The Prof G Pod with Scott Galloway - The Deal That Ended the Gaza War — with Dan Senor

Episode Date: October 13, 2025

Scott speaks with Dan Senor, co-author of The Genius of Israel and host of the Call Me Back podcast, about what may be the most consequential Middle East deal in decades. They discuss how Trump’s negotiators pushed Hamas to release hostages, Israel’s defiance of international pressure, and the regional realignment now underway across Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. They also explore what’s next for Gaza’s governance, Netanyahu’s political future, and whether this moment marks the true end of the war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

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Oh hungry, oh Henry! Today marks arguably the most significant moment since the war in Gaza began two years ago. Hamas freed 20 remaining hostages in Israel released some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners as the first step in Trump's proposed peace deal. Israel and Hamas haven't agreed on the broader terms yet, but Trump's already declared, quote, the war is over. We wanted to speak to somebody who could give us the most inside color nuance around this, situation and there was like one name that immediately came to mind and that's Dan Cynor. Dan is a leading expert on Israel in the Middle East. He's the co-author of the genius of Israel and startup nation. He's also the host of the Call Me Back podcast, which has been really just a kind of a lighthouse in a sea of

misinformation and in propaganda and has become kind of the go-to source for information on this on this topic. Anyways, Dan, very much appreciate you taking time on what must be just an incredibly busy day for you. Thank you, Scott. It is a crazy, insane day of mixed emotions. You have been a thought partner with me on this over the last couple years and some of my most meaningful conversations. I mean this. We're not on my podcast. We're on your podcast, and I, and I also having you on mine. So I was happy to do this. So let's, let's, let's, start with, it feels that Mark Twain saying, how do you go bankrupt slowly than suddenly, it feels like this deal came about slowly than suddenly. Can you give us any nuance into over the

last 30 or 15 days? How did this culminate in a deal? Who were the parties? What were the pieces on the chess board? And what were the critical events and there were parties in bringing this deal to fruition? I've been thinking about that a lot because I think there's a tendency, Scott, you know, what you do and I do and what a lot of other folks do and trying to make sense of moments in in news cycles and there's a tendency to to just have these snap reactions to events and snap analysis and we live in this moment where the moment there's you know one conversation that is reported out between two leaders and then there's suddenly notifications out and there's whole you know cycles of articles written about a tense conversation or a good conversation

and trying to make sense of every minute, as opposed to taking a step back and sort of letting events play out and then try to like stitch them together. And so when I think about some of the moments that occurred over the last really four weeks, four or five weeks, that there was this instant analysis and consensus on what they meant. And we now know it was all kind of wrong. So I'm just want to rattle off some of them because it gets to the question you're asking. So one was Israel's decision to go into Gaza City. So keep in mind, as you know, and as I think many of your listeners know, Gaza City was the last stronghold, the last Hamas stronghold in Gaza, sort of like Hamas's Berlin or Hamas's Moscow. And Israel had avoided going into Gaza City for most of the war.

And now it made clear that it was going in. And everybody seemed to be against it. obviously in the international community, leaders, the UN, Europe, everyone was going crazy that Israel cannot do this. Hamas, obviously, was going crazy saying Israel cannot do this. And there was even division within Israeli society. Israelis were against it. The Israeli military was against it. And it was certain that it was just going to prolong the war, result in many more IDF casualties, result in many more Palestinian casualties, and risked the hostages. And everyone just thought this was the craziest thing in the world.

what we now know is that Israel's decision to defy all that pressure and that backlash and say, no, we're going in no matter what. And when the world expected, well, at least the U.S. will reign in Israel and not let Israel do this. President Trump said, no, Israel can do this and should do this, and there's no daylight, and we have Israel's back. And that we, at the time, everyone thought that was crazy. and what we now know, and even critics of that decision, who I just recorded a podcast with today, concede in retrospect that more than anything flipped out Hamas because they realized that there was no one reigning in Israel,

that this notion that Hamas could always use the hostages and the threat to the hostages as leverage against Israel would always reign in Israel, that the fact that that leverage or that currency was suddenly being devalued, led Hamas to realize we are on our own. We may want to bring it back to negotiating table. That's the first thing. The second thing is, I think history will look back at the Israeli operation in Doha,

the attempted strike against Hamas, which was a failure and was deemed a failure at the time. I think that had a catalytic effect, even though it was a failure. It sent a message to the region that you in Doha or Abu Dhabi or Riyadh or Riyadh or wherever may think that this war, as controversial as it is in the region, will stay contained to the Israel-Gaza border. And the fire is moving around the region, and the fire could come anywhere. And so I think that put a lot of pressure on some of these Arab capitals to tell Hamas enough. You know, we need to get to a deal. And then the third and fourth thing, which are items which I think are connected. And this is going to be controversial, I think, for many people

listening to this podcast. But I have to say it. I think that President Trump's decision to do two things. One, to send in Steve Whitkoff and Jared Kushner, who we know are not career diplomats, but everyone in the region knows these are two individuals that are extremely close to him. And in the Middle East, that matters a lot, that the sense of family, the sense of personal connection, when the leaders in the region knew that Jared and Whitkoff had been empowered by the president to go close the deal, it elevated the stakes for many in the region, including for Hamas. I mean, these guys were in the room with Hamas, like in the last couple of days, in last few days, directly. I think that sent a statement. And then lastly, Trump's decision to And this was, and I still don't know if this was, you know, how analyzed this was or this was just an instinct. Hamas said in this last round of negotiations, yes, but, right? We will agree. Yes, but. And they would have some changes. Now, what was the yes part? The yes part was for the entirety of these two years, Hamas would never agree to a deal that would release all the hostages at once, ever.

There was always a sense it has to be in phases. Israel has to withdraw. There has to be a pause in fighting. Then we'll release a few more, spread over a period of time. And this was, by the way, even I was guilty of assuming that was the only way it could work. It always has to work in phases. Hamas will never give up all at once. And at some point, Trump said, no, all of them at once.

We're not doing phases. You're not trickling them out. We want them all out at once at the front end of the deal. And every expert was saying there's no way. He's naive. He's foolish. And then Hamas said, yes, but. Now, in a negotiation, when someone says yes, but, you can choose to focus on the yes or the but.

