The Rest Is Classified - 1. The First CIA Coup: Oil, Iran, and MI6 (Ep 1)
Episode Date: November 27, 2024Welcome... to the first episode of The Rest Is Classified! It's Iran 1951. Mohammad Mossadegh, fuelled by an ever-growing nationalism, has just been elected Prime Minister. Immediately he chooses to ...nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, much to the anger of the British who control the majority stake. In response, MI6 are determined to destabilise his government and remove him from power. So they begin to conspire with the CIA. Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of Teddy Roosevelt and agency man, will go from Washington to Tehran and, building on existing instability, foment chaos on the streets. But it won't be plain sailing... Listen as David McCloskey and Gordon Corera tell the story of the 1953 Iranian coup orchestrated by the CIA and MI6. Get our exclusive NordVPN deal here ➼ www.nordvpn.com/restisclassified It’s risk-free with Nord’s 30-day money-back guarantee! Email: classified@goalhanger.com Twitter: @triclassified Editor: Kieron Leslie Producer: Callum Hill Senior Producer: Dom Johnson Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
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A frock-coated attendant appeared with tiny glasses of vodka and caviar canapes.
Then the Shah motioned me to seat myself.
He said to me, I owe my throne to God, my people, my army, and to you.
By you, he meant me and the two countries, Great Britain and the United States, that
I was representing.
We were all heroes. Now I must say, sadly, that is no longer true. What was a heroic story has
gone on to become a tragic story. Those are the wise words of the wonderfully named Kermit
Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt, who is a CIA officer and the on-the-ground operational
chief of a 1953 coup in Iran,
recalling those crazy events for his memoir.
That's right. Welcome to The Rest is Classified. Today, we're telling the story of the 1953 coup
in Iran, regime change in the Middle East engineered by the CIA and MI6. And David,
I guess, like our podcast, that was an Anglo-American joint venture.
That's right. And I think before we go any further, we should introduce the podcast.
This is The Rest is Classified. It's a new show from Goalhanger that will bring you stories from
the secret world of spies and espionage. I'm David McCloskey. I'm a former CIA analyst.
I worked for about 10 years at the CIA headquarters in Langley and in the Middle East.
I worked in field stations around the world. I wrote for the president's daily brief,
and I transitioned from writing spy stories inside the espionage business to writing stories about
the espionage business. I now write a series of spy novels that try to deal really authentically
with the world we're talking about, Gordon.
Yeah, and I'm Gordon Carrera. I've spent about 25 years covering the world of spies and secrets as a journalist from the outside, I guess, from events like September the 11th, 2001, the 9-11 attacks, through the war in Iraq, through poisonings of Russian spies like Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei Skripal. As a journalist
watching it, understanding it, talking to spy chiefs, to agents on the ground, and traveling
around the world to cover it. I've also written books about the history of espionage, including
on MI6, on Russian deep cover spies, and even about pigeons who acted as spies.
And I think on this podcast, Gordon, we're really going to look at espionage stories
from all over the world, past and present.
We'll look at things like the role of the CIA in Watergate up to the hunt for Osama
bin Laden.
We'll look at classic stories about cold warriors and double agents.
And we'll also look at how the North Korean security services rob banks.
So this is going to be the broadest possible view of the greatest stories in the world of espionage.
And so it's a chance really to explore those and give those who are listening a chance to
understand what really goes on on the inside, not just the kind of the myths about spies or
the fictional representation, but a view of what's really involved in the secret world and in spying
and what lies behind some of these stories,
which is often more extraordinary and crazier, I think, than the fiction, isn't it?
Any operation has an above the line and a below the line.
And we are definitely going to get you below the line
into the very classified pieces of what actually happened.
So that's enough backstory. Let's get on with today's show.
The CIA MI6-backed Iranian coup of 1953 and why this is a story worth telling.
Well, it is. And it's got skullduggery and Cold War, you know, sort of dirty tricks, which I'm always a fan of.
But it's also got, I think, a real resonance today, which is really interesting.
And I think that's the reason why it's such an important story. It's not that well known,
I think, in the US and UK, but it's hugely important. Iran, it shapes Iran, it shapes
the Middle East. It also shapes the way Iran thinks about Britain and America. I mean,
when you hear them shout death to America and talk about the great Satan and the little Satan,
it's Britain and America,
and they're really talking about what happened in this coup as being a kind of prime reason for that
kind of enmity to our countries. At the CIA, we used to say that Iranians believe in conspiracy
almost as much as they do in God and poetry. And so I think it has this wonderful resonance today.
