The Prof G Pod with Scott Galloway - China Decode: The Trump-Xi Meeting That Could Reshape the Global Economy

Episode Date: May 12, 2026

Trump heads to Beijing this week for one of the most consequential U.S.-China meetings in years — with trade wars, Taiwan, AI, rare earths, and the fallout from the Iran conflict all hanging over the talks. Alice Han and James Kynge break down what Trump and Xi really want from the summit, why China may have more leverage than many in Washington realize, and how Beijing quietly used globalization to accelerate its technological rise. They also unpack a striking new study showing Chinese investors heavily targeted research-intensive firms across Europe and North America — raising a bigger question: did the West help build the competitor it’s now trying to contain? Plus, Xi Jinping’s military purge is intensifying. China has handed suspended death sentences to two former defense ministers as Xi continues reshaping the PLA ahead of a more dangerous geopolitical era. They discuss why Xi is trying to build a world-class fighting force while simultaneously hollowing out large parts of its leadership. Also: China Decode will be LIVE this Friday at 10AM ET on Prof G Plus with Kevin Xu to break down the first day of the Trump-Xi talks and what comes next. Subscribe to China Decode on Substack for weekly analysis, livestreams, and deep dives into the biggest story shaping the global economy: chinadecode.profgmedia.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This is all about vibes. The Chinese understand this very, very well, and they are willing to play the positive moon music for Trump coming in because he needs to score a real foreign policy gain, and he will try to do that in Beijing with nothing really substantive. Maybe a Chinese promise to increase ag purchases and Boeing purchases coming out of the summit. Welcome to China Decode. I'm Alice Han. And I'm James King.

In today's episode of China Decode, we're discussing the most consequential Trump-She meeting yet, how China's quietly absorbing Western innovation and why Xi keeps purging China's top military leadership. That's all coming up, but first let's do a quick check-in with how the markets are starting the week. On Monday, Chinese stocks rallied with a Shanghai composite index breaking above 4,200 points to hit its highest level in over a decade. across the Shanghai, Xinjiang and Beijing exchanges nearly 2,900 stocks were up. AI and related tech sectors led the rally with memory chip stocks, Jiangbo, Long and Tongyo technology, jumping over 10%.

China's government bond futures fell across the board, with the 30-year main contract dropping 0.39%, the 10-year falling 0.06%, and the 5-year falling 0.03%. The 10-year government bond yield has been hovering around 1.3%. 0.75% edging lower ahead of the Trump-Shee summit. All right, let's get into it. This week, Trump heads to Beijing for one of the high-stakes meetings of his presidency. Sitting down with Xi Jinping as the world's two biggest powers,

try to study a relationship strained by tariffs, technological conflict, Taiwan tensions, and now the fallout from the Iran crisis. The meeting is set to begin this Thursday, and on Friday, James and I will be going live on Substack to talk all about it. We'll analyze day one of the talks outlining what's at stake and making sense of what comes next. We'll be joined by the wonderful Kevin Shrew, founder of the Technology Fund Interconnected Capital, who writes the popular blog Interconnected. Now, join us live this Friday, May 15th at 10 a.m. Eastern Time on Prof Gplus.

If you go subscribe now, you'll get notified before we go live on Friday. You'll get the China Decode newsletter in your inbox every week, and you'll also be the first to know about future live streams. James and I plan on doing more in the future. Go to ChinaDecode.profgmedia.com to sign up. But let's talk about what we know before the meeting. On paper, the Trump-She meeting agenda concerns trade, rare earths, semiconductors, Boeing jets, American ag, and a possible new Board of Trade framework to manage economic competition. But hanging over every conversation is a much bigger question,

whether Washington and Beijing are drifting toward managed rivalry or outright confrontation. The timing couldn't be more complicated. The Iran crisis, which remains unresolved, is looming over talks. And at the same time, she is reportedly pushing for softer U.S. language on Taiwan in exchange for economic concessions. Beneath all of this is a growing reality both sides now openly acknowledge that the U.S. and China no longer see trade and technology as economic issues alone. They see them increasingly as national security weapons.

