The Prof G Pod with Scott Galloway - China Decode: The U.S. Attack on Venezuela is All About China

Episode Date: January 6, 2026

In this episode of China Decode, Alice Han and James Kynge break down Beijing’s response to Trump’s sudden takeover of Venezuela — a move that hits China’s energy interests, loans, and influence in Latin America, and raises the stakes far beyond oil. Then they turn to the EV race, where BYD has overtaken Tesla for the first time, signaling a potential power shift in the global auto industry. And finally, they look at China’s quieter — but surprising — rise as a luxury food superpower, from caviar to truffles, and what it says about trade, consumption, and state-backed strategy.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Even although Venezuela is not Taiwan in terms of China's core interests, it is an important strategic foothold for China in Latin America. I mean, it was described as an all-weather strategic partnership back in 2023. That's sort of the second tier in terms of friendships that China has with the rest of the world. So this was a critical relationship that has, I think, been weakened with the Trump administration's move. Welcome to China Decode. I'm Alice Han. And I'm James King. In today's episode of China Decode, we're discussing how China will respond to Trump's takeover of Venezuela,

a turning point in the electric vehicle race, and China's luxury food boom. That's all coming up, but first let's do a quick check-in with how the Chinese markets are starting the week. On Monday, the Shanghai A-Share Index rose 1.4% on its first trading day of the year. The Hangsang H-Sang share index rose less. than 0.1% hovering near a seven-week high. Oil companies, PetroChina and China National Offshore Oil Corporation both fell more than 3% due to their ties to Venezuela, but more on this in just a bit. And Minimax, a Shanghai-based AI company backed by both Alibaba and Tencent, is expected to begin trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange within the week at an IPO valuation

of $6.5 billion. All right, let's get right. Let's get right. into it. China just watched the U.S. pull off a lightning strike and takeover in Venezuela, removing the leader Nicholas Maduro and threatening to take some control of the nation's oil industry. Now, this happened just hours after Beijing's top envoy were sitting with Maduro himself. Now, this timing could be accidental or it could be the opposite, but for China, Venezuela isn't just an ideological ally. It is a significant energy supplier, a major a strategic foothold in Latin America and a test case for pushing against U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. A day after the U.S. operation, the Chinese foreign ministry declared itself

quote-unquote deeply shocked and strongly condemned the flagrant use of force by the United States against a sovereign state. So the real question now isn't so much whether China is angry. It's how it will respond. Will Beijing swallow the loss and play the long game, or does Trump's move forced China to harden its posture elsewhere from Latin America to Taiwan or even the South China Sea? What happens next could tell us a lot about the shape of U.S. China relations in 2006. James, I want to hear your takes before I dive into mine. What's your view on this? Well, Alice, I mean, you know, when it rains, it pours, hey? The new year, starting off like this, there really couldn't be a bigger geopolitical question for China.

than how it reacts to this. And I think you framed it perfectly. Is it going to play the long game or are we going to see some retaliation pretty much straight off, potentially even military retaliation? Now, I'm not going to duck the question. I'm going to go straight in there. Of course, we can't know the answer. Such things are among China's most closely guarded secrets. But I think that we will not see a military retaliation from China on Taiwan or in the South China Sea, at least not in the short term. I think that what you've framed as China playing the long game is a much more likely scenario. And the reason I think that is because Taiwan considerations are in the background of China's reaction to this. Venezuela is a long way from China. It's a long way from Taiwan. But just let me try and

sketch out why I think Taiwan and China's reaction to Taiwan is crucial in this geopolitical shadow play that we're watching. I think that the way in which the U.S. framed its move on Venezuela as part of its attempts to shore up its backyard to concentrate on what both Trump and Marco Rubio described as the Western Hemisphere, I think that that may give China. array of hope or at least cause to wait and see whether the U.S. is really serious about concentrating its geopolitical attention onto the Western hemisphere, which of course doesn't include Taiwan or China, and thereby move away or shift the focus of its geopolitical reach away from China's sphere of influence. And so I think if that does turn out to be the case, we may well see

