The Prof G Pod with Scott Galloway - China’s Growing Power, US Diplomacy, and Ukraine’s Counteroffensive — with Ian Bremmer

Episode Date: June 15, 2023

Ian Bremmer, the president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, joins Scott to discuss why China has a spy base in Cuba, where the US struggles and excels on the global stage, and what to expect now that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has begun. Follow Ian on Twitter, @ianbremmer.  Scott opens by discussing how former President Trump exudes corruption and stupidity.  Algebra of Happiness: what made you? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

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NMLS 1617539. Episode 254. 254 is the area code covering parts of central texas including the waco area in 1954 the kidney became the first successful organ transplant what did the piece say when it was blocked by a kidney stone you're in my way hey you're the ones that wanted me to tone down the sex jokes. Go, go, go! Welcome to the 254th episode of the Prop G Pod. In today's episode, we speak with Ian Bremmer, the president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media.

He's also the author of 11 books and has a great TED Talk out about all the connection between tech companies and political power. It's about political power. We're going to have an election. That's my impression of James Carville. But more importantly, he's Prof G Pod's most featured guest at six appearances. Seven, if you count an interview that we split into two episodes. Anyways, and by the way, I just think the world of Ian Bremmer, I think he's like my Doogie Howser friend. He was a Tulane no joke when he was 14. And he was this famous geopolitical scientist, whatever kind of thought leader at like the age of 11. He's just an incredible blue flame thinker, a nice guy to get together with. And I like him

because he's just unafraid. I can't figure out his politics, which I also like, and he's very open to learning and thinking, oh, I didn't see it that way. Maybe I have it wrong. Anyways, we discussed with Ian the state of China and the U.S.'s relationship, as well as the war in Ukraine. As you know, the situation in Ukraine is moving really crisply right now, so we should note that we recorded this interview prior to the explosion that destroyed the Khovka Dam. As you know, the situation in Ukraine is moving really crisply right now, so we should note that we recorded this interview prior to the explosion that destroyed the Khovka Dam. As Ian points out in his newsletter, we don't know who blew up the dam, and in short, it doesn't make any sense on either party to have blown it up. The only clear conclusion, he writes, is greater miscalculations from Russia performing badly in the field,

more accidents, and bigger dangers from mistakes being made. Okay, more on the war and foreign policy later. Let's move to what's happening over here in the good old USA. And by the way, I should say the happening over there, former President Trump. I live in London now. I live in London because I'm fancy. Why did I move to London? Because I can, bitches. I get to come here and watch Premier League football and tell my friends I live in London, which is kind of a flex. Like, isn't he interesting? Isn't he cosmopolitan? Anyways, former President Trump, get this, faces 37 criminal charges related to his handling of classified documents that includes 31 counts of willful retention of national defense information. By now, you've seen the photos of boxes of classified documents littered around Trump's

Mar-a-Lago state. The documents include information regarding, get this, defense and weapons capabilities of both the United States and foreign countries, U.S. nuclear programs, potential vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies to attack by an adversary, and plans for possible retaliation in response to a foreign attack. This is the second time Trump has been indicted this year. And what do you know, he denies any wrongdoing yet again and will continue his 2024 campaign. So I think you can learn everything from cable television or from original scripted drama. The best original scripted drama of 2022 was Dope Sick. The best

original scripted drama of 2023 was Blackbird. Fantastic. And there's a moment in Blackbird, and I don't think this gives it away, where they say, we got them. And as it relates to President Trump, I think there are few things in American history, maybe nothing in American history. And we've had some real stains on our history, whether it was internment of the Japanese, the slaughter of Native Americans, the war on drugs, which was nothing more than thinly veiled bigotry in an

attempt to keep people of color down, income inequality. You know, there's a lot on and on and on, right? I believe in retrospect, we're going to look at Trump is by far the most indelible stain or the stain that took decades to wash out of the American experience. And we have had corrupt presidents. We've had visibly stupid presidents, but we've never had a corrupt and visibly stupid president. We got the whole Monty here. Nixon was corrupt, but he was not a stupid man. And many people would argue he was actually good for America.

W made a first ball at Hall of Fame, head up your ass, geopolitical, catastrophic, stupid mistake of going into Iraq. He wasn't a corrupt man. I actually think he was a good man. But here we have both. Here we have both. We have someone who has fostered a culture of cruelty, who has taught young men and people

on the right that mocking the disabled, making misogynistic statements, being found liable in the context of sexual assault. This is an individual who represents everything we don't want to be, in my view. This is going to be the stain that just takes about a billion washes to come out. What's different here? What's different here? The case in New York? Stupid. John Edwards paid off his mistress. People just don't care, and I think it's healthy, about lying about sex. What do you know, Bill Clinton? I did not have sex with that woman. I mean, that just wasn't going to go anywhere, nor do I think it's going to go anywhere. The stuff in Georgia is what I