And many of the negotiations over the last two years have fallen apart because various parties tended to focus on the butt. And what Trump seemed to do is he took the yes. Wait a minute. They just said yes. They will release all the hostages at once at the front end. Yes, they're going to quibble with some of the other details. But I'm going to bank the yes and deal with the butt later. And I do think generally in negotiations, whether it's in business or geopolitics, there's a sense

that opportunity can beget opportunity. And I think what the U.S. did here was say there's opportunity here. Hamas just said yes to something they've never said yes to before. We're going to grab that. We'll deal with the details later, deal with their butts. And we're going to figure out how to create momentum around the yes. And that's what happened. And once, by the way, everyone in the region, obviously not just the Israelis, but all

these capitals. I spoke to government officials, diplomats, and other countries in the region in Arab capitals. And they were like, wow, the moment everyone seized on the yes, we could start envisioning and enter this war. And so that created like, wait a minute, this is in reach. And here we are. So I want to respond to each of those three and try and inspire more color from you. In reverse order, I encourage people and something I have trouble with is to be a critical thinker and that is go issue by issue. And I find I have a negative bias towards almost anything that Trump administration does. I just immediately, reflexively, subconsciously find fault in everything this administration does. And I think if you are not giving this administration tremendous credit for

what has just happened, you are not a critical thinker. Also, I think Jared Kushner, who was my student. I got to think that some of the relationships entrust that he fomented and cemented during the Abram Accords really paid off here. I got to think he had a lot of these people on speed dial. Also, quite frankly, in typical Trump fashion, he seems more focused on the prize than the piece itself. So we tend to, again, want to have a conversation around whether or not, you know, who deserves credit. The Trump administration deserves a ton of credit for this. So kudos to them. The thing that you said that really shocked me and had changed my mind because I felt differently about it was the strike on Doha. I thought they were kind of four for four, the pager operation,

most strategic, effective, precision counterterrorist attack in history, right? Taking out around air defenses. We are all safer. If I could pick the Nobel Prize, if I was the Nobel Prize, if I was the Nobel Prize Committee, it would absolutely go to the IDF. I think they've created much more sustainable peace, a tremendous sacrifice to them strategically with incredible, courage, technology, bravery, everything we would hope from our military. They were sort of four-for-four, and then I thought, oh, no, the Doha strike, not only was probably a bridge too far, but it was a failure. That was, you know, that was just too far.

But I don't think there's any ignoring the timing that it happens, and all of a sudden there appears to be new pressure on Hamas. My sense is that two external parties, and tell me if you agree with this, that it can put pressure on Hamas, were Qatar. And to a certain extent, the Trump administration putting pressure on Israel, you know, there's just a small number of parties that could really put pressure on these groups. And it feels like Qatar is one of those parties. And to your point, when Qatar said, you know, Honey Badger don't give a shit, they will come in and start bombing our cities. shit just got very real for us, and we would like to see this come to an end. So the Gaza City thing, I had not even, I had, that was not even on my radar screen,

but a long-winded way or intro into a question of, we have a tendency in the U.S. to look at the Gulf as one amorphous region with similar politics and a similar view of Israel. And the reality is Qatar is just much different than the kingdom, which is much different than the UAE, which is not much different than Bahrain. And I'd heard you talk about the role that Turkey played here or will play moving forward. And I hadn't even brought that into the calculus.

Can you give us a sense for the different players in the region who played a critical role and who plays a critical role moving forward? Yeah. So I'll tick through each of them quickly and then if you want to focus in on any one of them, just let me know.

Obviously, the Saudis play the most important role in the region. in their largest economy, the only ones that have a real serious military in the region and a modernizing leader in Muhammad bin Salman, regardless of what some may think of him, he is single-handedly transforming that country. And it's understood both in Riyadhara and Jerusalem that if there is normalization between these two countries, between Israel and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab-Israeli conflict is effectively over. And, and, and And really the region and big parts of the world will be transformed, too, as a result of that.

You know, the Saudi leadership was planning on normalization with Israel before October 7th. And I think, and I know they're still committed to it. Obviously, the details got a little more complicated because of October 7th, but they're still committed to it. And this has been a huge carrot for Israel. Like, what do they need to do to get to Saudi normalization? So Riyadh is a major player. Qatar, for all the obvious reasons, is a major player here because they have direct channel to Hamas, whereas Saudi Arabia does not. And the Hamas leaders that are not in Gaza are based

in Doha. And Qatar, the government of Qatar, had been working for years with Hamas in Gaza long before October 7th, with, by the way, the knowledge of and a sort of quiet support of the Israeli and U.S. governments. And there's a sense that Qatar will play a big role in Gaza after the war. So when Qatar says it's now where you've lost us, that matters a lot in these conversations between the Arab countries and Hamas. And I'll also add that Qatar is in this unique situation where it's got extraordinary wealth and yet it's a tiny, tiny country and a tiny, tiny population. And I've heard officials from Qatar describe their situation to Kuwait in 1990. Small country, extraordinary wealth, extraordinary natural resources. But in one day, in August of 1990, Saddam Hussein's

military rolls into Kuwait and declares Kuwait, the 19th province of Iraq. And sure, Saddam's forces were kicked out of Kuwait, but that Kuwait has never recovered, that its stature and its status in the region never recovered to this day. And I've heard officials in Doha, basically, say, we don't want to be that. We're scared of being that. And so Doha's MO has been to be friends with everybody. They're closer to the U.S. They host a U.S. base in Doha, not too far from where the Israelis struck, tried to strike Hamas. They've opened ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. They've opened ties with the Iranians. They've opened ties with, you know, the bad actors in Afghanistan, the Taliban. They've relationship with everybody, with Europe, with Russia,

with Putin. That's their MO. We're friends with everybody. And hopefully that will give us some sense of security. And that model, that approach with a strike that Israel conducted in Doha, what that, can we be friends with everybody? And it's not going to cause problems with us, because right now Israel striking in the heart of Doha is, is, doesn't feel very safe. So that's, that's Doha. Egypt and Turkey to me are the most interesting stories here. Turkey after the the Israeli-U.S. war against Iran meant that Iran is no longer real player in the region. And it's lost its proxy system, Hezbollah, the Houthis are kind of on their last legs, that satellite state in Syria and Damascus, the Assad regime, which had been in power for 53 years gone. You know, and Iran is naked. No air defenses, Israel and the U.S. having total air superiority over Iran. So Iran is no longer players. So with Iran out of the region in terms of a power player, still in the region, but not a geopolitical power, the two countries now that matter the most are Israel and Turkey.

Turkey is a major, to me, the Israel and Turkey as the future major players in the region are, is the big story. And therefore, Erdogan has a lot of, has a lot of capital, political capital. And he also has, and again, this will make some people uncomfortable, but it is the truth. He also has a very good relationship with Trump. and I think Trump pressed on that. There are a lot of things that Turkey wants out of the U.S. Turkish relationship, certainly in the military side, and Erdogan and Trump have a very direct relationship. So pressing on Turkey to help close Hamas was important.