James, this is kind of like the Super Bowl for people like us who follow U.S. China relations. Whenever, you know, the big giants, the heads of state meet, there's a lot of analysis that happens before, during, and after. What is, if you were to look at it, what are your top predictions for what comes out of this summit. That's right, Alice, it really is like the Super Bowl for us. It's the time when all the emotions collect together and we get a chance to talk about this state of the superpower relationship. I tell you, to me, the big thing for this meeting, and I believe this is unprecedented, is that I think for the first time ever, it is the Chinese president more than the U.S. president that is

the person with the upper hand. I think that President Trump goes into this meeting relatively weakened, at least compared to when he took power in January last year. And I think correspondingly, Xi Jinping, China's president, is relatively strong. But just let me try to elaborate why I think this is the first summit between the U.S. and China in history where the Chinese side has more power. The first sitting president to visit China was Richard Nixon in 1972. At that point, there was no comparison between U.S. and Chinese power in the world. The U.S. GDP, I believe, was about 11 times that of China, just as a little trip down memory lane. The first president of the U.S. to visit China was, in fact, Ulysses S. Grant, who went in 1879. But that doesn't count because he was a former U.S. president

at that time, though he did spend six weeks in China. The last president to visit China was Trump himself back in 2017. And at that point, I think we can all agree that the US was definitely the more powerful of the two countries. But where we stand now, and if you disagree with me, please say, Alice, I mean, this is quite a big call I'm making. But where we stand now is the following. In nominal terms, the U.S. economy is still bigger than China. But adjusted for purchasing power parity, China is already a bigger economy than the U.S. China is at least a peer competitor when it comes to technological advancement compared to the U.S. China is, of course, by far the world's biggest trading nation. It's a much bigger industrial power than the U.S. It commands about one

third of the world's manufacturing output compared to about one sixth for the US. And of course, on the other side, the US has a much bigger and more impressive military than China. But my argument would be, unless you're at war, military strength doesn't really count for that much. I think that the key inflection point came last year when Trump had to roll back on the Liberation Day tariffs that he imposed on China. Now, at that point, for a brief period of time, the US levies on Chinese imports into the US was about 145%. Then China hit back, and it said that it was issuing restrictions on exports of critical minerals that US technology companies and its weapons manufacturers were dependent on, and within months, the White House had backed down. It had loved. It had loved

lowered those tariffs from about 145% to what is currently an average of 47.5%. And I think that, you know, to my mind at least, this shows that when it comes to economic power, China is able to weaponize much more persuasive, well, not much more, but somewhat more persuasive power than the U.S. We've seen it in the critical minerals, but China could also do it in other chokehold industries, active pharmaceutical ingredients, batteries, legacy semiconductors, and other items where China controls a massive amount of global production, typically hovering around 70 to 80%. So I'm not saying that this upper hand that China has will last forever.

Maybe Trump will pull something out of the hat at the summit. But at the moment, that's how I see it. I think this is historic in terms of U.S.-China relations for this. for this shifting power balance between the two. What are you seeing, Alice, what do you reckon to that call? Well, I love a big call, and I do agree with elements of it, although I think I probably come out with it being somewhat even in terms of the playing field.

My frameworking for this summit is the question, for both sides, what are your asks and what can you both agree on in terms of concessions? And on the China side, my sense, having just been there for a month, is that the Chinese care about three main issues and then two somewhat secondary issues. The three big issues are tariffs. They probably will want some minor reduction of the current effective tariff rate of a little bit above 30%. They probably want the Section 301 investigation to go away. Remember, that was put into place as a response to SCOTUS striking down AIPA.

So there's a tariff issue. Number two, they will probably, I think, want more clarity. on the freeze to export controls. And although I don't think there will be an announcement of loosening of some of the export restrictions on, say, chips, I think the Chinese will be pushing for a continued freeze on both ends, you know, export restrictions for chips in return for continued export restrictions for rare earths, which remember they remain in place

according to the current frameworking until November. And number three, there is a strong push for the so-called Board of Investment strategy, meaning that the Chinese are probably going to ask for Chinese factories like your BIDs or CATLs, battery makers, manufacturers, car makers to set up plants in a JV structure or wholly own Chinese structure in the U.S. That, I think, has been signaled quite strongly from Beijing in the last few months. And then the secondary issues, I think, about really the geopolitical ones, number one is Iran, some kind of dialogue over how Iran is resolved, although again, I think the Chinese would rather sit in the backseat and let the other players like Pakistan, the Americans,

the Iranians take the driver's seat. And then number two is Taiwan, although I sense, as we spoke about this previously, James, there will be less pressure on the Americans to change their rhetoric or language. I think the Chinese are more interested actually in another secondary issue, which I think may come up again, which is North Korea. And so there may be some attempts on the sidelines to reconnect Pyongyang with Washington. Trump may revive his conversations to have a phone call with Rocket Man again very soon after this. On the U.S. side, very strongly, you see this from some of the CEOs that are invited. Jensen Huang is just pulled out apparently. He's not going to be coming, but the Boeing CEO is going to be attending.