thought was going to get him, being caught on tape trying to coerce a Georgia Republic elections official into finding votes. I thought that was going to get him. But after speaking to several legal scholars and reading the indictment, folks, I think we got him. I think this guy is so visibly stupid that he can't hide his own criminality. What do we have here? The severity of the crime. Well, guess what? Nuclear secrets, plans on when would you actually, what would trigger a nuclear exchange and what wouldn't in terms of attacks on our allies by adversarial nations, information on perhaps a proposed invasion or attack on Iran. Okay, pretty severe crime, pretty severe crime. In addition, state of mind, Hillary Clinton didn't realize she was committing a crime, didn't realize she was doing

anything wrong when she was receiving emails, 110 emails of about 100,000 emails that included confidential information. So they decided not to pursue a criminal case. He not only knew this was classified information, he bragged that it was classified, and then he purposely transported it elsewhere such that he could show it off. He then goes on tape. He then goes on tape and admits that it's classified information and has attempted since then to cover it up. Where is he truly and visibly fucked? His lawyers, in what is an exceptional moment in any legal case, went to the judge and said, we want to violate client attorney privilege and get off of this case because he has enlisted us in his corruption. Our editor-in-chief here, Jason

Stavros, who was a very successful lawyer for a better part of a decade, said he has never read a case where he feels the defendant is more fucked than this case against Donald Trump. And these laws are pretty severe. We take, as we should, very seriously the mishandling and the casual approach to information that could kill agents overseas, diminish our standing globally, put us at huge risk militarily. This is, in my view, finally, and I've said this before and I've been wrong, this is the beginning of the end. America's experiment with the visibly stupid and the corrupt is in its final moments. This is an individual who is a criminal. This is an individual who represents everything that America is not. This is an individual that

has tapped into the anger that America, those on the right and those on the left, have fomented by not sharing in the immense prosperity we've registered over the last 40 years. With the bottom 90%, we have had tremendous prosperity in this country. What we have not had is progress. And rather than having an open, honest conversation around the struggles that middle America has faced over the last 40 years at the hands of both Republican and Democratic administrations, the void has been filled by a culture of cruelty, criminality, and corruption. And now, and now what's going to end it? Visible stupidity. This is the beginning of the end. We've got them.

We'll be right back for our conversation with Ian Bremmer. I just don't get it. Just wish someone could do the research on it. Can we figure this out? Hey, y'all. I'm John Blenhill, and I'm hosting a new podcast at Vox called Explain It To Me. Here's how it works. You call our hotline with questions you can't quite answer on your own.

We'll investigate and call you back to tell you what we found. We'll bring you the answers you need every Wednesday starting September 18th. So follow Explain It To Me, presented by Klaviyo. The Capital Ideas Podcast now features a series hosted by Capital Group CEO, Mike Gitlin. Through the words and experiences of investment professionals, you'll discover what differentiates their investment approach, what learnings have shifted their career trajectories, and how do they find their next great idea? Invest 30 minutes in an episode today. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Published by Capital Client Group, Inc.

Welcome back. Here's our conversation with Ian Brimmer, the president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media. Ian, where does this podcast find you? I'm in Chicago. I'm going to start referring to you as our Alec Baldwin. Why would I call you some critical thinking? Why would I refer to you as Prop G's Alec Baldwin. Alec Baldwin. Geez. Now, I mean, you're assuming that I have a level of Hollywood pop culture knowledge that aligns with my geopolitical experience. And I'm not thinking well about that.

So Alec Baldwin has hosted SNL 17 times. He's hosted SNL more than any person, any other person. And I think you now have's hosted SNL more than any person, any other person. And I think you now have been on Prop G more than any person. I think you've been on five or six times now. So anyways, you're our Alec Baldwin. Oh, that's cool.

Well, I'm delighted to hear that, Scott. I love being on with you. I feel like it's always an open and fun and sometimes unexpected conversation, right? We bring each other places we wouldn't necessarily otherwise go. It's a good thing. I like that. So let's bust right into it.

China is paying Cuba several billion dollars so it can host some sort of espionage or listening facility in Cuba. What are your thoughts here? A lot of thoughts. First of all, it's going to be a lot more effective than sending balloons over the country. I mean, that wasn't a non-issue, frankly. Remember, because the balloons were a backup. They were in case the Americans got into a fight with China and we took out their satellite capabilities. They still wanted to have the ability to do surveillance.