China taking a longer view on this. And although, yes, some of China's condemnations have been fairly strong, I also think that other statements by the Chinese so far give the sense that China is really waiting to see. The two pieces of reasoning that I advanced to support my point view is that the national security strategy which the U.S. released in December last year identifies the Western Hemisphere as the vital interest of the U.S. And it drops language from the Biden presidency that identified China as America's most consequential geopolitical challenge. It also doesn't even mention great power competition at all with China. And it also downgrades the status of Taiwan. In the past, under Biden,

it used to say that the U.S. was opposed to a shift in the status quo of Taiwan. But the new national security strategy unveiled in December last year in the U.S. says that it, quote, does not support a change in the status quo of Taiwan. This is seen as a clear downgrading of the importance. and sensitivity of the Taiwan question. So I think that China is hopefully waiting to see the U.S. redefine its geopolitical focus to its own backyard, i.e. Latin America and in this case, Venezuela in particular, and thereby shift away from Taiwan

and those contentious areas, the South China Sea, and China itself. And if that happens, it will give China breathing space to advance, its biggest priority in terms of geopolitics. But this is really hard to call at the moment, Alice, I'm really interested in your take on it. So how do you see it? Well, very quickly on the geopolitical front, before I talk about some of the economic consequences, which are worth delving into as well, it's interesting that, you know, we talk a lot about the Trump's approaches, the Roosevelt corollary into the Monroe Doctrine.

To borrow another Roosevelt analogy, I think China's approach to this after seeing what happened in Venezuela is going to be to speak softly and carry a big stick. And what I mean by that is on one hand, it will continue, I think, to pursue some kind of trade detente to try to soften some of the edges, the rough edges in the relationship. I think that they were heartened by the national security strategy document that you referred to James, not being a direct attack on China as it had been in previous administrations. But at the same time, you know, massively increasing its investments and deployment of its military capabilities. We saw that in full display a couple months ago at the September parade. So I think we'll have a two sort of two-track approach to this

relationship and towards China's geopolitical strategy. But it is worth mentioning, James, that even although Venezuela is not Taiwan in terms of China's core interests, it is an important strategic foothold for China in Latin America. I mean, it was described as an all-weather strategic partnership back in 2023. That's sort of the second tier in terms of friendships that China has with the rest of the world. So this was a critical relationship that has, I think, been weakened with the Trump administration's move. And if we think about the economic implications as well, it's not so much about oil because only about 5% of China's seaborne crude imports come from Venezuela. It's more about the debt that's outstanding. So we have still, by some estimates,

it's around $10 billion, if not more, of debt outstanding, that Venezuela owes to China. And a lot of that traditionally from Chavez onwards to Maduro was in the form of loan for oil deals. That, I think, is going to be subject to debate whether or not Chinese creditors are going to get a haircut or they're going to have to miss a lot of the debt that's owed. Because fundamentally, Venezuela, I think, is going to have to listen to the Americans, at least in the short term, in terms of some of these debt restructuring and oil. developments in the region. So I think from China's vantage point, this is a net loss, certainly,

but I agree with you, James, if we broaden it out, I don't think this materially increases China's designs to invade or blockade Taiwan. I think if I'm in Beijing watching this, I would tread carefully because the Trump administration has a military muscle to fight in areas that it deems to be in its national core interests, which in this administration is about the Western Hemisphere. So if I'm Xi Jinping sitting in Beijing, I'm going to sit tight a little bit and see what the Trump administration is going to do in its second half of a lame duck presidency. Because remember, we have the midterms coming up. A lot can change domestically that can also transform and alter Trump's geopolitical strategy. Absolutely. I think one of the

first indicators that we're going to get of the trajectory of China-U.S. relations after this move in Venezuela is whether or not Trump's meeting with Xi Jinping, which is supposed to take place in April, actually goes ahead. If we start seeing that, you know, that meeting is called off or people are talking about rescheduling and meeting, then I think it will be a sign that things are going badly wrong in the U.S.-China relationship, perhaps partly because of these tensions and losses that China's going to suffer over Venezuela. But if China gets a sense that there is something to play for on its crucial priority of Taiwan, i.e. a softening of the U.S. position on Taiwan, then I would expect China to be pushing full steam ahead for

that meeting to go ahead. Yeah, I agree. I think that will be the next litmus test in April if the two presidents meet and whether or not Taiwan is on the table, so to speak. And I'm sure that the Chinese will be testing the Americans to see to what extent the Trump administration is willing to sacrifice blood and treasure for a Taiwan campaign, which at least to my mind, when I think about the Trump clan and the people around Trump, I mean, including, frankly, Rubio as Secretary of State, it doesn't seem to be a top priority. I think that the focus in this administration is very much on Latin America,