I mean, interestingly enough, this operation is not really discussed all that
much at the CIA today. And yet in Iran, I mean, you can find articles that are written every year,
there's sort of retrospectives on it. I had dinner in Texas with a few Persians a few months ago.
There are Persians in Texas, many actually. And out of nowhere, they brought up this coup.
So it holds, I think, a real weight in the Iranian consciousness today. of the story is really that the Iranians think the Brits are behind everything bad that happens and that we actually manipulate the Americans, not just in this coup, but ever since. And so
they have this kind of outsized view of what Britain is capable of. And I remember asking
the ambassador about this and he said, well, it's nice to be in a country where they think we matter.
And I think that was his response to this. So let's get into the story. So the story is about oil. And you hear this from conspiracy theorists and people who are, you know, everything that happens in the Middle East, everything Britain and America do is about oil.
But it's actually true. always had a strategic role where it is in the Middle East, being part of that great game for
influence between Russia and Britain in the 19th century. But in the 20th century,
oil becomes much more important, and Iran has got tons of it. And Abadan, this key site in Iran,
becomes the largest oil refinery in the world. And it is run by the Anglo-Iranian or Anglo-Persian oil company,
which is now BP.
BP.
That's right.
Yeah.
That's right.
And it's a huge facility, and a really important facility, both to the company and to the country,
to the UK.
And it's producing essentially the entirety of the Royal Navy's oil needs.
Yeah.
And providing it at a discount.
Is that right?
Yeah.
I think Churchill had this great line when he was talking about Iran. he'd called it, and specifically it's oil, a prize from fairy
land beyond our wildest dreams. So it's immense strategic importance.
Yeah. And it's supposedly shared with the Iranians, but the Iranians-
But not really.
But not really. The Iranians don't get to see the books about where the money's going.
A lot of it goes to the treasury. A lot of it goes to the company.
It's also a kind of colonial enterprise. I mean, I saw some videos from, I think, the period of the 40s and 50s,
and the expat Brits are in swimming pools and living this lovely life. And they're trying to
encourage people to go out there. And meanwhile, the Iranian workers are kind of living in mud
huts and working in pretty terrible conditions. So it is not a happy place for Iran to see its wealth basically going
over to Britain. So by the time you get to the early 50s, the pressure within Iran to do something
about this is growing. It comes to a head because the oil company is not really willing to change
its terms. It's not really willing to compromise about what it gives. I mean, the foreign office
aren't very happy with the oil company. They call the boss of it a complete totalitarian because
he's so unwilling to compromise. And so as the pressure builds, you get a key moment, 1951,
with a new leader in Iran who's pushing for nationalization of oil.
And he's, I guess, talk about him here, Mohammad Mossadegh, but I mean, he's sort of
drafting off of this energy coming off of the mean, he's sort of drafting off of this energy
coming off of the Second World War for sort of throwing off the colonial shackles, right? I mean,
there's nationalism throughout the entire region is really on the rise. So this guy, Mossadegh,
I mean, where does he kind of come from? What's his position in Iran?
By this point, he's already getting on a bit. He was born in 1882, so he's quite an elderly aristocratic figure, well-educated, educated in Europe, tall, slumped shoulders, hangdog face.
But he was a politician who could also be a kind of passionate speaker, a passionate nationalist, pushing for Iran to take control of the oil.
The Brits hate him.
They see him as a kind of cunning, slippery figure. And he hates the British too, doesn't he? He really hates the oil. The Brits hate him. They see him as a kind of cunning, slippery figure.
And he hates the British too, doesn't he?
He really hates the British as well.
Really hates the British.
Yeah. And so it's mutual. The Brits say he's always ill and when people go to meet him,
he's in bed in his pyjamas. So he's a pyjama-clad weeper, as someone puts it.
So they portray him as this kind of populist revolutionary. I mean,
on the other hand, he's also romanticized by his supporters as this kind of great
liberal democratic figure. The CIA documents actually, from back then, refer to him as
an impractical visionary and poor administrator. Among all the redactions, they left that one
unredacted. So there's a solidly negative view of the man coming out of Washington and London. But he becomes prime minister in 1951.
Oil is going to be nationalized. So they're taking over the company.
He's man of the year. He's Time magazine man of the year.
He quite likes the Americans. The Americans kind of quite like him. They describe him as a kind of
George Washington figure. So he's partly seen in America as this kind of nationalist figure who's
throwing off the colonial shackles. But in Britain, it's fair to say they've got a problem with him.
