The Rest Is Classified - 179. Did Israel Spy on Trump’s Iran Negotiations? (Ep 1)

Episode Date: July 26, 2026

Do Israel and America spy on each other? And how do close allies navigate stealing each other’s secrets? Listen as David and Gordon step inside the tricky intelligence sharing relationship between the US and Israel. ------------------- THE REST IS CLASSIFIED LIVE 2026 at The Rest Is Fest: Buy your tickets ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ to see David and Gordon live on stage at London’s Southbank Centre on 4 September: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.southbankcentre.co.uk/whats-on/the-rest-is-classified-live/⁠⁠⁠⁠ ------------------- Sign-up for our free newsletter where producer Becki takes you behind the scenes of the show: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://mailchi.mp/goalhanger.com/tric-free-newsletter-sign⁠-up⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ------------------- Join the Declassified Club to go deeper into the world of espionage with exclusive Q&As, interviews with top intelligence insiders, regular livestreams, ad-free listening, early access to episodes and live show tickets, and weekly deep dives into original spy stories. Members also get curated reading lists, special book discounts, prize draws, and access to our private chat community. Just go to ⁠⁠therestisclassified.com⁠ or join on Apple Podcasts. ------------------- Get a 10% discount on business PCs, printers and accessories using the code TRIC10. Visit ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://HP.com/CLASSIFIED⁠⁠⁠⁠ for more information. T&C's apply. ------------------- EXCLUSIVE NordVPN Deal ➼ https://nordvpn.com/restisclassified Upgrade your online protection with an all-in-one security app! It’s risk free with NordVPN’s 30-day money-back guarantee 🌍 ------------------- Email: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠[e-mail]⁠⁠⁠ Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@restisclassified⁠ Video Editor: Joe Pettit Social Producer: Emma Jackson Assistant Producer: Alfie Rowe Producer: Becki Hills Head of History: Dom Johnson Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

For exclusive interviews, bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to series, first look at live show tickets, a weekly newsletter, and discounted books. Join the Declassified Club at the rest is classified.com. Do Israel and America spy on each other? Yes. Thank you, David. Spoiler alert. And how to close allies navigate stealing each other's secrets.

I've been completely thrown off by David's like spoiling the whole premise of these two episodes. We usually, we pose these questions at the beginning, and then it could take us, it can take us 45 minutes to an hour to answer them. And I thought, why not just do it right away? Right away. Just give them the cliff notes. And today we're beginning a two-part series. On this question, I mean, is it possible that allies could spy on each other, David? I'm shocked.

Shocked to think that might happen. But it's particularly interesting, isn't it? Especially at the moment, I'd say, this issue about whether America and. and Israel spy on each other and what that really means for their very complicated but increasingly close relationship. Yeah, we are recording this coming on the heels of some very interesting revelations about how close the Israeli-U.S. military partnership has become during Operation Epic Fury, of course. We had the remarkable revelation that Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, sat in the White House situation room in February looking President Trump in the eye. He brought

along the head of the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency, and they briefed the president on plans to attack around. And then, of course, during the war, the level of military integration between the two countries, maybe this is too superlative, but it felt unprecedented to me, how close the coordination had become between the two over the war in Iran. Absolutely. And I think it's interesting watching that from the UK, which in the past, in previous military operations, you think of the Iraq War, had been the ally which would have been working most closely in military and sometimes intelligence partnership with US. And I know Britain's ambassador to Washington was quoted, and he hadn't said this publicly. He said it, I think, to a group of students at the embassy.

Was this Peter Mandelson? No, this was after Peter Maddleton. This is the current ambassador. But he actually said, if America has a special relationship these days, it's with Israel, not the UK. And I thought it's a really interesting insight into just how close that is, which also makes the issue of intelligence gathering even more complex, doesn't it? And it's not been without controversy in the US because the closeness of that relationship over the Iran War and the fact the Iran War, it's fair to say, did not go to plan. And so, yeah, that's clearly raised questions, actually, about the closeness of the relationship and influence and control and therefore intelligence. This episode is brought you by HP. In intelligence work, it's rarely the obvious problem that causes failure. It's the overlooked detail or the flaw nobody quite solved.

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I'm just a neighbor, friendly neighbor. But he hasn't forgotten them. Sometimes Spider-Man has to do the hard thing. That's my responsibility. Talk to Banner? I didn't know you could get that big. Spider-Man, brand-new day in theaters Thursday. We've also had this other story, which the New York Times broke in June, where it was reported

that U.S. intelligence agencies have raised concern about Israel eavesdropping on American negotiators who were trying to figure out what a longer-term, more durable. if such a thing were possible, peace arrangement would be with Iran. And of course, that actually is the spark for us doing these episodes because I think this mental model that somehow because the two countries are so close, it's wild and unprecedented that they would spy on each other and somehow against the rules. And yet, as the Times reported, the Israelis apparently have been spying on Steve Whitkoff, Jared Kushner, others involved in the negotiations to figure out what kind of deal the U.S. might be trying to secure with the Iranians.