This is going to be a lean team of CEOs, but I think Trump is signaling that he wants more Chinese ag and aviation purchases coming out of this summit or in a future summit. And then Greer is coming as long with the Bessent from the USTR and Treasury Department respectively. And they, I think, will be pushing for more discussion about reducing the trade deficit. Although I qualify that this is, I think, fascinating

that you cited the 1970s, the statistics is pretty startling. The bilateral trade volume, this accounts for both exports and imports. The bilateral trade volume in 2025 between the U.S. and China saw the biggest drop since 1979. That was the year in which U.S. and China officially declared formal diplomatic relations. So, you know, this is coming at a time where, at least on the bilateral statistics front, we're seeing in our contemporary memory, the lowest levels of bilateral trade between the U.S. and China. I think the U.S. share of total Chinese exports the world has halved since Trump last came to China in 2017.

So it's interesting to see how, you know, really, over the last decade, trade has become reduced. Although, you know, if you look into the numbers, actually, it's just being rerouted through these third-party countries, mainly in Southeast Asia, Mexico and whatnot. But what has become, I think, more prevalent since 2017, and I'm curious about your thoughts, James, is the dual-use nature of pretty much everything.

You know, autonomous, weapons, AI, even biotech and pharma. I think increasingly that basket of dual-use technologies has increased from both sides, and you see that in the export restriction programs that they put into place. But the backdrop to this summit, I think, is very much going to be somewhat different to 2017, where I don't think it's going to be as much about trade. I think it's going to be more about some of these dual-use technologies.

They do not get resolved, I think, from this summit alone. There will be more to come. And I think she will go to the U.S. at the end of the year. But my, you know, one-liner takeaway is that this is all about vibes. The Chinese understand this very, very well. and they are willing to play the positive moon music for Trump coming in because he needs to score a real foreign policy gain, and he will try to do that in Beijing with nothing really substantive.

Maybe a Chinese promise to increase ag purchases and Boeing purchases coming out of the summit. But James, how do you think about the differences between 2017 and today? Well, I mean, I was just going to say, I completely agree with your point of view that, you know, the rhetoric around this summit is going to be fairly positive, I believe. But to my way of thinking, there is going to be a disconnect between what the rhetoric says, the mood music, the vibes, as you put it, and really what the security state in each country is thinking about the other. I don't think

there's been the slightest change in that regard. I think both the security state in China and the the security state in the US views the other as an implacable adversary. And so I think, you know, we're going to have another replay of this disconnect between positive vibes and then the deep state in both countries grinding away, undermining the relationship, sewing suspicion. And that's where, you know, the issue of dual use that you mentioned really comes in. Because technology is dual use these days. It is hard to get away from the way in which technology has changed has meant that, you know, the internet, your computer, your phone, all of these things become, well, not exactly dual use, but they could be used for

cyber snooping. They could be used by the deep state to the other side. And that's just some of the most commonplace technologies we have when you're talking about, you know, this 5G or 5.5G telecoms cables that you lay under the ground. That issue of dual use becomes magnified. So I think, think that we're going to get a positive vibe from this summit. Both sides are going to try and do that, but in the background, the suspicion is going to maintain itself. The two areas that I think the two sides need each other the most at the moment is, on the U.S. side, it needs China to try to get to some kind of solution in the war in Iran and obviously to unblock the Strait of Hormuz. That is a critical interest that I think Washington feels right now. And it needs China to use its agency