And so that was the purpose of ramping up their balloon program. It wasn't like they were getting additional useful intel out of that. This is additional useful intel. These are direct listening devices that would give the Chinese government much greater ability to surveil a big swath of the United States and you know, the Cuban government which is heavily sanctioned by the United States And is authoritarian Is far more aligned with China than they are with the US the Chinese don't have great security Capabilities military capabilities, but they got a lot of money And so I mean why wouldn't they throw a bunch of cash at Cuba to give them a little more leverage over the Americans? It's not so different

from the United States having allies and military bases all over the world, including right across China's border. There is, of course, one difference which is significant, and that is that Cuba is not in a position for its people to decide that they want this base there or not, whereas in Japan or in Australia, this is a democratically elected government, so what the government does reflects the will of the people. Having said that, of course, Scott, the United States maintains a major base in Qatar in the Gulf and, of course, has enormous military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. And those are authoritarian governments. So, I mean, as much as the United States isn't going to like this, it's not like the U.S.

is about to do anything about it. We're certainly not going to invade or annex Cuba, which is, you know, sort of what the Russian argument on NATO expansion basically was. Doesn't this reflect, and this is an opinion, and I want you to validate or nullify this. In my view, it't it reflect poor policy on behalf of Americans that we should have normalized relations with Cuba a decade or two ago, and then a small tail of very conservative Cubans in Florida in a swing state are driving U.S. policy and have maintained an adversarial relationship with an island nation, you know, 100 miles from Miami, and now it's coming back to haunt us? I want to agree with that, Scott. And I don't. And I don't. And it's not that you're wrong. It's absolutely true that a small number of relatively conservative and very strongly anti-Castro and post-Castro regime emigres to the U.S. have been very hawkish on any

normalization with Cuba. But most Cuban Americans are younger now, and they're not driving that policy right now. More importantly, in fact, most of them want to go and want to travel there, they want to do business there, all that. The thing is that the Cuban government has strongly resisted normalization. I mean, remember, under the Obama administration, you tried to reduce sanctions. You tried to get a level of direct trade and investment and openness to the U.S. economy. And the Cuban government stopped it. And the reason they stopped it is because they are very small as an economy. They are very close to the United States and they understand that if they open up and normalize with the U.S., their government is gone in short order, right? Because the investment from the U.S. will overwhelm them. The Cubans will

travel. They will get out. They will see it's vastly better. A lot of them will leave and stay gone. They're worried in the same way the North Koreans won't open their economy to the world because it would be the end of the North Korean regime. It's not that easy to just say, OK, let's open. It does take two to tango. And the Cuban government, very different from the Cuban people, have no interest in opening their diplomacy and their economy to the United States. That's a serious problem. It's really interesting. And just sticking with China, it strikes me the between, and I don't know how much of this is Western media engaging in hyperbole, but you hear reports of Chinese naval vessels really getting aggressive with American vessels. You see balloons coming over, and now you see what's happening in Cuba. This definitely feels like China is puffing out its chest or flexing a bit and asserting their authority and their power. Your thoughts? I think that's right. But I also think that American and Chinese power are so very different.

The United States is the world's dominant security power. No one else is close. U.S. outspends the next 10 countries combined in defense, and most of the next 10 are aligned with the United States militarily. And they also, of course, have their systems very integrated by the U.S. In many cases, American defense contractors are providing them. China does have much cheaper labor and they can get some cheaper components. So, I mean, it's not you're not exactly comparing apples to apples, but still it's overwhelming. And the U.S. is the only country in the world that can project its power militarily in every corner of

the world. And so you've got bases everywhere. And the Chinese, you know, not just China in the Western Hemisphere, China in their own backyard feels militarily surrounded by the Americans. Those bases are everywhere. But China has the second largest economy in the world. It'll probably be the largest by 2030. And the Chinese government actually controls the economy, as opposed to the U.S., where, you know, the private sector is the dominant actor, dominant set of actors. And that means that China has become

the dominant trading partner of pretty much every country, even in the Western Hemisphere, certainly around the world, but every South American country, you look in the Caribbean, China is increasingly economically dominant. And that is the way as a power. And that's the way that they actually get things done. So in the G7 summit recently, you saw the US and its allies bitterly complaining that the Chinese are engaging in coercive economic activities to get the political outcomes they want. And, you know, both sides are right.

The Chinese are more effective in leveraging their commercial authority to get power outcomes they want. The Americans are more effective in leveraging security outcomes to get the power that we want. And now you see backlash from both. You see more sanctions. You see the power that we want. And now you see backlash from both. You see more sanctions. You see the CHIPS Act. You see a critical minerals club that the Americans are driving with our allies. And you see the Chinese engaging more with the Cubans on military and the surveillance front. You see them, you know, as you say, puffing out their chest, trying to resist some of that dominant American military influence in their own backyard. So

I'm not surprised at all. I think you're right. But if we take a step back and we look at the global perspective on power and the geopolitical balance, we see that it's actually a more complicated story. So what using as an example, what do you do in Cuba? Do we just, I mean, you can't invade it because doesn't that, I mean, we can't tell the Chinese not to invade Taiwan and then we go and invade Cuba, or at least it doesn't, theoretically, it seems somewhat inconsistent. If you were advising the White House, how would you address this problem? Well, first of all, I do think that there is a useful point to be made that the Americans do not think it's legitimate to invade a country for making sovereign decisions on its territory about their military alignment.