We are going to look at this question of how do and under what circumstances do Israel and the U.S. spy on each other. We're going to look at this through the dynamics of what's happening today and some of the kind of more recent press reporting that's come out on this. we're also going to look at this through the lens of history in what I think is one of the most interesting and well-known kind of friendly fire espionage cases ever. And that is the case of Jonathan J. Pollard, who was a U.S. Navy intelligence analyst who over 17 months in the 1980s, spied for the Israelis and wound up handing them a stack of very useful classified information that Pollard himself estimated would stand about, you stacked up all the documents, it would stand about six feet

wide, six feet long, and ten feet high. And through that historical lens, I think we'll look at some big questions that get raised about the way that the U.S. and the Israelis spine each other, and maybe even more broadly, how does espionage between allies actually work? What is the what is the kind of risk reward calculation when what your friend is doing matters a lot to you and your friend might not be telling you the whole story. And so you have a kind of an inclination to steal secrets from your friend to understand what they might be doing. Again, I'm shocked, shocked at the idea this would happen. Obviously, just to say, it would never happen between the US and UK. I mean, two friendly countries like ours under very different dreams or between two people

like us, we'd never spy on each other, would we, David? You'd never use your spy skills to work out No. What I'm up to. So, you know, never. I would never put a key. I would never put a keystroke log around your phone, Gordon. This would never, such things would never happen. Never happened.

Has he started work on that script yet? No. I'm going to chase him up. But it does raise some really interesting questions, doesn't it? About, yeah, about what lies behind the decisions to spy, but also what the consequences are of getting caught. Because I think that the politics and the results of getting caught spying on your friends can be very different.

from getting caught spying on your adversaries or on other countries, where frankly, it's usual business. I think the Pollard case is really interesting in terms of the fallout. Let's set up a little bit, David, the history of the U.S.-Israel relationship, particularly when it comes to intelligence and spying. Well, the relationship has been built slowly over time, and I think, in particular, in the early days of the relationship, was very heavily relying on personal connections between the Israeli state and the U.S. intelligence apparatus. So Israel, of course, founded in 1948, U.S. intelligence at that time, the agency, the broader intelligence community, initially worried that the Russians, the Soviets, might use the Israeli state as a new

platform for influence in the Middle East. And by 1951, the CIA has set up a formal liaison channel with the newly created Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency. And that relates, for many years between the CIA and Mossad is the personal fiefdom of James Jesus Angleton, longtime counterintelligence chief, all around sort of nefarious character. Friend of Kim Filby, friend of the show. Dear personal friend of Kim Filby. And I mean, Anklinton's his own series. We've talked about doing that for some time and we will.

But Ankleton works out an arrangement with the Israelis. And again, when we talk about spy arrangements, we're not talking about ratified treaties that are written blood in most cases. We're talking about mutual understandings that could in certain cases be violated. But the understanding in kind of the 50s and 60s, you think about it as friends don't spy on friends. And there's a commitment between the two services not to target each other, which again, I put a bit of an asterisk around that. Also, this is important, the two services begin to share product of mutual interest, which makes sense. Angleton runs the relationship for several decades. And I should say, there is a very early payoff in particular for the agency because the Israelis are running networks of assets among

kind of Soviet bloc emigrays. They produce thousands of reports for the agency on the Soviet Union. the most well known is actually the Mossad collected or stole the text of then-soviet premier Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech in which he denounces Stalin. That's an Israeli product that ends up in Angleton's hands and thus in the CIA's hands. So some very valuable intelligence that the Israelis are able to gather and pass along to the Americans. Yeah, because I guess Israel's going to have access to places that it's harder for the Americans to get access to in the Middle East, but also through

its network of contacts around the world. There's going to be things like, I think after some of the wars they have with the Arab states, 67 and 73, they capture Soviet weaponry, which has been given to the Arab states and therefore can then pass it to the Americans who can then analyze it, which is obviously pretty useful. You could get elements of friction because there's this really interesting incident, which again, maybe we should do separately at some point in When a U.S. spy ship, a signals intelligence gathering ship, the USS Liberty, is hit and hit by the Israelis during the Six-Day War, killing 34 American sailors. I know there is a view in some causes that this was a mistake, but there's also, I mean,

I wouldn't call it a conspiracy theory, a theory from others, that the Israelis didn't want the Americans to listen in to what they were doing and blew up one of their ships. But it's an example of some of the tensions and frictions over it. Well, so the NSA's own declassified cryptologic history attributes it to a combination of Israeli mistake and faulty U.S. communication. So we should, I think just on the record, the official kind of U.S. government view is that it was an accident. I prefer the journalist account. But anyway. You prefer the conspiracy.

You prefer the conspiracy there. But obviously, blowing up a spy boat and killing 34 sailors will add some friction to the relationship. There's another incident, which is the, I think, still lingering suspicion that the Israelis stole nuclear material from the U.S. that was later used to create and fuel its own nuclear capability. And this is a fascinating story in its own right again. It centers on what was called the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, Newmec, which is a privately run fuel plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania. They processed highly enriched uranium on contract for the U.S. government.

