The Rest Is Classified - 139. Trump vs Iran: Saddam Hussein and the Nuclear Bomb (Ep 2)

Episode Date: March 18, 2026

After 9/11 it looked as though a new path of diplomacy could be forged between Iran and the US, and then George Bush referred to the nation as part of the Axis of Evil. The years that followed were characterised by Iran-backed terror attacks, regional instability and an uncertain future. But how did we get here? Listen as David and Gordon are once again joined by historian and author Arash Azizi to discuss the role of Saddam Hussein and Iran’s nuclear programme in the long conflict between Iran and the US. ------------------- Sign-up for our free newsletter where producer Becki takes you behind the scenes of the show: https://mailchi.mp/goalhanger.com/tric-free-newsletter-sign-up ------------------- Join the Declassified Club to go deeper into the world of espionage with exclusive Q&As, interviews with top intelligence insiders, regular livestreams, ad-free listening, early access to episodes and live show tickets, and weekly deep dives into original spy stories. Members also get curated reading lists, special book discounts, prize draws, and access to our private chat community. Just go to ⁠⁠therestisclassified.com⁠ or join on Apple Podcasts. ------------------- Get a 10% discount on business PCs, printers and accessories using the code TRIC10. Visit https://HP.com/CLASSIFIED for more information. T&C's apply. ------------------- EXCLUSIVE NordVPN Deal ➼ ⁠⁠https://nordvpn.com/restisclassified⁠⁠ Try it risk-free now with a 30-day money-back guarantee ------------------- Email: [e-mail] Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@restisclassified Video Editor: Joe Pettit Social Producer: Emma Jackson Assistant Producer: Alfie Rowe Producer: Becki Hills Head of History: Dom Johnson Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

For exclusive interviews, bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to series, first look at live show tickets, a weekly newsletter, and discounted books. Join the declassified club at the rest is classified.com. So how did we get to Operation Epic Fury? And what does the U.S. and Israel stand to gain from a weakened Iran? And what does the future hold for the Iranian people? Well, welcome to The Rest is Classified. I'm Gordon Carrera.

And I'm David McCloskey. And this is the second of two episodes where we're looking at the roots of Epic Fury, at the hostility between the US and Iran, particularly. And last time we looked at, from the 50s onwards up to the 1979 revolution and the replacement of this US client state to some extent under the Shah, with a revolutionary Islamist regime, which is going to take a very different position when it comes to the US. And we're joined once again by Arash Azizi, our traveling companion through this secret

history of the conflict between US and Iran. Welcome, Arash. It's great to be with you. So I guess, David, we should try and pick up on this idea of what happens after 79. And the extent to which this is the justification, isn't it, for Epic Fury, in the language of Donald Trump, that it's what the Islamic regime has done. to the Americans in his view and what it's done in the region which justifies this action. And that's what we're going to look at this time. That's right. And I think, you know, one of the themes,

Gordon, that Trump and his advisors have returned to frequently, both, I think, in the justification for and now the conduct of Operation Epic Ferry is that the Islamic Republic is a menace to its neighbors and kind of the broader region. They're the number one state supporter of terrorism, regime that has American blood on its hands from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia to Iraq, because its partners and proxies have killed thousands of Americans. There's, of course, you know, the famous George W. Bush reference to Iran as a member of the axis of evil. It's seeking nuclear weapons. And so I think in the last episode, we looked at the cauldron, the sort of melting pot of this Edmody that stretches all the way back to, you know, 1953 and 1979 with the revolution.

And today we're going to look at the external piece of this. How does the conflict between U.S., the West, and Iran kind of spill beyond Iran's borders after the revolution occurs? This episode is sponsored by HP. Most people are not counter-espionage experts, but that won't stop them getting targeted by cyber criminals seeking to extract their secrets. HP understands that approximately four in 10 UK businesses have reported cyber breaches in the past 12 months alone.

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Just WolfPro Security working tirelessly to protect your hard work. It's security that's built in, not bolted on. Find out more about how HP can protect your business at HP.com forward slash classified. Podcast listeners benefit from a 10% discount on all business PCs, printers, and accessories using the code TRIC-10, terms and conditions apply. Yeah, and Arash, you set this up a bit at the end of the last episode, the idea that this was a new regime which was intrinsically opposed to the United States and to capitalism and to the West because of its very nature. But also, I think what's important is it seeks

to export its revolution, doesn't it? That's one of the, you know, core. proponents of the 1979 revolution is that it wants to spread the revolution internationally and beyond its borders yes so the Islamic Republic is you know militant and revolutionary from the beginning opposed to capitalism opposed to communism and it does want to export it although what does this exporting actually means and how do you do that while being a state that is a member of the community of nations and a member of the United Nations, this becomes a contradiction that the Islam Republic has to deal with in its entire life.

In fact, I would say this, that it's important to remember these dualities of the Islam Republic. Islamic Republic is never a simple story. It's because from the very beginning, it's really driven by a lot of internal disagreements. Like, are we following Iranian national interest or not? especially diplomats who have, you know, a lot of them have actually come from the Shahz regime, but even the new diplomats, they come to adopt some visions of Iran and Iranian national interest. Is our economy more socialist or more capitalist?