I think we should pause here for a second to just think about what Iran looked like back then.
Because I think it's fair to say it doesn't really resemble at all the Iran of today, does it?
No, that's right. Because we think of Iran today as this kind of theocratic state run by the mullahs. And at that point, it's a much more complex, fluid country. You've got the
Shah, effectively the monarch, as ruling the country. But beneath him, you've got a
semi-functioning democracy, effectively, with a parliament. You've got bazaaris, you've got
merchants, you've got liberal Democrats,
you've got nationalists, you do have religious groups as well. You've got quite extremes of
poverty, but it's- Some communists.
Some communists as well, and workers, including the oil refinery. So it is a more fluid country
than I think we see today. And that explains, I think, some of the instability, which is at the
heart of this story. That's right. I think it's fair to say this story is happening at a point where all of those different groups
and factions are sort of trying to work out what Iran is actually going to look like in
the future.
So basically, they nationalize Anglo-Iranian oil company, right?
They nationalize it.
It's very popular in Iran.
Yep.
And we also have, and this will be an important part of the story, the Shah.
Yeah.
But the Shah really doesn't have a choice, does he? He goes along with this move, I guess it's extremely popular and it's going to add more money to Iranian state coffers. So he
goes along with it.
So the Shah and Mossadegh are kind of tussling for power at this point. And Mossadegh's nationalization
of oil is so popular, the Shah really can't do much about it.
This really isn't the Iran of the 70s that is a fully authoritarian police state, is
it?
I mean, there's a lot more competition for the way this government's going to be set
up.
Yeah.
It has got a kind of democratic parliament.
So Britain has now got this problem.
It is obviously not willing to let all this oil go into Iran's coffers and all the money
coming from it.
The British treasury is kind of broke
after the second world war. The money problems like today, it doesn't, the treasury needs every
penny it can get and it's not willing to let it stand. And then in 1951, Churchill is back
as prime minister, a man it's fair to say with a strong vision of empire and who is not the type to
want to see Iran disappear from Britain's
influence.
So, they've got this question about what they're going to do about it.
They look at diplomacy, they look at a legal case, doesn't seem to be working or getting
them anywhere.
An invasion is considered.
An invasion is considered.
So, either occupying Abadan, the oil fields, or even the full-
The full whack.
Land war in the Middle East.
Land war in the Middle East.
Yes. The siren song.
It's calling them.
But they managed to resist that.
And instead, the option is covert action and pressure.
It's too-
I find this appealing.
I find this option appealing.
This is where what becomes known as Operation Boot comes in.
I mean, the name tells you what they're trying to do.
They're trying to boot Mossadegh out.
So that's the idea of it. And on the nose.
On the nose. And so it's a campaign of kind of overt pressure, sanctions, boycotts of Iranian
oil, but also working behind the scenes to undermine him and get him dismissed from office.
And although it's MI6 that ends up sort of running with this, the idea doesn't originate in
the spy service. No, it seems to be the Foreign Office, which is interesting. It's sometimes the case that
MI6 is seen as the one always plotting this stuff. And actually, it's often the political
masters or the Foreign Office who are giving them the instructions.
Also the case in the States too, I would say.
Yeah. And there's a kind of colorful cast of characters. Weirdly, a lot of the people
seem to be academics, which is kind of interesting. I don't know what it tells you, but Robin Zahner is one of the first ones who was an experienced figure from MI6 who'd worked a lot in Tehran during the war.
Kind of crazy figure who is, an American said, a man with an extraordinary capacity to combine high thought with low living, which is quite a description. It does remind me of the CIA profile for hiring
at the time, which was essentially they were looking for PhDs who could win bar fights.
That's more or less what they were looking for in the early years of the Cold War.
So Zainab is a guy who at once is experimenting with opium and then leaves Iran in 1952 to go
back to be professor of Eastern religions at Oxford that year.
There you go. there you go.
Replacing him is another guy called Monty Woodhouse,
another great British name, flaming red beard,
Winchester and Oxford classicist,
who rather than becoming an academic,
goes into special operations executive during the war in Greece.
And he's really the one who comes up with Operation Boot to get Mossadegh out.