on defending the Western Hemisphere as opposed to being embroiled in conflicts overseas. But I wanted to talk a little bit about some of the economic implications for some of the players in China because, you know, we've heard on Monday the NFRA, the National Financial Regulatory Administration is telling the banks that it needs to release its exposure to Venezuela. It's still unclear when I was digging into the data

to the extent to which the policy banks and banks in China are exposed to Venezuelan debt. But when I look at the numbers since 2007, you have over $100 billion in loans that were lent to Venezuela to help with infrastructure, to help with oil. What's your take on this? Have you been following this, James?

Yeah, I mean, I used to write a lot about China, Venezuela, because Venezuela was the poster child of the Belt and Road Initiative launched by China around 2012 in Latin America. It was the number one borrower among Latin American countries from China, and China was building all kinds of infrastructure in Venezuela. There were factories, railways, roads. It really was a showcase of what China could do and China wanted to show the whole region.

And I remember back in the days of former President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, talking about the alliances between China and Venezuela as like a great wall of friendship that obviously we were supposed to read in would sort of keep the Americans out. And so, as you rightly say, Alice, Venezuela's been really crucial for China, but less so recently. And as you've already sketched out, I think if we boil it down to brass tax, I think China stands to lose about 10 billion U.S. dollars in loans that are not repaid if the deal doesn't go to its advantage. And also there's a potential that it could lose around $2 billion in terms of investment that was intended by Chinese companies in the Venezuelan oil sector that may now not go ahead.

Those are big numbers, but they're not catastrophic. China has lent more than $2 trillion US dollars as part of its Belt and Road initiative, according to aid data, a U.S. consultancy, over the last 10 or more years. So 10 billion, it's a large number, but it's not catastrophic in terms of the general reach of China's development lending around the world. Yeah, I'm going to agree with that. I think that the bigger implication is the geostrategic one for China and Latin America. And only broadened out to China's allies or partners, you know, I feel very much that the access of ill will has been weakened. Iran has been weakened substantially by Israel over the last few years.

This is yet another, I think, ally and partner for China that has. has been weakened under this administration. So we'll have to see what happens in 2026 with the rest of the players. Okay, we'll be back with more after a quick break and stay with us. For most of the history of television, if you missed a show, you just missed it. It was over. It was gone. But then this little company called TiVo came along and gave people superpowers.

You could pause live television. You could rewind it. You could save it and watch it. later. It was incredible, and the people who had it could not stop talking about it. This week on version history, a new chat show about old technology, we talk about the history of TiVo, and how it is that a company whose products actually no one ever really had or used became one of the most iconic stories in tech. All that on version history, wherever you get podcasts. Welcome back. Tesla has just lost its crown.

The company's sales fell 16% at the end of 2025, hit hard by the rollback of US EV tax credits. And for the first time, China's BYD has overtaken Tesla as the world's top electric carmaker. It's a sharp turn for a company that once aimed to dominate global auto sales and is now betting its future on self-driving tech and robots. James, let's go right into it. I have a lot of opinions, but I want to get your take on why BYD has finally overtaken Elon Musk's Tesla. It's not been a good year for Elon Musk 2025, I have to say. Yeah, I mean, this is one of the great corporate rivalries of our time. I mean, it's rather like the Coca-Cola versus Pepsi, Apple versus Microsoft, McDonald's versus Burger King, but this time

it has an extra twist because this is an American high-tech champion versus a Chinese high-tech champion. And the bare fact are that Tesla has lost its global sales crown to BYD, the Chinese carmaker, after almost a decade as the world's best-selling EV brand. And this is because both BYD's numbers were up very sharply in 2025. They got a 28% increase in global sales. And Tesla sales were down 8.6% for the year. Of course, Tesla's sales are down partly because of tax changes in the US, which removed an incentive for American consumers to buy Tesla cars. But more generally, and this is where I think the main story is, BYD is steamrolling into markets all over the world. Here in Europe, in Southeast Asia, where you are, I think at the moment, Alice

in Australia. And I've actually driven one of the BYD cars as it came off the first shipment to Australia. There was a massive ship transporter and about 5,000 BYD cars came off the ship. And I drove one in 2024 in Bremen. And I have to say, it took me a while to understand how to use it. There were so many kind of gadgets and dials. And the car was talking to me in German, which I speak very poorly, but after I got going, I have to say it was a very smooth ride. So it's a piece of high technology, but I think the crucial point is the BYD car that I was driving, which was the Dolphin Surf, cost about 23,000 euros. That's almost half the cost of the Tesla Model 3.

