there.

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Find out more at airgrid.com.i. 4.4 slash Northwest. And it's only $5 a month. So even if you're a hobo, you can afford it. Maybe if you're a hobo, you shouldn't be signing up for substacks. But my point is that it's very affordable. I'm active on Twitter at number 7. H-O-M-A-S-7-7. I'm active on Gab at Real underscore Thomas 777,

and I'm all over YouTube's now, thanks to people like my friend Pete, who put me on here, which is dope. And moving forward, I may get my own YouTube channel. I haven't decided yet, but I got to catch up on my, I've got to get to my print long for them before I make any other moves. But in any event, I can't think enough, Pete. I mean, I really enjoy these conversations and I really, just on their own terms and we're friends, but also I really, really appreciate the exposure. It's dope. So thank you very much.

No problem at all. Until maybe tomorrow. That would be great. And we're back with Thomas 777. How are you doing, sir? I'm doing very well, Pete. Thanks for having me back. I'm very much enjoying these, these sessions that we're having. And thanks for commenting me. The last two days, I was really going to sideline. I was quite sick. So thanks for accommodating the delay, and I'm sorry about that. No problem at all. So last time you had touched on Pearl Harbor, you had mentioned it for a second, and then a couple comments came in and said, hey, asked Thomas about Pearl Harbor and how that plays into the whole war effort, both theaters. So you want to talk a little bit about Pearl Harbor and did they see it coming?

Did they know it was coming? Was it, did they cause it? Well, there's a couple ways we can look at that. And I don't want to go too far outside the scope, but Admiral Kimmel, husband Kimmel. That was his name, husband Kimmel. I mean, you know how in that epoch, like particularly waspy people had very strange names. Yeah. Admiral Kimmel was one of those types.

And the big criticism, I mean, a lot of people claim particularly on the right, you know, the dissident right, they claim that, Well, you know, the Pacific Fleet was deployed as it was at Pearl Harbor, essentially to bait the Japanese into assaulting it. I don't think that was true. I mean, yeah, it was a provocative act to deploy that way. But I don't, I do not think that, I don't think Roosevelt, they don't think Sumner Wells. I don't, I don't think Morgan Thao. I don't think their idea was, we're going to deploy in this kind of array, and, you know, the Japanese is going to assault Hawaii. and that's going to get us into the war.

I don't think that for a few reasons. But back to Admiral Kimmel, he himself was really hung out to dry, and he was actually courts marshaled, and he was acquitted. But Kimmel was really, he was really kind of burned an effigy, and that wasn't entirely misplaced. I'm not a military vet, but I do know some things about how institutions work and that are scaled like, you know, institutions at scale. Granted, I'm talking about the private sector, not the military, but I read this whole

treatment of this book called Groupthink, which it's one part, kind of military sociology, and it deals with the QM missile crisis, it deals with Pearl Harbor. It's basically about a collective decision-making can lead to very, very productive or disastrous outcomes, depending on the presence or actions. of certain variables, depending upon the trust and confidence among the men in the group. I mean, all those things, okay? But one of the case studies was Pearl Harbor, okay? And the way this all their cast, though the kind of culture of these officers and their wives in Hawaii,

it almost struck me as, you ever seen the old, you ever seen Apocalypse Now Redux where there's the, there's a deleted scene where these kinds of French or Rostocrats? Yeah, yeah. And they're like pretending like the war is not really. really going on and, you know, they're still hosting their dinner parties and talking about, you know, the potential of a colored revolt and stuff. I, it almost seems like that. Like Kimmel and these, uh, these kinds of flag officers, they, they knew something terrible might happen, but it's, it's just, well, we're the United States Navy, what could possibly

happen. So I think there was an aspect of that, but everything, uh, everything Washington in the war department and Roosevelt's, the many most trusted and the men who most wanted to insinuate America into war around, you know, in his inner circle, they kept coming back to the fact, they were singularly focused on Germany, okay, they just were. And there was talk, and I'll get to this in a minute, that ultimately led to real intrigues when it became clear that there just wasn't a political will in America to go to war with. Germany, you know, whether to, you know, save the UK or to defend democracy or to or to or to fight against fascism, it, when that became clear and when the polls, when the polls, I mean, government

by poll really kind of began under Roosevelt, okay, and consistently about fully about 80% of Americans as late as April 1941, like were opposed to war with Germany. Japan, it was a little more complicated. People did not like the Japanese. Some of this was for racial reason. Some of this was for, there was tensions between American, Japan, that definitely did not need

to approach anything that led to this horrible war. But there was real tension between American Japan. It was not an American German. But still, there was a solid majority against that was opposed to pursuing a policy of

aggressive posturing, let alone war. with Japan. But there began to be talked in New Deal quarters of provoking a war with Japan as a backdoor to war with Germany, especially over the tripartite pact for obvious reasons. Which for those who don't know was a

pact between Germany, Italy, and the Empire of Japan, that if any one was attacked, the other two would come to the aid of the other. You know, basically a mutual defense pack. But it was framed in defensive terms, okay? Not that that means anything in power politics and actual

military terms, but in political terms, it's highly significant. But in any event, I don't believe, given that climate, it just does not seem credible to me that, you know, Kimmel's command, and the forces under his command were deliberately arrayed in order to provoke a Japanese attack. I don't believe that. And especially considering, you know, the, we talked about the Rainbow 5 leak in our last segment. And the reason why people generally don't know about that and the reason why it kind of became a nullity is because Pearl Harbor made it a nullity.

It was not a nullity in actual, it caused an effect term, because that's what provoked the furor of the Third Reich, Adolf Hitler, to declare war against America. I mean, it was many things, too. It was the Atlantic Charter. It was the fact that America was literally bankrolling the communist war against,

against the Third Reich. It was because, you know, as of September 11th, 1991, America had quite literally declared a naval war against Germany. I mean, it was all these things. But Rainbow Five was really what pushed the German, the OKW,

Gering, Raider, the Fuhrer himself, like the entire control group of the Third Reich's military decision-making apparatus. This is what pushed them towards war with the United States. States. This is what put them over that Rubicon, as it were, okay? But in terms of American

perception and American public opinion, it didn't figure because the Rainbow Five Leaked happened on December 4th, not even three days later, two and a half days later, Pearl Harbor happens. And out of Pearl Harbor happened, you know, war fever jumps off. Americans are outraged. They're frightened. Roosevelt goes in the radio and declares that, you know, the jabby who sold in Pearl Harbor was planned by Adolf Hitler, which is ridiculous in all kinds of ways. Hitler was a surprise as Roosevelt at Pearl Harbor. There was not good offices. There was between Tokyo and Berlin. There was not what we consider good diplomacy and good communication. There sure as hell was not military coordination at all. And this was not just going to the distance of the day and the absence of telecom tech that we take for granted. Okay, that's that's absurd.

but when um the uh getting back to uh getting back to uh pearl harbor and and the political intrigues surrounding it um on uh also on december 4th incident uh simultaneous with you know the same day as rainbow 5 was leaked something very, very strange happened at the Manila waterfront. The Philippines is America's largest overseas holding in Asia. People may or may not know that. That's why the assault on the Philippines was such a disaster. And there's a huge amount of casualties

and tens of thousands of people suffered horribly, including, of course, a huge number of American servicemen. Just awful stuff. On the many nights of Christmas, the Guinness Storehouse brings to thee Christmas nights at gravity. This Christmas, enjoy a truly unique night out at the Gravity Bar. Sayver festive bites from Big Fan Bell, expertly crafted seasonal cocktails and dance the night away with DJs from Love Tempo. Brett take infuse, amazing atmosphere, incredible food and drink. My goodness, it's Christmas at the Guinness Storehouse. Book now at giddlestorhouse.com.

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On December 4th, Admiral Hart, who was the commander of the Mendele Garrison, or the Mendele Waterfront, I think it was known as, he ordered a young lieutenant named Kempthali to take command of an obsolescent schooner called the Lanakai, or the Lanakai, to outfit it with a Spanish-American War era cannon, a couple of machine guns. He swore in about half a dozen Filipinos as temporary enlisted in the U.S. Navy. And Lieutenant Kemptali was ordered to pilot the schooner

to the coast of Cam Ran Bay, just off of what was Japanese. territorial waters because Cameron Bay is in what's now Vietnam and the Japanese were occupying it then. Keptali was given an envelope and he was told to open it upon reaching his objective, which was immediately outside the contiguous zone at Cameron Bay. He got these orders on December 4th. On December 7th was when Talley undertook this effort because the Lanakai had been outfitted for the purpose. and before he reached his destination, he was called back to the Manila waterfront because the assault on Pearl Harbor had happened. And Case Orange, or Planned Orange, which was the code name for War with Japan, he was informed that this was now underway.

Okay. Destroy the envelope. Destroy the message. He did. Years later, Admiral Hart, I, Milo Hart refused to talk about this for a couple of days. decades. Talley told Thomas Fleming, who wrote an incredible history of the New Deal regime in the Roosevelt administration as well as World War II and Roosevelt's role therein. He actually interviewed Kemp Talley. By this time, Adamle Hart was dead. Talley's point

blank, he said, was I sent on a suicide mission to provoke essentially what amounted to a Gulf of Tonkin kind of incident with the Japanese Imperial Navy. And Hart said, well, why else would you have been deployed there? You know, he's like, I can't tell you for certain because I didn't read the message I gave you because it was from the president and it was, you know, eyes only or whatever the military equivalent is. But why else could you be sent there other than as a decoy, you know? So take that for what it's worth.

Because, I mean, again, the Roosevelt had a real problem. on the Placentia Bay conference with Roosevelt, between Roosevelt and Churchill, that's mostly Roosevelt's big coup. You know, the, the U.K.'s war effort was not going well against the Third Reich. I mean, to say the least, I mean, it was a disaster. That's when the Atlantic Charter was declared, and Roosevelt said, you know, we stand with Britain, with Great Britain, and the Atlantic Charter, you know, set out a series of points, almost Wilsonian sounding points about what the post-war democratic order would look like once fascism was defeated,

which to me, again, is like another declaration of war and all but name against the Third Reich. And he, the minutes are of the, of the, of the conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, this is documented that Roosevelt said that he was going to continue to wage war against the German Reich without declaring war, and that he was going to continue to provoke the Third Reich into declaring war on the United States. The poll returns after the Placentia Bay summit after the Atlantic Charter.

Out of this whole media push for this kind of anti-fascist crusade, there was still solidly between 70% and 80% of the country opposed entering a war with German. and about 60 and 70% opposed war with Germany, even if the UK fell and even if the Soviet Union was defeated. And incidentally, I believe, and George Kennan kind of danced around this issue,

but with Kenan wanted to kind of read between the lines, Roosevelt never particularly went over great with Catholic voters for obvious reasons. but once he uh once uh after uh after the uh after the ever the over the barbarossa operation ensued you know june 22nd 41 it uh and roosevelt unconditionally declared alliance with moscow i mean that that was it you know like he he lost he lost catholic america you know like how how could you stand with how could you stand with communism you know i we don't care who who's in the in we don't care who's sitting in the in in in in Berlin is you know we we don't care what what Hitler is we don't care if he's a monster even you you can't

stand with communism against Europe you know that's insane that's madness but I what I'm getting at is that Roosevelt realized by by late 41 he realized he just was not going to get some he was not going to be able to stir up war fever against the German Reich he just was not going to happen absent some kind of mass assault by German, absent some kind of third Reichs version of Pearl Harbor against America, and that would never happen. Because even as late as days where Pearl Harbor, there's, you know, the, like we talked in the last session,

about one of the major reasons for the cleft between the furor and grand admiral raider was that Hitler, in no uncertain terms, said, like, we are not going to provoke the United States in 80. and, you know, your men will defend themselves and they're fired upon, but, you know, we are, we are not going to provoke a confrontation in North Atlantic.

And what Donets said later and granted, I mean, Donitz was, Donis didn't inherit a command of the Creasmarine until years subsequent, but, I mean, he was in a position to know. He maintained his own memoirs as well as at Nuremberg. that most of the incidents in which,

most of the incidents prior to December 41, when German U-boats did fire upon American vessels, these American vessels were moving in tight formation with Royal Navy warships that were indistinguishable therein. You know, I mean, and I've got a reason to believe that. That's exactly they would have deployed, I mean, especially in the wake of the Atlantic Charter. But, I mean, they've been doing that for years by that.

point i mean at least two years so that was that was um i mean that that's that's my take on pearl harbor and uh you know the way you understand too like we were talking before we went to air i mean one of the one of the real moral indictments of of the new deal regime if if your policy particularly in america i mean i think this is just i think this goes just generally okay but especially in America where there's purposeful structural hedges against overreach, particularly executive overreach, almost the point I think of a sort of self-defeating anxiety about it. You know, if you have a president who is pursuing a course,

a purposeful course to sue for war, said he can derive political gain personal power and or imposed an ideological vision in the wake or presumed aftermath and victory within that war. I mean, that's a kind of gross breach of public trust and

potentially catastrophic. I mean, not just an apocalyptic but for the foreseen of the country and its people that potentially can endure, the consequences of which can endure over centuries. And Roosevelt's Secretary of State was a man named Cordell Hall. It kind of a cipher.

The guy taught of the list in Roosevelt was known to make fun of him in the presence of witnesses. Roosevelt considered him an insufferable moron. Sumner Wells, the undersecretary of State, was kind of the real, was the shadowed secretary of state, the real diplomat. And there's a kind of the universal consensus, even among the uniform consensus, even among court historians, is that deploying Hull to negotiate with the Japanese ambassador in Namora, who was this very kind of upright, retired naval admiral, Hall's role was kind of just to obstruct and to sort of scream moral camps quite literally yet in the mora and instruct him that the Japanese we're not we're not we're not we're not we're not we're not we're not

proceeding acceptably in in power politics like meanwhile this was as America was quite literally destroying the Japanese economy you know purposefully you know so the Japanese the whole memo memorandum on the many nights of Christmas the Guinness Storehouse brings to thee Christmas nights at gravity. This Christmas, enjoy a truly unique night out at the Gravity Bar. Savour festive bites from Big Fan Bell,

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there much has been made about that by some historians and it was basically the final namura's final effort to achieve peace with the United States Japan was in a strange position politically you had these kind of frightened civilian politicians who were

who were incessantly worried for good reason they'd be assassinated if they ran to follow the military you had an army that was very very radicalized He had a Navy that was a lot more reasoned and probably America's best bet for for reaching some kind of negotiated settlement in terms of sphere of influence parameters in the Far East. Nomura offered, he said, look, he's like,

why don't we have a 90-day hiatus of any deployment by the United States or Japanese forces in theater? You know, we will agree to withdraw from southern Indo-China, which would be southern Vietnam and parts of Cambodia and Laos. But by that point, most of the Japanese codes have been broken. So Washington messaged to Hall and said that, well, you know, we've got intercepts that we've, you know, the codes have been broken and indicating the Japanese, they have planned to, to reinforce Indochina imminently, so obviously negotiating in bad faith. That doesn't make any sense.

Like, obviously, you're going to hedge your diplomatic efforts with, you know, the ability to deploy in depth to defend if need be. I mean, this is obvious. But that, so Hall responded essentially by, you know, just reiterating terms to Japan. And there were terms that obviously were not going to be abided. You know, they were, if Japan wanted the embargo lifted, if Japan wanted to, the embargo lifted, if Japan wanted to be able to access its assets, which had been frozen and could not be recovered for all practical purposes in the United States. You know, they'd have to, they'd have to withdraw completely from Indochina.