Now, the problem is the Iranians are kind of onto the Brits and what they're up to in the pressure campaigns. So in October 52,
they shut the British embassy and they basically kicked the British out. So at that point,
the kind of plans for the Brits to do regime change are effectively over. They have no one
on the ground to do it. So what do they do? What do they do? And Gordon, we've made it a decent way into this podcast,
much to my dismay, without mentioning the American security services. But we're going to
get there now, right? Because essentially, the British plan, they're going to go to Washington
and try to convince the Americans to get involved. Yeah, because they need the Americans at this
point. The UK has got agents on the ground, it's got a network, but it can't run them anymore.
It's also fair to say they need the CIA's people on the ground and they need the CIA's
money, frankly, because they think it's going to take some money to do this. And I think as well,
it's kind of an interesting moment to think about the relationship between the two
spy services at this point, because MI6 is the established one and CIA are the newcomers.
I actually think the arrangement here of British, essentially
MI6 networks in Iran, know how on how to operate in the country, plus sort of the CIA's kind of
political heft and the money is a great, you know, microcosm of the relationship at the time,
because the agency, I mean, at this point is, you know, the directorate of operations,
which was then called the directorate of plans is one year old at this point is, you know, the Directorate of Operations, which was then called the Directorate
of Plans, is one year old at this point in time.
The CIA was founded in 1947.
I mean, this is a young organization.
The Americans don't have a lot of experience, frankly, with on the ground spying in the
Middle East.
And they've learned all of the tradecraft from the Brits, right?
And there's an incredible fusion of the two services during the Second World War. So I think this partnership,
it fits together very naturally, doesn't it, to undertake regime change in the Middle East.
Although I think at this point, there's also a little bit of tension, because I think the Brits
know the Americans are the kind of rising power. And I mean, there's a great big-
A little galling, isn't it, to have to go to Washington? To go to Washington for help. I mean, there's a great bit. A little galling, isn't it? To have to go to Washington.
Go to Washington for help.
I mean, there's a famous scene.
So 53, which is when the coup happens, is also when Ian Fleming writes Casino Royale
when the book comes out, the first James Bond book.
And there's a scene in that where Bond is trying to bankrupt his adversary at the Baccarat
table and he's run out of money.
And so Felix Leiter, or the American spy, basically slides over an envelope with all
the money that he needs to do it.
And I think that's emblematic of how Britain felt at the time.
It's like, well, we know how to do it, but we kind of need the Americans.
They're the cash machine for us to do it.
And there is a bit of a feeling here where the Brits are like, we want to get rid of
Mottenegg and we're going to need to get the Americans to help us to do it.
And they have to sell that in a particular way, don't they?
Which is where Monty comes in.
Monty goes to Washington.
And they realize that saying, we just want our oil money is not going to necessarily
work with the Americans.
It's not the best sell.
It's not the best sell.
And the best sell is communism.
Communism.
Communism and the Cold War. Because right now we best sell. And the best sell is communism. Communism. Yes.
Communism and the Cold War.
Because right now we've got Alan Dulles running the Central Intelligence Agency,
don't we?
He's a Cold Warrior.
You know, what's funny is this story when we get to these CIA guys, none of these guys
would be allowed in the door today.
They were drunk all the time.
Alan Dulles, I believe he was having an affair with the Queen of Greece around this time
and had maybe
a hundred mistresses throughout his...
No.
Yes, yes.
And running the CIA.
These guys are not passing polygraphs today.
Okay.
But they're running the entire organization in the 50s.
And there's also, I guess, another wonderful character here, which is Kermit Roosevelt.
Yeah.
Let's deal with the name Kermit.
Now, he goes by Kim sometimes, but I think for our purposes, we should call him Kermit.
Yeah. Because, I mean, this is before the Muppets, we should say. So it's not a name.
It's not a name associated with Kermit the Frog. It's a real name, I guess. It's one of those
American names. And as you said earlier, he's Teddy Roosevelt, the former president's grandson.
So a kind of aristocratic figure, kind of in American terms, at least, from a big political
dynasty. Yeah. Well, he is kind of the Eastern establishment, I think, in many ways. Although,
anyone listening to this who is picturing Teddy Roosevelt with the large, very virile mustache
and sort of adventuring, this guy looks like an insurance salesman, I think. Now, as we'll see,
he's quite bold. He's quite adventurous. He's sort of an imperial adventurer in many ways, I think.
But he looks, you know, he's got kind of a puffy face and thinning hair.
He is an entirely unassuming looking character.
Another ex-academic.
I think you've been on that.
And another ex-academic.
He's a Harvard academic.
Yeah.
That's right.
And there's a great quote from a Brit who knew him here.