And between 1965 and 1980, the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies investigated the company's president, a guy named Zalman Shapiro, because there were enormous quantities of unaccounted for uranium. and the Department of Energy records show that there were nearly 300 kilograms of unaccounted for uranium that went missing before 1968. It's the largest, it's the largest loss at any U.S. commercial site. And when you, when you dig into it, Zalvin Shapiro has, you know, he has Israeli ties. He frequently traveled to Israel. Numek had actually acted officially as a procurement agent for the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

They had shipping partnerships with Israeli companies. And in 1968, the plant was visited by four Israeli intelligence officers, including the man who will eventually run Jonathan Pollard. The story will be coming to in a few minutes. Again, another story to do in depth another time. But losing 269 kilograms of uranium strikes me as slightly careless. Also, you know, not that similar to the amount currently that, you know, started a war in Iran and, you know, led to the Iranian side's being bombed. And also leaves you the question, which, again, maybe we can't answer, which is, how do you sneak it out if you're

working at the site? I just love the idea. He's got like, kind of briefcases. And underneath his papers, he just like slipped a load of uranium and then gets out. Yeah. And it's still a very murky situation. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission still says it can't rule out either hypothesis, either that it was just commercial loss or some. Or someone in a briefcase. Or someone took it out. So again, it's this murky episode, but it has led, it has obviously led some to believe that the Israelis stole, you know, highly enriched uranium and used it to to found

their own nuclear program, which they obviously still did. I have it. Now, despite the friction, by 1968, when Johnson is president, the U.S. Israel sign their first formal intelligence sharing pact. It's known as the CYR agreement. There's actually documents that have been leaked out. It doesn't show the agreement, but it shows references to this agreement. It's known as the CYR agreement. And it really was, you know, the point you raised earlier, Gordon, I think that on the U.S. side, it was driven by this desire to get access to the vast quantity of Soviet weaponry that the Israelis had come into possession of

following the six-day war. The U.S. wants to be able to tap that access and exploit these different weapons platforms that are now in Israeli hands. This agreement, the CYR agreement, is broadened and reinforced several times in the ensuing decades. In 1988, it's expanded and it becomes known as Ice Castle, which is a great name. Good name. And then post-Cold War, the Soviet threat gone. the U.S. Israel security relationship, the rationale really starts the shift toward, you know, terrorism, proliferation, other regional adversaries. Ice Castle is updated and it becomes known as Stone Ruby in 1996. And this brings us, I think, to a key piece of the intelligence sharing architecture between the two sides, particularly in the post-9-11 era, which is the signals intelligence. And there is a, in this 25 years after 9-11, there is a tremendous integration of the capabilities of the National Security Agency at the U.S.

And what is sometimes known as the Israeli SIGAT National Unit ISNU, it's also known as Unit 8200 inside the Ministry of Defense. And that is Israel's signals intelligence and sort of offensive cyber and technical collection capability similar to our NSA or Britain's GCHQ. And which is seen, I should say, as being particularly capable and is sweeping up vast amounts of data, very good at targeted hacking, things like that. And so it makes perfect sense, doesn't it, that you start to get a large scale sharing of that communications and intelligence data between the two. sides. And that is, I mean, a bit like the US and UK, actually, where actually it's the

Signals Intelligence, GCHQ NSA relationship, which is really at the heart of this intelligence sharing. It's the same, I think, with the US and Israel, isn't it? It's easy to get focused on the human stuff. But it's that sharing of info, which has really been important. And there's so much raw sharing, because it's not just finished, you know, signals intelligence when I was in the agency and I'm reading a report from NSA, I'm not reading the actual transcript of a conversation or the raw material. The NSA has analysts and linguists who process those things into reports that get disseminated. And those reports are the things that policymakers see that get cited in products like the president's Daily Brief and on and on. NSA and Unit A 200

are sharing raw information with each other. So they're kind of, it's like, I have a pipe and you have a pipe and we're sharing stuff that comes out of these pipes and then you can do with it what you will. And there was so much sharing under the provisions of that deal that the U.S. had to work out sort of safeguards for what the Israelis would do with information if they ended up having a U.S. person on one side of this phone call. Yeah. And in particular, what would the Israelis do if they had a U.S. official, a lawmaker? someone at the White House on the other side of one of these phone calls with a foreign partner or someone in a foreign country and the NSA or Unit 8200 has scooped that up. What do you do with that information?

So it's a signal of how close these services had become that those kind of details are needing to be worked out. Yeah, that is an interesting tension, is that what they call incidental collection, where you're not trying to collect on a particular American, for instance. But the American is talking to someone you are surveilling and therefore you get a conversation between the two parties, which is sensitive. But it is also interesting because as soon as you get that tight information sharing, you do get tensions.

And I think about the US-UK relationship. And, you know, one of the tensions there is, well, if you're that tightly bound and you're sharing at a kind of raw level, what happens if one side wants to use it to do something particularly aggressive? And in the UK, that became, you know, an issue. Gordon. We would never do such a thing. I just might suggest that after 9-11, the US became a touch more aggressive in doing things like rendition operations.

Right. You know, capturing people who were then sent off to third parties to be tortured. Or even this issue of drone strikes, which was quite, you know, sensitive between the US and UK. And they had to kind of put in little barriers or thoughts about that. And it sounds like it's similar with the Israelis as well, where they have to be careful. Because, of course, the Israelis are doing targeted killings. drone strikes and Israeli intelligence. So it's interesting because as soon as you get that level of raw sharing, you do get yourself into complicated questions about what it's being used for, don't you?