They'd have to, you know, they'd basically have to, like, they'd have to end the war with the Chinese mainland, essentially, like, seed, like, all the territory they'd conquer to Chankai Sheck as, you know, kind of like the American proxy, like client proxy. just like ridiculous terms. I mean, in the bounded rationale of what was underway. I mean, and it's, that's, that's my point. You know, if you're not, and there's, there's a parallel today wherein, you know, the, the State Department doesn't actually practice diplomacy. It just, it just shrieks at people, you know, and pursues a provocative and provocative lines of, of, of, of these, it just is usually prerogative.

of declarations that are, and the only purpose which is to be provocative, then to preclude resolution, short of hostilities. I mean, thankfully, America lacks the political will enforces in being to wage a war against Russia, but I mean, you know, unfortunately for the Japanese

and ultimately for the, for the United States, that that wasn't the case in 1941, but that was, that was, um, that was my point. What was what was, what was FDR?

deal with Germany. It seems to me that Germany is a more likely ally for the United States than the Soviet Union is. In actual terms, it doesn't make sense. I mean, not even an ally, but just a trade ally. It doesn't make any sense. You know that you are going to alienate so many people by sitting down with Stalin. Well, the thing is, I mean, this goes back, it's not a proximate cause, but there's a parallel. You know, going back, Christopher Clark, and he's a historian I invoke a lot because he's written some really interesting stuff on World War I.

And he wrote a whole history of Prussia. That's huge volume, but it's really dope. But, I mean, he made the point that the kind of absolute enmity, like the real hatred that develop between. Kaiser Vilhelm and King George. I mean, both of these men were insufferable people. It's part of it. But it, yeah, there's really no, there's really no reason for America, the UK, and Germany to have been at anything, but to have been at odds at all.

If anything, like, yeah, they should have been allies. Even notwithstanding communism in the monster that was Joe Stalin, that's kind of the natural alliance against, you know, the Russia and the east. I mean, yeah, it, the best, I mean, there's a little known guy. He was not a little known at the time. Yeah. But haven't some historians gone as far as to say that basically that Hitler was an Anglophile, that he just wanted to be, he wanted a partnership with England.

Well, yeah, unconditionally. Half a dozen times he offered the UK unconditional peace. I mean, that's its own thing. Like next session, I want to cover that. We'll get into the UK's. We'll get into the Churchill War against the Reich. But there was a, there was a guy named Harry Hopkins. he's kind of forgotten history now,

but he certainly was not unknown in his epoch. He was sort of the Colonel House of the Roosevelt administration. And he, it might have been Nye, or it might have been Burton Wheeler. It was one of the kind of arched nemeses of Roosevelt himself, who came to call Hopkins the American Rasputin. Rasputin had been the secretary of commerce, so they need 40. and he was forced to resign because he made some frankly extremist statements.

What could only be construed is in support of communism, like overtly in support of communism. And he published in April 41, he was no longer Secretary of Commerce, but he'd been literally moved into the White House. and the cover, the claim for this was, well, he's in poor health, and he was, and Mr. Roosevelt takes care of his people. It's like, okay, so why is he living in the White House? And he wasn't exactly a man without means. So, I mean, the implications obvious. You know, he was quite obviously, you know, kind of Roosevelt's closest, you know, advisor, the fact that it were.

but he declared in April 41 two things. He said, well, first of all, he said, in response to people who criticized the, you know, criticized the kind of anti-business climate that had emerged in America. I mean, there's a real threat of capitalism kind of being relegated to the Ashman of history, not by circumstances or any. thing of a historical nature, but because of some kind of truly socialist revolution in America. This is not impossible. This is not a fantasy, okay?

Hopkins response to that was, well, you know, America is in danger of a, quote, fascist revolution by big business. I mean, he literally said this. And he said that we need a quote, new deal for the world. He said that the world's under threat by fascism. Adolf Hitler is the architect of it. If we do not go to war to destroy it off Hitler and his German Reich and Mussolini and the Empire of Japan, who in his mind, too, are all conspiring together and responsible for everything bad that happened anywhere, you know, it's, there's a similar like Trotsky's nonsense, you know, like fascists and big business are conspiring to enslave us all. And if we don't, you know, we, you know, if we, if we, if we, if we don't export the new deal abroad and

annihilate our enemies, you know, we'll, you know, we'll, you know, we'll, you know, we'll, we'll just be a garrison state, you know, we'll be a city on the hill, but we'll be a besieged city on the hill. I mean, this is truly insane stuff, and it's, and frankly, if you're white and Christian and not some kind of deranged communist, I mean, that was like on its face treason. And Harry Hopkins died shortly thereafter, but if you're asking what, I believe this is how Roosevelt thought. Roosevelt was not a stupid man, and I think Roosevelt himself, it thought was a little more nuanced, but, uh, Roosevelt wasn't a wasp literally he was Dutch but I mean he was a wasp culturally okay he was an upper crust north-east Protestant and uh people who disdained him would call him behind closed doors obviously a traitor to his class all right uh there's something to that uh my take on it is that Roosevelt

believe these things I think he was a crazy anti-fascist okay I mean he it's it wasn't just it wasn't just what people like Burton Wheeler said I mean Wheeler was a good man I don't be wrong but Roosevelt wasn't just a guy who was in personal power I mean he was interested in that and I think

I think he became intoxicated by hubris as many men do but I think he literally believed what Hopkins elucidated in this kind of anti-fascist screed that he

that he both wrote and that he he explicated in public life until he was kind of sideline on grounds of, you know, the liability that he'd become for kind of saying these things above board that were not supposed to be said. That's my view of it. It's a crazy thing. I mean, crises, crises can... On the many nights of Christmas, the Guinness Storehouse brings to thee Christmas nights at gravity. This Christmas, enjoy a truly unique night out at the Gravity Bar. savor festive bites from Big Fan Bell, expertly crafted seasonal cocktails

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Get the facts be drinkaware, visit drinkaware.com. Didn't Mr. Kisinger say never let a crisis go to waste? And I think he was paraphrasing, I think he was paraphrasing Metternich. And people put a lot of shade

on Kissinger and I'm more friendly to Kissinger than people think and I'm not saying that that but I mean just speaking in terms of in objective terms I mean that true structural crises and particularly at it at a key historical apoccal junctures there's great potential for for for you know remarkable things as well as is like really terrible things and I think I think that's that that's how you that was kind of the Roosevelt moment but uh you know the uh the war among other things allowed the new deal to really become the new deal because that that allowed it to be a permanent regime you know is as total wars do that I mean that that's my view you know did anyone like at that point talking about

Roosevelt, like, said basically if you, if you take the side of the Soviet Union, you're, that Spanish Civil War, you were on the side of the communists and the same, I mean, it's basically just, I mean, it's hard to ignore that you've basically taken the side of people who throughout the 30s were causing insane, 20s and 30s. 20s in Italy and then insane bloodshed all over freaking Europe. Oh, yeah. I, and that's what, that's what the catalyst was for America first and for Father Cochlin.

And I mean, there was huge opposition to this. What's fascinating is that Nye himself, uh, there was a huge America first rally on the night of December 7th. Okay. Um, Nye's a, somebody came into the auditorium and, said, you know, the damn Jaffs just attacked Pearl Harbor.

Like, what do you think now? You know, Senator Nye. And people thought the guy was a heckler. She was removed. And then some new, it was either a newsman or an aide, or came over, you know, ran up and handed a telegram to Nye. Nye reads it and he said, you know, stupefied, this is the worst news I've heard in 20 years.

And then he said, the Empire of Japan has assaulted Pearl Harbor. You know, and they're like all these gasps go through the room and that was like a game changer and like Lindberg said like not in public but he said one of his confidants you know he

he said well Roosevelt got us in the back door I mean at that point there's still at that point I mean the die was cast you know it's like you can't you can't reason with people who are

who are swept up in that kind of war fever and and you know And particularly, like I said, like the, you know, especially considering the racial overtones of the Japanese-American War. Like, I'm not, that's not some woke take, like, oh, racist America. I mean, there wasn't, there was, in fact, a two-way hostility between East and West, Occident and Orient, you know, the white man and the yellow man. If you're going to look at it in those terms, that was very real, okay? I don't think that can be denied. And obviously, that was very much cultivated, too, by people.

people who hated the Empire of Japan for cynical reasons, but that's what changed everything. And that's also why Hitler and the O.K.K.W., they really, according to Ribbentrop and according to Garing, both of whom I consider to be credible, particularly Garing. You can say a lot of things about Garing. The guy wasn't a liar. And plus, you knew he was going to be hanged no matter he said. It's like, why would he lie about this anyway? He said, like, Hitler was shaken when he got the news that Pearl Harvard went assaulted. You know, he said that it's very rare you saw Hitler genuinely shaken. He's like, you saw Hitler angry a fair amount.

You know, you saw him, like, upset and somewhat agitated, but, like, shaken up. Like, that was not something you generally saw, like, even when conditions were pretty catastrophic. You know, and he, he was genuinely, like, you know, this is very, very bad, you know, is what is what Gary was getting at. And it was. But that's what changed everything, you know, and that's why, I mean, obviously, too, I mean, it was absurd that everybody from, from very different, albeit for very different reasons, but everybody from Roosevelt to MacArthur was saying, like, oh, this, you know, this was the

crowds who like plotted this, you know, the Pearl Harbor assault. I mean, that's, that's obviously ridiculous. but for another reason, I mean, the last thing, the last thing Berlin and Adolf Hitler wanted was for, you know, America to have some kind of catalyst like Pearl Harbor to fucking, you know, issue a general mobilization order and finally get the, at least, if not a sweeping war mandate, at least an adequate consensus just in order to pursue a war against the Reich. I mean, they sure as hell didn't want that. like what hell could they possibly gain from that? That put him in their nightmare quagmire of a true two-front war. I mean, Thomas Fleming makes the point, and I profoundly disagree with this, but he says, you know, if the Vermock had withdrawn to quote a winter line,

I mean, this presumes I'm going to armistice with Stalin too. That could have freed up 100 divisions at that point. as of December 1941, best caves, America in the UK, could have only mustered 20 divisions. It was Salt North Africa. You know, the Fleming's take is that, like, well, you know, the Kriegs Marine could have, you know, could have swept the Royal Navy out of the Mediterranean.

The Germans could have fortified the Atlantic Wall, absorbed Sweden as well as, you know, the Iberian Peninsula. And then, you know, like assaulted North Africa, a full bore. But I mean, that basically presumes that, you know, the Soviet Union no longer exists. Okay? It's like, okay, what are the Soviets doing during this time? They're reconstituting and then

Germany's dead. Hitler was not an amateur strategist. He was absolutely right. The way, the only way Germany wins the Second World War is the annihilation of the Soviet Union. That was the only way out. I mean, that's kind of a tangent, but

that's what What defeated America first was what allowed what was Roosevelt's out was a was a was a was a was a was a pro harbor attack and nothing else like make no mistake. Do you want to stay on the new dealers a little bit more? Do you want to jump into, I mean, you already mentioned once Barbarossa. Where do you want to go? I'd like to stay with the new dealers for the duration of that episode and then yeah, we'll jump into. into whatever you want next. Okay.

Next session, whether it's the U.K.'s war against the Royek or whether it's operating Barbara Rose, so you tell me. Okay. All right. Well, if we're going to stay on this, I mean, it seems to me that I've read not all of them, but I've read a good amount of about how the Supreme Court was just basically redone in the 30s. I've read some cases.

I mean, Ashwander versus Tennessee Valley. authorities, a very famous case, and you just start seeing this whole different, the courts are interpreting things differently. And it almost seems like you talked about how he would do anything to get into, to start a war. And it almost seems like he set up the court system that if it came to a court decision, he had the court on his side. Oh, yeah. And I think Felix Frankfurter, Frankfurter was somewhat nuanced in his thought. He can't just dismiss him as like this left-wing Jewish judge or as this Zionist. But he definitely was essential in the New Deal regime.

That goes out saying. And yeah, I mean, Roosevelt quite literally tried to pack the court. I mean, speaking of the overreach, I mean, he literally tried to, uh, he, he literally tried to, uh, alter the, alter the parricer. paradigm of a of a separation of powers by um by uh you know with with with with with with with with with with with with with with with the court packing bill which was defeated but yeah the the kind of hubris indicated there is as unbelievable but it's also even if that is somewhat complicated because the i made the point again and again to people that and john you who i

think is a brilliant guy i don't want to do over a field but people won't understand the judiciary and how it became kind of the truly seat of sovereignty post-Watergate in my opinion even though the seeds were laid before that if not sown. John U. was a good guy to read to learn about this topic. But Roosevelt, I believe, if he'd had a hostile judiciary that would have made that would have made, that would have presented him some

obstacles, but, you know, in the 20th century, presidents didn't just abide this idea that, you know, they, you know, I make the point again and again that, you know, the judiciary was a, almost an appendage of executive power. Whether it was, you know, an executive like Eisenhower deciding that he had to force integration in order to fight the Cold War on the sociopolitical front. and then literally backing up that decision at the point at, you know, at gunpoint like he did in Arkansas opposite Farbis. I think if, I think if Roosevelt had been dealing with a hostile Supreme Court that had been, you know, had been doing what it could to strike down, strike down the kind of more flagrantly heavy-handed to be charitable aspects of the new deed. I think Roosevelt would have just ignored it or, you know, he, uh, he, uh, he would have just, uh, he would have just focused on the foreign policy frauds and even more earnest to trigger the war. You know, and then it would have been a done deal.

You know, it's like, okay, America is mobilized for a total war. I'm, you know, I'm, I'm, I'm, I, shit, man. I mean, I, President Langen suspended habeas corpus during the war between the war between the States. The Supreme Court, what's that? Where this is a national emergency. you don't exist anymore. You know, I'm the law in the national emergency under Article 2. It's a fascinating question.

Frank further later ran a foul off for kind of for a very, he's a strange man, like in all kinds of ways. Like he, I can't remember he got formally indicted, but he got this barred, if I remember, right? Like, like, later in life for, like, simple corruption. Just like, literally taking bribes. I mean, a guy that's stature, like, that's very weird.

Like, think about that. Like, even it kind of, even the kind of losers in the Supreme Court today. Like, it'd be weird to hear about one of them just, like, taking a bribe, like some kind of, like some jerkwater governor or something. Like, I mean, it's weird, but, yeah, that, um, that definitely, uh, Frankfurt, uh, Frankfurt's cooperation. I mean, it has a support is, I mean, it's ideological agreement with Roosevelt demand as well as the

entire New Deal enterprise. I mean, I think that was essential to it. I mean, it, Roosevelt was a master Machiavellian, and he'll be remembered is that I made the point before that the real, one of the reasons I write so much longer form about Roosevelt than Hitler, it's not just because, like, I made the point before. I think they were each other's true nemesis.

But, I mean, Roosevelt might have been a bad man, but he was a political genius. He wasn't a slob, like Churchill. You know, he wasn't just a gangster like Stalin. I mean, I've got, Stalin's a phasinging guy, but he was very much a gangster. I mean, Roosevelt had something of a gangster in him, but Roosevelt and Hitler are definitely the most interesting executives in World War II, I think. I mean, I don't believe that's just my conceptual bias because I'm, you know, an American type. But, yeah, Roosevelt was a, it's pretty amazing what he was able to get done.

I mean, a part of that owed to circumstances that fell in his lap, like Pearl Harbor, but some of it didn't. You know, I mean, there's a lot of guys who have aimed to accomplish similar things, and it just blew up on their face, you know, because it, most people can't do that. I mean, Roosevelt was not a particularly nice guy. I mean, he was a charismatic guy all day, but he was kind of a bully.