And I have to say the cars are, you know, comparable in terms of their technology and their look. And I think that fact lies behind why BYD has managed to record a million sales of vehicles outside China last year. That's up an incredible 150% from 2024. So I think effectively, Tesla is being beaten by a cheaper car that looks kind of almost as good and is technologically either on a par with Tesla or even slightly better. what's your opinion alice well at the risk of being contrarian james i'm going to take the other side of it and say that um b yd may have peaked and some of these evy players may have peaked at least domestically

in china you know just to give people a sense of the numbers b oyd sold 2.26 million electric vehicles this year uh tesla sold 1.63 million so that's quite a big delta uh between the two players but a lot of it james i mean to your point still is a domestic-driven story. I think the majority of EVs sold by BID is still consumed by Chinese consumers. That trend that in the last few years has shifted, we're seeing more that are going out. But we can also discuss whether or not that is going to be an ongoing structure, given some of the trade barriers that countries like EU, for instance, are putting on China. But when I look at the domestic outlook, what's interesting to me is that the government, just in the last

week or so has announced that it's going to get rid of some of the tax waiver for the purchase tax on EVs. So originally there should be a 10% purchase tax. There was a full 100% exemption of that for a couple of years. As of this year, it's going to be a 50% exemption, so effectively a 5% purchase tax on all EVs. That could have a material impact on whether or not you as a Chinese consumer are going to buy a new vehicle. But on the flip side, they've announced at the end of December that they're going to put in $8.9 billion ultra-long special treasury bond issuance program to fund trade-in of EVs and subsidies. So it could be that we could see after March at the NPC meeting that there is some more support for existing EVE consumers trading in their old

vehicles and buying new ones. But we're also seeing an economy that's still trapped in some kind of deflation. Consumers are not spending as much as the government wants them to. So I'm still little bit skeptical about the growth trajectory domestically in terms of demand for EVs. And then when we factor in some of the headwinds globally to Chinese EV providers, I'm a little bit worried. Yes, BYD has a superior product. I was just in a BYD vehicle a couple days ago in Sydney, Australia. I'm seeing more of them on the streets, for sure. But I worry a little bit about how this will be perceived by foreign governments as an influx of cheap Chinese EV. So I'm a bit skeptical.

I'm holding my breath to see if we're going to see major legislation from countries around the world to try to limit the amount of Chinese electric vehicles. Because remember, autos is a huge political issue, not just an economic issue for a lot of countries around the world. So I think this will be an interesting thing to track, obviously, when we think about the broader Chinese overcapacity issue and China's export engine. But one last thing that I wanted to add, which I thought was super interesting, again, tied to Elon Musk, is that he tweeted a couple days ago

that China's silver export controls are not good because silver is needed in many industrial processes. And I think people forget that given that silver is a precious metal, but it is used in cars, for instance, in electric vehicles, in solar panels, in AI data centers. And, you know, we've seen the creation of these export controls to restrict a global supply more recently of rare earth. Silver has been added to that list. I think this is important and worth tracking because this also could have a material impact on Tesla, for instance, on other order makers, because silver is still an important input into some of these processes. And when I think about some of the levers that China will use in 2026, when it is unhappy, would say the Venezuela policy with Trump's tariff policy.

I think people should expect more of these precious metals, critical minerals, intermeter inputs being added to some kind of export control list and weaponized by China. I think that's really interesting, Alice. I just want to mention one thing. You raised the issue of protectionism. You know, countries here in Europe or elsewhere in the world may see these Chinese EVs steamrolling into their markets and displayed. sales of, you know, valued domestic brands. And so I definitely think that protectionist pressures will rise. But I don't know whether here in Europe anyway, the Europeans will actually get it together to have the unity to push forward, you know, greater tariffs or other forms of protectionism against the influx of these Chinese cars. And just one other really fascinating aspect that lies in the future. That is that BYD is planning on bringing its so-called flash

charging batteries to Europe sometime this year. Now, these flash chargers can charge a car within five minutes. That means that they will significantly reduce the amount of time it takes to charge your EV. The one I drove, I almost missed my plane on the way back to the UK, because because the charger was so slow that, you know, we were standing there, literally biting our nails, looking at the clock, wondering if we had the charge to get us to the airport. That will be a thing of the past when you can just draw up alongside a flash charger that will charge your car within five minutes. Now, Tesla does not have that technology.