Well, and indeed that is one of the primary points of friction in that relationship is, and I think this came out during the Lebanon war, the 34-day war in 2006, where the Israelis, you know, even at that point, we're relying immensely on NSA. And NSA was trying to make sure that it didn't provide information to the Israelis that could be used to, you know, conduct targeted killings in Lebanon as an example. It's a bit different from sharing two foreign officials talking about the political environment of the country to sharing actual information that could be used to target somebody. But again, it shows how close the two sides are that even in a case like that where there's a,

there's a difference of interested opinion and how information should be used, there's ways to create frameworks in which everyone can get most of the information and kind of, you know, work through these issues. You manage it. You manage it. You manage it, which I think is another theme of this relationship is that even when one side wants to do something that is contrary to the other side's interest, the overarching strategic interest that both sides perceive themselves to have, there's so much.

overlap that you can manage through unpleasantness in the relationship as a result. I mean, we've talked about how close on the signals intelligence side that relationship is. What about the human side? I mean, you worked at CIA. I'm not sure how much you can say about how the relationship with the liaison with your muscle out. Not much. You surprised me.

But yeah, I mean, I guess it's similar, but perhaps a bit more transactional rather than the, you know, a kind of automatic raw pipe sharing as it is on the signal side. It's a similar dynamic when we talk about the US-UK intelligence relationship, where when you have shared signals intelligence capabilities, oftentimes the way that looks is you're pooling resources behind, you know, shared systems and facilities that you each can use. And then as a result, you get, you know, you each share the product. With human intelligence, I I think it tends to be more, there's a tremendous, there is a tremendous amount of sharing, particularly of, you know, disseminated products that come from from assets.

But in terms of doing joint operations, I mean, it's much more case by case. Does one side break? Typically, the way this works in the Middle East on the human side, the Israelis, this may come as a surprise to you, Gordon, the Israelis are much more adept at recruiting human assets in places like Syria and Lebanon and Iran, even than the CIA, than we are. What we have that they tend not to have is deeper pockets and in some cases technology that they may want to leverage and and a global reach that they don't have because

they're much more focused. And so the partnership can often look that way where the Israelis are passing us very valuable human intelligence from the region or, you know, human-enabled SIGA. And the CIA is coming with money and with technology and with a kind of global edge that Massad doesn't have. So that gives us a picture, I think, of how the cooperation has evolved and in different areas. But recently, I think it's worth saying and exploring a little bit just how it's got trickier, it feels like. I mean, this report that came out of US media in the last couple of months was that the US Defense Intelligence Agency, friends at the DIA.

No, the DIA. No, they are. I've been adamant about this. The DIA are not friends of the show. They're not putting it in the same category as like Kim Filby or something like that. It's like, come on, let's be nice to our friends at the I. They wrote a report, though, so we have to take it seriously because it's the premise for this idea that there's a counterintelligence threat from Israel, which has increased and

has gone from high, I think, to critical. and higher than any other ally, other than South Korea, which is a kind of interesting one again to explore later. But it's based, isn't it, on some incidents which have happened recently, which suggests that, you know, perhaps there's always been a degree of, have we said, friction, but also intelligence gathering, that recently it's got worse. I mean, did you ever sense the Israelis were hanging around a bit too much in the Langley cafeteria? The interesting thing was that we didn't let them come into the building. Oh, really? So we would always beat with them at various random facilities in northern Virginia, kind of unmarked facilities that just happened to have someone standing outside with an M4.

And it's interesting because I had heard a story, which might be apocryphal, that the reason for this was that at one point, the Israeli, Elias had brought, there had been a Mossad liaison team that had come in. And one of the guys had gotten loose and was absent kind of running around the building somewhere. Around Langley. Oh, I seem to have left my pen here on the desk, you know. That was the story I got. And I thought it's a great encapsulation of the relationship because we're still sharing so much with them and they with us.

And yet we have this incident where there's been an obvious kind of breach of trust. And as a result, we've moved all of the liaison meetings off site. Now, I also think it's interesting the timing of the DIA report. Because again, to that dynamic, and we talked about this at the beginning of the episode, the U.S. and Israel have been fighting a war together in tandem. This unprecedented, I mean, the Israelis have military officials and officers who are sitting with their American counterparts at CENTCOM and Tampa. And at the same time, we have this report from the DIA come out that says the Israelis counterintelligence threat is elevated.

And I think those two things go together, to be quite honest with you. I mean, it is worth saying why the Israelis, who of course will deny, we should say, are doing this, why they'd want to do it. And the answer is actually, it's kind of, in a sense, because they are so closely tied with the U.S. in a war, you want to know, for instance, Is the US really committed to this war? How far is it willing to go? Is it thinking about negotiating with Iran or backing out of the war? All those things have a huge impact for Israel's security posture. And so you have a strong interest in knowing what's going on within the US system. You know, what's going on when the US and Iran talk directly, which they always do, without the Israelis being in the room, what's really going on? You know, are they cutting a deal which is going to undermine us? You can absolutely see. why that is an urgent intelligence collection priority for the Israelis. And you can probably get a lot of that information, can't you, from liaison and from talking to people and having good contacts in the White House and Capitol Hill. But there's a certain bit of it which intelligence can give you and which you might want

to get. I mean, intelligence is the gathering, not just the stealing of secrets, right? And by definition, if the Israelis are getting a set of talking points or frankly, if Whitkoff is going and talking to the Israelis and saying here's what happened, the Israelis, do they trust him? Are there pieces of this? Is he telling them the truth, but not the whole truth? Is he misrepresenting things? All of these. So those are secrets that they would, you know, Mossad or Unit 8200 would want to steal. I also think that the Israelis have probably been aided by the fact that many officials in the Trump administration are using their personal phones, they're flying on private aircraft. They're not, it seems, using staffing from U.S. embassies abroad. So there's a bunch of reasons why the negotiating team in this case would also be particularly vulnerable to foreign intelligence agencies targeting them. It's very tempting almost because it's easier than normal. Right. You know, to get it. You don't have to try that hard to get some of that

stuff. So you can see the temptation to do it. But it is worth saying, isn't it? There is a history of this. So it's not as if it's new the idea that Israel might be collecting against the US, is it? There's lots of cases. We'll talk about the Pollard case. But that's not a lone wolf either. I mean, there's cases from the 80s where an engineer at the U.S. Army's Armament Research Center provided classified documents allegedly to the Israelis. There's another one from the 90s, U.S. naval engineer investigated by the FBI on suspicion of passing classified data to Israeli liaison officers.