He was kind of a nasty individual. I mean, it's not, but he commanded real loyalty from people, you know, and Hitler did too. I mean, that's, like I said, man, I, I, I, I, I think they're both, I think, I think they're the most interesting players on, on the grand chessboard of the time. It seems to me that if, considering you had the New Deal and then people are looking at New Deal programs and they're like, this is border, you know, words like socialism, terms like socialism start, getting thrown around, it seems to me that when he decides that he's going to back the Soviet Union and he's going to meet, you know, he's in the famous pictures with him, Stalin and Churchill, that a lot of people at home really had to be worried about the direction that the United States was going

because we are all these programs that have never been in existence before and they were just basically pushed through by Fiat all through the 30s. Then all of a sudden he's climbing into bed with like, you know, an arch communist. And the, well, there's a couple of things. Yeah, good. The degree to which there was a systemic failure and Murray Rothbard, we talked about a couple sessions ago, Rothbard's history of the Great Depression is outstanding.

And I think it's key to understanding what happened. The degree to which, the degree to which people believed that capitalism had failed in structural terms and could no longer and could no longer be adapted to modern conditions at scale. This was a universal. People that accepted this. You know, that's why even the right wing was socialistic in the fact that they believe in the corporate state. You know, like, oh, obviously, you know, you need some degree of central planning in the economy just because, you know, there's too many inputs to manage without catastrophes.

and there's too many uncertainties, you know, and capital can't be efficiently allocated, you know, when you're talking about, you know, when you're talking about the modern, when you're talking about modern national economics, like everybody thought this, okay? So people were more habituated, that that kind of thinking was easier to swallow than it would be today. But also, yeah, to your point, people still hated communism for a good reason. but that's one of the reasons why I made the point to people before but that's also one of the reasons why the Nuremberg regime had to be implemented, okay, in the literal ashes of the war.

And that's also the Concord. I mean, I think Truman just hated the Russians anyway. And Stalin also was trying to hold him over. But Stalin viewed kind of this is his moment, you know, like a time of transition always is. Like particularly if an executive dies in office It's like Roosevelt did.

Yeah, the Cold War jumped off rapidly. I mean, to your point, part of that was public opinion. And people saying, like, why the hell are we in bed with Stalin? You know, particularly when his forces are poised, you know, to march all the way to, you know, to the Riviera. And isn't this why we, like, fought the war in the first place, supposedly to, like, you know, free captive nations from fascism? But it's okay if they go red, you know, what the hell is this? So that was part of it. but it's also the half of what Roosevelt really accomplished with the new deal

I mean I mean in terms of like the federal programs like the works programs and the subsidies and things it did basically nothing to them to stimulate recovery like structural recovery what it did do was it meant like guys weren't starving anymore and people you know you didn't cities weren't like choked with like with uh with with with like young men and women and boys and girls like wandering aimlessly because they had no work and they were starving you know it it gave them something to do and it you know even if you're just paying them in food stamps they could buy a loaf of bread and like a pint of milk like that when people are no longer hungry they that takes their mind off things they just assume that you know, whoever is providing them with these things knows better.

I'm not like putting shade on Americans of the era. I'm just saying people in all times think that way. Not because they're stupid. I mean, sometimes they are, but it, that degree to which the middle and working classes got just wiped out. There's some insane statistic. It was something like, like 40% of the national wealth got just wiped out by like the bank failure. Okay, like people had nothing.

You know, you had millions of people who just got overnight. They had nothing anymore. Like, what do you do? You know, it's like I, especially if you're some guy with like a wife and kids. You know, it's like I, you know, I got some, I got some kid. I'm terrified is like going to come down with polio or like, you know, die from malnutrition. You know, like, I'm worried that my wife's going to have to resort to like, you know, literally like selling her pussy or something on the streets.

We can eat, you know, it's like I, if Mr. Roosevelt's going to like hand you like script to buy government cheese for digging a hole for no reason. Like, you're going to be cool with that. Okay. Even if, you know, and you'll, the rational side of your mind is going to work out later that like, well, why did this happen and stuff? But in the moment, you know,

it's, that's all you're thinking. You know, so, I mean, that was, it was all of those things. But yeah, to your point, I mean, that's why the, that's why, that's why that enterprise full of, the, the Washington Moscow Concord just fell apart rapidly. I mean, and,

And that was, I mean, much as Roosevelt did have incredible political instincts. I mean, objectively, I'm not putting shine on him as like a good man, obviously. But it, that was a big blind spot of his because he obviously thought, I mean, Roosevelt wasn't bad hell of his all adult life. He knew he wasn't going to live to be an old man. And, I mean, so, I mean, he obviously believed that, like, oh, this, you know, that what, how would, where the League of Nations failed, you know, this, this kind of American Soviet concord is just. going to endure you know because we see eye to eye like even though you know the russians might be brutal and they you know they might they might approach you know uh political reality and and and differently than we do but you know this is just going to endure because hey we you know we

we defeated fascism and you know we we we brought people you know uh we we we we're elevating man and things like he he i mean i don't know how anybody can believe that that i mean the america and russia would always be at odds in some basic way It's absurd that there's this enmity right now owes the ethno-sectarian hostility of a very, a very powerful minority that is a great deal of power in America, particularly vis-a-vis foreign policy. I don't want to get into that right now because it's too off topic. But I'm not saying that it makes any sense that America is that loggerhead to Russia perpetually these days. But there would never be some kind of friendly concord between Washington and Moscow, no matter what.

But particularly considering, you know, when you had the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, you know, is the regime there. Like, that's ridiculous. But that was a real of those big blind spot. But he did think that. I mean, even somebody like Patton understood he, at the end of the war, he's like, well, the armies are here. Let's go. Let's march to Russia. You know, and then he gets, what, two weeks later, he gets hit by a car and he does?

It's not very long after that. Yeah, that's. I've heard a lot of guys on the right, particularly, like a good buddy of mine. He's an Iraq war vet. He's a really cool, petterwood kind of guy. But he's, you know, he's in the Marine Corps, not in the Army. But he really likes to read about these military figures, obviously, because, I mean, he's a military type. And that's dope.

I really like that those guys participate on my platforms. But he's asked me more than once. like, I mean, he's convinced that Patton was murdered on account of the fact that, yeah, to your point, I mean, Patton really was not at all with the program. And I mean, Patton goes problems for, for civilian leadership as well as the military brass. Anyway, but I'd have to deep dive into it more. I mean, I know the circumstances that way he died. I know that it's weird. I'm not prepared to go as far as to say he was murdered, not because I think that's impossible, but because I'd have to, spend more time with the evidence, but yeah, it's certainly is strange. There's a lot of fascinating stuff. At Piper,

Yacom Piper, who's like a hero of mine, you know, the Leapstendart, the commander, not overall commander. I mean, he was the quote of a colonel, but, uh, he, uh, you know, he originally

was under a death sentence, the Docow trials. These trials, we literally held, they were some of the secondary, the second wave of war crimes trials. They were actually held at the Dockow camp. They're not called the Doggoe trials because it was, it wasn't a trial of the, of the KZ types who guarded Docco. It was the Leap Standart Boys, the Vaf and SS guys who,

and they were tried like at that facility, okay, that's why. But this American captain, his name alludes me, he was, he was captured during the Battle of the Bulge, and he got to know Peeper pretty well. this cop group, cop group, Keper, like,

he'd captured him. And, yeah, he relayed that, uh, he and Piper became pretty good friends. And, uh,

he told, uh, Danny S. Parker, who wrote a couple of great books on Yacin'Piper. And he, this, this captain relayed to him and kind of,

Parker kind of took his oral history. And he said that, yeah, he's like, he's like, he's like, I'm not going to lie. You know,

he's like, I'm like, you know, people's a great guy. I, I, I frankly like the boys under his command. Like, why the hell are like shooting at these guys?

He's been in the Lions with the Ivins. Granted, this guy was a young captain, he wasn't a general. But I, yeah, I don't, I don't, I, I, I, I can't imagine that those thoughts did not enter the minds of any remotely, you know, grounded man under arms in the European theater on the American side. I mean, I'll get it not. But, yeah. what do you uh let's we're coming up on an hour let's like wrap this off and the next session we'll take up whatever you want but yeah what do you want to deal with in closing um or did we miss anything i don't think so man i just want to make sure that um like i said i've taken

steps to to that kind of progress more linearly i've got kind of a scattershot mind i mean i i hope that doesn't mean i'm going senile but i uh i uh i take i take i i take criticism seriously. The response has been overwhelmingly positive to the series we've done. That is dope. I'm very honored by that. And I take great pride in that because that's the whole point. But I've taken steps to proceed more and more linear terms so it's easier to follow. And I also want each hour we do to cover a different aspect of things. And it's your show quite literally. So next session, yeah, I think we should have to cover the like Churchill's, war against Hitler.

We should cover Barbarossa. Either one is fine. But I think the England, England's play in all this probably should come into, because there's a lot of interesting, there's a lot of interesting stuff there. Hitler wasn't particularly like the biggest fan of the United States, but he did like England.

Yeah. No, that's great. And there's the whole Hess flight to the UK. A lot of intrigues and fans. stuff there. Yeah. No, I'd like nothing more, man, then they cover that. Cool. All right. Well, remind everybody about your substack and we'll

end it. Okay. You can find me a few different places. You can find my substack at realthomas 777.com. You can find me on Twitter at number seven, H-O-M-A-S-7-7.

You can find me on Gab at real Thomas 777. I've got a book out, a science fiction brand. I'm eminently releasing another one in the series through Imperium Press. It's called Steel Storm. I think you should read it.

It's dope. I know it is because people tell me it is. I didn't think anybody would read it, but they did. And that is great. But yeah, yeah, that is what I do, and that is where you can find me. Until the next time. Thank you.

Everyone back to the Pekina show. Thomas is back. What's going on, man? Hello, Pete. Thanks for hosting once again. I'm really enjoying these discussions, and I think it's important for posterity, not because I have any kind of profound wisdom to drop on people, but I think the record from a revisionist perspective, it's important to get that out there. And too many of these sources remain, even if they're a lot more accessible now than 20 or 30 years ago, you know, they remain kind of esoteric and I think

we're kind of doing God's work by you know making these things more immediately available to people or at least you know um at least introducing them to the modes of thought um you know to scholarship that maybe they're not familiar with you know because there is a bully pulpit of

of bad history that uh has disseminated everywhere and it's almost like the weather like man made weather or something so yeah I think this is important what we're doing it's not just because I enjoy talking to you when you're my friend and I like doing this kind of stuff. I'm going to figure out some place to put all of these episodes as like a series. I think I know where I'm going to do it, too.

All right. So before we started recording, you had mentioned that we had talked about the U.S. getting into the war on the last episode, and you want to talk today, which is probably, you said it's probably going to be two episodes about Churchill. But you said you wanted to do some mop-up on that. the last episode. Yeah, I wanted to just kind of, just kind of an addendum

to the, to the New Dealer Revolution, which is, I mean, mainly what we were talking about. We'll get more into kind of the nuts and bolts of the ethics of the American War and some of those things, you know, kind of when we get into the aftermath in Nuremberg, because I think that that would be the more proper way to treat it, because I'm not a military

science guy or like a military officer or something, you know, so I don't really get into the, I mean, if people want to talk about the military side of things, like that's dope and that's fascinating. I'm probably not the guy to really get into that. I'm, you know, a political theory guy and a revisionist. But I kind of wanted to explore, like, all the policy facets of the New Deal and convey that it was truly a revolutionary enterprise. And it touched and concerned every aspect of American life, you know, socially, politically,

economically, all of that. And I think we covered that pretty completely last. episode, but, you know, kind of the final, kind of the final feature, not just in linear terms of what we were talking about, but kind of the, kind of the ultimate, kind of the penultimate act of the new, of the new dealers in Roosevelt himself was the unconditional surrender declaration. And incident to that, what was called the Morgenthau plan. And the latter did not actually become policy, but something like that was perceived by the Axis powers as what America's ultimate intention was. So we're going to talk about how they were going to talk about how Germany, Japan, and to a lesser degree, Italy responded to Roosevelt's declarations and American moves and why they didn't, you know, quote, surrender before they were utterly devastated.

This is fundamentally important, understand. Okay. there's this common myth that I run into all the time. And Thomas Fleming, who's one of my favorite historians, he's deceased now. But he and David Irving are about the only historians who really address this directly. There's just war theorists and Article II kind of constitutional scholars like John Yu who deal with it in very kind of legalistic terms. But in truly historical and ethical terms and existential terms, and existential terms,

it's not something that's really addressed. I'm constantly hearing guys who are otherwise learned declare that, oh, well, you know, the Japs were crazy. They wouldn't surrender. You know, it's like, okay, something happened at the Casablanca Conference in 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill and Mr. Stalin, although Roosevelt made the proclamation, declared that nothing short of unconditional surrender would end the Second World War. Like, what does the unconditional surrender mean?

People would ask Roosevelt this, and he said that, well, you know, it means, you know, total and unconditional capitulation to the Allies, you know, or face utter annihilation. Well, America had cut off all diplomatic relations with the Axis. So it's like, what does that mean? That means you're going to endlessly attack us until you decide to stop attacking. I mean, that makes it literally impossible to surrender. and if you want to understand why the Germans literally fought to the last man, it was two things. It was number one, because the alternative was, they were trying to get as many of their people out of the East as the Red Army carried out this mass campaign of rape, homicide, and just utter devastation. And they wanted to get as many of their people west as they could, okay?

Because whatever the Americans were going to do, it was not that bad, okay? Secondly, if the opposing force, neither officer corps nor the military leadership, nor the civilian leadership, nor their diplomatic offices will speak to you, it's quite literally impossible to surrender. You know what do you do? When there's a thousand bomber raid over your city, you're supposed to run outside and wave a white flag? you know, like you're, like, how does that actually work? So essentially the Second World War stopped. What America decided was going to stop. I mean, in Europe it stopped, you know, in the Red Army,

conquered Berlin, and there was nobody left, essentially, like who was capable of taking up arms or proffering any meaningful resistance. And, I mean, when the hammer and sickle was hoisted above the ruins of the Reichstag, I mean, that, I mean, that was it. I mean, in the case of Japan, you know, there's this mythology that, like, well, we had to nuke Japan or this. People are constantly banning that, well, we would have lost a million U.S. servicemen invading Japan. It's like, okay, why would you have to invade Japan? Japan had no capacity to make war.

It was starving. It was defeated. Incendiary raids were being run over Tokyo, where 100,000 people were dying in 40 hours. Like, what the hell is Japan going to do to you? you know, like, and how, why, why, why you need to invade and occupy it or nuke it? You know, the way in the West for about 2,000 years, the way we waged war, not counting things, you know, like the, like the Greek, war against the Persians or the Roman war against Carthage, you know, the way, the way we raised war is we come to terms with a defeated enemy. We don't simply assault them

until there was none of them left. Or, you know, declare that we will not accept their surrender and and claim that they're crazy and refuses surrender by not finding a way to not not finding a way to lay down their arms and we refuse to accept uh we when we refuse to accept that uh that kind of capitulation so i mean that's that's that's that's crazy of itself and but it uh so i mean that that really really stiffened access resolve but it also was the show i mean the whole the whole raise on dent for the new deal was was the annihilation on the of certain forms of culture and political modalities together, which constitute fascism in the mind of the New Dealer.