And the last country here is Egypt, which is, you know, we all focus on, and the press just focuses on that there's only one border for Gaza, which is the Israel-Gaza border. When in reality, there's two borders. There's the Israel-Gaza border and there's the Gaza-Egyptian border. And Egypt was occupying Gaza before the 1967, six-day war. And Egypt could have let any number of Gaza and Palestinians war refugees into Egypt over these last two years and did not. They basically barricaded the place. And Egypt has a big stake in what happens in Gaza next. And they have direct channels with Hamas.

And they are also the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. to this day, Egypt is a massive, massive recipient of U.S. foreign aid. And so for all those reasons, concern about the war spreading throughout the region, close ties to Hamas, and a big recipient of U.S. foreign aid, I think, gave the U.S. a lot of leverage over Cairo. What is the state of Hamas right now? There's a general viewpoint that militarily, it's been totally neutered. as a political body, as a military force, where is Hamas right now? I think militarily it is virtually non-existent, meaning it basically had a free run from 2007, call it, to October 7th, 20203, to build up a very sophisticated military. It was, think of it as, what we tend to think of it as like a militia or it is a terror group, but it, but the way it was organized,

It was organized and trained and developed like a light infantry army of a sovereign state. It had battalions and it had a command and control structure. And it had the troops, if you will, the terrorist commandos were very well trained. They had sophisticated weapons. They built this tunnel system that was, you know, bigger than the London, you know, the tube. It was this massive, massive infrastructure. So that was a couple decades in the main. making. And so what does Hamas have now? Most of their fighters that have been training over the last

number of years have been wiped out or captured by Israel. Its leaders have been largely wiped out. It's the sophisticate of its arms, they haven't gotten arms supplies over the last two years. So it's all but non-existent. However, and here's the however. One, what it has done over the last year is it's been losing a number of its fighters. It's been recruiting new and new fighters. Now, they're not well trained. They're like kids. You can see it. When I speak to IDF soldiers who in Gaza, they say like at the beginning of the war, they're fighting very sophisticated, well-trained Hamas fighters. Now they're fighting like 15-year-old, 14-year-old boys who are just recruited like cannon fodder for Hamas. So it doesn't have the level of sophistication. They haven't received new arms, but there are some arms still there

and how we handle or how the U.S. and all those involved we're meeting in Charmel-Shek today deals with deal with the disarmament of Hamas of what's left of their arms is going to be a very complicated issue, not easy to, not easy to discern how that's going to be implemented. Israel is very focused now on blowing up the tunnel system in Gaza. That will take a lot of time and won't be easy. So what exists of Hamas now is basically a political organization in Gaza that has a sort of rag-tag militia, which is different from what it had before October 7th, which was a political organization in Gaza and a very sophisticated military.

Now, that political organization will still try to stay in power and still try to terrorize. And in fact, there are other Palestinians. There are stories coming out of Gaza today about Hamas kind of coming up from the rubble, what's left of Hamas, and imposing retribution on Palestinians that defied them over the last few months or that they argued worked with the Israelis or worked with the food aid distribution services or whatever. there's there's these i mean you can see them online there's these executions going on of any kind of clans or families or individuals that that in some way they believe we're not loyal to hamas during this war that's playing out now now the international press is going to have

no interest in covering that it's brutal by the way uh and ghoulish to to see but it is but it is going on the press won't have interest in it because it doesn't involve israel but what's playing out right now is a fight for the future of gaza and and whether or not there's there's there's There are Palestinians that are willing to stick their necks out and say, we want a different future than what we've had since Israel pulled out of Gaza, you know, two decades ago. And Hamas is going to try to play in that competition. We'll be right back. Should babies have phones? That's a question, senior Vox correspondent.

Adam Clark Estes asked a bunch of researchers recently. It was personal. He has a two-year-old. I feel like I'm going to be facing a new hurdle every day for the rest of my life in some respects. But when it comes to tech, I think the big challenge here is that it is constantly changing. And these are new challenges. We don't have clear answers on what the right thing to do is. As a parent, it feels very scary. The prevailing wisdom tells us no.

Keep that screen away from your child. but one expert wants us to rethink things. This is something that my wife and I talked and thought a whole lot about, and really kind of at some point between the ages of two and three, we decided to give our daughter her first phone. This week on Explain It to Me, Toddlers and Tech. What to do and what do we know? New episodes on Sundays.

Find it wherever you get your podcasts. Maybe even on your baby's phone. What does governance likely look like moving forward in Gaza? Because even deep into the war, with all of the devastation, I had read that 70% of residents, and I don't know if they're under pressure to say it in a poll, still supported Hamas. Whereas the Islamic regime in Iran, it was flipped. Only 30% of the populace supports the reigning government there. Does Hamas still have deep, deep support among the people of Gaza,

which likely means they are going to be very involved in governance. What does governance look like and what is the current view on Hamas amongst the residents of Gaza? So it's not clear what governance looks like will look like right now. We don't know what exactly it would look like because there's just going to be this international stabilization force. It's set up. There's these Arab countries.

They're going to step in, the Emirates, the Egyptians, maybe others. They're going to come in and try to help run the place. There's this body, this board that's being created. Tony Blair is going to have a big role in trying to create some transitional technocratic governing body to kind of just run the place. So basically get a bunch of technocrats, not ideologs, who can come in and just, you know, get the trains running on time, start thinking about the rebuilding, start thinking about getting humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, start dealing with just delivering

essential services to Ghaz and Palestinians before they really think through who's going to govern this place, who the future of the Ghazan state or whatever we want to call it will be. So I think we don't know. Your point about 70% of Ghazan Palestinians supporting Hamas, when you drill down into that data, what you find is it's not so much that they support Hamas. And this is both, this is going to sound odd to say, it's both an encouraging sign in a countertuitive sense, but also a depressing sign. They don't necessarily support Hamas. They support October 7th.