It is bringing out technology, but it will be slower than the five-minute charge. What I've been able to read online says that the next Tesla, supercharger will charge a battery to within a range of 200 miles within 15 minutes. So China is ahead yet again in this crucial aspect of the whole EV market. Yeah, very interesting. All right, let's take one last quick break and stay with us. Welcome back. China is now exporting more than electronics and EVs.

it is exporting luxury food. From caviar to foie gras, truffles to macadamia nuts, China has quietly become a global heavyweight in high-end agriculture, supplying its growing domestic appetite and increasingly reshaping markets overseas. Now, backed by provincial governments and years of investment, China now dominates global caviar production, a shift that's turning what were once niche European delicacies

into another front in China's expanding. trade power. I mean, this is a topic close to my heart, given that I do love food, James. Well, you're a tremendous cook as well, which is credentials that I definitely don't have. So, but I would just start by saying how wrong I have been in my thinking on this topic, I never imagined that China would leap to the global forefront of luxury food. I just thought that markets such as caviar, foie gras, macadamia nuts, black truffles, matcha tea, would remain the domain largely of premium foreign brands in China. They have a kind of a cachet, let's say the brand is French or Australian or Japanese or Russian or Iranian when it comes to caviar. But no, in this area too, it seems that China has risen to the forefront and is now dominating.

not only the market inside China, but globally too. I just never imagined that that would happen. The Financial Times has got a really good piece on this phenomenon, and it turns out that the caviar example goes right back to the late 1990s when some aquaculture scientists decided that you could use sturgeon to breed, and it would take about seven to ten years for a sturgeon to mature, produce eggs, And then you would take those eggs to a breeding center, and then the young sturgeon would grow. And that's how this market has developed.

And so since that time, when China produced almost no sturgeon, to 2024, China produced 43% of the global total. I just find that extraordinary. But tell me, Alice, how are you seeing this whole topic? Well, firstly, I have to preface this with a fact. that I love European food, and I think there's something special about, you know, Parmesan coming from the region of Italy, Hamanaburka coming from Spain. There's something that is unique about those flavors and the artisanal nature of how that developed. And when I mentioned this topic to a couple of European friends of mine,

I think they were very upset by this because their immediate reaction was, well, it's never going to taste as good as what we produce here in Europe. But I think that that defeats the purpose, and I think that that is not seeing this for what it is, which is that China is trying to create more agricultural products. It is trying to develop more high technology and agricultural development, aspects, I think, which will both appear in the five-year plan in March. And this is all part of Xi's broader strategy to have on the one hand agricultural self-sufficiency, but also develop agricultural critical technologies that can be developed domestically. but also potentially exported around the rest of the world. I'm thinking particularly of global South countries like Africa, where it would be particularly germane and of use.

So when I think about this, I think about it more in the context of China using its export engine and manufacturing engine to the food realm. And I think that there will be a degree of nationalism whereby Chinese people will think, well, I don't need to get caviar from Eastern Europe or Russia, I don't need to get truffles from Italy. These truffles domestically have a good enough tawha to borrow a wine term,

and we want to support domestic producers. So I can see that as a trend domestically within China. I'm not so sure if this is going to be an attractive proposition for foreigners, but if you're cost-conscious and you're looking to get something that is half the price, say, of a European premium good, maybe you go for the Chinese one. I think it'll be harder sell globally. I do think this will do very well domestically for all the reasons I mentioned. And just to drive home a personal story.