That's what it was. And I brought up the Morganville plan because Henry Morganthau, who was the Treasury Secretary, which seems like kind of a middling cabinet position to a lot of administrations, but like we talked about in the New Deal regime, there's a lot of posts in it and of themselves would not seem to confer great power upon the man in the post. But, you know, you had people close to Roosevelt who didn't even

have any kind of formal cabinet post. They were just minister without portfolio. Or there were guys like Sumner Wells who, you know, weren't, they were, you know, who in his case was undersecretary of state, but he was the de facto, what kind of chief diplomat? Well, Henry Morgan Thout is this by being secretary of the treasury, he had tremendous authority in structuring policy. and everything in the New Deal from its foreign policy to its machinations to bringing America into war

with Japan when it being clear that there probably was not going to be some sort of there was not going to be some sort of a lucetania type incident with the Third Reich that would provide a catalyst you know everything from that

those kinds of intrigues to the civilian conservation corps to the kind of quasi- a, you know, Keynesian economic corporate scheme that was devised, you know, early on in the regime. I mean,

a lot of this came from Henry Morgan, though. And Morganthau developed what he considered to be a post-victory regime for Germany called the Morgan-Though plan. It was entailed was basically ethnically

cleansing Germany, you know, reducing its population by about third. He wasn't specific about how this would be done, but one can imagine we talked about suppressing the birth rate and things like this, like in unofficial capacities. And one can imagine what that would mean.

He wanted to strip it of all, of all modern industry and divided into basically four states, like many states. The only economic activity would basically be subsistence farming. You know, you want to restrict people's education

to like basic literacy. he, like, essentially, like, Margetha, he was a crazy Zionist type who wanted, his plan for Germany was basically what Himmler's plan was for for, for, for the Russian hinterland.

Okay, he basically wanted to create like a population, kind of half-literate agrarian slaves. It would like never rise up again. And, uh, this is totally insane. For all kinds of reasons. Particularly because at that point, I think it could still be said that America was

at least in terms of the constitution of its population was still, you know, like a white Western Christian country. And I, that's not just repast, it's crazy. And even, um, even Churchill, like, kind of awful brute that he was, said, this is totally insane. And like, how would this be workable anyway? And, you know, London, to the, to the credit of, uh, some of the people in church was in a circle they said look if you're going to do that you might as well just see the entirety of you know of of germany to ivan and let the soviets do what they want with it because like what's the point of this you know is it other than the basically you know ethically

cleansed and punish the germans but you know that's that's that's ethics aside that's that's not that's that's not that's not viable in the in the emerging strategic landscape and so much the u.k was more realistic about the soviet union than on than the United States was, I mean, which is ironic. But as we get into the person of Mr. Churchill, I think it may become apparent as to why that is. But I just, I wanted to clarify some of those final points, because I was pretty certain that people would have called me on it had I not.

And I just think, I just think it was an important addendum to, to the New Deal, to the New Deal regime. Do you want to get into, you want to get into, you want to get in Churchill's war? Yeah, just jump right in. Okay. The, uh, I think the way I'm saying Churchill, I mean, for, for this segment we're laying down today, I kind of want to get into the man of Churchill and without being too speculative or, or needlessly punitive, kind of his character, not, I don't generally delve into that in history,

even when we're talking about wartime executives, but in Churchill's case, I think, it's essential. The person at Churchill is as essential understanding the UK's war as the New Deal ideology of anti-fascism is as essential understanding the American War. One of the bizarre things about Churchill, and even people who had a basically amiable relationship with him made the point that Churchill basically was not at all consistent in his sympathies, in his statements. Things almost seem to be something of a game to him in an almost cliched way. I think it was David Irving. I can't remember where I read this

initially, but it's been sourced by a few people. But I think I initially read it in David Irving's two-valium treatment of Churchill. In March, 1946, Churchill went on to speaking two-year-old. Churchill went on a speaking tour of the United States because he was very much in demand. I mean, America's always had this kind of peculiar fascination with the UK. And, I mean, the Churchill cult was already well established then, not just, you know, in the UK proper, but in America. And I believe that endorsed to this day. Excuse me.

Churchill is speaking in Fulton, Missouri. He began unconditionally praising Stalin, you know, Stalin is a great man. He's the one true, like, you know, true. humanist in Russia, you know, like, you really understands, you know, why, why we fought the war. And people were kind of like aghast, you know, like in this audience, you know, because this is middle America, you know, and even people who are basically similar to Roosevelt and the New Deal Enterprise. I mean, first of all, Mr. Roosevelt was in the grave by this point. Secondly, I speculate, I mean, it goes without saying. I mean, even people who'd been very

much on board with a war effort, you know, they were not, they were not going to respond well. to these kinds of glowing suggestions about the character, Mr. Stalin. So Churchill discerns that his audience is kind of, he's losing his audience. So he quickly recoversed. Oh, I mean, I just meant the Communist Party are very disciplined and very brave men. You know, when we know this because of their great sacrifice in Berlin to defeat fascism. But of course, you know, I, Mr. Churchill, you know, as you all know, Like, I commanded white armies against the Bolsheviks in 1919, you know, and I, you know, my, my, my, my, my, my, my, uh, my, uh, my, my, uh, my, my, uh, my, my, uh, my, my, uh, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm never had any truck with socialism.

him. So John Davenport, who was this at the time, he was kind of a, kind of a well-known journalist, kind of like a thinking man's, uh, kind of like a thinking man's Walter Cronkite, and that makes any sense. I can't think of a better way to characterize him. He was the Churchill. He says, well, Mr. Churchill, if that's the case, how do you capitulate we did a Yalta, like how could you basically hand the world to Stalin, you know, and Churchill just waved it off and said, oh, well, the war had to be ended at all costs, you know. But the thing is Yalta didn't end the war, and the Soviets really didn't do anything to bring down the Japanese. They seized the Kerala Islands. I'm sure I'm bouching that pronunciation. But, I mean, post-Yalta, I mean, Okinawa happened, Iwo Jima happened. You know, America dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan, atomic bombs rather, like, how, you know, how exactly just end the war. I mean, it might seem like a middling thing to focus on, but it's, you know, Churchill's kind of like this master of, like, obfuscating actual issues. You know, like it wasn't, he, he managed to always answer questions with this kind of grand flourish without actually saying anything.

And if you want to understand his political career, you got to consider Churchill had a bizarre background. His father was descended from the Duke of Marlborough and his mother was an American and kind of a loose woman while accounts. Like I believe, I believe when Churchill was, they were in Churchill's brief time in the Army. me, his mother was then, you know, then called Pushing 50. It was involved with some kind of foppish young officer type was about Churchill's age.

I mean, that's, there's something wrong there. I mean, one doesn't need to be a, it's not kind of moral prude or something to recognize that there was something very dysfunctional here. Particularly for a society woman in the UK of, you know, the turn of the century. I mean, that's, this is strange.

You know, um, Churchill's father drank himself to death and apparently was demented for sometime before then. Churchill in May 1904, he abandoned what is, you know, his family's Tory heritage, declared that he hated the conservatives and that Balfour was, you know, unworthy of high office, let alone, you know, let alone the office of the prime minister. He defected a liberal party, nominally ungrateful. grounds that he supported free trade and that you know

belfort protectionism was sabotaging the you know the prosperity that that that was needed to compete not just with the United States which at that time was not in particularly good terms with the UK I mean that's all another issue I don't want to digress into but also it's got to be it's also got to be mentioned that the liberals want a landslide in 1906 relatively. And Sir Henry Bannerman

made Churchill undersecretary for the colonies, and then later some kind of like ministry, he signed him some kind of role in the ministry of trade. Okay, so basically, I mean,

he Churchill's so an opportune moment, and he seized it, okay? He by this point the family did not, its fortunes were waning. What it kind of salvaged things at this point was that a lot of the women in Churchill's family had married into wealth,

including Churchill's Aunt Fannie, who's kind of well-known because there's this endless correspondence between Churchill and Fannie, which is not particularly interesting, but historians make a lot out of this. What is interesting is that Fannie's sister, she married a guy who went to take, today's terms would be a billionaire, I believe. You know, he was like on the order like Carnegie in terms of the wealth.

Okay, it was like some iron mogul in the UK. And he was an arch enemy of a, he had been an arch enemy at Chamberlain, John Chamberlain, the first Chamberlain and his tariff regime. And so suddenly Aunt Fanny and her sister is throwing all this money at Deer Winston, who now was a liberal member of parliament. You know, I mean, it just characterizes Churchill's entire life, okay? Kind of like going where the money is, changing his strife whenever he has to. And during this period, too, Churchill, one stipulation he did make to John Chamberlain is,

Churchill said at all costs, we've got to avoid another European war, we've got to find some way to come to terms with Germany, We've got to find some way to build, you know, a rampart defense against the colored world and the communists. See, this is fascinating, isn't it? Because this is Mr. Churchill in the aftermath of the war and he's positively talking like Lothrop Stoddard or Madison Grant. You know, I mean, dare I say, he even sounds like what people would call a fascist, you know. And I mean, this is his entire angle. This is basically how he's making a living.

Um, lo and behold, uh, lo and behold, uh, by 1911. Yeah. 1911,

Churchill's, uh, he's, he's appointed first lord of the admiralty. This had always been something of any ambition of his. Um, and, uh,

he insinuated himself, he insinuated himself into, that role, mind you, after almost a decade of, you know, advocating peace on the continent and an conciliatory view towards the Kaiser Reich, you know, suddenly Churchill changed the stripes completely and says, you know, we've got a real problem with naval readiness. You know, we're not, we're the, the high-seas fleet of Germany is, you know, a threat to the UK. You know, we, we can't count on on our own, you know, technical supremac. to see any longer.

And one thing, too, Churchill's big coup was the conversion of coal, the oil firing ships. As it turned out in the war, that like a lot of these, a lot of these dreadnought-class ships, like, did not have adequate armaments, but that's another, that's kind of military esoterica,

but it did become an issue at the at the Darden Nels. Looking at that in a minute. But in any event, so, this is about the third time in 15 years. Churchill has done a 180, in terms of his purported political sympathies and made a, and staked his career fortunes on a position that,

that, you know, only a few years previously was a complete opposite of what he purported to believe. You know, I mean, in some ways, Churchill was kind of like the first lobbyist. You know, there's this famous, there's this famous, you know, about the first Gulf War and then Senator Al Gore. he's like waiting in the atrium of the senate of the heart senate building or something and he's like waiting he's waiting for like exit poll data to come in to decide if he should like you know vote for the war resolution to go to war with iraq or not you know i mean that

that that that's very much kind of the i mean i mean al gore was kind of a he was kind of easy to he was kind of easy to lay impoon because the man was a fool and he uh had a tendency to do things like wear more pancake makeup up on a Portuguese hooker but it's uh the point being that Churchill was kind of like the first of this type in the in the angle sphere. I mean, yeah, there was always political corruption. Yeah, there were always people.

There was always men who, you know, were, were morally compromised by the prospect of money or promotion or, or all of the above. But, you know, this guy, like being a career politician who literally changes the stripes, owing to the, you know, only to the currents of public opinion, or,

or, or, or, or, or, or, or, or,

or, like, that really was not something that was done. You know, like, guys like Churchill, you know, kind of lesser nobility types.

They kind of insinuated themselves into a role and like, that was their role. You know, so this, that's kind of, this kind of gave people pause, um, within elite circles in the UK.

Um, Churchill's tenure as Lord of Admiralty, frankly, was disastrous. The Churchill fancied himself, despite having no meaningful military experience, other than about six months in India, wherein he didn't discern any real opportunity for battlefield heroism or anything exciting. You know, he quickly became bored with that and resigned his commission. Nonetheless, he fancied himself some great military mind or commander. There was a disaster when he sought to strike the German right flank of the Antwer Bridgehead.

You know, the U.K.'s assault forces were totally under strength. This repeated in 1915 at the Dardanelles, which is well known to people. You know, it was a very, very dark incident for the empire. It was a slaughter. The aim was the pulverized Ottoman fortifications and capture Constantinople. Churchill gambled on on Royal Navy guns being able to outrange the Turks

as I understand it. And again, I'm not any kind of military authority. This was another disaster. There was not adequate infantry forces in being to facilitate the follow-up assault. Those that were available had been rushed through training.

When finally deployed on March 1915, it was a sloth. water. This, however, has become a, would become a characteristic of Churchill, this kind of like failing upward. He was dismissed yet six months later. He was assigned to France to Italian commander. He was recommissioned as lieutenant colonel with the Royal Scots Fuseliers. Lloyd George basically intervened to save him. George isn't going to find this for the man. owing probably the i i don't know the you know whatever it's hard to discern the kind of sympathies of uh and inhabits of these in these kind of aristocratic circles particularly the last century but i mean lloy george has become a patient of his in in a very real way um churchill uh george backed

off though around 1919 because churchill showed up quite literally uh now mind you Churchill at this point was a minister of munitions and a secretary of state for war, which is kind of like a meaningless cynicure. Yet Churchill shows up in France, in Paris, in 1919, in full uniform, swagger around drunk, like some kind of quadillo. I need to declare is that he demands the intervention of all allies against the Bolsheviks, and he will lead this expedition. And I mean, this was an embarrassment, and it was bizarre.

You know, so that basically ended Churchill's public life. I mean, for the time. Five years later, in 1924, Churchill suddenly reemerges. He's reinvented himself. He's rejoined the conservative party. You know, and I guess memories being short and Churchill being able to sell illusory promises even better than a Vegas showgirl can to a lonely businessman.

You know, he got a leave son of life. he went from he went from he went from a he went from a from there he began demanding a a general

naval buildup presumably because he was trying to cultivate you know allies in the Admiralty he had alienated through a disastrous performance as Lord of the Admiralty he started demanding you know Britain reconstitute its battleship fleet

you know, railing against the, the, uh, what, uh, what, what became the, uh, what became the, uh, the Washington Naval Treaty. Um, then once again, he reverses himself, uh, by, by 1926, he's saying that we've got to cut, you know, defense expenditures of the bone, because, I mean, this was the way the currents were going once again. And he, he, he obviously did not, He didn't find himself welcome back into the Admiralty for eternity. In both 1926 and 1928, he declared there's no chance that in his lifetime that there would be any war with Japan. He said in his words, it's unthinkable, and they're not foresee the slightest chance of it. He said in 1926 and in 1928 that Britain should adopt a 10-year policy that owing to the fact that war is unthinkable with any other...

in the next 10 years that defense had cut down to the bare minimum. It was around this time that Lord Escher, who was an interesting figure, and he died before the Second World War. But he was a historian. He had some arguably socialist sympathies, but I think his discussion of the person of the time and his lifetime, he wrote interesting stuff on Disraeli. He wrote some really interesting stuff on Belfort.

On Churchill, he said Churchill was, a flim-flam man. He said the guy's a showman. He's totally devoid of substance. It is worse. He handles subjects and rhythmical language and quickly becomes enslaved to his own phrase or by his own phrases. He deceives himself into thinking he is taking broad views when his mind is fixed on one comparatively small aspect of the question. I want to say one thing about this and I'll give it over to you because I don't want to suck all the air out of the room. I've heard people say a lot, as I'm sure you have two, as everybody has who's exposed the kind of pop history in this country.

Oh, you know, and there's this film, this obnoxious film, Darkest Hour, with Gary Oldman, who otherwise is like a dope actor, right? I was sad to see him kind of featuring this propaganda piece, but everybody must make a living, including actors. But, you know, the big praise that people, or the big shine people put on Mr. Churchill is like, well, he was such a great order. You know, being some showman order. like that's not really a great thing to be.