Mid-2000s, there's a Pentagon analyst who passed classified U.S. policy documents on Iran to A-PAC staffers in the U.S. That's the Israeli lobby group, yeah. Right. And who were then accused of relaying that to Israeli diplomats. The Snowden leaks, when those came out, showed a 2013 national intelligence estimate

that ranked Israel the third most aggressive intelligence service against the U.S., behind only China and Russia. That's staggering, isn't it? I mean, that's amazing, isn't it? The third most aggressive intelligence service against the U.S. The other piece of this is that they are an extremely capable intelligence service as well. So the capability, the aggression, the propensity to take risk, all of these things that we've talked about these traits and other episodes of this pod.

We talk about targeted killings in Iran, for example. I mean, the Israelis bring the same, it's the same intelligence culture, I think, when they look at the U.S. You know, so in some ways, it shouldn't be surprising. There was a 2019 report that came out that the Israelis were behind the emplacement of cell phone surveillance devices that were found near the White House and other locations around Washington. In 2021, Israeli military intelligence officers were caught planting listening devices at DIA headquarters. Wow. I mean, that's pretty strong. Pretty crazy.

In 2025, officers from Shinbet, which is Israel's domestic intelligence agency, were reportedly discovered to have tried to plant a listing device in a secret service vehicle that was obviously in Israel. So this is a trend. Yeah, there's a trend. Yeah, there's a trend. I mean, I remember discovering a story that back in the 90s, Israel had found a way to get hold of the phone call records from the U.S. but also the UK.

they'd found a very interesting way to basically scoop up all that data, which included, you know, was someone from the White House calling someone they shouldn't do? You know, all that kind of data. And it was dealt with very quietly at that point by both countries. And I think that's one of the, you know, tendencies you see is that it happens. People get caught and then it tends to get dealt with quietly as it happened in that case. But I should just raise the possibility, David, that it might not be entirely a one-way street. I mean, is it plausible that the U.S. could be spying on Israel, on its friend, its ally?

Yes, obviously. And I think, I think, you know, there are recent reports, for example, about the U.S. and British intelligence apparently, and again, I'm not sure if these are corroborated, but apparently hacking into Israeli drone feeds to try to monitor incursions during Israel's war in Gaza. The bigger one, though, the bigger one is Iran. And it's what are the Israeli intentions, and in particular before the war, there would have been a tremendous interest in Washington in knowing if the Israelis were planning to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. Or whether they're bluffing, for instance. How serious are the intentions, yeah. Exactly. And there are leaked documents from 2008, 2011, that period, I think some from the Snowden trove.

that show the U.S. and GCHQ, Gordon, spying on emails connected to the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, the Defense Minister's Office, and several Israeli embassies. Shocking. The operation apparently had some fun code names, Broad Oak and Carboy, and it was run, supposedly, from a shared NSAGCHQ listening post on the Atlantic Coast of Bratok. Britain. I wonder what facility that would be, Gordon. Or maybe if you visited it. An Atlantic Coast facility. I mean, there is a place called GCHQ Bude, which is on the Atlantic coast, on a Cornwall way, which I have visited. And a big satellite dishes and satellite domes.

I've got to take it inside for a program on GCHQ a while back. But I'm shocked. I'm shocked again to think that spying might have been going on at that station and that they might have actually, you know, when they toured me around and told me these big satellite. dishes. They might have actually been scooping up someone's communications and listening to it. What are these dishes doing, guys? Yeah, what are these giant dishes pointed at the sky toward in the general direction of the Middle East? It is a beautiful place, by the way. If you ever get the chance, David, and listeners, to visit GCHQ, Bud, lovely walks by the coast. You can go take a coastal walk and see these massive satellite intercept facilities and are perched over the

ocean looking at the sky. It's amazing. But yes, I think it is entirely plausible that there might be a bit of that guy go. Apparently from that facility, Gordon, the NSA and GCHQ had hacked the international mobile roaming system that allowed them to intercept texts and calls from various smartphones connected to Israeli leaders. And there are reports that the U.S. said, because the Israelis, when these reports came out, the Israelis said, oh, these are useless like government e-bails that no one, there's nothing sensitive on these at all. And further we question the veracity of all the reporting. And it does seem that the U.S. and Britain may have had the ability to eavesdrop inside the internal communication system that the Israeli prime minister was using. And again,

you can see how Washington and London in those years would have a shared interest in understanding if the Israelis were serious about a strike on Iran or whether they were, to your point, bluffing. Yeah, no, I think that that's absolutely right. I do just note, David, that you are citing quite a lot of material that comes from the Snowden documents. And so, you know, for all your dismissals of our friend Ed, you suddenly are quite happy to kind of, you know, quote from his material when it comes to telling a story. But, you know, anyway, just thought I just note that as we move onwards. Should we not use all of the leaked documents once they're leaked Gordon? Maybe we shouldn't. I'm just, I'm just noting for our audience who remember your disdade for Snowden. I've just noted.