Because what is Islamic economy doesn't mean anything. And also, why are we having such a beef with the United States or should we have this beef or should we work with it? So in reality, none of this turns out to be so neat. In the 1980s, of course, Iran, the first country that attacks Iran in 1980 is Saddam Hussein. as Iraq, and that's not a U.S. ally. It's kind of a Soviet ally, but it's also a kind of anti-communist of its own. So in many ways, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was more similar to Iran than many other regimes in the world. But it attacks it, and Iran has to defend itself. For a few years, the war goes on for eight years, because Iran really pursue it even after kicking Iraq is out

of Iranian territory. And who do you think sells arms to Iran secretly, of course, in this period, Israel and the United States, this becomes the Iran-Contraffair. So I guess what I'm trying to say is that this regime is very noxious from the very beginning to its neighbors and to the world because he wants to spread Khomeinism and this revolution. And there are a lot of internal fights. Let me just say, for example, that there are elements in the regime who immediately they try to organize a queen Bahrain.

They try to destabilize the Saudi regime. And the system sort of reigns them in, actually. The system rains them in. But it does pursue other forms of durable transnational activity. And I guess this kind of conversion of a potentially amenable downtrodden Shia community and a geopolitical opening, which occurs through the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, is that these new sort of intelligence organizations, security organizations of the Islamic Republic, step into that chaos. in Lebanon and begin to create or kind of stitch these Shia groups together into what will

eventually become Hezbollah. Absolutely. And that kind of even predates the invasion. Iranian Shia revolutionaries have helped organize the Lebanese Shia. And the 1970s, they helped fund Amal, which is a Shia party. But Hezbollah comes to be after the Iranian Revolution by the initiative of what is called the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, this militia that is founded in 1979 to guard the revolution, and different Lebanese Shia groups.

So some who are supporters of the Da'a Party, which is a Shia party founded in Iraq, some who are more sort of clerical. Some actually have some links to the Palestinian movement. And all of these are open to all sorts of different divisions because Lebanon has been in a civil war since 1975, right? In this civil war, Shia and the Palestinians are not really on the same side necessarily.

Anyway, it's not to get bogged down to too much detail, But Hezbollah, Hezbollah really is the jewel in the crown of Iran's, what later becomes one of Iran's axis of resistance. And you can say it's Iran's transactional activity. Because it sort of hits the right spot, because it's a party that really comes to represent the Lebanese Shia for a period. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it's fighting an active invasion. So it has the legitimacy of a national resistance movement.

It's a success story, basically. And Iran does it because Iranians have this authority amongst the Shia. seen as, you know, the big Shia country and who has just led a successful Islamic revolution, so they know what they're talking about. So they're looked up to, and Hezbollah builds itself up during the 1980s and it starts a new, of course, chapter in Iranian-American enmity by a dramatic attack on the U.S. Marines. Yeah, we should say. I mean, that really is one of the kind of defining events for the 80s, isn't it? The attacks on the U.S. embassy in the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut by Hezbollah, where you've got these suicide truck bombs, effectively, killing, I mean, hundreds of American servicemen. I mean, it's incredibly deadly, isn't it, David?

So in April of 83, a suicide bomber, Hezbollah suicide bomber, drives a truck packed with explosives into the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. That kills 63. And then just six months later, or so in October of 83, another truck bomb is driven into the marine barracks at Beirut Airport. And of course, the U.S., that's a whole separate story of why the U.S. has gotten involved in Lebanon and 241 American servicemen are killed. It's actually the deadliest day for the U.S. Marines since the Battle of Iwo Jima against the Japanese in the Second World War. So to take this back to some of the justifications for Operation Epic Fury, I mean, this period is sort of front and center because we have, we have Iranian-backed, supported, directed, financed, armed, Hezbollah terrorists who are killing American servicemen and women and civilians at the

embassy in Beirut. So I think a lot of the enmity can be traced back not just to what's going on in Iran, but of course to the way the Iranians have kind of exported this revolutionary brand of anti-American Shia Islam into Lebanon. And Hezbollah does several actions in the U.S. They arrest and severely torture and kill the station

chief of the CIA in Beirut. And they take hostage tons of people, Europeans and Americans, and Iran openly uses these hostages in negotiations in Americans. And of course, President Reagan's redraars from Lebanon, right, in response to the bombing. That's part of this story. I should also say here that my good friend and someone who I've always looked up to, Kim Gattas, has a beautiful new book from what I understand coming over the 80s. and yeah, Kim has an excellent book called Black Wave about the region post-1979.

It's an exceptional book, I think. It really is an exceptional book. I agree with you 100%. And her new book, I think, it's going to be very illuminating for a lot of us as well, looking to Lebanon in the 80s and, you know, all that is happening there. Obviously, a lot of that is directed against Israel, and that's where Hezbollah's main, you know, activity is in Lebanon. I mean, it is this idea that it's intrinsic to Iran, that it wants Israel wiped off the map.

Is that actually an accurate reflection of the policy, or is it kind of bluster? Is it talk? How should we understand that position? Well, it's a fascinating point to talk about. The Islamic Republic sets itself the cause of destroying Israel from early on. And it's very clear what it means. It means that Israel shouldn't be there. It's a legitimate colonial entity usurping Muslim lands, and it shouldn't be there.

And they really do believe this. It belief that is common across much of the global left at the time and now, but they take it seriously. And anyways, so this is the E2Sad Islam Republic. Now, it definitely goes toward it. It first of all commits to it diplomatically. I opposes a two-state solution and repeatedly states it. It supports armed militias who will take armed action against Israel. In fact, since the 1980s, the only state in the world that really takes action against Israel is Iran.