A man like Calvin Coolidge or like Abraham Lincoln, I know people have mixed feelings about Lincoln. I do too, but Lincoln actually was a plain spoken individual. He was not some kind of showman. The reason why the Gaysburg Address stood out is because on grounds with the brevity is because Lincoln was not, he was not some hustler who went out there

and, you know, kind of entertained ignorant people. owing to the emergency, you know, one man, one vote in the fact that, you know, politicians by the late 90th century literally become salesman. Like Churchill, he, he,

the fact that he treated question time in parliament that some sort of, as the Winston Churchill show, like I don't really see where that's admirable. You know, it, uh, that's why I see parallels with Bill Clinton and Winston Churchill. Like, you're not, you're not some, you're not some great man or some man of the people. if your whole angle is you believe in nothing, you know, you have the soul of a pig,

you have absolutely no principles, but hey, you like, you really, really, really entertain people with IQs about 85. I mean, like, why is that admirable? You know, I mean, like, and that's basically what Churchill had going for him. And if you listen to, I'm always making the point that, you know, I, like we talked last session or last discussion, I'm always making the point that whatever we can say about Roosevelt, and I think Roosevelt in some ways was a profoundly evil man. Roosevelt was a brilliant guy. I mean, he was a ruthless Machiavellian, but if he wasn't at Roosevelt's speeches, I mean, yeah, the guy's lying his ass off, but you can tell that there's a complicated intellect there. Like Churchill, it's like, it's ridiculous.

You know, I mean, you can really, like David Irving made the point that Churchill in his early 20s literally played with toy soldiers. know, and he, he, uh, Lloyd George was disgusted because on the, during the battle of Ipra, Churchill was like running around like, like literally a bugliant that, you know, he was, he was getting to play war, you know,

and everybody in the, everybody else in the chain of command, civilian and military was beside themselves. And there's this fat man who's, you know, acting like a 12 year old playing with his GI Joe's. I mean, it's, there's something grotesque about this. But yeah, I, uh,

I, I didn't mean to, uh, I didn't mean to, I didn't mean a monopolize the discussion. So you pretty much brought us up to 1932, 1933, when two elections happen that changed the course of the world. So how is what's Churchill doing at this time? Essentially Churchill made his, he staged his final comeback by fabricating a lot of 14, and being numbers about the vermouth and particularly the lufa churchill realized there wasn't a lot of churchill realized very quickly i mean as everybody did that uh you know alarmism like admiralty at least in the sense that he'd been able

to fin angle his way into role into position's real power in the in the first war like that that was no longer going to carry the day um what he was uh he was he was He was busily agitating for, uh, by inflating, you know, by inflating the, the reported threat posed by Germany to, uh, to, uh, to, uh, to the UK, the UK supremacy on the continent and in the, in the colonies. And, uh, the way he was doing that owed, uh, what do you got to understand first, you got to understand who is funding Churchill. And we're going to get more into that next session. But the Churchill, between the time that he left or was forced out of his post-the-admiralty,

and he stayed just come back as a concerted a member of parliament, Churchill had become quite wealthy as a historical author. He published his own memoirs, which, I mean, were incredibly self-serving. He published the history of the British Empire, this multi-volume, this multivalium kind of magnum opus. And for the time that made him quite wealthy, he became a firebrand against Germany, owing to the convergence of what we consider a political action committee in today's terms,

called uh that called to quite literally called itself the focus group um it was a uh it was a combination of i mean the people in its ranks i mean it was a diverse coalition i mean not not i mean by today's in today's political cultures we'd take this for granted but at that point it was somewhat novel you know you had like out and out Zionist types um who uh you know obviously had ethno sectarian reasons for for hostility to the German Reich. You had industrialists who owed to the Washington Naval Treaty and Britain's defense expenditures being cut down to the, like literally the bone, had, you know, found themselves really kind of put out of business. I mean, even before the 1929 crash, I mean, hit the UK very hard, arguably as hard as United States. but even notwithstanding that British heavy industry was having,

they were looking at real problems in terms of solving their fortunes. And the end of defense subsidies, particularly naval subsidies, really, really, really hurt them. So you had typical kind of military industrial interests. you had you had people like Vantasaritut not him himself but people like him

we just had a kind of hostility of the German Reich I mean dating back to I mean you raised I don't want to go too far a field but I mean you raised in our last discussion

you know why why did the UK develop this kind of enmity towards Germany that's a complicated issue when I we do need to delve into that a little bit just for context here

you know like we like we talked about a moment ago you know John Chamberlain the first Chamberlain I think him is the good Chamberlain although uh although Neville Chamberlain I think it's kind of unduly maligned he was not a good executive but um the fact that he's uh he's got a burn effigy I think isn't misguided but John Chamberlain he quite literally said uh you know in strategic terms the most sensible alliance would be that between London, Washington

and Berlin against Moscow, and in the east, you know, the Anglo-Japanese alliance will, you know, further hedge against both China and Russia, which makes perfect sense. And this is, what, yours was fascinating.

Young Kaiser Villalm, you know, when he'd only, um, ascended to the, um, to the throne, uh, the years previously. He said that Chamberlain's vision would never come to fruition because the UK and France would never be able to put their differences aside. Lo and behold, like, within a few years, you know, the Entente is what truly poisoned Anglo-German relations.

But I think if there was one single proximate cause, I mean, people say people like to drop everything from, you know, King George and Villalm were both kind of insufferable personalities. And Wilhelm never felt like the Germans were being respected by the UK, and that's probably true. And there's a manichaean aspect to this. So, like, George and Villalham look literally like doppelgangers. It's bizarre. You know, I mean, they weren't related, but they literally look like twin brothers. You know, and it, the Boer War, I think the Boer War, I think the Boer War,

more than any single catalyst was what set this enmity in motion. The German Reich really strongly identified with the Boers and vice versa. I mean, owing not just the fact that outside of the Mibia, Germany, didn't really have holdings in Africa that they felt a great power should, and the Boers were kind of their clients. But in cultural terms, there's commonality between the basically Dutch Boers and the Germans. Out of that, like the very, very

kind of strong communitarian racial identity that developed doing in part the fact that the boars were quite literally beleaguered by the whole continent of racial others, but this kind of this kind of warrior Calvinist fate that sustained them. And I've got this whole idea

that there's a pious dimension in national socialism that's unique to the German character. And German people's general. generally. But all of that esoterica aside, the British began using the Boer War as an excuse to board and search and, in many cases, detain German ships under auspices of, well, you know, any ships from the continent, you know, traveling to the Cape, you know, we've got to make sure that they're not furnishing weapons and munitions and supplies to the Boers. But somehow it's always German ships that are being, you know,

corralled in this way. And the Germans weren't stupid. And Villalem was not without fault. I mean, the high-sees fleet, in my opinion, and Holweig later, the chance of the German Empire, who I think was probably about the only good guy

on the Eve of World War I, but that's another issue. And Holbeg always maintained that the Blue Water Navy, what the Germans called their high-seas fleet, It was designed to two things. Germany could be strangled, and it was, by a starvation blockade. And I want to get into that in a minute, or discuss to Mr. Churchill.

But also, Germany in 1904, in 1914, in 1924, in 1984, in 1984, in 1984, and always viewed Russia as its primary adversary. and if in the 19thines you're Wilhelm the 2nd, you're looking eastward and you're saying, I've got to be able to dominate the Baltic and essentially, you know, cut the Russian fleet off of the knees if I'm going to win a general war against Russia.

And that makes sense. I don't think there's a realistic, I don't think there's a strategic I don't think a strategic challenge to the UK by the German Empire in 1914 made really any sense in general terms I just don't but in the UK

there was there the Australia road the game was bad was the Boer War and one of things Villalham did Paul Kruger the kind of great Boer revolutionary as he was running raids, you know, against the British in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State or whatever, Kaiser Ville. I sent him a telegram congratulating him.

And this was not good form. And like goofy as it sounds now, but in those days, these kinds of diplomatic slaps in the face, were viewed almost like acts of war. I mean, like, these days we're, like, diplomatic language become meaningless. You know, unless you're, unless you're quite literally detonating ordinance,

or you're carrying a terrorist axe, or opening fire on people, like nobody cares what you say. I don't mean, the cold war are going to change that, but it, but you better believe, if you were, if you were some radical bore farmer,

like Mr. Kruger, you know, and you were, you were playing Viet Cong with, with the British Empire, and a European at the state was, like, sending you formal praise for doing that. Like, this was viewed in the gravest terms. It really was. And nobody said that Villanom was an intelligent man or that he made wise decisions. And, like, I'm always coming back at the point.

There's a reason why A.O.F. Hitler denied him a state funeral when the old man died, you know, in 1990. I think he died in exile in Holland, but there's a reason, you know, I mean, and it, it was big that Hitler, especially considering Hitler fought in the Great War. I mean, it was a, it's telling that he wouldn't even know the guy be buried would, like, stay arres. I mean, that's, you know, and it's not accidental. And it's not just only to the fact that he grossly mismanaged the war, you know, I mean, if you're that kind of despised by, you know, by your own people. The problem generally is you. But in any event, I raised

the Churchill's kind of final act. I mean, this was in his role as this was in his role as war minister that I was kind of extended beyond all reasonable parameters.

It is posed as Lord of Admiral. The Churchill is the one who imposed a starvation blockade on Germany. And it literally was a of Asian blockade. In 2016, there was food riots all across the German Empire because people were starving. Okay, particularly elderly kids, you know,

it was a disaster. All told about 3 quarters of a million people died between 1915 and 1919. And Churchill in his post, the Secretary of War, Secretary of State for War, rather, he extended, he demanded and he got his way, the black cave was extended through 1919 was only I believe in about 83,000 dead for that year and

why was this done this was done so that Germany would accept the war guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty and that's really what truly discussed to the American delegation it demanded that the German except full guilt for the war you know to them to pay 32 billion and gold Bullion for them to pay, Churchill demanded that it be included that they pay, that Germany pay the pensions of British soldiers who fought on the Western Front. I mean, this was totally insane. And it demanded that Kaiser be arrested, prosecuted as a war criminal.

And, of course, the Germans said they're not going to sign that. So Churchill demanded, it got his way, that the starvation block could be sustained until they capitulated. And, of course, the U.S. Senate, to its eternal credit, refused to endorse the side treaty. It wasn't really worth the papers written on when America bowed out of it and refused to ratify it or enforce it. And, you know, that entire, you know, Germany's unwillingness to comply and kind of Anglo-French impotence therein, like, posturing without the ability to actually deliver on threat by the

Western allies. It had a lot to do with, you know, I said about Stilis 939, and we will get to that. But I forgive the out-of-sequence some discussion of the starvation blockade. I just, it's a rare instance of something that's truly unconscionable. And like Herbert Hoover said, I recommended the other day on my Twitter, my gab timeline, this biography of Herbert Hoover, I think is really dope. And Hoover is a guy, he was a very decent guy, and he was actually a pretty good president. And he's burned effigy and held responsible for the Great Depression,

which is grossly misguided. But Hoover said, we don't starve. He said in America, we don't starve women and kids, we don't kick a man when he's down after we've defeated him. and uh the and he's right okay i mean there's something you're not you're not you're not being some

you're not being some liberal pussy or you're not being some you know some some uh some social justice humanist or something to say that you know you don't you don't impose draconian a draconian peace not just on another white Christian country but even uh you know

even even on even even even an alien power that's outside the culture completely. So long as you're not engaged in an existential war against them for survival, you don't treat people that way in defeat. There's no honor in it. And honor matters and ethics matter. And the killing and non-combatants matters too.

And we're going to take that up in a more complete capacity when we deal with the Nuremberg, um, um, addendum to our discussion. but what I want to I want to give back to you in a moment, but I what I want to do in our next discussion, which we can record any time. You said Saturday.

I want to get into a focus as we talked about, which was really the first, in my opinion, modern political action committee. It really was. That's not some that's not some hokey metaphor of invoking or some imperfect analogy.

you really did not you did not have dedicated committees to raise money you know to advance discrete policy initiatives to elect like an individual man and promote that man is like the face of these policies like you had lobbyists you know all in sundry and you had for you know a couple centuries by that point you know you had men who who owed their political career to basically being representatives of you know either you know industry or agriculture or you know military interests such as they could be said to exist in the early modern era. But Churchill is really, he really was the first man where you had a bunch of wealthy people and organizations that presented wealthy people saying, you know, here are our policy demands. You know, we're going to

cooperate to realize these demands and we're going to select this man, you know, and we're going to see to it that he has installed in office, you know, to implement these demands as policy. I've researched this thoroughly, and Churchill is, he is, like, he is, he is the original example of this. I'm sure there's going to be people in the comments who are like, oh, no, there was, you know, Lord so-and-so from 1850 or whatever, and it's not the same thing, okay? And, especially considering there's a, literally a modern national media apparatus buying Churchill, you know, if you want to. And a central bank.

Yeah, exactly. Yeah, yeah. And we're going to deep dive into that now. I don't want to now, because we've been going for almost an hour. and frankly, I want to kind of organize my thoughts a little better for the second part. But what do you want? Let me ask an opinion question. Yeah, yeah.

Did they get behind him because they knew that he was not the smartest man in the world, and he just seemed like he could be a good puppet? I think there's a few things here, okay? Churchill was a weird guy. I mean, he was weird in terms of personal habits and stuff. But he also, like I said, Churchill had this kind of promiscity. He was glamorous mom who was an American. He had this dad who literally drank himself to death and was crazy.

Churchill, like, straddled America in the UK. He hung around a bunch of Nouveau-Rees-type guys and, like, rich Jewish guys. But he also was a lesser noble. He literally was descended from, you know, the Lord of Marlborough. So, like, he knew how to move in aristocratic circles, too. Like, you take for granted these days that there's this kind of citizen-of-the-world types. you know, who are insinuated into high places. And a lot of them are mediocrities, as I think Churchill was, but that's not the point.

Like, the point is that guys like that weren't real common in the United Kingdom of, you know, 1930. So Churchill was, he had rare characteristics in that way. But it's also, it's also like, it's, it's less like we discussed during the hour. Like, Churchill was a guy who literally would defect at the drop of a night. he was for sale. And that's why I compare me to Bill Clinton. There's a lot of guys, and myself included. I mean, I'm a Christian.

I'm a senator like every other man and woman is, and I'm not better or any worse. No man is any better or any worse in this regard. And all men can be bought basically if they're in political life. That's why they're there. But there's very few guys where they literally have no principles at all. And if you dangle money in their face, they'll basically show for whatever you want. Like whatever you want. You know, that's, that is rare.

And I think it's indicative of being some kind of a cycle path, frankly. I'm not just saying that. Like, you can say what you want about Hitler. Hitler believed in everything he was doing. You can say Roosevelt was an evil guy. Roosevelt actually believed everything he said. I don't think Churchill believed in anything. Yeah, like, I really don't.

And either that or it's, and I'm not, I'm not just dropping a cheap shot owing to his alcoholism. I mean, only to some of my own issues in the past that have been recanted about, I'm the last person who's going to, like, trash people for having, like, drug or alcohol problems, okay? But if you're a lifelong drug addict or alcohol, like, it does, like, start to make you go crazy. And I consider the fact, and David Irving dropped this in his Two Valley Mystery. Like, Church was probably starting to lose his mind by the time he was, like, our age, you know, like in his 40s. I mean, you can't, you can't be a drunk for 30 years and have that not, take its toll. You know, I'm sure that must have had something to do with it. And again,

that's not some, that's not some kind of cheap, you know, that's not some sort of cheap slander on Mr. Churchill. It just doesn't, I mean, I, I, I know guys who, I know guys who betrayed their own principles, you know, for profit. I, I've never met a guy who was like Mr. Clinton or like Winston Churchill where it's, you know, one day they're having for this, you know two years later they're advocating for the precise opposites and then a year after that they're arguing for something totally opposed to both like that that's that's literally insane you know or at a Churchill today would not be able to pull that off because he'd be people have the memory of a house fly these days but it he would have been caught him in some

scandal and or it would have just been like he would have just not been making seriously anymore but you could reinvent yourself in 1924 1934 you know when there wasn't not only was another 24 or a media cycle. There wasn't even television then. You know, I mean, there was radio. There was a global media developing, but it was not this. You could, you could disappear for years, reinvent yourself. And if you've got to control people's access to you, and if you had, like Churchill did, like a real media and money apparatus behind you, you kind of like literally like reinvent

your history. Okay. But we're going to, we're going to get into the focus next. next session and the Warriors and we'll specifically deep dive into that. Then this may be somebody's first, they're just dropping in on this one. They haven't heard a previous one, so plug your stuff. Okay, thank you, Pete. You can find me on Twitter that awful, awful platform.