Ed, if you're out there, I hope that I hope, I hope that you're sure. shin splints have healed, buddy, you know, and that you're doing okay in Moscow. I hope it's going great. So anyway, back, the context is important, though, isn't it? Because as we said, a lot of this has been about Iran, hasn't it? And about the tensions over Iran. And I think it's, you know, there's an interesting story that the NSA, I think in 2014, intercepts material, which shows that Israel was spying on the U.S. in its negotiations about Iran. So, you know, So there's the kind of circularity of it, spies, spying on spies, spying on spies. But that I think goes back to this idea that Iran has been at the crux of perhaps, to some

extent, the closeness today, but also the tension between the two sides. Because when the US and Iran were going through the talks, which eventually led to the Iran nuclear deal, the so-called JCPOA, Benjamin Nesson, he was always been opposed to that. And so certainly had an interest in spying on that and seeing what he could find out. And perhaps I think what's interesting is not just spying on it, but also, you know, using that intelligence. Yeah, this was a particularly uncomfortable story when it broke. I think the Wall Street Journal broke the story.

And I should say the journal ran kind of two separate parallel investigations, one looking at the U.S. spying at Israel and the other one looking at Israel spying of the U.S. in this period, which I would definitely commend to listeners. But in 2015, as the Obama administration has negotiated the nuclear deal, the Israelis, your point, huge interest in understanding what sort of deal might be cut. The Israelis probably don't want the U.S. cutting kind of a separate agreement with Tehran in the first place. And Netanyahu at this point is waging back in 2015 is waging basically an open PR campaign against the deal, which very famously, and him speaking to a joint U.S. session of Congress without the White House's agreement or perhaps for knowledge. So the Obama administration was irate. And this was done. I believe it was organized by then Speaker of the House John Boehner, Republican and obviously opponent of the Obama

administration. So there's this kind of acrimony between the two leaders personally. There's also this potential divergence of interest to that the Israelis don't want there to be a diplomatic solution inked with the Iranians. And apparently, Gordon, you'll be shocked to hear, the Israelis were spying on the negotiating teams. It was a mix of eavesdropping,

shocked. Information that they acquired from confidential U.S. briefings, maybe some human intelligence, and diplomatic contacts in Europe. And I think it's fascinating because those talks were being conducted under this architecture of what was called the P5 plus one, which was the U.S. UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany. And the Israelis, as they're collecting all this information on the U.S. negotiation and, you know, the team,

the Israelis apparently sent a delegation to meet with the French and British negotiating teams and then use the information clean from that to later argue that all of the information they had gotten was coming from diplomatic contacts in Europe and had not actually been stolen from the U.S. negotiating team. So in other words, we're not spying on you directly. We're just sort of getting all this from having canapes in Paris, you know. And planting a computer virus, supposedly, even at the hotels, hosting the negotiations, which is pretty direct.

But it is interesting, isn't it? Because it's there, they're gathering intelligence. And then they're running an influence campaign in Washington to pressure Congress, to pressure people to go against the deal. So you can see there the real tensions in the relationship. But of course, we should say throughout at all, Israel has consistently denied spying on the US and that there's no intention or order to do so, isn't there? Yeah, Netanyahu frequently says that he has a directive, some kind of mysterious directive,

that there should be no intelligence work at the US, no spying on the US. None. Vemently denies it. I mean, I think the US would similarly, maybe, not as vehemently, but would deny that we're collecting on the Israelis. And so we have this, you know, very interesting situation where there's an intense closeness. There's a lot of spying on each other where interests might diverge. And there's a sort of public calm to all of it, in which both sides deny that they would ever spy on one another. I'm shocked, shocked there's

gambling in this casino. I know. I'm shocked that spies would spy on each other. Okay, well, at that point, let's take a break. And when we come back, we'll look at the Jonathan Pollard affair. Perhaps I think the most notorious and fascinating episode in this unusual spy relationship. Hello, everybody. We've got some very exciting news to share with you. That's right. If you're thinking about joining the declassified club becoming what we call a secret squirrel,

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This episode is brought to you by Cancer Research UK. What if your immune system could learn to recognize cancer cells? That's immunotherapy. One type is car T cell therapy. T cells are your body's watchmen, and doctors can now extract these and reprogram them to spot cancer. Car T cells, they've started showing this real promise in treating cancers of the blood like leukemia. Because unlike most cancers, blood cancer cells, they float around. separately, and that makes it easier for car tea cells to seek them out and destroy them. And now, Cancer Research UK-funded scientists are designing car-tie cells that can tackle

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Activia. You might already be eating yogurt, but not all yogurts are created equal. Activia contains over one billion probiotics per serving to survive and reach the gut alive. When it comes to gut health, Activia is the number one family doctor recommended probiotic yogurt brand. Choose Activia, feel good from the inside out. Visitactivia.ca for more details. Well, welcome back as we dive deep into the U.S. Israel intelligence relationship and whether they could possibly spy on each other. Let's set up this very interesting individual, Jonathan Pollard, who is going to be, you know, I think a big figure. in the relationship right up to today, is me, David? I think more than anybody else, he casts a very long shadow over the U.S. Israel spy relationship.