to get Pakistan back again to energize to lead the negotiations that might lead to some kind of resolution. And on the Chinese side, you've mentioned it already, Alice, they're always looking for something on Taiwan. Taiwan is so front and center for Chinese policy. Exactly what they might get is really not clear at the moment. They might be looking for some kind of positive state by the White House, but I think they might probably, they'll be pushing for something a bit more concrete, maybe a severe cut in US arms sales to Taiwan, something like that. This is speculation on my behalf. That would be huge. I don't have sources on that at the moment, but I think China realizes that it has the upper hand and it's pushing hard for something more concrete. Whether they get it or not,

that's another question. You think that would be too, too big to ask, right? Well, I think it's a pretty big concession for the Americans to make. They still haven't formalized, and so far as I understand, James, where they haven't actually delivered on those sales yet to Taiwan. I think that probably is significant because they didn't want to rock the boat ahead of the Trump-She meeting. But that would be unprecedented, at least from my understanding, or do you not agree? No, I think it would be a big call, but I think China's playing for big stakes this time.

You know, it realizes that it is much more powerful and it was a lot. in the past. And Taiwan is always its first ask in US-China summits. So they're probably going big, I mean, in terms of their hopes or expectations, whether the US will give it, that's another question entirely. And as I said, I'm not speaking from sources. I'm just, you know, speaking from experience on this. Okay, we'll be back with more. After a quick break, stay with us. the show comes from LinkedIn. It's a shame when the best B2B marketing gets wasted on the wrong audience. Like, imagine running an ad for cataract surgery on Saturday morning cartoons or running a promo for this show on a video about Roblox or something. No offense to our Gen Alpha listeners,

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China's economic rise may not have just been powered by cheap manufacturing and exports. It may also have been fueled by a major global effort to absorb Western technology from the inside out. A new study by American, European, and Chinese economists tracks trillions in hidden Chinese corporate ownership, finding that Chinese investors heavily targeted research-intensive firms across Europe and North America. But after those investments, innovation didn't spike at the foreign companies themselves. Instead, patent filings surged back home in mainland China. The findings add fueled to a growing fear in Washington that while the West thought globalization would change China, Beijing may have been using globalization to systematically accelerate its own technological

rise. And now, as the U.S. and China battle over AI, chips, and industrial dominance, the question is whether America helped build the competitor it is now trying to contain. James, as a historian, my first reaction to reading this paper, which is published by both mainland Chinese and American economists highly recommend, is the sort of 18th century. allusion to Slater the Trader for people who don't know who this is. This is an Anglo-American industrialist. He's born British.

He went to America. He stole the, or rather memorized the blueprints for textile mills from the UK and brought it over to the US, the East Coast of America, to set up his own textile empire. And the Brits call him Slater the trader.

The Americans see him as a big, Andrew Jackson called him a huge hero and the father of modern American industrialism. The reason I cite this is because it really is as a question of perspective, right? And in the game of technological and economic competition, all is fair, at least from my perspective. And this reminded me so much of that example, because in some ways it is pretty much the same deal.

You know, you buy up or you try to memorize the R&D of other companies. You then take that home, and you boost the productivity and innovation in the mainland, even if those foreign companies that you originally invested in see profits fall, all that really matters is the technological transfer that you achieve back home. But James, do you agree or disagree? To be frank, I'd never heard of Slater the Traitor, but that's a great story.

First of all, I just want to echo what you said about this study. This really is a groundbreaking study, and we're going to be linking to that study in the show notes. Just let me call out their name of the lead, author, Luke Leaven, who is Director General of the European Central Banks Research Department, and he's connected with Jenny Bai from Georgetown and Hongru and Yao Juncker from the Nanyang Technological University. And they have gone into 160,000 odd cases. It's a data set that big of firms that have done acquisitions in 159 countries. So this is why I think we're highlighting

this, it's truly comprehensive. And what they discovered is that Chinese investors, these are Chinese companies acquiring other companies, mostly in Europe or the US. They have amassed about 3.3 trillion US dollars in global corporate assets. So, first of all, the size of China's acquisition of tech companies all over the world has been a lot. bigger than we previously knew. 3.3 trillion is a massive number. And then the second really extraordinary thing about this study is that what the way they managed to do this was to look into the operations of Chinese companies that are registered in tax havens, like the Cayman Islands, for instance. And normally the thing about tax havens is that they're all secret. You can't get