But I've got high hopes for it moving forward. Thanks to Mr. Musk and other things. You can find me there at number seven, H-O-M-A-S-777. You can find me on Gab at Real underscore Thomas-777. You can find me on Substack at RealThomas-S-777.com. We've got a podcast there. We've got long-form stuff there. We've got all kinds of stuff there.

And you can join it for only $5 a month. and unless you're like a bona fide hobo you can afford that. I'm not in a position yet where I can just drop stuff for free. I'm trying to get there. Like I'm not just saying that. I genuinely am.

But right now, every subscription helps. And it'll never be more than five bucks a month. But like I said, that comes out of something like 17 cents a day that's cheaper than feeding one of those fucking African kids like on those late night fucking infomercial. And I, you know,

like those average kids got NGOs helping them out. I don't have NGOs like an old fucking peckerwood who like writes politically incorrect stuff. Like no one's going to like fucking, no one's going to drop fucking paper on me if you don't. So there you go. Yeah, anybody who

comes up to us offering us large amounts of cash to write or produce, we're going to be like what the hell? What are we being set up for, you know? Yeah, exactly. And forgive me, I'm getting over a big,

the RA flare up. That's why I'm not like dying of freaking COVID or AIDS or something. Like I forget me for sniffling and coughing. I know it's gross. But um, I wanted to, I wanted to make sure we recorded today and uh, I, yeah, we're, uh, we're gonna, well, let's, let's record part two of, uh, of Churchill and Churchill's war on Saturday. And we'll go for an hour and a half if need be then. Okay. Um, and then, yeah, subsequent to that,

we'll get into Barbarossa and then the addendum will be like Nuremberg and like, you know, a summary of, you know, the, the political intrigues of war and just kind of like a, a, uh, summing up, you know, the, the Nuremberg World Order and and the raison d'oeuvre for the war itself. And again, I can't thank you enough. Sincerely. And thanks for accommodating me. Like I said, I was real sick the past few days. And, um, you're, you're very kind, man, and understanding. I appreciate that. No problem at all. All right. Until the next time. I want to welcome everyone back to the Piquino, show. By request, people have been making comments. We are going to pick up where we left off with

Thomas 777. Has it gone, Thomas? Very well. Thank you, Pete. Again, thank you for, thank you for continuing to host me and for participating in this discussion series. Like I indicated last time, I think it's important for posterity and just to kind of disseminate revisionist perspectives in a way that's more accessible. and I think we're doing very good things here. Yeah, the way I'm going to do this is once we record the last episode, all of the episodes I put on my substack are private. They're early releases.

I'm going to put these on my substack and make them public and just make these public. So anyone can go to them. Anyone can get the RSS feed from the substack and can listen to them. So that'll be, I think that's a good idea. And I trust that Substack's going to be there for a while. Yeah, that's my primary platform anymore because I, I mean, I get deplatformed a lot, as I think people know. I've never been censored or deplatformed or warned by Substack. I believe the only thing that they crag down on is obviously pornography, you know, threats to violence or criminality.

And I do, I have heard people say that they've, they've had issues if they allow. racially inflammatory language. Um, out, out of context, you know, just, I mean, jokes that nature and things. And I, I, I generally issue that. Cause that's, it's not generally something I, I include anyway. I mean, not as I care if people talk that way, but it's, I don't really do that. Um, but yeah, substack is, is, is, there's a reason why I am associated with them. I've been very happy.

All right. So when we finished off last time, we got up to, we were talking about Winston Churchill, 1932 and it seems like right about 1933 he with he along with a couple other people really starts to rise to prominence and power so jump in 1932 was really that I mean Churchill remained Churchill's wilderness years really remained from 1932 probably until 1936 but 1932 especially he was not behaving like a man of his portfolio, okay, a lesser nobleman who had served in government and was considered something of a prodigy early on, I mean, rightly or wrongly.

He, he began writing really, really, really what amounts to hack copy for pretty much anybody who would publish his essays. For a time, and this is incredibly bizarre, he found this American publishing house that was, as we talked before about Churchill kind of playing a character quite literally, particularly in American media, as, you know, this, this kind of John Bull, like, literally like the manifestation of John Bull, like he was almost like this mascot of old blighty. And this publisher was paying him to write classics of English literature as reinterpreted by Winston Churchill.

So it was Winston Churchill literally writing kind of the comic book CliffsNotes version of things like Weathering Heights with his own kind of snarky. commentary and are spursed in jokes. Like, why anybody who want to read that? I have no idea. They didn't sell particularly well. I mean, Churchill pretty much was living on the advancements from things like that. He still had a good relationship with the Daily Mail, which soured very rapidly shortly thereafter.

We're going to get into why that was. But, I mean, that'd be like, it's an imperfect analogy, but imagine a guy like John Kerry or like Mitt Romney. One of these guys just kind of bounces around the swamp. Imagine if you started writing kind of cheap romance novels, you know, kind of men's adventure novels, and it just started publishing op-eds and Wapo and, you know, on the Daily Beast. Like that would seem strange. I mean, would it not? I mean, that seemed strange today. It's really strange for, you know, 1930, 1931.

So, and here's my point is that, you know, this is not a man who, I mean, not only was he not particularly liquid and wealthy, but he wasn't just a man in the kind of genteel pocket. that a lot of, you know, kind of lesser noblemen found themselves in the, in the hustle and bustle 20th century. I mean, this was a guy with real problems. You know, he was very, very, very addicted to alcohol. He had a son who couldn't seem to make his own way in the world and, you know, was a degenerate gambler. You know, he had a daughter who suffered from depression and there's nothing funny about that. And I'm not making fun of that or you're saying that that's grounds for prejudice or something. but, you know, he, this was not a family that was doing well, okay? And Churchill really was his ability to generate income was supporting not just himself and his wife,

but his adult children and all these hangar-ons. Like it wasn't, this, this was not a responsible man, okay? And I mean, I, as, I know in America, people like to draw this kind of distinction between private and public life and in some ways that's appropriate. But if you look at the way a man governs his private affairs, if he does that in a grossly irresponsible way, you can't say that, oh, but in public life, he's entirely responsible. And he's, you know, not at all a slave to his passions. And, you know, he's constantly able to discern the correct course, even if he fails time and again in affairs of the heart and personal matters. I mean, I think that's not just me putting shade on Churchill because I think that he's not an admirable figure.

bring it back kind of the hard and fast facts of the thing and uh Frederick Lindemann in throughout 1932 Frederick Lindemann was kind of Churchill's only really close associate

Lindemann had a background someone like Churchill he was German born he was the Lord of Charwal and probably butchung that pronunciation he was something of a gadfly he shared kind of Lord Van Satert's

hostility to Germany, but at the same time he was quite anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist, and he was dogmatically anti-communist. But Charles' association with him, both he and Churchill, they kind of made a habit of costly assailing Ramsey McDonnell, who was then prime minister. And McDonald, I think he's an interesting prime minister, brief as his tenure was, but he made a lot of enemies among industrialists and a, and a, and a, among old empire loyalist types because, you know, the guy was viewed as being, you know, not just friendly to trade unionism, but, you know, people, people accused him of being read. People accused him of having these radical socialist sympathies, which he really didn't. I mean, he was something of a grand coalition builder. He fancied himself as that. That included, uh, that included, uh, being somewhat cozy with radical elements, but he certainly was not a communist. He certainly was not, you know, some, uh, some sort of radical. but McDonald was, you know, one of his, one of his big policy points was disarmament.

I mean, this was a global movement towards disarmament, okay, the League of Nations, that was its purported Rayzone Detra. But McDonald, he actually took that seriously. And he said, why the hell, what are we arming for war against? You know, he's like, Germany right now is pro-straight and even were it not. There's really no reason for us to collide with them on strategic matters. you know, even with the situation in Vimar and with the then, you know, ascendant national socialists, you know, this is not some clear and present threat to the United

Kingdom or its empire. That's ridiculous. He avoided discussion of the Soviet Union, but that was pretty common among any labor politician then. And you can say that that's not a particularly flattering tendency as such that it has existed, but he was not unique in that. But the point is, McDonald's not simply trying to stick it to these armaments concerns and these munitions

manufacturers and the very, very strong Admiral T. Lobby, he really believed in this. And, you know, he believed that this was viable. And frankly, what killed the Enterprise in 1933 was when the Germans formally withdrew from the League of Nations. But by that point, and McDonald's efforts had been, had really been tanked by the fact that it was becoming increasingly clear that, you know, proposals like the Washington Naval Treaty and, you know, what the French were demanding as regards collective security in the continent, you know, it meant disarmament for thee, but not for me. and even if Hitler had not been at the helm by then, I think whoever was Chancellor would have done the same thing. You know, the Japanese and ceremoniously withdrew after, you know, in the wake of the Washington-enabled treaty. And in their words, they were being treated like coolies, and there's some truth to that. I mean, however anybody feels with the Japanese Empire.

They were essentially being dictated to that, you know, they could only, they could only maintain a fraction of the military maritime tonnage that the United States and the UK would. And, I mean, nobody, you're essentially, you're not practicing diplomacy when you issue those kinds of ultimatums. You know, you're, you're aiming for diplomacy to fail on purpose to rationalize your own, continued course of defense policy and it's exactly what happened but during this time

Churchill's other patron that he picked up probably for cynical reasons only in large part as we just mentioned is continued to salt on McDonald Lord Rothmere who was a

was a he was a newspaper magnate okay Like he was kind of, I'm trying to think of a good counterpart to, kind of a Robert McCormick sort of figure, okay? Rothbeard lost two sons in the Great War. You know, he, so he was, he very much had an interest in reaching a conquer with Germany. That was personal, not just because he was kind of an old-line patriot. He eventually developed a fairly amiable correspondent of that Hitler.

There was very few people in the UK. He was very selective in the right, mostly with another one. But he was very selective in his context. There's not a lot to this correspondence other than Rothmere stating that, you know, he sees no reason why the Tories or the liberals, if either slept into office, why they would not continue a course of. you know, reconciliation with Germany. However, in the euphemistic language, where often they were employed,

you know, there were elements that wanted to see this fail. I mean, you can read the entirety of the correspondence, I believe, on the Wilson Center's website. I'm not endorsing the Wilson Center, but I believe it is there.

If not, there's other places you can find it. But my point is there's not some, there's not some remarkable nuggets of historical truth in these things. I only bring it up because it's significant to, addressing the rift

between Churchill and Rothmere. As as Churchill's kind of anti-German polemic reached increasingly fevered pitch, Rothmere finally got so

affronted by it that he ended any association with Churchill. He refused to pay him for any more content. You refused to run anything secondhand that had been penned by Churchill, or was it all sympathetic to his position. And so again, I mean, Churchill was, if not so much cast under the wilderness politically as he had been.

He was once again without a financial patron. And Robert was extended him, you know, loans of the world. It was, you know, pretty clearly gifts and all that name. So, Churchill is in search of a patient. The 30th being 1934. And what happened to say before, God forbid, Churchill would be able to. And God forbid Churchill would work for being seen in a...

Hold on, we're losing... Hold on, we're losing... You're going in and out. Now, your connection, your connection is weak. Okay. How about now? I don't see the, it sounds better. Yeah, anybody trying to restore the connection.

Okay. Okay, how about now? It sounds better. I'm still reading it as weak, but that doesn't mean anything. It just matters how it sounds. Okay, I'm coming through, okay? Yeah, keep going. Okay.

So Churchill's yachting in the Mediterranean, you know, with at least keeping of appearances. It makes the acquaintance of a man named Alexander Cordo. Alan Cora is a Hungarian Jew. He emigrated literally to Hollywood. Okay, like he was

the early talking films, okay, he was very prominent in this nascent industry. There was a lot of business at this time. Okay. The first point of

UK production, talkies from production, with his film that probably a lot of I can't look out on a film

on a screen type make much of it. I have no idea of the quality of it, but it was massively profitable. Corda became incredibly wealthy.

Quartermich's acquaintance and he bails him out. He quite literally pays his debts and he doesn't do so. Okay.

And this was that he'll head before a Ross Ropee, right, raw up here, you know, baking him literally to make him literally to money, Carlo. And Robert Bails out

Churchill, I believe, to the tune of 10,000 pounds sterling, which was a huge amount of money in those days, okay? But weeks later, really weeks later, only weeks later, owing to Churchill spent their ways, the approaches Cora asked for more money.

Okay? You know, Corda ended off, you know, there's another infusion of of cash, even hires Churchill's daughter for a no-work job, okay, because Churchill kind of confided to him. You know, I'm worried about my daughter and, you know, the man she's carrying on with. That's a total other story. I don't want to get into a digression, but, so, you know, not only is court of paying Churchill's bills, he's covering guns gambling debts, and he's hiring Churchill's wayward, kind of sad daughter

with these, with these psychological problems, which, again, are no fault of her own. But, you know, he's literally hiring the man's family for these no-show jobs. some kind of mafiosi water or something. Cortaford gets its hooks in Churchill tells them, hey, look, I'm going to give you a job. You know, he's like, you don't need to pay back the money I gave you, but I'm going to give you a job. I'm going to commission you to write a screenplay on, you know,

the life of George V titled Jubilee, because, you know, the Jubilee celebration at George the Fifth is coming up, and, you know, this would just be so great. And this will put you on the map again. And, you know, you can kind of rebuild some respectability as, you know, not just a man of title, but a man of mean. and, you know, who's kind of engaged with, you know, the, the 20th century. And this will be great, you know.

And Churchill does that kind of out and off. You know, he writes this screenplay that never comes to fruition. But there's much made and kind of like society pages. Like, oh, Churchill's under the film industry. Like, what a great thing this is, you know. And look, he's, you know, he was this man about town and Mr. Cordo and, oh, wow. You know, like, you know, Winston's not just this kind of stuffy old, you know, descendant of the house of Marlboro or whatever. he's really on the he's really he's really doing great things for national prestige and

all this other stuff i mean uh so throughout uh 1934 this is going to churchill's new patron cord introduces churchill de bernard barouc uh bernard baruch is a banker quite literally you know he's a wall street financier he's also a huge zionist okay his uh his whole his whole cause his whole kind of life outside of business finance and and uh and this kind of wheeling and dealing is uh you know um procuring a uh a a racially pure if we can you know

use the familiar terms of the era uh it created a jewish state in palestine you know in a homeland for the jewish people where that would be for them alone and you know he's uh when he's not editating for this. He's, you know, he's funding myriad Jewish causes. And, you know, in the United States and in Europe, you know, he's active with the nascent anti-deformation league, which was, you know, had come into existence in the 19thens. Um, at the Leo Frank incident, which, uh, I don't want to get into here. People have strong feelings about that. I might want opinions, but that, you know, my point is that he was, as, uh, as Jewish power in America became institutional.

he was an instrumental figure in this. Okay. Churchill became so tight with Baruch and with Cordo later on, I mean to jump ahead just for a moment. In 1942, Corder was made a knight by Churchill or Churchill sponsored and essentially demanded his knighthood. Now, this is what I heard of for a film industry personage. Okay, it was the first time the title been conferred on anybody like that. All right, but this gives you an idea of the degree to which they were, they're kind of fortunate. were insinuated. This was not just some, you know, temporary marriage of convenience. Like Churchill's job basically became, you know, acting in the employee of this man and his associates. Very quickly, after this is kind of solidified, Churchill's kind of singular focus, he begins declaring that German airpower was a mortal threat to the British Empire. He began stating that, you know, only of these intelligent sources that he never discloses, you know,

Germany's, by 1935, Germany will have 5,000 assault aircraft. You know, these aircrafts can drop, these aircraft in one sortie can drop 500 tons of bombs on London. You know, in contrast, you know, there's not a single, you know, the Royal Air Force doesn't even have the capacity to reach the European continent, which was nonsense by that time, even, prior, even before the Lancaster bomber, go to the drawing board, like the RAF in 934-35, they could easily reach the low countries and even the roar.