The only state who actually fires bullets at Israel is Iran. A state. I don't count the hootis because they're not an official state, right? There are a couple of complications, though. First of all, they're not as stupid. They know that Israel is a nuclear-armed-state. They know it's not a goal that they can achieve immediately. But it's nevertheless a goal that they follow.

And as I said, they arm all these groups about it. They take actions against it. They have these positions. Secondly, like everything else in the Islamic Republic, this is not uncontested. And from early on and certainly later from the 90s, elements inside the Islamic Republic say, look, this is silly.

We're sacrificing all we have on this quest to destroy Israel. We should give this up. And we should be like other countries, say, accepted to a state solution effectively. If the Palestinians come to an agreement with Israelis, Iran won't be more Catholic than the Pope and would accept it. They've come to say that.

So it is true, but it has these two caveats, if you will. Well, you know, certainly in the 80s and 90s, I think, you could characterize it as a period of kind of freewheeling, almost revolutionary adventurism on the part of the Iranians to some degree. I accept the point that there's, there are constraints, but, you know, there's the support for Hezbollah, which turns kind of

over this period as you get into the 2000s from a kind of proxy into maybe more of a partner as his Bala becomes more established in Lebanon, particularly when the Israelis withdrawn 2000. And on the terrorism side, though, it's fascinating to me that, I mean, you have these pretty significant attacks that occur, like, for example, Kobar Towers bombing in Dara, Saudi Arabia in 1996, 19 U.S. Air Force personnel are killed. That's done with Iranian sort of direction and patronage through Saudi Hezbollah. There's bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, a Jewish community center there in 1994, kind of the same script of the Iranians directing this. funding it, supporting it, that was done, you know, those attacks in South America done by done by Hezbollah. But as you get to 9-11, I think this, it's interesting because it's maybe one of the, one of the only times in this history where you could say there was potentially a

different, is there a path forward here for the U.S. and Iran to go on a different, you know, have a different kind of relationship because some of the, some of the openings that they The Iranians suggested were they are quite fascinated to look back on. Yeah, I did a bit of reporting, actually, around this time of 9-11. And because the two sides actually kind of cooperated a bit over Afghanistan, didn't they? A lot, more than a bit, yeah. The 9-11 attacks, yeah, directed by al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, where they're being sheltered by the Taliban. And actually, both the U.S. and Iran have an interest in getting rid of the Taliban and changing the regime there.

So there's a really interesting period, isn't there, where there were openings, there's a bit of talks. there's some sign that perhaps, you know, there's the possibility of reproschement. And then Iran is labeled part of the axis of evil. Because I think my recollection of looking at it was that there were hardliners on both sides in Washington and in Tehran who were basically like, uh-uh, we do not want to move closer. We do not want to see that happen. Yes, definitely. So the factional politics on both sides are important to understand.

So in Iran, there are many who, from the 90s on, want to push for Iran to become a normal state, basically, to establish relations with the U.S., to become more normalistic. And these are not the people who are doing Buenos Aires. They're not the people who are doing debombing in Dahan, Saudi Arabia, which is a very fascinating episode, generally. Because there's also this fight over Saudi Arabia.

Is Saudi Arabia our neighbor, or is it an illegitimate kingdom we need to overthrow or something in between? There are different fights about this. But in terms of 2001 and 9-11, so following 9-11, U.S. and Iran work very closely in Afghanistan. I mean, they have the same goal. They want to overthrow Taliban. Iran has an important role in the Bond Conference, which helps sort of bring about it, establish a government in Afghanistan that could follow. And the access of evil speech leaves not only Iranians by surprise.

This is a state of the Union by President Bush in January, 2000. 2002. It doesn't only leave Iranians by surprise. It leaves U.S. diplomats who were conducting the talks and working close with Iran, basically military and collaboration in surprise. There's a story that, you know, Qasem Soleimani and his people show up to talks to the Americans and they have brought a map. You know, they were saying, oh, this is all the bases of Taliban and the U.S. side is sort of kind of couldn't believe it that they've come to offer so much. and at some point they're like, oh, well, can we like copy this map? They're like, no, this is your copy.

Like, we made it for you. And they give it. So there was really close collaboration going on. And the axis of evil speech doesn't immediately put an end to it, but it makes it clear that obviously that's not the direction. And look, the Bush administration really flirts with the idea that has been tempting ever since, before and since, of maybe we can just get rid of these guys.

Maybe instead of trying to figure out who's the little nicer Mullah and stuff, maybe we can just get rid of these guys. Yeah. And of course, they were on their high horse after Iraq. And they also, it's in this period, it's in this period that they reject the Goldiman letter. This is a very important document. Yeah, let's set this up because we have the access of evil speech. Then March 2003, Iraq, which is, of course, Iran's long-time adversary, is removed from power, which I guess, you know, the Iranians are pretty happy about. equally they can see the language in Washington, which is first Baghdad and then Tehran,

you know, a lot of the kind of hardcore neocons are saying. They used to say boys go to Iraq, real men go to Iran. I mean, that was the... Yeah, that was the language. Yeah, I do remember that. And so at that point, the Iranians reach out, don't they, in that period, and basically offer to... There are back channel contacts to say, let's do a deal. We can find some way of accommodating your worries and your demands. This is the Goldman letter. So they sent it through the Swiss ambassador to run team Goldman. And Swiss was the protector of U.S. interest in Iran, right?