This is not the Cold War. It's not 1962. And we're not Russia. And again, the people that are making, that are trying to justify that the Russians invaded Ukraine because Ukraine as a sovereign democracy isn't allowed to decide they want to join a defensive alliance. Look, I mean, I don't trust the Chinese as far as I can throw them on security. But if the Cubans want to set up a listening base on their own sovereign territory, they have the right to set up a listening base on their own sovereign territory. Now, the United States can counter that base and they can counter it with jamming. They can counter it with espionage. And I suspect that the Americans will do those things. And it would not shock me if down the road at some point, if those things were ineffective,

if you saw sabotage of some degree and the Cuban listening base was not as effective as you thought it might be. Now, that's a risky decision to take, but those sorts of things happen a fair amount in the history of international geopolitics. But of course, the best way for the Americans to compete against the Chinese is to out-compete them. And that means doing the kinds of things

the United States has done, be more attractive to more people around the world, economically, militarily, and also diplomatically. The U.S. is very attractive as a military ally. The U.S. is very attractive as a military ally. The U.S. is pretty attractive as an economic cooperator for the advanced industrial economies. The U.S. has not been so effective as a diplomatic partner. And I mean, you and I have seen that recently in the Middle East with the Chinese brokering that Saudi-Iran deal. Where are the Americans? We'll see if a Saudi-Israel deal gets brokered by the Americans deal, where are the Americans? We'll see if a Saudi Israel deal

gets brokered by the Americans. But you want the Americans to still be seen as the dominant, useful diplomatic partner and ally. And the level of dysfunction in Washington and also the on-again, off-again, depending on who the president happens to be, and you can go back on agreements you used to do, that makes the Americans much less reliable than, say, for many countries, than a China that will be run by the same guy for decades. And that's a problem. That's a problem. So, I mean, the United States does have, you know, a little bit of its hand tied behind its back because some of its diplomatic capabilities are not expressed well by its political system.

There was a moment you said something along the lines of that America doesn't invade sovereign nations. And the word that popped into my mind was Iraq. Of course. So you would argue that was a legitimate invasion and that we haven't lost a ton of moral authority there? I think the U.S., it was an illegitimate invasion, and the U.S. lost a ton of moral authority there? I think the U.S., it was an illegitimate invasion, and the U.S. lost a ton of moral authority there. I think that's absolutely the case. And by the way, we're not talking about the first Iraq Gulf War

when the Americans with allies invaded Iraq because they invaded a sovereign nation, Kuwait. And I think that was a wholly justifiable and legitimate war, and one that I'm glad the Americans fought. But the second war in Iraq under Bush was a war of choice fought under faulty intelligence, false political statements against a brutal dictator. And I'm perfectly happy to see him gone. And so are many Iraqis,

but that doesn't justify the war. And I think that the United States did a lot of damage to its own moral authority by engaging in that illegitimate war. And by the way, I mean, we just all celebrated Kissinger's 100th birthday, someone I know very well. But I mean, you know, he was also involved historically in a lot of support for illegitimate wars and genocide. You know, you saw in Cambodia, of course, the secret war that went on there, supporting Suharto in Indonesia against East Timor, which now legitimately has independence, but of course course at the time was basically facing a genocide. I mean, the Americans have been on the wrong side of a lot

of policy historically, and I'm certainly not going to sit here and try to argue otherwise, but that does not mean that what we have, that wrongs that we've experienced historically are things that presently reflect in U.S. policy globally. I mean, you know, the United States had slavery, too. The United States committed a genocide against Native Americans. We don't think those things are appropriate or correct. We fought a civil war over one of them. So, you know, I don't necessarily also believe that things that happened in history, whether it's, you know, old, old history or even recent history have to define the america the united states that you and i live in today yeah i mean the list is long right japanese

internment camps though going back to or before we shift to ukraine isn't isn't america struggling with well first is this is the shift i'm about to articulate happening? And is the U.S. struggling with this shift? The shift being that we're no longer the dominant player on the global stage. That China, because of its economic might and ability to attract partners. I was talking to someone who's the CEO of an Indian company and he said, 3% of our exports go to China, 30% of our imports come from China. So at the end of the day, when we sit down at the table with them, they just have a lot of power because they could, he said, China with a stroke of a pen from one person, and you referenced the autocracies are

actually quite efficient on certain levels around decision-making. One call from Xi at night, they could shut down our automotive industry and millions, if not tens of millions of people would be out of work in India. And they're exerting that power. And is America having a tough time adjusting to the fact that you call it G0, but it's definitely not a G1 world anymore? It's definitely not a G1 world. And the United States still has a lot of advantages. You've got the global reserve currency, the dollar, which is a large majority of the holdings of all central banks in the world. It's higher than the yen, the euro, and the yuan together combined. You've got massive oil and gas and food production exporters. The Chinese are importers. That's a problem. It's a vulnerability for them. You've got

strong demographic growth, which is the only major economy in the world, with the exception of India, where that's true. China's got massive demographic contraction that's coming up. The U.S. is still dominant in most technologies, so the Chinese are a parody in some that are very important. So, I mean, the baseline of American power continues to be very significant and not just about its military capabilities. But you're absolutely right, Scott, that on the global stage, the economy is no longer driven by the U.S. The economy is not driven by anyone. It is multipolar. And some

of that is because China is bigger than it used to be. Some of it is because they're consolidated state capitalists under one leader. Some of it's because the Americans are so divided and no longer have a trade policy and can't provide market access. There are lots of reasons for it, but it's a frustration. It's a frustration for americans in part because the reason why china was brought into and welcomed into american institutions for the last 40 years part of it was because the u.s knew it would make americans wealthier american corporations wealthier but part of it was a mistaken assumption that as the chinese became wealthier and more powerful, that they'd become Americans. And they're not. They're still authoritarian. They're still state capitalists. They're just wealthier and more powerful. And, you know, Americans are not prepared to accept that.