So I was traveling in Yunnan last year. And Yunnan, some people may know, has the most biodiverse range of mushrooms in the world. Most of the world's actually Porcini mushrooms come from China. I've come from Yunnan specifically. And China accounts for a third of the world's truffles. and exports went up 60% since last year. I actually went to an Italians factory in Yunnan, and he was producing porcini mushrooms, potabella mushrooms, truffles,

which he was selling in powdered form or dried form to the European market. And apparently Europe does not have enough porcini mushrooms to make all those risotto sachets. So in some ways, China is part of this global industry because it has the ability to produce. juice en masse and at scale. And so I think that there will be areas like this dried mushroom powder that I'm talking about where China is already being globally accepted. And I don't think people actually even realize that. And one last fun fact that I have about this is that

apparently people in China don't like the taste of truffles. So it's a very easy sell to cultivate that domestically in Iran and then sell it to the rest of the world because it's not seen as delicacy in China, which I thought was quite interesting comparative advantage at play. But a super interesting story, and I'm glad FT covered it because I think it shows so many aspects of what's happening in China in terms of taste changing, in terms of domestic alternatives to foreign products, and in terms of China trying to compete at a global scale with some of these premium goods. Yeah, and you mentioned Yunnan there, which I'm really glad because I think that sometimes maybe people outside China, when they think of China, they've seen all the pictures of the factories and the big cities and the small. and the pollution, but a province like Yunnan, which is right on the southwest, sort of bottom corner of China on the map, bordering Myanmar, is honestly one of the most beautiful places anywhere in the world. And you mentioned Terroa. I would have thought that Yunnan,

Terroa is superior to many parts of the world. The biodiversity is absolutely off the charts. And in the Financial Times story that I'm quoting from, there's a quote here from one of the growers there who says, there's a joke that whatever expensive fruit exists in the world, Yunnan will import it, research it, cultivate it, and bring down the price. So I think that sort of sums up this trend. We really shouldn't underestimate, you know, some of the natural underpinnings that China has to grow this stuff and to grow really high quality food. Well, I guess we're going to have to try Chinese caveat next time. I think I think you're going to China's very soon, James. So you're going to have to try something for me.

I have to admit I don't like caviar. All right. Do you like truffles, James? Listen, Alice, I come from North Yorkshire, which is a very set to bottom place. I don't think I've ever had a truffle in my life. What about you? I am very partial in truffles. I mean, I was in southwest France a couple months ago, and they have a particular white truffle that's quite unique there. So I am partial to them. But James, we're going to have. have to change that for 2026. We're going to have to get you eating caviar and truffles. Living the high life. All right, James, it is prediction time, and we're going to make our first predictions for 2026. I'm going to do something a bit left field because I think this is going to

come up in a couple weeks. You know, when we see on January the economic readout in China, I think the economic trajectory of China is still going to be a top line issue for investors and and the rest of the world in 2026. But I want to take it to a prediction that I feel fairly strongly about, which is on the currency side. I think we're going to see an appreciation of the CNY, a slight appreciation by at least 10%. I think I feel comfortable about the currency ending at 6.8 to 6.9 by the end of the year, primarily because I think the Trump administration is going to elect a fairly doveish Fed chair. It could well be Kevin Hassett. And in that case, when we factor in the interest rate

differentials between the Fed and the PBOC and the fact that China isn't going to intervene, I think, strongly to defend the currency. I think we could see the currency go up and strengthen against the dollar to around 6.8 to 6.9 by the end of the year.

And that is materially important because it obviously impacts U.S.-China trade talks, negotiations. Trump isn't a fan of a weak C&Y. He wants to see a weak dollar. And I think this could be an error in which there is some degree of compromise between China and the U.S. But James, what's your prediction for 2026?

Well, I'm going to go back to what we were talking about at the top, Alice. I think that China will swallow its pride, swallow its humiliation, suffer its losses with regard to Venezuela, and I think it will play the long game, and I think the Trump C meeting in April will go ahead, and both sides will try to gain. whatever advantage they can in other areas, effectively putting aside what China is currently condemning

as this unlawful move by the United States in Venezuela. Okay, so watch the space. We're going to wait for a Trump-She meeting in April. That'll be exciting. All right, that's all for this episode. Thank you so much for listening to China Decode. This is a production of Prof G Media. Our producer is David Toledo.

our associate producer is Eric Janikis. Our video editor is Ness Smith Savadoff. Our research associate is Dan Shalan. Our technical director is Drew Burroughs. Our engineer is William Flynn. And our executive producer is Catherine Dillon. Make sure to follow us wherever you get your podcast so you don't miss an episode and talk to you again next week.

Thank you.