And yeah, and they basically offer to normalize ties with the U.S. They offered to give up on this anti-Israel line, basically, that effectively adopt a more to a status position. And, yeah, give up the al-Qaeda members who were in Iran. And the U.S. isn't interested, is it? No, U.S. rejects that, basically. The U.S. rejects it. Yeah, the U.S. rejects that.

Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. When was it sent? What year? I think it's 2003. 2000. I think it's right after the invasion.

It's, it's, yeah, May 2003. May 2003. I was going to say May 2003. Yeah. They freak out. Yeah. They freak out. I mean, they think, oh, wow.

I mean, I was a young boy in Iran. I remember that, right? The idea was the U.S. came to Afghanistan. It came to Iraq. It's just, you know, it took over the whole region. And there was a sense that you were surrounded by the, the U.S. and they freak out. So they give that letter and the U.S. says no, because they think they can overthrow the government in Iran. Well, I think this Iraq moment is an important one because it

frames so much of the geopolitical story to come, which is from the Iranian standpoint, it's like massive opportunity but also massive risk, right? On the risk side, the U.S. is just knocked out Saddam and the Taliban. And it's done so relatively quickly, as seen from 2003, 2004. And to your point, the Americans are rejecting any sort of outreach from Iran and maybe we're next. But the promise or sort of the opportunity side of this is that Washington has also knocked out the two other big boys on either side, literally on your on your eastern border and your western border. And so you as the Iranians now have, I think, more space to sort of explore your neighborhood and expand your interests and influence regionally because the big boy Saddam

in particular has been has been knocked out. And I think this, this Iraq experience really sets a new kind of collision course for the U.S. and Iran because we never square this fundamental dilemma, which is if Washington is trying to build a stable and more representative system of governance in Iraq, It has to include factions, Shia parties that are going to be in relationship with or under the influence of Iran, right? Yeah. So it has to do that. And yet at the same time, the U.S. is trying to resist all manner of Iranian influence in Iraq. And those two things are sort of working directly in contradiction to one another throughout the entirety of the U.S. occupation.

That's right. Yeah. No, you put it very well. This is a contradiction that they have to deal with. And I mean, it's worth saying as well that the Iranians and particularly the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, the Quds Force, also get very involved in supporting groups fighting the Americans in Iran. This is another important moment. And I mean, it's something which Americans, I think I understand why Americans get incredibly angry about this. Because, you know, their view is, you know, the Iranians were supplying the weapons and the training and giving the expertise.

to kill American troops. But from the Iranian point of view, you can absolutely see the logic, which is you've got a country which has moved in next door to you, and which is threatening to attack you next, you want to bog it down and to cause as many problems for it to stop it thinking it can take you next. So there is a kind of dark logic to that position as well, but which claims, I think, many American lives. Yes, it claims many American lives.

And the Iranians helped build themselves in Iraq like that. So they, you know, this is Qasem Soleimani's life achievement, if you will, right? So he's the head of the Quds Force. From 1998, he's appointed as the head of the Quds Force, or the Jerusalem Force, as is called, which is basically the external operations wings of the Revolutionary Guards. And the Goetz Force, that it's called Jerusalem Force, because of course the ultimate goal is liberation of Jerusalem. The Gulfs Force helps run Hezbollah in Lebanon. It's first guy, by the way, the first leader of the Guzbollah,

before Gassim Soimani is a guy called Ahmed Wahidi, who is today the head of the IRGC. He was after the U.S. just killed the last head. Ahmad Bahadhi was appointed as a head. And, you know, he helped Hezbollah in the 80s. Again, a kind of tough guy to use Trumpian language. Sohams of Amani is appointed in 1998. He's kind of led, he's been Iran's drug czar effectively fighting the drugs in the late 80s and 90s. And he's helped the anti-Taliban forces in the United States.

Afghanistan before that. And now in the late 90s, in 1988, he's appointed as the head of the host force. And Iraq is going to be one of five years of the job. He has his assignment effectively of leading the Shia forces in Iraq, and he makes it his life's work and is able to build personal relationship with the Shia militias. And Iran is really able to use precisely two things to effectively dominate Iraq. First, the democratic system, because actually it's a pretty good system for foreigners to use sometimes, because all you need is to get people to vote for your candidates, right?

And the sectarian civil war that ends up happening between Shias and Sunnis, and Iran is both responding to it and helps exacerbate it, right? So out of this quagmire, Iran comes to control and have a tight relationship, with tons of Shia militias in Iraq, and this becomes, Iraq becomes a central theater of Iranian-American confrontation. And Kassam Soleimani is, is it fair to say that he's the architect of that strategy, or is he? No, he's definitely the architecture of that strategy in Iraq, 100%. Yes. So he, he, you know, especially on the military side. I mean, Khomeini is the mastermind also, but Soleimani is the one who actually does it. And I would say the, you know, just to

round out the point on sort of, again, bring this back to kind of the central exam question of the series, which is why the U.S. at Iran at such odds. And what does the secret history tell us about that? On the Iraq point, you know, the Iranians are probably responsible for one in six U.S. combat fatalities in Iraq. So when you look at the Pentagon, they put out numbers in 2019 and tied back 603 deaths of U.S. personnel in Iraq to attacks conducted by Iranian-backed militants. And a huge part of this was not all of it, but a huge part of it, were these things called EFPs or explosively formed penetrators, which essentially weird kind of mixture of, it's an extremely cheap way to conduct attacks, but you also need state production capacity

to build these kind of metal tubes. And I should say, listeners to our podcast will appreciate appreciate this, that Gordon has edited out all of my detail on EFPs from the script. It was a long. In classic Gordon Carreira fashion, but essentially what it is is it's like a metal tube that sends like a cannon almost like this charge, an explicitly formed charge, and it shoots it out essentially into vehicles in a very sort of directed way very quickly. and these were devastating against these kind of mind-resistant ambush protected vehicles that the U.S. was using in Iraq to counter the threat from improvised explosive devices.