That's what the polling says. So they say they're frustrated with Hamas and they're frustrated with Hamas running Gaza, but they support the war against Israel. And that to me is we're now going to see whether or not that's what they felt the pressure to say, whether or not they can, you know, whether or not on Palestinians and Gaza can start speaking freely, do they say, look, invading Israel and war after war after war against the Israelis was a mistake. We set back our own cause and we need to start a new day of coexistence.

whether or not that there's there's there is that sentiment out there and there just needs to be oxygen in the space where Palestinians can feel safe articulating it we don't know the flip side is it could be that Hamas at least in its hatred and its ideological hostility to Israel is so entrenched as in Gaza and among Palestinians that no matter who emerges in Gaza that sentiment that hold on people's minds cannot be broken. We don't know. I mean, what I'm looking forward to is testing it. I mean, we have to test this now. Is there a world in which there can be some leadership in Gaza that can be willing to coexist with Israel? And I will say, it's not easy because to do so, if anyone is willing to stick out their neck and present that

kind of vision, they are risking their lives. They are risking their lives. To what degree are you concerned that the prisoner swap, so 20 hostages and whatever remains they can locate, turn back over to Israeli families? In exchange, Israel has released some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners. To what extent are you concerned, and is there any way to safeguard that we're, I say we, that the Israelis or this deal, isn't just repopulating the leadership ranks of Hamas? Because if I remember correctly, Sinwar was once a prisoner of Israel. was handed back. To what extent are the Israelis, you know, against their will? They would not rather have this way. Are they going to just replenish the leadership of Hamas? It is one of the

things I'm most worried about with regard to this deal and the previous deals. You're absolutely right. In 2011, Israel did a released, they did an exchange. They released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons to get back one hostage, Gilad Chalit. And one of those prisoners that was released, as you said, was Yechia Sinwar. And the question is, is Israel releasing today a lot of Yechia Sinuars? I think there are two problems with this approach of the prisoner releases, and I don't think Israel had a choice, but there are two problems with it. One is, not only are you replenishing Gaza and the West Bank, because some of them are going to

return to the West Bank with these monsters who know how to be monsters and are quite skilled of being monsters, even if they've been in prison for 10 or 20 plus years. So you're replenishing, as you said. And two, you're sending a message that this works. When you take Israelis hostage, you get your heroes, if you will, the biggest monsters from Hamas, out of prison and back home. So it has two effects. A, it creates a risk that the people who know how to conduct this kind of violence and wage this kind of mass violence are now free. And two, you create an incentive structure because you're saying this is how we get, this is how we get our people out of prison is we take Israeli, we kidnap, and we steal Israelis. So I'm deeply, this is what I'm among the

things I'm most worried about. This is, this is right up there. And yet I don't think Israel had a choice. I, you know, it's the way Israel deals with hostages is, is perplexing to so many people around the world because, you know, if you look at the standard practice when someone has taken hostage, the standard practice, the kind of the practices that are that are encouraged by experts in hostage negotiations is to downplay the significance of the hostages, to not make them household names, to not turn them into these symbols of a priority for society, even if it is a priority for society to get them back. You shouldn't turn them into these rallying cries because that only increases their value. Their stock only goes up in the eyes of Hamas. Wow, look how badly Israel wants

these people back. All the more reason to hang on to them. All the more reason to kidnap more of them. And yet Israel time and time and time and time again does this. Whenever Israelis are taken hostage, you get a version, this was an extreme version, but you get a version of what we've just seen over the last two years, where there's a sense from Israel's enemies that Israel wants nothing more than getting these hostages back on the one hand. However, if you listen to Hamas's rhetoric, one of the things they have said, including Sinwar himself, was that Israel's greatest weakness is they love life. Israel's greatest weakness is Israelis love life, whereas we love death. These are not my words. This is Hamas's,

words, Sinwar's words, and they thought that the kidnapping, the taking of hostages is what is what would break Israel because they're so weak that they so desperately want these people back. And I could argue this so many ways, Scott, and I think about this a lot. On the one hand, of course it's a weakness for all the reasons you and I were just saying. On the other hand, when you watch the images from today and you just see this, the vibrancy, of Israel and the health of Israeli society. And regardless of what you think of its politicians, regardless of what anyone thinks about certain decisions they made here or there, you just watch that Israel was willing to risk everything to get back what? These musicians and these kids

who entered went to the Nova Fest music festival and parents and innocent, you know, people who lived on the wrong kibbutzim and, you know, and were there at the wrong. time and just these regular people they're willing to risk everything. And what is Hamas trying to get back? Hamas is trying to get back monsters. I mean, literally agents of barbarism, not just agents of chaos, agents of barbarism. That's who they value. And Israel values the people were seeing return today. And so I, on the one hand, think it's a weakness for Israel and I live in fear that Israel's going to get into this aversion of this jam again. In the other hand, I think one of the reasons Israel endures, an Israeli society.

endures and is a standout and a shining light in an otherwise often very dark region is in part because they have this love for life yeah I think you're right tactically it's a weakness but strategically if you know I use the term loosely the brand of Israel there is something about life and an appreciation and kind of no man or woman left behind it reminds me of the film superman where general Zod is watching the devastation they're reeking and he all of a sudden pauses and says, I found Superman's weakness. He cares. You know, if you're looking for moral clarity in geopolitics, you're just, you're just not going to find it. Of this 20-point plan, what are you most worried about? It feels, I love what you said earlier, and I think it's a great, actually,

great business lesson that if you can, you know, if you're trying to take over a company or a merge of the company, if you can get the price agreed to, you can probably work out the rest, right? And what you're saying is the release, the hostage and prisoner exchange was kind of the, was the price and that we should be able to figure out, both sides should be able to get to some sort of resolution. Of the remaining points to be ironed out, what do you see is the most fraught with risk of an enduring peace here? One, the issue of disarmament, which I referenced earlier. So among the 20-point plan, Israel, I mean, Hamas must be disarmed. How's that going to happen?

Who's going door to door and tearing Kalashnikovs and, you know, RPG launchers from the hands of Hamas? Who's doing that? Really, who's doing that? Are Egyptian and Emirati forces doing that? Maybe. Are American forces doing that? No. Are Israeli forces doing that?