And I think we will see in his story a lot of the dynamics that we've been talking about and how the spy relationship actually works. So let's set up Pollard, the man. He's born in 1954. He's one of three children raised in South Bend, Indiana. his father was an award-winning microbiologist who taught at Notre Dame. By his family's own account, Pollard's childhood is tough. He complains constantly of being picked on in high school.

He's beaten up and seems that it's because he's Jewish. One of the happiest stretches of his childhood, though, comes at 16 when he attends a summer camp for gifted children in Israel. Pollard goes to Stanford. By the whole accounts is a capable student, but also a very heavy drug and alcohol user. And as it turns out, he is an emotionally unstable, fabulous, which is quite the cocktail that we've got brewing here. Former classmates at Stanford will end up telling investigators that Pollard had all of these stories about his ties to Mossad. right? So he's been to Israel by this point. He's claiming he's an Israeli spy is an operative. In one case, he waves a pistol in the air and screams that people are out to get him. So you have this kind of emerging brew of fabulous and emotional instability that are pretty grouted at him. After Stanford, he kind of drifts, ends up attending several graduate schools, including Tufts at Fletcher's, their school of law and diplomacy.

And I think you can kind of see between this time of Israel and the graduate study, which is in international relations, he's got some intellectual interest in the wider world, although he never earns a graduate degree from any of the institutions he attends. Emotionally unstable, fabulous. Sounds perfect for the U.S. intelligence community at this time, David. And he actually tries to join the CIA in 1967. And amazingly, given what we now know about the CIA and the people that recruits, including people who stash away $42 million in gold. bars in their homes. He gets turned down. So hold on, hold on, hold on, hold on. Most people don't steal 42 million in gold bars or wind up or or wind up committing espionage with the Israelis. Okay, okay, I take that back. I take that back. So we're, but we focus, you know, we do. We focus on the bad eggs a lot on the rest is classified. We need to have, you know what we need to do is we need to have a story about someone who just has a kind of boring career where they don't, where they don't, don't commit treason. But they tend to be, the stories aren't, aren't as great.

So, but the CIA says no, Gorda, the CIA turns him down. Apparently, he's turned down after his polygraph and background investigation lead the agency to conclude, as one official has said, that he was a blabbermouth who also misrepresented his drug use. So where does he go? Goes to the Navy, right? He lands a civilian job as a research analyst in what was called the field operational intelligence office in Soutland. Maryland. This is in September of 1979. Now, that job requires a T.S. SCI, top secret security clearance.

This reminds me of the Snowden affair, Gordon, where when investigators run the background investigation on Pollard, the Navy investigators, the CIA does not pass along the judgments on Pollard that it had derived from its

polygraph and background investigation, which is poor form. Now, Pollard, his work is focused on, this is very specific, surface ship systems in non-communist navies, which feels maybe slightly niche or third tier, but he's by his superior's accounts quite good at the job. Now, the fabulousism, the fantasist inside Pollard, though, just can't help himself because at Suitland, at this naval facility, he will repeatedly tell colleagues stories about his ties to Basad and his supposed work as an operative.

in the Middle East. And there is a great anecdote from a guy named Lieutenant Commander David Mueller in the Navy. He has, Mueller has a job opening and he, he has an interview with Pollard. Pollard is interviewing for this job and Pollard comes in early on Monday boarding. Pollard arrives for his interview, unshaven, looking like he hadn't slept. And he explains that the reason for this is that on Friday, his fiancé, a woman named Anne Henderson, who will play a role in this story, had been kidnapped by IRA operatives in Washington. And he, Pollard claimed that he had spent the entire weekend chasing the kidnappers and had only rescued her in the early hours of Monday morning. And then presumably had come to the interview, which is why he looked like hell.

He's Jack Ryan. He's Jack Ryan. That is a crazy story. I mean, that should raise some red flags. I mean, or at least lead you to check out the fact that his wife or his fiance has been kidnapped. But anyway, it doesn't. So he's still there. I mean, it's wild, isn't it? Yes. Yeah, I think it's fair to say Pollard is not a member of the reality-based community. Okay. So that's, the reality-based community is a, you know, it's a shrinking group. It's when we try and, we try and, we try and be part of it on the whole. We try our best. Now, so in addition to that, Pollard has money problems. One of the FBI investigators who did a damage assessment on Pollard told Seymour Hirsch, investigative reporter, and Hirsch wrote a long New Yorker article on the case,

which is actually quite good. Pollard was apparently broke. Credit card debts, loans, debts on rent, furniture, he's got car loans. He's borrowing from colleagues, but he's still spending really lavishly on food, on drugs. He's racking up big bar bills. And so he's, you know, already, you don't have to be a particularly adept student of human nature to realize that Jonathan Pollard would be primed for recruitment by the Israeli intelligence service should it become interested in him. And you'd also think that maybe with all of these warning signs, Pollard's career would come

off the rails and the Navy would fire him. They don't. After the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the Navy stands up what was called an anti-terrorist alert center at Suitland, at the facility where Pollard works. Pollard is assigned to its threat analysis division, which further broadens his access inside naval intelligence. He is clearly an unstable, fabulous with debts and access to secrets, who is a perfect target for an intelligence, you know, pitch.