the information that you need. When I was a journalist at the FT, we used to try to, and do this a lot. I don't know how these guys did it, but they managed it. And they found, for instance, that about 800 billion US dollars in Chinese ownership of companies abroad is held by Cayman Island subsidiaries of those Chinese companies. So this is a massive kind of backdoor, I suppose, to acquisitions all over the world. And then the revelation is, after that, that these Chinese companies, these Cayman Island companies, have been buying primarily tech companies, and they've been buying them apparently because of the pre-patent intellectual property that these companies held. So they're doing that because then they get hold of the intellectual property,

and as you said, Alice, that allows them to climb the technology ladder and to take China with them. So what this paper to me has discovered is this extraordinarily vitality. route through the tax havens to budding tech tech companies in the US and Europe and elsewhere that have helped China ascend the technology ladder to a degree that, well, certainly I had no idea about before. So I think it's a big, I think it's a really big contribution to our understanding of how the world works. Then the last finding is that once these companies in the U.S. and Europe have been bought by a Chinese company held in the Cayman Islands or in one of the other tax havens. The intellectual property is then taken back to the Chinese company and then

registered as a patent. And that's one of the reasons why we see China owning so many of the patents in the world these days. At the moment, the applications by Chinese companies for patents at the World Intellectual Property Organization at the United Nations is far greater than any other country. From memory, I think it's about 1.8 million patents pending, you know, applications pending. And that compares to about 500,000 for the US. So I think this paper has discovered a crucial kind of backdoor

that China used to vault itself higher up the technological ladder So I thought it was really a fascinating insight. But my other takeaway from that, which I found very fascinating beyond the fact that it shows how official data sets really underestimate or understate the level, to your point, James, of tech transfers or Chinese companies even buying up through MNA activity foreign firms via these Cayman Islands, tax havens, so to speak. What was also interesting to me was the fact that these companies are doing it themselves out of their own naked interests, as opposed to it being a narrative that you often

hear about it being state-led technological transfer. And what was so interesting to me to see is that you just have a ton of private and state-owned enterprises that are going out finding really interesting technological companies in their R&D and investing in them and then bringing that technology back home and filing patents. I think that that somewhat changes the narrative that a lot of people have of it being very top-down. In this instantiation, it feels very much like a bottom-up initiative. If you think about the story of China joining the WTO onwards, it's a story of a lot of companies going out there

and finding interesting innovation and technology and bringing it back home. So I found that super interesting. And then just, I don't even know how they did it. I was curious, given your background in journalism, James. I was very curious to ask you, How on earth did they go about finding the, you know, the parent companies, the OG parent companies of these shell companies that were domiciled in the Cayman Islands and BVI. I have no idea.

That's a mystery to me, complete mystery. I've tried to do this on many occasions. I mean, I think every China journalist under the sun has tried to do this. This is, we've all known for decades that many Chinese companies go to the Cayman Islands, register themselves there and then effectively get kind of carte blanche. Nobody knows who they are in reality because they go under the name of a Cayman Islands subsidiary and then they use that subsidiary as a camouflage to then do whatever they want to do in the world, sometimes buying a company, sometimes, you know, registering stocks or whatever it may be. But we have, at least in my experience, it's very difficult or nigh on impossible to get any kind of information on who

those companies actually are and then what they did afterwards. So kudos to these researchers. You know, this seems to be quite groundbreaking to me. And what was so interesting in the data set is the huge jump compared to all the other sectors. So they look at different industries, the top ten industries in terms of assets owned by China, from manufacturing, to energy, to mining, information, technology, construction, and manufacturing saw the biggest rise from 2012 to 2014 to 2019 to 2021. So even although we had this argument of decoupling that we started to hear in 2017-18, you know, in 2019 to 2021, we saw a three-time rise effectively in Chinese ownership of foreign manufacturing-related companies. That I think is fascinating to me. And it

kind of chimes with the sequencing, if you think about it, of China really doubling out, doubling down on manufacturing as a share of GDP. You know, as somebody who covers the economy a lot, what was interesting from the 2020 period onwards is this massive decline in the real estate sector and more lending given to the manufacturing sector and manufacturing share of GDP increasing as a result. So I found that really interesting is that China actually benefited even more from overseas M&A in manufacturing in 2019 onwards as opposed to before that. Okay, let's take one last quick break and stay with us.