Whether or not Americans should and to what degree is another question, but they're not. Democrats and Republicans are not prepared to accept an authoritarian state capitalist China at the table with the same level of influence and respect that an American ally would have. That bet for the Americans did not work out. And that means that we now have this relationship. The two most powerful countries in the world really have zero trust. And it's certainly the worst relationship we've had with them since Tiananmen.

And that's a problem. And it's particularly a problem because you've seen Scott Jamie Dimon just got back from China, had great things to say about the Chinese. Elon Musk just got back from China, had great things to say about the Chinese. I'm sure if we sent LeBron to China,

he'd have great things to say about the Chinese. I'm sure if we sent LeBron to China, he'd have great things to say about the Chinese. Most American corporations are more aligned with Canada, Japan, South Korea, the UK, Germany, France, than they are with Washington when it comes to China. And that is a challenge for the Democrats and Republicans in formulating China policy. Yeah, it's really, I mean, a couple of things that struck me as really insightful. The Americans, one of our superpowers is our optimism. And sometimes that bleeds into narcissism. And I think the general assumption was that if a nation became capitalist, they'd immediately be an ally and sign up to Baywatch and Apple Pie. And there's definitely, just because they go capitalist, I would argue Saudi Arabia is going embracing capitalism. China, I would argue on many levels, is more capitalist than we are, but that doesn't necessarily mean we're going to be great,

great friends. And the other thing that strikes me, what you just said, I see, I work with a lot of big American companies and their attitude is, as it relates to our supply chain and manufacturing our shoes and our components in China, it's business as usual. And we have a great relationship with them on the ground that you see this level of rhetoric and heat around policy. But when it comes to actual business relationships, they continue to have a very productive ecosystem. Yeah. I mean, you know, we talk about de-risking, that is the term of art presently, between the United States and China. But of course, the fact is that the United States is doing an extraordinary amount of business with China. And most of these corporations, not all, but certainly a large majority, want to continue to have global supply chain, access to global markets, access to a large and fast-growing consumer base. You've got 800, 900 million people online in China. They're still growing faster than the

United States from an overall economic perspective. Any luxury goods producer, any major hotel chain, the sports industry, Hollywood a little bit less because the Chinese are developing a lot more of their own content. But most of them see China as not only a core market, but the principal growth market that they have globally. Now, the counter indicators there, Scott, one is that Chinese labor today is more expensive than Mexican labor. It has gone up a lot as China's gotten wealthier. So the idea that you would use China as your factory for global production is less attractive just on a pure economic dollar for dollar basis than it used to be. And of course, the Chinese don't have rule of law.

They don't have an independent judiciary, and they support a lot of their own national champions and people that are connected to their government. So it is getting harder for companies to feel like they have a level of clarity and visibility into how they're going to engage in their business practices over the next five, 10 years. So I do see a lot of baseline Chinese American companies in China that are now saying, we may not want to expand our investments the way we have. I see a lot of movement, tech companies now opening a lot more in India than they used to, especially as India develops a much more improved regulatory environment in technology and invests in their own tech infrastructure, digital infrastructure. I see that with Apple. I see it with Cisco.

I see it with Google, a bunch of other companies like that. Those are big moves that five years ago they never would have made. And then I see just the general populism in the United States saying, hey, we went too far with globalization. We hollowed out our own middle and working classes. We want to now get a lot more investment back in the U.S. So, of course, no more chip production in Taiwan. That should all be in the U.S. Want to promote a lot more local investment, even if it's more expensive. And, you know, some of that is national security. Some of that is, you know, a deep-seated concern about undervalued American workers. And some of that is the failure of the U.S. social safety net over the past decades that should have been working for Americans, but wasn't.

We'll be right back. Riley Robeson, the senior AI reporter for The Verge, to give you a primer on how to integrate AI into your life. So tune into AI Basics, How and When to Use AI, a special series from Pivot sponsored by AWS, wherever you get your podcasts. What software do you use at work? The answer to that question is probably more complicated than you want it to be. The average U.S. company deploys more than 100 apps, and ideas about the work we do can be radically changed by the tools we use to do it. So what is enterprise software anyway? What is productivity software? How will AI affect both?