Okay, so I mean, this was just an out-and-out confabulation. This was largely met with derision, but it gains an audience with people sympathetic to the politics of people like Baruch and Cordo. A man named Desmond Morton, businessman, industrialist, another wealthy patron. And he establishes a, we consider a political action committee. It's called the Industrial Intelligence Center.

I mean, that sounds innocuous, right, and neutral and, you know, like some kind of source you'd go to for data on the world around you and particularly on, you know, the capabilities of nations, actually your potential. It starts this industrial intelligence, this industrial intelligence center begins presenting figures and data, once again, based on undisclosed sources in the intelligence community. he again reiterates he says that you know by then in 1938 there'll be 5,000 German assault aircraft you know the UK even at maximum production you know could only field 900

you know mind you there's never these these statistics were never cited there's never any discussion of the make or model these aircraft there's never any discussion of their quality there's never any discussion of their range there's never any discussion of their armaments you know nothing

further they claimed you know if London was targeted in one day there'd be 30,000 dead you know, within 70s of assault, possibly double that. You know, Chamberlain, to his credit, publicly stated, you know, there's no information backing Churchill's claims. But, you know, even before Chamberlain became this kind of figure that was burning effigy, you know, after the Munich summit and subsequent, you know, history that, you know, assigned him this kind of villain's role, you know, Chamberlain didn't out of the public profile, Churchill did. have the backing, you know, nor do they have the ability to disseminate rebuttals to what Churchill was saying. You know, Churchill didn't quite have a bully pulpit. He wasn't even in government at this time. But if your friends are all millionaires, I mean, by today's standards, that'd be

billionaires. You know, they're insinuated in media. You know, they're, they've got power and authority on Wall Street. I mean, you can get a lot done. And if you go around yelling things from the proverbial rooftops, even if it's nonsense, you're going to, people are going to listen to you if you say it enough, okay? It doesn't matter if you've got Ramsey McDonald, you know, who's kind of on his way out anyway and risking, you know, a vote of no confidence. It doesn't matter if you got, you know, Mr. Chamberlain, kind of kind of stuffy dull Mr. Chamberlain saying, well, actually this isn't true inciting the facts and figures to rebut it. You know, it comes down to presentation. It comes down to saturation of the conceptual landscape. I mean, we see this

today. You know, people say totally insane things about Vladimir Putin and Russia. Like, even if you don't like the Russian or don't like Mr. Putin or sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, whatever that may be, the things that are said about this situation don't make any sense. It's like, okay, well, it was the same thing in those days.

And I'd argue it was even more insidious because you couldn't get on the internet and fact check, you know, and you didn't, you didn't have alternative sources of media. You know, you basically had whoever could yell the loud is to read the most outlets that would be receptive to publicizing and disseminating

these statements. That was the opinion that won out. 1935, the German air codes, at least the lower operational air codes, are actually broken by British intelligence. UK Foreign Secretary John Simon,

he says what Churchill's saying is nonsense. The number of extant actually existing German aircraft, he's talking forces in being, was 578. UK foreign secretary John Simon met with Erhardt and Milch in March at 1935.

For those that don't know, Milch was the first CEO and he was really the founder of Lufthansa. He later became a field marshal. He was the hero of the Battle of Narvick. He was ethnically part Jewish. He's an interesting guy.

David Irving wrote a great biography of him. But Simon met with Milch because Milch was something I mean he wasn't just he didn't just had military rank he was a diplomat of his in his own right as much as business moguls are because they have to be

Milch was a guy who was genuinely well liked unlike unlike the unlike the official foreign ministry a lot of these figures in the UK actually like dealing with Milch okay that's if it seems strange for him to be meeting with the foreign secretary that's why

Simon wanted to meet with him to discuss the forthcoming naval talks. The, after the, after the, after what happened, you know, with the Kaiser's high seas fleet and in terms of provoking anxieties, which led to an arms race, which in turn was an contributing factor to the Great War, there was great concern and more responsible policy circles about transparency in, in maritime arraiments, okay, that was the context of that. milch wrote down in his diary this personal diary after the meeting with john simon quote we are banking on britain's assistance against russia that is importance okay that actually is an essential kind of nugget of truth like buried in this kind of murky measm of of um of diplomatic and uh military intrigues of the era okay i mean milts really not only was he close to adolf hit at that point, then Ernst Udett had more formal authority within the Luftwaffe.

I would argue that Milch was probably closest to Gehring in operational terms. Okay, the fact that Milch, not only is he striking a non-confrontational posture towards the UK, he's openly, you know, writing in his private diary that an essential aspect of his strategic vision, and those Berlin's strategic vision, is bringing the UK into its strategic fold as an ally against the Communist East. I believe that says it all, okay?

I mean, I don't see how anybody can rebut that, you know, or how it can be said that, like, well, Milch is not in a position to know what the actual intentions of Berlin or as fewer were or what the OKW actually had in mind. I mean, I, but that is something of a tangent. November 1935, the British air staff convenes issued an internal memorandum stating unequivocally that German forces in being was no more than 594 aircraft. They did not single out Churchill as the target of this rebuttal, but they did make mention of irresponsibly inflated figures. okay the implication here is obvious Churchill wrote in response to this

the Committee of Imperial Defense which was the UK did not have a general staff like the like the Vermeck did and you know our equivalent in this country would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Committee of Imperial Defense was basically that equivalent okay so Churchill addresses the Committee of Imperial Defense and he wrote rather ominously

is my sincere hope that this figure will not be made public as it would certainly give rise to misunderstandings and challenges. So think about that. Some guy who's become the kind of Aaron Boy, a bunch of billionaires. I mean, some of whom are frankly pretty dangerous people. They've got ties to militant

Zionism. They've got ties to the armaments industry. They've got ties to Wall Street. They've got this kind of media bully pulpit that's just kind of coming into existence, you know, on account of, you know, movie house, visual media becoming kind of a dominant propaganda platform.

They're writing you, you know, they're writing the letter is saying, you know, we, we really don't think you should publish certain data that that would cause misunderstandings. I mean, you don't, you don't need to be prone to conspiratorial thinking or a paranoiac to understand that the implied threat they're in. Okay. I mean, this is really incredible to me that I, that any, you know, but I mean, the, the UK, I mean, kind of, and I'm not trashing English people, but they're, for all reputation for subtlety and kind of nuanced and irony, they tend to speak rather plainly when they plan to threaten

people. And I think this is in a way that would not be the case in America. Opposite perception as that may be. November 935 is a seminal that this is a seminal month in year of a Churchill. because the conservatives are swept into power. This is no surprise to anybody.

Baldwin becomes the prime minister. He has no time for Churchill. He's committed to peace. He's got no interest in pandering to the armist lobby. He's got no interest in villainizing Germany. So as a substantiated general mobilization or a military bill. build up. Okay.

During this time, as we mentioned, Lord Rothmere, he was still in contact with Adolf Hitler. I believe this was his second to last correspondence with him. He wrote to Adolf Hitler clandestinely. He said that if Hitler could broker a peace between Italy, which was then at war with Ethiopia, Abyssinian Empire, as it was then known, that that could bring beneficial, diplomatic overtures from the new government in London. I find Hitler's response somewhat fascinating.

Let me bring it up here, but I'll read a word for word. Hitler replied, for 100 million years, this earth has moved around the sun. During that long time, it has always been filled with the struggle of human beings for nourishment, and later for dwellings and clothing, et cetera, countless influences have brought constant changes in the distribution of property. And now, in a certain year, after millions of years in which the earth has moved around the sun, an American professor claims the formation of a diplomatic league of partly heterogeneous nations with

completely opposite interests with a view to banishing future change from the world and effectively banish any change. And that sounds ominous, but that's also a very Hitler statement. I mean, essentially, Hitler was saying, which way to happen is going to happen, you know, I have no reason not to, you know, see if he'll doche, I'll be responsive to peace overtures, but this will not change anything. And you of all people should know better, considering you're, you know, you're Mr. Empire loyalist. That seems like a very stilted statement from Hitler, but you got to understand the way that British aristocrats wrote and the way that Hitler, the kind of Habsburg German artist wrote. reading between the lines, this is a fascinating response. But the point is that, you know, it was not just, it was not just kind of degenerate eccentric royals who were making friendly overtures

directly to Berlin. Okay, I mean, it was, there was active correspondence between Rothmere. And, I mean, Rothmere himself was an unusual person, but he wasn't some outlier. Okay, I just, I wanted to drop that for context. forgive me if it was kind of a tangent. But what Hitler also said was that, not to Rothmere, but when he was asked, I believe, by Ribbentrop, because Ribbentrop always had,

Ribbentrop is the foreign minister of the Third Reich, his chief diplomat. When he asked, you know, he said, okay, now with, you know, with what remains the League of Nations, definitely trying to progress, I'm going to peace between Italy and Ethiopia, you know, would now be the time to, you know, push for reclamation or colonies in Africa. Hitler said, I don't want to get the slightest impression that I'm trying to capitalize on a crisis,

which is interesting to me because Hitler supposedly is the man who, you know, like Mr. Kisinger said, never let a crisis go to waste. Now, of course, Hitler didn't hesitate to act or strike when he felt that circumstances were favoring the moment in military or political terms. But the point being, you know, if Hitler was this guy who was held bent and weakening the British Empire, like why wasn't the burmacht also in ethiopia why wasn't hitler doing exactly riventrop said saying like hey we demand a stake in africa you know i mean he could have been doing all these things and he wasn't he was basically saying he was he was kind of dropping these cryptic philosophical statements on rothmere you're telling ribandrop hey i don't want to provoke

london i mean this is not these are not the antics of a man who's trying to exploit a weakness and we views as its enemy there is not um especially one considers that baldwin the concerns were swept into power with a pretty strong mandate, but Baldwin himself, a British prime minister is not like a U.S. president, okay? It's not the man Baldwin, it's not like he, you know, it's not like the voters were voting for Baldwin. They were voting for the Tories. I mean, but moving on, 1935 goes 1936. Churchill angles for the position of Minister of Defense, which seems strange,

considering Baldwin's kind of intipity to him. but the sponsorship that Churchill had behind him, you know, people like Baruch, people like Cordo, he probably assumed that that, the, both the prestige and the in black threat or menace of that would carry him.

He's unceremoniously passed over. William C. Bullitt, who will be a familiar name to people who followed this series, you know, the arch new dealer, Roosevelt Ambassador to France, a man who, for all practical purposes, was kind of chief diplomat, without formal title.

Can you hear me? Yeah, go ahead. Yeah, we're good. Okay, yeah. I got to, okay, yeah, it said for me as my signal cut out. But Bullet wrote to Churchill when he was in London, when this was underway, you know, when the new Baldwin government was swept to power and Churchill was continuing these kinds of deranged and annex claiming that the Germans are going to kill us all.

He said the FDR, quote, strangely enough, all the old anti-Bolshevik penhivist. fanatics like Winston Churchill are trumpeting the Bolshevik thesis and are advocating an intente with the Soviet Union. And he wasn't being funny. You know, and bear in mind in 1920, and you'll still find this among woke types who don't really understand that their own kind of ideological heritage. You know, in 1920, Churchill was the man was saying that, you know, we've got to stand with Europe at all caught against Bolshevism.

He was showing up in Paris. proverbially waving a saber around saying that he wanted to lead an army against the you know the reds and and all of this and incidentally too he was saying that you know the jews are the source of all of this radicalism you know very very interesting now he's on the payroll of uh of american uh of american zionist uh millionaires but um what uh energized churchill's propaganda efforts probably more than anything rightly or wrongly i'm not saying this was warranted i'm saying just in terms of public opinion. March 736 is when the Veramock done of the Rhineland.

Okay. This really more than anything was Hitler's big gamble. Okay. Hitler was not really a military gambler. Politically, yes, militarily, no. That's a subject for another show. But this was the real test of Versailles and what remained of the political will to enforce it. Okay. And when the French did not act, when London did not...

you know, stage a diplomatic coup and, uh, and put pressure on Paris to do something. Or offer, if not direct military, you know, logistical and, you know, um, maritime support for the effort. It was, it was clear that Versailles was dead. Okay. Um, this energized Churchill to say, see, see, I was right all along, you know, the, the Germans are these mad here redentists. Um, it uh it um it uh it uh and i mean that that that can't be overstated okay i mean again this certainly not like so a seat of war fever in in in the in uh on the london street or something but it did it did it did give people pause um particularly people who uh had frankly something of a backwards looking view of strategic matters and viewed france as kind of

key ally of the empire and for context too at this time France was viewed as the preeminent European army and like land powers generally okay like they were not they were not viewed as a paper tiger they were not viewed as a state that you know due to political fracturing like lack the will to fight a general war with Germany okay I mean so even people who had a more cynical view of politics and did not accept this kind of Germanophobic you know kind of pro-Zionist view that was just intractively hostile to Germany, it would have given them pause regardless if it seemed as if, you know, a war between France and Germany was looming. And a lot of them would have been sympathetic to France.

And that's what I meant. But by, by the end of, by the end of 1935, you know, as we talked about, we talked about Churchill's financial. difficulties and the fact that he was quite literally rescued from destitution by by Baruch and Corda. By the end of 1935, another kind of figure like Andrew Churchill's orbit, Leonard Montefori, he was president of the Anglo-Jewish Association, which was exactly what it sounded like. But it wasn't just an ethnic lobby. group, you know, like the ADL.

I mean, it was that too, but its big thing was kind of having like an international presence. And it was a, very much an advocacy group for German Jews. And German Jews, I'm just speaking candidly here, there

was a great deal of enmity between German Jewry and obviously the third right government, but also many German people, okay? I'm not saying that's right or wrong. I'm not trying to just come on here and see bad things about Jewish people, but this

is a fact, okay? And no sectarian conflict happens in Europe, as it happens in America, as it happens anywhere on this planet. The Jews of Germany were very, the Jews of Germany were very much at odds with the broader culture, and people who claim like this was not the case are diluting

themselves, okay, because they were. People who claim that Hitler just confabulated this narrative and out of nowhere are diluting themselves. So that is the context. Lord Leonard Monteforei, he facilitates the introduction. Not only does it become another one of Churchill's monetary patrons. He facilitates the introduction at Churchill to what was called the anti-Nazi council.

It was quite literally called the anti-Nazi council. What was the anti-Nazi council? I mean Yuginspire, or Yuginshpire, okay? he was the chief financier of it. He was, for all practical purpose, as a Jewish refugee. In a later years, interestingly, Schpire, he published an autobiography and a testimonial, basically, of the inner war years. This was out of the Second World War, okay? Spire, basically, he was writing this kind of testimonial.

This is my life. This is how I founded, you know, as financed here, you know, the anti-Nazi league, which became the focus. and we'll get into what the focus was in a minute. You know, and he made much of the fact, thinking he was praising him, like, oh, and, you know, I brought Mr. Churchill into our service, essentially. Churchill begged him not to publish it. And according to some people, Churchill threatened to sue to prevent it being published. I don't know if that second allegation is true.