He was a courteous, soft-spoken Easterner with impeccable social connections, well-educated
rather than intellectual, pleasant and unassuming as host and guest, and especially nice wife. In fact, the last person you'd expect
to be up to the neck in dirty tricks. And that's a quote from Kim Philby.
That's who you want a recommendation from is Kim Philby.
So Kermit comes up with a plan.
Kermit comes up with a plan.
With Monty.
Yeah, Kermit and Monty have now got the plan, which the Americans call Ajax. Ajax, which is a slightly better name. Better than boot. They actually call it,
in other documents, it is TP Ajax. TP is the digraph, which means Iran. That's the code for
an Iran operation back then. It's changed since, of course, but TP Ajax is how it's christened in
all the cables. That's right.
So the Brits have got the Americans on board by talking communism.
Kermit's been appointed the field commander.
And by the time we get to July 1953, Kermit is on his way into Iran to organize the coup.
That's right.
And we probably should say, because we mentioned communism.
Yeah.
Do they have a point? Does Monty have a point when he comes to Washington and argues that this is all sort of an attempt to prevent Tehran from falling into the Soviet axis? Well, there is Tudor, which is a kind of communist party, which is out on the
streets and has some support in Iran, but Mossadegh is no communist. He's a kind of nationalist rather
than a communist. So I think the idea that they're worried about Soviet influence and the Soviets
getting the oil. Yeah, I mean, there's a bit of worry, but I think it is a bit of a play
by the Brits as well. And I think the Americans probably also know that, don't they?
Maybe. I guess we also have Eisenhower in office at this point, more of a cold warrior,
more interventionist than Truman. And we have CIA guys who are, I think, excited, frankly,
to get in the field and make something happen. So maybe on July 19th,
1953, with Kermit on the way to Tehran, we'll take a break and come back and see what he gets up to.
Sounds good.
Well, we're back with Kermit Roosevelt. We're in Tehran in July of 1953. Kermit is there.
He is planning a coup. He's got bags of cash and he's ensconced in a villa calling himself
James Lockridge. That's right. And he's supposed to be undercover as James Lockridge,
but he plays tennis with other expats and diplomats. And every time he misses a shot, he curses himself and says,
oh, Roosevelt, which is his real name.
So it's not...
And then when people ask why,
he goes, well, I'm such a passionate Republican
that I hate Franklin Roosevelt, a Democrat.
And so I use the name as a curse word.
I mean, that's not good cover, is it, David?
It's pretty rough.
It's pretty rough.
Although I will say that being wasted
on Lime Rickies and playing tennis, that's just a normal CIA operation.
Is that what you did in the Middle East?
Yeah, exactly.
Can you confirm that?
It seems very normal. So Kermit's there. Now he's brought money. Is that right? To
kind of throw around. But it's maybe less than we would think to accomplish the overthrow
of a government. Is that right?
Yeah. I mean, some of the estimates said that he can do it for $100,000, something like that. I
mean, it seems crazy, doesn't it? To think that's all it costs for the coup. I mean,
the estimates vary, but that's basically bribe money that he's got.
I thought this was also very interesting. I was not aware of this before we started to dig in,
that he actually takes over MI6's networks in Iran, doesn't he? Which is, you know, I actually can't think of a modern parallel
where you don't have a joint, I mean, it's a joint effort,
but he doesn't have Brits on the ground with him.
He's there, he's taken over the British network.
Yeah, exactly.
And it's the key part of this network are a group of brothers,
the so-called Rashidian brothers.
And this is a family, a very wealthy family.
Their father made a fortune. They're very influential with the kind of bazaaris and the merchants, the elites. And these are the kind of Brits guys on the ground.
And they've been paying them £10,000 a month at one point, which is, I mean, in those days,
a lot of money for them. And the idea is that they then have this wider network across the country,
which they can activate. But of course, because the Brits have have this wider network across the country, which they can activate.
But of course, because the Brits have been booted out of the country, they can't run it anymore.
So even though these, I don't think they're that keen on the Americans, but the Brits
basically hand them over to the Americans and say, you know, now you guys are going
to work together.
I think in today's parlance, we call these guys support assets, right?
So these are not, they don't have insight into what Bosadek is doing necessarily.
They don't operate inside the military. They don't know what into what Mossadegh is doing necessarily.
They don't operate inside the military.
They don't know what the Shah is up to, but they can essentially get things done in Tehran.
They can get mobs out on the street.
That's kind of the plan, isn't it?