The Iranians supplied a lot of the sort of piping, the fabricated piping that militants used. And it led to 600 U.S. personnel deaths in Iraq. So, you know, when I talked to colleagues of mine who worked the Iraq issue and Iran issue, you know, after the Iraq war, this is one of the more visceral kind of charges against the Iranians that still gets people extremely, with, I think, good reason, extremely furious. Yeah, I think it's really interesting because it does, in a way, the hostage crisis was for a previous generation, you know, what happened in Iraq, particularly, I think, for U.S. military and intelligence for the new generation.

But there was also another vector for tension between the U.S. and Iran, which was Iran's nuclear program. So let's take a break. And then when we'll come back, we'll have a look at that and bring it right up to Epic Fury today. Whether it's with your besties or date night, get to all the hottest concerts with Go Transit. Go connects to all the biggest entertainment venues and makes it affordable with special e-ticket fares. A weekend pass offers unlimited travel across the network on any weekend day or holiday for just $10. A weekday group pass offers the same weekday travel flexibility, from $30 for two people, up to $60. for five. So no matter what day of the week, Go's got you covered. Find out more at go-transit.com

slash tickets. Well, welcome back. We're looking at that growing tension between the U.S. and Iran. And another aspect of it was the nuclear program. I mean, there'd been a nuclear power program back to the Shars days. And I think after the revolution, Aetullah Khomeini was initially kind of resistant to the idea of nuclear weapons, sing was the work of the devil. But of course, you then have the war with Iraq, the question about whether Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction, as you call them chemical weapons, but also nuclear. And so Iran is looking to build quite quietly the capacity for the bomb. And then in 2002, it goes public, doesn't it? Because the Natanz program is exposed to the world by an Iranian opposition group. And then you have from that period onwards,

the growth of the tension. I mean, really, the story of the, the story of the, the start of the story which takes us up today, which is, you know, what is going to be done about Iran's plans for a bomb? Can it be slowed down? Can it be stopped? Can it be contained? Is it something the world could live with? And clearly Israel feels like it can't, even though it's a nuclear state. Arash, I guess on the bomb itself, maybe we should just briefly explain. They haven't raced for a bomb itself, have they? They've raced for the potential to have a bomb, but quite consistently through this period. Why is that so important? Well, Iran tries

a nuclear program like many other states do. And it looks like by the US estimates, by 2003 it stops all weapons work. Before 2003, it had sort of toyed with that. But after that, it insists on his nuclear program. And this is really one of the follies of Khomeini, again, the Supreme Leader of Iran.

There's this terrible mistake that the Iranian regime obviously makes, which is that they neither dart toward a bomb, which they haven't really done weapons book 2003. Had they done it, you could say, okay, fatal complete, no Iran has nuclear weapons, no deal with it. But nor do they give it up fully enough to stave off all these sanctions and all this pressure that's on them. So, yes, Iran does sign a nuclear deal with the U.S. and a group of five other countries in 2015. And yes, it is the Iran signs this deal in

2015. It's the U.S. under President Trump that leaves it in 2018. But Iran had ample opportunities to go back to a deal. It had this under the Biden administration. It had it under the rest of Trump's first term and even in Trump's second term. And they never really, they never really do this. So because Chominee is very fascinating.

Chominee is very worried. He does not want Iran to become normalized with the U.S. And so Chominee is very genius, tactical move, was declared in a few years ago that Iran 2019, I think he formalizes it, which says Iran will not negotiate and there won't be a war, right?

So he refuses to negotiate with the U.S., but there won't be a war either. And of course, Iran both negotiated and there was a war, and finally he was killed in that war. So it's a folly of Iran, and the way Iran sinks all his resources into his nuclear program. Nuclear program becomes the locus of its

problems with the world, tons of sanctions by U.S., by European countries and others on Iran because of its desire to, because of its nuclear program. Whereas had he given it all up, I mean, you know, there was nothing that Iran could gain by his nuclear program that was as important as as all the sanctions and all the pressure Iran faces. Did he see it as leverage? I mean, was that what it was, or is it intrinsic to the regime we must be allowed to develop nuclear power stroke nuclear weapons. No, I think you saw it as defiance. Defiance.