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Welcome back. China has handed suspended death sentences to two former defense ministers as Xi Jinping's sweeping military purge continues. Officially, it is an anti-corruption campaign, but with nearly 100 senior officers reportedly removed or investigated in recent years, the crackdown increasingly looks tied to something bigger. Loyalty, control, and preparing China's military for the potential of a more dangerous geopolitical era ahead. Many of the officials targeted oversaw missile forces, weapons deployment, and nuclear modernization, raising new questions about instability inside the Chinese military. At the exact moment, tensions with the U.S. and Taiwan are rising.

She is trying to build a world-class fighting force, but is also hollowing out large parts of its top leadership in the process. James, this is fascinating for anyone who is deep in the weeds of China politics. But I sense that a lot of other people are so interested in the internal machinations. Just to summarize, two of the most senior people in the PLA, that's the People's Liberation Army, and remember, this is a party apparatus that is designed to be the military forces of the party. These are the two guys, Li Shang-Fu, who was the Minister of Defense, and Wei Feng He, who was the commander of the PLA Rocket Force,

which is effectively the artillery service, so he was in charge of all the missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are the two guys who just recently have been given a death sentence, although there is a two-year reprieve. And as you and I were talking earlier, James, it is likely that they will have the death sentence commuted and have instead life imprisonment.

But James, how do you see the importance of these recent moves in historical context? And what do you think this means for the PLA's battle readiness? Just two really easy questions. Yeah. Well, first of all, I think these two guys, Wei Feng He and Li Shang-Fu, as you said, they are currently, now that they've been sentenced, the most senior Chinese Communist Party officials to be put in prison. This is a big thing in itself. And as you rightly say, Alice, although the sentence is death, there is this reprieve for two years.

And in almost all cases, this is then commuted to life in prison. But I wanted to look at this also to discuss China's penal system. It may not be a very light topic, but it is a fascinating topic. Or at least to look at the highest echelon of that system. And that is to focus on the jail, the prison, that these two former leaders of the Chinese People's Liberation Army will be going to, in all likelihood. That prison is called Chinchung. It's on the outskirts of Beijing. I remember when I was a journalist based in Beijing, like many other journalists, you kind of go there.

You're obviously not allowed in, but you can sort of go to the perimeter and see if you can see anything interesting happening. Of course, you can't. But this is a fascinating place. If we look at who is in this prison, Chinchung, we can see some interesting things about how the Chinese Communist Party works. The first is that if you are a former official of considerable status, you get better treatment in the prison than normal people who are sentenced there. So there is a famous inmate in the prison right now called Borse Lai. He is a former Politburo member. and at one point in Chinese politics, people were wondering whether Borse Lai would be the successor as president. In other words, he was a rival of Xi Jinping in some people's minds for the top job.

According to reports, Borse Lai is held in fairly comfortable conditions in Chinchung prison. He's got a cell of around 20 square meters. It's got an en suite toilet. unlike typical inmates who have to wear standard prison fatigues, as a high-ranking official, he's often permitted to wear his own clothing, including like a Western-style suit. He can watch TV normally between, you know, specific times of the day, like 2 o'clock in the afternoon until 9 in the evening. Apparently, senior Chinese Communist Party officials also have access to better quality food.

they can have milk at breakfast, and they're allowed to walk in the prison grounds, sometimes alone. They're allowed to receive visits from family members. So, you know, it's not so draconian. That's if you're a very senior official. I do want to make it clear that I'm not making light of being a prisoner in China. I've known three people, all of them, who've spent time in Chinese prisons. And I must say that in the testimony of all three of them, it is a uniquely harrowing experience. Two of these cases I'm not allowed to talk about

because they were private conversations. But the one that I think resonates with me is that of a man called Sidney Rittenberg, who's now passed away. He was an American. He was senior in the Chinese Communist Party during the time of Chairman Mao and was sentenced to 16 years in solitary confinement during two separate prison terms.

And I remember talking to Sydney when he was still alive, and he actually wrote a book about this called The Man Who Stayed Behind, that was written in 2001. So a lot of this is described in his book. But I remember him saying that the first 12 months that he was held in prison, he was held in a completely dark cell, and he was in solitary confinement for the entirety of his 16-year duration.