It's to turn the temperature up on Mossadegh.
Yeah.
That's the heart of Ajax, is a propaganda and a kind of psychological campaign against
Mossadegh and the country
and the population as a whole to increase the pressure. Turn up the temperature on the streets,
as you said, with violence. Use propaganda to suggest Mossadegh is a communist or is pro-communist,
effectively to kind of polarise the country and to make people think, well, either on one side,
it's Mossadegh and the communists, and on the other side is the Shah, and to use that to force people, if you like, to turn against Mossadegh and towards the
Shah, and then use that pressure to get the Shah to dismiss Mossadegh, and then install the kind of
classic strongman, a General Zahidi, his place, and then basically bribed the military
and parliament to support that process and not get in the way.
But this might just be because I'm a former CIA man, but it's fair to say that Tehran
at this point in time is not a stable place.
I mean, the Shah, there was an attempted assassination on the Shah a couple of years ago.
There's been assassinations of Iranian politicians in the run-up to this,
not by CIA and MI6. There's been a tremendous amount of street action. This isn't a stable
democratic system. No, politics is very unstable. The CIA and MI6 are sort of overthrowing,
which I think is a bit of the cartoon that we get now of this story. But this is a very volatile environment that the CIA and
MI6 are in the middle of. And I think it's fair to say that they're maybe adding fuel to a fire
that's already burning, but they're not starting it and they're guiding it.
Yeah, and they're guiding it. I think that's right. And so they have this plan,
which is effectively to get rid of Mossadegh. But the key figure in this is the Shah, Mohammad Reza.
The idea is he is going to sign decrees dismissing Mossadegh and installing Zahidi, the strongman.
Which is legal.
Which is technically legal.
You're right.
Yeah, it's technically legal.
He is allowed to do it.
He's the Shah.
It's a kind of constitutional monarchy in which he does have that power.
I mean, it's worth getting, I think, a little bit into the character of the Shah. I mean, he's in his thirties, he was in the shadow of his father,
been a bit of a playboy and a kind of mix of insecurity and a sense of his own importance
and destiny. And I think that combination is part of the problem. So he's kind of reluctant
to get involved because Mossadegh is popular and he knows
that. And so the challenge they've got is how to persuade him to act. And so they bring in a
procession of people to see him, to persuade him, to try and influence him. And so, first of all,
there's his twin sister, who's slightly domineering, I think, and who's living on the
French Riviera in exile. As one does.
As one does. And an MI6 officer goes out with a mink coat and a bag of cash.
And the CIA officer goes out and I think flirts with her to try and persuade her.
And she goes back, but she can't persuade her brother to sign the decrees.
One of the Rashidian brothers goes to see the Shah.
That doesn't work.
They send a guy called General Norman Schwarzkopf.
And now some people might recognize that name because his son, also called General Norman Schwarzkopf, leads the Gulf War in 1991.
But he goes to see the Shah and it still doesn't work. So at this point,
there's no choice for Kermit but to break cover effectively and go see the Shah himself.
And interestingly, the CIA assessments at that time will describe the Shah,
and this is almost 30 years before the revolution that will bring him down, as lacking moral courage.
There's a sense of he's not able to clearly act, is he, in this case?
Yeah.
And I think going to see him is a big deal for Kermit, isn't it?
Because for a CIA officer to go and visit the Shah, to some extent, if you get spotted, that's showing your hand, isn't it? Because for a CIA officer to go and visit the Shah, to some extent, if you get spotted,
that's showing your hand, isn't it? Well, he's been living as James Lockridge,
playing tennis in a villa in North Tehran. It's extremely risky, but I guess he felt
that they needed to show in an unambiguous way that Washington and London were behind him. And Kermit is probably the right
messenger in that sense, bring someone into Tehran to talk to the Shah.
But it is risky because if he's spotted, then it kind of shows that the American hand is there
conspiring. But it's midnight on Saturday, August the 1st, and a car picks up Kermit,
takes him from his home. He goes on the backseat. He lies down on the back of the car and they pull a blanket, blanket pulled over him, you know, trying to be covert.
A sentry waves him through.
The car stops just in front of the palace.
And a man walks up to the car, opens the door and slides in beside him and says, good evening, Mr. Roosevelt.