You saw it as defiance. And look, the point about the Islamic Republic is it does not want to integrate into the regional and global order. It wants to be this defiant fortress, right? So Aitullah Khomeini, in 1988, when he accepts the ceasefire with Iraq, which was seen as given up on this quest to overthrow Saddam and march to Jerusalem and all that, right? What does he do right after? He does a couple of crazy things

just to remind the world that he still got it. In Valentine's Day of 1989, February 14, 1989, he does the fatwa against Salman Roshty, which is out of the blue. This is this British author who has written this book. No one's talking about this book in Iran. I told him he hasn't read it,

but he puts a fatwa in his head. Which follows Mr. Roshdie all his life and as you know, led to, finally led to an attack on him in the U.S. in which he almost lost his life, in Chattako in New York. But so anyways,

the point is that why does, I think the Roshti Fatwa is very important in understanding the Islamic Republic. Why does Ayatollah Khomeini give the fatwa? Like, what a state policy is achieved by this? The policy of showing to the world that Iran is defiant

and that it won't play by your rules. So it's not about the nukes. It's not about the fatball. It's not about the Holocaust denial. Why does Aitullah Khomeini keep doing the Holocaust denial? I mean, it doesn't help anybody. What it does help is to show that Iran will not play by Iran is a genuine, revolutionary defiant state.

Yeah. So it's interesting. So it goes back to your point that it's intrinsic to the regime, this defiance and this confrontational attitude. No, I don't like the word intrinsic usually because it, because, Because it can suggest that it cannot change. Right. And I do think it can change.

It's a choice. It's a choice. Yeah, it's a choice by the leaders. It's a choice by successive leaders. Exactly. To pursue that policy. And it's a choice contested by many. Is a choice contested by many in the regime?

They just lose the power of us. So people like Hassan Rouhani, the former president, he clearly doesn't like these choices. But he loses the internal power battle to Khameney. And I think it's worth, you know, as we just are sort of bringing this thing forward in time and getting closer to the start of Epic Fury. I mean, you know, this kind of, this defiance, this policy, this choice of defiance,

of resistance, you know, I kind of see this period around the end of the nuclear deal. So when Trump, when Trump essentially unilaterally walks away from it in 2018 is kind of the high watermark of this strategy. I'm curious what you think of this take, Arash. But, you know, if you look at the kind of 2018-2019 period, when you look regionally, you know, you look at Iran has kind of stabilized Bashar al-Assad in Syria. So they have their Syrian ally. Hezbollah is looking pretty strong after, you know, the 2006 war with the Israelis, where they've kind of claimed victory. Iranian influence is growing in Iraq. There's a Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut land quarter that's opened up, got some solar. Amani has kind of overseen this architecture of building up these partners and proxies all

throughout the region. Again, at other point where Trump and the advisors around him have kind of labeled the Iranian regional position as a menace. And then at home, it seems at that point in time, like the strategy of kind of not quite giving on the nuclear program, but also using it as leverage with the U.S., with the international community, as paying some dividends for Khomeini and the people. around him, and then it starts to tip. And I think we see a period starting, and I, you know, I kind of mark the turning point as the actual, the assassination of Gassam Soleimani,

which takes place in January of 2020. But around that period of time, it's essentially, it begins a string of, I would say, losses and setbacks for the regime externally and internally, that more or less bring us up to the point where we're at today. And Arash, I mean, Soleimani is killed by a U.S. drone strike under President Trump, this huge figure. You've talked about his importance. It's fascinating, though. There wasn't much of a response from Iran, was there? I've always found that a little bit odd.

Why that, what does that tell us? It's a very excellent question. And I, you know, we're talking six years later. It's because Aitullah Khomeini has a contradiction, which is that he wants to keep on defiance, he wants to keep on death to America, but he knows he doesn't want a war. He doesn't want a war. He knows a direct confrontation with the U.S. will be suicidal for him, right? He understands that. So he does this, or he does what Islam Republic has made in art.

Play here and there, right? Attack Argentina when you can. Do terror operations that can't be claiming back to you. Build these little militias in different countries that you surround the U.S. and Israel with, but without getting into direct confrontation. Build a nuclear weapon, but build a nuclear program, but not a nuclear weapon. Basically tease your way around these things, right? And President Trump obviously doesn't like that, right?

He doesn't play by those rules. So he, you know, he killed Soleimani, which went against everything that they had thought possible. And Khomeini blinks effectively. He attacks Ayn al-Assad in Iraq. They also down a Ukrainian airliner, which is an episode of its own. Many people believe they did it on purpose in order to effectively prevent a war. I mean, there are some sort of a strange theories there. But the fact of the matter is the urgency shoot down a Ukrainian airliner and killed everybody in it.

Now, they say it was by a mistake, of course. But a lot of people don't believe that. But the point is, look, basically, this strategy unravels, and it unravels from that day. You're like, okay, you can't get to just shout death to America for 40 years. What are you going to do about it now? Their bluff is called always. Their bluff is called by Trump. So, you know, in the first term and then in the second term.

But it's interesting because I think of October 7, 2023, and the attack on Israel by Hamas is another big turning point, because that is the point at which Israel's risk calculus changes about what it's willing to tolerate in the region and what it's willing to do and how aggressive it's willing to be. And of course, one of the things it does as well as going into Gaza is it goes after Hezbollah and it goes after very hard and kills the leadership of Hezbollah, the great Iranian proxy.

This is all the beginning of what is leading us up today, to today, isn't it? is partly Israel shifting its position? 100%. I mean, this is very clearly a post-October 7 world. I mean, it's clear that that is a very important turning point. Because in response to October 7, which is this big calamity in Israel, it kills hundreds more than 1,000 Israeli civilians.