And how are these tools changing the way we use our computers to make stuff, communicate, and plan for the future? In this three-part special series, Decoder is surveying the IT landscape presented by AWS. Check it out wherever you get your podcasts. Let's shift to Ukraine. Since we last spoke to you a couple months ago, there's been a lot of attention on the counteroffensive, spring counteroffensive, and then a discussion around what is the staying power of Russia here. Anyways, state of play, what do you think has changed in the last two months, and if and how has it changed your view of the situation there,

and any predictions or thoughts around the next six months? Well, we're very close to the counteroffensive beginning in earnest. It has started in the sense that the Ukrainians have already ordered a number of probing attacks across the front lines Ukrainian troops on the field to try to break the land bridge that the Russians have between Russia and Crimea. And, you know, they will probably take some territory. This area is well defended by the Russians, but they probably won't break the bridge. And that's one thing that's happened is we'll watch and see that counteroffensive and the Ukrainians will probably be in a better position after the counteroffensive than before. We also see a lot of movement on the part of NATO to put Ukraine in a much better position after the counteroffensive so that negotiations might start, so that a pause in the fighting, a ceasefire might occur. I'll tell you a few of those things. First of all, the Americans are working with allies to create military guarantees

for Ukraine that would fall short of full NATO membership, but would treat Ukraine like Japan or like Israel to provide a level of certainty to the Ukrainian people that the Russians aren't going to get a second bite at this apple, that they will continue to have that level of defense on an ongoing slash permanent basis. Secondly, you see the Americans, the Brits and others ramping up their willingness to provide more advanced weapon systems to Ukraine. The F-16s, for example, the long-range missiles from the UK, soon from the US, for example. These are weapons that are not going to be deployed in the counter-offensive, but they're weapons that will show Ukraine that you're going to have a very capable military to defend your territory after this offensive is over. This is longer-term planning.

You also see the Americans, the Europeans, ramping up support for the hundreds of billions of dollars that will be required for rebuilding, for reconstructing Ukraine after the counteroffensive. And that includes seizing some of the Russian frozen assets, sovereign and oligarch, to use those to rebuild Ukraine, which has some precedent in international law, given that the invasion was illegal, as declared twice in a strong majority vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

So the idea here is, I mean, there are some people that support Ukraine that say Ukraine has to win. The only way they can win is if they get all their territory back, including Crimea. And I'm telling you, Scott, that is not going to happen militarily. We know that. The Ukrainians know that. They certainly know that when it comes to Crimea. Zelensky's admitted that privately to NATO leaders repeatedly. So what does that mean? Well, what that means is if you can have a successful counteroffensive and they get some more of their land back so that Ukraine hasn't lost 20% of the land, it's more like 10% or 8%. And they have security guarantees, and they've got massive military support and training and intelligence, and they have money for reconstruction, and they're joining the EU. That to me looks like a win for Ukraine. I mean, nothing will bring back the 40,000

civilians that are dead. Nothing will bring back the people that have suffered from tens of thousands of war crimes. Nothing will obviate the suffering of 8.5 million Ukrainians who have been forced into refugee status have had their homes blown up all the rest i mean you know these these things this feels like a genocide for the ukrainians and will for generations but from in terms of what will happen going forward if you're china looking at taiwan if you're any country looking at nato or the g7 you would say that the west stood up for the for the independent sovereignty and territorial integrity of a democratic country that was illegally invaded and did their damnedest to

make it right. And, you know, as you mentioned, given the spotty history of the United States and its allies on this stuff, you know, getting it right in a big case here is important. So it sounds, you sound hopeful to me. It sounds to me like you're sort of fashioning or envisioning a counteroffensive that is modestly to significantly successful, which puts Ukraine and the West in a position of negotiating a decent deal that all parties could sort of claim some sort of victory. And then we move on with a Ukraine that's more tightly integrated into the West, diplomatically, economically, militarily, and that you see that might happen, say, call it fall. Yeah, I think that there's a reasonable possibility that by the end of the year,

Ukraine will be in a markedly better position than they are right now. And we will have some level of a freeze in the fighting. I think that's wholly plausible. That's the good news. And by the way, the markets will like that. The global economy will like that. But there is bad news here, Scott. And I focus on two pieces of really bad news. You said that, well, I could see a deal that everybody can get behind. Well, the Russians are not winners in that deal. Russians are big time losers. Their economy still cut off from the G7.

Their assets still frozen. Some of them seized for reconstruction. Putin is still considered a war criminal. So it's very interesting. Wouldn't that be up for negotiation, though, Ian? Wouldn't that be up for in what part of the wouldn't that be up for negotiation? Part of the settlement would involve all of those things. You know, I think it's going to be hard. I am optimistic that we might be able to get to a frozen conflict.

I am pessimistic that we can get to successful negotiations. By the way, I do think that China will be a part of any negotiation and the Americans at the highest level, um, except that they recognize that you're not, you're not going to get Russia to the table unless Russia has someone they can talk to and they can't talk to the Americans. They can't talk to the Europeans. So having Xi Jinping, a part of this is something that probably will eventually happen. But I still think that, um, this relationship is fundamentally broken and that Putin has lost too much and can't get back from that. So he will still be a rogue state.