I cannot say that I expected to see you, but this is a pleasure. And it's his imperial majesty, the Shah. I mean,
so there they are for the first time meeting. What do you think they're talking about? How's
he persuading the Shah to sign those decrees? Well, we have Kermit's memoir, right? It was
a very self-serving kind of piece of propaganda, but we don't actually know because the CIA has declassified pieces of
this story about a decade ago. But you look at those documents and much of it is still
not declassified. It's still redacted, blacked out, or just white pages that have come out of
the archives. So we have to speculate a little bit. And I think, though, what is true and what is a fact is that in the decade after this coup attempt,
the Americans will pump almost a billion dollars into the Shah's regime. So he becomes the sort of
client that we think of on the cusp of the 1979 revolution. I think it's fair to say that Kermit probably hints at some of
this and that he'll become sort of America's guy in the Middle East if we can get rid of Mosaddegh
and sort of resolve this political crisis. So I think hints of that, certainly some cash to sort
of buck him up in the near term. And the other piece of this, which I think is quite interesting,
is that Mosaddegh has been really attempting to purge the military of the Shah's supporters. I think getting rid of somebody
who's infecting this key institution is probably also really critical to the Shah.
Yes. If you're the Shah, you're thinking, I can get the Americans on board supporting me,
and I also don't want them not supporting me. So there's a kind of implicit threat there as well, which is, you know, I want their backing.
These are the rising powers, you know, in the Middle East as the US now.
So I guess that conversation is the key to it.
Kermit has to establish his bona fides, right?
That he's not freelancing.
Yeah.
And this is fascinating, I think, because one of the things they do is he wants to show
that he's operating on behalf of the US and the UK officially,
of Eisenhower and Churchill. And so he tells the Shah that the fact that this is official will be
confirmed by a code word that the Shah will be able to hear on the BBC. And that Churchill,
this is according to Roosevelt's account, had arranged for the BBC to end its broadcast on one of the subsequent nights, not by saying the usual phrase, it is midnight, but instead, it is now exactly midnight with the pause.
I thought the BBC was an independent institution, free media.
I thought it was above dirty tricks, Gordon.
Now, let's deal with that. I knew that would come up. Hang on. There is a history of this.
Okay. Because if you go back to World War II, right? Massage personnel. Do you know these ones,
which were sent out to people like the French resistance on the ground? And so you'd have at
the end of a broadcast in French french language which the bbc was
broadcasting into europe they say it's now time for personal messages and they would say something
like jean the bird is in the cage and it the key is ready for it to be open and that would be a
coded message to someone in the french resistance to say you know the drop is coming you know by
aircraft tomorrow night and they would understand the code. So there is this history of the BBC using coded messages. But I have to say, it is quite surprising it's used here in
the Cold War period in the Middle East. And I mean, there is, I should say, a kind of bit of
tension between Iran and the BBC. It's still ongoing. And I think part of the problem is
it's seen as this kind of state broadcaster, which it's not.
But in this period, it was being used, it looks like, to send coded messages
to the Shah, effectively, a direct message to the Shah.
And so the Shah sort of says, who presumably could be aware of this,
the use of the BBC during the Second World War. The Shah basically says, okay, let's hear it. He
decides quite reasonably to leave Tehran and go up to his
hunting lodge and Kermit gets wasted. Is that right? So basically Kermit eventually persuades,
it takes a few nights actually for Kermit to kind of work on the Shah and to get him there.
But eventually he gets him there and persuades him, you're going to sign the decrees and we're
going to dismiss Mossadegh, put in Zahidi. The plan looks like it's going to be quite
straightforward. It's legal.
It's legal. It's interesting because the Shah says, I'll do it. But when it happens,
I want to be out of town. Which tells you something about-
Lacking moral courage.
Lacking moral courage. He says, I'm going to be up at my hunting lodge at the Caspian when this
happens because I don't want to be in the city when it goes down.
There's a certain logic to that, I suppose.
Yeah, there's a logic to that,
but it's not exactly owning your decision, is it?
No.
I mean, so finally it looks like it's on.
Kermit and his team start drinking.
I mean, pretty heavily, it seems like,
which seems to be a theme of their time in Tehran.
Well, we do need to talk about this at some point.
I mean, there's several drinking binges in this story,
but the extent of the drinking I was not aware of. It is part of
the operation. How much do you think they were actually having?
Well, I mean, he says he stayed up on a drinking binge until 5am. I mean,
this is Kermit himself in his kind of slightly crazy memoir, admitting it. So he's not embarrassed
about it, but they were just knocking back vodka and lime. I suppose if I was in the middle of coup planning, I might have 20 drinks at night
too. Keep your mind fertile as you navigate Tehrani conspiracies.