Israel has basically conceded that it won't be by agreeing to this deal. So there's talk about Hamas disarmament, but I don't see Hamas saying they're going to disarm. And I don't know who's at, because to go go door to door and get those Kalashnikovs means every time you, quote, unquote, knock on a door, you're risking your life. Who, which country is signing up to have their lives of their soldiers being risked in order to get Kalashnikovs out of the hands of Hamas, 15-year-old boys? So the disarmament piece worries me. The, the role of Hamas in the governing structures, you and I were talking about, not clear. I think that if Hamas emerges as a player in a future governing authority in Gaza, it will be a huge win for Hamas that will be able to say that, you know, Israel took out Iran, Israel took out Hezbollah, Israel took out, you know, had a role in taking out the Assad regime, but we Hamas, we launched the biggest massacre on the Israeli people, on the Jewish people in a single day since the Holocaust, and we're still standing. And not only we still standing, but we actually have a role in the governing authority in, in, Gaza. So the message that sends to the region worries me. I can go on and on with some of my

other concerns, but I think the biggest caveat to everything I'm saying, which is what is so extraordinary to me about this deal, not only getting all the hostages back at once at the beginning, was that Israel is, the IDF is still in Gaza. The IDF is still in 53% of Gaza, according to this deal. Now, it's not in Gaza fighting and it's not in war, in war fighting mode, but it is there. It is present. It can obviously turn on warfighting mode when it wants to. So Israel has real leverage now as the details are being sorted out to basically say, we're still here. And if we're uncomfortable with the way things are going, you know, we have a lot of tools as well. So I have a lot of concerns. I, those are mollified

by, from my perspective, from Israel's perspective, by the IDF being allowed to stay in Gaza until some of these details are sorted out. I want to turn to the politics or governance in Israel right now. Something that I found incredibly distressing but not surprising was the deafening silence from that kind of pro-Palestinian advocates here in the U.S. Because my understanding is that this deal is absolutely not what certain factions of the far right in the Knesset wanted. They wanted occupations. They wanted settlements.

They wanted continued military presence. They wanted permanent displacement of the Gaza and Palestinians out of Gaza. Yeah, you're exactly right. Everything the hard right wanted, really, I mean this. And I'm obviously I'm an advocate and I defend Israel, but I'm a critic of the hard right in Israel. I know what they wanted. I know what they wanted. And they didn't get it.

Yeah. And yet this feels like a deal. This feels like, to me, the best or arguably a pretty good deal for Hamas. and yet it felt like factions in the U.S. were, to me, it out of them as being more concerned with having a vessel for anti-Israel or anti-Semitic hate as opposed to real concern for a deal that brings a lasting peace. I saw none of these flags flying or none of these celebrities urging Hamas and Israel to get this deal done. It's almost the analogy I would use what you talked about with Egypt or some of the other nations that they saw. the conflict in Gaza, quite frankly, is politically advantageous for them from a brand in a PR standpoint, but weren't that interested in actually helping the people of Palestine. And so I'm using

that one, that's a comment leading up to a question, which I think you agree with. But what, give us the state of play of the governance, how Israel, my sense is Israel, the far-right faction, which a lot of people would argue, had way too much influence over Netanyahu. de-stabilizing the region. There was a fear that there was a kind of wag-the-dog situation here where Netanyahu wanted to be on a war footing, regardless of what the right thing or the humane thing was to do, and that the far right in Israel did not get what it wanted. Far from it here. Talk about the governance in Israel, how this deal came about, what kind of pressure was applied, and what do you think this means for governance, and specifically Netanyahu moving forward in Israel?

So, a few things. First, I completely agree with you. We have been lectured and hectored at for the last number of months that there is a genocide taking place in Gaza. And this was everything from these rallies and protests in places like London and Paris and New York City to, as you said, the Hollywood elite. The, you know, the, I don't want to start singling out names. You know who these people are. They were all talking about a genocide. Stop the genocide. You know, obviously I strongly dispute what it was a genocide.

It wasn't a genocide. And we can talk about, I mean, Israel has lost over 900 soldiers in this war, the majority of which, the overwhelming majority of which was after October 7th, meaning it chose to send its youngest, its best, into Gaza to fight. Why? If it was a genocide or an attempt to genocide, Israel would have just obliterated the place from the air. And it didn't. It sent soldiers in to fight. I mean, it's just so, it's so absurd on so many levels, this idea that this was a genocide. That said, if you really believed it was a genocide, then when the genocide was, quote-unquote, stopped,

where there was actually a peace agreement that stops the genocide, IDF soldiers are not fighting in Gaza today. Shouldn't your first moral obligation be to embrace the peace agreement that made that happen? And when all these players did not do that, they revealed themselves as not interested, actually, in the Palestinian people. They were interested in a political weapon against Israel. That's what this was about. And the cause of, quote, unquote, stopping the genocide became that weapon once the genocide, quote, unquote, stopped. They weren't interested, first off. Second off, on a very practical level, you know, ask yourself, how many Palestinians were actually dying?

Every day. like a lot we should we need to say that a lot of Palestinians were dying every single day now we can debate the numbers and there's a you know I have serious issues with the with the authorities in Gaza who provide these numbers but it's it's it's it's indisputable that you pick you 50 70 90 10 15 whatever your number Palestinians were dying in this war every single day if you care about the Palestinians today there are no Palestinians at least from Israeli forces dying being killed in Gaza. Shouldn't you celebrate that day and the next day and the next day every day those are lives saved? And the fact that that's not the focus, I think, tells you everything you

need to know. As it relates to the Israeli government, I think two things are going on. I don't think nothing yet who is as beholden to the hard right in his government as the press often characterized. I think, obviously, coalition politics always has its own dynamics. But I don't think they had the gun to his head that everybody thought, certainly as we can tell. see over, over events of the last couple of weeks, his government could fall over this deal, and yet he still pushed it through. Israel now is going to have to go to elections at some point, between now and October of 26. According to Israeli election law, the next election has to happen by October of 26.

And so now the big question is, does nothing yet go to elections soon? Does he go to elections very soon? Does he, quote, unquote, take the win and say, I'm now, only I could have gotten this deal done. Only I could have gotten the hostages back. And only I now can take this energy and this talent that you saw as I maneuvered the geopolitics of Israel and the region and the world and got the Iran threat eliminated. I got the Hezbollah threat eliminated.

And now I'm the guy to make Saudi normalization happen. And that's why I need to continue serving in government. And I'm staking my election on Israel's full normalization into the region. That's what this is about. That's one way he could run. The other way he could run is actually just delay the election and push off calling elections well into next year and try to start making the normalization happen and then run on that. I think the latter is a riskier course for him because I think on the one hand there's a lot of promise in terms of normalization. I think we're going to see movement from Saudi Arabia with Israel.

I think we're going to see movement from Syria. I think we're going to see movement from Indonesia. So there could be a lot that happens on the normalization front. But as we know, diplomacy and international politics can take weird twists and turns. And I think Netanyahu would probably want to run as the guy who can deliver it rather than the guy who's in the muck of trying to deliver it. But either way, he's going to have to go to elections. And of course, I'm not talking with the elephant in the room. He was the prime minister under whose watch, the biggest catastrophe for the Jewish people, as I said earlier, in a single day since the Holocaust occurred.

And that notion, that reality has never been tested in Israeli politics. People say, well, Golda Meir in 1973, after the Yom Kippa War, she got reelected right away. It's true. But the Yom Kippa War was catastrophic for Israel. It was 19 days. It was, it was in retrospect compared to what Israel's just gone through in terms of the shattering of Israel, the trauma for Israel. Nothing else comes close to it.