He will still see himself at war with NATO. And I think that's a very dangerous place for the Europeans to be. That's a very dangerous place for the world to be. I mean, just a few months ago, we saw this UK reconnaissance airplane that was over the Black Sea, international waters, operating perfectly legally, just collecting information on the Russian forces for NATO, for Ukraine. A Russian fighter jet locked its weapons on. The fighter pilot misunderstood the order from his superior officer, fired his missiles, and they misfired, thankfully. Our 38 British airmen would have been

dead. We were really close to a Cuban Missile Crisis right there. And we all need to recognize that this level of ongoing war footing with the Russians, against the Russians Russians is a very dangerous place to be. And we just saw all these massive Russian criminal cyber attacks against a whole bunch of UK companies. There's going to be more attacks on critical infrastructure. There's going to be all sorts of espionage and they've got nuclear weapons. You know, when when Trump was on CNN, he didn't make much news. I mean, you know, he beat up on Caitlin Collins and had his laugh track audience there. But the one place he did make news was on Ukraine, because Trump hasn't really said very much on Ukraine since the war started.

And Caitlin was pushing him on whether or not he was willing to call Putin a war criminal. And his response was very interesting. He said, now is not the time for that. And Caitlyn pushed him again. What do you mean? You know, he's done all these horrible things. Hey, you know, right now we're trying to like end this war. We call him a war criminal. We're putting him in a corner. It's much harder for him to actually be willing to come to the table. I happen to agree with that. I think that Putin is a war criminal. But I also know that war criminals, you know, the only ones I can think of are people like Milosevic, Gaddafi, Bashir. I mean, these people end up in jail or dead.

We don't have a way to take out Putin. The guy's got 5,000 nuclear warheads. It's not helpful for us to be engaging in that way with him at this point. And by the way, I will tell you that a lot of Biden's advisors privately feel the same way. So, and they can't say that. You can't say that publicly because, you know, we're all us versus them in this country right now. And if Trump says something on Russia, Ukraine, he's only carrying water for Putin. But the reality, I think, is more nuanced here. And it's going to be really tough to get this genie back in the bottle. So bringing Ukraine into domestic politics, it struck me. I watched the town hall with Ambassador Governor Haley, and she is trying to differentiate herself from the other Republican candidates by saying, you know, she's quite hawkish on

Ukraine, you know, saying this is important. This is more than about Ukraine. This is about the West. What role do you think Ukraine will play in the election, the 2024 election? And who do you think it favors or what? How does the chessboard play out here? So DeSantis was taken out of context and had an unartful response to that Tucker Carlson request on Ukraine. And he then really sort of backtracked and said, absolutely not. I need

to support. We need to support Ukraine. This is, this is really significant. We're, we're, you know, we have to defend the Russian invasion was illegal. Um, in other words, I see most of the Republican candidates actually pretty aligned with Haley on this and aligned with McCarthy on this and aligned with McConnell on this. I think that that is a very strong Republican policy that is aligned with Biden on continuing to provide strong support for the Ukrainians militarily and continuing to maintain very tough sanctions against Putin and Russia. Trump is obviously on the other side of that. Vivek Ramaswamy is definitely taking on the Trump line on Ukraine, and it is end the war. Zelensky is not to be trusted. Ukraine is corrupt. And you can find some of that with J.D. Vance, some of that with Marjorie Taylor Greene.

In other words, I'm really cherry picking to find the Republicans that have that perspective, except it's Trump. And of course, for any of you that had the misfortune of watching the 10-minute rant by Tucker Carlson in his first Twitter show the other day, which included really a direct dog whistle anti-Semitic screed against Zelensky. It was deeply disturbing. It was pretty much blood liable. You know, he knows what he's doing. He's definitely promoting that, too. I do think that there is, you know, a potential for a growing knee jerk MAGA populist. The Ukrainians are evil. They are corrupt. They're run by a dirty Jew.

And Soros is backing them. And we need to do something about that. I mean, I hate to say it, but there is that that that is definitely coming. And, you know, our friend Elon has done a lot to help those dog whistles get more broadly distributed. I worry about that, but it's still early days and it's very far. It's a fringe Republican perspective at this point, thankfully. And then just to wrap up here, we had Jeffrey Sachs, the economist from Columbia on, and I know you're friends with Jeffrey. I think a lot of Jeffrey because he's fearless. Some of the themes, though, went from sort of a balanced viewpoint where, you know, a sober view of America's role in the world. It felt a little bit, I don't know, self-loathing around America. And one thing that caught our attention, I wish now looking back, we talked about this off mic, I'd push back harder, is that he believes, and I don't want to put too many words on his mouth, but reductively that we kind of provoked Putin and put Putin in a corner before the invasion. He wanted America to take some responsibility for Russia's incursion into the Ukraine. What are your thoughts? I do like Jeff. I've known him for easily 20 years. I think he's a really smart guy. And he's, you know, kind of a strongly knee-jerk anti-imperialist. And there

are lots of reasons to feel that way when you look at U.S. history. Ukraine is not one of them. And the Ukrainian people are an independent people. Putin has, on a number of occasions, said that he doesn't accept that. He's called the Ukrainians Nazis. He doesn't respect their sovereignty. He believes that the country should be a part of Russia. And I think that what the Americans did was less provoke the Russians than make Putin believe that the West wasn't going to do anything. After 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and had their little green men in operation that they denied in southeast Ukraine. They said, oh, they're just soldiers on vacation, on leave, which is ludicrous on its face. The Americans didn't respond and the Europeans did virtually nothing.