But he is actually going to offer himself, isn't he? So it's not a pitch that comes to him. He makes the decision, which I guess is true of lots of spies. But that's an important part of the story, isn't it? Because it is not the Israelis going out hunting for him. He's going to come to them. Yeah, Pollard raises his hand. And he makes this decision.

He gets in touch with an Israeli official through an activist that he do, who's an old family friend. and the Israeli official that Pollard eventually contacts is a guy named Colonel Aviam Sella, who is on leave in the U.S. He's actually studying for a doctorate, believe in computer science. And so Sella has this outreach from Pollard. He knows Pollard's a naval intelligence analyst. And Sella will go to the Israeli consulate at New York and basically say,

am I okay to talk to this guy? and he clears the meeting with Pollard with the science counselor at the consulate of New York, and we'll come back to who the science counselor actually is in a moment. Sella and Pollard end up scheduling a meeting at a coffee shop inside the Hilton off Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D.C. And I think it's amusing for me to imagine these two guys sitting together, because I don't think you could have more contrast between two people if you tried. Pollard is this kind of rumpled sort of chubby cheek analyst who's kind of a social outcast, right? And Sella is this articulate athletic.

He's a former fighter pilot who is also something of an Israeli national hero. Sela has seen combat in the 67 War in 73. He had participated in the mission to destroy Saddam's nuclear reactor. And this is important. Sela, even though he's awesome, is not an intelligence officer, right? He's a pilot, and he's currently at this point in time a student who spends a lot of his time in the states helping Israel in New York, giving talks about his combat missions, and then after the talks, money is raised for Israeli bonds. So I think both guys are probably a little bit out of Sela's nervous. But it's kind of out of their comfort zone.

This is not normally what they do. Pollard is wowed by Sella's combat record. The fact that he shot down these Soviet piloted Migs over the Suez in 69. Pollard apparently says, you know, anyone who's killed Russians is fine by me and really decides that he likes Sela. And Pollard, he just starts to reel off the information that he can get. He's got, obviously, he's got that TSSI clearance. he can get material that's housed at DIA, CIA, NSA, you know, the National Photographic Interpretation Center where they do all the imagery analysis. And Pollard tells Sella that his ultimate goal is to save Israel from another war.

Pollard also says he wants to emigrate to Israel eventually, but in the meantime he'll work for Israel inside U.S. intelligence that eventually he'll leave. Sella at first wonders if it's a setup, which I think is a good instinct. You know, it feels almost too good to be true. But he eventually comes to believe that Pollard is legit. But, you know, he's, Sela is smart and he'll eventually set up a test for Pollard where he'll say, look, I want you to bring me anything you can get on Saudi and Soviet air defense systems. and as a bonus, can you produce satellite photos of the damage at Osirak,

the Saddam's nuclear reactor that had been destroyed by the Israelis. Those are sensitive. And obviously the Israelis would have their own perspective on the damage assessment. They could compare the things to check. They also set up a commo plan at the meeting. Sella says, well, why don't we use pay phones

near your apartment and to give you a sense of just how sort of excited and kind of squirly Pollard is? Pollard at the meeting literally stands up and runs out and comes back 20 minutes later. He leaves Sella sitting there in the coffee shop. Comes back 20 minutes later with the phone numbers for the pay phones, scribbled on a piece of paper, hands them over to Sela. And Sella assigns each phone a one-letter code from the Hebrew alphabet.

So the plan is that to contact Pollard, he will call Pollard at home. He'll say a Hebrew letter. Feels like he would have chosen a different language where you're trying to mask. ask the source of the espionage, and then Pollard would hang up and then go to the magic payphone and wait for the call from Sella. So Pollard leaves the meeting, and he goes home and tells his girlfriend, Anne Henderson, who is it accomplice in the story, we should say? And has not been kidnapped by IRA operatives, we should also say. And was rescued, was rescued by Pollard in the early Monday morning from IRA operatives. No, she, Ann Henderson is convinced,

or has encouraged Pollard to do this. You know, the money piece of this, there's been some debate in the years since this case of how much of his motivation is ideological and how much of it is that he's got crushing money problems and needs to find a way to earn some extra cash. It's often both, isn't it? Yeah, but, you know, it's a both-and situation.

And Pollard leaves thinking, well, okay, these Israelis will eventually pay me, even though he and Sela at this first meeting don't discuss payment at all. And within a few months, Pollard and Anne, they're both kind of a team in this, fly to Paris to meet Sella. And over several days in Paris, they hammer out the operational plans, the compensation, the taskings, the things that the Israelis are particularly interested in. The Israelis basically cover all of Pollard and Anne's expenses, hand over a bunch of cash. Sela buys an expensive ring for Pollard to give to Anne.

and the espionage is consummated between John Pollard and the Israelis. But it's not going to last for long, and it's going to end in not just disaster for them, but actually quite a significant incident, which is going to have reverberations through the decades for the U.S. Israel relationship and even get caught up with negotiations with the Palestinians, among other issues. So let's stop there. And when we come back for part two, see what happens with Pollard with his espionage, how the net closes round him, and what the fallout really is. So do join us next time. But a course, a reminder, if you want to hear that right away, you can join the Declassified Club at the rest is classified.com. Lots of other goodies there,

including ad-free listening and early access to all our series. And of course, please do sign up for our newsletter, which you could also do there. But otherwise, see you next time. We'll see you next time.