And nothing, Yahoo, was prime minister when it happened. and I don't know if that's if that's surmountable it's you know we have these periods scott where you say what's the first election going to be like in the u.s what's the first election presidential election going to be like after covid or what's the first presidential election going to be like after the 2008 global financial crisis or what's the first election going to be like after 9-11 we know we go through these periods and the truth is it's very hard to know ever what happens what's going to happen these elections because on the one hand after 9-11, Bush got re-elected. And not only did he get re-elected, he won the midterms

in 2002 right after 9-11. Of course, there was no way the Republicans would have won the White House in 2008 after the global financial crisis. So you could, these things can go in all these different directions. It's very hard. When you have these seismic events in the life of a nation, trying to predict what the politics would be, I think is, it's totally unprecedented. You don't have no historical precedent in Israel's case to point to in terms of how the electorate will react. I do think you will see one phenomenon this time in Israeli politics is the emergence of what they call the Miloim Nix. The Miloim is a Hebrew word for the reservists. There were all these very, so Israel's standing army is pretty small. It depends on this incredible reserve force,

which are people in their 20s and 30s basically who have day jobs and kids and, you know, cool jobs in tech and whatever. And, you know, over three to 400,000 of them fought. the reservists and the standing arbor standing army in the last two years that's a higher percentage of israeli society than the percentage of american the american population that fought in world war two so this this war touched everybody every family and all these it's a small countries a friend of mine just said but it's a big family uh israel and these reservists who are very talented impressive people. You know many of them. For the first time I'm hearing from them, you know what? Maybe I should run for office. You know, I've never thought about a career in

politics. I was working in tech in Tel Aviv. I did, I worked in an elite unit. I served an elite unit in the IDF, but I was basically disconnected from politics. For the first time I'm hearing those people say, this must be a new day for Israel. This must be a rebirth. And it's, it's our generation now that has to play a role. So I do think in Israeli politics, everyone's focused on Bibi or not Bibi. It's like the way in American politics, everything's Trump or you know, Trump and everything, everything, the, the arc of history bends one way or the other towards how you think about Trump. It's the same with Netanyahu, such an outsized force in Israeli politics. I think we focused on Netanyahu as we should in our analysis at the expense

of, I think, a new generation that will be rising in Israeli politics and the role they play could be certainly unprecedented and very interesting. We'll be right back after a quick break. We're back with more from Dan Cienor. It's so interesting. You know, I immediately go to, and I don't mean to diminish the gravity of these situations, but I immediately go to branding because marketing is my background.

And brands, you know, Hynickin's a fairly pedestrian beer in Holland, and it's a luxury beer in the U.S. And Budweiser's a luxury beer in the U.S. And I find that some of these historical figures, whether it's Tony Blair or Goldemeyer, are much more popular outside of their own nation. And I was struck by how many people were applauding at every mention of Trump in these celebrations

in Israel yesterday and today and booing when they heard the term Netanyahu. And then I've also heard other people say that Netanyahu was literally running to stay out of jail. Yeah, I don't buy that. I mean, I'm open to the whole range of criticisms against Netanyahu, but I think this idea that, you know, there's a tendency, I think, for those of us who, you know, follow these events so closely to always find, like, the secret motive behind a politician's actions. So then this narrative emerged that Nathenaeu has these corruption cases and that he just wants to extend the war in order to extend his government, stay in power, and the odds of him be going to jail, go down if he, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, if, you.

He stays in government, and therefore, unfortunately, for Israelis and Palestinians, the war has to go on and on in service of Netanyahu's political career. I don't buy it for two reasons. One, these corruption cases are pretty weak, if you look closely at, even Netanyahu critics who are deep into the legal aspects here, I think they're pretty weak. A, B, even if he goes, even if he's found guilty, these legal cases have been going on forever. They will go on for a while. Even if he's found guilty, he will likely appeal them. the idea that anyone's sending Nathan Yahoo at that point well into his 80s

to prison, it's just not believable. I think it's so complicated. And I think you talked about this at the beginning about like trying to compartmentalize how you think about Trump and being able to hold many views. One of discussed, which you articulated at the same time of that you're impressed by what was accomplished here.

I think it's important to understand or just keep in mind that politicians usually have many competing motives. I've worked with a lot of politicians. I always find this. There's a sense of commitment to public service. So genuine, good-spirited, like, I want to try and do things, you know, publicly-spirited people who at the same time have their own issues about their reputations and how they'll be thought of in history and their, and some degree of narcissism. It's all wrapped up in that in the decisions to make. It's all wrapped up in it. And Natanyahu, his political rise, if you go back to his political rise now decades ago,

basically was on the back of the heroism and tragedy of his brother, Yoni Natanyahu, the Battle of Entebbe, the Operation Entebbe. He led the operation to Entebbe, got these Israeli hostages out, and he was the only one who was killed in the operation. And that is when the Natanyahu name became this like, like this mythical, like larger-than-life name in Israeli society and then soon after Benjamin Netanyahu ran for office or got involved in politics, ultimately ran for office. The idea that the bookends of his career could be the Yoni Natanyahu story at the beginning of his career, rescuing Israeli hostages

to the other bookend being the largest number of Israeli hostages taken on his watch at the end of his career. And I'm convinced, I'm not in the man's head. I speak to him from time to time, but I'm not in his head. I'm convinced that that other book, he was not willing to allow that other bookend be the bookend, that he was going to get these hostages back. Now, when someone says, I'm going to get these hostages back, is it because he's publicly spirited? I believe he is. I know that's going to be hard for people to, I believe he genuinely wanted these hostages back. Is he also consider himself a custodian of his own reputation and his own career? Of course. Point to me a politician that doesn't. And so it's, it's like,

we should be able to say that politicians are complicated enough just because of those two competing factors that they're constantly like twisting and twirling inside their heads. We don't have to come up with and then there's this and then there's this and they sneakily trying to do that. I think we're all usually wrong about those layers and layers and layers. And these two big factors are usually the factors. And tragically, they sometimes compete with one another. But when they're synchronized, they're all.

both moving the same direction, that's when I think the real magic can happen. And I think that's what has happened, actually both for Netanyahu and for Trump in the closing of this deal. Let's assume that there's something resembling an enduring peace and that this conflict has come to an end. And let's take off the table that let's assume that the residents or the citizens of Gaza and Israel are winners here. Who are the other winners? And probably more interestingly, the losers, with this piece. Obviously, I think Israel is a winner. I actually think the Palestinians are winners here, the Palestinian people, for the reasons