It's a huge shock to Israel. And Israel starts a devastating war on Gaza, but it also starts going after the axis of resistance. dismantling it one by one. So effectively degrades Hezbollah. And degrading of Hezbollah also helps for the fall of Assad regime. The Assad regime is, of course, attacked by the Syrian revolutionaries, and the credit belongs to them by bringing it down.

But of course, Israel's degrading of Hezbollah has helped. And I believe Iran was not consulted on October 7. I didn't think they knew it was happening. Chomani would have never approved such a thing. I think because he's much more risk-averse. So, yeah, by the what follows is that Israel helps decimate the acts of resistance. But actually, look, we have to think about the fall of the axis in several ways. Inside Lebanon and Iraq, there's also rising Shia constituencies that are unhappy with the system.

They're unhappy that their interest is now represented by a sort of cliques linked to Tehran, their whole political system. And Iraq and Lebanon are not fun places to leave as a result of this, basically. The political system is unresponsive to citizens' demands, the state. is ineffective and divided. So there's in 2019 there are important mass movements in Iraq and in Lebanon against the sectarian system in this country, which is effectively against Iran's role. This is very important, often forgotten, actually. In 2019, in Iraq, this really leads to the appointment of the first non-Islamist prime

minister of Iraq since 2003, and that's Mustafa Khadami, a guy who wants to hear Iraq closer to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan. to Egypt, to Arab countries, and not to Iran. And I would say Iraq has never gone back, basically, under Qasemese successor, Mahmah Shia Sudani, even though there's a long history of how Sudani came to be and he was basically considered to be a pro-Iran candidate

compared to the previous, compared to Qasemi and compared to the fact that Mhqad al-Sadar, this Shia cleric who really came out against Iran, had tried to organize a government that, he had tried to organize a government that was more explicitly anti-Iran, but even Sudani continues the path of academy. So you have this development in Iraq, you have the degrading of Hezbollah, you have the most important fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

So Iran effectively sees the fall of its axis. And of course, you also have repeated Israeli attacks on Iran, which are massive intelligence failure on part of the regime. Israel is... Yeah, which show the weakness. Yes, Israel is still the... the Iranian nuclear archives, all of it. They literally with two guys on a motorbike, they put the entire nuclear archives on the back of two motorbikes and storm out of Iran.

They kill Fakhrizade, who is really the father of Iranian nuclear program, and they kill him in his very safe compound outside Tehran. They kill Ismail Hanier, the head of Hamas, as he's visiting Iran, which is a huge humiliation. Of course, in Lebanon, by hitting his blood, they also Kiel Hassan Nassarla, the leader of Hezbollah. So all of this really degrades Iran and leaves, you know, leaves it much more defenseless when it comes to the current war. Which I think really does bring us up to Epic Fury. I mean, where we are today.

I think, Arashaman, this is the, I threatened in the first episode that I was going to do this. I'm going to, I'm going to follow through on my threat, which is to look you in the and ask you, where do you think this is headed? And maybe I'll break it into maybe two questions. I think the first is, you know, of all of the different reasons that have been given for Epic Fury, what do you think is the most compelling? Why are the U.S. and Israel doing this right now?

Oh, I think that was an easy to answer, I think. I think it's not about the nuclear weapons. I think it's not about Iran's missiles. I think it's not about, you know, the proxies. It is about regime change. I mean, they wanted to get rid of the Islamic Republic. They believe the Islamic Republic is torn on their side since 1979, and they want to finally do something with it,

finally do something that has evaded every president since President Carter. I think that's how Trump looks at it, and that's how Israelis look at it. They think we are on a role, we hit all over the axis, let's go to what people used to call the head of the snake, right? And they thought this is possible because there was also a massive domestic movement against the regime. And they had battered it, come out time and time against it. Of course, it appears very foolish to me as a sort of goal.

Because how are you going to achieve it? Well, what's the plan exactly here? What do you think is going to happen? Maybe we'll know in a few months that I was wrong and they had a plan. Unless, unfortunately, I think for many Israelis and even many in the Israelis, regime in the Israeli government and maybe perhaps some in the U.S. They don't mind, they don't want a democracy in Iran or sort of the transition to something else.

And Iran that is degraded, disintegrated, weak, and therefore not a threat, is also acceptable. I think it's very clear the Israelis don't mind that. And some in the U.S. might also, the president has unfortunately, and alarmingly, for example, said that maybe the map of Iran would probably not look the same after, although you also on, you know, the statements he makes off the cuff to the press are, it's not always clear that their expression of a state policy, let's say. Anyways, so I think the, I think they, they wanted to do this. And I think the president, I think President Trump, I think he loved what happened in

Venezuela, the Venezuelessal transition. It's a very neat thing when you look at it from his goals. He went in, he took the president out. They had probably behind the scene, worked with this other person from inside of Jin, Delsi, Rodriguez, who came out and said, great, we'll work with the US, everything is great now, and we'll sell oil and basically we're friends now. I mean, it's remarkable that they established diplomatic relations already two months later, right?

And I think President Trump loved that, and he thought, well, great, I can do that. And I think the thinking was, well, if you kill Aitullah Khomeini, surely the next leader is going to be like, well, I don't want to be killed, so I'll play ball with the U.S. And of course, it's going to be much more complicated than the case of Iran. And that's, you know, that's why things are not looking great for the, for the U.S. Vara for the other moments. They've willed the end, which is getting rid of the regime, but not the means to get there. But I also think this point about the history and the hostility is interesting, isn't it?