In fact, when the Russians then hosted a World Cup, a lot of European leaders, including Macron, others traveled to Russia. This was while the Russians were illegally occupying Ukraine. No consequences. And I think that when you add that to the failure of the U.S. in Afghanistan, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States, so embarrassing, so painful to watch after 20 years of war, to have lost that war in such an ignominious way. When he saw that Merkel, who was such a strong supporter of the Ukrainians and a strong opponent of the Russians, left for Schultz and the Social Democrat that was more, they were the ones that were really responsible for engaging more with the Russians. I think he saw opportunities. I think he saw, I can go in and take Ukraine and

they're not going to do anything. It's going to be like 2014 all over again. So no, I mean, in fact, quite to the contrary, I don't think the Russians were provoked. I think the Russian Putin felt like he had impunity, felt like there wouldn't be consequences, felt like he already saw that he bullied and got away with it. 2008 in Georgia, 2014 in Ukraine, and then 2023. And finally, this guy's sitting around, continuing to bluff on a short stack, throwing all in. And he finally got called by a bigger staff. That's what happened. But he thought he could get away with it. And the idea that the Ukrainian nation doesn't have the unilateral right to join a defensive alliance. I mean, NATO doesn't have to let them in but you know it wasn't like the west was saying we were going to take over ukraine the ukrainian people wanted to join nato just like

they wanted to join the eu um you know the soviet union was incredibly repressive from moscow these these independent countries the the the former so Soviet republics that became independent after decades of brutal Soviet rule, they wanted out. And thank God there were places for them to go. And, you know, I feel for them. And I was a little sad. I heard some of Jeff's comments on your pod, and I think it's, I was a little sad that he puts it in that way, that the United States is responsible by provoking Russia and somehow justifying Putin's behavior because of what the U.S. did to him. I don't

think that's reasonable at all. Ian Bremmer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, the world's leading political risk research and consulting firm, and GZERO Media, a company dedicated to providing intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs. He is the author of 11 books, including his latest, The Power of Crisis, How Three Threats and Our Responses Will Change the World. He joins us from, did you say Chicago, Ian? I said Chicago, yeah. And also, let's talk about our Twitter spaces.

Yeah, that's right. What are we talking about? What are we doing? I think we're announcing our run. Yeah, you're running for president. I'm going to announce that. And the technology will break down. It's going to be fantastic.

We're going to break Twitter. That's a myth we tell ourselves to take credit for things and feel good about ourselves and kind of fall into this narcissism that's fomented by an American culture on individuality. But I think it makes sense and it's a healthy practice to, on a regular basis, sit down and say, am I American-made? born into where I could take advantage of entrepreneurship or great universities or the ability to move or an environment that let me practice free speech or value the arts? What is it about the country you live in that has made you who you are? What is it about the people who made you who you are? Do you have a certain sense of humor that was genetically passed on? Is it experiences you've had that have kind of shaped you? I think it's important to just sort of say, if you were to disarticulate who you are, where do the pieces come from? What were the factories that made them,

such that you can appreciate them, you can be grateful for them, and you can think about being a better shepherd and investing in the future for other people? What made you? What external forces made you? Are you a function of tragedy? If you think about comic books or you think about Marvel movies, the hero and the villain are both shaped by tragedy. The hero is usually the orphan and the villain is usually someone who has a big scar. And the difference is how they each responded to tragedy. The hero decides that he or she wants to protect people based on their suffering, and the villain has decided that they're angry, and they want to punish other people based on some traumatic event that's happened in their life. Are you shaped by trauma? But what is it that's made you? What are the

factories you were made in? And what does that say about the rest of your life where you want to invest your resources, who you want to love, what you want to foster, what values you want to promote in terms of your own relationships? Are you American-made? Who made you? What factories are you from? This episode was produced by Caroline Shagrin. Jennifer Sanchez is our associate producer, and Drew Burrows is our technical director. Thank you for listening to the Prop G Pod from the Vox Media Podcast Network. We will catch you on Saturday for No Mercy, No Malice, as read by George Hahn, and on Monday with our weekly market show.

That was not funny. Okay. All right, we'll go with the first one. There was literally an uncomfortable pause. It's like, oh my God, who's going to tell him? You think I got guns like this naturally? Hello, supplement. Hello, supplement.

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