I was saying earlier, which is the war ends, and at the same time that the Arab world has made clear that they're committed to rebuilding Gaza. So the war ends, and it's not like everyone's abandoning ship and bailing on the Palestinian people. So the Palestinians are winners here. I think the U.S. is a winner here because it has demonstrated. that, you know, there was this image, someone was describing to me today on television a split screen of Israeli soldiers taking the hostages out of Gaza and returning them. So you see

the image of these Israeli soldiers taking hostages out of Gaza at the split screen on the news at the same time that Air Force One was landing at Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. And it was that split screen, which is the power of, of course the guy in the uniform, the soldier from whatever country is fighting. There's power that comes from that, but where you get the real kind of exponential turbocharge power is when it's paired with that Air Force One, when it's paired with the power of the U.S. and the President of the United States, regardless of who the president is. And so I think it's important for us as Americans to keep in mind when we go, when we go shoulder to shoulder with allies and help them achieve their security aims, we are sending a message

about American power that I think has the value that goes on in the world well beyond the individual, the moment we're focused on. That's, that's so the U.S. I think is a winner here. And I think their world largely winners here, because they get calm. They get some stability. They get, you know, the Gulf states like the Emirates and the Bahrainis have been huge beneficiaries of the Abraham Accords. There's now a potential now for further normalization, which I think will do wonders for the growth, the modernization, the economic growth in the region. So they're winners. I think the losers, if I would pick one other bucket of losers, are most of Europe, not all of Europe, but most of Europe.

I think the European leaders like Starmor in the UK, like Macron and France, and then outside of Europe, like Kearney and Canada, I think made a huge mistake. Just when pressure was mounting on Hamas, they came in with that recognition of a Palestinian state, the U.S. when, which basically declared that they believed that with no conditions that Hamas release hostages, with no conditions that Hamas leave Gaza, with no conditions that Hamas rearm, they sent a message that as far as Europe was concerned in Canada, that October 7th was Palestinian Independence Day. And that was a terrible move by them. And then even worse for them was then Trump completely ignores them and moves his own diplomacy

to make something happen and he does it the U.S. does it, the Gulf states do it and Europe's completely cut out of it they're like not even involved so they also look impotent not only did they make the wrong bet but then they looked impotent

so I would say Hamas in Europe in Canada to some degree are the losers think the Palestinian people Israel most of the Arab world Turkey and the U.S. are the winners There are a few people I know in this nation that understand the chessboard better in the Middle East than you. You've served in government.

You've obviously been studying these issues and almost become sort of a go-to-media figure. If someone had told you, if someone had laid out on October the 8th, what just transpired? And then you had to guess what was going to happen over the next two odd years. What has surprised you most about what has happened military? politically and also domestically in the U.S. Look, I continue to be floored by the, I mean, I had Sam Harris on my podcast on the anniversary, the two-year anniversary of October 7th. I asked him on the first year anniversary on the podcast, I asked him what surprised him

the most. And he said just the explosion of anti-Semitism. And then he said on year two, he's still surprised by it. For me, I was, you know, I was surprised by it in year one, by year. or two. I guess I was still surprised, but I, but I, I kind of had become numb to it a little bit. I, I do worry, Scott, that many friends of mine, Jewish friends of mine are like, okay, this period is over. The hostages, the light living hostages are back. The war is over. We're done. And I don't think we're done because I think now we have to start really thinking about,

there was almost no time to kind of deal with how prevalent and ugly and pervasive this anti-Semitism was, and now we're going to have to start dealing with. I think you see a lot of people in the UK, in France, Canada, elsewhere, leaving those countries, Jews and big numbers. I think that's going to, I mean, I think we're all going to start looking around saying, what does this mean for Jewish life? In the U.S., if, why couldn't something like the Manchester Synagogue attack happen at any number of Jewish institutions in the U.S.? Who's going to stand up for us? Who has our back? And so there's that, that's going to be our new day, sadly. And then the other big surprise for me is taking out Iran.

I can't, I couldn't be more emphatic about what, if you would have told me, if you forget about it, my surprise, if you'd have told Sinwar on October 6th, right, that, or give him your scenario on October 8th, hey, you just launched us attack. And in the next two years, let me tell you what's going to look like. Hezbollah, your sister terror organization in Israel's northern border, gone. Their whole rocket arsenal, gone. The Assad regime, in power for over five decades, gone. Iran's nuclear capability, which was emerging to pose an existential threat to Israel, gone.

I mean, if you just go one after the other, he would have never believed it, right? I think Iran was the linchpin. Israel, if you think about Israel's decision to go out. after Hezbollah, which removed the biggest check on Israel going after Iran. That was, Israel was always, Israeli planners were always concerned about going after Iran because of the risk of Iran lighting up Hezbollah on its northern border. With Hezbollah gone, it created a path for Israel to go against Iran. And then Israel going against Iran and doing it, executing it masterfully, then created

space for the U.S. to come in. And, and then this policy issue that many of us have been perplexed by for decades. two decades really. The possibility of Iran going nuclear. There are four major countries that are a major threat to the United States. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Three of the four have nuclear weapons. Iran was the only one that didn't. And you could not imagine, any of us could not, I could not imagine a path in which Iran was going to be stopped, short of military action. You just couldn't. All this diplomacy was not going to work. Iran suddenly being enlightened was not going to happen. Iran was marching towards a nuclear weapons capability. And if I

would have, I couldn't imagine that after this terror attack by Hamas, the net out would be that within two years, Iran would be the first country whose nuclear ambitions would have been reversed of the major powers arrayed against the U.S. and the West and Israel as a result of all of this. by military force by the U.S. and Israel, I'm still kind of shocked by it. It has transformed the region. I want to pivot to a more optimistic tone or talk about what I see as some points of light here, and I think you'll agree. You wrote up a book called Startup Nation about essentially zero to one, if you were loosely to say countries that have really excelled fast in terms of GDP growth, it's usually been a function.

of technology or finance or both. And Israel is out in spades. And also war, nothing creates innovation like the existential threat of your society going out of existence, whether it's World War I and tanks and aircraft or World War II, you know, jet transportation radar, splitting the atom, Cold War gave rise to the Internet, DARPA and GPS. We see in Ukraine, there's real hope that that economy someday might be rebuilt with the prosperity, the drone technology. Ukraine, assuming we have a sovereign Ukraine, will likely be an incredible hub for asymmetric warfare and all sorts of consumer applications around drone technology. You study Israel, you know the economy well there, pivoting to what type of innovation is going to come out of this war.