Because Trump himself, you know, I think did some interviews around 1980 about the hostage crisis, saying, why don't we just attack them? I can't believe they've taken our people hostage. He is someone, because of his age, who's lived through this history of enmity between the two countries. including back to the hostage crisis. And therefore I think, you know, would love his legacy to be, I'm the one who dealt with the Iranian problem in a way none of these previous presidents did. So I think the history, and that's why he references the history,

kind of that we've been talking about defines him and what he wants. But as you said, that doesn't mean he's going to get it. I mean, I think any U.S. president, I think anybody who was becoming U.S. president, right, U.S. has this presidential cult, right? It's very important. Like, you know, presidents are very defined. they're defined by their achievements. You have, I see presidential cult,

because it's not necessarily the same in other systems, right? That everything is attributed to the president. They're defined by their achievements and their failures. So every president, I think, will have a bucket list of things. Like, what are the things I can do to, like, to put my place in history? And of course, I think Iran has been one of it since President Clinton, at least, right? Like, you know, what if I am the person who can solve this Persian puzzle,

you know, who can solve the Iranian problem, basically. So I think it's a temptation for any president. I think anybody who wants to become president, I mean, a temptation for them, of course, and, you know, it was to President Obama, obviously, and he has spent so much diplomatic effort to so much effort. It's kind of crazy, if you remember how much of the effort that the U.S. government went to the Iranian file during the Obama administration, much less, for example, went to the Israeli-Palestinian volume, which he also tried to crack. So yes, I think it's not surprising at all

that someone like President Trump would want to solve it. And he's been rather obsessed with it since his first term. But can I also say there's a consistency to President Trump that he's always basically his whole, since his first term, he said, look, I don't care who is in charge of Iran. I don't care if it's democracy or not. all I want is that they play by these, you know, they play by these rules and they stop these things against the U.S. don't have a nuclear weapon and all that.

So he was ready to negotiate in the first time. They didn't negotiate with him. The second time he negotiated and he waged the war at the same time. And now here we are. And I think he's now come to the conclusion that, okay, no, actually, I'm convinced by the Israelis, we can and must get rid of the regime. But I think in his mind getting on the regime can I still mean, as I said, a Venezuela is still transition.

if which power passes to someone else inside the regime. Yeah. Arash, last question to close out this, I think, this series. We've been obviously talking about the history of the conflict, the secret conflict between the U.S. and Iran. Do you see a scenario, a plausible scenario at the end of Epic Fury that leads to a better relationship between the U.S. and Iran? The short answer is yes.

I was opposed to this war and I am opposed to it for the huge civilian casualties and lack of a clear plan and many other reasons to be skeptical of this war. But of course all my life I've believed that it is possible for Iran and America to reconciliate. They're kind of my two countries, so I would love to see that personally as well. but I also trust on a pure cold-headed analytical person I do believe it's possible because I believe Iran has no other choice even though now Ataullah Khamini is killed, he's replaced by his son

who is injured and nowhere to be seen so we are in this situation in which the Revolutionary Guards are kind of running the country the new Supreme Leader is nowhere to be seen it appears that they are on a role that they feel like they've really resisted against America so far and frankly, if the war, right now, things don't look so bad March 11th from the

perspective of the Islamic Republic in a way, because they can say you kill their leader, you destroyed all of these things, but we stayed in power, we had orderly succession, and it's you who are kind of freaking out and blinking first and wanting to leave. Because survival is victory. Exactly. Exactly. And the U.S. has a democratic system, which means that when oil prices go up, the president gets worried, you know, there's a domestic sort of scene here. None of that, you know, Iran doesn't

have to, the Iranian leadership doesn't have to worry about that. The Iranian, the guards are going on TV every day saying, we're going to shoot anyone who comes to the streets. Very openly saying it, by the way, they're not even coaching. The head of the Iranian police went on TV and said, if you come on the streets, we'll shoot you. That's almost like a direct quote, right? So, So that's what Iran does, right? President Trump can't say that. So he has to still win elections. So, well, he doesn't have to win, but his party has to win elections. Hopefully, he doesn't have to win elections anymore. But anyways, but the point is that, so survival is victory. So they're on their high horse there. But I think ultimately, ultimately they realize that they need to come to some sort of an understanding with the U.S.

That they need to end this long enemy with the U.S. in order to, because on the day after of this war, Iran would be a ruined place, economically ruined in a terrible condition. I think the kind of leaders that will be able to come to power and hold power in Iran won't be the kind of crazy extremists who don't want to do anything with the U.S. I think they'll end up having enough of pragmatic elements in there who will go toward establishing the United States. So I think in five years from now, Iran and the United States will have diplomatic relationship. I'm not sure it would be Islamic Republic, which is in Iran. I'm not sure who will be the leaders in Iran. But I think resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and the US is something that will happen in the next few years. Well, Arash, thank you so much. I think that's a good place to bring to end this series looking at how we got where we are. Thank you so much for joining us to the two books by Arash, our Shadow Commander and what Iranians want, both essential reading now. And of course, if you are a club member, you can hear more because we've got a special Q&A with Arash for members of the classified club. Can join it. The rest is classified.com. But thank you very much, Arash. And thank you very much, Arash. And

Thank you all for joining us. We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time.