I have to further fact check it. But it is documented that Churchill zealously oppose the publication of this testimonial. And that's very, very interesting. you know like why if uh if church was so you know this man who was just so committed in his in his opinions and they you know they they they were so grounded and right and you know against the grain of public opinion like why would he care you know it's it's very very interesting but uh the anti-nazi council it did not actually originate in uh in uh in uh in london society circles it originated new york city um spire again financed it you know

a lot of the kind of legwork brought people into its orbit. But a New York City attorney named Samuel Intermeier, he was chairman of the World Jewish Economic Federation, which, you know, was again, I mean, it was an ethno-sectarian advocacy group, but kind of more business-oriented, more commerce-oriented, less of a focus on, you know, kind of traditional ethno-political lobbying, although that was also a strong interest of it. But E. But E. Um, Jemeyer incorporated it. And what put the World Jewish Economic Federation on the map is that the Jewish Economic Federation, the World Jewish Economic Federation, they organized a trade boycott on German goods and

manufacturers upon the, uh, the National Socialist's ascendancy to government. In 1934, um, they approached a man named Sir Walter Citrin. He was chairman of the Trade Union Congress. which seems an odd alliance. These kinds of ethnic lobbyist type guys who are high-flying Wall Street attorneys in America, you know, and kind of big shot London finance years, you know, very, very capitalist-thorient people. You know, they address this trade union guy, you know, Citrin, who's got a, you know, reputation for being, you know, red. But interestingly, they incorporate together.

The trade union in Congress becomes one with the world Jewish Economic Federation. And what do they incorporate is, they quote, non-sectarian anti-Nazi council for human rights? That's a mouthful of nonsense, if I've ever heard it. When you were saying about capitalists getting together with like the trade unionists and everything. Yes, sir. Anyone who studied what happened with election laws up to the 2020 election will recognize that. Oh, definitely, definitely. I was being halfway prestigious, but I mean, for people who don't.

know, like I'm not making fun of people, don't know the history of this, but it's, on its face, it seems bizarre if one doesn't understand the kind of intrigues and the sympathies of the people involved. But yeah, the, the world Jewish Economic Federation, uh, under Sam Untermeyer and, you know, bankrolled by, you know, London millionaires. And it incorporates with the trade union, the trade union Congress as the non-sectarian anti-Nazi council for what? For human rights. So what we have here is we have, uh, We have what amounts to it's one-half anti-defamation league type ethno-nationalist lobbying organization, one-half kind of foreign policy pressure group to make war on Germany.

And it's this odd constellation, a kind of crazy Zionist bigots, Jewish businessmen who, yeah, definitely have Zionist sympathies, but also are like, you know, looking to get paid out and out communists. a handful of disgruntled Tories, just like regular-world Englishmen who hate Prime Minister Baldwin and are willing to basically, you know, burn down anything to stick it to Baldwin, crazy as that seems. You know, Wall Street financiers are in this circle of all stripes, a lot of Jewish individuals among them, but not exclusively. And then you got these regular old war profiteers industrialists, you know, who old Ramsey McDonald had stuck at two with disarmaments. you know, and they don't, they don't care who's footing the bill. They don't care of it's Zionists.

They don't care of its Tories. They don't care of its piggy Winston Churchill and another crusade. All they know is that we're all going to get rich. You know, and we, in times have been bleak for us for the last 20 years. We've had a succession of hostile prime ministers that didn't give us what we want. And even the ones who had a more bellicose posture towards Berlin said, there's just not the money here to give you what you want. Now, interestingly,

as this anti-nodont, non-sectarian anti-Nazi council, um, becomes more and more and more bound with Mr. Churchill, and Churchill becomes more and more vocal, and becomes more and more publicly associated with, you know, a lot of these kind of significant figures in the Jewish community of a powerful,

you know, pedigree. The, uh, the board of Jewish deputies, which was the oldest Zionist NGO basically in the world, okay? They got a little bit nervous. You know, and they're like, look, we should probably avoid this kind of, we should probably avoid this kind of overly aggressive lobbying, you know, because it looks unseemly. Rabbi Stephen Wise, who was kind of the American counterpart, he basically just told these people, like, you're out of it. You're either going to go along with this and you're going to go along with our strategy or we're going to destroy you.

You know, we're going to sap you of your funding. We're going to discredit you in media. You're just going to be nothing. You're going to cease to exist. He founds the rival World Jewish Congress based in Geneva. And what proceeds is all these elements that had been brought into this non-sectarian an Ananasi council, you know, basically closed ranks against the Board of Jewish deputies and its holdouts. Okay. And basically just crushed like any opposition within their own house ruthlessly.

Okay. And what followed this was highly conspiratorial. Okay, so basically now we have a quorum of all these elements with the decided, and with the decidedly Zionist bent politically, Mr. Citrin, the trade union leader, the trade union Congress leader, he's seen, he's documented to be dining regularly with representatives both of the now cowed, or the now dominant world Jewish Congress. He's seen in their company at the same time of a chairman of major industrial, and chemical combines, which is interesting because a lot of these people, they were looking forward

to the next war thinking that chemical munitions were going to be a thing, but they weren't in terms of battlefield utility. But as well as, you know, weapons manufacturers, representatives of munitions combines, you know, industrial lobbyists, you know, it's like, literally, you can't, like, make this stuff up. It's like something you see in, like, some quirky superhero movie of, like, all these evil guys at the table, you know, here's some mafiosi, here's the mayor, here's the three congressman. I'm not. trying to be silly, but this is like literally what, this literally was underway.

You know, I mean, it's, it's, it seems like something out of a movie or, or something of a cheap, uh, pamphlet commissioned by hair gerbils to try to make British policy look like it had been co-opted entirely by Jewish interests or something, but this is in fact what happened, you know, after, uh, even after the, uh, even after, um, after, after, and after the, after the Rhineland, uh, occupation. Interestingly,

the, but Congress with its with its charter, the Labor Party still flatly opposed rearmament. They said, we're not going to be militarize. You know, we're not, we're not going to strike a bellicose posturing against Germany. We're not going to seek deterrence through

through a mobilization of arms, basically. Okay? So the the anti-Nazi council, which is now increasingly called the focus. And their communications to one another, which could be intercepted, obviously.

The euphemism they utilized was the focus. And so when you run across in Churchill's own writings or if you run across in documentary evidence corralled with people like David Irving and like Thomas Fleming references to the focus, this is what they're talking about. And later, the anti-Nazi Congress of Human Rights, It was later formally incorporated as the focus.

But at this point, it was still an unofficial moniker. But when the Labor Party, in the wake of the Rhineland occupation, flatly announces that, you know, even as the opposition, we're not going to criticize Baldwin's unwillingness to rearm, it's just not on the table. The focus convenes a meeting organized by Satrine, man named Henry Wickham, Steve. Steed with the keynote speaker.

Steed had been on the payroll of the Prague government, which even in the best of times had a tenuous grip on power owing to the ethnic and political situation. Steed declared that he was going to take this war chest, which had to be substantial because in the year 1923, 1924 alone, even paid the equivalent of between 250,000 and 500,000 pounds sterling by Prague for political activity.

So jumping out in 1936, if he was still being paid anything like that, he had a huge amount of money at his disposal. At this meeting, it's decided that Steed, utilizing his contacts, diplomatic, and otherwise, he's going to approach potentially what he called potentially sympathetic politician, not just on the Labor Party when they can serve in liberal parties as well and see if he can change their mind about the rearmament. you know, which is obviously a euphemism for buying legislation. Okay. As all this is underway, Baldwin, the prime minister, realizes he's a problem. Okay, the man wasn't a fool. And he realized that Churchill was in real danger of garnering some kind of quorum against him and that amounted to a war party. Okay. Baldwin decides he's going to try and neutralize Churchill by granting him what's called a deputation.

That's essentially a minister without portfolio, what would be considered that on the kind of. continent, but in the British government, which seems kind of Byzantine, even to me, and I know something about it. It's basically one part minister about our portfolio, one part unofficial advisor, okay? So Churchill now has access to Baldwin when he wants. Like I said, I believe, and I realize every historian speculates, but I think this is pretty clear. I believe Baldwin had two things in mind. I believe that would neutralize Churchill's vanity because, oh, now, you know, he's got a role in government.

But it also, Churchill couldn't keep his mouth shut. Okay. He wasn't just a bragger, but he was an alcoholic. And he just said things that he should not have said. You know, both in terms of insulting people and in terms of just kind of disclosing what he was doing. And Baldwin knew that because he knew the man very well. So Mr. Churchill's plotting against you. It's kind of better to have him coming by your office and slugging down, you know, gin and kind of

talking to you about what's on his mind than to have him out doing god knows what i mean silly as that sounds it's not a joke i mean it's it's a real thing you know i mean and it kind of in all times but churchill's sort of a almost comical example of a man who you subject to that sort of who you need to neutralize in that way okay right at this time is when uh the a and c you know the anti-naz council for human rights it begins formally referring to itself is the focus. Charles says, look, we can't have people thinking that, you know, we're a pressure group, okay? And this made sense, because Churchill did have good Machiavillian instincts. You know, not to be crude about it, but he realized, I can't be seen about town, hanging

around a bunch of rich Jews calling themselves the anti-Nazi Congress. Okay. Meanwhile, I'm, you know, ducking into Mr. Baldwin's office and telling him his business. Okay, this would not be a good thing. So from then on, what's now the focus becomes exponentially more powerful, but in some ways more profile. There's no more of these lunchtime meetings between, you know, you know, millionaire industrialists of chemical concerns and armist factories who, you know, are meeting with, you know, some New York City rabbi who's also, you know, got his hands in Wall Street and all whom, you know, are talking about how we can pressure the Baldwin government to really, really, you know, sock into Germany.

That's not going to happen anymore because now they're getting their way. and congruous with this, Wickham Steed, he sets up what's called a research section or what they call it a research section for the focus. Now, what does that mean in practical terms? Well, that meant dissemination of propaganda. It meant doing things like formally disseminating, you know, facts and figures on Nazi rearmament to the press.

You know, it meant declaring from undisclosed sources, you know, intelligent sources, oh, these are the, this is Germany's intention, or, you know, these are our forces in being versus the Germans and, you know, this is our aircraft gap, you know, things like this. Basically a propaganda office, okay? Now, A.H. Richards, who was, I don't believe he was Jewish, but he was kind of the frontman for the, for the anti-Nazi Congress going back some years. And he was the organizing secretary. He was the money man. So as Wickham Steed kind of proudly announces, I'm setting up the research section. Richard says, you know, without really thinking, where's the money going to come from from this?

Churchill suddenly became visibly livid. And Richard quickly was kind of ushered out of the room. And according to him in later years, was instructed, look, you are never to inquire about funding. And you were never to insult Mr. Churchill like that again, okay, especially not in the presence of witnesses. All you need to know is that rest assured, all explain. expenses have been taken care of. And if any of our benefactors ask, you tell them that it's not a problem, okay, that this will be paid for.

All we need is them to contribute their time and efforts and to basically, you know, carry out a request, whether that's arranging meetings or who we need to meet with, you know, whether that's, you know, issuing statements to the newspaper outlets that they're familiar with and friendly with, you know, or whether it's seeking out friends across the Atlantic, you know, who might be sympathetic to our plight. But you never ever raise money and you never ever address Mr. Churchill directly. on such matters. And that's very interesting, too. Because basically, by this point, which would come as no surprise, considering the resumes of the men who constituted it,

Churchill was the frontman of an organization that basically had a bottomless war chest, within reason. But for what it needed to accomplish, you can buy a lot of legislation for tens of millions of dollars in 1936. Okay? I mean, that's, and people misunderstand. I mean, the days, these days where we talk in terms of billions of dollars and, you know, we talk about guys like Elon Musk, you know, throwing around, you know, tens of billions of dollars. Like, we lose sight of this. But, you know, if you had, when the average person was making a few hundred dollars a year, I mean, if you were talking about tens of millions of dollars, you might as well have been talking about all the money on this planet. I mean, that was an obscene amount of money. You know, I mean, it was not, it was, it was not any small thing, okay? I mean, and nothing. even came close and to that to demonstrate that the funds for the research group under steed were in fact they were arranged by the board by the board of deputies of british jews

the vice president of the board of deputy board of deputies of british jews was a man named sir robert wayley cohen who was sir robert wayley cohen so robert wayley cohen was the chairman of shell you know shell where you get your gash formerly known as british shell Okay, that's show. At a meeting at Cohen's home, July 22nd, he donated 50,000 pounds sterling for any expenses needed by the focus. The rest of the membership of the board of deputies of British Jews, they cut checks for 25,000 pounds sterling,

and they pledged to match that any time was needed. Okay. Now, for context, to give kind of light, to what I just said. This was five times the budget of the British Council. The British Council was the top foreign policy lobbying organization in the British Empire. It was bankrupted literally by the royal family. The British Council was.

Okay. It was kind of like the Council on Foreign Relations of the British Empire. Okay. The focus, they had five times their budget. Like, think about that for a minute. So basically, there was no pressure group, no lobbying group, no organ, government, no kind of tentacle of the royal family that could, that could affect everyone's policy that came anywhere close to this NGO that Churchill had behind him.

Like nothing probably on this planet other than like the U.S. War Department and the kind of several industrial concerns that constituted that. I mean, if we could even, you know, make an comparison because obviously they hadn't even mobilized for war yet. So I'm just trying to give an idea of like the kind of bottomless nature of this budget. You know, without exaggeration, it was that vast. But Whaley, Waley Cohen's patronage came at a price. What was that price?

He said you wanted to have authority, final authority over all, all official statements on policy by the focus. Okay. You wanted the opportunity to edit or censor any policy. statements anything Churchill took to Baldwin any declaration within the focus itself not for public consumption that was considered to be you know an essential uh policy ambition he was the final authority on that okay he was he he even redacted later on he'd redact entire section to Churchill's speeches because he didn't like the way it read now what was his uh Beyond being a control freak or just wanted to know where his money was going,

like, what was Mr. Cohen's rationale? Cohen said that, he said, at base, he said the policy of focus has to be to refute the claim that there were any redeemable aspects of the German Third Reich and its regime, and that there were any redeemable aspects to Adolf Hitler, and that there was any legitimacy to any policy they pursued or any claim they issued. It kind of sounds like the American orientation towards Putin's Russia today, doesn't it? That's very interesting. But I think I've kind of dropped a lot here.

I'm sorry. Literally. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it, what I, I kind of want to conclude, I want to wait until our next session. I want to get into Churchill becomes prime minister. or before that. I'm going to to go to Munich. Churchill becomes prime minister,

the war years. That'll take about half an hour, I think. And then have our 45 minutes. And then we'll get into the onset of Operation Barbarossa and switch our focus to the Soviet Union. And then in our final episode, before we get into the aftermath of the war

and the Nuremberg, we'll deal with kind of the convergence of policy. New Deal policy, Churchill and the focus, Stalin's Soviet Union. I realize it seems like we're getting bogged down to minutia, especially on the issue of Churchill in the UK, but there's an incredible amount of detail and complexity here, and it's a lot more conspiratorial than what happened in America or the Soviet Union. Does that sound agreeable?

Sounds good to me. Okay. And again, I'm so sorry we had to delay this particular session, but if you want to, if you want to jump back on the content on Saturday or any time they're after, that would be just fine. Yeah, when we stop recording, I'll talk to you about that. Okay. Plug your substack real quick and we'll end this. Actually, I'll do so.

I get deplatformed a lot, so don't look for me on Twitter because I probably won't be back there. You can find me on Substack. Real Thomas 777.substack.com. I've got a lot of print content coming out imminently, and a lot of long form I'm going to be posting up more regularly. on the substack. So please follow it. Please join it. The podcast drops every other week.

It's only $5 a month. It'll never be more than that. Unless you're truly like in dire freaking hobo straits. Like join for $5 a month. Please. It helps. That's all I got. Appreciate it.

Until the next time. Thank you, Pete. Thanks.