I think, I hate to call it an innovation, but I never thought of tunnels as being a huge innovation of warfare, and it played a key role here. What innovation do you see or what technologies do you think played a key role here in terms of the IDF in Israel that might give us a glimpse into future technologies? Yeah, I think there are two laboratories, as you're alluding to. There are two laboratories today that are the future, you know, where we can study the future of warfare, and that's Ukraine and Israel. While Ukraine has some of this, Israel has it at a whole other, almost like industrial scale, it has this incredible tech ecosystem that has been called to fight. So I know plenty of Israeli tech entrepreneurs and people who work at biggest

Israeli tech companies or big multinational tech companies with operations in Israel that have been called up to fight. And they come back from fighting in Gaza and they say, I want to, I want to work on the defense of my country right now. And so the number of defense tech, the sector, the defense tech sector. So before October 7th, there are about 160 defense tech startups in Israel. Now that number is close to 400 in a matter of two years. It's a booming, no pun intended sector. And it all deals, as you said, with drone warfare, with counter drone warfare, with AI, you know, is obviously embedded in all of this. And I think we are experiencing and observing a surge in defense spending globally, especially in the U.S. and Europe, and all these

countries that talked about cutting off arms to Israel, arms sales to Israel, doing business with Israel, buying arms from Israel, I think all that's going to fall by the wayside. I think these governments have a lot of money to spend on defense. They're studying what Israel has learned in its two-year war, and they are going to be dazzled, as I know you have, I have, others have, by these Israeli innovators and the combination of this incredible technical expertise combined with having gone through crucial leadership experiences serving in war, leading men into battle,

the crucial leadership experience that these people have, which gives them a huge advantage in building companies. And now this understanding of where warfare is going, there are many areas I can talk about in the Israeli tech sector that are caused for, for optimism or bullishness, I think the defense sector is going to make the cyber sector, which was, Israel was outside of the U.S., Israel was the biggest cyber sector, cyber security startups in the world.

I think it's going, what we're about to see in defense tech is going to eclipse cybersecurity. The future of war fighting with technology is, Israel is going to be the hub. You know the podcast, two Jews in the News, I think it's called? Yeah, yeah. unholy, yeah. Oh, I'm sorry, unholy, yeah, two Jews and the news. They invited me, I'm not sure why, on the podcast before October the 7th, and asked me a bunch of questions about life in America and anti-Semitism.

And I said, well, anti-Semitism is a light sleeper. I don't really feel it in the U.S. I don't feel it in corporate America. If you ask me, if it's there, I would say no, I don't notice it. I listen to that podcast now, and I cringe at just how fucking stupid I was around how naive and ignorant I was. I mean, you know, that adage that two-thirds of an iceberg's masses below the surface, this felt like 99.9% of anti-Semitism in the U.S. was underneath the surface.

At least I didn't see it. I have been absolutely flummox, and this is my pivot to something optimistic. You and I know each other fairly well now. I know what a huge role of faith plays in your life. It plays almost no role in my life, my Judaism. I don't feel any real connection to the religion. Since the seventh, I have become a proud Zionist. It is totally illuminated for selfish reasons.

I tell my sons who I have not brought up in any sort of religious indoctrination that, look, it's a dangerous world. At some point, you want to make sure you can go to a prosperous, safe place for Jews, and that's Israel. So you have a vested interest in the survival of Israel and Zionism, and then people come online in comments as they will, in this podcast, and they accuse me of being a Zionist as if it's a bad thing. I'm like, 100%, spot on, guilty is charged.

And my moment of hope here is that I think there are a lot of people like me who are ignorant to the threats against the Jewish people in Israel and now feel activated. And just like my friend or someone I admire a great deal, Dan Harris, is a 10% Happier podcast. I feel like I'm 110% more. I'll say a Jewish, 150% more Zionist. And I'd like to think that a lot of people feel that way now, that we don't take our background, we don't take the importance of speaking out,

we don't take the demands that we devote resources, attention, and speak out, that it was really activated a lot of people, including myself, who quite frankly were indifferent and on the sidelines. Do you see hope in that? Have you seen evidence of that? Totally. I've seen huge, huge, it's what we call October 8th Jews, you know, Jews who after October 7th weren't engaged in their Judaism, and then October 8th, they were like lit up.

What I don't want it to be is all channeled towards fighting with Israel's and the Jewish people's enemies. Obviously, fighting with Israel's enemies and the Jewish people's enemies is important, but it can't be the way we, the enrichment in my life that I've gotten from leading a Jewish life is not from fighting anti-Semitism. Obviously, it's part... Fighting anti-Semitism is a condition

of the Jewish people going back thousands of years, but every century, really. But it can't be our sole existence, because the truth is, it's unpleasant. Like, you say,

you don't want to... Like, my kids, if I just, if they just, if I just sit around every night telling them about the anti-Semite they've got to fight with, they're going to be like,

geez, dad, this is, I mean, I guess I should do it, but it's pretty, it's pretty unattractive way to live my life. What they have benefited from, what I've benefited from,

is the joy of Jewish holidays, the joys and enrichment and stimulation from Jewish learning and debates and Jewish literacy and understanding Jewish history and the sense of community when they're part of a Jewish community. The rituals, you know, there's so many rituals we live with, you know, my family, every Friday night we do a Shabbat dinner. My children love it. My wife and I love it. We have people from the community come for Shabbat dinners or we go to other people's homes. It's like a resetting every week on the Sabbath of family interconnectedness, not with devices, not with, you know, parties and social events, but with togetherness, human interaction, reflecting on the week, reflecting on time. I think those, I mean, I could go on and on about this.

Those are the things that I hope those who are October 8th Jews don't suddenly become, you know, what date is is October 13th, don't send suddenly that that October 8th Judaism doesn't end on October 13th, 2025. I hope that it's a launching pad for living Jewishly in ways that aren't just about fighting with our enemies, because fighting with your enemies is no way to live a life. Dan Sienor is a leading expert on Israel in the Middle East. He's the co-author of the genius of Israel and Startup Nation. He's also the host of the Call Me Back podcast. Dan, a lot of young men listen to this podcast. I think you're a fantastic role model for young men because you have taken and tackled and really jumped into the deep end of the most polarizing, emotional,

and partisan issue, and you handle it with grace. I listen to all your podcasts. You don't interrupt people. You don't insult them. And you're a fantastic role model, not only for young men, but for the media in general, to just demonstrate the kind of grace and rigor that you demonstrate. You've really been a point of calm and a lighthouse in this storm. very much appreciate you and your good work here.

Thanks very much, Dan. Let's just say I learned from the best. Thank you.