Yeah. But at this point, they think it's on. The idea is the decrees are going
to get signed. The problem is the courier with the decrees that have got to get signed
turns up late at the palace and the Shah has already already gone up to his hunting lodge so they get uh colonel nasiri who is the head of
the imperial bodyguard which is a great title and future head of the shah's secret police and they
get him to fly up to the caspian it's now the afternoon of august the 13th gets the decrees
signed turns up but there's storms, so he can't
fly back.
He's got to drive back.
Kermit is waiting by the pool.
He's drinking.
Day is turning to night.
He's got his lime Ricky.
Yeah, he's got his lime.
What is a lime Ricky?
Is that your favorite drink, David?
It's lime and gin, basically.
Cocktail tips as well from the podcast.
That's right.
They're playing cards, and then midnight comes, and there's a kind of violent pounding on the compound gates they got
the decrees so they've got the two decrees dismissing mosaddegh and installing zahidi
the problem is it's the weekend the weekend has just started and in iran it would start kind of
late thursday and it go on through friday And really you can't do anything until the sun
goes down on Saturday, August the 15th. So they've now got this problem that they've got the decrees,
but they've got to wait. And so they sit there and they wait, hoping it's all going to go to plan.
The idea is these are going to get delivered to Mossadegh dismissing him, to Zahidi installing
him. So on the 15th as the sun sets, Roosevelt is in a safe
house, again, drinking vodka, singing Broadway tunes. Now they sing Luck Be A Lady Tonight from
Guys and Dogs. I was cheered to see that the sort of tradition of having a theme song
has a long and storied history. Tell me, does that still happen?
Well, it still does. So it was very common in stations, first of all, to have
CD players constantly playing a soundtrack. It was thought it was sort of the last line of defense
against listening devices. And so there was just music running all the time, which could be a bit
of what's going on here. These guys have a record going, they're blasting a song, sloshing drinks, hoping
that no one's listening to them.
But there also were at bases in the Middle East, it was very common to blast the theme
song from Team America, World Police-
Oh my word.
On a loop, just to keep the-
Ironically, yeah.
To keep everyone fervently patriotic as we banged away on cable traffic.
Wow.
So this is a predecessor to a storied history.
So they're there singing, they're drinking, waiting for the phone call that it's all happened.
The hours tick by.
There's no word.
No one's come to see them.
It's the morning now of August 16th.
Clearly, it feels like perhaps something has gone wrong and they don't know yet what has gone wrong. But you can imagine the tension rising in that villa as it's happening.
Finally, dawn comes. They've been up all night.
Hungover.
Hungover. Kermit switches on the radio. And at 7am, what they hear is Mossadegh, the man who's supposed to have been overthrown.
And like any good coup, you take over the radio station, right?
So if you don't have the radio station, you've lost.
And he's there, and he's on the radio, and he's saying, I have been victorious over a coup attempt led by the Shah and foreign elements.
And at that moment, also, the Shah is panicking. I mean,
he's basically going, it's over for me. I'm going to have to flee the country. So he's running,
or in his case, flying, because he's a pilot. And so he pilots his own plane from the Caspian
to Baghdad out of the country. Stop skinning the bighorn sheep that he'd shot up there and
quickly gets into his Cessna to fly to Baghdad.
So if you imagine for Roosevelt at this moment, I mean, it's a disaster, isn't it?
Well, he's in the middle of Tehran with basically no real backup, right? And he's,
Mossadegh probably has some sense that he's involved at this point, or at least that the
Brits are involved. And this is really, I mean, if Mossadegh is convinced that MI6 and the CIA have been trying to overthrow him, not only is
he sort of personally in danger of being ripped apart by a bob or thrown in jail, but it seems
possible that the very thing that the Brits and Americans are trying to prevent, which is sort of
a more Soviet communist leaning government in Iran,
they could actually bring that about by having tried to overthrow Mossadegh.
So, I mean, put yourself in Kermit's mind at this point. You're hung over,
you're in a villa, the radio's come on, Mossadegh is there. What are you thinking?
You might be thinking about packing a bag, but even though he looks like an insurance salesman,
he's actually quite a bold character, isn't he? Even at this point,
the CIA is telling him maybe you should think about getting out. But Kermit is not that kind
of guy. I think that's a good place to leave it for today. And we'll pick up and see if Kermit
can rescue the day for the coup next time. Thanks for listening to The Rest is Classified.
We'll see you next time. Thanks.