And his book, and what he spoke to me and other people about, was the self-disciplined regime that he decided he had to evolve to survive, mainly to maintain his sanity. And it involved a lot of reading and learning and learned, learning poetry by heart and then reciting those poems so that he didn't lose his mind. What's your reflection, either on the prisons or these two that have been sentenced, Alice. You mentioned the elite rocket force. I mean, this is an extraordinary thing that the head of the rocket force of China, the guy in charge of the nuclear missiles, is now in prison.

Yeah, well, I had no idea about this, the prison side of things. So James, thank you so much for elucidating that. It's fascinating. Just to backtrack a little bit of it. little bit in terms of why these guys were taken out. Now, there's speculation and reporting that the PLA Rocket Force scandal, which really erupted in 2023, was a series of investigations in response to high-level procurement corruption. And this was in particular related to evidence that it had been uncovered at the time that missiles had been filled with water rather than rocket fuel and that missile solos had not been properly built. So in general, the takeaway from that is that there was this feeling that the PLA not only wasn't bad already, but there was a level of

corruption that was impinging upon military preparedness and an ability to compete with, say, America in the future. And on top of that, you know, officially, these two former military high-level officials have been accused of accepting and giving bribes. Now, I think in some of the cases that have come out recently, this is related to the anti-corruption side of things, there have been announcements that these high-level officials in the military, in the PLA, have not only been accepting and giving bribes, but they've been promoting their own people.

And now, as you know, James, in Chinese political history, there is this system of, you know, higher-level officials promoting or bringing up their mutual, their assistance, their secretaries, their chiefs of staff for loyalty reasons. And I think part of the concern, this is my speculation, is that not only has there been grafted in procurement corruption, but there could be these sort of rival power bases of factions that have been created within the PLA because of internal, effectively internal, and hiring via these, you know, top-level senior officials in the military. And right now, as we talked previously, James, and it's startling to note that the Central Military Commission, which is really the top state and party organ governing the PLA and the combined military forces, is actually carved out such that there are only two

members left, Xi Jinping, and the anti-corruption minister. And so what was effectively a seven-man team is now a two-man. man team, and that will need to be filled out, I suspect, in the next October 27 party Congress. But my takeaway from this, you know, and I think this is the TLDR, is that the Chinese elite leadership has been hollowed out and is not yet ready to do anything significant over Taiwan. And this is why I don't subscribe to the view that in the next year or two we'll see some kind of Taiwan showdown, because effectively, you know, having a, elite military leadership is extremely important. And I do not think that the government,

that Xi Jinping will take that risk before trying to replenish the ranks. All right, James, you know what time it is. It is prediction time. As you look into your crystal ball for the future this week, what do you see? Well, I'm looking at Chinese renewable energy exports. And the reason I'm looking at this is, of course, because of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that getting oil is more difficult and the price of oil has gone through the roof. And so this, of course, has been a boon to Chinese exporters of renewable energy, such as solar power batteries and electric vehicles. So my prediction is that the exports of these items will rise this year by at least 30% compared to last year 2025. This comes after a jump in the

exports of these three items by an average of 70% in March. Now, obviously, I think that at some point the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is resolved and tensions die down, and therefore the impetus to buy these renewable energy technologies from China will subside a little bit. So we might see the average increase this year go from 70% in March down to at least 30% percent. for the whole year. So that's my call, Alice. What are you seeing? So this segues with the summit that we're about to see between

Trump and she and Beijing this week. It's just been announced that CEO of Envidia Jedzin-Wang, who was originally, I think, supposed to be part of the delegation of CEOs, small delegation going to Beijing. It will not be going. And I think that portends

that the H-200s that have been formally approved by the Americans for sale to China will probably not be announced by the Chinese in terms of accepted imports. And I think this will be a setback for Jensen Huang, who's still really keen to have a foothold in the China market and not lose out on it. I just see so much momentum in the public and private markets for Chinese chip competitors. And I think that the Bit government will continue to flex this muscle of saying that it won't need H-200s

and continue to really bolster the domestic chip industry. As a result, I think there's still a lot of upside in Chinese semiconductor stocks. So watch that space. All right, that's all for this episode. Thank you for listening to China Decode. This is a production of ProfG Media. Make sure to follow us wherever you get your podcast so you don't miss an episode. Talk to you again next week.

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